ML17335A564

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LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A564
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1999
From: BAKKEN A C, DEPUYDT M B
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-99-024, NUDOCS 9910260103
Download: ML17335A564 (6)


Text

VA.JRSVP.XJ.REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)<<SIACCESSIONNBR:9910260103'OC.DATE:99/10/18NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaMAUTH.Nlg!E.'UTHORAFFILIATIONDEPUYDT,M.B.,IndianaMichiganPowerCo.BAKKEN,A.C.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET05000315

SUBJECT:

LER99-024-00:on990708,literalTSrequirementswerenotmetbyaccumlatorvalvesurveillance.CausedbymisjudgementmadeinconversionfrominitialDCCookTStoWStdTS.Submittedlicenseamendrequest.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ATERECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMELPD3-1COPIESLTTRENCL11RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMESTANG,JCOPIESLTTRENCL110INTERN.ILECENTERRES/DET/ERABRGN3FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDR11111111111111NRR/DIPM/IOLBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DRAA/OERABLMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXT111111111111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083IFULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR15ENCL15

IndianaMichiganPoweiCompanyCockNudearRaclOneCookRaceMgman.Ml491066164696lZINEMANAMICHIGANPOWEROctober18,1999UnitedStatesNudearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555OperatingLicenseDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:&hlhhl~tgtgDFRSDFDRRM~~.thfllghltlghltg:LER315/99-024-00,"LiteralTechnicalSpecificationsRequirementNotMetByAccumulatorValveSurveillance."Therearenocommitmentsidentifiedinthissubmittal.Sincerely,A.ChristopherBakken,IIISiteVicePresidentIsrdAttachmentc:S.E.Dyer,NRCRegionIIIR.P.PowersP.A.BarrettR.F.GodleyR.WhaleD.HahnRecordsCenter,INPONRCResidentInspector9910260103991018PDRADOCK05000315SPDRAE/':~Iaiericn'sEnetgInrlnl,'rda NRCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGUlATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYORBNo.31504(04EXPIRES06)30/2001ESTSAATEDIKSIDENPERRESPONSETOCOLDLYIATIHTISSEQPOATORYWFORMAllONCIKIECAONREOUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDIESSONSLEARNEDAREWCORPOMTEDWTOTIC~PROCESSAIEIFEDBACKTOSCMSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREOARDINOBISICENESTNATETOTHEPFORllATIONANDRECORDSMANACEMENTlÃIANCHIT%Feej.IAS.NVCIEARRECIAATORYCOMMISSOILWASISNOTOILOC20MSCC01.PIC)TOTHEP~REDVCTIONreameroleoolor),OFRCEOFMANAOEMENTAroIROSET,wASISNrnorADC21500FACIUlYNAME(1)TITLE(0)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315PAGE(0)1of3LiteralTechnicalSpecificationsRequirementNotMetByAccumulatorValveSurveillance07DAYYEAR081999EVENTDATE(5)1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER024REVISIONNUMBER00REPORTDATE(7)MONTHDAYYEAR10181999AILINAMCookNuclearPlant2AIUTYHAMCKETNUMB05000-316NUMOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)OPERATINGMODE(9)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(viii)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRIi:(Checkoneormore)(11)POWERLEVEL(10)020.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpeorrinADCraoIDerorrornNRCForm366AMs.MaryBethDepuydt,RegulatoryComplianceTELEPHONENUMBER(Inc4deAreaCode)(616)465-5901X1589COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXCAUSECOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEloEPIXSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED14)YES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE)XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15MONTHDAYAbstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJuly8,1999,duringareviewofTechnicalSpecifications(TS)surveillanceprocedures,itwasdiscoveredthatTSSurveillanceRequirement(SR)4.5.1.cwasnotbeingmetbytheassociatedsurveillanceprocedure.SR4.5.1.crequiresthatpowertotheRCSaccumulatorisolationvalvemotoroperatorbedisconnectedby,"...removalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."ThesurveillanceproceduredoesnotmeettheliteralwordingofTSSR4.5.1.cinthatthebreakerisopenedandmaintainedinthatpositionratherthanbeingphysicallyremoved.ThisLERisthereforesubmittedinacco'rdancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),asaconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.ThisconditionresultedfromamisjudgmentmadeintheconversionfromtheinitialD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)TStotheWestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STS),asdescribedinNUREG-0452.ThewordingappearstohavebeenadoptedfromtheSTSwithoutconsideringthetypeofbreakerinstalledfortheaccumulatorisolationvalves.AlicenseamendmentrequestwillbesubmittedtochangeTSSR4.5.1.c.AcomprehensivereviewoftheadequacyofTSsurveillancetestproceduresisbeingperformedaspartofRestartActionPlan¹0001,"ProgrammaticBreakdowninSurveillanceTesting."Theidentifiedconditionhasnosafetysignificancebecausepowerwasremovedfromtheaccumulatorisolationvalvecontrolcircuit,therebypreventinginadvertentvalveoperationduetoasinglefailureinthevalvecontrolcircuitry.NRCFORM366(6-1998) 0NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)2of31999-.02400TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useaddiiionalcopiesofNRCFormP66A)(17)Unit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownOnJuly8,1999,duringareviewofTechnicalSpecifications(TS)surveillanceprocedures,itwasdiscoveredthatTSSurveillanceRequirement(SR)4.5.1.cwasnotbeingmetbytheassociatedsurveillanceprocedure.SR4.5.1.crequiresthatpowertotheRCSaccumulatorisolationvalvemotoroperatorbedisconnectedby,"...removalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."Thesuiveillanceprocedure,01(02)-OHP-4030.STP.031,"OperationWeeklySurveillanceChecks,"requirestheoperatortocheckthebreakerswitchintheOFFposition,butthebreakerisnotphysicallyremovedfromthecubicle.Therefore,thesurveillanceproceduredoesnotmeettheliteralrequirementofTSSR4.5.1.c.Thisconditionresultedfroma.misjudgmentmadeintheconversionfromtheinitialD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)TStotheWestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STS),asdescribedinNUREG-0452.TheNUREG-0452,"StandardTechnicalSpecificationsforWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactors,"accumulatorisolationvalvesurveillancerequirementappearstohavebeenadoptedwithoutconsideringCookplantdesign.DuringconversionfromtheoriginaltotheSTS,itwaserroneouslydecidedthattheTSSRwouldbemetbyopeningthemoldedcasecircuitbreaker(MCCB)thatsuppliespowertotheaccumulatorvalveoperator,andmaintainingthebreakerintheOFFposition.TheinvestigationhasshownthatCNPpersonneldonotconsidertheMCCBscapableofbeing"rackedout"duetotheirphysicaldesign.Instead,whendirectedtorackoutthisstyleofbreaker,personnelunderstandthatrackoutmeanstoplacethebreakerintheOFFposition.WhilethesurveillanceprocedureactionsmeettheintentoftheTSbyplacingthebreakersintheOFFposition,theydonotmeettheliteralrequirementofTSSR4.5.1.c.Thisconditionhasexistedsinceinitialplantstartup.OnSeptember20,1999,thisconditionwasdeterminedtobereportable;therefore,thisLERissubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),asaconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.ThegapintimebetweenthediscoverydateofJuly8,1999,andthereportingdateofSeptember20,1999,wasduetotheneedforevaluationbyD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)staffandmanagementduetotheextendedhistoryoftheissue.TSSR4.5.1.crequiresthatweperiodicallyverify,"...thatpowertotheisolationvalveoperatorisdisconnectedbyremovalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."ThebasisforthisTSsurveillancerequirementisthat,"...astheseaccumulatorisolationvalvesfailtomeetsinglefailurecriteria,removalofpowertothevalvesisrequired."ThisCNPTSsurveillancerequirementandbaseswereadopteddirectlyfromNUREG-0452,andnoplant-specificchangesweremadetotheCNPrequirement.Tophysicallyremoveabreakerfromacircuit,thebreakerisrackedout.Theterm"rackout"meanstousetheinstalledrackingmechanismtophysicallymovetheswitchgearbreakerawayfromthebusstabssuchthatthebreakerisnolongerincontactwiththebusbars.Additionally,rackingoutabreakerdisconnectsthebreakerfromthecontrolcircuitsuchthatthebreakercannotoperate.Breakersthatarecapableofbeingrackedouthavebuilt-inmechanismstoallowtherackoutoperation,andaregenerallyfoundonswitchgearbuses.Thesafety-relatedaccumulatorisolationvalvesarepoweredfromtheAux600VswitchgearbusesthroughMotorControlCenters(MCCs).ThebreakersusedontheseMCCsarenotoftheswitchgeartype,andhavenomechanismforbeingNRCFORM366A(6-1998)

