ML17229A344

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LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A344
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/13/1997
From: BENKEN E J, STALL J A
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-97-130, LER-97-005, LER-97-5, NUDOCS 9705200337
Download: ML17229A344 (11)


Text

QCATEGORY1REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)1ilACCESSION NBR:9705200337 DOC.DATE:

97/05/13NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:--.3-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPo~er&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION BENKEN,E.J.

FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.

FloridaPower&Light'o.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION EDOCKET05000335

SUBJECT:

IER97-005-00:on 970419,reactor wasshutdownduetoreactorcoolantpressureboundaryleakage.RepairstoRCPBwascompleted

&laSDCtrainwasrestoredtosvc.W/970513 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL:

ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTEiNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOOREgW~NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME WIENS,L.NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2FILE01LITCCBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111G0D0NNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT.

415-2083)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSIQN REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR25ENCL25

,J FloridaPower8LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach.FL34957May13,1997L-97-13010CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Reportable Event:97-005DateofEvent:April19,1997ReactorShutdownRequiredbyTechnical Specifications TheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresident St.LuciePlantJAS/EJBAttachment cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant(I9705200337 9705i3PDRADOCK05000335SPDRpQttUQ(i4anFPLGroupcompanyIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENBEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDSYOIMNo.31604104EKFNIES04nolssESTIMATED SVROENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATOINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANOFSACKToeIOUSTRY.

FORWARDCOMMDITSREGARDING SURDENESTIMATTOTHEINFORMATION ANORECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT.eF33)VN.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION.

WASHINGTON, OC206660001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTI31600104b OFRCE0MANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON, OC20603.FACIUTYNAME(1)STLUCIEUNIT1DOCKETNNASBE12l05000335PAGEIsl1OF7TITLE14lReactorShutdownRequiredbyTechnicaI Specifications duetoReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryLeakageMONTHDAY0419SEauENTIAL REVISIONNUM9ERNUMBER97,97-005-00MONTHDAYYEAR051397FACIUTYNAMEFACIUTYNAMEN/AN/ADOCKETNUMSER DOCKETNVMSER OPERAT)NQ MODE(6)POWERLEVELl10)20.2201(b) 20.2203(e) l2)(i)20.2203(0)l2)(iii)20.2203(n)

(2)(iv)20.2203(0)(2)(v)20.2203(o) l3)Iii)50.36(c)ll) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(0)(2)(i)50.73(n)(2)(iii)50.73(n)(2)(v) 50.73(n)(2)(vii) 50.73(n)(2)(viii) 73.71OTHERSpecifylnAbstractbeloworlriNRCForm3SSANAMEEdwinJ.Benken,Licensing EngineerTELEPHONE NVMSEROnc4deAtesCoal(561)467-7156CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSBPN/AN'.jViE:kj YES(lfyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE)~XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATEl15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Umitto1400spnces,i.o.,npproximote(y 15single-specod typowritten lines)l16)OnApril18,1997,St,LucieUnit1wasoperating inMode1at100percentreactorpower.Leakagefromaoneinchlineonasafetyinjection (Sl)pipeventwasidentified andsubsequently determined tobereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)leakage.Theleakagewasrestricted toSafetyInjection

~Tank1B2inventory, andnoreactorcoolantleakageresulted.

Areactor.shutdownwasinitiated onApril19,1997,andwascompleted inaccordance withTechnical Specification requirements.

TheUnitwasplacedinMode5onApril20,1997,toimplement repairs.Duringtheplantcooldown, shutdowncooling(SDC)train1Awasdeclaredinoperable andtheredundant trainwasusedtocompletethecooldown.

TheRCPBleakagewasrepairedandtheUnitwassubsequently returnedtoMode1operation onApril23,1997.TheplantshutdownwasrequiredbyTechnical Specifications duetothe,presenceofpressureboundaryleakage.Thefailuremechanism associated withthepressureboundaryleakagewasdetermined tobehotcrackingofasocketweldassociated withtheSlventline.Thehotcrackingwascausedbyweldcontamination.

