ML17335A553

LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented

ML17335A553
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	10/07/1999
From:	DEPUYDT M B INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A552	List: ML17335A551 ML17335A553
References
LER-99-023, NUDOCS 9910130194
Download: ML17335A553 (7)

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NRCFORM366U.S.NUCLEARREGULATCOMMISSIONie-1999)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters,foreachblock)APPROVMBNO.3150-0104EXPIRES06/30/2001Estimatedburdenperresponsetocomplywiththismandatoryinformationcogectionrequest:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporatedintothelicensingprocessandfedbacktoindustry.ForwardcommentsregardingburdenestimatetotheRecordsManagementBranch(T4F33),U.S.NuclearRegutatoryCommission.Washington,DC205554&1,andtothePapenNorkReductionProject(3t504104),OiriceofManagementandBudget.Washington.DC20503.lfaninformationcollectiondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalrdOMBcontrolnumber.theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andapersonisnotrequiredtorespondto.theinformationcollection.FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBERI2)05000-315PAGEI3)1OF4TITLEt4)InadequateTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceTestingofEssentialServiceWaterPumpEngineeredSafetyFeatureResponseTimeEVENTDATE{5)LERNUMBER{6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)MONTHDAYYEARYEAR1999SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARFACILITYNAMEFACIUIYNAMEDOCKETNUMBERDOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(I)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)DPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR5:(CheckTHISREPORTISSUBMITTEoneormoro){11)50.73(a)(2){viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.7120.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a){2)(iv)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c){1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER{12)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworInNRCForm366ANAMEMaryBethDepuydt,RegulatoryComplianceTELEPHONENUMBERIInrSudeAreaCode)(616)465-5901X1589COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)cAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToEPIXSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED14YEs{Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).NOEXPECTEDMONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.o.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlinos)(16)OnJune24,1999,duringareviewofthefindingsofExpandedSystemReadinessReview(ESRR)teambyPerformanceAssurance(PA),itwasdiscoveredthatnotestingprogramcouldbeidentifiedwhichverifiesthecapabilityoftheEssentialServiceWater(ESW)pumpstomeettheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)responsetimespeciTiedintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS)ortheUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.Subsequentinvestigationconfirmedthatin-placeTSsurveillancetestingmeasuredtheESFresponsetimefortheESWpumpsastheelapsedtimefromactuationofthechannelsensoruntilpumpbreakerclosure,butdidnotincludethetimeuntilaspecifiedpumpdischargepressureisreachedoruntiltheESWpumpdischargevalveisopen;asrequiredbythedefinitionofEngineeredSafetyFeatureResponseTime.SinceexistingsurveillancetestingdidnotsatisfytheTSdefinitionofESFresponsetime,theidentifiedconditionconstitutesamissedsurveillancetest.ThisisanoperationorconditionprohibitedbyTSandwasdeterminedtobereportablepursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)onSeptember7,1999.Theapparentcauseofthiseventwastheinadequateunderstandingoftheplantdesignbasis.Surveillancetestswillberevisedandimplementedtoincludethetimetoachieveprescribedpumpdischargepressure/flowand/ordischargevalvepositionaspartoftheoverallESFresponsetimetestingfortheESWsystempriortorestartofeachrespectiveunit.TheESWESFresponsetimesinUFSARTable7.2-7willbeevaluatedandrevised,ifnecessary,priortorestartofeachrespectiveunit.ESWsystemperformancerecordsandsurveillancetestresultsprovidereasonableassurancethatthesystemhasremainedcapableofperformingitsinterldedfunctions.Therefore,therewereminimalsafetyimplicationstothehealthandsafetyofthepublicasaresultofthisevent.'I)9i0i30i9499i007PDRADGCI{l050003i5SPDR

