ML20137R049
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| ML20137R049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1986 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137R046 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-85-31-EC, 50-336-85-36, NUDOCS 8602070171 | |
| Download: ML20137R049 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000245/1985031
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:-
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT FOR SPECIAL INSPECTION
50-245/85-31; 50-336/85-36
Docket Nos.: 50-245; 50-336
Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Facility: Millstone Units 1 and 2
Meeting At: Region I, King of Prussia,-Pennsylvania
Date: January 9, 1986
Prepared By: k [ hm -s ([ay/%
R. J. Summers, Project Engineer /Date
Approved By: M Std
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B
ll24l86
Date
Meeting Summary
The enforcement conference was held to discuss the findings of NRC Special Inspec-
tion 50-245/85-31; 50-336/85-36. The licensee presented the results of their re-
view of the event and the corrective measures they have taken and plan to take to
prevent recurrence.
8602070171 060204
PDR ADOCK 05000245
G PDR
_ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - .
.
DETAILS
1. Licensee Attendees
J. Opeka, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations
E. Mroczka, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
W. Romberg, Millstone Station Superintendent
J. Kelley, Millstone Station Services Superintendent
R. Kacich, Licensing Supervisor
R. Asafayco, Quality Services Supervisor
N. Tasker, Director, System Security (NUSCo)
2. NRC Attendees
T. Murley, Regional Administrator
J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
W. Kane, Deputy Director, DRP
J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel
E. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B, DRP
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material and Safeguard Branch, Division of Radiation
Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS
J. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Madden, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS
R. Summers, Project Engineer, DRP
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
3. Licensee Prese.7tation and Discussion
The licensee made a presentation addressing their investigation into the dis-
covery on November 13, 1985, of a handgun in a tractor trailer cab upon exit
search from the Millstone Station protected area. The licensee's presentation
included a review of the event and corrective actions taken and to be taken
in the future. A copy of the licensee's presentation materials are appended.
4. Meeting Results
NRC Region I acknowledged the efforts the licensee has taken and plans to take
to prevent recurrence of this type of event. Any enforcement actions taken
in regard to this event will be forwarded under separate correspondence.
. ._ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _
,
' i . -+
s !
.
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
'
USNRC REGION 1
JANUARY 9, 1986
i Reference: Special Inspection
A Problem Description
On November 13, 1985 at approximately 1310 hours a .38 caliber revolver was
found in a Tri-State Motor Transport tractor trailer cab as it was exiting
the Millstone Station protected area. The weapon was discovered inside a
locked briefcase which was located in the sleeper section of the cab, be-
tween the cab wall and the mattress, covered by two pillows. During the
inbound search the assigned guard failed to locate the briefcase and there-
!
fore did not discover the weapon.
The following is a summary of events that occurred concerning the Tri-State
vehicle.
1
i
The Tri-State vehicle in question arrived at the Vehicle Access Point on
' the Unit 1 and 2 side at approximately 0945 hours. The officer assigned to
vehicle sign in/ vehicle searches notified the Radwaste Department and ob-
tained authorization for the-vehicle to enter the protected area.
Once the vehicle was " frisked" by Health Physics it was allowed to enter
the inbound search pen via gate 12 (Appendix A Vehicle Access Program).
The driver was then questioned by the search officer as to whether or not
he was carrying any weapons, explosives, drugs or liquor; to which he
replied in the negative. The driver then opened all his cargo storage
doors and he and.his passenger proceeded to the personnel access point to
<
be processed. .
l A few minutes into the search the driver came out of the personnel access
point and asked the search officer if he could enter his vehicle to re-
trieve his passenger's handbag, as she needed her identification for pro-
cessing. The search officer directed him to enter the search pen via gate
e 12 (outside the protected area). At this time the driver advised the
! search officer that he remembered that he had some "little bottles" in the
vehicle. When the officer questioned him further he determined that the
~
driver was referring to small bottles of liquor. The officer advised the
driver that the liquor could not be brought into the protected area, how-
ever, the bottles could be locked in the property hold box in the personnel
access point until he left the protected area. The officer then questioned
i the driver again to determine if there were any other prohibited items in
the vehicle. The driver again replied no.
l ~
The search officer then completed searching the vehicle. The search in .
j cluded the cargo areas, the inside of the cab on both sides, the overhead, '
the sleeping compartment, under the seats, the. engine compartment and the
exterior undercarriage area. The search officer appc'rently performed an
inadequate search as he did not discover the briefcase in the sleeping
compartment.
)
1 -- . , , , _ _ _ - _ _ - , _ - - - - _ - _ .
*
-
,
-2-
,
The vehicle with the driver, passenger and escort entered the protected
area at 1000 hours. The cab was then hooked up to a trailer. The driver,
passenger and escort exited the vehicle, locked it and went to the radwaste
trailer where they remained until approximately 1235 hours. When all the
required paperwork was ready the driver, passenger and escort went to the
radwaste office for approximately 10 to 15 minutes then returned to the
vehicle and drove to the exit search pen.
While the driver and passenger were processing out through the personnel
access point a different search officer performed an exit search of the
vehicle. During this exit search the officer discovered a briefcase in the
sleeping compartment between the wall of the cab and the mattress, covered
by two pillows. The briefcase was locked. After completing the vehicle
search the officer requested that the driver be sent into the search pen to
open the locked ~ briefcase. The search officer asked the driver if there
was.anything inside the briefcase she "should know about" prior to him
,
opening it. He replied, no. The driver unlocked the briefcase combination
lock and advised the officer that she could open it. When the officer
lifted the top she noticed the barrel of a gun. She shut the briefcase,
told the driver to move back slowly with his hands up and had gate 14
opened to allow him out of the pen.
B Cause Of Problem
NNECo determined that this incident was due to inadequate performance by
the inbound search officer due to the following:
*
The licensee personnel and the Contractor Training Department did an
indepth review of the training program and concluded that it was
satisfactory.
* A review of the vehicle search history shows that security officers
find prohibited item prior to vehicle entry and take appropriate
action.
*
The weapon was found during the exit search which is of the same
quality and uses the same standards as the entrance search.
C Corrective Action
Completed Actions
* The inbound search of ficer, who has a long history of good service,
was suspended for three days, then retrained and requalified in all
access control and search tasks (personnel and vehicle access).
*
An awareness bulletin was promulgated by the contractor force manage-
ment for review by all security personnel.
- - - - - _ .____ - _ _
r_
- *
,
-3-
.
*
A special program was established by the contractor force where their
supervisors monitor a specific number of vehicle searches each shift
and document the results. On the spot corrections are made as neces-
sary.
*
The contractor reviewed the existing training program for vehicle
searches and concluded that the training program is satisfactory.
*
The Tri-State Motor Transport Company has been informed of the inci-
dent by letter and advised of station policy.
*
The Tri-State Motor Transport Ccmpany has been advised of NRC enforce-
ment action and requesting a response detailing their corrective
action.
*
Signs have been posted at each vehicle access stating weapons and
firearms must be declared to security prior to protected area entry.
Planned Actions To Be Completed Prior To April 1, 1986
*
As an enhancement to the training program, arrangements have been made
to lease a cab over engine with a sleeping compartment to be used for
hands-on guard training.
*
A letter will be re-issued to trucking firms that frequently do busi-
ness at Millstone advising them of station policy and NRC requirements.
This letter will be re-issued periodically.
* A bank of lockers that can be utilized by drivers to store items they
- do not want searched or brought into the protected area will be placed
outside the protected' area and away from the search area.
D Conclusion / Summary
NNECo has determined that the incident was an isolated event that has been
adequately corrected and should not recur based on the following:
~
*
NNECo identified the problem.
*
The guard who discovered the weapon reported it promptly and properly
followed procedures.
*
As indicated by past discoveries the searches have been effective in
prohibiting unauthorized material from being taken into the protected
area.
*
The matter was promptly reported to the NRC.
*
Appropriate corrective action has been taken and will be reinforced by
additional actions prior to April 1, 1986.
F ! l i i i
r
. .
.
.
APPENDIX A
VEHICLE ACCESS PROGRAM
The Vehicle Access Points at Millstone are both located adjacent to a personnel
access point. Each Vehicle Access Point has. inbound and outbound search pens
which isolate and control the vehicles during the search process. CCTV is used
to monitor the search pens and to inspect the tops of the vehicles. The
monitors for the CCTV system are located at the vehicle access booths which are
manned by an armed guard when the access point is in use. Normal vehicle
processing is as follows:
*
Vehicles stop outside the search pen areas for authorization and logging
in.
*
Once authorization has been obtained the vehicle is allowed to enter the
inbound search pen providing that the pen is empty or that searches have
not been initiated on vehicles previously let in the pen.
*
The driver and any passengers are required to leave the search pen and go
to the personnel access point for processing. The gates to the search pen
are closed while the search is being conducted.
*
When the search is completed the officer requests that the protected area
gate be open and allows the driver and any passengers or escorts (now
badged) into the pen from the protected area side.
*
Once the vehicle exits the pen the protected area gate is closed. Written
security procedures prohibit opening both sets of gates in a search pen
except during an emergency.
*
.Upon exiting the same process is used in reverse using the outbound pen.
_ _
- ., __
_ _ _ _ - -_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -
r .
.
.
,
): Sign-
n
I"
J' Booth
n ,
i
,.
l ,,
"
Gate 12
>>
JI
"
I,
. I
f
1,
' lI 1;
i:
ir
Spenarch
,,
;-
1:
l
t u ,
"
y n
;
.
' n
n
I IN
8 ),
d
Gate 13 2
~
*
n l
I
P g
/
# Jr
0 ,
,
;
i
*
'
-
';
I
a Cate la n
i.' L N
i
] <N "
!
}h ,
h_" OUT
"
! ,
- A
i ,,
!
Personnel 4
i Access
l Point -
u Search
-
- -
" -en 3
"' % 4
b ,
'
D
"
, %
-
- '
Ga+e 15
I I
e
o
,\
z .
/ \
Q l
- __
n--
. .. -
,
.
VEHICLE SEARCH INFORMATION
DATE WEAPON OR PROHIBITED ITEMS
04-09-84 WINE
04-09-84 BEER
12-31-84 KNIFE
01-10-85 BEER
02-05-85 WEAPON j
02-19-85 WEAPON
03-04-85 WEAPON AND AMMO
03-05-85 WEAPON
04-03-85 BEER
04-12-85 LIQUOR
05-15-85 BEER
10-01-85 WEAPON
11-13-85 LIQUOD
12-09-85 WEAo0N
12-11-85 WEAPONS
l
l
l ,
_
--..
r~' Interoffice memorandum
Q, tu: Burns Supervisory Personnel frors Ronald C. Petersen [[ datz November 14, 1985
Chief of. Security
.
subject Vehicle Searches ,
cWes.
.
~
U3-821 -
,
..............................................................................
.
As all are aware, a loaded handgun came on site on November 13 through VAP.
This was a one-hour NRC reportable event, and NRC disposition is pending.
.
The amount, quality, and speed of corrective action taken following an event
such as this can have a, major effect on the final NRC dispositon. As'a part
of our corrective action, the following practice will begin with the se:ond
shift on November 14.
Supervisors will begin monitoring individual vehicle searches at each vehicle
access point. The number of searches monitored should be as many as practical,
but not fewer than four per shift. Searches monitored should focus on tractors
with . sleeping compartments whenever possible. The supervisor is to carefully
observe the search, ensure that the search is adequate, and correct any minor
deficiencies'on the spot. If an inadequate search is observed, ensure that a
proper search is perfonned and report the incident to the shift connander for
final resolution. All observations are to be documented on Burns Routine Re-
ports and will include the date, time, and location of search, the officer
perfonning the search, and coments concerning the throughness and adequacy of
the search.
,This is a temporary measure to be continued until further notice.
RCP:sk
.
.
_ _ . _ _ _ -
-__ ,
-
l ....,-.-
. .
.. .. ; u . . ...-_ ,
.
[Tl
L.
Interoffice memorandum
toc All Burns Security from: November 14. 1985
Personnel Ronald
Chief C..Petersen.h
of Security date:
subject Awareness - Vehicle Searches cop
..
U3-821
_______________________________________________,______________________________
On November 13, 1985 at approximately 0945 brs., a tractor with a sleeping com.
partment entered site through VAP. Questioning of the driver revealed the pre-
sence of several small liquor bottles, which were properly removed and held.
The search revealed no other material or conditions calling for denial of access,
and the cab entered the Protected Area.
On the same date at approximately 1310 hrs., the same vehicle was exiting the
Protected Area when the outbound search revealed the presence of a locked brief-
case. The search officer, observing proper procedure and precaution had the
driver unlock the briefcase. The officar opened the briefcase and discovered.
a loaded .38 caliber handgun. The briefcase was found between the mattress and
the wall of the cab, covered by two pillows. Investigation indicates this to
be the location of the briefcase when the vehicle came in, and when it was not
discovered by the in-bound search officer.
The result was that a loaded weapon was inside the protected area in a blue pass
vehicle driven by a non-picture V badge individual. This was a one-hour NRC
reportable event, and the final cisposition by the NRC is pending.
The above described incident highlights the r.eed to ensure that every search be
complete and thorough, and that search officers be aware of all areas within a
vehicle where prohibited items may be hidden. Vehicle searches are a routine
function, with the vast majerity of searches revealing no prohibited items. We
cannot let this fact lull us into a false sence of security. As evidenced b.y
the above incident, a loaded weapon could be present on any vehicle we search.
The consequences of not finding one are potentially severe.
Let's learn fom this incident and prevent any re-occurance through thoroughness
and awareness.
