On September 16, 2004, with Catawba Unit 2 in MODE 6 entering a refueling outage, a visual examination was performed on the steam generator ( SG) 2A, 2C & 2D lower head bowl drains.� Reactor Coolant System ( RCS) pressure boundary leakage was identified on the 2C and 2D SG bowl drains.�The 2A SG lower head bowl drain did not have any pressure boundary leakage. The pressure boundary leakage path was suspected to be the nozzle coupling to vessel weld.� This event was reported to the NRCOC at 1131 on September 17, 2004 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(ii)(A).� The most probable cause of the SG Bowl Drain leak is primary water stress corrosion cracking ( PWSCC).� The 2C & 2D SG bowl drain leaks were subsequently repaired, examined and tested.� The 2A SG bowl drain was also repaired similar to the 2C & 2D SG bowl drains as a preventive measure.� The 2B SG bowl drain had been repaired in 2001 due to a similar leak (LER 414/01-002).
A corrective action from the previous LER was the development of a program to address Alloy 600 issues which included the inspections that discovered the events in this LER.� This issue is not applicable to Unit 1 because the SGs are a different design that does not have a similar drain line. The overall safety significance of this event was determined to be minimal and there was no actual impact on the health and safety of the public. |
LER-2004-001, relPowere Vice President
A Duke Energy Company Duke Power
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Rd. / CNO1VP
York, SC 29745-9635
803 831 4251
803 831 3221 fax
November 9, 2004
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/04-001 Revision 0
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage
Due to Small Cracks Found in Steam Generator
Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators
Attached please find Licensee Event Report 414/04-001
Revision 0, entitled "Reactor Coolant System Pressure
Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in.Steam
Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators."
This Licensee Event Report does not contain any regulatory
commitments. Questions regarding this Licensee Event Report
should be directed to R. D. Hart at (803) 831-3622.
Sincerely,
Dhiaa Jamil
Attachment
www.dukepower.corn 00-
U.S. Nuclear Reguldhory Commission
November 9, 2004
Page 2
XC:
W.D. Travers
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Administrator, Region II
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
E.F. Guthrie
Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Catawba Nuclear Station
S.E. Peters (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop 10-B3
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
NRC FORM 366� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)� COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50
hours. Reported lessons learned are Incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back
to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashinMon, DC 2055
LICENSEE EN/ENT REPORT (LER) 0001, or by Internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management(See reverse for required number of and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an Information col ectiond( inverse �for each block) does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or
sponsor. and a person Is not required to respond o. the Information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 050- 00414 1 OF�6
4. TITLE
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in
Steam Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam GeneratorsDocket Number |
Event date: |
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Report date: |
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4142004001R00 - NRC Website |
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BACKGROUND
Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 is a Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor [EIIS: RCT]. Unit 2 has four steam generators (SG) [EIIS:
SG] connected to the reactor coolant system (RCS) [EIIS: AB]. The Unit 2 SGs are Westinghouse Model D5 SGs. The four SGs are vertical shell and U-tube evaporators with integral moisture separating equipment. The reactor coolant flows through the inverted U-tubes, entering and leaving through the nozzles [EIIS:
NZL] located in the hemispherical bottom head of the SG. The bottom head is divided into inlet and outlet chambers by a vertical partition plate extending from the head to the tube sheet.
However, there is a small semi-circular hole at the center bottom of this plate to allow draining the bowl through one common drain line. Manways are provided for access to both sides of the divided head. Steam is generated on the shell side. The SGs are primarily carbon steel. The heat transfer tubes are Inconel-600, the primary side of the tube sheet is clad with Inconel, and the interior surfaces of the reactor coolant channel head and nozzles are clad with austenitic stainless steel.
No structures, systems, or components were out of service at the time of this event that contributed to the event. This event is not applicable to the Unit 1 SGs because they are a different design and do not have a drain line in the bottom channel head.
The leakage of reactor coolant through the 2C and 2D SG channel head bowl drains was so minimal that it was detectable only by the visual observation of a small quantity of boron crystals. However, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.13(a) limits RCS Operational Leakage to "No pressure boundary LEAKAGE" while in MODES 1 through 4. Condition B of TS 3.4.13 requires that if pressure boundary leakage exists, the unit is to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to be in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Therefore, Unit 2 operated in a condition prohibited by TS.
Unit 2 was operating in MODE 6, "refueling" immediately prior to this event. This event is being reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(ii)(A), "any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded." This event is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications" and 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(i), limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor not met.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
(Dates and times are approximate) On September 16, 2004, visual and surface examinations of the SG 2A, 2C and 2D lower head bowl drains were conducted as part of the Alloy 600 Inspection program during the current Unit 2 refueling outage. This program was part of the corrective actions associated with the 2B SG lower head bowl drain leak that was reported to the NRC in LER 414/01-002, November 12, 2001. The bowl drains for SGs 2A, 2C and 2D were previously subjected to a penetrant test on March 3, 2003 and no rejectable indications were identified. A visual examination was performed on the SG lower head bowl drains and the 2C and 2D SG bowl drains were rejected. Surface examinations were performed on 2A and 2D. SG 2A lower head bowl drain was liquid penetrant tested and satisfied ASME Code acceptance limits. SG 2D lower head bowl drain was liquid penetrant tested and was rejected. SG 2C lower head bowl drain was not liquid penetrant tested since the visual inspection indicated an obvious pressure boundary through wall leak. This issue was documented in the Catawba corrective action program for resolution.
An evaluation of this condition on September 17, 2004 determined that this event was reportable to the NRCOC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(ii)(A) "any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded." This event was reported to the NRCOC at 1131 on September 17, 2004.
The SG bowl drains are located in the center of the lower channel head. The opening to the SG bowl is beneath the partition plate that separates the hot leg side of the channel head from the cold leg side. The opening to the drain hole was measured to be 0.51" in diameter. A small passage in the partition plate above the drain hole called the "mouse hole" connects the bowl drain to the hot and cold leg channel heads simultaneously. The bowl drain was constructed by hard roll expanding an Inconel-600 sleeve into a clearance hole through the generator shell. The sleeve was seal welded to the stainless steel bowl cladding at the inner surface of the bowl. The lower end of the sleeve was seal welded to a butter layer of Inconel 82 or 182. A 316 stainless steel half-coupling was welded below the sleeve termination to form the bowl drain nozzle on the SG outer shell. The coupling was welded to the butter layer using a partial penetration weld and Inconel 82 filler material. A gap was left between the lower end of the sleeve and top end of the coupling to compensate for thermal expansion during welding. A 4" length of 3/8" diameter pipe connected the drain line to the drain nozzle. The drain line increased to W' diameter pipe at a coupling below the 4" section and terminated at two valves and a pipe cap approximately 2-1/2 feet away from the drain nozzle.
CAUSAL FACTORS
The most probable cause for the SG 2C & 2D bowl drain leak is primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). The Alloy 600 weld filler material in the as welded condition has been shown to have a history of susceptibility to this type of degradation in the presence of primary coolant at PWR operating temperature. Axial cracks dispersed through the weld around the circumference of the nozzle demonstrated the generic susceptibility of the bulk filler material. No indications of circumferential extent were identified to suggest the structural integrity of the nozzle was challenged. The initiation of cracks at a gap exposing the back of the partial penetration weld to primary coolant was characteristic of PWSCC.
The existence of the gap between the nozzle coupling and lower end of the drain sleeve is likely the cause of this occurrence of cracking.
This scenario meets all the requirements needed for PWSCC to occur, and is known through industry operating experience to be susceptible to attack. The weld material exists in a highly stressed state. The weld material is exposed to primary coolant via a gap, and the temperature is somewhere near the SG 2C and 2D hot leg temperature of 617 °F.
Under these conditions, PWSCC is likely to occur.
Other forms of degradation were ruled out by a lack of evidence or discovery of a scenario consistent with those forms of degradation.
The orientation and location of the cracking was inconsistent with several degradation modes such as mechanical or thermal fatigue.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. The SG 2A, 2C, & 2D channel head bowl drain lines were deleted and the drain line connection to the SGs was repaired and plugged to eliminate the PWSCC concern associated with alloy 600 weld material. The repair consisted of removing the indications by machining and welding in a new plug with weld filler material known to be resistant to PWSCC (Alloy 52).