Theinoperability ofthe1ASDCtrainwasduetothemisalignment ofaminimumflowrecirculation line,andthepresenceofgasvoidsinthehighpointsofthe1ASDCsuctionline.Corrective ActionsInclude:1)Repairswerecompleted totheRCPBandthe1ASDCtrainwasrestoredtoservice.2)Additional analysiswasperformed toconfirmthefailuremechanism fortheaffectedsocketweld.3)Weldtestingisbeingperformed toevaluateforpotential improvements.

4)The1ASDCtrainwasrestoredtooperation following ventingandinspection.

5)SDCsystemventingprocedures arebeingrevisedtoincludeadditional frequency andtemperature requirements, NRcFORM38$I4.95)

NRCFORM366AI495ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO ST.LUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-005-002OF7TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionelcopiesofOftCForm366AJI17IOnApril17,1997,St.LucieUnit1wasoperating inMode1at100percentreactorpower.At1037,aHighPressureSafetyInjection (HPSI)Pump[EIIS:BQ:P]

wasstartedandinventory wasaddedtotheSafetyInjection Tanks(SIT)inaccordance withnormaloperating procedures.

Following theSITfillevolution, operators notedthatthe1B2SIT[EIIS:BP:TK]

levelwasslowlydecreasing.

Therateofinventory lossintheSITwasobservedtobeapproximately 2.5percentovera6hourperiod.Additionally, operators noticedanincreaseinreactorcavityleakagefromapproximately 0.2gpmto0.45gpm.Basedontheindicated increaseinreactorcavityleakage,areactorcoolantsystem(RCS)[EIIS:AB]

inventory balancewasperformed toevaluateandquantifyRCSleakage.Theinventory balancedetermined thatnochangeinRCSleakageratehadoccurredandvalueswereconsistent withthosedetermined priortofillingtheSITs.Aninvestigation wasinitiated todetermine thesourceoftheindicated increaseinreactorcavityleakage.OnApril18,1997,whileconducting acontainment inspection toidentifythesourceoftheleakage,waterwasobservedintheareaofthe1B2SITpipetrench.Tominimizeradiological

exposure, aroboticcamerawasdeployedtodetermine thesourceoftheleakage,whichappearedtooriginate from+hevicinityofventvalveV-3"15[EIIS:BP:VTV].

Thisventvalveislocatedwithinthereactorcontainment building(RCB)onthe1B2safetyinjection pipe,upstreamofthe1B2safetyinjection loopcheckvalve(RefertoFigure1).Asampleofleakagewasobtainedandanalyzed, whichindicated aboronconcentration inthesampleof2915partspermillion(ppm).RCSboronconcentration atthetimewasapproximately 840ppm.tAreduction inreactorpowerwasinitiated at2020on'April18,1997,toallowpersonnel toaccessV-3815andcharacterize thesourceoftheleakage.At0150onApril19,1997,withthereactorinMode2atapproximately 10'ercent power,acontainment entrywasmadetoinspectV-3815.Theinspection revealedafailure.ofthesocketweldjoiningtheoneinchventlineforV-3815tothesockoletinthesafetyinjection loopline.Thiswasdetermined tobereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)leakage,inaccordance with10CFR50.2,andtheactionstatement forTechnical Specification (TS)3.4.6.2wasenteredat0217hours.ActionStatement 3.4.6.2.a, specifies, "WithanyPRESSUREBOUNDARYLEAKAGE,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 30hours."Areactorshutdownwascommenced andSt.LucieUnit1enteredMode3(HotStandby)at0228onApril19,1997.ANotification ofUnusualEventwasmadetotheStateofFloridaat0229'andtotheUSNRCat0245,inaccordance withtherequirements oftheSt.LucieEmergency Planforeventsinvolving RCSpressureboundaryleakage.TheUnitenteredMode4at1405andthe1Bshutdowncooling(SDC)train[EIIS:BP]

wasplacedinserviceat2322hoursonApril19,1997.Operators attempted, butwereunable,toplacethe1ASDCtraininserviceduetoadecreaseinpressurizer

[EIIS:AB:PZR]

levelwhenthesuctionvalvesforthe1ASDCtrainwereopened.The1ASDCtrainwassubsequently declaredinoperable, andtheplantcooldownwascontinued usingthe1BSDCtrain.Unit1enteredMode5onApril20,1997,at0315andtheUnusualEventwasterminated atthattime.Following repaiIaftheaffectedweldonthe182safetyinjection lineandresto.dtion ofthe'ASDCtrain,St.LucieUnit1retuinedtoMode1poweroperation at0153onApril23,1997.

