12-20-2012 | On 10/23/12, during planned maintenance on DG 2B, it was determined that the DG had been retroactively inoperable since its last monthly test which was conducted on 09/28/12. During this test, it was noted that an engine tachometer malfunction had occurred; however, at the time, the malfunction was not recognized as adversely affecting DG operability. On 10/23/12, the cause of the DG inoperability was determined to be a failed tachometer relay power supply. It was determined that the failed power supply would have prevented the DG's output breaker from automatically closing in response to a Design Basis Accident ( DBA).
The root cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate technical evaluation following the tachometer malfunction on 09/28/12.
Planned corrective actions in response to this event include: 1) Revising the DG operating and test procedures to ensure that the tachometer relay is operating properly; 2) Revising the DG Design Basis Document to describe the relationship between the tachometer related components; and 3) Developing a visible and/or an audible indication for verification of the status of the tachometer relay power supply.
There was minimal safety significance to this event. A Probabilistic Risk Analysis ( PRA) evaluation was performed and the results of this evaluation indicated that the Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability ( ICCDP) and the Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability ( ICLERP) associated with this event were less than 1.0E-06 and less than 1.0E-07, respectively. Therefore, this event did not affect the health and safety of the public. |
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LER-2012-001, Carolinas
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
4800 Concord Rd.
York, SC 29745
803-701-4251
December 20, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:�Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/2012-001
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 414/2012-001,
Revision 0 entitled, "Diesel Generator (DG) 2B Was Unknowingly inoperable from 09/28/12 to
10/23/12 Due to Failed Tachometer Relay Power Supply".
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR
50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)-(D).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the
public.
If there are any questions on this report, please contact L.J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084.
Kelvin Henderson
LJR/s
Attachment
www. duke-energy. corn
Document Control Desk
Page 2
December 20, 2012
xc (with attachment):
V.M. McCree
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II
Marquis One Tower
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200
Atlanta, GA 30303-1257
J.H. Thompson (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 8-G9A
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
G.A. Hutto, III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station
INPO Records Center
700 Galleria Place
Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
Document Control Desk
Page 3
December 20, 2012
bxc (electronic copy)(with attachment):
INPO
L.E. Harmon
C.S. Kamilaris
R.D. Hart
G.Y. Helton
S.F. Hatley (ICES)
M.K. Green
R.T. Simril, Jr.
B.C. Carroll
M.C. Nolan
W.J. Pritchett, Jr.
T.L. Patterson
K.R. Alter
H.D. Brewer
R.E. Abbott, Jr.
B.J. Horsley
S.L. Western
bxc (hard copy)(with attachment):
D.B. Alexander
L.S. Nichols
L.J. Rudy
ELL
Master File CN-801.01
LER File
RGC Date File
NCMPA-1
NCEMC
PMPA
ICES
Lee.Harmon@NRC.gov
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013
(10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported
lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send commentsLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to
infocollects.resource@nrclov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used(See reverse for required number of to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRCdigits/characters for each block)
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information
collection.
r1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 05000414 10OF
•4. TITLE
Diesel Generator (DG) 2B Was Unknowingly Inoperable from 09/28/12 to 10/23/12 Due to Failed Tachometer
Relay Power SupplyDocket Number |
Event date: |
10-23-2012 |
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Report date: |
12-20-2012 |
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Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition |
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4142012001R00 - NRC Website |
|
BACKGROUND
This event is being reported under the following criteria:
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS).
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), any event or condition that resulted in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 are Westinghouse four-loop Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) [EllS:
RCT].
The onsite standby power source for each 4160 volt Engineered Safety Features (ESF) bus [El IS: BU] at Catawba is a dedicated Diesel Generator (DG) [EMS: EK]. For each unit, DGs A and B are dedicated to ESF buses ETA and ETB, respectively. A DG starts automatically on a Safety Injection (SI) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure) or on an ESF bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal. After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI signal. With no SI signal, there is a ten-minute delay between the degraded voltage signal and the DG start signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, a sequencer [EllS: EK] strips loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.
In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Approximately one minute after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or to maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Each DG must therefore be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This must be accomplished within 11 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses.
TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating" delineates requirements for the DGs. Two DGs are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. With one DG inoperable (Condition B), the inoperable DG must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action B.4). With two DGs inoperable (Condition E), one DG must be restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (Required Action E.1). If this is not accomplished (Condition G), the affected unit must be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Required Action G.1) and in Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (Required Action G.2). In addition, because the DGs provide emergency AC power to certain TS required systems that are shared between the Catawba units, the cascading effects on these shared systems' TS and their supported systems' TS must also be considered when one or more DGs become inoperable.
On 09/28/12 when the tachometer relay power supply failure occurred and on 10/23/12 when this event was determined to be reportable, both units were in Mode 1 at 100% power. Except as indicated in the Safety Analysis section of this report, no other structures, systems, or components were out of service that had any effect on the event.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Date/TimePEvent (Some event times are approximate.) 08/29/12/0022-0225 DG 2B was started and run successfully during its monthly test. (Time indicates DG 2B start/shutdown.) 09/28/12/1919-2128 During the monthly test of DG 2B, an engine tachometer malfunction was noted. A work request/work order was generated to inspect and repair the tachometer during the next DG 2B work window on 10/23/12. At the time, the tachometer malfunction was determined to not affect DG 2B operability. (Time indicates DG 2B start/shutdown.) 09/29/12/1930PProblem Investigation Process (PIP) report C-12-08248 was written to document the issue.
10/02/12/--PPIP C-12-08248 was updated to document the fact that the tachometer had read 0 rpm during the test.
10/23/12/0418PDG 2B was declared inoperable for planned maintenance.
1645PDuring the planned maintenance on DG 2B, Engineering determined that the lack of rpm indication was caused by a failed tachometer relay power supply. A 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock per TS 3.8.1 Required Action B.3.1 was started for performing a common mode failure evaluation for DGs 2A, 1A, and 1B.
1731PPIP C-12-08991 was written to document the common mode failure evaluation. At the time, it was believed that the failed tachometer relay power supply would have prevented DG 2B from automatically starting in response to a DBA.
It was subsequently determined that the failed tachometer relay power supply would not have prevented DG 2B from automatically starting; however, it would have prevented the DG's output breaker from automatically closing in response to a DBA.
10/24/12/0322�The common mode failure evaluation was completed. No common mode failure mechanisms were identified.
1534-1850 The failed tachometer relay power supply was replaced. Required testing was completed on DG 2B. (Time indicates DG 2B start/shutdown.) 10/24/12/2221�DG 2B was declared operable.
CAUSAL FACTORS
The root cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate technical evaluation following the DG 2B engine tachometer malfunction on 09/28/12. This was attributed to an inadequate understanding of the relationship between the tachometer dial, the tachometer relay, the tachometer relay power supply, and the interlocks associated with the DG's output breaker (breaker 2ETB-18). Engineering DG subject matter experts and Operations licensed personnel did not recognize that the anomalous engine speed indication affected the automatic operation of the DG's output breaker. The impact of the tachometer malfunction on the ability of the DG's output breaker to automatically close was not recognized until 10/23/12 when the tachometer relay power supply failure was being investigated.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate:
1. Station Management initiated a Unit Threat Team in response to the failed tachometer relay power supply. A maintenance plan was developed to replace the failed component.
Based on available information during the event, Catawba performed a common mode failure evaluation as required by TS.
Subsequent:
Following replacement of the tachometer relay power supply, DG 2B was tested and returned to operable status. All applicable TS Conditions were subsequently exited.
2. The failed tachometer relay power supply was sent to the vendor for failure analysis.
Planned:
Operations will add steps to the DG operating and test procedures to verify the DG running status light is lit and Operator Aid Computer (OAC) on and speed indications are present when the DG is started. This will ensure that the tachometer relay is energized.
2. Engineering will revise the DG Design Basis Document (DBD) to describe the relationship between the tachometer, the tachometer relay, the tachometer relay power supply, and the interlocks associated with the DG's output breaker.
3. Engineering will develop a visible and/or an audible indication for verification of the status of the tachometer relay power supply (local indicating light or priority OAC alarm).
There are no NRC commitments contained in this LER.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
During the time period that DG 2B was inoperable from 09/28/12 to 10/24/12, there was one instance where DG 2A was also inoperable for planned maintenance. This instance began on 10/09/12 at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> and ended on 10/10/12 at 0546 hours0.00632 days <br />0.152 hours <br />9.027778e-4 weeks <br />2.07753e-4 months <br />. Therefore, during this interval, both Unit 2 DGs were simultaneously inoperable. In addition, various Unit 2 and Unit 2/Unit 1 shared Train A TS required equipment was inoperable during the time period that DG 2B was inoperable. This resulted in various Unit 2 and Unit 1 supported system TS requirements being violated during this time period.
Duke Energy used a risk-informed approach to determine the risk significance associated with the vulnerability of the DG 2B output breaker failing to automatically close.
The Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) and the Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) associated with this event were evaluated by considering the following:
- The duration of the period of vulnerability of the DG 2B output breaker
- The use of the average maintenance Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model to represent plant configuration, equipment unavailability, and maintenance activities during this violation The ICCDP associated with this event was determined to be less than 1.0E-06 with the use of the model of record. The ICLERP associated with this event was determined to be less than 1.0E-07.
During the time period that DG 2B was inoperable, the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) remained functional.
The SSS is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire, security, and station blackout incidents by providing the capability to maintain Mode 3 conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room.
Therefore, this event is considered to have a small risk impact and is of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Within the previous three years, there have been two other LER events involving DG inoperability due to a failed subcomponent. These events were documented in LER 413/2010-004, "Technical Specification Violation Involving Notice of Enforcement Discretion Due to Failure of Diesel Generator Engine-Mounted Thermocouple", and LER 413/2011-001, "Technical Specification Violation Involving Notice of Enforcement Discretion Due to Failure of Diesel Generator Mechanical Governor". However, those events did not involve the same root cause as this event. This event is therefore considered to be non-recurring.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EllS: XX]. This event is considered reportable to the INPO Consolidated Event System (ICES) (formerly called the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program).
This event is considered to constitute a Safety System Functional Failure during the time period when both DGs were simultaneously inoperable. There was no release of radioactive material, radiation overexposure, or personnel injury associated with the event described in this LER.
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| | Reporting criterion |
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05000413/LER-2012-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000327/LER-2012-001 | Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Essential Raw Cooling Water System due to External Flooding | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000388/LER-2012-001 | Two Control Room Floor Cooling Systems Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000395/LER-2012-001 | Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4342 August 3, 2012SCE~r .so A SCANA COMPANY Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir / Madam: Subject:VVIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER 2012-001-01) CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES & REACTOR WATER LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO AN INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2012-001-01 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1. This revised report describes a condition where Core Exit Thermocouples and Reactor Water Level Indication System would not be operable for accident monitoring. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This letter and attached LER contain no new commitments and no revisions to existing
commitments.
Should you have any questions, please call Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042. Very truly yours, Dal Thomas D. Gatlin TS/TDG/jw
Attachment
c: K. B. Marsh P. Ledbetter S. A. Byrne J. C. Mellette J. B. Archie EPIX Coordinator N. S. Carps K. M. Sutton J. H. Hamilton INPO Records Center R. J. White Marsh USA, Inc. W. M. Cherry R. J. Schwartz V. M. McCree NSRC R. E. Martin RTS (CR-11-01807) NRC Resident Inspector FileV(818.07) M. N. Browne PRSF (RC-12-0116) V fALVirgil C. Summer Station • Post Office Box 88 .Jenkinsville, SC • 29065 • F (803) 345-5209 1 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.0Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management andLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information(See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, thedigits/characters for each block) information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 05000 395 1 OF 5 4. TITLE Core Exit Thermocouples & Reactor Water Level Indication System Inoperable due to Inadequate Maintenance Procedure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000397/LER-2012-001 | DG-3 Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Failed Governor 05000 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000410/LER-2012-001 | Forced Shutdown Due to an Increase in Drywell Leakage in Excess of Technical Specifications Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000289/LER-2012-001 | Single Condition Making Independent Trains Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000286/LER-2012-001 | Common Cause Inoperability of Both Trains of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps Due to Inability to Control AFW Regulating Valves After Isolation of Nitrogen Backup | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000265/LER-2012-001 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Exceeds Technical Specifications Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000456/LER-2012-001 | Two Main Steam Safety Valves Failed Pre-outage Setpoint Testing Due to Abnormal Spring Geometry | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2012-001 | Technical Specification Required Plant Shutdown Due to Missed Surveillance and Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000483/LER-2012-001 | Modification Implementation Error Adversely Impacted the Containment Cooling System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000250/LER-2012-001 | Containment Concrete Thickness At Spalled Patch Does Not Meet Technical Specification Design Value | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000414/LER-2012-001 | Carolinas Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 4800 Concord Rd. York, SC 29745 803-701-4251 December 20, 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:�Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/2012-001
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 414/2012-001,
Revision 0 entitled, "Diesel Generator (DG) 2B Was Unknowingly inoperable from 09/28/12 to
10/23/12 Due to Failed Tachometer Relay Power Supply".
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR
50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)-(D).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment. This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the
public.
