ML17229A537

St Lucie Unit 2 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 960106-970525.

ML17229A537
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Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/25/1997
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ST.LUCIEUNIT2DOCKETNUMBER50-389CHANGES,'TESTS ANDEXPERIMENTS MADEASALLOWEDBY10CFR50'9FORTHEPERIODOFJANUARY6,1996THROUGHMAY25,199797ii280239 97ii24PDRADOCK05000389RPDR INTRODUCTXON Thisreportissubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.59(b),whichrequiresthat:i)changesinthefacilityasdescribed intheSARii)changesinprocedures asdescribed intheSARiii)testsandexperiments notdescribed intheSARwhichareconducted withoutpriorCommission approvalbereportedtotheCommission inaccordance with10CFR50.59(b)and50.71(e)(4).Thisreportisintendedtomeetthisrequirement fortheperiodofJanuary6,1996,throughMay25,1997.Thisreportisdividedintothree(3),sections; thefirst,changestothefacilityasdescribed intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)performed byaPlantChange/Modification (PC/M);thesecond,changestothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheUpdatedFSARnotperformed byaPC/M-andtestsandexperiments notdescribed intheUpdatedFSAR;thethird,asummaryofanyfuelreloadsafetyevaluations.

Eachofthedocuments summarized inSections1,2and3includes'a 10CFR50.59safetyevaluation whichevaluated thespecificchange(s).

Eachofthesesafetyevaluations concluded thatthechangedoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionnorrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications; therefore, priorNRCapprovalwasnotrequiredforimplementation.

TABLEOFCONTENTS8409985153914639319194093ICWPUMPMATERIALCHANGESRABVENTILATION SYSTEMDAMPERMODZFZCATION RANGEINCREASEFORFEEDWATER ANDMAINSTEAMINDICATORS ANDRECORDERS INSTALLATION OFANPSWORKSTATIONINCONTROLROOMICWANDCWSYSTEMINSTRUMENT IMPULSELINEMODIFICATION 10129502895248INSTALLATION OFANACOUSTICFEEDWATER FLOWMETERINSTALLATION OFVIBRATION MONITORING PROBESONRCP2A213149601296099DRAINVALVESFORSTEAMSUPPLYTOTHE2CAFWPUMP16RCGVSPRESSUREINDICATOR CONTROLLOGICMODIFICATION 159612496133REACTORVESSEL0-RINGREPLACEMENT ADDITIONOFMANUALISOLATION VALVESTODIESELDRIVENAIRCOMPRESSOR.

1718961389614396153961599616196163SHUTDOWNCOOLINGISOLATION VALVEMODIFICATION

)THERMO-LAG RELATEDMODZFICATIONS QUICKLOCINCOREINSTRUMENT FLANGEDESIGNCONDENSATE PUMPMECHANICAL SEALVENTINGSTEAMGENERATOR TUBEPLUGSANDTUBESTAKESCONTAINMENT BUILDINGRADIANTENERGYSHIELDMODIFICATION 1920212223249616796174BYPASSING THE2APURIFICATION FILTERREPLACEMENT OFRABSUPPLYFANHVS-4AWITHANON-EQMOTORANDSHIELDWALL2526 00 KKXXQlLRSEFJ-92-009 LUDETERMINATION OFCEAOPERATIONAL LIFE28SEMP-95-004 OPERATION WITHREDUCEDPRESSURIZER HEATERCAPACITY29FPER-96-002 FIREPROTECTION EVALUATION ANDUFSARUPDATERELATED30TOTHERMO-LAG WALLSSENS-96-003 CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMOPERATION 31SEMS-96"007 ADDITIONOFMANUALISOLATION VALVESINTHEREACTOR32COOLANTGASVENTSYSTEMFPER-96"010FIRE,PROTECTION EVALUATION FORTHECONTROLROOMHVACSYSTEM33SENP-96-019 SEFJ-96-019SEFJ-96-022 UFSARCHANGES-PLANTHEATUPANDCOOLDOWNANALYSISTOALLOWANINCREASED NUMBEROFOUTOFSERVICEINCOREDETECTORS EVALUATION OFTHEBEACONCOREMONITORING SYSTEM3436SENP-96-022 ELIMINATION OFTHE'PRESSURE RELIEFFUNCTIONFORTHEREACTORCAVITYPRESSURERELIEFDAMPERS37SENS-96-033 SENS-96-039 WASTEGASHOLDUPSYSTEMOPERATION

\EVALUATION OFTHECEDMCSCOOLINGSYSTEMANDENCLOSURE 3839SENS-96-046 USEOFTHESTATIONBLACKOUTCROSS-TZE FORNON-LICENSED BLACKOUTEVENTS40SEIS-96-049 REMOVALOFREDUNDANT HPSZ,LPSIANDSHUTDOWNCOOLINGVALVEPOSITIONINDICATION 41SENS-96-060 SENS-96-065 SENS-96"069 SENS-96-072 SENS-96-091 REVISZONOFSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSPENTRESZNTRANSFERMETHODSUSEOFBREAKAWAY LOCKSONTHEHOTSHUTDOWNPANELROOMDOORSHIGHRATEOFCHANGEOFPOWERTRIPDESIGNBASISASSESSMENT OFCEAMODESELECTORSWITCHHYPOCHLORITE SYSTEMUFSARCLARIFICATION 4243444546 2RGZIQH>SESP-96-093 (Continued)

RESPONSETONRCRAIREGARDING PRESSURIZED THERMALSHOCK47SENS-97-006 EVALUATION OFFULLCOREOFFLOADS48SEFJ-97-011

~LOWFLOWTRIPSETPOINTCHANGE49SEES-97-019 SENS-97-024 SESJ-97-026 DELETIONOFREQUIREMENT FORREFUELING MACHINEUNDERWATER CAMERAWASTEGASSYSTEMANALYZEROPERATION RESPONSETONRCSUPPLEMENTAL RAIREGARDING "PRESSURIZED THERMALSHOCK505152SEMS-97-034 EVALUATION FORTHEUSEOFSIMULATED INCOREDETECTOR53ASSEMBLIES INCORELOCATIONS R9ANDT13SENS-97-036 SENS-97-038 INTAKESTRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEMOPERATION PRESSURIZER CODESAFETYVALVEMODIFICATION 5455SENS-97-040 SAFETYINJECTION TANKPRESSURIZATION REQUIREMENTS FORMODES3&4OPERATION WITHREDUCEDREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPRESSURE56SEMS-97-043 SENS-97-044 SENS-97-045 SEMS-97-070 SENS-97-071 FIREPUMPSSTARTINGSEQUENCECONTAINMENT SUMPSCREENSUFSARCHANGEFORCONTAINMENT SUMPSCREENSUFSARCOMBUSTIBLE LOADINGUPDATECONTROLROOMEMERGENCY SUPPLIES5758596061

BADST.LUCIEUNIT2CYCLE10RELOAD63

SECTIONIPLANTCHANGE/MODIPICATIONS

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 84099MATEALThismodification consistsofallowingtheuseofASTM-A-479, TypeXM-19austenitic stainless steel(Nitronics 50)inadditiontothe,original

material, ASTMB-164,fortheICWpumps'hafts, couplings andkeys.Thenewmaterialofferssuperiorpitting/crevice corrosion resistance andshouldprovideimprovedmaterialperformance.'his modification providesfunctionally equivalent components anddoesnotaltertheperformance characteristics oroperation oftheXCWpumps.

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 85153DAMPMDFIDampersGD-3andGD-4serveasbackdraftdampersforreactorauxiliary building(RAB)mainsupplyfansHVS-4AandHVS-4B.Eachofthesegravitydrivendampersclosestopreventfree-wheeling ofitsassociated fanwhenthatfanissecuredandtheotherfanisoperating.

ThisPC/Mmodifiesthedamperstoinstallanadjustable stoponthedamperlinkagetopreventthehorizontally mounteddamperfromopeningbeyondthe90degreefullopenposition.

Additionally, dampermullionsarebeingmodifiedtofacilitate maintenance accesstothebearings.

Theuseofa90degreestopisstandardpracticeforhorizontally mounteddampers.Thestopprovidesaddedassurance thedamperswillclosewhenrequired.

Themullionmodifications improvemaintenance accesstodamperbearings, thusfacilitating theabilitytolubricate andmaintainthebearings.

Thesechangesdonotaltertheperformance characteristics ofthedampersandareexpectedtoprovideimproveddamperreliability.

0

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 91463FEEDEEDThismodification expandstheindicated rangeforfeedwater andmainsteamflowindicators andrecorders.

Theoriginalinstruments wereprovidedwitharangeof0-6E+6ibm/hr.Althoughthisoriginalrangeenveloped thestretchpowerfeedwater andmainsteam'flows(5,893,450 ibm/hr),thedeviceswereoperating closetotheirmaximumupperlimit.ThisPC/Mincreases therangeofthesubjectinstruments to0-7E+6ibm/hr.Asaresultoftherangechange,theFeedwater Flow/Steam Flowcontroller proportional bandswereadjustedandtheQuickOpeningTimeConstantsettingsfortheSteamBypassandControlSystemwereadjustedtocompensate fortherangechange.Systemtransmitters werealsorecalibrated.

Thereisnonetchangetosystemoperation orperformance.

AsapartofthePC/M,ABB-CEevaluated thechangesandprovidedrecommended coefficient settingstoensurethatsystemswillprovidethesameperformance andmeetthesamerequirements astheoriginaldesign.10 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 93191ROLXUDQRxzThismodification addsacustomized workstationinthecontrolroomfortheAssistant NuclearPlantSupervisor (ANPS).Theworkstationwasinstalled inproximity totheReactorTurbineGenerator Boards(RTGBs)andrequiredtherelocation offourcomputerprinters.

Installation alsoimprovesRTGBaccesscontrol.Thischangewasevaluated toensurethatnoadverseinteractions with'afety relatedequipment werecreated.Ahumanfactorsreviewconcluded therewasnoadverseimpactassociated withthechange.11 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 94093IATIThismodification allowsfortheuseofalternate materials (6MolySS,Titanium, andHastelloy C-276)foraportionoftheinstrument impulselinesassociated withtheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)andCirculating Water(CW)systems.Thismodification alsoallowstheuseoftubinginplaceofpiping.Thealternate materials anduseoftubingwasevaluated andfoundtobeanacceptable equivalent substitution.

Allapplicable designrequirements aresatisfied andICWandCWsystemoperation isnotaffectedbythechanges.12 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 95028DMETEThismodificationinstallsanacousticflowmetertomonitorfeedwaterflow.Thenewflowmeterprovidesimprovedperformance overtheexistingfeedwater flowventuriswhicharenoteasilyremovedandcleanedandaresusceptible tofouling.Feedwater flowventurifoulingresultsinconservative powermeasurements whichresultinplantoperating inefficiencies.

SafetyEvaluation JPN-PSL-SEIP-95-031 wasissuedtoevaluateandjustifythetemporary useoftheLEFMalongwiththeexistingventuri.Severalmonthsofdatawereobtainedandevaluated.

ThisPC/Mprovidesthedetailsforpermanent installation oftheLEFT1'IThismodification doesnotchangeanymechanical components ofthefeedwater system.Theoriginalfeedwater flowmeasurement systemremainsinstalled asaredundant system.Althoughsecondary sidethermohydraulic parameters havechanged,thechangeswereevaluated tobewithindesignlimits.LEFMaccuracytestingwasperformed atAldenLaboratories andwasformallydocumented inTestReportMPR-1576.Theresultsofthistestingwereincludedincalculation PSL-BFJI-94-001, l'*'lluncertainty ofthepowercalculation beyondthe2.limitatfullpowerandthatitprovidesuncertainties lessthanthoseanalyzedunderJPN-PSL-SEFJ-94-016, forpowerlevelslessthan100:.TheLEFMsoftwareunderwent aformalsoftwareverification andvalidation.

iPLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 95248L0FVPBEA2~REX'hismodification installsasetofvibration monitoring probesonthelowermotorcasingofreactor.coolantpump(RCP)2A2atapreviously abandoned probelocation.

Thenewprobesareofthesamemakeandmodelandareinstalled inthesamelocationand~configuration asthesetoforiginalprobeswhichwererelocated tothetopofthemechanical sealviapreviousmodification.Thenewprobesareseismically mountedandareusedformonitoring andtroubleshooting purposes.

Thereisnoimpactontheoperation orqualification oftheRCP.

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96012Thismodification temporarily changesthecontrollogicofrectorcoolant'as ventsystem(RCGVS)pressureindicator PIA-1140toannunciate onlowpressureinsteadofhighpressure.

PIA-1140islocatedbetweentheRCGVSprimaryandsecondary isolation valves(isolation fromthereactorcoolantsystem)andisdesignedtoprovideoperators withanindication ofleakagepastoneormoreoftheprimaryisolation valves.Asaresultofleakagepastoneormoreoftheprimaryisolation valves,theannunciator isinconstantalarm.Changingthecontrollogicwillclearthealarmandwillprovideanalarmonalowpressurecondition.

Thenewalarmisusefultooperators inthatitwouldbeindicative ofaleakpastoneormoreofthesecondary valves.Thismodification iseffective untiltheCycle10refueling outagewhentheRCGVSisolation valvesarescheduled forreplacement.

Note:TheRCGVSisolation valveswerereplacedandthecontrollogicwasrestoredtoitspreviousconfiguration duringtheCycle10refueling outage.

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96099Thismodification providesforsystemimprovements byincreasing thereliability ofthesteamsupplysystemforthe2Cauxiliary feedwater pumpturbine.Thismodification relocated thewarmuplineinlettoallowbetterdrainingofthesteamsupplylineandreduceoperating transients whenopeningthesteamadmission valves'dditionally, upstreamisolation valveswereinstalled ineachwarmuplinetoenhancesystemmaintenance

-capabilities'he modification conformstothesamequalitygroup,materials, andclassification asthesystem.Thereisnoadverseimpactontheoperation orqualification ofthe2CAFWpump.16 0

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96124RJGsGWThismodification replacestheexistingreactorvessel0-ringswithaspringenergized 0-ringdesignrecommended byHelicoflex (theoriginalequipment manufacturer) andABB-CE.Thenewdesignreducestheamountofhoningand/orwelding(andassociated radiation doses)currently requiredtoaddressminorsurfaceanomalies ofthevesselflange.Thenew0-ringsusemetalstripsilverjacketing inlieuofelectroplated silverandtheyuseaninternalhelicalspringtoprovidesealingforceduringflangecompression.

