05000259/LER-2017-002

LER-2017-002, Unauthorized Firearm Introduced into the Protected Area

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
Event date:	03-02-2017
Report date:	05-01-2017
2592017002R00 - NRC Website

LER 17-002-00 for Browns Ferry, Unit 1, Regarding Unauthorized Firearm Introduced into the Protected Area

ML17118A010
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/27/2017
From:	Bono S M Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 17-002-00
Download: ML17118A010 (8)

comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

NO

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000-259 - 002 - 00

I. Plant Operating Conditions Before the Event

At the time of discovery, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1 and 3, were in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Unit 2 was in Mode 5 to support a refueling outage.

II. Description of Event

A. Event Summary On March 2, 2017, at 1215 Central Standard Time (CST), a firearm was found and confiscated in the protected area (PA). This resulted in an unauthorized firearm in the PA, which led to the declaration of a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE) based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.7-U, a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. Required actions for the NOUE were taken in accordance with the stations emergency plan implementing procedures. An unauthorized weapon in the PA is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, the BFN Security plan, and procedure SSI-7.6, Personnel Access Control. The actual introduction of contraband into the PA constitutes a reportable safeguards event, in accordance with NSDP-1, Safeguards Event Reporting Guidelines, and 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4).

The contract employee who introduced the firearm was removed from the PA, their badge was disabled, their access was revoked, and their personal vehicle searched for additional contraband. A post-event fitness for duty (FFD) test was attempted but the individual declined after numerous failed attempts to provide a sample.

B. Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event There were no structures, systems, or components whose inoperability contributed to this event.

C. Dates and approximate times of occurrences

Dates & Approximate Times Occurrence March 2, 2017, An individual processed through the electronic search at 0913 CST equipment and gained access to the PA while unintentionally in possession of a firearm.

While processing through, the individual placed their backpack and coat into an x-ray machine bucket. The Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) on duty did not positively identify all items prior to granting PA access, which led to the unauthorized firearm inside the PA.

2017 comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

E. Other systems or secondary functions affected

No other systems or secondary functions were affected by this event.

F. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error Nuclear security was notified that an individual brought a firearm inside the PA. After searching the individual's locker, a firearm was discovered on March 2, 2017, at 1215 CST.

G. The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component This event did not involve an equipment failure.

H. Operator actions

There were no operator actions associated with this event.

comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

I. Automatically and manually initiated safety system responses

There were no automatic or manual safety system responses associated with this event.

III. Cause of the event

A. Cause of each component or system failure or personnel error The direct cause of this event was determined to be that the NSOs did not positively identify all materials in the x-ray search.

B. Cause(s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause The root cause was determined to be that the training provided to the NSOs drove the identification of contraband instead of driving the NSOs to conduct a physical search when the NSO cannot positively identify all materials using the x-ray image.

IV. Analysis of the event

TVA is submitting this event in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 73.71(a)(4), due to actual introduction of contraband into the PA. The condition was discovered on March 2, 2017, at 1215 CST, when security found and confiscated the firearm during a search of an individual's locker, after receiving a tip from another employee. The individual, unsure of what to do after discovering they had introduced a firearm into the PA, showed the weapon to two other employees and asked them for advice. As soon as the individual left to return to their duties, the other employees relayed the information through the appropriate chain of command. Failing to detect the unauthorized weapon was an action contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, the BFN Security Plan, and procedure SSI-7.6, constituted a reportable safeguards event.

V. Assessment of Safety Consequences

This event did not result in the inoperability or unavailability of any system to provide their required safety functions. This event resulted in a security condition that did not involve a hostile action. Upon learning of the unauthorized firearm in the PA, NSOs quickly secured the site by apprehending the individual and confiscating the weapon, and permanently removed both from the PA. Therefore, TVA has concluded that there was no significant reduction in the protection of the health and safety of the public.

A. Availability of systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event This event did not result in any system or component failures.

2017 comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

NO

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000-259 - 002 - 00 B. For events that occurred when the reactor was shut down, availability of systems or components needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident Safety system availability was not impacted by this event.

C. For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimate of the elapsed time from discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service This event did not involve any equipment failure. Safety system operability was not impacted by this event.

VI. Corrective Actions

Corrective Actions are being managed by TVA's corrective action program under Condition Report (CR) 1268051.

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

The individual who introduced the firearm was removed from the PA, their badge was disabled, their access was revoked, and their personal vehicle searched for additional contraband. A post- event FFD test was attempted but the individual declined after numerous failed attempts to provide a sample.

1. The NSOs on-duty when the individual entered the PA were disqualified. The Search Lane where the individual entered was closed for Maintenance to inspect its x-ray machine, which was found to work as designed.

2. Two NSOs are now assigned to each lane's search monitor to view the items being processed through the x-ray machine, and any unidentifiable items are physically searched. A fleet-wide policy of random physical searches of personnel and packages has been implemented.

3. More than 800 lockers, cubicles, and other areas, constituting 50 to 60 percent of the PA, were searched for contraband. No additional contraband items or unauthorized items were found.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence or to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future The corrective action to prevent recurrence is to revise task practical evaluation training and procedure SSI-7.6, Personnel Access Control, to include acceptance criteria for performing successful material searches.

2017 comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

A search of the BFN Corrective Action Program identified no similar events have occurred at BFN.

VIII. Additional Information

There is no additional information.

IX. Commitments There are no new commitments.

2017