05000348/LER-2003-003

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LER-2003-003,
Docket Number
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
3482003003R00 - NRC Website

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

On May 2, 2003 at 0605 with the reactor at 3.8 percent power during post refueling startup, an unplanned emergency safeguards actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System [BA] occurred. An unexpected 1B Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP)[SJ] speed increase led to a manual trip of the 1B SGFP. The IA SGFP was out of service at this time. Trip of the only operating SGFP caused both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pumps to start. Reactor power was lowered from 3.8 percent to 2 percent and the reactor was stabilized on Auxiliary Feedwater.

Thorough troubleshooting of all components and electrical connections in the speed sensing and control circuits identified no problem. The speed sensing circuit was recalibrated. The SGFP speed sensing and control circuits [JK] were instrumented and a test run of the pump conducted. During this test run, the SGFP speed sensing and control circuits performed as expected. Based upon the test run with no problems, the SGFP was returned to service.

Subsequently, on May 9, 2003, with the reactor at 100 percent power, an unexpected SGFP speed increase occurred again. Power was reduced to approximately 60% to allow for removing the SGFP from service. The high pressure and low pressure governor valves were observed to be fully open while operations was in the process of isolating steam to the SGFP. Troubleshooting determined the cause of this condition to be a failed speed sensing circuit "Tach Pak." A replacement "Tach Pak" was installed in the SGFP speed control cabinet.

Due to its proximity to other SGFP control components for the operating IA SGFP, the faulted component was electrically disconnected, but was not physically removed from the cabinet. Therefore, the cause of the failed component is not known at this time. The failed component will be investigated at the next outage of sufficient duration.

Cause of Event

The cause of this event was intermittent equipment failure in that the output of the speed sensing circuit "Tach Pak" for the 1B SGFP control failed low, causing the unexpected speed increase which led to the operator trip of the SGFP.

Safety Assessment In neither the May 2 reportable event nor the May 9 subsequent equipment failure did the SGFP exceed its design overspeed trip setpoint of 5775 rpm. In both events, operator action was manually initiated to remove the 1B SGFP from service as a conservative response to the loss of speed control.

All safeguards equipment functioned as designed. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this event.

Corrective Action On May 9, the speed sensing circuit "Tach Pak" was replaced.

Additional Information

Due to its proximity to other SGFP control components, the faulted component was not physically removed from the cabinet during the repair on May 9. The failed component will be removed at the next outage of sufficient duration and the cause of failure investigated by December 17, 2004.

The calibration and maintenance history of the speed sensing circuits on the SGFPs on both units will be reviewed to determine the acceptability of current Periodic Maintenance (PM) practices. Reliability of new and refurbished Tach Paks from available sources will be evaluated. Based on these reviews and investigations, changes to the design, procurement and/or PM programs for this equipment will be made as appropriate. These actions will be complete by December 12, 2003.

The following LER has been submitted in the past two years involving SGFP control issues: