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The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
On March 13, 2014, the Agency (Texas Department of Health) was notified by the licensee's Site Radiation Safety Officer (SRSO) that one of its radiographer trainees may have received an overexposure while performing radiography at a field site on March 12, 2014. The radiographers were using a QSA880D camera containing a 69 curie iridium - 192 source. At 2100 hours (CDT), the radiographers had completed a shot and the trainee went to the camera to disconnect the guide tube from the camera. The trainee stated while attempting to disconnect the guide tube he observed the reading on the dose rate meter had gone back up. The trainee backed away from the camera and the source was returned to the fully shielded position. It is unknown at this time where the source was located in the guide tube. The SRSO stated the trainee may have been in contact with the guide tube for as long as 15 seconds. The SRSO stated the radiographer trainer was near the trainee during the event. The SRSO stated the trainee's self-reading dosimeter was off scale. The SRSO did not know if the trainee's alarming rate meter was alarming at the time of the event. The SRSO stated he was not at the licensee's facility when he contacted this Agency, but he was returning to the facility. The SRSO stated he would provide additional information as soon as they had a chance to interview the individuals involved. The Agency contacted the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer who stated they were on their way to the company's facility to do reenactments and preliminary dose assessments. The SRSO stated the trainee's dosimetry had been collected and will be sent for processing. No other individual received an exposure due to this event. The Agency contacted the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) and informed them of the event. REAC/TS agreed to provide the licensee with assistance when requested. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
Texas Incident # I-9167
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/14/14 AT 0957 EDT VIA FAX * * *
The Agency was contacted by the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) at 1700 (CDT) on March 13, 2014 and provided with additional information on the event. The CRSO stated they had interviewed the radiographers involved in the event and discovered a second radiography trainee was involved. The CRSO stated the three individuals were shooting welds on a tank. The two radiography trainees were inside the tank in a man lift basket operating the camera. The camera would hang on the side of the tank. The radiography trainees would place the collimator to perform the shoot and then back off from the camera the distance of the control cables, approximately 35 feet, and operate the camera. The trainer was in a man lift outside the tank placing film. The CRSO stated the camera had been retrieved from the wall of the tank and placed in the basket with them while they waited to set up for the next shoot. The radiography trainees stated they were in the basket for as long as 15 minutes, with the source not fully shielded. The radiography trainee who tried to remove the guide tube stated he had difficulty removing the guide tube, so the 10 to 15 second estimate for the time he spent trying to remove the guide tube was accurate. The radiography trainee stated when they retracted the source to the fully locked position, it took about one quarter turn of the crank handle to fully retract the source.
During the interviews with the radiographers, it was discovered that the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube was not wearing any personnel monitoring devices. He had left them in the truck. The other radiography trainee was wearing their dosimetry, but failed to turn the alarming rate meter on. The CRSO stated the dosimetry will be sent to their dosimetry (lab) for processing.
The CRSO stated they had contacted REAC/TS for assistance. They have taken the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube to the hospital for blood samples to be provided to REAC/TS. The radiography trainee will be taken to a medical facility again on March 14, 2014.
The Agency contacted the CRSO at 0700 (CDT) on March 14, 2014, and asked the condition of the radiography trainee's hand. The CRSO stated they were not aware of any issues with the individual's hand. The Agency discussed the previous event in Texas with similar circumstances. The consultant for the licensee working with the CRSO was also the consultant in the previous event and is providing the licensee with information gained in that event.
The licensee currently plans to have the Site RSO to manage the health aspects of this event. The CRSO will manage the investigation of the event. The CRSO stated the former Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director for NRC Region IV will meet them in La Porte on March 14, 2014, to help with the reenactment.
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK ON 3/15/14 AT 2120 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *
On March 15, 2014, the Agency (Texas Department of Health) was notified by the licensee that based on the reenactment of the event, they have calculated the exposure to the hand of the radiography trainee to be 3,680 rem. The calculation is based on the trainee's hand being 0.5 centimeter from the source for 10 seconds. The licensee reported the whole body deep dose equivalent was 6.0 rem for the trainee. The licensee stated they examined the trainee's hand today and did not see any visual effects of the exposure. The licensee stated the trainee has not experienced any pain in his hand. The licensee stated they will continue to monitor the trainee's hand. The licensee stated they are still corresponding with REAC/TS.
The badge for the second trainee in the basket was read by the dosimeter processor and reported to be 3.327 rem. The licensee stated based on the reenactment they believed the reading to accurately reflect the individual's exposure.
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (Dudes), FSME Resources via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/23/14 AT 0925 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *
On April 20, 2014, the Agency was notified by the licensee they had completed their investigation into the exposure to the radiographer who had come into contact with the guide tube while the source was not shielded. The investigation determined that the source was located at a distance of six inches from the hand of the radiographer when he contacted the guide tube. Interviews with the radiographer who retracted the source determined that the crank out handle had been rotated almost one full turn to retract the source, not one-quarter turn as initially reported. The error in the initial report was due to the radiographer who returned the source to the fully shielded position not having a clear understanding of the term he used as English is not his primary language. Based on that information, the calculated dose to the radiographer's hand is 4.0 rem for the event. The calculated whole body dose to the radiographer was calculated to be 12.0 rem TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The hand and TEDE dose calculated by this Agency are consistent with the numbers assigned by the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
Notified the R4DO (Azua), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1756 EDT ON 05/20/14 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
On May 20, 2014, the Agency received a copy of the NRC Form 5 for the radiography trainee. The Form 5 listed the TEDE dose for 2014 as 12.369 rem and the SDE Max Extremity dose as 15.680 rem. Also, the reporting criteria was changed to match the exposure reported by the licensee.
Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
Notified R4DO (Gepford) and FSME (McIntosh) via email.
The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email:
Licensee contacted BROP (Bureau of Radiation Protection) at approximately 2:30 PM on 5/6/14 to report that a radiography crew experienced a source disconnect during radiography operations earlier in the day. After completing the 3rd shot of the day a radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the camera. The drive cable appeared to crank back in but reading on the survey meter indicated that the source was still outside the camera, apparently in the area of the collimator. Licensee personnel attempted to crank the cable in and out several times in an attempt to retract the source, but were unsuccessful. The area was secured and monitored by licensee personnel pending further retrieval efforts.
The corporate RSO was contacted, who dispatch two trained source retrieval personnel to the location. During evaluation it was determined that the drive cable had broken near the male connector. Licensee personnel were able to unlock the camera, feed the broken drive cable through the camera, and retrieve the source into the shielded position. Retrieval was accomplished at approximately 6:30 PM that evening. A new drive cable was connected to the camera and the radiographers were able to continue operating the camera with the new drive cable without incident.
The two licensee retrieval personnel recorded doses of 20 mRem and 40 mRem on their pocket dosimeters. The licensee is having the broken drive cable returned to their corporate office for examination to determine the cause of the break. Licensee is preparing a written report on this incident.
The Radiography Camera involved is a QSA Model 880D, Serial number D8378 containing 46.1 Curie Ir-192 source. The sealed source is model number A424-9, serial number 12727C. The incident occurred at the Kensington, OH site.
State of Ohio Reference No.: 2014-010
Corrective actions included obtaining a new cable. Repairs were made without an engineering change to the system.
State of Ohio submitted the NMED Item Number: OH140006 on 05/07/14.
The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) performed an inspection of Blues City Brewery (BCB) on 9/21/2011. The facility was previously owned by Coors Brewing Company through 9/1/2006.
During the inspection, it was discovered that a 3.7 GBq (100 mCi) Am-241 source (Industrial Dynamics Company - IDC model 06110-1, serial #5533) was missing. The source had originally been contained inside a level gauge (IDC model FT -100, serial #90205). According to IDC records, IDC had removed the source from the gauge on 9/29/1999, wipe tested the source, packaged it for shipment, and left the package in the possession of the Coors Brewing Company's RSO. The IDC RSO stated that they had no further record regarding the source. BCB conducted a thorough search of their facility for the source without success. DRH contacted the former Coors Brewing Company's RSO, but he did not have any additional information regarding this source.
On 10/25/2012, DRH received a quarterly report (7/1/2012 to 9/30/2012) from IDC that stated they recovered the source.
Tennessee Event TN-12-126.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf +
On May 20, 2014, at 0835 hours during plant startup, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Operations personnel manually tripped the reactor due to meeting the pre-briefed trip criteria of 85% narrow range level on the 'A' Steam Generator. This manual trip criterion was reached after the steam generator water level began to oscillate following the start of the 'A' Condensate pump. A manual main steam line isolation was performed in order to limit reactor coolant system cool down. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.
This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 was not affected by this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
No relief or safety valves lifted during this event. The unit is maintaining primary temperature using the atmospheric steam dumps and main feedwater pumps. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. +
At 0853 EDT, Millstone Station Unit 2 removed the Stack Radiation Monitor RM-8169 from service for planned maintenance. Maintenance and testing were completed and the Stack Radiation Monitor returned to service at 1100 EDT.
