05000271/LER-1993-012

LER 93-012-00:on 930908,noted That Containment Air Valve & TIP Found to Have Seat Leakage Above That Permitted by Ts. Caused by Leakage Through Check Valve.C/As Will Be Reported in Suppl to LER.W/931007 Ltr

ML20057F215
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	10/07/1993
From:	Wanczyk R VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-012, LER-93-12, NUDOCS 9310140299
Download: ML20057F215 (4)

LER-2093-012,

Event date:
Report date:
2712093012R00 - NRC Website

text

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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

+ t 7% ~7; P.O. Box 157, Governor Hunt Road

[l {', Vernon, Vermont 05354-0157 l

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y (802) 257-7711 l

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October 7, 1993 I

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'I Document Control Desk l Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE:

Operating License DPR-28 Docket No. 50-271 Reportable Occurrence No. LER 93-012 ^l 1

Dear Sirst j As defined by 10 CFR 50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 93-012. j I

Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION W ,' /W T Robert J. anczyk A Plant Manager cc: agional Administrator USNRC Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 I

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1300% 'l r

9310140299.931007 p PDR ADOCK 05000271 p.

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NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR 7 COMMIS$10N APPROVED OMS Wo. 3150-0104

('6-89) EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATE 9 BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITN VQIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT SRANCH (P-350), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0m lS$10W, WASHINGTON DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NO. (2) PAGE (3)

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION 0l5l0l0l0l2l7l1 0 1 of 0 3 TITLE (4) Appendix J Type B and C Failure Due to Seat Leakage EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQ # REV # MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NO. (S) 0 5 0 0 0 0 9 0 8 9 3 9 3 -

0 1 2 -

0 0 1 0 0 7 9 3 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THis REPORT !$ SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO REQ'MTS OF 10 CFR in CHECK ONE OR MORE (11)

MODE (9) -

N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b) l l POWER 20.405(a>(1)(i) 50.36(e)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(w) 73.71(c) l LEVEL (10) 0l0l0 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER:

.................. 20.405(a)(1)(lii) X 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

.................. 20.405ta)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(vill >(s)

..... ............ 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) l l LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) i NAME TELEPHONE NO.

AREA CODE ROBERT J. WANCZYK, PLANT MANAGER Bjoj2 2lSl7l-l7l7l1l1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THl$ REPORT (13) 04USE SYST COMPONENT MFR REPORTABLE CAUSE SYST COMPOWENT MFR REPORTABLE TO NPRDS .... TO NPRDS ....

X LlF l1l$lV Cl3l3l9 YES ....

l l l l l l j ....

X XlG l1l5lV Cl5l6l0 YES l l l l l l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MO DAY YR I

SUBMISSION DATE (15)

X YES (If yes, conplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO 1l1 0l8 9l3 l

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approx. fif teen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 09/08/93 and 09/18/93 while performing Type C Leak Rate Testing with the Ptant shutdown for the 1993 refuel l outage. Containment Air check valve CA-89C (Ells = LF) and Traversing incore Probe (TIP) Ball Valve 32 (Ells =lG) were found i to have seat leakage above that permitted by Technical Specification 3.7.A.4 On 09/08/93, the sum total as found maximum pathway leakage for Type B (penetrations) and Type C (valves) exceeded that allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix J. The pathway leakage exceeded that allowed by Appendix J as a result of the leakage through check valve CA-89C. Appendix J limits the total B and C penetration leakage to 0.60 La.

Vermont Yankee will perform maintenance on the valve $ that were found to be leaking to determine and correct the l cause of the failure. The valves will then be retested to verify that seat leakage is within allowable limits.

The root cause evaluation for the f ailure of the two valves is ongoing and the results will be reported in a supolement to this LER.

N3C Form 366 (G-89)

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WRC Form 3664 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 (6-89) EXPIRES 4/30/92 EsilMATED BURDEN PES RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THl$

INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COPMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESilMATE TO THE RECORDS AND TEXT CONTINUATION REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-350), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

, COMMISSION, WASHINGTON DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MAkAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET ko (2) LER WLNBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQ # REV #

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 0l5l0l0l0l2l7l1 9 3 -

0 1 2 -

0 0 0 l2 0F 0 l3 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 09/08/93 and 09/18/93 while performing Type C Leak Rate Testing with the Plant shutdown for the 1993 refuel outage, Containment Air Valve CA-89C(Ells =LF) and Traversing incore Probe (TIP) Ball Valve #2(Ells =lG) were found to have seat leakage above that permitted by Technical Specification 3.7.A.4.

The following information is for the affected valves:

CA-89C 11/2* Circle Seal Check Valve TIP Ball #2 3/8" Consolidated Controls Solenoid Operated Ball Valve The measured leakage for the valves were:

Penetration X-22 CA-89C Leakage Exceeded Test Apparatus Capacity Penetration X-35B Tip Ball #2 Leakage = 0.623 pounds mass per hour Allowable single valve leakage is limited to 0.522 pounds mass per hour.

On 09/08/93, the sum total as-found maximum pathway leakage for Type B (penetrations) and Type C (valves) exceeded that allowed by 'OCFR50 Appendix J. The pathway leakage exceeded that allowed by Appendix J as a result of the leakage through check valve CA-89C. Appendix J limits the total B and C penetration leakage to 0.60 La.

CAUSE OF EVENT To be determined after maintenance has been completed and reported in a supplement to this LER.

ANALYSIS OF EVENI Vermont Yankee calculates total penetration leakage using the maximum pathway leakage method (summing the largest Type C valve leakage for each penetration). Due to the leakage through CA-89C, Vermont Yankee conservatively calculates that the Appendix J criteria of 0.6 La was exceeded.

Calculating total penetration leakage using the minimum pathway leakage method (the sum of the Type B and the smaller of the Type C) is currently yielding a total penetration leakage within the allowable limits.

For CA-89C a second valve in the same line met the leakage criteria in the Technical Specifications and Appendix J.

TIP Ball Valve #2 is the only Appendix J tested valve in the line for penetration X-358, but the leakage from that valve was quantifiable and only slightly grea er than the acceptance criteria. In addition, an explosive isolation valve is also installed in the line downstream of the TIP ball vs:ve. This valve is not leak tested, but will provide backup isolation.

Based on the above, the potential adverse effects on the public health and safety as a result of these events was minimal NRC fora 366 _

(6 89)

WRC Fira 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMIS$10N APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 d6-89) EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY nt!TH THl3 INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICEkSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BORDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND TEXT CONTINUATION REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-350), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Canu!SSION, WASHINGTON DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASNINGTON, DC 20603.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NO (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) l YEAR SE0 # REV # )

1 VERMONT TANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 0l5l0l0l0l2l7l1 9 3 -

0 1 2 -

0 0 0 l3 0F 0 l3 j TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17) l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ,

l Corrective Actions implemented pnor to plant startup: ,

1. Repair and successfuny retest failed valves CA-89C and TIP Ball Valve #2 prior to plant startup.

Long Term Corrective Action:

1. Identify root cause for the failures of the two valves prior to startup and report it in a supplement to this LER. I I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No similar events have been reported to the Commission for TIP Ball valves in the last five years.

A similar event was reported to the Commission for Containment Air Check Valve CA-89C in 1989 (LER 89-07).

A similar event was reported to the Commission for total as-found B & C leakaDe in 1989 (LER 89-07),1990 (LER 90-12), and 1992 (LER 9210).

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v NRC Form 366 (6-89)