2.In order to eliminate the potential exposure of carbon steel base metal from primary chemistry water, the sealing of the divider plate hole (mouse hole) for the 2A, 2C & 2D SGs was completed. The mouse hole modification is necessary to eliminate this concern and potentially damaging long term oxidizing effects from leakage through the upper seal weld or cracks in the Inconel 600 drain tube. This modification also serves to minimize dose during refueling outages by eliminating the crud trap in the bottom of the SG bowl. This modification had been previously completed for the 2B SG during the spring, 2003 refueling outage.
3. An Engineering Support Document was developed to address Alloy 600 issues as a corrective action to the previous LER (414/01 002). This includes an inspection program based upon a ranking of the susceptibility of Alloy 600 components. The Unit 2 SG bowl drains were included in this program as components with a high susceptibility requiring inspections.
This report does not contain any commitments required for regulatory compliance.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
With the completed modifications on SG 2A, 2C, & 2D bowl drains, there are no current operability concerns. The 2B SG was repaired during previous outages. No other methods of Non-Destructive Examination could be performed on these welds because of the geometry/configuration.
With this leak present during MODES 1 - 4, Technical Specification 3.4.13.a would not have been satisfied. No pressure boundary leakage is acceptable. The degraded condition of the bowl drain weld does not represent a challenge to the nuclear safety of the unit. The residual stresses from the partial penetration J-groove weld caused axial-radial cracks. These cracks grew until they resulted in a leak that was visible when the insulation was removed from the SG. The leakage did not exceed Technical Specification limits for unidentified RCS inventory loss, no radiation alarms sounded, and the small amounts of boric acid crystal deposits that were observed had caused no observable corrosion to the SG vessel.
From a nuclear safety perspective, it has been concluded that any leakage due to typical PWSCC is not a challenge to nuclear safety.
Reasons in support of this conclusion are:
- Leak rates from these cracks were very low
- Cracks were axial in orientation thus minimizing any potential for a catastrophic failure of a nozzle.
For the previous LER, a calculation was performed to determine the probable consequences on the RCS if the cracks on the bowl drain lines would not have been detected. The conclusion reached was that due to the cracks being in the radial/axial orientations, there would have been no catastrophic failure of the bowl drain connection. Engineering has evaluated the failures identified in this LER and no observations or other issues related to these failures has been identified or discovered that would lead to a different conclusion from that reached in previous LER. Therefore, the overall safety significance of this event was determined to be minimal and there was no actual impact on the health and safety of the public.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The 2B SG bowl drain experienced a similar leak in the fall of 2001 and was reported to the NRC as LER 414/01-002 on November 12, 2001.
The event reported in this LER has the same root cause. Therefore, this event was determined to be recurring in nature. However, this event only affected the SG bowl drains for Unit 2 and those SG bowl drains have been repaired to preclude recurrence. The Unit 1 SGs are of a different design and are not susceptible to this event.
Catawba has implemented an Alloy 600 inspection program to monitor other areas that have Alloy 600. Therefore, no further corrective actions are necessary. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX]. This event is considered reportable to the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program. This event did not include a Safety System Functional Failure nor involve a personnel error.
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures or personnel injuries associated with this event.
Submittal Title/Subject: LER 414-04-001, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in Steam Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam Generators Background Information:
Scheduled Submittal Date: 11/09/04 Mandatory Submittal Date? (YM) PORC Approval Date 11/04/04 NSRB Approval Date NA Commitment Revieval Submittal Lead Name Randall D. Hart_ Phone_ 831-3622 Content Development (Attach additional information as needed) Contributor Name/Site Scope/extent of Contribution or Portion Contributed Randall D. Hart Originator W. 0. Callaway Engineering review Individual Review (Attach additional Information as needed) Reviewer Name/Site Signature Portions or Subjects Reviewed and Nature of Review NhWhtSov enend e 174e 174- e0h1/17-rIt411JM `"uki4"t Regulatory Review Reviewer Name Signature Nature of Review Submittal Lead PD0,4- q(A.01 NRIA/ RGC Manager SP[ 44cc4cd) SA Manager (Optional) 110,,,,,, r R‘,..., .......Liat-D1-6.,, 6.4,, 41'e-oz J0 GU ,.,,..,.-j — Legal Dept Review (Optional _ Name Signature Nature of Review This completed form must be presented with the original submittal for signature. The form may be filled in with reference to e mailed information In place of actual signatures and required information so long as the e-mailed information is maintained with the copy of this form that is sent to Master file.
VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE
12 Catawba Nuclear Station PIP C-04-04663 ENCLOSURE 1 Signature Sheet Prepared By: Rbar4A/3 Date: t t(eiloti Reviewed By:� Date:
Date: //AO, Date: 111g lov Date: � Approved By: � Date: hA/05 I�g --------
ENCLOSURES:
1.Safety Review Signature Sheet 2.References 3.Corrective Action Schedule 4.Cause Code Summary 5.Personnel Contacted Catawba Nuclear Station PIP C-04-04663 ENCLOSURE 2
REFERENCES
1.LER 414/04-001-00 2.PIP C-04-04663 3.Catawba TS 3.4.13 and Bases 4.LER 414-01-002 5.UFSAR Section 5.4.2 6.DBD CNS-1553.NC-00-0001, Rev. 14, Reactor Coolant System (NC).
ENCLOSURE 3
CORRECTIVE ACTION SCHEDULE
Corrective�Person(s)�Person(s) Due Date Action Contacted Assigned See PIP C-04-04663 Catawba Nuclear Station PIP C-04-04663 ENCLOSURE 4
CAUSE CODE ASSIGNMENT SHEET
CAUSE CODE:
See PIP C-04-04663 ENCLOSURE 5
PERSONNEL CONTACTED
Personnel Contacted:
1.Dave Ward 2.W. 0. Callaway
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05000348/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000333/LER-2004-001 | Inadvertent Actuation of ECCS and EDGs While in Refueling Mode | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000306/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2004-001 | Failure To Comply With Technical Specification 3 .7 .5 .1, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System | | 05000301/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000313/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000285/LER-2004-001 | Failure To Perform A Leakage Test Due To Lack Of Understanding of Penetration Design | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000271/LER-2004-001 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Exceeds a Technical Specification Leakage Rate Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000266/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000318/LER-2004-001 | . Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Water Level After Feed Pump Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000289/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2004-001 | | | 05000247/LER-2004-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Oscillating Feedwater Flow and Steam Generator Level with Flow Perturbations Caused by a Degraded Feed Water Regulating Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000244/LER-2004-001 | Gaps in the Control Room Emergency Zone Boundary | | 05000255/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000364/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000461/LER-2004-001 | Clinton Power Station 05000461 1 OF 4 | | 05000414/LER-2004-001 | relPowere Vice President A Duke Energy Company Duke Power Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Rd. / CNO1VP York, SC 29745-9635 803 831 4251 803 831 3221 fax November 9, 2004
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/04-001 Revision 0
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage
Due to Small Cracks Found in Steam Generator
Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators
Attached please find Licensee Event Report 414/04-001
Revision 0, entitled "Reactor Coolant System Pressure
Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in.Steam
Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam
Generators."
This Licensee Event Report does not contain any regulatory
commitments. Questions regarding this Licensee Event Report
should be directed to R. D. Hart at (803) 831-3622.