Thisdesignhasbeensuccessfully usedinover75nuclearinstallations.

Thischangeprovidesafunctionally equivalent designandhasbeenevaluated byABB-CEasbeingacceptable foruse.17 0

PLANT'CHANGE/MODIFICATION 96133ALETEThismodification installsnormallyopenmanualisolation valvesinthedischarge linesfromtheEmergency DieselGenerator (EDG)airstartcompressors tofacilitate aircompressor maintenance.

Fourisolation valveswereinstalled downstream oftheexistingcheckvalvesandupstreamofthesensinglinesontheelectricdrivenaircompressors whichareequippedwiththeirownisolation valves.Thevalvesdonotinterfere withoverpressureprotection oradversely

,affectfunctional operation ofthesystem.Thismodification eliminates thepracticeoftypically takingoutofservicebothcompressors inordertoperformmaintenance ononeofthecompressors.

Thismodification allowstheisolation ofeitheraircompressor ineachtrainformaintenance andisconsidered adesignenhancement.

Thereisnoadverseimpactontheoperation orqualification oftheEDG.18

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96138LAgllIQIQj~g ThisPC/Mmodifiesshutdowncoolingsystemhotlegsuctionisolation valvesV3651,V3652andV3480topreventpotential pressurelocking.Thesevalveswerepreviously identified viaevaluation JPN-PSL-SEMP-93-036 asbeingsusceptible topressurelocking.Thischangeisbeingperformed tosatisfytherequirements ofNRCGenericLetter95-07.Themodification drillsa3/16"holeontheupstream(reactorcoolantsystem)sideofeachvalvedisksinordertoprovideventingofhighpressurefluidfromthevalvebonnetarea.Thisisastandardmethodofaddressing pressurelockingconcernsandisendorsedinNUREG-1275 Vol.9.Thedownstream seatofthevalvesisnotbeenaffected.

Thismodification doesnotadversely affectoperation ofthe~~subjectvalvesortheshutdowncoolingsystem.19 e

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96143IFATThisPC/Mimplements changesrelatedtoconcernsovertheperformance ofThermo-lag 330-1andthefireprotection ofvariousplantequipment.

AsaresultofNRCconcerns, FPLperformed individual fireareaevaluations toassesspotential options(e.g.,redundant equipment, conduitreroutes, manualactions,etc.)whichwouldeliminate theneedforprotection ofaffectedconduits.

Thismodification reroutesconduitsprotected withThermo-lag 330-1.Thereroutedconduitscontaincablesforthe480Vpowerfeedtobatterycharger2Afrommotorcontrolcenter2AS;lowvoltage125V.dcpowerfrombus2AtoRTGB-205andRTGB-206; andlowvoltage120Vacpowerfrominstrument bus2MA-1toisolation cabinetMA/SAforpowerdistribution toRTGBs201,202,203,205and206.Thischangeeliminates Thermo-lag surveillance andmaintenance requirements associated withtheaffectedconduit.Thismodification alsorestorestheprotection providedtothepressurizer high-lowdischarge pressureinterfaces byeliminating theprotection requirement andoperatoractionforthePORVblockvalvesandaddingfireprotection tothePORVcables.Thus,operatormanualactionshavebeenreplacedwithapassiveprotection andarenolongerneededforafireintheelectrical penetration rooms.ThechangesprovidedbythisPC/Marelimitedtothefireprotection aspectsofsystemdesignanddonotaffectthesafetyfunctions oftherelatedplantequipment.

20 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96153UMEFLEDEQgmi~yThismodification replacestheexistingreactorinstrument nozzlepenetration andsealingsystemwiththeABB-CENOdesignedQuicklocsystem.Includedwiththischangeisthereplacement of56incoreinstrument assemblies whichenterthevesselthroughthenozzleflanges.TheQuicklocmodification replaces10incoreinstrument flangeswhichareusedforincoreinstrument (ICI)andheatedjunctionthermocouple (HJTC)probeinsertion intothereactorvessel.Theseflangesserveasapartoftheprimarysystempressureboundary.

Thenewdesignreducespersonnel radiation exposurebysimplifying instrument nozzleassembly, disassembly andICImaintenance.

Reactorcoolantsystempressureboundarydesignrequirements havebeenmaintained.

ThenewICIassemblies arecompatible withtheQuicklocdesignandarefunctionally.

equivalent totheoriginalassemblies.

Thereisnoaffectontheinterface betweentheICIsandtheexistingcomputersystem(DDPS).21

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96159PEThismodification providesameansofventingcondensate pumpmechanical sealspriortopumpstartupandprovidesablowofflineonthemechanical sealinletstrainers toallowforon-linestrainercleaning.

On-linestrainercleaningwillincreasecondensate pumpavailability sincethepumpswillnolongerhavetoberemovedfromserviceforthisevolution.

Existingventvalveswillbeusedandmanualblowoffvalveswillbeadded.Thecondensate pumpsarenon-safety pumps.Thischangedoesnotaltercondensate pumpdesign,functionorperformance characteristics.

Althoughadditional potential failuremodesareintroduced (e.g.,inadvertently leavingavalveopen),thebenefitsofthemodification outweightheconsequences ofsuchfailures.

22 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96161TEQgmngryThismodification evaluates newlydesignedCombustion.

Engineering

standard, extendedandshortmechanical steamgenerator (SG)tubeplugs,standardweldedtubeplugsandstandardandfulllengthtubestakes.Thischangedoesnotaffecttubeplugginglimitswhichareestablished bythereloadsafetyanalysis.

Thenewplugdesignsareequivalent inform,fitandfunctiontoexistingplugdesignsandtherequirements oftheoriginalconstruction codeofrecordhavebeensatisfied.

TheplugsandstakeshavebeendesignedforuseinCEdesignedSGsinaccordance withASMECode.Theonlychangeinthestandardmechanical plugisataperdimension intheXDoftheopenendoftheplug.Theextendedandshortlengthplugshaveslightlychangedinlength.Theextendedplugwillaccommodate adifferent locationinthetubeforsealingintheeventthenormalsealingareaisdamaged.Theshortplugcanbeusedwhenthereisaninterference duringinstallation.

Allplugsmeetthesametestingcriteria.

Additionally, thenewdesignincludessignificantly moremetalattheplugtipandthusdoesnotrequiretheantiwearcollarwheninstalled behindatubestake.Tubestakedesignshavebeenevaluated byABB-CEtoensurethestake/tube assemblyremainsoutofcriticalvibration frequencies duringnormalandabnormalconditions andtoensurecompatability withtubeplugs.ThisPC/MalsoallowsthegrindingoftheSGdividerpartition platecornerpatchplateboltheadsintheeventofaninterference duringpluggingactivities.

Thesubjectboltsarenotloadedexceptfortheinitialtightening duringfabrication.

Theboltsarenotcreditedinanystructural evaluations orcalculations.

ABB-CEhasevaluated modification oftheboltheadsandconcludes itisacceptable toremoveupto50%oftheboltheadareaandstillmaintainadequatesheararea.23 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96163Thismodification removesThermo-lag 330-1wall-type radiantenergyshieldsincontainment andreplacesthemwith16gaugestainless steelsheetmetalpanels.Additionally, 24gaugestainless steelsheetmetalwillbeusedtocoverfourThermo-lag coveredconduitsincontainment.

Thereplacement barriershavebeenevaluated toprovideadequateprotection andtohavenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedstructures, systemsorcomponents.

ThesubjectwallsarebeingreplacedasaresultofNRCstatements regarding thecombustibility ofThermo-lag 330-1andsincetheUFSARand10CFR50AppendixR(SectionIII.G.2.f) requireradiantenergyshieldstobeconstructed fromnon-combustible materials.

24 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 961672PURIFATRRERXZThismodification addresses thebypassing (isolation) ofthe2Apurification filterbyclosingisolation valveV2360andopeningbypassvalveV2355.Letdownflowwillberoutedaroundthe2Afiltertothepuri'ficationionexchangers.

ThisPC/Mmakespermanent thetemporary changeauthorized viaTemporary SystemAlteration (TSA)2-96-028.

Thechangeincreases flowthroughtheboronometer andeliminates theboronometer lowflowalarmduringperiodswhenonlyonechargingpumpisinoperation.

Additionally, thechangeeliminates theneedfordisposalofhighlyradioactive filters.Isolation ofthe2Afilterhasnoeffectontheplant'ssafetyanalysissincenoreduction infissionproductoractivation productinventory iscreditedtothefilter.Thepurification ionexchangers willcontinuetoremaininservice,aswillthe2Bpurification filterlocated'ownstream oftheionexchangers.

Experience hasshownthattheionexchangers areeffective removersofparticulates andeliminate thedifficulty ofdisposing highlyradioactive filterelements.

Plantchemistry specifications andlimitsonreactorcoolantsystemspecificactivityhavenotchanged.Asaresult,noincreaseinfuelcladdingperforations willresultfromfilterisolation.

The2Afiltermaybeplacedbackinserviceintheeventofunexpected fuelrodfailures.

25 0

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96174MEFB4LHVS-4Aisanenvironmentally qualified (EQ)fanmotorwhichprovidessupplyairforthereactorauxiliary building(RAB).Themotorforthisfanfailedandwasreplacedwithanon-EQmotorandaseismically mountedlocalshielding wallviaTemporary SystemAlteration 2-96-24.ThisTSAconfiguration wasevaluated andfoundacceptable viasafetyevaluation JPN-PSL-SEES-96-011, Revision1.Thismodification providesthejustification tomaketheTSAapermanent plantchange.Thereplacement motorwaspurchased asanequivalent Class1Ereplacement withtheexception ofitsradiation qualification.

Becausethenewmotorwasnotqualified foraradiation environment, ashielding wallwasincludedaspartofthemotorreplacement.

Thisnewshielding wasevaluated asproviding acceptable attenuation ofexpectedpost-.accident radiation levels.Inaddition, theshielding wallwasseismically analyzedtoensureitsintegrity ismaintained andthattherearenoadverseinteractions withadjacentequipment.

Theweightoftheshielding wallwasevaluated againstallowable floorloadsandfoundtobeacceptable.

ThisPC/Mwasconcluded torepresent afunctionally equivalent replacement fortheoriginalmotor.Theability,oftheHVS-4Afantomeetitsdesignrequirements hasnotbeencompromised.

26 SECTXON2SAFETYEVALVATXONS 27

-SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEFJ-92-009 REVISION0ERMIATIOFEAPERATLFETheUFSARsforeachunitassumea10yearoperational lifeforcontrolelementassemblies (CEAs).TheCEAvendor,ABB-CE,clarified thatthisisa10calendaryearlimitwhichcorresponds toapproximately eighteffective fullpoweryears.The10yearlimitisbasedonadifferent CEAdesignthanthatcurrently usedatSt.Lucie.Thisevaluation utilizesunitspecificCEAinspection dataalongwithdatafromasimilarplant(Arkansas NuclearOne-Unit2)todetermine theoperational lifeoftheCEAdesigncurrently inusersCEAoperational lifelimitsweredetermined byevaluating CEAperformance againstdesigncriteriarelatedtocladdingwear,unrecoverable claddingstrainlimits,fastneutronfluencelh.mittoprecludefailureduetocladdingmaterialdegradation, andCEAabsorbermaterialdepletion.

Currentandfuturefuelmanagement andCEAprogrammed repositioning strategies werealsoincludedinthisevaluation.

Asaresultofthisevaluation, CEAinspection andreplacement strategies havebeenrevised.28 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEMP-95-004 REVISION3TIOTHDZEEATQgggggryRevision0ofthisevaluation documents theacceptability ofremovinguptoatotalofsixpressurizer heatersfromserviceifneeded;oneproportional heaterandfivebackupheatersforatotalof300kW.Thiswouldleaveaheatercapacityof1200kW.Thecapability tosafelyshutdowntheplantundernaturalcirculation conditions isnotadversely affectedsincethebackupheatersrequiredtoprovidepressurecontrolunderalossofoffsitepowerwillbemaintained atorabovethetechnical specification limitof150kWperheaterbank.Revision3wasissuedtoprovideclarification regarding requirements forheatercapacity.

29

SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-FPER-96-002 REVISION1OTETEVELEThisfireprotection evaluation reviewstheuseofaThermo-lag wallasafirebarrierandconsiders Thermo-lag asacombustible loadinlightofNRCInformation Notices92-082and95-027andGenericLetter86-10.TheUFSARwasrevisedasfollows:plantconformance toNRCBranchTechnical Position9.5-1wasrevisedtonotetheacceptability offirebarrierswhichdonotmeetASTME-1193-hourcriteria, but'havebeenevaluated'nd determined toprovideadequateprotection forredundant safeshutdown.

equipment andcomponents; thefireratingofanauxiliary buildingThermo-lag wallwaschangedfromanASTME-1193-hourratingtotheas-built/tested firerating;and'ariousfirezonecombustible loadingvalueswereupdatedbasedontheincreased loadingassociated withtheuseofThermo-lag.

30 e

SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-003 REVISION0PERAThissafetyevaluation wasissued'oclarifytheUFSARwordingwithrespecttooperation ofthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS).TheexistingUFSARwordingpredominantly described systemoperation intheautomatic modeofoperation, including thealignment ofthechargingpumpsuctiontothevolumecontroltank(VCT).Althoughthesystemwasoriginally designedtobeoperatedinautomatic, ithastraditionally beenoperatedinmanualbecauseofadesiretomanuallycontrolreactivity changes.Thisoperational flexibility wasdesignedintothesystem;however,itwasnotdescribed intheUFSARinanydetail.TheUFSARswererevisedtonotetheacceptability ofsystemoperation inthemanualmode,including theabilitytodiluteorborateviadirectinjection throughthechargingpumpsratherthanviatheVCT.TheUFSARChapter15accidentanalyseswerereviewedanddetermined toboundtheUFSARchanges.

SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEMS-96-007 REVISION0GAVEVALThissafetyevaluation documents theacceptability ofinstalling threemanuallyoperatedisolation valvesinthereactorcoolantgasventsystem(RCGVS).TheRCGVSinterfaces withthereactorcoolantsystemandprovidesapressureboundaryfunction.

Thenewvalvesallowtheisolation ofexistingnormallyclosedsystemsolenoidoperatedventvalvesinordertofacilitate maintenance onthesolenoidvalves.Thenewmanualvalvesarerequiredtobemaintained lockedopen,therebyensuringproperoperation oftheRCGVS.Intheeventitbecomesnecessary toperformmaintenance ononeofthesolenoidoperatedvalves,theassociated manualvalve(s)maybeclosed.Pertheevaluation, theappropriate RCGVStechnical specification requirements mustbecompliedwithwhenisolating aportionofthesystem.Themanualvalvesweredesignedandfabricated inaccordance withASMEClass1requirements andwerepurchased asnucleargradecomponents.

Thevalveswerereviewedforsystemcompatibility, including valvepressuredrop,materials andseismicdesign.32

SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-FPER-96-010 REVISIONS 06c1ERQKBsQKThissafetyevaluation assessestheneedforadditional fireprotection featuressincefiredampersarenotpresentinHVACductspenetrating thefirewallbetweentheHVS-5A65BfanroomandthecontrolroomHVACequipment room.Theevaluation alsoallowstheremoval,ifdesired,ofthermalwrapinstalled onthecontrolroomHVACductslocatedintheHVS-5A&5Bfanroom.Thisfireprotection analysisconsidered thedesignandconstruction offireareapenetration inconjunction withsystemoperating featuresandareacombustible loads'heevaluation concludes thattheexistingbarrierprovidesadequateseparation andthatneithertheinstallation offiredampersintheventilation ductsnortheuseofthermalwrapwouldaugmentormaterially enhancethesafetyoftheplant.33 00 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENP-96-019 REVISION0HEAreviewoftheplantheatupandcooldownoperating procedures identified someminordiscrepancies betweentheprocedures andtheUFSAR.Thissafetyevaluation evaluates thesedifferences andprovidesthenecessary UFSARchanges.Nochangestoplantprocedures wererequired.

'J SAFETYEVALUATION O'PN-PSL-SEFJ-96-019 REVISION1ALLOWDDETERFThissafetyevaluation documents theresultsofapowerpeakinguncertainty analysisoftheCECOREcomputercodewhichisusedtomonitorthecorepowerdistribution.

Atthetimethiswasperformed, 10of56detectorstringswerefailed.TheUFSARlimitforfaileddetectors wasnomorethan25%ofthetotal.Theanalysisquantified theimpactofincreasing theallowable numberoffaileddetectorstringsontheuncertainty associated withtheresulting powerdistributions obtainedfromthereducednumberofdetectors.

Theeffectofincreasing theallowednumberoffaileddetectors from25:to46%wasevaluated.

Theevaluation concluded thattheabilityoftheincoredetectorsystemtoperformitsintendedfunctions remainsunaffected.

Note:Incoredetectors werereplacedduringtheCycle10refueling outage.35 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-022 REVISIONS 0Ec1LUATIFTHBATEThissafetyevaluation qualifies themethodology andperformance oftheBestEstimateAnalyzerforCoreOperations

-Nuclear(BEACON)systemforcoreanalysisatUnits1&2.ThisallowstheuseofBEACONasareplacement fortheINPAXcode(Unit1)andtheCECOREcode(Unit2).BEACONisanadvancedonline,coremonitoring andsupportsystemwhichprimarily usesrodpositions, coreinlettemperature andfixedincoredetectorinstrumentation signalsinconjunction withacompleteanalytical methodology forgeneration ofnearreal-time 3-Dpowerdistributions.

Thesystemprovidescoremonitoring, coreanalysisandfollow,andcorepredictions.

TheheartofthesystemisanNRCapproved, threedimensional nodalcode,ANC.36 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENP-96-022 REVISION0LATFEELThereactorcavitypressurereliefdampersweredesignedtoopenandventthelowerportionofthereactorcavityintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident.

Thisevaluation revisesthedesignbasesofthedamperstoeliminate thispressurerelieffunctionbasedonNRCapprovaloftheleak-befor'e-break evaluation forSt.LucieUnit2.Assuch,thedynamiceffectsassociated withahotorcoldlegpipingfailuremayberemovedfromtheplant'sdesignbasisandthereliefdampersarenolongerrequiredforpressurerelief.37

'SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-033 REVISION0DThissafetyevaluation clarifies UFSARwordingwithrespecttothepermissible modesofoperation forthewastegasholdupsystem.TheUFSARdescribes systemoperation withtheflowstreamroutedfromthegassurgetanktothewastegascompressors andthegasdecaytanksforholduppriortodischarge throughtheplantvent.Whilethisisanacceptable modeofoperation andisthepreferred modeofoperation duringperiodsofhighreactorcoolantfissionproductinventory, itisalsoacceptable, subjecttotheconstraints providedbytheTechnical Specifications andtheOffsiteDoseCalculation Manual,todischarge gaseouswastedirectlytotheplantvent.Originalplantdesignassumednormaloperation withacertainamountofreactorcoolantactivity.

Undersuchconditions itwouldbeappropriate toroutewastegastothedecaytankspriortorelease;however,becauseofimprovements infueldesignandplantoperating practices, normalcoolantactivitylevelshavebeenmuchlowerthantheoriginaldesignassumptions.

,Assuch,itisacceptable toroutegaseouswastedirectlytotheplantvent.38

'SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION1EDLEThissafetyevaluation documents theacceptability ofthecoolingsystemandenclosure ofthecontrolelementdrivemechanism controlsystem(CEDMCS)locatedonthe43'levation ofthe'eactor auxiliary building.

AlthoughtheCEDMCSisanon-safety, non-seismicsystem,theseismicadequacyofthedesignwasconsidered toensurenointeraction concernsexisted.Additionally, theUFSARwasrevisedtonotetheadditional combustible loadingassociated withtheenclosure itself.39 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-046 REVISION00E-LIEDBLAE-TIETheUnit162UFSARsprovideadiscussion ontheuseofthestationblackout(SBO)cross-tie withrespecttotheanalyzedSBOevent.TheanalyzedSBOeventconsiders thatbothunitsareinitially atpowerand,uponablackout, arebothmaintained inahotstandbycondition (Mode3)withACpowerprovidedfromasingleavailable emergency dieselgenerator.

Theblacked-out unitispoweredviatheSBOcross-tie.