The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. +
The following information was received from the State of Utah via fax.
The Utah Division of Radiation Control (DRC) was notified at 1:38 p.m. MST on Wednesday, August 13, 2013 of an incident where a church chapel was destroyed by fire. The fire had occurred three months earlier on May 13, 2013. No one noticed the radiation symbol mixed with the trash until a representative of the church, watching the residue being shoveled from the chapel. He noted the radiation symbol stuck to the remains of the melted sign.
The DRC contacted the church representative and was informed of the details of the fire.
The DRC Radioactive Materials Section Manager was notified of the incident.
Notification to the NRC was completed on January 24, 2014.
The tritium sign was melted by the high heat of the fire. There were no remaining identifiable components. The debris from the sign was mixed with other burnt materials and the trash had been shoveled into waste containers. The church representative said there was nothing recoverable in the fire's residue.
The EXIT sign (Model B-100) was manufactured by SRB Technologies in 2005. The sign was designed to operate for 20 years using 18.9 curies of tritium. The estimated activity of tritium remaining inside the sign when it was destroyed was approximately 12 Curies.
Utah Event Report ID No.: UT140001 +
The following was received from the State of Kansas via fax:
Today (on) 4/22/14, (the) x-ray radiography crew had a source hang-up, at the NCRA plant in McPherson, Kansas, at approximately 0930 CDT. (The) radiography crew performed their operational and emergency procedures very well. A 35 curie Ir-192 source hung up in the source guide tube. (The crew) made the necessary adjustments to their boundaries, kept watch over them, allowed no one to enter, notified (the crew supervisor) and the Kansas RSO. They re-adjusted the crankouts and pulled them to straighten out the cranks and guide tube, and were able to retract the source into the device with one attempt, and were successful. There was no disconnect or anyone exposed to radiation levels above regulatory limits.
Notification of the incident was given to the plant safety coordinators at the time of the incident, and they remained at distance to avoid exposure, the full time of the incident lasted approximately 10-15 minutes from the initial determination of a stuck source to retraction of the source into the device.
Three monitored IRISNDT staff were onsite and they watched over the boundaries while the retraction was completed. After the incident, all IRISNDT staff read their Instadose film badges and got readings from their personal dosimeters ranging from 1.2 to 3.8 mRem.
Kansas incident # KS140007 +
The following was received from the State of Arizona via email:
The Agency (State of Arizona) was informed by the Licensee at approximately 2:45 PM (MDT), April 22, 2014 that at approximately 2:00 PM a worker had lost a Campbell-Pacific Model MC-1, SN MD41007631 moisture density gauge off a pickup truck. The worker forgot to close the tailgate. The gauge contained 10 millicuries of Cesium 137 and 50 millicuries of Americium 241. At approximately 3:15 PM, the Mesa Fire Department reported they had possession of a gauge found on a freeway near the work site.
A review of the situation confirmed that this was the lost source by the Licensee. The Agency (State of Arizona) has released the gauge to the Licensee for leak testing.
The NRC, FBI and Governor's Offices are being notified of this event.
The Agency continues to investigate this event.
First Notice: 14-008
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf +
On April 30, 2014, at 0800 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) will be unavailable due to pre-planned maintenance on a motor control center associated with the TSC. The TSC is expected to be restored to a functional status in approximately 13 hours.
If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures, and the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with the Hatch emergency plan and applicable site procedures.
This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the planned loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOHN SELLERS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2011 EDT ON 04/30/2014 * * *
The planned maintenance activities have been completed. The power was restored to the TSC at 1802 EDT on 4/30/14. Ventilation has been confirmed to be functional. The TSC was fully functional at 1802 EDT on 04/30/14.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayres). +
An employee with low blood sugar reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility for further evaluation. A whole body survey of the employee in her plant clothing was performed. The maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's right boot (7,887 dpm/100cm2). Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into her personal clothing, and was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release.
The licensee notified the NRC Fuel Facility Inspector. +
Based on a review of industry operating experience, it was identified that each unit has two un-fused DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building through other separate fire areas including the Control Room. The DC breakers used to protect the motor power conductors are insufficient to protect the control conductors for these circuits. It is postulated that a fire induced short in one fire area could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment by overheating the cable and causing a secondary fire in other fire areas where the cable is routed. At Unit 1, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Cable Spreading Area and Control Room. At Unit 2, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Normal Switchgear, Service Building Cable Tray Area, Cable Vault, Instrument Relay Room, Control Building West Communication Room, Control Building Cable Spreading Area and Control Room.
The postulated secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of each unit's fire protection analysis. A preliminary investigation of the issue indicates that existing fire protection safe shutdown procedures could be used to safely shut down the plant if needed. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures will be implemented for affected areas of the plant.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. +
This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. Unit 1 was in mode 1 and in a condition of moving irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. Unit 2 was in mode 5 and in the condition of moving irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, core alterations, and operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock (Unit 2) and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the auxiliary building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 5 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement) was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less that -0.25 inches of water column at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. +
The following was received from the state of Colorado via email:
On or after February 05, 2014, while working on a license renewal action, the Colorado Radiation Program was informed by the licensee that it had three (3) generally licensed electron capture detectors (ECDs), containing ~15-18 mCi of Ni-63 (each), that (leak tests) indicated contamination in excess of regulatory limits. The devices were determined to be manufactured by Hewlett-Packard and Agilent Technologies (model number verification is pending).
The licensee reported that upon discovery, the devices were contained to minimize potential contamination spread. The area where gauges were used/handled was surveyed and determined to be free of contamination. The licensee indicated that the manufacturer was notified and the devices have been returned to the manufacturer for disposal.
Further investigation by the Colorado Radiation Program is pending. +
The Service Water Radiation Monitor will be removed from service to facilitate planned preventative maintenance. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency assessment capability under NUREG 1022 revision 3 specific to RU 1.2 and RA 1.2. The planned maintenance is expected to last 7 hours. During this time, the site Chemistry Department will perform sampling every thirty minutes per procedure. As a result of the sampling, reasonable assurance exists to monitor and detect rising radiation levels in order to protect the health and safety of the public.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. +
At 1016 (EDT) CCNPP (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant) Unit 1 automatically tripped due to an RPS actuation. Cause is under investigation. All safety functions are met with normal heat removal. Electric plant is in a normal lineup. No ESFAS (Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System) actuations have occurred.
Steam Generator atmospheric dump valves momentarily opened and then closed. There is no known steam generator tube leakage. All control rods fully inserted on the trip.
There was no impact on Unit 2 from this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and provided a courtesy notification to the Calvert County Control Center. +
On 5/01/2014 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on one of the 66 penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. This penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 52 of 66 penetrations have been examined, with 51 satisfactory. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage.
The plant is currently shutdown and in a mode undefined (Defueled) and the reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup.
This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. +
While investigating a Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room instrument sump level high alarm, condensation was observed dripping out around the HPCI turbine shaft gland seals. A steady stream of water was also observed coming out of the governor end gland seal along with a slight leak coming from the coupling end. Observation revealed that leakage through the 'closed' steam admission valve (1E41-F001) was apparently resulting in water accumulation in the HPCI turbine. A blown fuse that prevented the associated HPCI exhaust drain pot from draining in conjunction with the leakage by the steam admission valve was determined to be sufficient to impact HPCI operability. Required actions were taken in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Efforts are underway to determine the actions needed to restore the HPCI system to operable status.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SELLERS TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0154 EDT ON 5/2/14 * * *
HPCI has been restored to an Operable but degraded nonconforming condition. Fuses replaced and automatic functions restored. Leakage confirmed to not be excessive for this condition. Compensatory actions established. Restoration time 2345 EDT 5/1/14.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ayers). +
An employee with a foreign body in his left eye reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid and then released the employee to an off-site medical facility for further evaluation. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed. The maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's boots, 370,667 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release.
Licensee notified NRC Region II Division of Fuel Facility Inspection personnel. +
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile from Flowserve:
Jam nuts were found to be missing on size 4, pressure class 600, normally open, in-line check valves per Flowserve drawing no. 07-45546-01. The valves are used in saturated steam service and must close with a reverse flow of less than 7000 lbs/hr steam at 95 and 1085 psig. The valve operating parts are identified as safety related.
These valves were supplied to both Diablo Canyon and Sequoyah nuclear power plants. Flowserve recommends that all in-service valves be inspected for proper torque and that dual thread staking be provided per revised Flowserve drawings. +
This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1920 (PDT), on 05/02/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Low and High Range Detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1754 EDT ON 05/08/14 FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO DONG PARK * * *
Following completion of maintenance activities PRM-RE-1B, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector was returned to operable status at 0810 PDT on 05/08/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R4DO (Whitten). +