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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 September 13, 2016 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260 Licensee Event Report 50-260/2016-002-00 10 CFR 50.73 The enclosed Licensee Event Report provides details of the inoperability of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, High Pressure Coolant Injection system. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting this report in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact J. L. Paul, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager, at (256) 729-2636.
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S. M. Bono Site Vice President Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 50-260/2016-002 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failure Due To Stuck Contactor cc (w/ Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
ENCLOSURE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 50-260/2016-002-00 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failure Due To Stuck Contactor See Enclosed VII. Additional Information:
A. Previous Similar Events
A review of the BFN CAP and Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for Units 1, 2, and 3 revealed no contactor failures resulting in the inoperability of BFN HPCI systems for the last three years.
B. Additional Information
There is no additional information.
C. Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:
The failed contactor was not part of the planned maintenance being performed during the scheduled LCO. Due to the additional, unplanned inoperability of the HPCI system resulting from the failed contactor, this system was unable to perform its safety function while in a mode of applicability for HPCI.
This event resulted in the inability of the BFN, Unit 2, HPCI system to perform its safety function for mitigation of the consequences of an accident. In accordance with NUREG-1022, this event is considered a safety system functional failure.
D. Scram with Complications Consideration:
This event did not result in a reactor scram.
VIII. COMMITMENTS
There are no new commitments.
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| 05000260/LER-2016-001, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Safety System Functional Failure Due to a Blown Fuse and a Failed Relay | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Safety System Functional Failure Due to a Blown Fuse and a Failed Relay | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000259/LER-2016-001, Regarding Failure of 4kV Shutdown Board Normal Feeder Breaker Results in Actuations of Emergency Diesel Generators and Containment Isolation Valves | Regarding Failure of 4kV Shutdown Board Normal Feeder Breaker Results in Actuations of Emergency Diesel Generators and Containment Isolation Valves | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000296/LER-2016-001, Regarding Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Pump Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Safety System Functional Failure | Regarding Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Pump Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Safety System Functional Failure | | | 05000259/LER-2016-002, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Safety System Functional Failure Due to Inoperability of Primary Containment Isolation Valve | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Safety System Functional Failure Due to Inoperability of Primary Containment Isolation Valve | | | 05000260/LER-2016-002, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failure Due to Stuck Contactor | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failure Due to Stuck Contactor | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000296/LER-2016-002, Regarding Improperly Installed Switch Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | Regarding Improperly Installed Switch Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000259/LER-2016-003, Regarding Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures Do Not Consider Potential for Fire-Induced Failure of 4kV Shutdown Board Under-Voltage Trip Functions | Regarding Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures Do Not Consider Potential for Fire-Induced Failure of 4kV Shutdown Board Under-Voltage Trip Functions | | | 05000296/LER-2016-003, Regarding Main Steam Isolation Valve Leaking in Excess of Technical Specification Requirements | Regarding Main Steam Isolation Valve Leaking in Excess of Technical Specification Requirements | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-2016-004, Regarding Incorrect Tap Settings for 480V Shutdown Board Transformers Results in Inoperability of Associated 480V Shutdown Boards | Regarding Incorrect Tap Settings for 480V Shutdown Board Transformers Results in Inoperability of Associated 480V Shutdown Boards | | | 05000296/LER-2016-004, Regarding Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints | Regarding Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000259/LER-2016-005, Regarding Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints | Regarding Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000296/LER-2016-005, Regarding Automatic Depressurization System Valve Inoperability Exceeded Technical Specification Limits | Regarding Automatic Depressurization System Valve Inoperability Exceeded Technical Specification Limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000296/LER-2016-006, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Found to Be Inoperable During Testing | Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Found to Be Inoperable During Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
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