RCP:sk
,
f
- -
- . _ . . _ .. - , - . . -- - - - . - . - - - - - .
m
v.
-
.
.
'
.
*
. .
Geomi Men e See Suwt Benin Connect cut
NORTHEAST UTILITIES
[,7%," "",",~,,. P O BOX 270
.3, .w. HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 061414270
g y e (203) 666-6911
L .ee
.r am
u ar-a ca*. .
.
Novernber 22, 1985
MP-8404
Tri State Motor Transport Co.
Lock Box No. 462
Joplin, M0. 64802
Gentlemen:
Recent events at Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford , Conn. ,
have indicated a need for a re-statement of Northeast Utilities pelicy
regarding possession of weapons at this station.
Briefly stated, the policy is that no weapon is to be brought into the
station's protected area.
If an individual applying for protected area access has a weapon in his
possession, and a valid permit for that weapon issued by the State of
Connecticut, the weapon is to be surrendered to the guard force prior to
entry. The weapon will be returned upon exit. .
If an individual applying for protected area access has a weapon in his
possession, and has n_c o valid permit for that weapon issued by the State
of Connecticut, that person is in violation of Connecticut state law.
The weapon vill be confiscated by the Security Of ficer and, together
with the person possessing the weapon, turned over to the police for
disposition.
l Your drivers can save themselves a great deal of trouble by not attecpt-
ing to bring any weapon into nuclear power stations under control of
Northeast Utilities. Please bring this letter to their attention.
Very truly yours,
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
& O
Wayne D. Bomberg
Station Superintendent
M1 . stone Nuclear Power Station
WDR/PLW:mo
ec: P. L. Weekley
/
.
1
NORTHEAST UTILITIES **' o"'ca * $*'o St'**t **'"a cenaaet cut
ZM,",*,,'m'"C P O BOX 270
.. ..,,. .: . :,m HARTFORD CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
g == s e u . a, a ca (203) 666-6911
" " * " ***""
December 11, 1985
i MP-8471
Tri State Motor Transport Co.
Lock Box No. 462
Joplin, MO. 64802
Gentlemen:
On November 22, 1985 I addressed a letter to you restating the Northeast
Utilities policy regarding possession of weapons at this station. The
incident that prompted the letter was the introduction of a pistol into
the station's protected area by a Tri State driver, Mr. Roosevelt
Murray.
At about 1:10 PM on November 13, 1985 a .38 caliber revolver was dis-
covered in the " sleeper" section of the tractor trailer cab as the cab
was being inspected for departure from the station. The revolver was in
a briefcase between the mattress and the vall of the cab, covered by two
pillows.
Our subsequent investigation revealed that the officer who performed the
search when the truck was enterinF the station did not find the weapon.
However, this officer questioned Fr. Murray prior to the vehicle search,
asking him if he was carrying any weapens, explosives, drugs or If quor.
The driver replied "no". Subsequently, the driver adcitted to having
four small bottles of liquer which were re=oved from the vehicle prior
to its entering the station's protected area.
The Nuclear Regulatory Cer=ir sien (NRC) has also investigated the
incident. NRC enforcement action is likely, and may result in a signif-
icant fine of Northeast Utilities.
Please advise me as soon as possible that you have brought ey earlier
letter to the attention of all of your drivers. Also, I would appreci-
ate your advising me of any other corrective action that you have taken,
or that you intend to take in the future. A reply before January 1,
l 1986 would be helpful to me in my discussions with NRC officials. ! '
Very truly yours,
- NORTHEAST NUC1. EAR ENERGY COMPAh*Y
N6y 0
k.yne D. Rom rg
Station Superi endent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
VDR/RJA:mo
ec: E. J. Mroczka
J. J. Kelley
R. J. Asafaylo
.'
.'
Security Program
November, 1983 -
Present
Units 1, 2, and 3
Violations Date Level
Failure to fulfill security plan 5-11-84 IV
comitment (Outage Access) didn't
record card key access on one
authorized personnel entry to VA
(SRI)50-245/84-11
Failure to provide effective 2-20-85 IV
surveillance of isolation zone.
(Truck Parked next to fence
blocking view of camera)
(SRI)50-245/85-02
50-336/85-03
Failure to detect unauthorized 11-13-85
weapon transported on site in
attache case in Truck Sleeper
Compartment. (LIC ID'd - special
inspection by SRI - 50-245/85-31
and 50-336/85-36
Failure to lock door of 12-5-85 V
unattended vehicle. Re:
50-423/85-74
SALP ASSESSMENT
Category I -
Units 1 and 2
Category 1 -
Unit 3 (Recomended to DRP)
/
}}