ML20153B338
| ML20153B338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153B328 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8803220072 | |
| Download: ML20153B338 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1986007
Text
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p,Me g
y jo-g UNITED STATES
'r n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
5 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
l
\..../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.2.?
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-309
1.0 Introduction
On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the
Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip
signal from the reactor protection system. This incident occurred during
the plant startup and the reactor was tripped manually by the operator
about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The
failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the
sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident,
on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an
automatic trip signal was generated due to a steam generator low-low
level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor was tripped
manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive
Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and
report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the
Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inouiry into the
generic implications of the Salem incidents are reported in NUREG-1000,
"Generic Implications of ATkS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigation, the Director, Division of Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requested (by Generic letter 83-28
dated July 8,1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for
an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to
certain generic concerns. These concerns are categorized into four areas:
(1) Post-Trip Review, (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface,
(3) Post-Maintenance festing, and (4) Reactor Trip System (RTS) Reli-
ability Improvements. Within each of these areas, various specific
> actions were delineated,
ox
This safety evaluation (SE) addresses Item 2.2.2, Vendor Interfaces, of
@%$g
8y letters dated November 10, 1983, February 16, 1984, April 12, 1984,
R$ December 14, 1984, June 18, 1985 and August 20, 1985, the licensee
@@ described their planned and current actions regarding vendor interfaces
nl < (Item 2.2.2). Certain of these actions were reviewed during a staf f
N on-site Region I inspection conducted May 12-16, 1986, as described in
j gg Inspection Report 50-309/86-07. Additionally, the licensee provided to
j coa.a. the staff a copy of their issued procedure that addressed the control of
vendor instructions / manuals (this procedure was in draft form during the
above referenced staff inspection).
e
.-
i
E [omg'o ~ UNITED STATES
$ n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
_g a WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555
\...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.2.'
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-309
1.0 Introduction
On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the
Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic raactor trip
signal from the reactor orotection system. This incident occurred during
the plant startup and the reactor was tripped manually by the operator
about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The
failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the
sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident,
on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an
automatic trip signal was generated due to a steam generator low-low
level during plant startup. In this case, tha reactor was tripped
manually by the ooerator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive
Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and
report on the generic implications of these occurrences at linit 1 of the
Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inouiry into the
generic implications of the Salem incidents are reported in NUREG-1000,
"Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigation, the Director, Division of Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requested (by Generic Letter 83-28
dated July 8,1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for
an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to
certain generic concerns. These concerns are categorized into four areas:
(1) Post-Trip Review. (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface,
(3) Post-Maintenance Testing, and (4) Reactor Trip System (RTS) Reli-
ability Improvements. Within each of these areas, various specific
actions were delineated.
This safety evaluation (SE) addresses Item 2.2.2, Vendor Interfaces, of
By letters dated November 10, 1983, Februa)y 16, 1984, April 12, 1984,
December 14, 1984, June 18, 1985 and August 20, 1985, the licensee
described their planned and current actions regarding vendor interfaces
(Item 2.2.2). Certain of these actions were reviewed during a staff
on-site Region I inspection conducted May 10-16, 1986, as described in
Inspection Report 50-309/86-07. Additionally, the licensee provided to
the staff a copy of their issued procedure that addressed the control of
vendor instructions / manuals (this procedure was in draft form during the
above referenced staff inspection).
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Q
2.0 Evaluation
Position
For vendor interface, licensees and applicarts shall establish, implement
and maintain a continuing progran to ensure that vendor information for
safety-related components is complete, current and controlled throughout
the life of their plants, and appropriate 1v referenced or incorporated in
plant instructions and procedures. Vendors of safety-related equipment
should be contacted and an interface established. Where vendors cannot
be identified, have gone out of business or will not supply information,
the licensee or applicant shall assure that sufficient attention is paid
to equipment maintenance, replacement, or repair, to compensate for the
lack of vendor backup, to assure reliability commensurate with its safety
function (GOC-1). The program shall be closely coupled with action 2.2.1
above (equipment qualification). The program shall include periodic
communication with vendors to assure that all applicable information has
been received. The program should use a svstem of positive feedback with
vendors for mailings containina technical information. This could be
accomplished by licensee icknowledgement for receipt of technical mailings.
