Semantic search

Jump to: navigation, search
Search

Edit query Show embed code

The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Category:Power Reactor]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.4281 seconds.


Results 50 – 97    (Previous 50 | Next 50)   (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)   (JSON | CSV | RSS | RDF)
 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5428116 September 2019 14:35:00ClintonNRC Region 3Reactor Water CleanupOn 9/16/19 at 0817 CDT, the Division 1 and Division 2 reactor water cleanup (RT) system differential flow instrumentation was declared inoperable due to failing downscale caused by flashing in the sensing lines that occurred during reactor cooldown for refueling outage C1R19. The Division 1 and Division 2 RT differential flow instrumentation were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Conditions D and E which require restoring at least one division of instruments to operable status within one hour. This condition renders the leakage detection system incapable of performing its safety function, thus it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). In response to the above, system alignment was changed to increase subcooling to restore indication. Division 1 and 2 Division RT differential flow instrumentation were declared operable at 0852 on 9/16/19. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5427813 September 2019 12:23:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0427 CDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1334 EDT FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5427713 September 2019 12:21:00Watts BarNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1341 EDT FROM DEAN BAKER TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5427613 September 2019 11:57:00SequoyahNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 09/16/2019 AT 1148 EDT FROM SCOTT THOMAS TO BRIAN LIN VIA PHONE * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5427212 September 2019 03:25:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. Radiation monitor RU-140 (#2 Steam Generator Main Steam Line radiation monitor) experienced a communication failure on both ports A and B. The RU-140 monitor is off line and non-functional at this time. At least one channel of RU-140 is required to perform a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) dose assessment. This represents an unplanned loss of radiological assessment capability for the inability to perform dose assessments that require the radiation monitor. The ability to make emergency classifications from other radiological data collection methods such as field sampling remains available. Actions have been initiated to restore the radiation monitor. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5427112 September 2019 00:49:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Primary containmentOn September 11, 2019 at 1719 CDT, plant personnel identified a condition in which the 208 foot elevation inner primary containment airlock door was not in its fully seated and latched position while the 208 foot elevation outer primary containment airlock door was opened. The 208 foot elevation outer containment airlock door was subsequently closed by the individual exiting the area. The time that both 208 foot elevation containment airlock doors were not in their fully seated and latched positions was less than 1 minute. Following this occurrence, maintenance personnel inspected the 208 foot elevation inner containment airlock door and re-positioned this door to its fully seated and latched position. There was no radioactive release as a result of this event. This condition requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5426811 September 2019 17:58:00OconeeNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5426611 September 2019 03:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Remote shutdownA lightning strike occurred at approximately 1502 CDT on 09/10/2019, and a resulting power surge damaged some of the security door card reader system equipment. However, this did not affect access to plant areas for personnel who were already within protected area. At 1830 on 09/10/2019, it was discovered that some of the oncoming night shift personnel could not access particular areas that required the use of security card readers. Extent of condition check at 1934 on 09/10/2019 determined that access to 1A and 3A Electric Board Rooms, which contain remote shutdown panels and Fire Safe Shutdown equipment. was prohibited for the night shift personnel. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Access was restored to all plant areas at 2106 on 9/10/2019. No plant events occurred during the time frame that the 1A & 3A Electric Board Rooms inaccessible that would have required access to these areas. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542637 September 2019 15:53:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3Main Turbine
Reactor Protection System
At 1309 EDT on September 7, 2019, with the unit in Mode 1 at approximately 95 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during main turbine valve testing. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the turbine bypass valves discharging steam to the main condenser. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The cause of the reactor protection system actuation is under evaluation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542627 September 2019 12:01:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2Reactor Coolant SystemOn September 09, 2019 at 0824 EDT, with St. Lucie Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Low Reactor Coolant System Flow due to a trip of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. The cause of the loss of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump is currently under investigation. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by main feed water and the main condenser using the turbine steam bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 542576 September 2019 02:47:00South TexasNRC Region 4Reactor Coolant System

EN Revision Text: CONTAINMENT PENETRATION DISCOVERED NOT ISOLATED At 2115 CDT on 9/5/2019, an inside containment test connection and inoperable outside containment isolation valve were discovered to be open for a containment air sample penetration. This resulted in the containment penetration not being isolated. The inside containment test connection was closed at 2322 CDT on 9/5/2019.

This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURTON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1342 EST ON 11/7/19 * * *

This event was originally reported on September 6, 2019 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Upon completion of the investigation of the event, it was determined that the event had insignificant safety consequences because the containment breach was disconnected from the Reactor Coolant System by a series of closed valves for the duration of the event. Additionally, the lines to the inside containment connection and the outside inoperable containment isolation valve that was found to be open as well as the main line connecting and passing through the penetration were one-inch diameter lines. Analysis determined that containment breaches that are less than a three-inch diameter do not lead to a large radiation release. The event did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) did not apply to this event and this notification is to retract reporting under that criterion. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).

ENS 542565 September 2019 16:53:00CatawbaNRC Region 2This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system occurred on 4/28/19. Filtration capability was not impacted by this condition. Maintenance subsequently repaired the condition and the TSC ventilation system was returned to service on 5/1/19. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility."
ENS 542531 September 2019 17:44:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2A hurricane warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the plant site. A hurricane warning was confirmed with the State Watch Office at 1717 EDT. As a matter of procedure, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event classification for the hurricane warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the offsite notification."
ENS 542521 September 2019 00:09:00Watts BarNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramWhile operating at 100 percent power, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped at 2055 EDT on August 31, 2019 due to loss of steam generator #2 level control. The trip was not complex. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems, including Auxiliary Feedwater, actuated as designed. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Dump System. Unit 2 is not affected. The cause of the loss of steam generator water level control is being investigated. The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5424428 August 2019 19:10:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Core Spray
High Pressure Core Spray
Primary containment
On Wednesday, August 28, 2019, at 1316 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a power loss to the Control Room High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Instrumentation Panel due to an internal inverter failure. The power loss caused the loss of the HPCS System (a single train system). The minimum flow valve (a Primary Containment Isolation Valve) for HPCS opened due to this power loss as well. This valve was manually closed in response to this, and the outboard isolation requirement for the associated penetration (which) is closed (for the) system remained intact throughout this event. No other accident mitigation systems were affected by this event. The cause of this event is under investigation at this time. The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. This Condition is an 8-hour reportable condition as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
ENS 5424227 August 2019 02:34:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
At 0109 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a dropped rod causing a negative rate trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and steam dump systems. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5424126 August 2019 16:41:00CookNRC Region 3A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during pre-access testing. The employee's access to the plant was denied.
ENS 5423925 August 2019 15:51:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3Feedwater
Standby Gas Treatment System
Reactor Building Ventilation
Automatic ScramOn August 25, 2019, at 1102 (CDT), Quad Cities Unit 1 experienced an automatic scram from 100 percent power. All rods fully inserted and there were no complications. The trip was initiated from a main generator ground fault relay. Troubleshooting of the fault is in progress. All systems responded as designed. There were no systems inoperable and no TS (Technical Specification) action statements were in progress prior to the Reactor Scram. Reactor water level dropped below the Group 2 and Group 3 Reactor Water Level Isolation set-points as expected, and recovered via the Feedwater system. Standby Gas Treatment System auto started and Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation occurred as expected. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 was not affected.
ENS 5423723 August 2019 00:33:00HatchNRC Region 2High Pressure Coolant InjectionAt 2234 (EDT), on 08/22/2019, while Unit (2) was at approximately 100 percent power in MODE 1, it was discovered that Unit 2 HPCI was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Initial evaluation is that it is a power supply issue. The system had no indications, followed by smoke from behind the circuitry, and then indications returning. This is associated with a 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation.
ENS 5423422 August 2019 12:49:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) regarding an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On June 27, 2019, at 0130 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, the U2 4-kV Vital Bus F was automatically transferred from its auxiliary power to its startup power due to an invalid loss of bus voltage signal. The cause of the invalid signal was due to a test jumper that was inadvertently left in place during surveillance testing. As a result, one auxiliary saltwater pump started and two containment fan cooler units started in slow speed. At 1245 PDT, Vital Bus F was transferred back from startup power to auxiliary power which is the normal plant operating configuration. This event was entered into the Diablo Canyon Power Plant corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
ENS 5423320 August 2019 20:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5423220 August 2019 18:28:00CooperNRC Region 4At 0939 CDT, on 8/19/19, the National Weather Service reported to Cooper Nuclear Station that the National Warning System (NAWAS) Radio would neither transmit nor receive. The system has been intermittently available since then, but never declared fully functional. The backup notification system has been verified to be available throughout this period. Additional information from the National Weather Service received 8/20/19 at 1414 determined that the Shubert Tower transmitter is non-functional and would not be repaired until 8/21/19. The transmission outage is conservatively assumed to have begun at the first notification on 8/19/19 at 0939. The Shubert Tower transmitter activates the (EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM) EAS/Tone Alert Radios used for public notification. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) when the primary notification system is or will be unavailable for greater than 24 hours with the backup system available. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed."
ENS 5422919 August 2019 14:46:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3Auxiliary Feedwater
Feedwater
At 0924 EDT, on August 19, 2019, it was discovered that both trains of the Auxiliary Feedwater System were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The door separating the two steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms was inadvertently left open during maintenance activities for more than an hour. The door was immediately closed upon discovery, restoring operability to the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The non-safety grade Motor-Driven Feedwater Pump remained operable during this time; additionally, the beyond-design basis diesel-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump also remained available. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5422416 August 2019 15:05:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Steam Generator
Automatic ScramAt 0821 MST, on August 16, 2019, a main turbine trip occurred followed by a loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room then received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Following the reactor trip, auxiliary feedwater was manually started to maintain steam generator levels. A Main Steam Isolation Signal was manually initiated as directed by the Emergency Operating Procedures. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or challenged operator response. All control element assemblies fully inserted into the core and no emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric steam dump valves. Units 1 and 3 were unaffected by this event.
ENS 5422014 August 2019 20:00:00Watts BarNRC Region 2This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) actuation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2. On July 26, 2019, at 1003 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Train A CVI actuated due to an invalid High Radiation signal from 2-RM-90-130, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. Prior to and following the invalid High Radiation alarm, all radiation monitors except 2-RM-90-130 were stable at their normal values. All required automatic actuations occurred as designed. Upon investigation, the cause of the invalid High Radiation alarm was due to a failed ratemeter for 2-RM-90-130. Control room operators performed appropriate checks and confirmed that the subject indication was an invalid high radiation signal. The ratemeter for 2-RM-90-130 was replaced and the monitor returned to service. At the time of the event, plant conditions for a High Radiation alarm did not exist; therefore, the CVI was invalid. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5421914 August 2019 14:47:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3At 12:01 PM (EDT), on August 14, 2019, all fifty-four (54) of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Offsite Emergency Notification sirens were inadvertently activated for one minute during a planned silent test. The County Sheriff's Dispatch Office notified FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company of the inadvertent actuation. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). All sirens remain functional, and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the issue. The Licensee will be notifying Ottawa and Lucas counties and the state of Ohio. The inadvertent activation was by the county dispatcher.
ENS 5421211 August 2019 12:14:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Auxiliary Feedwater
Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Automatic ScramAt 0840 EDT, on August 11, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to low water levels in the steam generators. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS and AFW. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup.
ENS 5421111 August 2019 11:40:00SalemNRC Region 1Feedwater
Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramAt 0814 EDT on 8/11/19, with Unit 2 at 83 percent power during a planned load reduction, the reactor was manually tripped due to degraded feedwater flow control to the 23 Steam Generator caused by a malfunction of the associated Feedwater Regulating Valve, 23BF19. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred following the manual reactor trip as expected due to low level in the steam generators. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. Due to the actuation of the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of New Jersey. Unit 1 remains at 100 percent power.
ENS 542058 August 2019 13:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4Shield Building
HVAC
This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On June 25, 2019, at Waterford 3, while performing an emergent replacement of relays on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A that affected Shield Building Ventilation Train A and HVAC Equipment Room Supply Fan AH-1 3A, unintentional contact was made between two contacts on the relay, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of other relays in the sequencer circuit. This caused the starting of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A, Switchgear Ventilation Fan A, and Boric Acid Makeup pumps. This was a partial actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A. Affected plant systems started and functioned successfully. This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542036 August 2019 17:29:00PerryNRC Region 3Reactor Protection System
Feedwater
At 1335 EDT on 08/06/2019, it was discovered that reactor protection system (RPS) instrumentation functions for turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure, end of cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) instrumentation, and control rod block instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable due to a loss of feedwater heating; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). RPS instrumentation, EOC-RPT instrumentation, and control rod block instrumentation functions were restored at 1422 EDT on 08/06/2019. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542015 August 2019 17:06:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Secondary containmentOn August 5, 2019, at 0936 CDT, Grand Gulf entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 due to a Secondary Containment personnel door, 1A401B, not being able to meet its design function. Door 1A401B was unable to be closed and latched. This condition is being reported as a loss of safety function. The station also entered 05-S-01-EP-4, Auxiliary Building Control (Secondary Containment) to address Auxiliary Building differential pressure due to the opened Secondary Containment penetration. Actions were taken to close and latch Door 1A401B. Secondary Containment has been declared operable. TS 3.6.4.1 and 05-S-01-EP-4 were exited. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the condition."
ENS 541995 August 2019 01:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On August 4, 2019 at 1745 (EDT), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 11 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 11. The APRMs were restored to operable on August 4, 2019 at 1807, when the RRP 11 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 541983 August 2019 23:33:00Hope CreekNRC Region 1Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramAt 1947 (EDT) on 8/3/19, with Hope Creek in Mode 1 at 37 percent power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to loss of condenser vacuum. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. Reactor level was stabilized using Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and Reactor Feedwater Pumps. Currently reactor water level is being maintained by the feedwater system and decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the main turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the manual actuation of RCIC, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safe shutdown equipment available. The licensee will be notifying the state of Delaware, state of New Jersey and the Lower Alloway Creek township.
ENS 541973 August 2019 06:47:00ClintonNRC Region 3High Pressure Core Spray
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Standby Gas Treatment System
Service water
Primary containment
Secondary containment
Automatic Scram

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL At 0226 (CDT), an automatic scram on low reactor water level occurred due to a trip of the 'B' Reactor Feed pump. All control rods fully inserted. Reactor water level 2 was reached and the High Pressure Core Spray system, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system, Division 3 diesel generator, Standby Gas Treatment Systems 'A' and 'B' and all shutdown safety related service water pumps started as expected. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Core Spray injected as expected. All level 2 containment isolation signals occurred as expected and all level 2 containment valves closed as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled in band by condensate. Reactor pressure is being maintained by main turbine Bypass Valves. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), for ECCS discharge to RCS; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), for RPS actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for specified system actuation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency per their communications protocol.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID LIVINGSTON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0321 EDT ON 8/4/19 * * *

Following automatic initiation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System as described above, the HPCS System was manually secured following station procedures after verification that additional RPV (reactor pressure vessel) injection was no longer required. Securing HPCS injection in this manner prevents automatic restart of the system in the event of a subsequent low RPV level condition, rendering it inoperable. As the HPCS system is considered a single train safety system, this meets the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This reportable condition was identified following review of post-scram actions. The HPCS system has been restored to a Standby lineup. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAMES FORMAN TO KERBY SCALES AT 1545 EDT ON 8/6/19 * * *

Following the scram, the Primary Containment to Secondary Containment and the Drywell to Primary Containment differential pressure limits were exceeded. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4, Primary Containment Pressure, and 3.6.5.4, Drywell Pressure, Actions A.1, B.1, and B.2 were entered. Primary Containment to Secondary Containment differential pressure and Drywell to Primary Containment differential pressure were restored to within the LCO limits at 1505 on 8/3/19 and the associated TS Actions were exited. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function due to being outside the initial conditions to ensure that drywell and containment pressures remain within design values during a loss of coolant accident. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the drywell and primary containment functions to control the release of radioactive material for the same reason. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

ENS 5419131 July 2019 16:20:00WaterfordNRC Region 4Reactor Coolant SystemOn July 31, 2019, at 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced initiation of a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Prior to this, on July 31, 2019, at 1108 CDT, the boron injection flow paths were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.2, 'Flow Paths - Operating,' and the charging pumps were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.4, 'Charging Pumps-Operating.' This was due to visual examination identifying that propagation had progressed on a previously identified flaw on piping upstream of the header supplying the charging pumps. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to the action statements of LCOs 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 not being met. LCO 3.0.3 requires that action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours. At 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced direct boration to the reactor coolant system. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."
ENS 5419031 July 2019 15:55:00South TexasNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: DISCOVERY OF CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1 reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0601 was declared inoperable on December 29, 2018, STP Unit 1 reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0602 was declared inoperable on July 30, 2019. Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 requires one of two reactor head vent valves to be operable. This issue placed the plant in a 30-day Technical Specification Action. At 0741 CDT on July 31, 2019, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) made a determination based on firm evidence that reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0602 had been inoperable since June 24, 2019. This results in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The inoperable equipment is required for accident conditions and presents no danger to the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the units. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURTON TO KERBY SCALES AT 1108 EDT ON 8/21/19 * * *

The Event Date and Time provided in EN# 54190 should have been reported as 7/30/2019 at 1521 CDT, since this was the time of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Young)."