Thereisnodiscussion intheUFSARsontheuseofthecross-tie forabla'ckout eventwhichoccurswhiletheunitisoperating inModesotherthanMode1(i.e.,blackouteventsbeyonddesignandlicensing basis).Thisevaluation recognizes theuseofthecross-tie forthoseeventsandrevisestheUFSARsaccordingly.

40 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEIS-96-049 REVISION0DHPALVEPIT/@mmeThesubjectvalvepositionindication deviceswereintendedtoprovideoperators withanindication ofvalvepercentopen.Theseindications were.inadditiontotheseparately providedopen/closed indication.

PertheplantEmergency Operating Procedures, NormalOperating Procedures andOff-Normal Operating Procedures, whentheassociated systemvalvesarerequiredtobemodulated, operators arerequiredtorelyonmonitored parameters suchassystemflow,pressurizer levelorreactorcoolantsystemtemperature andnotthisvalvepositionindication.

~~~~~Pertheplant'sTotalEquipment

Database, theseindicators arenotrequiredtosatisfyNRCRegulatory Guide1.97requirements forpost-accident monitoring.

Thevalves'pen andclosedindicating lightsareusedtodetermine valveposition.

Assuch,thesehistorically unreliable indicators havebeenremoved.

0 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-060 REVISION0FTEAMETFERMEHODThesteamgenerator blowdownfacilityissharedbybothunits.Transferofspentresinisdescribed intheUnit1UFSARasviagravityfeedtothespentresinstoragetank.Thisevaluation revisedtheUFSARtorecognize alternate meansofresinprocessing.

Allresinsaretreatedasradioactive untilsampledandanalyzedbyHealthPhysics.Following thisanalysis, resinsmaybeusedinanotherionexchanger ortransferred intoastoragevesselorshippingcontainer.

Transferofresinmaybeasdescribed intheUnit1UFSAR,orresincanbedirectlypumpedfromtheionexchangers toastoragecontainer orshippingliner.Perplantprocedures, theshippinglinerwouldthenbede-watered priortooff-siteshipping.

Elimination oftheuseofthespentresinstoragetankduringtransfersavesaprocessstepanddoesnotposeanuclearsafetyconcern.

e SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-065 REVISION0THEHOTDPThissafetyevaluation documented acceptability ofinstalling abreakaway lockonthedoortothehotshutdownpanelroomofeachunit.Breakaway locksprovideimprovedsecuritybyallowinganeasymeansofdetermining iftheroomhadbeenenteredwithoutcontrolroomauthorization.

Becausethelocksareofthebreakaway type,thereisnorestriction tooperatoraccessshouldthekeynotbereadilyavailable whenaccessisrequired.

43 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-069 REVISION0RTDggnan~~yThissafetyevaluation wasissuedtoclarifythedesignbasisofthehighrateofchangeofpower(HRCP)tripoftheUnit1andUnit2reactorprotection systems(RPS).TheexistingUnit162UFSARsandTechnical Specifications refertotheHRCPtripasanequipment protective tripwhichisnotrequiredforreactorprotection andisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses.

ABB-CE,viaTechNote96-04,clarified theoriginaldesignintentoftheHRCPtripfunction.

TheTechNotesuggeststhatalackofdiscussion inoriginalFSARshascausedsomeutilityandABB-CEpersonnel toerroneously assumethattheHRCPtripwasnotcreditedinaplant'ssafetyanalyses.

According toABB-CE,thepresenceoftheHRCPtripprecluded thespecificanalysisofeventsinitiated fromsubcritical conditions.

Thisevaluation incorporates theconclusions oftheABB-CETechNoteintotheTechnical Specification BasesandtheUFSARs.44

SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-072 REVISIONS 0&.1ELERWTThissafetyevaluation clarified theUnit1&2UFSARswithrespect,toplantoperation withthecontrolelementassembly(CEA)modeselectorswitchintheOFFpositionratherthanintheAUTOMATIC position.

Bothunit'sUFSARsdescribeautomatic systemoperation withrespecttomaintaining programmed reactorcoolanttemperature andpowerlevelduringboricacidconcentration changes.AlthoughtheUFSARsdescribeautomatic operation, theyalsomentionmanualoperation.

ItwasnottheintentoftheseUFSARdiscussions tolimitplantoperations toaparticular mode(i.e.,manualorautomatic),

rather,theUFSARsareproviding ageneraldescription ofsystemcapabilities.

Automatic operation wasprovidedasapartofthesystem'sdesigntosupportload-following plantoperations.

SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SENS-96-091 REVISION0RLAATI~u~nryAs.aresultof,UFSARreviews,adiscrepancy regarding thehypochlorite systemdescription wasidentified.

Specifically, boththeUnit1and2UFSARsrefertoahypochlorite "generating" systemwhenidentifying thesystem;however,theplantshavefrequently beenusingatemporary systemforchemicalinjection.

Thistemporary s'stemdoesnotgenerateitsownchlorinesolution, ratheritusesachlorinesolutionwhichisprovidedfromanoff-sitesourceandisstoredinasuitabletank.Thehypochlorite systemisanon-safety systemcommontobothunitsandwasdesignedtoproduceasodiumhypochlorite solutionviaelectrolytic decomposition offilteredseawaterandtoperiodically injectthissolutionintotheseawaterintakebaysforthecontrolofbiological fouling.Asaresultofincreased maintenance, equipment aging,partsobsolescence, etc.,theoriginalsystem(i.e.,the"generating system")isfrequently notinserviceandaliquidchlorinesolutionfromanoff-sitesourceisused.Whetherornotachlorinesolutionisgenerated on-siteisimmaterial totheachievement ofthesystem'function.

Thisevaluation revisestheUnit182UFSARdescriptions toreplacetheterm"hypochlorite generating system"withtheterm"hypochlorite system."46 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SESP-96-093 REVISION0EQARDIZEDThisevaluation providedSt.Lucie'sresponsetoanNRCrequestforadditional information (RAX)regarding theplant'spressurized thermalshock(PTS)evaluation previously submitted totheNRC.A10CFR50.59evaluation wasperformed inordertoreviseUnit2UFSARTable5.2-7a,including theadditionoftemperature dataandsurveillance weldmaterialpropertydata.47 SAFETYEVALUATXON PSL-ENG-SENS-97-006 REVXSXONS 0Ec1ALThissafetyevaluation documented theacceptability ofafullcoreoffloadasaroutineplantoutagepractice.

Theabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainfuelpooltemperatures belowthe140FlimitprovidedintheNRCStandardReviewPlanhasbeenconfirmed.

Thefollowing restrictions wereprovidedintheevaluation toensureitremainsboundingforfutureuse:thecalculated maximumdecayheatloadduringeachfullcoreoffloadshallbes31.7E6BTU/hrat168hoursfollowing reactorshutdown; thereactormustbesubcritical foratleast168hourspriortoplacement ofthefirstoffloadassemblyinthepool;priortooffload,poolwaterlevelshallbeconfirmed tobewithinitsnominaloperating band;withoneheatexchanger inservice,coolingwaterflowshallbemaintained 23560gpm;twofuelpoolcoolingpumpsshallbeinoperation (exceptions noted);andcontrolroomannunciation forpoolhightemperature, pumpstatusandpoollevelshallbeoperable.

48 00 SAFETYEVALUATION JPN-PSL-SEFJ-97-011 REVISIONS 061TPThissafetyevaluation revisedthereactorcoolantlowflowtripsetpointtogainoperating margin.Duringimplementation oftheCycle9lowflowtripsetpointprocedure, pre-tripalarmsweregenerated.

Itwasfoundthatthecalculated valuesofthetripsetpoints wereclosetotheactualmeasuredflowvaluesasindicated bysteamgenerator pressuredropreadings.

Themethodology usedingenerating theseoriginalsetpoints wasidentified asbeingconservative withrespecttotheincorporation ofuncertainties.

Themethodology usedfortherevisedsetpointisconsistent withthatusedinotherSt.Luciesetpointcalculations.

Fortherevisedsetpoint, theuncertainties werecombinedusingthesquarerootsumofthesquares(SRSS)method.Fromasafetyanalysisstandpoint, thereactortripfordegradedflowremainsunchanged andthenewsetpointvaluescomplywithtechnical specification requirements.

49 I0 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SEES-97-019 REVISION0FOFCHThissafetyevaluation documented theacceptability ofremovingtheunderwater camerafromtherefueling machine.Additionally, theevaluation alsodocumented theacceptability ofusingaportabletemporary camera,ifdesired.PertheUFSAR,bothaviewingportintherefueling machinetrolleydeckaswellaselectronic andvisualindication ofrefueling machinepositionoverthecoreareprovided.

Theunderwater cameraprovidessupplemental visualindication forrefueling operations andisatooltoaidinrefueling.

Thecameraisnotrequirednorcreditedwiththeprevention ormitigation ofafuelhandlingaccident.

Removalofthecamerawillresultinelimination ofworkpresently resulting inhighradiation doses.50 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-024 REVISION0EMALZB~RXYThissafetyevaluation addresses aCondition Reportwhichidentified aconcernrelatedtotheUFSARdescription foroperation ofthewastegassystemanalyzers andprovidesthedocumentation necessary torevisetheUFSARdescriptions.

Thewastegasanalyzeristypically operatedbysamplingthein-serviceGas'ecayTank(GDT)atasinglepoint.However,theUnit2UFSARstatesthatthegasanalyzerisusedto"sequentially measureseveralpointsinthesystem."Althoughthisconfiguration describes amethodofoperation basedonagasanalyzerfeaturethatallowsforautomatic sequential samplingoperation, itdoesnotcorrectly reflectthewaythesystemisoperatedperplantprocedures (asinglesamplepointisuseddepending onsystemoperation, GasSurgeTank(GST),toGDTorGSTtoplantvent).Thecontinuously monitored singlesamplepointsareselectedbasedonthedesiredmethodofgaseouseffluentrelease.Ifgassamplesexceedapredetermined levelofradioactivity andholding.ofthegaseouseffluentisdesired,thenthein-service GDTpathisutilizedandcontinuously monitored foroxygen;likewise, iflittleornoradioactivity existsinthesample,thentheGSTtoplantventpathisutilizedandcontinuously monitored.

Bothmethodsofgaseouseffluentcontrolandreleasearemonitored forradioactivity.

Thisevaluation concludes thatoperation ofthewastegasanalyzerandthewastegassysteminamanualand/orbatchmodewithcontinuous monitoring ofasinglesamplepointdoesnotadversely impactplantsafetyanddoesnotconflictwiththeTechnical Specifications ortheOffsiteDoseCalculation Manual.51 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SESJ-97-026 REVISION0REDEThisevaluation providedSt.Lucie'sresponsetoasupplemental NRCrequestforadditional information (RAI)regarding theplant'spressurized thermalshock(PTS)evaluation previously submitted totheNRC.,Safetyevaluation JPN-PSL-SESP-96-054 documented Engineering's responsetotheoriginalRAI.A10CFR50.59evaluation wasperformed inordertoreviseUnit2UFSARTable5.2-7afandTable5.3-2,Severalminorenhancements weremadetoTable5.2-7a,including theadditionoftemperature dataandsurveillance weldmaterialpropertydata.Aninformational notewasaddedtoTable5.3-2.52 0

SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SEMS-97-034 REVISIONS 0Ee1LIORLATEDCOELTThissafetyevaluation documented theacceptability ofinstalling twosimulated fixedincoredetectorassemblies providedbyABB-CE.Theevaluation alsoconsidered theeffectofbrokendetectorpiecesleftinthethimbletubesatthesedetectorlocations.

Thesimulated assemblies wereinstalled duringtheCycle10refueling outage.Duringinspection oftheupperguidestructure (UGS)incoreinstrumentation (ICI)guidetubes,brokenICIdetectorsegmentswerelocatedinlocations R9andT13andcouldnotberemoved.Becauseofthisproblem,thelocations couldnotbeusedfor,.incore instrumentation.

ItwasdecidedtopushthebrokenpiecesdownintothethimbletubessothattheyremainshieldedwellunderwaterduringtheUGSlift..Simulated ICIassemblies weresubsequently installed.

Thesimulated assemblies aredimensionally similartothenormaldetectorassemblies andweredesignedforthisapplication.

Thenumberofremaining available detectors remainsaboveUFSARandTechnical Specification requirements.

Thebrokendetectorpiecesleftinthethimbletubesweredetermined tohavenoadverseeffectonplantoperation orsafety.Thisconclusion wasbasedonanevaluation performed fortheeffectsrelatedtovibration, seismicloads,loosepartsmigration/potential consequences, andeffectspertaining toneutronic aspectsandcorebypassflow.53 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-036 REVISION0TEMRATITheintakestructure ventilation systemconsistsofexhaustfansEATE-41A&,B.Thesefansaredesignedtomaintainroomtemperature withindesignlimitsandtooperateasasupportsystemfortheintakecoolingwaterpumpswhicharerequiredbythetechnical specifications inModes1,2,3&4.Thereisnotechnical specification LimitingCondition ofOperation (LCO)forthefans.TheUFSARdescribes thefansasSafetyRelatedcomponents whicharedesignedtomaintainthetemperature oftheICWpumproombetween80-120F.Thecorrectly stateddesignfunctionofthefansistolimitroomtemperature tolessthan120F.TheUFSARdescription alsoimpliesthatfanoperation isrequiredinallmodesofplantoperation.

Infact,therearecertainplantconditions wherethefansmaynotberequiredtooperate(e.g.,duringperiodsofcoolweatherand/orwithonlyoneICWpumpinservice).

NRCGenericLetter91-18describes supportsystemoperability andrecognizes thatalicenseemaymodifythesupportfunctionbytheuseofthe50.59processandUFSARchange.Thisevaluation revisestheUFSARtoaddresstheaboveitemsandtoclarifyastatement regar'ding manualandautomatic systemoperation.

54 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL>>ENG-SENS-97-038