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1996)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACIUTYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)3of31999-02400TEXTPfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCFormP66A)(17)rackedout.Rather,thebreakersusedaresmallMCCBs,whicharecommonforasmallloadofthistypeandvoltage.TheMCCBsarehard-wiredtothesupplylinesandloadsintheMCC,andaredifficulttoremovefromtheircubicles.Theterm"rackout"doesnotapplytoMCCBs.To"electrically"removetheaccumulatorisolationvalveMCCBfromthecircuit,theoperatormerelyhastoopenthebreakerandmaintainitintheOFFposition.PlacingthebreakerinOFFde-energizescontrolpowertothevalveoperator.DeliberateoperatoractionbyphysicallyclosingthebreakeratthelocalMCCpanelisrequiredtorestorevalveoperatorcontrolpower.Openingtheaccumulatorvalvebreakerwhenreactorsystempressureisgreaterthan2000psigpreventsthepotentialforanactivefailureorinadvertentoperationofthevalveswitchfromthecontrolroomtocausethevalvestoclose.Noelectricalfaultwillcausethebreakertoclose.Therefore,theintentoftheTSismet.Basedontheaboveinformation,theidentifiedconditionhasnosafetysignificance.Openingtheaccumulatorisolationvalvebreakerorremovingthebreakerfromthecircuitbothremovepowertothecircuitandpreventinadvertentvalveoperationduetoasinglefailureinthevalvecontrolcircuitry.NoimmediatecorrectiveactionswererequiredbecausetheplantwasinanoperatingModewherethesurveillancerequirementwasnotapplicable.AlicenseamendmentrequestwillbesubmittedbyOctober22,1999,tochangeTechnicalSpecificationsSurveillanceRequirement4.5.1.ctoread,"Atleastonceper31dayswhentheRCSpressureisabove2000psig,byverifyingthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperator."AspreviouslystatedincorrespondenceAEP:NRC:1260GH,datedMarch19,1999,"EnforcementActions98-150,98-151,98-152and98-186,ReplytoNoticeofViolationDatedOctober13,1998,"acomprehensivereviewoftheadequacyofTSsurveillancetestproceduresisbeingperformed.ThisactionisbeingtrackedbyRestartActionPlan40001,"ProgrammaticBreakdowninSurveillanceTesting."NoneNRCFORM366A(6-1996)