It shall also define the interface and division of responsibilities among
the licensee and the nuclear and non-nuclear divisions of their vendors
that provide service on safety-related eouioment to assure that requisite
control of and applicable instructions for maintenance work on safety-
related equipment are provided.
Discussinn
The licensee stated in their response letters that they actively
participated in the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC1 program
and intended to implement the NUTAC Vendor Equipment Technical Information
Program (VETIP). Procedure 0-06-07, Control of Vendor Instructions /
Manuals, Rev. O, is the licensee's implementing instruction for
interfacing with vendors of safety-related equipment. The procedure
addresses the methodology for acquiring new vendor technical information
(VTI); the technical reviews and approvals for VTI revisions that are
received from an external source; the revision of VTI for internal reasons
such as modifications; the formal contacting of vendors on an annual
basis; and, assigned responsibilities and administrative controls. A
staff inspection conducted May 12-16, 1986, verified
that the licensee had imolemented a prnoram for control, technical
review and revision of safety related VTI. The program included formal
annual contacts with vendors who suppliad safetv-related equipment. Also,
the inspector verified that plant naintenance and surveillance work
procedures were technically adequate and consistent with the
actual equipment sampled; and the appropriate VTI was consistent with
that aquipment.
Based on the licensee's commitment to fully implement the NUTAC/VETIP
guidance, the actions described in their prncedure for vendor interface,
and the conclusions and findings of the referenced staff inspection,
_ .. - . . _ . _ . .
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. .
s
.-
2.0 Evaluation
position
For vendor interface, licensees and applicants shall establish, implement
and maintain a continuing progran to ensure that vendor information for
safety-related components is complete, current and controllad throughout
the life of their plants, and appropriatelv referenced or incorporated in
plant instructions and procedures. Vendors of safety-related equipment
should be contacted and an interface established. Where vendors cannot
be identified, have gone out of business or will not supply information,
the licensee or applicant shall assure that sufficient attention is paid
to equipment maintenance, replacement, or repair, to compensate for the
lack of verdor backup, to assure reliability commensurate with its safety
function (GOC-1). The program shall he closely coupled with action 2.2.1
above (equipment qualification). The program shall include periodic
communication with vendors to assure that all applicable infornation has
been received. The program should use a system of positiva feedback with
vendors for mailings containina technical information. This could be
accomplished by licensee acknowledgement for receipt of technical mailings.
It shall also define the interface and division of responsibilities among
the licensee and the nuclear and non-nuclear divisions of their vendors
that provide service on safety-related equipment to assure that requisite
control of and applicable instructions for maintenance work on safety-
related equipment are provided.
Discussion
The licensee stated in their response letters that they actively
participated in the Nuclear Utility Tcsk Action Committee (NUTACl program
and intended to implement the NUTAC Vendor Equipment Technical Information
Program (VETIP). Procedure 0-06-07, Control of Vendor Instructions /
Manuals, Rev. O, is the licensee's implementing instruction for
interfacing with vendors of safety-related equipment. The procedure
addresses the methodology for acquiring new vendor technical information
(VTI); the technical reviews and approvals for VT! revisions that are
received from an external source; the revision of VTI for internal reasons
such as modifications; the formal contacting of vendors on an annual
basis; and, assigned responsibilities and administrative controls. A
staff inspection conducted May 12-16, 1986, verified
that the licensee had imolemented a prnoram for control, technical
review and revision of safety related VTI. The program included formal
annual contacts with vendors who supplied safetv-related equipment. Also,
the inspector verified that plant naintenance and surveillance work
procedures were technically adequate and consistent with the
actual equipment sampled; and the appropriate VTI was consistent w'ih
that equioment.
Based on the licensee's commitment to fully implement the NUTAC/VETIP
guidance, the actions described in their prncedure for vendor interface,
and the conclusions and findings of the referenced staff inspection,
(
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-the staff concludes that the licensee's actions are consistent with the ]
- NRC position for Action 2.P.2 of Generic 1.etter 83-98 and, therefore,
acceptable.
Date:
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Principal contributor: ' George Naouda, Region I
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the-staff concludes'that the licensee's~ actions are consistent with the
NRC position for Action 2.?.2. of Generic letter 83-28 and, therefore,
,
acceptable.
'Date:
., Principal contributor: George.Napuda, Region I