If there are any questions on this report, please contact L.J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084. Kelvin Henderson LJR/s Attachment www. duke-energy. corn Document Control Desk Page 2 December 20, 2012 xc (with attachment): V.M. McCree Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 J.H. Thompson (addressee only) NRC Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto, III NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 Document Control Desk Page 3 December 20, 2012 bxc (electronic copy)(with attachment): INPO L.E. Harmon C.S. Kamilaris R.D. Hart G.Y. Helton S.F. Hatley (ICES) M.K. Green R.T. Simril, Jr. B.C. Carroll M.C. Nolan W.J. Pritchett, Jr. T.L. Patterson K.R. Alter H.D. Brewer R.E. Abbott, Jr. B.J. Horsley S.L. Western bxc (hard copy)(with attachment): D.B. Alexander L.S. Nichols L.J. Rudy ELL Master File CN-801.01 LER File RGC Date File NCMPA-1 NCEMC PMPA ICES Lee.Harmon@NRC.gov NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013
(10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported
lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send commentsLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrclov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used(See reverse for required number of to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRCdigits/characters for each block) may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. r1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 05000414 10OF •4. TITLE Diesel Generator (DG) 2B Was Unknowingly Inoperable from 09/28/12 to 10/23/12 Due to Failed Tachometer
Relay Power Supply | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000247/LER-2012-001 | Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Caused by an Inoperable 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Due to Fuel Oil Below TS Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2012-001 | Unanalyzed Conditions Exist for Standby Shutdown Facility Mitizated Events | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000445/LER-2012-002 | COMANCHE PEAK 05000445 10OF06 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | 05000413/LER-2012-002 | Discovery of Inadequacy in Surveillance Testing of Solid State Protection System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2012-002 | Unplanned LCO 3.5.4 Entry Due to RWST alignment to Purification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000410/LER-2012-002 | Loss of Isolation Function on RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Line due to Breaker Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000482/LER-2012-002 | . One Train of Automatic Safety Infection Blocked During Entry Into Mode 3 Due To Procedural Weakness | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000361/LER-2012-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Vibration Trip Not Bypassed For Non-Accident Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000346/LER-2012-002 | Leak from Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Piping Socket Weld due to High Cycle Fatigue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000333/LER-2012-002 | High Pressure Coolant Injection Pressure Control Valve Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000306/LER-2012-002 | Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable Due To Missing Flood Control Barrier Seal | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | 05000250/LER-2012-002 | Non-compliance with TS 3.4.9.3 due to Manual Isolation Valve Found in Incorrect TS Configuration | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 05000278/LER-2012-002 | Failure of Primary Containment Isolation Valve due to Foreign Material Results in Condition Prohibited by TS | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000316/LER-2012-002 | Unit 2 Reactor Trip from Generator Trip Due to Incorrect Relay Setting | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-2012-002 | Unplanned Actuation of 121 Motor Driven Cooling Water Pump | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000298/LER-2012-002 | Improper Rotor Installation Causes Failure of Diesel Generator to Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000247/LER-2012-002 | Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Caused by New Fuel Assemblies Stored in a Configuration Prohibited by the TS | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000237/LER-2012-002 | Inlet Steam Drain Pot Drain Line Leaks Result in HPCI Inoperabilities | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000298/LER-2012-003 | Reactor Building Doors Opened Simultaneously Causes Loss of Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000410/LER-2012-003 | Suppression Pool Level Below Technical Specification Limit During Mode Change | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2012-003 | Plant Modification Interfered with the Operation of Containment Wide Range Level Indicator | | 05000298/LER-2012-004 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 05000410/LER-2012-004 | Manual Reactor Scram due to a Loss of Main Turbine Gland Sealing Steam Resulting in Lowering Condenser Vacuum | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000382/LER-2012-004 | Essential Chiller Oil Leak Creates Unanalyzed Past Operability Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000265/LER-2012-004 | Drywell Radiation Monitor Failed Downscale | | 05000261/LER-2012-004 | Reactor Tripped Due to a Turbine Trip Caused by a Feedwater Isolation Signal from Steam Generator 'B' High Level | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000454/LER-2012-004 | Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzle Weld Repair Surface Indications | | 05000254/LER-2012-004 | Breech in Secondary Containment | | 05000482/LER-2012-004 | Two Charging Pumps Capable of Injecting into the RCS Due to Inadequate Definition of Centrifugal Charging Pump in LCO 3.4.12 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000410/LER-2012-005 | Automatic Diesel Actuation Due to the Loss of a 115 kV Offsite Power Source | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000298/LER-2012-005 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000298/LER-2012-006 | Missing Vent Plug Results in Technical Specifications Prohibited Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000220/LER-2012-007 | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Logic Actuation Following an Automatic Turbine Trip Signal Due to High Reactor Water Level | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
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