ML20127D506
| ML20127D506 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127D473 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301150253 | |
| Download: ML20127D506 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.136 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-36 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWB COMPANY MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-309
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated October 19, 1992, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, Technical Specifications (TS).
The requested changes would modify the remedial action requirements of Technical Specifications 3.6.B and 3.6.C by deleting alternate train testing requirements.
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee's current TS require a special test of the alternate train when the opposite train is inoperable. This results in both trains being inoperable and forces a loss of an important safety function during the test, such that a plant shutdown may have to be initiated.
The alternate train testing requirement was included in the licensee's TSs during the plant licensing phase.
The original purpose was to provide a positive demonstration that a complete loss-of-safety function had not occurred when one train of equipment became, or was found inoperable.
It was later realized that the added assurance of testing is not sufficient to justify the complete, intentional less-of-safety function during the test, provided required periodic surveillance testing is current and there are no known reasons to suggest that the alternate train is inoperable.
The staff's position is that equipment is inoperable when it is removed from service, and remains inoperable and incapable of performing its safety function during performance of a surveillance test subject to TS.
This position is restated in Generic Letter 91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degradea and t
l Non-Conforming Conditions and on Operability", dated November 7, 1991.
Based on its evaluation, the NRC staff finds that deleting the alternate train testing requirement from TS Sections 3.6.8 and 3.6.C does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, nor involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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V 3.0 STATC CONSULTATION
-In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the designated Maine State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment, The State of ficial had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual. or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 55582).
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the-public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3)-the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, Principal Contributor:
E.H. Trottier Date:
January 11, 1993