05000400/LER-2003-002, Re Manual Reactor Trip Due to Trip of a Condensate Booster Pump
| ML032100615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/2003 |
| From: | Waldrep B Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-03-085 LER 03-002-00 | |
| Download: ML032100615 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4002003002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Progress Energy JUL 2 1 2003 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-03-085 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2003-002-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2003-002-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report describes a manual reactor trip due to a trip of the "A" condensate booster pump. Event notification EN 39864 previously reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, B. C.
adrep Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant BCW/jpy Enclosure c:
Mr. R. A. Musser (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Progress Energy Carolinas. Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P.O.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 Z~ii3~2-,2,
Abstract
On May 20, 2003 at 0453 with the reactor at approximately 20 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped in response to an automatic trip of the operating main feedwater pump (MFP). The WA' MFP tripped in response to an unplanned trip of the A" condensate booster pump (CBP). Both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps started due to the trip of the MFP. Safety systems functioned as required. The operations crew responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant was stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system temperature and pressure following the reactor trip.
The cause of the unplanned trip of the "A" CBP was due to low oil pressure after a gear in is variable speed fluid coupling (VSFC) failed following vendor refurbishment. Immediate corrective action was to replace the VSFC. Additional corrective action will be to specify a "run-in" of the gear set following VSFC refurbishment to develop adequate load-carrying capability of the gear teeth.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2000)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Forr 366A)
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate corrective action was to replace the VSFC. Additional corrective action will be to specify a "run-in" of the gear set following VSFC refurbishment to develop adequate load-carrying capability of the gear teeth.
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
This failure is similar to the failure of the "A" CBP internal oil pump that occurred during the previous refueling outage in 2001. An apparent cause evaluation was performed at that time and concluded that the test procedure caused the failure by installing jumpers to run the CBP internal oil pump and its auxiliary oil pump simultaneously. The root cause evaluation associated with this LER confirmed that even short simultaneous runs of the two oil pumps can cause damage to the pinion gear of the CBP internal oil pump. However, in the event reported by this LER, no jumpers were installed to run the two oil pumps simultaneously. In this event, the cause of the gear failure was due to improper "run in" of the pinion gear in the CBP VSFC following vendor refurbishment. Therefore, the corrective actions of the previous failure would not have prevented the event reported by this LER.