NRCFOIIM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER).TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO ST.LUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEOUENTIAL REVISION3OF797-005-00TEXTIifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofIVRCForm366AII17IThereactorshutdownwascompleted inaccordance withTSrequirements forRCSleakageinvolving thereactorcoolantpressureboundary.

'heRCPBleakageoriginated fromasocketweldonaoneinchventlinetoV-3815,locatedonthe1B2safetyinjection header.Whileonly1B2safetyinjection tankvolumewasaffected, andnoreactorcoolantinventory waslostasaresultoftheleak,thesiteoftheleakageisclassified asreactorcoolantpressureboundary, asfurtherdiscussed inthisreport.FailureanalysisoftheaffectedweldontheventlinetoV-3815wasperformed following theevent.Theanalysisconcluded thattheinitiating failuremechanism washotcrackingoftheweldduetocontamination.

Boricacidresidueisconsidered tobethemostlikelycauseofthiscontamination.

The1ASDCtrainwasdeclaredinoperable whenoperations personnel observeddecreases inpressurizer

.levelwhileopeningtheSDCsuctionisolation valves.Localobservations identified thatsystempressureinthe1ASDCtrainwasfluctuating duringattemptstoopenthevalves,andasafetyreliefvalveonthe1ASDCtrain,V-3483,temporarily liftedasdesignedinresponsetothesystempressuretransient.

Subsequent inspection andtroubleshootingofflownoisesinsystempipingbyoperations personnel identified thatamanualrecirculation isolation valve(V-3"<4)forthe1Alowpressuresafetyinjection (LPSI)pumpwasnotfullyshutasrequiredforSDCoperation.

ThisresultedinaflowpathfromtheRCStotherefueling watertank(RWT)whentheSDCsuctionvalvestothepumpwereopened,andwastheprimarycauseoftheindicated decreases inpressurizer levelpreviously discussed.

Uponinspection, thehandwheel forV-3204wasfoundtobedifficult tooperateandappearedtobeclosed,howeveroperators usingavalvewrenchwereabletomanipulate thevalveanadditional twoturnstothefullyclosedposition.

Aworkorderwaswrittentorepairthedefective valveandpreventive maintenance practices arebeingreviewedtoaddressgenericaspects.Systemventingandinspections performed following theeventdetermined thatthepressureresponseobservedinthe1ASDCtrainwascausedbythepresenceofgasvoidsinthehighpointsofthe1ASDCsuctionpipinginconjunction withapartially openLPSIpumprecirculation valve.Thepresenceofvoids,alongwiththepartially openrecirculation valvewouldprovideconditions conducive tosteamflashingandpressurefluctuations intheLPSIpumpsuctionlinewhenreactorcoolantwasinitially alignedtothesystem.VentingoftheSDCpipingisrequiredtobeperformed following systemuseastheresultofasimilareventin1995,howevertheprocedures didnotspecifically requirethatthisbeperformed atambienttemperature.

Thecompletion ofventingfollowing thelastuseoftheSDCsystemmaytherefore nothavebeenadequatetopreventsubsequent degassing (voiding) ofreactorcoolantintheSDCsuctionlines.Consequently, procedural inadequacy wasacontributing factorbynotpreventing conditions whichwerefavorable totheformation ofthe'gasvoidsinthe1ASDCsystem.TS3.4.6.2requiresthatnopressureboundaryleakagebepresentinModes1,2,3and4.TSActionStatement 34.6.2.a,furtherspecifies, "WithanyPRESSUREBOUNDARYLEAKAGE,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 30hours."St.LucieUnit1vasplacedinMode3,HOTSANDBYe';0228,onApril191997,approximately 23minutesfollowing theidentification ofRCPBleakage.

NRCFORM366AI4.96)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO ST.LUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-005-004OF7TEXTlemorespeoeisrequired, useeddidonel copiesofNRCFarm386AJI17)Theplant'entered Mode5at0315onApril20,1997,approximately 25hoursafterentryintoMode3.Basedontheabove,thiseventisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A),asacompletion ofaplantshutdownrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications.

According tothedefinition providedintheSt.LucieUnit1TS,PRESSUREBOUNDARYLEAKAGEisdefinedas"...leakage (exceptsteamgenerator tubeleakage)throughanon-isolable faultinaReactorCoolantSystemcomponent body,pipewallorvessel.wall."Additionally, 10CFR50.2definesthe"reactorcoolantpressureboundary" asfollows:...allthosepressure-containing components ofboilingorpressurized water-cooled nuclearpowerreactorssuchaspressurevessels,'piping,pumpsandvalves,whichare:(1)Partofthereactorcoolantsystem,or(2)Connected tothereactorcoolantsystem,uptoandincluding anyandallofthefollowing:

Theoutermost containment isolation valveinsystempipingwhichpenetrates primaryreactorcontainment, Thesecondoftwovalvesnormallyclosedduringnormalreactoroperation insystempipingwhichdoesnotpenetrate primaryreactorcontainment, Thereactorcoolantsystemsafetyandreliefvalves.Duringthisevent,asmallamountofinventory fromthe1B2SITwasobservedleakingfromaweldassociated withaoneinchvent,-V-3815,locatedonthe1B2safetyinjection pipe,upstreamofthe1B2safetyinjection loopcheckvalve.Pertheabovedefinition, thisventisapartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarysinceitislocatedonasystemconnected totheRCSandiswithintheoutermost containment isolation valveinsystempipingpenetrating theprimaryreactorcontainment.

Additionally, V-3815islocatedintheQualityGroupAportionofthesafetyinjection system.ThisQualityGroupisdescribed bytheSt.LucieUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Section3.2,asspecifically applyingtoreactorcoolantpressureboundarycomponents.

TheSt.LucieUnit1TSbasesrelatedtoRCPBleakagespecifythatpressureboundaryleakageofanymagnitude isunacceptable asitmaybeindicative ofimpending furtherpressureboundaryfailure.'herefore, thepresenceofanypressureboundaryleakagerequiresthattheplantbepromptlyplacedinacoldshutdown(Mode5)condition.

Compliance withtheLimitingConditions forOperation (LCO)asspecified intheTechnical Specifications assuresthatthefunctional capability ofequipment requiredforthesafeoperation oftheplantismaintained.

Following theidentification ofpressureboundaryleakageduringthisevent,operators promptlyimplemented theapplicable TSActionrequirements.

NRCFORM366AI4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO ST.LUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-005-005OF7TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired, useedditianelcopiesoffVRCForm366AJI17IAreviewofsimilardocumented maintenance weldfailuresatSt.Luciewasperformed following theevent.Basedonavailable information, itwasdetermined thatnosignificant failurerateexistedforthisfailuremechanism, therefore thesocketweldleakagefromtheventlineforV-3815isconsidered tobearandomfailure.AsaresultoftheRCBPleakage,nolossofreactorcoolantsysteminv'entory

occurred, andtheareaofleakagewasisolatedfromtheRCSbythe1Bsafetyinjection headerloopcheckvalve(V-3247)[EIIS:BP:VJ.

V-3247isalsoaddressed bytheSt.LucieUnit1TSandisrequiredtomeetperiodicsurveillance criteriaforleakagewhichprovidesaddedassurance ofvalveintegrity.

Leakagefromthe1B2SITduringtheeventwaslimitedtoapproximately one-halfgallonperminuteandmakeupwasprovidedasnecessary tomaintaintherequiredtankvolume.Theoperability ofthe182Slwasnotaffectedbytheweldleakage.NWithregardtothe1ASDCsystem,St.LucieUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysis(UFSAR),Section9.1.5.3.2, statesthat"Nosinglefailureofanactivecomponent duringresidualheatremovalwillresultinalossofcorecoolingcapability.

Thereactorcoolantsystemcanbebroughttorefueling temperature IIsingoneIowpressuresafetyinjection pumpandoneshutdowncoolingheatexchanger."

