ML17241A411

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LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A411
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/16/1999
From: FREHAFER K W, STALL J A
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-99-160, LER-99-007, LER-99-7, NUDOCS 9907210143
Download: ML17241A411 (7)


Text

CATEGORY1REGULATOINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM(RIDS)ACCESSION'NBR:9907210143 DOC.DATE:

99/07/16NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-389 St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FREHAFER,K.W.

FloridaPowerSLightCo.STALL,J.A.

FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKETI05000389

SUBJECT:

LER99-007-00:on 990610,cooldown transient duringreactorstartupwasnoted.Causedbypersonnel error.Trained6briefedpersonnel

&.revisedprocedures.

With990716ltr.DI'STRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPD2-2PDINTERNAL:

ACRSNRR/DIPM/IOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DRAA/OERAB EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME GLEAVES,W 1CWzzz,.E, CENTER1NRR/DRIP/REXB 1RES/DET/ERAB 1RGN2,FILE0111LMITCOMARSHALL11NOACQUEENER,DS 11NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL11111-11111111111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083NFULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR16ENCL16 FioridaPower5LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957'July16,1999L-99-16010CFR$50.4U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:1999-007-00 DateofEvent:June10,1999Personnel ErrorDuringReactorStartuLedtoUnlannedCooldownTransient Theattachedvoluntary LicenseeEventReport1999-007isbeingsubmitted toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.Stall,'VicePresident St.LucieNuclearPlantJAS/EJW/KWF Attachment cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRC,RegionHSeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LucieNuclearPlant9'rr072iOX4G 9'rr07i6PDRADQCK05000389SPDRanFPLGroupcompany RCFORM366(8-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)Estimated burdenperresponsotocomplywiththismandatory information collection request:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporated jntothelicensing processandfedbacktoIndustry.

Forvrardcommentsregarding burdenestimatetotheRecordsManagement Branch(T-6F33),U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC20555~01, andtothePaperwork Reduction Proiect(3t5th0104),

OfficeofManagement andBudget,Washington, DC20503.Ifaninformation collection doesnotdisplayacurrently validOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andapersonisnotrequiredtorespondto,theinformation collection.

U.S.NUCREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDBYNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES06/30/2001 FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389PAGE(3)Page1of5TITLE(4)Personnel ErrorDuringReactorStartupLedtoUnplanned CooldownTransient MONTH06DAYYEAR101999EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-007-00REPORTDATE(7)MONTHDAYYEAR07161999FACIUTYNAh'IEFACIUTYNAMEOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)DOCKETNuhIBERDOCKETNUMBEROPERATING MODE(9)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(2)

(v)60.73(a)(2)(i)60.73(a)(2)

(viii)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRgt(Checkoneormoro)(11)POWERLEVEL(10)00020.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)

(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)

(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)

(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 60.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)

(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)

(v)50.73(a)(2)

(vii)50.73(o)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyInAbstractbeloworinNRCForm380ANAMELICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER12)TELEPHONE NUMBEIt(IncludeAresCode)KennethW.Erehafer, Licensing Engineer(561)467-7748COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT13CAusESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyee,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(16)MONTHDAYABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximate/y 15sing/ewpaced typewritten

/ines/(16)Thisvoluntary LERdescribes anunplanned reactorplant:cooldowntransient thatoccurredonJune10,1999.At0345hoursonJune10,1999,Unit"2wasinMode3atnormaloperating pressureandnormaloperating temperature.

Areactorstartupwasinprogress, buttemporarily suspended totroubleshootannunciator problems.

Licensedcontrolroompersonnel decidedtoperformpostmaintenance testingonthenumber3'throttle valve;anevolution thatrequiredlatchingtheturbine.At0412hours,theturbinewaslatchedwithoutincident.

Atapproximately 0420hours,thecontrolroomwasinformedthatthetestingwascompleteandthattheturbinecouldbetripped.Aftertheturbinewaslocallytripped,themainfeedwater 15percentbypassvalveswerechecked,buterroneously notreset,becausethecontroller outputhadnotchanged.At0423hours,severalannunciators cameinwhichindicated asteamgenerator overfeedcondition including letdownlowpressure, steamgenerator highlevels,andpressurizer lowlevel.Atthattime,the15percentvalveswerereset,theoverfeedwasterminated, andlevelswererestoredtonormalconditions.

Thiseventwascausedbythefailuretouseexistingprocedural guidanceonturbineshutdown.

Contributing factorsincludenon-conservative reactivity management decisions, inadequate operatorknowledge ontheoperation ofthemainfeedwater 15percentbypassvalves,andaninadequate pre-evolution brief.Corrective actionsincludetraining, briefings, andprocedure changes.NRCFORM360I0.1998)

RCFORM366A(6-I996)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-007-00PAGE(3)Page2of5TEXT(Ifmorespeceisrequired, useeddidonel copiesof/VRCForm366A)(17]Description oftheEventAt0345hoursonJune10,1999,Unit2wasinMode3atnormaloperating pressureandnormaloperating temperature (NOP/NOT).

Themainsteamisolation valves(MSIVs)[EIZS:SB:V]

wereopenandvacuumexistedinthemaincondenser.

Thesteambypasscontrolsystemwasmaintaining reactorcoolant'system(RCS)[EIIS:AB]

temperature inautomatic controlandthemainfeedwater system[EIIS:SJ]

wasinoperation andmaintaining steamgenerator

[EZZS:SB:SG]

levelsautomatically onthe15percentbypassvalves[EIIS:SJ:FCV].

ThemainturbineDEHsystemhadxecentlybeenreturnedtoservicefollowing arepairtoaleakonthenumber3turbi.nethrottlevalve[EZIS:TA:FCV].

Areactorstaztupwasinprogress.

TheUnit2licensedcontrolzoomstaffconsisted oftheassistant nuclearplantsupervisor (ANPS),boardreactorcontroloperator(RCO),deskRCO,aRCOdedicated tothestartup,andaseniorreactoroperator(SRO)reactivity managerdedicated tothestartup.IAtapproximately 0345hourstherotatingmaintenance shiftsupervisor (RMSS)andsystemengineerrequested thatOperations latchtheturbinetopostmaintenance test(PMT)theworkperformed onthenumber3throttlevalve.TheANPSdiscussed thepossibility ofdelayingthePMTuntiltheturbinestartupwiththeRMSS.TheANPSdecidedtogoaheadwiththePMTinordertosavetimeincaseareworkonthevalvewasrequired.

Thenuclearplantsupervisor (NPS)andreactivity managerwereinformedoftheintention tolatchtheturbine.Atailboard wasconducted fortheturbinelatchevolution bytheANPSwiththeboardRCOandnuclearwatchengineer(NWE).Procedure GOP-201,"ReactorPlantStartup-Mode2toMode1,"wasusedasguidanceforthelatchingevolution.

TrippingoftheturbineaftezthePMTwasnotdiscussed inthebrief.At0405hours,annunciator P-17,themainsteamisolation signal(MSZS)2AS/GPressureLowChannelTripannunciator, alaxmedinthecontrolroomandthencleared.Investigation foundthattheDchannelMSISblockbistableontheengineered safetyfeatureactuation signal(ESFAS)cabinethadalsocomein.TheANPS/NPSdiscussed theoperability statusoftheeffectedchannelanddecidedthatsincethereactorwasstillinMode3,totemporarily stopthestartup.Maintenance personnel wouldperformafunctional checkontheaffectedsteamgenerator pressurechanneltoensureoperability priortoentryintoMode2.Controlelementassembly(CEA)banksA,B,1,and2werefullywithdrawn.

CEAbank3was57incheswithdrawn.

CEAbanks4and5werenotwithdrawn.

Theprojected entryinto-Mode2wasthenextrodwithdrawal sequence.

At0412hours,theturbinewaslatchedwithoutincident.

Atapproximately 0420hours,thewatchengineercalledthecontrolroomandsaidthatthePMTwascompleted andthatthetuzbinecouldbetripped.TheANPSdirectedthewatchengineertotriptheturbinelocally.Aftertheturbinewastripped,theboardRCOcheckedthe15percentbypassvalves,butdidnotresetthevalvesbecausethecontroller outp'uthadnotchanged.TheANPSwasinformedthatthecontxoller outputhadnotchangedandthevalveshadnotbeenre'set.Thewatchengineerwasalsoinformedthatthe15percentvalveshadnotbeenresetwhenheenteredthecontrolroom.Shortlythereafter, theANPSleftthesurveillance areatodiscusstheDchannelsteam'generator lowpressurebistabletroubleshooting statuswith,theOperations Manager.TheboardRCOleftthevicinityofthefeedstationtoinvestigate anannunciator.

At0423hoursseveralannunciators cameinwhichindicated asteamgenerator overfeedcondition including letdownlowpressure, steamgenerator highNRCFORM300A(0.1998)

'4RCFORM366A6i998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LERjTEXTCONTINUATION

.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(205000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAl REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-007-00PAGE(3)Page3of5TEXT(Ifmoraspaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A/(17)Description oftheEvent(cont'd)levels,andpressurizer lowlevel.Atthattime,the15percentvalveswerereset,theoverfeedwasterminated, andlevelswererestoredtonormalconditions.

Duringthetransient RCStemperature wasreducedfrom535'Fto526'F,orapproximately 9'F.CauseoftheEventThecauseofthiseventwasthattheoperators didnotutilizeexistingprocedural guidanceforturbineshutdown.

Thereisnospecificprocedure tolatchandtriptheturbinefortesting.Theoperators diduseprocedural guidancefromGOP-201,"ReactorPlantStartup-Mode2toMode1,"tolatchtheturbine.However,trippingoftheturbinewasnotdiscussed priortothecontrolroombeinginformedthatthePMTwascompleted.

Noprocedural guidancefortrippingthetu'rbinehadbeenconsidered bytheANPSorboardRCO.Whennotifiedtheturbinewasreadytobetripped,theANPSmadethedecisiontotriptheturbinewithoutconsidering whatprocedural guidancehewasusingtodothetrip.NOP-2-0030125, "TurbineShutdown-FullLoadtoZeroLoad,"steps7.41.3-7.41.6providestheguidancefortrippingtheturbineandspecifically addresses resetting the15percentbypassvalvesaftertrippingtheturbine.Contributing factorstothiseventwere:~Conservative Decision-Making:

Thecrewdecidedtoproceedwithturbinelatchevolution withareactorstartupinprogress.

nTheANPSconsidered thepossibility oftheadverseeffectsiftheturbinelatchevolution causedtheRCStocooldownduetoturbinevalvemispositioning orleakby.However,heconsidered thispossibility remoteanddecidedthePMTneededtobecompleted toensuretheturbinerollwouldnotbedelayed.TheNPSconsidered theplantstablesincethestartupwasonholdanddidnothaveanyproblemwiththeturbineevolution proceeding.

However,therewasnovalidreasontocompletethisevolution priortocompletion ofthereactorstartup.~..Pre-evolution briefing:

Thetailboard briefingfortheevolution wasnotadequate.

TheANPSconsidered theturbinelatchaminorevolution withdirectprocedural

'guidance andtherefore, didnotconsideritnecessary tousetheAP0010120,"ConductofOperations,"

CS-9checklist.

Thebriefdidnotincludeallmembersofthecontrolstaff,onlythepersonnel involvedintheevolution.

TheANPSdidnotincludethedeskRCObecausehewasperforming hisnormalshiftlydutiesandwasbehindduetotheincreased paperwork loadofthestartup.TheANPSdidnotincludethereactorstartupRCOorthereactivity managerbecausetheywerededicated toonlythestartup.However,becauseofthepossiblereactivity effectsoftheevolution, theindividuals involvedinthestartupshouldhavebeenincludedinthebrief.Onlytheturbinelatchingevolution wasdiscussed intheprejobbrief.TheANPSwasfocusedonensuringtheDEHcomputerwasproperlysetupfortheturbinelatchandtheproperturbineresponseonlatching.

GOP201,"ReactorPlantStartup-Mode2toMode1,"steps6.25-6.33werereviewedandconsidered appropriate fortheevolution.

Priortoandduringthebrief,theANPSneverconsidered trippingtheturbineorthestatusofthe15percentbypassvalvespost-trip.

NRCFOAM300A(0.1998)

NRCFORM366A6-1998lLICENSEEEVENTREPORT"(LERjTEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DQGKETNUMBER(2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-007-00PAGE(3)Page4of5TEXTIifmorespaceisreriuired, useadditional copiesofIVRC&rm366AJ(17)CauseoftheEvent(cont'd)Othermembersofthecontrolroomstaffwereawareofthepostturbinetripstatusofthe15percentbypassvalvesandtheimportance ofresetting thevalves.Hadthebriefincludedallmembersofthecrew,itislikelysomeonewouldhavediscussed theimportance ofthepromptlyresetting thevalvesandoftheprocedural guidancetodoso.~OperatorTraining/Knowledge Level:Theoperators misinterpreted the15percentbypassvalvecontroller indication aftertheturbinetrip.The15percentbypassvalvesfailtothe5percentflowpositionfollowing aturbinetrip.Thereactorturbinegenerator board(RTGB)controller istakenoutofthecircuitbutthereisnochangeincontroller output.Theoperators mistakenly interpreted thenormalcontroller outputfollowing thetripasevidencethatthevalvewasstillfunctioning inautomatic andthatresetting.'he valves'as notnecessary.