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARRETORYCOMMISSIONl+,16.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAMEI1)DocKETI2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGEI3)CookNuclearPlantUnit105000-315"EAR1999SEQUENTIALNUMBER023REVISION2QF4NUMBER00TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ)17)CONDITIONSPRIORTOEVENTUnit1wasdefueledUnit2wasdefueledDESCRIPTIONOFTHEEVENTOnJune24,1999,duringareviewofthefindingsofExpandedSystemReadinessReview(ESRR)teambyPerformanceAssurance(PA),itwasdocumentedthatnotestingprogramcouldbeidentifiedwhichverifiesthecapabilityoftheEssentialServiceWater(ESW)pumpstomeettheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)responsetimespecifiedintheTechnicalSpecificationsortheUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.SubsequentinvestigationofthisconditionbyEngineering,completedSeptember1,1999,confirmedthattheacceptancecriteriaforin-placeTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancetestingdefinedtheESFresponsetimefortheESWpumpsastheelapsedtimefromactuationofthechannelsensoruntilpumpbreakerclosure.TestingdidnotincludethetimeuntilaspecifiedpumpdischargepressureisreachedortheESWpumpdischargevalveisopen,asrequiredbythedefinitionofEngineeredSafetyFeatureResponseTime.TheTechnicalSpecification(TS)andUFSARdefinitionofEngineeredSafetyFeatureResponseTime.isthattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsESFactuationsetpointatthechannelsensortountiltheESFequipmentiscapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(i.e.,thevalvestraveltotheirrequiredpositions,pumpdischargepressuresreachtheirrequiredvalues,etc.).SinceexistingsurveillancetestingdidnotsatisfytheTSdefinitionofESFresponsetime,theidentifiedconditionconstitutesamissedsurveillancetest.CAUSEOFTHEEVENTTheapparentcauseofthiseventwasinadequateunderstandingofthedesignbasisoftheplant.DuringthedevelopmentoftheESWESFresponsetimes,thedesignbasisrequirementsforESWavailabilityduringanaccidentwereinadequatelyunderstood.ThisresultedinsurveillanceproceduresforESWwhichdidnotsatisfytheUFSARandTechnicalSpecificationdefinitionofESFresponsetime.ANALYSISOFTHEEVENTTheTechnicalSpecification(TS)andUFSARdefinitionofEngineered'SafetyFeatureResponseTimeisthattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsESFactuationsetpointatthechannelsensortountiltheESFequipmentiscapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(i.e.,thevalvestraveltotheirrequiredpositions,pumpdischargepressuresreachtheirrequiredvalues,etc.).SinceexistingsurveillancetestingdidnotsatisfytheTSdefinitionofESFresponsetime,theidentifiedconditionconstitutesamissedsurveillancetest.ThisisanoperationorconditionprohibitedbyTSandwasdeterminedtobereportablepursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)onSeptember7,1999.ResponsetimesforEngineeredSafetyFeaturesareprovidedintheUFSAR,Section7.2,Table7.2-7.TheESFResponseTimeBasisProcedurespecifiesthestrategyusedatCookNuclearPlanttodemonstratetheoperabilityofvariousEngineeredSafetyFeatures,systemsandsub-systems.Thisproceduredefines"DeviceResponseTimeasthetimefromSafeguardsMasterRelayclosinguntilthecomponentreachesitsESFposition.Additionally,"ESFResponseTime"isdefinedasthetimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsESFactuationse'tpointatthechannelsensoruntiltheESFequipmentiscapableofperformingit'ssafetyfunction.TechnicalSpecificationsSurveillanceRequirementsforESFresponsetimeinSection4.3.2.1.3andTable3.3-3specifythateachEngineeredSafety.FeatureActuationSignal(ESFAS)functionwillbedemonstratedtobewithinlimitsatleastonceper18moriths.ReviewofEmergencyDieselGeneratorLoadSequencingandESFTestingrevealedtheESFresponsetimefortheESWNRCFORM366AI6-1998)

