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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5492329 September 2020 21:19:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On July 22, 2020, at 1030 CDT, it was discovered that the as-found Unit 2 Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Maximum Confirmation Count Setpoint did not match the values in the Quad Cities Unit 2 (Core Operating Limits Report) (COLR) per TS SR 3.3.1.3.3. All Unit 2 OPRMs were declared inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the OPRM system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There were no other Technical Specification or safety systems inoperable at the time of this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Quad Cities Unit 2 returned their OPRMs to operable on July 23, 2020, at 1210 CDT, following a setpoint adjustment. In addition, during a more recent meeting between station personnel and the NRC resident inspectors, feedback was provided that brought to the station management's attention that they needed to make the required 50.72 notification as a result to this past inoperability.
ENS 5492129 September 2020 10:21:00North AnnaNRC Region 2A non-licensed Dominion Energy supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5491828 September 2020 14:39:00SequoyahNRC Region 2On 9/28/20 at 1143 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made after discovery of a visible oil sheen on the waters of the U.S. (Sequoyah's side of the intake forebay skimmer wall at the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) building). The source was an oil bucket that overflowed with rain at the ERCW pumping station. Efforts are in progress to eliminate all other potential sources of oil at the station that could be released to the environment. Estimate of volume spilled is less than one quart. The following agencies have also been notified: - EPA Region 4 - Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) - Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC). Cleanup is in progress. Measures to prevent recurrence are being taken. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5491728 September 2020 05:02:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1HVAC

EN Revision Imported Date : 10/12/2020 LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE: This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/28/20 to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes replacement of supply fan and roof-top unit. Work is scheduled to complete on 10/11/20. If an emergency is declared requiring PBAPS TSC activation during this period, the PBAPS TSC will be staffed and activated using existing Emergency Preparedness (EP) procedures. If the PBAPS TS becomes uninhabitable due to radiological, or other conditions, the TSC Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with EP procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/9/20 AT 1234 EDT FROM BRIAN BAILEY TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

An eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability was made on 9/28/20 under Event Notification 54917 for planned maintenance activities to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. This update to EN 54917 is to notify applicable stakeholders that, following satisfactory completion of the planned supply fan and roof-top unit replacement work, the PBAPS TSC ventilation system has been returned to service with no remaining work or outstanding deficiencies related to this work. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lally).

ENS 5491627 September 2020 05:08:00CallawayNRC Region 4Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
At 0203 (CDT) on September 27, 2020 the plant was in Mode 1 at 98 percent power when a turbine trip/reactor trip (from a generator trip signal) occurred. All systems responded as expected. A Feedwater Isolation signal was received due to the reactor trip with RCS average temperature less than 564 degrees Fahrenheit. The Auxiliary Feedwater system started on a valid actuation signal to restore and maintain steam generator levels. The plant is being maintained stable in Mode 3 with no complications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal, and decay heat is being removed via the Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems.
ENS 5491325 September 2020 15:28:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5490824 September 2020 06:31:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4On September 24, 2020, at 0258 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was notified that one Emergency Notification Siren located on US Hwy 61 had actuated. Claiborne County was informed that no emergency exists at GGNS. The alarming siren has since been secured. Notification is being provided to the NRC in regards to the potential for media inquiry. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5490723 September 2020 18:56:00Fort CalhounNRC Region 4At 1528 CDT, a fire was reported in containment. Fire was extinguished using a portable fire extinguisher by dedicated fire watch. Offsite fire departments responded at 1541 CDT and the fire was confirmed extinguished at 1601 CDT. There were no injuries reported. The state Fire Marshal of Nebraska has been notified. There was no release of radioactivity or hazardous materials. The following statement is planned to be released to the media: A small industrial fire broke out this afternoon at OPPD's Fort Calhoun Station, the decommissioning nuclear plant just south of Blair, Nebraska. It had been put out by fire extinguishers before firefighters arrived. No release of radioactivity occurred. All employees and contractors are accounted for and safe. Based on our preliminary investigation, the fire appears to have been caused by a torch used for cutting. Firefighters are using a thermal gun to identify any potential remaining hot spots. The plant is undergoing decommissioning and all spent nuclear fuel is fully secured in industry-standard dry cask storage, located away from the site of today's fire. The public remains safe and the facility remains secure. All work at the site is on a temporary hold. Safety remains our highest priority. OPPD will provide additional information as it becomes available.
ENS 5489812 September 2020 21:12:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 1748 EDT on September 12, 2020, Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long-term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repair options to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC are currently being evaluated. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This same condition was reported under EN #54887.
ENS 5489711 September 2020 22:54:00PalisadesNRC Region 3At 1930 EDT, on September 11, 2020, Palisades Nuclear Plant was conducting ultrasonic data analysis from reactor vessel closure head in-service inspections. During this analysis, signals that display characteristics consistent with primary water stress corrosion cracking were identified in head penetration 34. No leak path signal was identified during ultrasonic testing. The plant was in cold shutdown at 0% power and in Mode 6 for a refueling outage at the time of discovery. Repair actions will be completed prior to plant startup from the outage. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for degradation of a principal safety barrier. This is the only indication that is currently present, however, if additional indications are found, they will also be repaired prior to the plant startup. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
ENS 5489510 September 2020 16:09:00PilgrimNRC Region 1A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's rights to access the plant have been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Region I Decommissioning Lead Inspector.
ENS 548888 September 2020 13:13:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Automatic ScramAt 0925 EDT, on September 8, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Overpower Delta Temperature. Unit 1 Channel 1 Overpower Delta Temperature was tripped as a planned evolution when an inadvertent Unit 1 Channel 2 Overpower Delta Temperature signal was received. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. Unit 2 is not affected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 548876 September 2020 11:39:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 034S (EDT) on September 6, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC: becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 548855 September 2020 02:27:00CookNRC Region 3Reactor Coolant System
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn September 4, 2020, DC Cook Unit 2 experienced a lowering Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure caused by a failed open Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Spray valve. At approximately 2242 (EDT), a manual Reactor Trip was performed due to the lowering RCS pressure. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic Safety Injection was actuated due to the lowering RCS pressure. RCS pressure has recovered to normal and is stable. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), ECCS Discharge to RCS, as a four (4) hour report. Notification is also being made as an 8 hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Reactor Protection System (RPS), Containment Isolation, Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS), Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW), and Emergency AC Electrical Power actuations. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Aux Feedwater Pumps started as required and are operating properly. All ECCS components operated as required including Containment Isolation. Decay heat is being removed via the Condenser Steam Dumps and ECCS has been secured. Three of four Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured and RCS pressure has recovered to normal pressure and is stable. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Unit 1 was not affected and remains in Mode 1, 100 % power.
ENS 548804 September 2020 01:40:00River BendNRC Region 4Feedwater
Service water
High Pressure Core Spray
River Bend Station experienced an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) at 2048 (CDT) on 9/3/2020 while operating at 92% power. Initial investigation indicates a power supply failure in the Division III trip units which feeds HPCS and Division III Diesel Initiation signals. The Control Room Operator responded to the event by taking manual control of Feedwater Level Control to maintain Reactor Water Level nominal values. The HPCS injection valve was open for approximately 25 seconds before operators manually closed the valve. The manual closure of the injection isolation valve caused the system to be incapable of responding to an automatic actuation signal. The manual override of the injection isolation valve was reset approximately 52 minutes after the event. The HPCS system has remained inoperable. The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that caused loss of function of the HPCS System. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. These conditions put the unit in a 14-day LCO (3.5.1) for HPCS Inoperability and a 30-day LCO (3.7.1) for one Standby Service Water Pump Inoperable (2C).
ENS 548773 September 2020 15:36:00Prairie IslandNRC Region 3On 9/3/2020, at 1421 (CDT), a notification was made to the National Response Center as a result of a spill of approximately 3 fluid ounces of hydraulic oil into the plant waters of Prairie Island Nuclear Plant intake on 9/2/2020. This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact to public health and safety. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 548741 September 2020 14:48:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1Main Steam Isolation ValveThe following is a synopsis of information received from the licensee: On March 6, 2020, while at zero percent power and in Cold Shutdown - Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) determined through surveillance testing that three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) did not meet their Technical Specification closure time. The cause of the MSIV failures has been determined to be delayed Air Pack response. The delay was caused by a buildup of corrosion product and waxy foreign material believed to be dried pipe thread sealant or O-ring assembly lube that accumulated on the internal surfaces of the Air Pack during refurbishment by the vendor Trillium (previously Hiller). The following is action taken or planned to be taken to prevent recurrence: A note will be added to the procurement requirement evaluation form and purchase order for MSIV Air Pack refurbishments to minimize use of O-ring lubricant and thread sealant to limit likelihood of capturing foreign material on Air Pack valve internals. The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to above is: Component - Main Steam Isolation Valves, Air Pack. IEEE 803 Function Identifier - VOP. IEEE805 System Identification - SB. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. For further information contact: Todd Tierney Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC Brandon Shultz Site Regulatory Assurance Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (315) 349-7012 .
ENS 5487031 August 2020 15:30:00Watts BarNRC Region 2This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report two invalid Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) actuations at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1. On July 23, 2020, at 0956 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Train A CVI actuated due to an invalid high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-130, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. Upon investigation, the high radiation signal was caused by a failed power supply. Corrective action included replacing the power supply, 1-RM-90-130 detector, and restoring the system to service. On August 7, 2020, at 2017 EDT, the Train A CVI actuated due to an invalid high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-130, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. Upon investigation, a small tear was identified in the foil covering the scintillation detector. This defect caused erratic indication and the system actuation. The foil was replaced and the system was restored to service. Prior to and following the invalid high radiation alarms, all radiation monitors except 1-RM-90-130 were stable at their normal values; therefore, the CVI was invalid. Control room operators performed appropriate checks and confirmed that all required automatic actuations occurred as designed. These events were entered into the corrective action program as CR 1625135 and CR 1628904. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5486731 August 2020 08:28:00PalisadesNRC Region 3A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5486428 August 2020 16:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334). On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction. ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP ((Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)) 3 and 4. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5486328 August 2020 10:22:00DresdenNRC Region 3At 1645 CDT on 8/27/2020, it was determined that a licensed operator tested positive in accordance with the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5485926 August 2020 18:10:00Prairie IslandNRC Region 3Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1319 CDT, on August 26, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 95.2 percent power in coast down for the 1R32 refueling outage, the reactor automatically tripped due to flux rate. All systems responded normally to these conditions with auxiliary feedwater initiating as expected. Operations stabilized the plant without complication. Decay heat is being removed via a main feedwater pump to the steam generators. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation. The cause of the scram is under investigation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5485525 August 2020 02:26:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Feedwater
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Automatic ScramOn August 24, 2020 at 2305 CT at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) an Automatic Reactor Scram occurred after a trip of the Reactor Feed Pump B and subsequent lowering of reactor water level to 11.4 inches Narrow Range. The scram occurred with Reactor Power at 14% and the main generator offline. All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to control reactor cooldown, Currently GGNS reactor pressure is being maintained at 450-600psig. Reactor water level is being maintained with condensate through startup level control. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit. The NRC Resident has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. Notified R4DO.
ENS 5484921 August 2020 12:53:00River BendNRC Region 4Reactor Protection System
Reactor Recirculation Pump
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn August 21, 2020 at 0908 CDT, River Bend Station was operating at 100% reactor power when reactor recirculation pump 'B' tripped. At 0918 CDT, a manual reactor scram was inserted at 67% reactor power after receiving indications of thermal hydraulic instability as indicated by flux oscillations on the period based detection system (PBDS) and average power range monitors (APRMs). All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. Currently River Bend Station Unit 1 is stable and pressure is being maintained using turbine bypass valves. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation as result of Group 3 isolations. NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on this event. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.
ENS 5484821 August 2020 12:42:00PerryNRC Region 3Standby Liquid Control
Control Rod
At 0953 EDT on 8/21/20, it was discovered that both trains of the standby liquid control system were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All control rods remained operable during this time period. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both trains of the standby liquid control system were declared inoperable due to an inadvertent addition of water to the storage tank which caused the boron concentration in the tank to go low out of specification.
ENS 5484721 August 2020 03:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Manual ScramOn 08/20/20 at 2354 (EDT), with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 34% RTP (Rated Thermal Power), the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to Steam Generator Water Level control issues that resulted in the only Steam Generator (S/G) Feed Pump tripping on low suction pressure. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually upon the loss of the last running feed pump. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified. Decay heat removal is by the steam dumps to atmosphere. Unit 4 is not affected. The cause of the low suction feed pressure to the steam generator feed pump is under investigation.
ENS 5484419 August 2020 15:57:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Automatic ScramOn 08/19/20 at 1325 EDT, during Unit 3 startup at approximately 0 percent rated thermal power, the reactor automatically tripped. The trip was automatically initiated from the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation. All other systems operated normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by Steam Dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation trip is under investigation.
ENS 5483918 August 2020 00:08:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Feedwater
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Auxiliary Feedwater
Manual ScramOn 08/17/20 at 2113 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 92% (Rated Thermal Power) RTP, the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to a turbine runback caused by CV-3-2011, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Control Valve, failing open, followed by rising Steam Generator (S/G) levels. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually when the 3C S/G Level reached 78% narrow range. Unit 3 Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed manually in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) network due to 38 MSR Main Steam Stop valve position indication lost. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in normal electrical line up. Lightning strike is believed to be the initial cause of the runback.
ENS 5483413 August 2020 13:24:00HarrisNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn August 13, 2020, at 0938 EDT, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a control rod dropped during control rod testing. This is considered to be an unanalyzed condition and requires a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedure. All safety systems functioned as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as designed and was secured. Steam generator levels are being maintained by Main Feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the RPS actuation, this event is being reported as a four hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the unanalyzed condition and unplanned Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5483212 August 2020 11:24:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4On August 11, 2020, at approximately 1432 MST, a licensed operator's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty screening test. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5482911 August 2020 20:22:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1At 1334 EDT on Tuesday August 11th, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System lost power due to a trip of the Station Blackout (SBO) electric power supply breaker. The trip was due to a fault at the Conowingo Dam and Conowingo was not able to realign electric power to the SBO within an hour. Power restoration is complete and TSC Ventilation was restored at 1725 EDT. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5482811 August 2020 11:12:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4At 0915 PDT, on August 10, 2020, Pacific Gas and Electric determined a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5482610 August 2020 14:38:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Shutdown Cooling
Automatic Scram

