IR 05000309/1984011

Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Resolution of Insp Issues from Insp Rept 50-309/84-11.Items Closed,Pending Region I Confirmation

ML20133G298
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	07/31/1985
From:	NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20133G286	List: IR 05000309/1984011 ML20133G284
References
NUDOCS 8508080628
Download: ML20133G298 (4)

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Enclosure Resolution of Inspection Issues

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Maine Yank ~ee Power Plant Docket No. 50-309

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Introduction Between October 22-26, 1984, we assisted Region I in conducting an Appendix R inspection at Maine Yankee. On January 17, 1985, Inspection Report No.'50-309/

84-11 was issued pertaining to that inspection. The following items were

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left unresolved by the Region pending NRR evaluation of proposed fire protection ir,cdificatiens and/or additional information supplied by the licensee:

Item (84-15-03), Unsealed openings in fire barriers Item (84-15-06), Structural Improvements to fire doors Item (84-11-04), Non-fire-rated seismic gap Item (84-11-07), Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump "

By letters dated' March 20 and May 15, 1985, the licensee submitted additional infonnation.

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2.0 Item (84-15-03) Unsealed Piping and Ventilation Duct Openings in Walls Identified in the SER and Fire Hazard Survey as Fire Rated We observed that certain walls and ceiling / roofs, which form the perimeter of several fire areas in the plant, contain unsealed pipe penetrations'and

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unprotected ventilation duct / louver openings. The locations of these features are delineated in a letter from the licensee dated October 11, 1984.. We were concerned that a fire within one are'a would propagate through the openings and damage redundant / alternate shutdown-related equipment on the other sid However, we previously evaluated certain penetrations in the Service Building and Turbine Building and found them acceptable, as detailed in our Safety Evaluation of November'30, 1984. In the remaining areas, the breached boundary construction is separating the areas from the exterior of the plant. The walls and/or roof do not separate shutdown-related equipment inside the plant from redundant / alternate components outsid In addition,'there is no accumulation j ___ _ . __

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8508080628 B50731 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G PDR

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of combustibles or fire hazards outside the plant that would represent a threat to the systems in these locations. Therefore, the unprotected openings have no safety significanc Where unprotected penetrations exist in walls or ceilings between two interior fire areas,.these barriers do not separate redundant shutdown. systems ei.the The areas on either side of the perimeter construction are provided with fire detectors and automatic and manual fire fighting equipment as delineated in the

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licensee's~ Fire Hazard Analysis. 'The areas also have a limited fire load, with combustible material dispersed throughout. If a fire were to occur, we expect it to be discovered in'-its formative stages before significant flame spread or temperature rise occurred. The fire would then be suppressed by the plant fire brigade using manual fire fighting equipment. Because the perimeter, ,

construction contains unprotected openings, we expect a certain amount of '

smoke and hot gases to filter into adjoining areas. But tnese products of ,

combustion would be so cooled and dissipated as to pose no significant threat

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i to safety systems in adjoining areas or represent a serious potential for causing

.second ary fires involving combustible materials in adjoining location Therefore, these penetrat' ions have no safety significanc We, therefore, recomend that this item be considered closed.

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Item (84-15-06) Structural Improvements to Dcors 3401 and 3402 and Installation of a Sprinkler System Accepted as Equal to 3-Hour Rated Door l We observed that doors Nos. 3401 and 3402, Primary Auxiliary Building to Fuel Handling Building, were altered to allow a crane monorail to pass through the doors. At the inspection, we concluded that, because of the limited fire hazards, the existing fire protection and the absence of shutdown-related equipment on either side, the modifications made to

door 3402 were acceptable. However, the existing configuration of door 3401 was unacceptable. The licensee verbally committed to install a partial automatic sprinkler system above the monorail on the truck bay side of this l

,_ _ door 2 We considered this itent unresolved pending the licensee's implementation-of this comitment. By letter dated March 20,1985, the licensee confinned

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-3-that the installation of the sprinkler system at door 3401 was complet Therefore, this item should be considered close .

Item (84-11-04) Non-Fire Rated Seismic Gap Around the Containment We observed that the fire area boundary walls and floor / ceiling assemblies of Fire Areas G, H, I, J and K are formed, in part, by a " shake space" (seismic gap) at the containment boundary interface. This shake space is filled with a non-fire rated sealant and capped on both sides with an angle iron bolted into the wall or floor / ceiling. We were concerned that because the configura-tion was not fire rated, fire would propagate through the shake space and damage redundant shutdown-related systems on either side. At the inspection, we agreed with the licensee that in areas protected by an automatic fire suppression system or where the seismic gap was located in exterior walls and did not separate redundant / alternate shutdown equipment, this concern was adequately

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mitigate In those locations where the above considerations were not appli-cable, the licensee verbally connitted to either install an automatic fire suppression system or to replace the non-fire-rated sealant with a fire-rated penetration seal. We considered this item unresolved pending faiplementation '

of the licensee's connitments. By letter dated March 20, 1985, the licensee confirmed that the non-fire-rated sealant in the seismic gaps was replaced with a " fire proof" niaterial fiaving a 3-hour fire rating. Therefore, this item should be considered close Item (84-11-07) Oil Collection System for the Reactor Coolant Pumps ,

We observed that an oil collection system had not been installed at the RCPs per the technical requirements of Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. This item was deferred pending our review of an exemption request submitted by the licensee. In our safety evaluation of November 3,1984, we recommended that this exemption request be denied. By letter dated May 15, 1985, the licensee committed to install an oil collection system for each reactor coolant pump and provided design details of the system. We-have evaluated this design and

_ _ _ _ concl_ude that it meets the requirements of Section.II.J of. Appendix R. and therefore, this item should be considered close _ _

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- 4-Conclusion -

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Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the following inspection -

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items should be considered closed, pending Region I confirmation that modifications have been satisfactorily completed: '

Item (84-15-03), Unsealed openings in fire barriers Item (84-15-06), Structural Improvements to fire doors Item (84-11-04), Non-fire-rated sei:mic gap '

Item (84-11-07),011 Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pumps

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Principal Contributer:

D. J. Kubicki, DE

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Date: July 31, 1985 .

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