The1BSDCsystemremainedoperational atalltimesduringthisevent,andwasnotaffectedbytheinoperability ofthe1ASDCtrain.The1BSDCtrainwasplacedinservicetofacilitate theRCScooldownandfunctioned properlyinestablishing Mode5conditions.

TheRCSheatremovalsafetyfunctionwasmaintained atalltimesduringtheevent.Following theevent,FPLengineering personnel performed awalkdownofthe1ASDCsystemandrevieweddataobservedduringeffortstoplacethe1ASDsysteminservice.Basedonthepressures inthesystemobservedduringtheevent,areviewofthedesignandhydrostatic testingforthissystem,andlocalinspection, the1ASDCtrainwasdetermined tobefunctional andacceptable foroperation.

Basedontheabove,thiseventdidnotadversely affecttheprotection ofthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Following theidentification ofthepressureboundaryleakageonthe182safetyinjection header,St.LucieUnit1wasplacedinColdShutdowninaccordance withtherequirements ofplantTechnical Specifications.

2.Theaffected'!B2safetyinjection headerventlineweldwasremovedandrepairswereimplemented.

TheUnitwasreturnedtoMode1poweroperation onApril23,1997,~following completion oftherepairs.

NRCFORM366AI4-95IILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIST.LUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-005-006OF7TEXTfifmorespeceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCFarm366AJI17I3.Aninspection andfailureanalysiswasperformed forthefailedsocketweldassociated withV-3815ventline.Theanalysisdetermined thattheinitiating failuremechanism ofthesocketweldwashotcracking, duetocontamination oftheweld.Whilethisfailureisconsidered toberandomatSt.Lucie,additional testingwillbedonetoevaluateboricacidweldcontamination anddetermine ifadditional preventive measuresarenecessary tominimizethepotential forrecurrence.

The1ASDCtrainwasreturnedtoservicefollowing systemventingandtherealignment oftheminimumflowrecirculation valveforthe1ALPSIpump.Acautiontagwasplacedontherecirculation valveandaplantworkorderwasinitiated torepairandrestorethevalvetosatisfactory operation.

5.Ventingofthe1ALPSIpumpsuctionlineiscurrently beingperformed atanincreased frequency andtheresultswillbeevaluated todetermine ifadditional changestoventingperiodicity arerequired.

6.Tofurtherprecludethepossibility ofgasformation intheSDCsuctionlines,St.LucieUnit1and2shutdowncoolingsystemprocedures arebeingrevisedtorequirethatsystemventingfollowing SDCoperation beconducted atambienttemperatures.

FPLengineering willreviewtheprocedure revisions forincorporation ofadequateguidanceandcorrective actionspriortoissue.Component:

SafetyInjection Pipe1inchVentLine-SocketWeldMaterial:

Piping-304/316stainless steelwithER308/316fillermaterialSockolet-304stainless steelLER-389/95-001 St.LucieUnit2(2/21/95)

-Theeventdescribes thefailureofalowpressuresafetyinjection (LPSI)pumpduringasurveillance, duetoairbindingofthepump.Therootcausewasattributed tothemigration oftrappedairintheemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)headerfollowing maintenance.

In-houseEvent95-09St.LucieUnit1(2/27/95)

-ThiseventinvolvedtheliftingofsafetyreliefvalveV-3483atSt.LucieUnit1following theinitiation offlowfromthe1ALPSIpumpduringSDCoperation.

Theprimarycausewaspressurespikinginthehotlegsuctionlineduetoarapidincreaseinsystemflowratefollowing LPSIpumpstart.Gasvoidingwasconsidered asapossiblecontributor.

Corrective actionswereimplemented following theeventtominimizetransient fluidfloweffects.NKCFORM366AI4.95]

NRCFORM366AI495)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIST.LUCIFUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-005-007OF7TEXT/ffmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofiVRCForm388A/I17IBQUB~SAFETYINJECTION TANK(SIT1B2)(SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM)REFUELING WATERTANKTRETURNHEADER(f--sQi-(LsSIT.;"182~,-.+-(~isLTOSIASCLOSEhs'ROMHPSIPUMPB-eIMIISIASV3815ISSAMPLEAREAOFLEAKAGERCSLOOP182