05000414/LER-2010-001, Regarding Reactor Mode Change with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.6 Not Met in Violation of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4
| ML100710088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2010 |
| From: | Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 10-001-00 | |
| Download: ML100710088 (11) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4142010001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PDuke dEnergy Carolinas JAMES R. MORRIS, VICE PRESIDENT Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station / CN01 VP 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 803-831-4251 803-831-3221 fax March 9, 2010 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket No.
50-414 Licensee Event Report 414/2010-001 Attached is Licensee Event Report 414/2010-001 Revision 0 entitled, "Reactor Mode Change with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.6 Not Met in Violation of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4."
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
If there are any questions on this report, please contact Marc Sawicki at (803) 701-5191.
Sincerely, James R.
Morris Attachment E Z2 www. duke-energy. corn
Document Control Desk Page 2 March 9, 2010 xc (with attachment):
L.A. Reyes Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, S.W.,
Suite 23T85
- Atlanta, GA 30303 J.H. Thompson (addressee only)
NRC Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place
- Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
Document Control Desk Page 3ý March 9, 2010 bxc (electronic copy) (with attachment):
INPO lerevents@inpo.org K.W. Phillips R.D. Hart G.Y. Helton S.F. Hatley (EPIX)
M.K. Green D.R. Brenton S.L. Nader A.M. Peterman K.D. Thomas R.G. Hull T.W. King K.R. Alter H.D. Brewer K.L. Ashe B.J. Horsley M.J. Brown bxc (hard copy)(with attachment):
R.L. Gill L.F. Vaughn G.F. Winkel M.J. Sawicki ELL Master File CN-801.01 LER File RGC Date File NCMPA-l NCEMC PMPA
Abstract
approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
As part of an extent of condition review of an issue identified in the Fall 2009 Unit 1 refueling outage, it was discovered that during the Spring 2009 Unit 2 outage, a reactor mode change was made with Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.6 not met, as one train of the Containment Spray (NS) system was inoperable.
On April 16, 2009 at 1500, with Unit 2 moving from Mode 5 to Mode 4, LCO 3.6.6 was unknowingly not met, as Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.6.3 could not be met due to a valve incapable of automatically opening in accordance with the SR.
This mode change was in violation of LCO 3.0.4.
The issue was identified during the Fall 2009 Unit 1 refueling outage; however, a risk assessment was performed per LCO 3.0.4.b to allow the mode change, preventing the unit from violating TS.
After further evaluation, the Unit 2 event was identified and the condition was determined to be reportable on January 11, 2010.
The cause of the event was that unclear TS Bases did not address inoperability of the NS system when the valves in question were de-energized.
Corrective Action was taken to make all licensed Operations personnel aware of the lessons learned from this event through an Operations Guide.
The Emergency Core Cooling System Water Management License Amendment Request was previously submitted and will remove the requirement for automatic actuation of the NS system, thus allowing for the deletion of SR 3.6.6.3.
This incident was determined reportable since the plant was in a condition prohibited by TS.
There was no safety significance associated with the event.
I NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
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Removal of an NS train from service during on-line conditions is usually acceptable.
Manual alignment capability of the NS system to draw from the containment sump existed throughout the event.
Therefore, there was no additional risk incurred as a result of failing to perform the risk assessment required by 3.0.4.b.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
After a search of the past three years' history for Catawba Nuclear Station, there have been no reportable events with respect to unintended mode changes or any other failure to comply with LCO 3.0.4.
Licensee Event Report 2009-001 documents the sole reportable event in the last three years regarding NS operability as per TS 3.6.6.
In that instance, the Component Cooling System (KC)
Heat Exchanger Control Valve failed to control flow to the KC Heat Exchanger which caused both trains of NS to be inoperable for approximately two days.
This past case is not related to the current event.
This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure as one of the two trains of NS was operable throughout the incident.