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONi6-1999)"LICENSEEEVENTREPORTtLER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACIUTYNAMEI1)DOCKET{2)LERNUMBERI6)PAGEI3)CookNuclearPlantUnit105000-315YEARSEQUENTIALNUMBERREYIsI0N3OF4NUMBER199902300TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ{17)pumpsismeasuredfromtheinitiatingsensorchanneltothepumpbreakerclosure.TestingdoesnotincludethetimeforthepumptoreachtherequireddischargepressureorfortheESWpumpdischargevalvetoopen.Inearly1975,operationalproblemsidentifiedwiththeESWsystem,includingseverewaterhammeratpumpstart-up,leadtotestingbeingperformedundervariousoperationaltransients.Thistestingdidnotresultinasignificantwaterhammer,however,aprevioustestandoperatingexperienceshowedthatthewaterhammerdidnotoccurwhen'anidlepumpwasstartedwithathrottleddischargevalveeventhoughitsheaderhadnotbeenpressurizedforaslongastwelvehours.DeterminationwasmadethatthewaterhammerswereinduceduponthestartofanidleESWpumpwithafullyopendischargevalveevenwhentheheaderhadbeendepressurizedfornomorethanafewminutes.ThisdeterminationleadtomodificationofthedesignoftheESWpumpdischargevalves,suchthatthevalvesremainclosedwhentheESWpumpisidle,andareinterlockedtoopenonESWpumpstartatbreakerclosure.ResponsetimesforsensoractuationtoESWpumpbreakerclosureandESWpumpdischargeMOVstroketimesaremeasuredundertheSurveillanceTestProgram.However,thesetimesarenotcombinedtoprovideanoverallESFresponsetimewhichmeetstheTSdefinitionandwhichiscomparedtoanacceptancecriteria.TheESFresponsetimetestprocedurewasreviewedtoverifythatESFpumpsotherthanESWaretestedfrompumpstarttorequiredsystempressure/flow.Eachwasverifiedtoincluderequirementstomeasuretheoverallresponsetimefromsensoractuationuntilanacceptabledischargepressureorflowprescribedbyacceptancecriteria.AlthoughtheESWESFresponsetimesareincludedinUFSARTable7.2-7,ESWresponsetimesarenotexplicitlyincludedintheUFSARChapter14.0accidentanalysisassumptions.ESWisnotimmediatelyrequiredtosupportthecontainmentspraysystem(CTS)andEmergencyDieselGeneratorduringadesignbasisLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA).ESWsystemperformancerecordsandsurveillancetestresultsprovidereasonableassurancethatthesystemhasremainedcapableofperformingitsintendedfunctions.Basedupontheaboveinformation,therewereminimalsafetyimplicationstothehealthandsafetyofthepublicasaresultofthisevent.CORRECTIVEACTIONSSurveillancetestswillberevisedandimplementedtoincludethetimetoachieveprescribedpumpdischargepressure/flowand/ordischargevalvepositionaspartoftheoverallESFresponsetimetestingfortheESWsystempriortorestartofeachrespectiveunit.TheESWESFresponsetimesinUFSARTable7.2-7willbeevaluatedandrevised,ifnecessary,priortorestartofeachrespectiveunit.AsdiscussedinletterAEP:NRC:1260GH,"DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Units1and2,EnforcementActions98-150,98-151,98-152and98-156,ReplyToNoticeOfViolationDatedOctober13,1998,"datedMarch19,1999,asurveillanceprogramownerandmanagerpositionhasbeenestablished,reportingtotheWorkControlDirector.ALeadershipPlanhasbeendevelopedwhichincludesthecreationofadetailedsurveillancedatabasetoalignsurveillancerequirementstospecificimplementingproceduresandacomprehensiveadequacyreviewofsurveillancetestingprocedures.AspreviouslydiscussedinLER315/99-021-00andaspartofRestartActionPlan00001fortheProgrammaticBreakdowninSurveillanceTesting,theadequacyoftheTSsurveillanceprogramwillbeevaluated.ThisevaluationincludesverificationthatTSsurveillancerequirementsforallmodesofplantoperationareincorporatedintoTSsurveillancetestprocedures.Also,aspartoftheRestarteffort,SystemandprogrammaticassessmentsintheExpandedSystemReadinessReviewsandLicensingBasisReviewsarereestablishinganddocumentingtheplant'sDesignandLicensingBasis.NRCFORM366Ai6-1999)

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONI6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAMEI1)CookNuclear'lantUnit1DOCKETI2)05000-315YEARLERNUMBERI6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERPAGEI3)4OF4199902300TEXT(lfmorespacoisrequired,usoadditionalcopiesofNRCForm386A/I17)SIMILAREVENTS315/99-010-00315/99-015-00315/99-016-00315/99-021-00NRCFORM366AI6.1998)

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