ML17309A901

LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr

ML17309A901
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	08/27/1997
From:	FREHAFER K W, STALL J A FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-97-221, LER-97-008, LER-97-8, NUDOCS 9709040179
Download: ML17309A901 (8)

Text

'IFloridaPower@LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957APLAugust27,1997L-97-22110CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,.D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNo.50-335,50-389ReportableEvent:97-008DateofEvent:July26,1997InoperableMechanicalFirePenetrations1TheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.73toprovidenotificationofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyours,VicePresidentSt.LuciePlantJAS/KWFAttachmentllllllllllllllllllilllllllllillllllllllcc;RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlantV~9709040179970827PDRADOCK05000335SPDRant.rLuroupcompany

NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLZCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDSYOMSNO.3160%104EXRRES04rsorssESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREOVESTI60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINOPROCESSANOFSACKTOSIOUSIRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREOAROINOBURDENESTIMATTOTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAOEMENTBRANCHIT.SF331UWNUCLEARREOIAATORYCOMMISSION,WASHINOTON,OC206664XX)1ANDTOTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECT(316001041,OFACE0MANAOEMENTANDBUDGET,WASHINOTON,OC20603.FACIUTYNAMEIllSTLUCIEUNIT1llTLE<4)DOCKETNUMSGI(2)05000335PACE(311OF4InoperableMechanicalFirePenetrationsOutsideAppendixRDesignBasesMONTHDAY728OPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)97100YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-008-020.2201<b)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(s)(2)(iv)MONTHDAY82720.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)97FACIUTYNAMESTLUCIEUNIT2FACIUTYNAME50.73(s)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(s)(2)(v)50.73(s)(2)(vii)OOCKETNUMSER05000389DOCKETNULISER0500050.73(s)(2)(viii)73.71OTHERSpecifyInAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366ANAMEK.W.Frehafer,LicensingEngineerTELEPHONENUMBERSnoILereAreeCode)I561)468-4284CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANVFACTURotTONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToNPRDSNHPENX999NYEs(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Umitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single.spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJuly28,1997,St.LucieUnits1and2wereinMode1at100percentpower.FPLwasinvestigatingworkbacklogsanddeterminedthatthecorrectiveactionsassociatedwithNRCInformationNotice(IN)94-28,thatdealtwithfireprotectionbarrierdeficiencies,werestillpending.TheoriginalINreviewrequiredthevaluationof218mechanicalpenetrationsealsbecausetheinstalledconditiondidnotcorrelatetofirebarrierqualificationtesting.However,theoriginalreviewdidnotestablishifthe218sealswereoperable.Anoperabilityassessmentforthe218penetrationsealswasperformedandofthispopulation,sevenpenetrationsealsinUnit1andeightpenetrationsealsinUnit2areinoperable.Theapparentcauseofthiseventwasthatthesealmanufacturerdidnotprovideformaldocumentationforinstalledsealsthatdeviatedfromqualificationtestconfigurations.Additionally,theproblemidentificationandcorrectiveactionprocedureinplaceduringtheoriginalINreviewwasweakinthattherequirementsandguidanceforperformingoperabilityassessmentswerenotwelldefined.Correctiveactionsinclude:1)theexistinghourlyrovingfirewatchincludesthe15inoperableseals,2)GenericLetter86-10mechanicalfirepenetrationevaluationswillbeperformedforthe218mechanicalsealsthatarenotboundedbytestedconfigurations,arid3)theinoperablemechanicalfirepenetrationswillbemodifiedtomeetthreehourfirebarriercriterion.NRCFORM366(4.95)

NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEOUENTIALREVISION97-008-02OF4TEXTilfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm368AiI17IOnJuly28,1997,St.LucieUnits1and2wereinMode1at100percentpower.FPLwasinvestigatingworkbacklogsanddeterminedthatcorrectiveactionsassociatedwithfireprotectionbarrierswerestillpending.NRCInformationNotice(IN)94-28describedsituationswhereinstalledfirepenetrationsealsdidnotdirectlycorrelatetothefirebarrierqualificationtestconfiguration.Thenoticerequestedalllicenseestoreviewtheinformationforapplicabilitytotheirfacilitiesandconsideractions,asappropriate,toavoidsimilarproblems.St.LuciePlantevaluatedtheadequacyofthefirepenetrationsealsatbothunitsinJanuary1995.ThisevaluationshowedthatSt.LuciePlanthad365mechanicalpenetrationsealsandthat218ofthesesealsarenotdirectlyboundedbytestdata.Thisincludes72sealsforUnit1and146sealsforUnit2.However,theevaluationdidnotestablishifthediscrepantfirepenetrationsealswereoperable.FPLpersonnelperformedanoperabilityassessmentforthe218penetrationsealsthatwerenotdirectlyboundedbytestdata.Ofthispopulation,theoperabilityassessmenthasshownthatsevenpenetrationsealsinUnit1andeightpenetrationsealsinUnit2areinoperable'TheseinoperablepenetrationsealshavehadFireBreachPermitsgeneratedandpostedintheareaofthesealandarebeingmonitoredbythehourlyrovingfirewatchasrequiredbytheAppendix"R"FireProtectionProgramatSt.Lucie.Theapparentcauseofthiseventwas'duetoweaknessesassociatedwiththepreviousproblemidentificationandcorrectiveactionprocedureinplaceduringtheoriginalIN94-28review.TheSt.LucieSTARProgramwassubsequentlyreplacedbytheConditionReport(CR)process.Anoperabilityassessmenontheconditionofthe218firepenetrationsealswasnotperformedundertheSTARProgram.Therefore,theimportanceofcorrectiveactionsspecifiedbytheoriginalSTARwasnotrecognizedduringtheSTARtoCRconversion.TheCRprocedureensuresthatoperabilitydeterminationsareperformedforpotentiallydegradedSystems,Structures,andComponents(SSCs),andprovidespositivetrackingmechanismsforrequiredcorrectiveactions.Theapparentcauseofinstalledmechanicalfirepenetrationconfigurationsnotbeingboundedbytestedconfigurationswasduetothesealmanufacturernotprovidingdetailsdocumentingthereasonfortheselectionandacceptabilityofeachmechanicalpenetrationseal.DeviationstothetestedconfigurationweretobereviewedandcertifiedatSt.Luciebythesealmanufacturerduringinstallation.However,noformaldocumentationonthedeviationsfromtestedconfigurationswasprovided.Thisconditionisreportableunder10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)becausetheasfoundconditionof15firepenetrationsealsdoesnotmeetthethreehourfirebarrierrequirements.ThefirebarriersarediscussedintheUnit1andUnit2FSARs,Chapter9.5A.Theprincipaldesignobjectiveofthethreehourfirebarrieristoprotectplantpersonnel,thegeneralpublic,andtheenvironmentbyensuringthateveryfirepenetrationsealprovidesapassivethreehourfirebarrierbetweenthevariousfireareasoftheplant.Thefirebarrierdoesnotperformanysafetyrelatedfunctioneitherduringnormalplantoperationorduringaccidentcondition.Thefirebarrierisapassivedeviceandispartoftheplantfireprotectionsystem.NACFOAM366A(4-95I

NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGUlATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION97-008-03OF4TEXT/Ifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofIIRCFarmM6AII'l7)The218firepenetrationsealsthatwerenotdirectlyboundedbytestdatafellintofourgeneralcategories:i)thepenetratingitemislargerthanthetestedconfiguration;ii)thesealhadmorethanonepenetratingitempassingthroughitandnotesting,applicabletothissealmaterial,wasconductedwithmorethanonepipepenetratingtheseal;iii)somesealsdidnothaveconclusivetestdataexactlyperASTME-119requirements;andiv)somesealsexceededthedesignlimitationsofoperatingtemperatureandorpipemovement.Operabilitywasestablishedbyevaluatingthefieldconditionsagainstthefollowingguidelines:1.Ifthedesigntemperatureormovementexceedstheallowabledesigndataonthesealdrawingthesealwasvisuallyexaminedviawalkdown.Ifthesealwasvisuallyacceptableonbothsides,thatis,nodegradationduetoshrinkageorpipemovement,thesealisoperableifallothercriteriaaremet.2.Ifthenormaloperatingconditionshasthepipefilledwithwater,andthemaximumtemperatureofthepipecouldnotincreaseabovetheboilingpointofwateratarelativelylowpressure,theheatfluxfromafiretothesealorpipetotheothersideofthebarrierwouldbelowduetothewateractingasaheatsink.Therefore,undertheseconditionsthesealisoperablewithrespecttothefirebarrierrequirementsduetotheconductionandconvectionpropertiesofbasicheattransfer.However,sealswithpipingfilledwithwaterwherethepipingtemperature/pipemovementexceedsthedesignlimitationsofthesealfornormalorintermediateoperationareconsideredinoperable.3.Forsealsthatdonotfallintotheabovetwocategories,therulesdevelopedfromTech-Sil,Inc.(Promotec)DocumentNumberTS-TP-0081,TestReportIIITS-TP-0081,"FireandHoseStreamTestforIIITS-MS-0080-ASelf-SupportingHighDensitySiliconeGel,"TestDate9/11/81,willbeapplied.4.Sincepenetrationsealsthathaveamultiplenumberofsmallinstrumentationtubespenetratingthemarepartiallygroutedandusuallytransversethickerthannormalbarriers,theydonotreadilyfallunderthesame'categoryasotherpenetrationsealsandbecauseaninstrumentationtubeissmall((2")theyareoperable.5.TestReportIIITS-TP-0048-C,"FireandHoseStreamTestofaSinglePenetrationSealedwith//TS-MS-0045-8SiliconeElastomer,"showsthata2"pipewitha6"sealpassedtheASTME-119testingforM-1typeseals.Therefore,fortheM-1sealdesignall2"andsmallerpenetrantswitha6"sealthicknessareoperable.6.Forinsulatedpipes,theinsulationwilltendtoshieldthesealfromthefireandtherefore,anyinsulatedpipewillnotbesubjecttobeinginoperableduetodesigntemperaturelimitations.Fifteenfirepenetrationsealsdidnotfallintooneoftheabovesixguidelinessotheywereconsideredinoperable..NRCFORM366A(495)

NRCFORM366AI4-96)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT1YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION0500033597-008-04OF4TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofiVRCFerm366AJI17)The15inoperablefirepenetrationsealswereevaluatedanddeterminedtobenotsafetysignificant.Althoughtheas-foundconditionofthesefirepenetrationsealswasnotinaccordancewiththetestedconfigurations,andwouldprobablynotmeetathreehourfirerating,theinstallationdoesprovidesomeresistancetofirepropagation.Fireprotectiondefenseindepthprovidesanintegratedmeansformitigatingtheconsequencesofafire,suchastheexistingsmokedetectionsystems,automaticwaterfiresuppressionsystems,hosestations,administrativeprogramsthatcontrolcombustibleloading,andoperatoractions.Inaddition,thelocationoftheinoperablefiresealsdidnotchangetherouteoftheexistingrovingfirewatchthathasbeeninplaceascompensatorymeasuresforinoperableThermolag.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwasnotadverselyaffectedbythisevent.The15inoperablepenetrationsealshavehadFireBreachPermitsgeneratedandpostedintheareaofthesealandaremonitoredbytheexistinghourlyrovingfirewatchasrequiredbytheAppendix"R"FireProtectionProgramatSt.Lucie.2.GenericLetter86-10mechanicalfirepenetrationevaluationswillbeperformedforthe218mechanicalsealsthatarenotboundedbytestedconfigurations.3.Theinoperablemechanicalfirepenetrationswillbemodifiedtomeetthethreehourfirebarriercriteria.Manufacturer:Promatec,Inc.(formerlyTech-Sil)Equipment:ElastomerSealsLER50-389/97-004-0describedaconditionwhereSt.LucieUnit2doublesidedcabletrayfirestopswerenotinstalledinaccordancewiththedesigndrawings.NRCFORM366AI4.96I 0,~