At 1258 CDT on August 10, 2020, Duane Arnold Energy Center declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power due to high winds. The event at the single unit plant resulted in an automatic scram from 82 percent power (Mode-1) to zero percent power (Mode-3). They are headed to Mode-4. There is damage on site, but the Reactor Building is intact. All rods inserted and cooling is being addressed via Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) for level control and Safety Relief Valves are removing decay heat to the torus. Both Standby Diesel Generator are running. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Iowa Department of Emergency Management, and the Linn County and Benton County Emergency Management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 08/10/2020 AT 1554 EDT FROM CURTIS HANSEN TO OSSY FONT * * *

This report is being made under CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) for an automatic reactor scram due to loss of offsite power due to high winds. In addition, this report is being made under CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (B) due to PCIS ((Primary Containment Isolation System)) Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (activating) due to loss of offsite power. All isolations went to completion. RCIC injecting for level control. All rods fully inserted during the scram. The plant electrical line up is both SBDGs (Standby Diesel Generators) are running. Decay heat is being removed via SRVs (Safety Relief Valves) to the torus. Progress towards shutdown cooling. NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) notified at 1448. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

ENS 548248 August 2020 05:34:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Condenser
Manual ScramOn August 8, 2020, at 0127 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was manually shut down due to a turbine high pressure control valve malfunction. Reactor pressure is being controlled with bypass control valves to the main condenser. Reactor level is being maintained with condensate and feedwater through startup level control. The plant is stable in MODE 3 and proceeding to cold shutdown. The cause of the 'D' high pressure control valve malfunction is under investigation at this time. All rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Additionally, at 0159 CDT, with all rods fully inserted and after the 0127 CDT manual reactor Scram, an automatic valid RPS actuation signal was received. This event is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 548206 August 2020 13:10:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
This report is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an automatic actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. Because the actuation was invalid, this 60-day telephone notification is being made instead of a written LER (licensee event report), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On 06/08/2020, at approximately 0424 EDT, a trip of the Unit 3 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) MG-Set resulted in a partial activation of the primary containment isolation system and inboard containment isolation valves closed in multiple systems. All affected Group III containment isolation valves were verified to be closed. It was determined that the normal power supply for the Unit 3 'A' RPS had failed. Power was transferred from the normal to the alternate source and the RPS 'A' channel was reset. Investigation determined that the 3A RPS MG Set motor contactor coil winding had failed due to an internal short circuit. The motor contactor has been replaced. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 548164 August 2020 22:43:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Service water

EN Revision Imported Date : 8/20/2020 BOTH SERVICE WATER HEADERS DECLARED INOPERABLE On 8/4/20, at 1745 EDT, Millstone Unit 2 entered technical specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both service water headers being declared inoperable because strainer differential pressures (D/Ps) were greater than 9 psid. The high service water strainer D/P was the result of heavy debris impingement caused by tropical storm Isaias. To reduce heat loads and service water flow, Unit 2 reduced power to 75 percent. One service water header was restored to operable at 1816 EDT, at which time TS 3.0.3 was exited. At 1843 EDT both service water headers were declared operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 8/19/2020 AT 1141 EDT FROM ERIC DONCH TO KIRBY SCALES * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on August 4, 2020, NRC Event Number EN 54816 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which both trains of service headers were declared inoperable due to service water strainer differential pressures greater than 9 psid. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation supports the conclusion that a strainer differential pressure of 16 psid would not challenge the system flow distribution during worst case conditions. The evaluation also demonstrates that flowrates on both headers were observed to be unaffected during the timeframe of the high strainer differential pressure conditions. Therefore, both service water headers would have provided the required flows to perform their safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN 54816 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Greives).

ENS 548123 August 2020 23:31:00BrunswickNRC Region 2High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Protection System
Emergency Diesel Generator
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Shutdown Cooling
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
Control Rod

At 2312 EDT, on August 3, 2020, Brunswick Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The unit was at approximately 20 percent power and was not synced to the grid when the unit automatically scrammed. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Diesel Generators started and began powering the safety buses. Safety systems actuated as expected. The Unit also experienced a loss of Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, but one pump was returned to service. Unit 2 remains at 100 percent power and is unaffected. The licensee notified State and local governments, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK TURKAL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0120 EDT ON 8/4/2020 * * *

At approximately 2302 EDT, a loss of offsite power occurred on Unit 1. This resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. Per design, emergency diesel generators 1 and 2 properly started and loaded to their respective emergency buses. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started and is being used to control reactor water level. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started and is being used for pressure control. As previously reported, an Unusual Event was declared at 2312 EDT due to the loss of offsite power. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in the process of shutting down for maintenance associated with a ground on the main generator. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). As a result of the reactor trip, reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1). The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sample isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Per design, the loss of offsite power also caused a Group 1 (i.e., main steam isolation valve) isolations. Due to the Emergency Diesel Generator and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuations, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of the event is minimal. All safety related systems operated as designed. Investigation of the cause of the loss of offsite power is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Inverso).

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/4/2020 AT 1534 EDT FROM JOSEPH ELKINS TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

At 1454 EDT on August 4, 2020, the Unusual Event was exited when offsite power was restored to Unit 1. Per design, when the loss of offsite power to Unit 1 occurred, all four emergency diesel generators (EDGs) started and EDGs 1 and 2 properly suppled emergency buses 1 and 2. Since Unit 2 was not affected by the loss of power, EDGs 3 and 4 ran unloaded. With restoration of offsite power to Unit 1, EDG 2 has been secured. EDGs 1, 3, and 4 are being secured as required by plant operating procedure. Notified R2DO (Inverso), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA OC, DHS NICC WO, CISA IOCC (email), DHS SWO (email), FEMA NWC (email), FEMA Ops Center (email), FEMA-NRCC-sasc (email), NRCC THD Desk (email), NuclearSSA (email). ********************************************************************************************************************************

ENS 5480831 July 2020 17:40:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2

A Hurricane Warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the plant site. A Hurricane Warning was confirmed with the State Watch Office at 1700 EDT. As a mater of procedure, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event classification for the Hurricane Warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the Offsite Notification. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OC, DHS NICC WO, CISA IOCC (email), DHS SWO (email); FEMA NWC (email), FEMA Ops Center (email), FEMA-NRCC-sasc (email), NRCC THD Desk (email), NuclearSSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/2/20 AT 1456 EDT FROM LOUIS ENGELKE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The Hurricane Warning was downgraded to a Tropical Storm Warning by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County, including the plant site. At time 1445 EDT, on 08/02/20, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event classification. There are no changes in plant status for either unit. Both units are stable at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. The licensee notified State and County officials of the termination. Notified R2DO (M. Miller), IRD MOC (Kennedy), NRR EO (C. Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA OC, DHS NICC WO, CISA IOCC (email), DHS SWO (email); FEMA NWC (email), FEMA Ops Center (email), FEMA-NRCC-sasc (email), NRCC THD Desk (email), NuclearSSA (email)

ENS 5480630 July 2020 11:59:00CallawayNRC Region 4

EN Revision Imported Date : 8/18/2020 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ERROR POTENTIALLY PREVENTING TIMELY COMPLETION OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT At 0815 CDT on 7/30/2020, it was determined that a procedural error in emergency procedure ES1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, could delay realignment from emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection phase to recirculation phase under lower plant operational modes. It is noted this scenario is postulated to occur only when the boron dilution mitigation system is operable in lower modes of operation as per Technical Specification 3.3.9 (required operable in Mode 2 (below P-6), 3, 4 and 5). Current plant conditions require this feature nonfunctional so this issue does not impact current plant conditions. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no current impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 8/17/2020 AT 1603 EDT FROM JOSH COPELAND TO KERBY SCALES * * *

Event Notification (EN) 54806, made on 7/30/2020, is being retracted because re-evaluation performed subsequent to the notification has demonstrated that the error in Emergency Operating Procedure ES1.3 would not have resulted in a condition outside of the current licensing basis analyses of record for the Callaway Plant. This re-evaluation addressed core effects, containment pressure-temperature and radiological consequences analyses, documented in the plant's corrective action program. The re-evaluation has led to the conclusion that the procedural error in ES1.3 would not have prevented any system required to be OPERABLE by the Technical Specifications from performing its specified safety functions. With all systems capable of performing their specified safety functions, the current licensing basis analyses of record for Callaway Plant remain valid and bounding. Based on these considerations, it has been determined that the condition reported in EN 54806 did not result in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Consequently the condition did not meet the criteria for an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this Event Notification retraction. Notified R4DO (Taylor)

ENS 5480329 July 2020 04:28:00Prairie IslandNRC Region 3Radiation monitor RE-69, 'Guardhouse Area Radiation Detector' was found failed on operator rounds. RE-69 is a category A1 piece of equipment that provides the sole means of indication for a parameter used to directly assess emergency action level (EAL) RA3.1, 'dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in either of the following areas: Control Room (R-1), Central Alarm Station (R-69).' A compensatory measure was subsequently established and the ability to assess EAL RA3.1 has been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5480024 July 2020 09:00:00SequoyahNRC Region 2At 0105 (EDT) on 7/24/20 it was discovered Unit 2 Ice Bed was INOPERABLE. Therefore, since this is a single train system the requirements of 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) have been met. This condition is being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency NRC Notification. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition put the unit in a 48-hour LCO. The old chillers were put into service to bring the temperature of the ICE bed down. At 0833 EDT, the technical specification limit was no longer exceeded and the unit exited the LCO.
ENS 5479621 July 2020 12:42:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Control RodAt 0851 EDT on July 21, 2020, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Robinson Unit 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to LCO 3.1.7 not being met as a result of indication loss on Control Rod positions with more than one position indication inoperable for a group. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 0752 EDT to initiate action within 1 hour to place the unit in MODE 3 within 7 hours. Since a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1003 EDT on July 21, 2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Shutdown was initiated and power was reduced approximately 3 percent. Reactor power was back to 98.5 percent at the time of notification.
ENS 5479521 July 2020 08:58:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Primary Containment Isolation System
Main Condenser
Manual ScramThe following was received from TVA - Brown's Ferry at 0858, 21 July 20. On July 21, 2020, at 0435 hours Central Daylight Time, Browns Ferry Unit 1 inserted a manual reactor scram due to degrading main condenser vacuum from marine biofouling at the intake structure. Browns Ferry Unit 2 is in Mode 4 and Browns Ferry Unit 3 is at approximately 76% rated thermal power and stable. Primary Containment Isolation Systems received an actuation signal for groups 2, 3, 6, 8 on reactor water level below +2". All Primary Containment Isolation System groups that received an actuation signal performed as designed. Additionally, all other systems functioned as designed. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b )(3)(iv)(A), Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation and (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant is stable in Mode 3 and will remain shutdown until marine growth clogging the intake structure abates.
ENS 5479420 July 2020 18:11:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Primary containment
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn July 20, 2020, at 1325 hours Central Daylight Time, Brown's Ferry Unit 2 inserted a manual reactor scram due to degrading main condenser vacuum from marine biofouling at the intake structure. Brown's Ferry Unit 1 performed a down power to 43% and Unit 3 down powered to 76%. Conditions are stable on both Unit 1 and 3 following unit down power. Primary Containment Isolations Systems received an actuation signal for groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 on reactor water level below +2". All Primary Containment Isolations System groups that received an actuation signal performed as designed. Additionally, all other systems functioned as designed. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), "Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation and (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed via normal feedwater and condenser.
ENS 5479220 July 2020 16:36:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3In the evening of 7/19/20, a report was received from Ottawa County Sheriff Dispatch personnel that a single siren had sounded. Review of the siren system computer log determined Siren 202 in Carroll Township had malfunctioned and sounded at approximately 2003 EDT, and sounded a second time at approximately 2045 EDT while the siren was being polled for troubleshooting. Personnel were dispatched to Siren 202 to deenergize both the AC and DC power to prevent additional soundings. The cause of the siren sounding is under review, but it occurred following storms passing through the area. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5478917 July 2020 19:59:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Manual ScramOn July 17, 2020, at 1346 PDT with Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures due to increasing hydrogen usage in the Unit 2 main generator. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and the Auxiliary Feedwater system started as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3. This notification is being made in accordance the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a manual actuation of the reactor protection system and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an automatic actuation of a specified safety system. The cause of the increased hydrogen usage is under investigation. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5478115 July 2020 14:58:00Watts BarNRC Region 2At 0835 EDT on July 15, 2020, it was discovered that the main control room (MCR) envelope was inoperable due to a MCR door being found ajar; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The door was closed, restoring the MCR envelope to operable at 0839 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477613 July 2020 17:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2On July 13, 2020 at 0831 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined an SNC supervisory personnel failed their fitness for duty test. The employee has been removed from the site and their access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477310 July 2020 08:30:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 900 EDT on July 10, 2020, Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson Nuclear Sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Harris Nuclear Plant, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477210 July 2020 08:28:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Brunswick, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.