Thethreelicensedoperators involvedintheevolution failedtore'cognize thestatusof15percentvalvespostturbinetrip.Theymisinterpreted controller outputnot,changingasindication thatthevalvehadnotrepositioned tothefivepercentflowposition.

Hadanyofthethreeoperators recognized thatthecontroller wasoutofthecircuit,andthatcontroller indica'tion remaining thesamewasanexpectedresponsewhenthevalveshadmovedtothedesignpostturbinetripposition, thenthevalveswouldhavebeenreset.~Self-Checking:

Theoperators didnotadequately followuponanunexpected plantzesponse.

Theoperators expectedtohavetoresetthe15percentbypassvalves,butdidnotfollowupwhentheexpectedcontroller responsewasnotobtained.

Theyincorrectly reasonedthatsincetheyhadtrippedtheturbinelocally,the15percentvalvesdidnotneedtobereset.Otherplantparameters thatwouldhaveconfirmed the15percent.valvepositions, suchassteamgenerator levels,werenot..closely monitored toverifyproperoperation.

TheboardRCOallowedhimselftObecomedistracted andlefttorespondtoanotherannunciator.

Additionally, other',.membersofthecontrolroomstaffwerenotbroughtintothediscussion oftheunexpected responseofthe15percentvalves.AnalysisoftheEventThiseventisbeingreportedasavoluntary LER.AnalysisofSafetySignificance FPLperformed anassessment forthiseventusingABB-CEbestestimatestandarddesigncalculations anddetermined thattheinadvertent cooldowndidnotresultinMode2conditions.

Calculationally, K,qgremainedlessthan0.99,butbecauseofuncertainties inthecalculations andinmeasurements, itispossiblethatthereactorenteredMode2.However,theplanthadareactor,startup inprogressandwasreadytoenterMode2.ThedecisiontoperformthePMTonthenumber3throttlevalveduringareactorstartupwasanonconservative reactivity management decision.

Reactivity management isaprimaryfunctionofthelicensedoperators inthecontrolroomandthisdecisionNBCFORM3BBAIB-1998)

NRCFORM366A6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILiTYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-007-00PAGE(3)Page5of5TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCFarm366A)(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance (cont')demonstrates alackofsensitivity toreactivity management issues.Althoughthis.eventmostprobablydidnotresult'in aninadvertent modechange,thiseventdidrevealseveralfailedbarriersthatshouldhaveprecluded thecooldownevent.Theenhancements tothesefailedbarriersareaddressed inthecorrective actionsnotedbelow.Corrective Actions1.TheSROinvolvedwastemporarily removed'fromlicensedactivities inordertodeveloptherootcauseandcorrective actionsforthisevent.TheSROwasreturnedtolicenseddutiesafterde-briefing thePlantGeneralManageronthefindings.

2.Eachavailable Operations department supervisor hassignedaletterAcknowledging therequirements forAP0010120,"ConductofOperations,"

checksheet9foxprejobbriefings andtherequirements forprocedure usage(withthebalanceduewhenthepersonnel returnfzomvacations, etc.).3.Procedure NOP-1/2-0030122, "ReactorStaxtup,"

is,beingchangedtoincludestepsandcautionstonotperformanyevolution whichcouldinfluence RCStemperature andthusreactivity duringtheapproachtocriticality, 4.Operations management hasbriefedalloperations controlroomcrewsontheincident.

Thebriefingstresseda)theimportance ofthoroughp'rejobbriefings usingprocedure AP0010120,"ConductofOperations,"

checksheet'9;b)thenecessity ofusingtheappropriate procedure foreveryevolution andeverypart,ofeveryevolution; c)theimportance ofself-checking andfollowing uponunexpected plantresponses byuseofdiverseindications toensureequipment status,and;d)theimportance ofconservative reactivity management duringxeactorstartup.5.ATrainingBriefonoperation ofthe15percentbypassvalvesisbeingissuedtoensurealllicensedoperators knowtheoperation andRTGBindications ofthe..valvesafteraturbinetrip.6.'peration ofshutdown/low powerfeedwatercontrolisbeingincorporated intothe'Licensed OperatorContinuing Traini.ng Programtoensurealloperators areawareoftheoperating characteristics andRTGBindications offeedsystem.7.Thisevent,including therootcauseanalysis, isbeingcoveredinLicensedOperatorContinuing Training.

8.Avideoofproperprejobbriefingtechniques andexpectations isbeingproducedforuseinLicensedOperatorContinuing Training.

Additional Information FailedComonentsIdentified NoneSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORM3BBAIB-1998)