,REVISIONS 0&1ICODEAFETYPlantChange/Modification (PC/M)96139Mprovidedforthereplacement ofthepressurizer codesafetyvalvesduringthe1997refueling outage.QualityReport97-0754documented aQualityAssurance (QA)reviewofthemodification whichconcluded thata10CFR50.59safetyevaluation shouldhavebeenperformed forthemodification sincethechangerepresents achange'othefacilityasdescribed intheUFSAR.Specifically, theQAreportnotedthattheUFSARdescribes thevalvesashavingablowdownofapproximately 10'hereasthenewvalveshaveaspecified blowdownvalueof4%.Condition Report97-0753waswrittenonthesubject.AlthoughthePC/Mprovidedananalysiswhichaddressed thechangeinvalve'blowdown, itdid,notincludea10CFR50.59evaluation.

Thisevaluation documents the10CFR50.59consideration forchangingtheblowdownofthesubjectvalvesandrevisestheUFSAR.55 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-040 REVISION0DEPERATEDEACTORIEMEFThissafetyevaluation waswrittentoevaluateandcorrectUFSARwordingpertaining tooperation ofthesafetyinjection tanksatreducedreactorcoolantsystempressures.

ExistingUFSARwordingistooexplicitandexcessively preciseinitslanguageanditconflicts withtherelevanttechnical specification requirements andplantprocedures.

56

SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SEMS-97-043 REVISION0AGEUEEJumpilyThisevaluation revisestheUFSARtoclarifythatthetwofirepumpsdonotstartsequentially.

Thefireprotection code(NFPA-20)referstosequentially startingfirepumps.Thisrequirement isintendedtopreventawaterhammerandpossibleelectrical systemoverload.

SincetheSt.Luciedesignincorporates ahydropneumatic tankwhichmaintains thepipingsystemfullofwaterandsincethetwofirepumpsarepoweredfromseparateelectrical busses,theneedforsequential pumpstartingiseliminated.

Thisevaluation alsoclarifies thatthepumpsstartatasystempressureof"equaltoorgreaterthan85psig"ratherthan"at85psig."57 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-044 REVISION0ggm~ryCondition Report97-1102documents gapsidentified inthecontainment sumpscreens.Thisevaluation waspreparedasaresponsetotheCR.Thecontainment sumpscreensactasabarriertopreventdebrisfromenteringtheemergency corecoolingsystemandcontainment spraysystem.PertheUFSARandtheoriginalNRCSafetyEvaluation Report,thesescreensweredesignedinaccordance withNRCRegulatory Guide1.82,Revision0.Thisevaluation documents thedesignandlicensing requirements forthesumpscreensandclarifies thedesignbases,including adiscussion ontheacceptability ofgapsinthescreen.Ananalysisisprovidedforthesumpdividerscreen(thescreenwhichsegregates thesumpintoAandBtrains)todetermine thelimitingdividerscreengapsize.TheUFSARwasrevisedtomoreaccurately describetheoverallsumpscreendesign.58 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-045

,REVISION 0Asaresultofrepairsrequiredfortheemergency corecoolingsystemcontainment sumpscreens,"'uestions wereraisedregarding theacceptability ofusinga20gage(wire)meshscreenforrepairstothe18gagemeshsumpscreen.TheUFSARdescribes onlyan18gagemeshsi'zewithanopenareaof0.0081squareinches.Thisevaluation documented theacceptability ofusingthe20gagemeshscreenforsumpscreenrepairs.The20gagemeshwasconsidered acceptable since:ithasanequivalent openingof0.090"diameterrequiredforfiltering ofparticles thatcouldbecomelodgedinthefuel;itdoesnotadversely affectthecapability ofthescreenstowithstand maximumdebrisloading;itwillnotadversely affecttheflowratethroughthescreens;anditisconstructed of304stainless steel.TheUFSARwasrevisedtonotetheacceptability ofascreenmeshsizeotherthan18gage.59 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SEMS-97-070 REVISION0PDmumm~NRCInformation Notice92-82statedthatThermo-lag wasacombustible material.

Thisevaluation revisesUFSARfirezonecombustible loadinginformation asaresultofincluding Thermo-lag asacombustible

~Thestorageofvariouscombustible materials relatedtoplantoperation andmaintenance hasalsobeenincluded.

Theevaluation concluded that,withthisadditional combustible loading,adequatefireprotection isprovidedtoensurethecontinued availability ofredundant safeshutdownequipment andcomponents.

60 SAFETYEVALUATION PSL-ENG-SENS-97-071 REVISION0BoththeUnit1andUnit2UFSARsincluderequirements forthestorageofemergency suppliesinthecontrolroom.Theseemergency suppliesconsistoffood,water,medicalandsanitaryprovisions intendedforcontrolroompersonnel intheeventofadesignbasislossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheUFSARdescriptions includealistofspecificsanitation suppliesbasedonOfficeofCivilDefenseSanitation KitIIIwhichwasapparently developed foruseinfalloutshelters(supports 25personsfor2weeks).Inaddition, theUFSARsnotethatasupplyoffoodandwaterisstoredinthecontrolroomstosupportacrewoftenpersonsforaoneweekperiod.Thereisnoregulatory requirement forthestorageofspecificemergency suppliesinthecontrolroom.Assuch,the'evelofdetailcontained withintheUFSARsisunnecessarily restrictive anddoesnotallowforefficient plantoperations.

Additionally, NUREG-0800, doesnotdiscusscontrolroomemergency supplies'.

Thisevaluation revisestheUFSARstodeletethespecificsupplyrequirements fromtheUFSARsandwillrecognize thesite'sEmergency Planwithrespecttoensuringadequatefood,water,medicalandsanitary-suppliesareavailable forcontrolroompersonnel.

Thisactionisconsistent withRevision1toRegulatory Guide1.101,whichnotesthatemergency planrequirements shouldbemaintained separately fromtheFSAR.61 0

SECTION3RELOADSAFETYEVALUATIONS 62 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION 96172TLELThisengineering packageprovidedthereloadcoredesignoftheSt.LucieUnit2Cycle10.TheCycle10coreisdesignedforcyclelengthsbetween12,793and13,545EFPH,depending uponvariation intheCycle9lengthofbetween9,902and11,024EFPH,respectively.

ThecyclelengthsforCycle10includedanendofcycleinlettemperature coastdown to535'Ffollowedbyacoastdown inpowertoapproximately 85-.power.Cycle9isexpectedtoreachanEOCexposureofapproximately 10,738EFPH.'heprimarydesignchangetothecoreforCycle10isthereplacement of64irradiated fuelassemblies withfreshRegionMfuelassemblies.

ThefuelisarrangedinalowleakagepatternsimilartothedesignoftheCycle9core.Themechanical designofRegionMfuelisthesameasthatofRegionL(Cycle9)withtheexception ofincorporating corelessHID-1Lgrids.Thetwodesignsareequivalent fromthestandpoint ofperformance andfunctional requirements.

Thesafetyanalysisofthisdesignwasperformed byAseaBrownBoveriCombustion Engineering NuclearOperations (ABBCENO)andindependently reviewedbyFloridaPowerandLightCo.r63