Sincerely,
Dhiaa Jamil
Attachment
www.dukepower.corn 00- U.S. Nuclear Reguldhory Commission
November 9, 2004
Page 2
XC: W.D. Travers
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Administrator, Region II
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
E.F. Guthrie
Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Catawba Nuclear Station
S.E. Peters (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager (CNS)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop 10-B3
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
NRC FORM 366� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)� COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50
hours. Reported lessons learned are Incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back
to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashinMon, DC 2055
LICENSEE EN/ENT REPORT (LER) 0001, or by Internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management(See reverse for required number of and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an Information col ectiond( inverse �for each block) does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person Is not required to respond o. the Information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 050- 00414 1 OF�6 4. TITLE Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Small Cracks Found in
Steam Generator Channel Head Bowl Drain Line on 2C & 2D Steam Generators | | 05000368/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000423/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2004-001 | Control Rod Shutdown Bank Anomaly Causes Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000413/LER-2004-001 | Gas Accumulation in Centrifugal Charging Pump Suction Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000395/LER-2004-001 | Reactor Trip Due to Valve Failure During Forced Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000390/LER-2004-001 | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Invalid Turbine Trip Signal (P-4) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000369/LER-2004-001 | Auxiliary Feedwater System in prohibited condition due to inadequate procedure. | | 05000454/LER-2004-001 | Exelent
Exelon Generation Company, LLCRwww.exeloncorp.com NuclearByron Station 4450 North German Church Road Byron, IL 61010-9794 October 17, 2004 LTR: BYRON 2004-0111 File: 2.01.0700 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject:RLicensee Event Report (LER) 454-2004-001-00, "Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Flow Rates Below Technical Specification Requirements Due to Inaccurate Flow Indication" Byron Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-37
NRC Docket No. STN 50-454
Enclosed is an LER involving the August 17, 2004, event involving low flow conditions discovered in Unit 1 Reactor Containment Fan Coolers for a time period longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. William Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance. Manager, at (815) 234-5441, extension 2800. Respectfully, Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station Attachment LER 454-2004-001-00 cc:RRegional Administrator, Region III, NRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector— Byron Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7.2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T.6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) *I@ nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Informabon and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB:10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not _ conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1 rand ITV NAUP o natuerr An warn q par= . Byron Station, Unit 1 0500454 1 OF 5 4. Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Flow Rates Below Technical Specifications Requirements Due to Inaccurate Flow Indication | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000336/LER-2004-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000364/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000423/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000237/LER-2004-002 | Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 05000237 1 of 5 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000244/LER-2004-002 | Consolidated Rod Storage Canister Placed in Incorrect Storage Location | | 05000530/LER-2004-002 | Main Turbine Control System Malfunction Results in Automatic Reactor Trip on Low DNBR | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000305/LER-2004-002 | | | 05000247/LER-2004-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Decreasing 23 Steam Generator Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Closure Due to a De-energized Solenoid Operated Valve from Wiring Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000414/LER-2004-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to Control Rods from Shutdown Bank D Dropping into the Core | | 05000251/LER-2004-002 | AAA | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(b) | 05000397/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000346/LER-2004-002 | Reactor Trip During Reactor Trip Breaker Testing Due To Fuse Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000395/LER-2004-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Load Due to Momentary Fault on Incoming Feed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000269/LER-2004-002 | eif Powere RON A. JONES Vice President A Duke Energy Company Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Power ONO1VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax September 9, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269,-270, -287
Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1
Problem Investigation Process No.: 0-04-2808
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached
is Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1, regarding
a Main Steam Line Break mitigation design/analysis
deficiency which could result in the main and startup
feedwater control valves being technically inoperable for
mitigation of some steam line break scenarios.
This report is being submitted to supplement Revision 0
submitted July 6, 2004. At that time the root cause
investigation and an analysis of the consequences of
potentially exceeding the Environment Qualification (EQ)
envelope curve were still in progress.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR
50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical
Specifications, 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an Unanalyzed
Condition, and 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D) as a potential loss of
safety function for Accident Mitigation. This event is
considered to be of no significance with respect to the
health and safety of the public.
www.dukepower.corn Document Control Desk
Date: September 9, 2004
Page 2
Attachment: Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Revision 1
cc: Mr. William D. Travers
Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
Mr. L. N. Olshan
Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D.C. 20555
Mr. M. C. Shannon
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station
INPO (via E-mail)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7-2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DCLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to bpi @nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and(See reverse for required number of Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection doesdigits/characters for each block) not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and,1 nnmnn lc not rent Owl to tocnnni-I to the intnrmatinn rntlentinn 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 050-81 OF 0269 11 4. TITLE Main Steam Line Break Mitigation Design/Analysis Deficiency | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000313/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000271/LER-2004-002 | Special Nuclear Material Inventory Location Discrepancy | | 05000285/LER-2004-002 | Inoperable Diesel Generator for 28 Days Due to Blown Fuse During Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000336/LER-2004-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000311/LER-2004-002 | Failure To Comply With Technical Specifications During Reactor Protection Instrument Calibration . | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000254/LER-2004-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2004-002 | | | 05000302/LER-2004-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Due To Fuel Oil Header Outlet Check Valve Leaking Past Seat | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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