ENS 5418830 July 2019 15:42:00FermiNRC Region 3Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
High Pressure Coolant Injection
On July 30, 2019, at 1014 EDT, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan D was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while placing in it high speed. The MDCT Fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation revealed that a high speed breaker control power fuse had blown. The control power fuse was replaced, the MDCT Fan D was tested satisfactorily, and HPCI was declared operable at 1431 EDT. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector
ENS 5418527 July 2019 22:31:00PerryNRC Region 3Main Steam Isolation Valve
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1929 EDT on 7/27/2019, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 98 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to a Main Turbine Trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were manually closed to prevent exceeding Reactor Pressure Vessel Cooldown Rate. Rector Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was manually initiated to stabilize Reactor Vessel Water Level and Pressure following MSIV closure. The Main Condenser and Feedwater are available. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via RCIC. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the Main Condenser and RCIC. The cause of the Main Turbine Trip is currently under investigation. The site is in a normal electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5418326 July 2019 13:27:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5417923 July 2019 19:50:00San OnofreNRC Region 4On 7/23/2019 at 1405 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) made a required formal notification to the Regional Water Quality Control Board for the state of California concerning a monthly oil sample of the oil removal system. The sample was analyzed to contain 42 ppm oil. This number exceeds the daily instantaneous maximum of 20 ppm. An additional sample was taken approximately one minute later and was analyzed to contain 8.1 ppm oil, potentially indicating a problem with the initial sample. Additional investigation is underway and a written follow-up report will be submitted to the Regional Water Quality Control Board within 5 days in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. The licensee will inform NRC Region IV staff.
ENS 5417621 July 2019 12:08:00CookNRC Region 3Service water
Reactor Protection System
Feedwater
Steam Generator
Main Turbine
Manual ScramOn July 19, 2019, DC Cook Unit 2 started experiencing degraded performance on the Unit 2 Non-Essential Service Water System (NESW) which affected one (1) NESW pump. On July 21, 2019, a second NESW pump on Unit 2 experienced degradation. On July 21, 2019, DC Cook Unit 2 elected to do a rapid downpower over approximately 40 minutes and perform a Manual Reactor Trip from 17 percent (rated thermal power) to repair the condition before any threshold was exceeded. The manual reactor trip was completed at 0826 EDT on July 21, 2019. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Aux Feedwater pumps were started as required and are operating properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves following breaking Main Condenser Vacuum for expedited cooldown of the Main Turbine. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Unit 1 was not affected.
ENS 5417519 July 2019 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2Main Steam Isolation Valve
Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Automatic ScramAt 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted.
ENS 5416816 July 2019 17:34:00FermiNRC Region 3At 1445 EDT, on 7/16/2019, during routine maintenance activities on the sanitary sewage system, a leak from an overflow line to a parking lot was discovered. The total amount leaked is estimated to be 20 gallons. Approximately 2 gallons reached gravel in an excavated section of the parking lot. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause of the leak is under investigation. As a result of some of the sewage reaching gravel, environmental reports are being made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the Monroe County Health Department, and the local news media. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5416315 July 2019 16:30:00FermiNRC Region 3Service waterAt 1335 EDT on 7/15/2019, during dredging activities in Fermi 2's General Service Water (GSW) intake canal, a hydraulic line on the dredging machine became disconnected and approximately one quart of hydraulic oil spilled into Lake Erie. The oil leak to navigable waters has been stopped. The oil was contained within a boom, cleanup activities commenced immediately, and cleanup was completed at 1500 EDT. The cause of the oil leak is under investigation. Environmental spill reports were made to local, state, and federal government agencies. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State agencies notified were Michigan Department of Environmental Protection and the Michigan Pollution Emergency Alerting System. The licensee also notified the National Response Center.
ENS 5416212 July 2019 22:50:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2High Pressure Coolant Injection
Core Spray
At 1640 CDT on 7/12/19, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) received an invalid auto isolation signal which closed the HPCI steam supply valves rendering HPCI inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The isolation occurred while performing a calibration and functional check of a level switch for the Unit 1 Core Spray system. Continuity was checked across the incorrect set of contacts which completed the circuit in logic bus 'A' for the auto isolation signal in the HPCI system. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel during the time HPCI system was isolated. HPCI was returned to operable at 2110 CDT on 7/12/19. CR 1532094 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 541528 July 2019 18:40:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 541473 July 2019 18:32:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4FeedwaterThis 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On May 9, 2019, at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, while performing an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel B monthly test, a test pushbutton was mispositioned, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System. In accordance with the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Trip Test portion of the surveillance, the first technician placed EFIC Train B in the tripped condition. The second technician then went to the front of the control room to verify Remote Switch Matrix (RSM) indications. The first technician recalls thinking he was given the order to reset Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. Therefore, the first technician performed the step using three-part communication, but there is uncertainty about what was said. Due to the amount of time the second technician spent in front of the control room, the first technician assumed Operations reset the RSM to complete the Train B reset. The second technician returned to the ESAS cabinet and directed the first technician to perform the reset of Train B EFW Bus 1 Trip. The first technician, expecting his next action to be the trip of Train B EFW Bus 2, placed Bus 2 in the tripped condition. This put both buses of Train B EFW in trip and caused the actuation of P-7A EFW Pump. This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 541453 July 2019 15:24:00South TexasNRC Region 4

At 1026 CDT on July 3, 2019, the National Weather Service notified the South Texas Project (STP) that the Bay City NOAA radio transmitter was out of service. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This condition impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the STP Electric Generating Station. The loss of the alert radio system meets the reporting criterion for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Matagorda County alert sirens, which are also part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remain operable. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. These measures consist of a reverse 911 system available from Matagorda County as well as local law enforcement personnel who would perform route alerting for the affected areas of the EPZ. The event has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A return to service time for the radio transmitter is not currently available. Matagorda County was also notified by the National Weather Service and STP. This meets the reporting requirement for notification of an offsite agency, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT TATRO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1615 EDT ON 7/3/19 * * *

At 1321 CDT, the National Weather Service communication tower was returned to service. South Texas Project verified that the automatic notification radios have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire).