ML17229A673
| ML17229A673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1998 |
| From: | FREHAFER K W, STALL J A FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| L-98-077, L-98-77, LER-98-002-01, LER-98-2-1, NUDOCS 9804020418 | |
| Download: ML17229A673 (40) | |
Text
~CATEGORYREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9804020418DOC.DATE:98/03/26NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerSLightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFREMFER;K.W.FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAME,RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET¹05000389
SUBJECT:
LER98-002-00:on980224,radiationmonitorsurveillanceinadequaciesledtooperatingoffacilityprohibitedbyTSs.Causedbycongnitivepersonnelerror.Permanentprocedurechangeswereimplemented.W/980326ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:ZE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ERECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRS'EOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DET/EIBEXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEGLEAVES,WSOD/NPD/RABFILECENTER'EELBNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR25ENCL25 FloridaPowerStLightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957March26.1998L-98-07710CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389ReportableEvent:98-002DateofEvent:February24,1998RadiationMonitorSurveillanceInadequaciesLedto0erationofFacilitProhibitedbTechnicalSecificationsTheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.73.Verytrulyyours,VicePresidentSt.LuciePlantJAS/EJW/KWFAttachment'c:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant9804020418980326PDRADQCK050003898PDRanFPLGroupcompany
NRCFORM366(4-96)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLZCEHSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.31600104EXFUIES04)30/QsESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATOINFORMATIONCO!LECTIONREQUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEBACKTOBIDUS(RY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATTOTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCH(T0F33)U.S.NUC(EARREGULATORYCOMMISSION.WASHINGTON,DC206664)00(ANDTOTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECT(3(600(04),OFFICE0MANAGEMENTANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON,DC20603.FACIUTYNAME(1),STLUCIEUNIT2DOCKETN(2%4SER(2)05000389PAGEt3)1OF8TITLE(4)RadiationMonitorSurveillanceInadequaciesLedtoOperationofFacilityProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsMONTHDAYYEAR2498SEQUENT)ALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER98-002-0MONTH3DAYYEAR2698FACIUTYNAMEn/aFACIUTYNAMEn/aDOCKETNUMBERDOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(vnr)73.71OTHERSpecifyfnAbstractba(oworinNRCForm388ANAMEK.W.Frehafer,LicensingEngineerTE(EPHONENUMSOIBooludeAreaCode)l561)468-4284cAUBESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETONPRDSSYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERTONPRDSILn/an/an/aDILn/an/an/aYES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewiittenlines)(16)OnFebruary24,1998,St.LuciaUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.Thesystemengineerdiscoveredthefirstoftwosurveillanceproceduredeficienciesconcerningthecontrolroomoutsideairintake(CROAI)radiationmonitors.ThemonthlyfunctionaltestdidnotverifytheCROAIradiationmonitoralarmandtripsetpoints.ThesecondsurveillanceproceduredeficiencywasdiscoveredonMarch5,1998,whenitwasconcludedthatthechannelcalibrationtestdidnotverifyoperationoftheCROAIradiationmonitoroutputcontacts.Thecauseoftheproceduredeficiencieswascognitivepersonnelerrorduringdevelopmentofthesurveillanceprocedures.CorrectiveactionsincludeddeclarinEItheCROAIradiationmonitorsoutofserviceandenteringtheappropriateTechnicalSpecificationACTIONstatementrequirementsatthetimeofdiscovery.Permanentprocedurechangeswereimplemented,andtestingwascompletedontheCROAIradiationmonitorstodeclarethembackinservice.NRCFORM388(496)
NRCFORM366AI4.95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION98-002-02OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrertuired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCFarm366A/I17)OnFebruary24,1998,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.Thesystemengineerdiscoveredthatthemonthlyfunctionalsurveillanceprocedure,2-1220054,"FunctionalTestingoftheUnit2AreaRadiationMonitoringSystems,"forthecontrolroomoutsideairintake(CROAI)radiationmonitorsdidnotspecifyanacceptancelimitforthealarmsetpoint(EIIS:IL:RA).TechnicalSpecificationtable3.3-6requiresthatthecontrolroomisolationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointsbelessthanorequaltotwotimesbackground.Theprocedurewasrevisedin1994suchthatthealarm/tripsetpointfortheCROAIradiationmonitorswaspermanentlysettoavalueof125countsperminute(CPM).Thisrevisionalsoremovedtherequirementtoverify,recalculate,orreviewtheCROAIradiationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointstoconfirmthattheyremainedconsistentwithcurrentbackgroundlevels.Analarm/tripsetpointof125CPIVIwasnon-conservativerelativetoactualmeasuredbackground.EAsaconservativemeasure,at12:35,onFebruary24,1998,bothtrainsofCROAIradiationmonitorsweredeclaredoutofservice.At13:00thecontrolroomwasplacedintherecirculationmodeasallowedbyTechnicalSpecificationtable3.3-6,ACTIONstatement26.TheCROAIradiationmonitorbackgroundwasestablished,thenewsetpointswereimplemented,andthreeoutofthefourCROAIradiationmonitorsweredeclaredbackinserviceat19:30onFebruary25,1998(RIM-26-66remainedoutofserviceforanunrelatedequipmentproblem).DuringinvestigationoftheCROAIradiationmonitortwicebackgroundissue,anothersurveillancediscrepancywasidentifedonMarch5,1998.TechnicalSpecificationtable4.3-3requiresthatachannelcalibrationfortheCROAIradiationmonitorsbeperformedonarefuelingintervalperiodicity.Thechannelcalibrationsurveillancerequirementincludestestingtheactuationlogic.Procedure2-1400069,"CalibrationofthePSL-2ControlRoomOutsideAirIntakeMonitors"(CROAI's),"isintendedtosatisfythechannelcalibrationtestrequirement.However,thisproceduredidnotfullysatisfythesurveillancerequirementssincetheCROAIradiationmonitorcontactoutputtothecontrolroomemergencycleanupsystem(CRECS)actuationlogicwasnotverified.FPLdeterminedthatpastactuationofCROAIradiationmonitorsRIM-26-65and66establishedoperabilityofthosemonitors'utputcontacts.Basedontheabove,CROAIradiationmonitorsRIM-26-61and62weredeclaredinoperableat14:40onMarch5,1998,andthesurveillancerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification4.0.3wereexercised.Thesurveillancetestingwascompletedsatisfactorily,andOperationsdeclaredCROAIradiationmonitorsback'inserviceat17:15onMarch5,1998.ThecauseoftheseeventswasdeterminedtobecognitivepersonnelerrorduringthedevelopmentoftheCROAIradiationmonitorsurveillanceprocedures.PerTechnicalSpecificationTable3.3-6,controlroomisolationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointsshallbelessthanorequaltotwotimesbackground.CROAImonitoralarm/tripsetpointswereroutinelyverifiedtobewithintwoNRCFORM388A(4.95)
NRCFORM366AI4-65lLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION3OF898-002-.0TEXT(ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesoffVRCFormM84/I17Itimesbackgroundlevelsduringmonthlyfunctionaltestingviaprocedure2-1220054.A1994procedurerevisionerroneouslyremovedthesestepsfromtheprocedure.Sincethattime,thealert/tripsetpointswerenotrecalculatedorreviewedtoconfirmthattheyremainedconsistentwithcurrentbackgroundlevels.Inaddition,procedure2-.1400069failedtoproperlytesttheCRECSactuationfunctionoftheCROAIradiationmonitoroutputcontacts.Theseerrorsledtoproceduralinadequacies.Bothconditionsdescribedinthisreportarereportableunder10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)asanyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.TechnicalSpecificationtable3.3-6specifiesthattheCROAIradiationmonitorsetpointshallbelessthanorequaltotwicebackground.TechnicalSpecificationtable4.3-3requiresamonthlychannelfunctionaltest.Achannelfunctionaltestisrequiredtoverifyoperabilityofthealarmand/ortripfunction.ContrarytoTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancerequirements,theCROAIradiationmonitoralarm/tripsetpointswerenotverifiedaspartofthechannelfunctionaltest.Additionally,TechnicalSpecificationtable4.3-3requiresaCROAIradiationmonitorchannelcalibrationonarefuelingintervalbasis.Channelcalibrationsshallbetheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechanneloutputsuchthatitrespondswiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracytotheknownvaluesoftheparameterwhichthechannelmonitors.Channelcalibrationsshallencompasstheentirechannelincludingthesensorandalarmand/ortripfunctions,andmaybeperformedbyanyseiiesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalchannelstepssuchthattheentirechanneliscalibrated.ContrarytoTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancerequirements,theCROAIradiationmonitoralarm/tripoutputcontactswerenotadequatelytestedaspartofthechannelcalibrationactivities.ThefunctionoftheCROAIradiationmonitorsistoactuateCRECSwhenhighradiationlevelsaredetectedfromtheoutsideairintakeducts.Theanalysisstatesthatfollowingalossofcoolantaccident,thetotalexposurefromairborneactivitywithinthecontrolroomarewithinthelimitssetforthin10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriterion(GDC)19.Thesemonitorsarealsouseda'scontrolroomhabitabilityinstrumentationtoenabletheoperatortoevaluatehabitabilityNACFOAM366AI4-95I NRCFORM366A(4-95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEOUENTIALREVISION98-002-04OF8TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCFerm3SGAJI17)conditions.Bycomparingthereadingsfromthetwoairintakes,theoperatorcandeterminewhichsideoftheplanthasthelowerairborneradiationlevelandallowoutsideairwiththelowerairborneradiationtobedrawnin.Unit2isequippedwithfoursafetyrelatedCROAIradiationmonitors(RIM-26-61,62,65566).Tworedundanttrainsmonitoreachofthetwocontrolroomairintakeducts.EachCROAImonitorusestwodetectors.Thefirstdetectorisascintillationdetectorwhichissensitivetobothbetaparticlesandgammarays.Theseconddetectorisidenticaltothefirstexceptanaluminumbetashieldisinstalledoverthescintillationdetector.Therefore,theseconddetectorissensitiveonlytogammarays.Themonitorsubtractsthegamma-onlysignalfromthecombinedbetaandgammasignalwitharesultthatrepresentsonlythebetacontribution.Thebetaactivityisdisplayedbythemonitorasathirddetectorchannel.Thebetaactivity,whichisrepresentativeoftheactualcontaminationcontributiontothebackgroundactivitylevel,istheprocesssignalusedtodeveloptheCROAIradiationmonitoralarmandtripfunction.Thisarrangementprovidesadiscriminatingbackgroundthatisnotsen'sitiyetochangesinthegammaraybackground.Upondetectionofhighbetaradiationactivitybythemonitors,asignalisdevelopedtoisolatethecontrolroomandinitiatetheCRECSfans.Thedesignofthemonitorutilizesthebetashieldeddetectortoestablishbackgroundbecauseallbetaradiationisconsideredcontaminationforthepurposeofthesemonitors.Sinceambientbetalevelsintheatmosphereareconsiderednegligible,definingthemascontaminationisconservativeandreasonable.Backgroundradiationisnotasingularvalue,butisdefinedasarangeofnormalactivitylevels.Thisrangewasdefinedastwostandarddeviationsfromtheaveragebackgroundleveltakenoveradefinedtimeperiod.Thismeansthatcontaminationactivitylevelswouldhavetoincreasetotwiceaveragebackgroundactivitylevelstocauseanalarm/trip,andsatisfiestherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Thissetpointmethodologyalsoavoidsundesirednuisancealarmsandunnecessarycontrolroomrecirculationactuationsduetoelectronicnoiseorbetabackgroundfluctuations.AlthoughthepreviousCROAIradiationmonitorsetpointof125CPMwasnon-conservativerelativetothederivedbackgroundasdescribedabove,thisconditionhadnosafetysignificance.ThefunctionoftheCROAIradiationmonitorsduringaccidentconditionsistoprovideasignaItoinitiateCRECStopreventthedosetothecontrolroomoperatorsfromexceedingGDC19criteria.SpecifyingaCRECSactuationsetpointattwicebackgroundisextremelyconservativerelativetothesafetyfunctionbeingperformed.Thefollowingcomparisonssupportthisassertion.NRCFORM366AI49SI NRCFORM366AI4-95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSISTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION98-002-05OF8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm3M4/I17IEngineeringreviewedtheUnit1CROAIradiationmonitorrequirements,andalthoughtherearenoUnit1TechnicalSpecificationrequirementsfortheUnit1CROAImonitors,theUnit1updatedfinalsafetyanalysisreport(UFSAR)statesthattheCROAIradiationmonitortripsetpointsareapproximately320CPM.Additionally,theStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STS)setpointforthecontrolroomisolationsignalisanominalvalueof6X10'PMabovenormalbackground.Theas-foundUnit2CROAIradiationmonitorsetpointof125CPMisboundedbyboththeUnit1CROAIradiationmonitorsetpointsandtheSTSsetpointrequirementsforcontrolroomisolation.Therefore,FPLconcludesthatthepostaccidentcontrolroomoperatordosewouldbeboundedbyGDC19criteria.TheCROAIradiationmonitorchannelcalibrationprocedure2-1400069didnotfullysatisfythesurveillancerequirementsbecausetheCROAIradiationmonitorcontactoutputtotheCRECSactuationlogicwasnotverified.Procedure2-1400069installedajumperacrosstheoutputcontactsofthemonitorundertest,thuspreventingthede-energizationofrelay3A(3B)(whichwouldactuateCRECS)duringtheradiationmonitortest(seeFigure1).Thecontrolroomisolationfunctionofrelay3A(3B)isverifiedduringtheUnit1and2IntegratedSafeguardsproceduresbygeneratingacontainmentisolationactuationsignal(CIAS).However,neithertheSafeguardsnorthechannelcalibrationsurveillanceproceduresverifiedCRECSactuationviatheCROAIradiationmonitoroutputcontacts.Theoperationandmaintenancehistoryforthepast18monthswasreviewedtodetermineifoperationoftheCROAIradiationmonitorcontactscouldbedemonstratedinsomeothermanner.Tworelatedeventswerefoundasfollows:AspuriousactuationofthecontrolroomemergencyventilationsystemoccurredonNovember8,1997.ThespuriousactuationwasdefinitivelydeterminedtohavebeencausedbyradiationmonitorRIM-26-65.Thiseventdemonstratestheoperationoftheoutputcontactsofthismonitor.2.AspuriousactuationofthecontrolroomemergencyventilationsystemrecentlyoccurredonMarch3,1998~ThespuriousactuationwasdefinitivelydeterminedtohavebeencausedbyradiationmonitorRIM-26-66~Thiseventdemonstratestheoperationoftheoutputcontactsofthismonitor.TheoperationofthetworemainingradiationmonitorswasverifiedonMarch5,1998.Basedontheabove,FPLconcludesthatreasonableassurancewasprovidedthatthepastcapabilityoftheCROAIradiationmonitorscontrolroomisolationfunctionwasnotaffectedbytheinadequatesurveillances.NRCFORM366A(4-95)
NRCFORM366AI4.9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION98-002-06OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofhfRCporm366Ai(17)Basedonthediscussionsabove,bothconditionswerenotsafetysignificantandthepublichealthandsafetywerenotadverselyaffected.~1TheCROAIradiationmonitorsRIM-25-61,-62,-65,and-66weredeclaredoutofserviceandUnit2enteredTechnicalSpecificationTable3.3-6Action26onFebruary24,1998.TheCROAIradiationmonitorbackgroundwasestablished,andthenewsetpointsenteredintothemonitorsonFebruary25,1998,atwhichtimethreeoftheCROAIradiationmonitorswereplacedbackinservice(RIM-26-66remainedoutofserviceforanunrelatedequipmentproblem).TheCROAIradiationmonitorsRIM-25-61and62weredeclaredoutofserviceand,TechnicalSpecification4.0.3wasexercisedonMarch5,1998.WorkOrder98005359verifiedthetripfunctionoperabilityofRIM-26-61and62,andtheCROAIradiationmonitorswereplacedbackinservicethesameday.ChangestotheCROAIchannelcalibrationsurveillanceprocedure2-1400069,"CalibrationofthePSL-2ControlRoomOutsideAirIntakeMonitors(CROAI's),"wereimplementedthatrequiresthatthemonitorsetpointsberecalculatedaspartofthesurveillanceandtoalsoverifytheoperabilityofthetripactuationrelaycontacts.4.ChangestotheCROAImonthlyfunctionalsurveillanceprocedure,2-1220054,"FunctionalTestingoftheUnit2AreaRadiationMonitoringSystems,"wereimplementedthatrequiresreviewofthemonitorsetpointsaspartofthesurveillance.5.Thetotalequipmentdatabase(TEDB)forRIM-26-61,-62,-65,.and-66willbeupdatedtoreflectthecorrectsetpointmethodologyfortheCROAIradiationmonitors.6.Radiationmonitorsetpointsareunderreviewaspartofanon-goingOffsiteDoseCalculationManualreview.NRCFORM389A(4.95I 0
NRCFORM366AI4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGUlATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT2YEARSEOUENTIALREVISION0500038998-002-07OF8TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useeddiuonelcopiesofNACForm3MA/(17INoneLER50-335,389/97-006,"OperationProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsDuetoInadequatelyTestedDegradedVoltageSystem."LER50-389/97-008,"InadequateControlRoomVentilationProcedureResultsinConditionProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecifications."LER50-389/97-006,"OperationProhibitedbyTechnicalSpecificationsDuetoInadequateSurveillanceTestingofESFSubgroupRelays."NRCFORM368AI495I NRCFORM366A(4.95ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION98-002-08OF8TEXT(ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofIVRCFermMGA/I17IContactsNormallyClosedContactsOpenonActuationRIM-26-61OutputContactRIM-26-62OutputContactRIM-26-65OutputContactRIM-26-66OutputContactU1CIASContact-U2CIASContact-3ARelayDe-energizetoInitiateControlRoomIsolationandRecirculation,3BRelayTrainSAFansandDampersTrainSBFansandDampersFigure1GROAIRadiationMonitorCRECSActuationNRCFORM368AI4.95l Distri70.txt'DistributionSheetPriority:NormalFrom:LindaEusebioActionRecipients:NRR/DLPM/LPD2-2KJabbourCopies:11NotFoundNotFoundInternalRecipients:RidsRgn...MailCenterRidsResDraaOerabRidsResDetErabRidsNrrDssaSplbRidsNrrDripRexbRidsNrrDipmIolbRidsManagerRGN2.FILE01RES/DRAA/OERABRES/DET/ERABNRR/DSSA/SPLBNRR/DRIP/REXBRR/~DMSOF-IEECENTEACRS111111111111111NotFoundOKOKOKOKOKOKNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundExternalRecipients:NOACQUEENER,DSNOACPOORE,W.internet:smittw8inel.govINEELMarshall111.1NotFoundNotFoundOKNotFoundTotalCopies:Item:'ADAMSDocumentLibrary:MLADAMS"HQNTAD01ID:003677070
Subject:
LER99-008-00regardingimproperreturnofRPSchannelbackinservicewhichresultedinoperationprohibitedbyTSon12/14/99.Withletterdated1/12/00.Body:Page1 Distri70.txtDocket:05000389,Notes:N/APage2
FloridaPower5LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957FPLJanuary12,2000L-2000-01310CFR$50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389ReportableEvent:1999-008-00DateofEvent:December14,1999ImproperReturnofRPSChannelBackinServiceResultsin0erationProhibitedbTSTheattachedLicenseeEventReport1999-008isbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR$50.73toprovidenotificationofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LucieNuclearPlantJAS/EJW/KWFAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LucieNuclearPlantanFPLGroupcompanyGQp6r~C)7C~>
NRCFORM366(6-'I998)U.S.NRREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBBNO.3150-0104EXPIRES06/30/2001Estimatedburdonperresponselocomplywiththismandatoryinformationcollectionrequest:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporatedintothelicensingprocossandfedbacktotndustry.FonvardcommentsregardingburdenestimatototheRecordsManagementBranch(TWF33),U.S.NuclearRenulatoryCommission,Washington,DC2055&4001~andtothePaperworkReductionProject(31504104),OfficeofManagementand8udget,Washington,DC20503.IfaninformationcollectiondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,lheNRCmaynolconduct,orsponsor,andapersonisnotrequiredtorespondlo,!heInformationcollection.FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389PAGE(3)Page1of4TITLE(4)ImproperReturnofRPSChannelBackinServiceResultsinOperationProhibitedbyTSMONTHDAYYEAREVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHDAYREPORTDATE(7FACIUTVNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED6)OOCKETNVMSER121419991999-008-0001122000FACILITYNAMEOOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRg:(Check50.73(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2201(b)50.73la)(2)(viii)oneormore)l11)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)'0.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)l2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifylnAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366ANAMELICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONENUMBERSaetudeAreaCodetKennethW.Frehafer(561)467-7748COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT13ICAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToEplxCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToEPIXNANANOSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14IYES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYABSTRACT(Limitto1400speces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrr'ttenlines/.{16)OnDecember14,1999,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1operationat100percentreactorpower.OnDecember14,1999,FPLdeterminedthatchannel"D"ofthereactorprotectionsystemsteamgeneratorlowleveltripwasplacedbackinservicewithoutthepostmaintenancetestingrequiredbyatemporarychangetoprocedure2-OSP-62.02,"RPSLogicMatrixTest."'hecauseforthiseventwashumanerror.Properoversightwasnotmaintainedfollowingthedecisiontoperformthelogicmatrixtestusingatemporarychangetothelogicmatrixtestprocedure.Upondiscovery,FPLperformedtherequiredpostmaintenancetesting.Operationspersonnelwereinformedoftheincidenttopreventrecurrence.NACFORM386(8-1998)
NRCFORM366A16-1999)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LERjTEXTCONTINUATION.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DQGKETNUMBER205000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-008-00PAGE(3)Page2of4TEXTIifmorespaceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AI(17)DescriptionoftheEventOnDecember14,1999,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1operationat100percentreactorpower.OnDecember14,.1999,FPLdeterminedthatchannel"D"ofthereactorprotectionsystemIEIIS:JE](RPS)steamgenerator(SG)lowleveltripswasplacedbackinservice(BIS)withouthavingperformedthepostmaintenancetesting(PMT)requiredbytemporarychange(TC)99-163toprocedure2-OSP-62.02,"RPSLogicMatrixTest."OnDecember7,1999rRPSSG2Aand2BleveltripbypasschannelDwereplacedinbypassduetotheleveltransmitterfor1ASGlevel[EIIS:JE:SG:LT],LT-9013D,failinghigh.OnDecember8,1999,aone-timeTCto2-OSP-62.02,"RPSLogicMatrixTest,"waswrittentoallowforRPStestingwiththischannelbypassed.NoteswereaddedtotheproceduretoallowproceedingwiththeremainderoftheRPSsystemandthatPMTforthechannel"D"RPSSG2Aand2BlowleveltripswouldberequiredpriortoplacingthosechannelsBIS.OnDecember9,1999,thelogicmatrixtestwascompletedsatisfactorily.OnDecember13,1999,LT-9013D,wasdeclaredbackinserviceandtheRPSchannelsassociatedwithLT-9013Dwere'takenfromthebypasspositionandplacedtonormal.OnDecember14,1999,FPLdeterminedthattherequiredPMTwasnotperformed.TherequiredportionsofthelogicmatrixtestwerecompletedupondiscoveryofthedeficiencyandaConditionReportwasinitiated.CauseoftheEventThecauseforthiseventwashumanerror.ProperoversightwasnotmaintainedfollowingthedecisiontoperformthelogicmatrixtestusingaTCtothelogicmatrixtestprocedure.On-shiftOperationsmanagementrequestedthattheTCbedraftedandthepaperworkforthechangewasapprovedbyanassisantnuclearplantsupervisor(ANPS)andanuclearplantsupervisor(NPS).OnDecember9,1999,uponcompletionoftheRPSlogicmatrixtest,barrierssuchastheEOOSLog,DataSheet29fordeferredsurveillance,NPSturnoversheet,etc.shouldhavebeenusedtoensurethattheproperPMTwasperformedpriortodeclaringtheinstrumentbackinserviceandplacingthebypassswitchbacktonormal.ShiftsupervisionactuallydiscussedtheuseofDataSheet29ofOP 0010125A,"DeferredSurveillance,"totrackthesurveillancerequirementsofchannel"D"priortoreturningittoservice.However,thiswasnotdone.Failuretouseavailableadministrativetoolsledtothisevent.AnalysisoftheEventThiseventisreportableunder10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)as"...anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.TheapplicableTechnicalSpecification3/4.3.1,"ReactorProtectiveDevices,"actionstatementwas:"WiththenumberofchannelsOPERABLEonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels,STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATIONmaycontinueprovidedtheinoperablechannelisplacedinthebypassedortrippedconditionwithin1hour."Contrarytothisrequirement,LT-9013Dwasremovedfromthebypassedconditionand"placedtonormalonDecember13.ThelogicmatrixtestforthischannelhadnotbeencompletedandthegraceperiodforthissurveillancehadexpiredonDecember9,1999.Therefore,RPSchannel"D"wasnotincompliancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecifications.NRCFORM3BBA<6-1999)
NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(205000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-008"00PAGE(3)Page3of4TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofiVRCForm366AJ(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificanceThereactorprotectivesystem(RPS)consistsofsensors,calculators,logic,andotherequipmentnecessarytomonitorselectednuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS)conditionsandtoeffectreliableandrapidreactorshutdown(reactortrip)ifanyoracombinationofthemonitoredconditionsapproachspecifiedsafetysystemsettings.TheRPSfunctionsaretoassurethatreactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)andfuelperformance,guidelinesarenotexceededduringmoderatefrequencyeventsandinfrequenteventsandalsotoprovideassistanceinlimitingconditionsforcertainlimitingfaults.AreactortripinitiatedbytheRPScausestheinputmotivepowertoberemovedfromthecontrolelementdrivemechanismcontrolsystem(CEDMCS)bythetripswitchgear,whichinturncausesallcontrolelementassembliestobeinsertedbygravity.Thelowsteamgeneratorwaterleveltripisprovidedtotripthereactorwhenthelowerofthemeasuredsteamgeneratorwaterlevelsforthetwosteamgeneratorsfallstoalowpresetvalue.Thesystemisdesignedsuchthatthesinglefailurecriterionandperformancerequirementsaremetwiththreechannelsinservice.Acoincidenceofanytwoliketripsignalsgeneratesareactortripsignal.However,fourmeasurementchannelswithelectricalandphysicalseparationareprovidedforeachparameter.Toenhanceplantavailability,afourthchannelisprovidedasaspareandallowsbypassingofonechannelwhilemaintainingtherequisitetwo-out-of-threelogic.Thebenefitofasystemthatincludesfourindependentandredundantchannelsisthatthesystemcanbeoperated,ifneedbe,withuptotwochannelsoutofservice(onebypassedandanothertripped)andstillmeetthesinglefailurecriterion.Thesystemlogicmustberestoredtoatleastathreeoperatingchannelconditionpriortoremovinganotherchannelformaintenance.ThesubsequentsurveillanceoftheRPS"D"channelsprovedthattheRPSchanne'1"D"2Aand2BSGleveltripswereoperableduringthetimeintervalbetweenDecember13andDecember14,1999.However,evenifthechannel"D"RPSSG2Aand2BSGleveltripswerepostulatedtobeinoperable,thisconditionwouldnotaffecttherequisitetwo-out-of-threeRPSinitiatinglogicforaSGleveltripbecausenootherSGlevelRPSchannelswereinbypassortripduringthistimeperiod.Therefore,thiseventhadnoimpacton'hehealthandsafetyofthepublic.CorrectiveActions1.TheRPSlogicmatrixtestwasperformedforchannel"D"onDecember14,1999,immediatelyupondiscoverytherequiredPMTwasnotperformed.2.AmemowassenttoallOperationsmanagementpersonneldescribingthisscenarioandevent.Thiswillallowforthesharingoflessonslearnedandheightenpersonnelawarenesstothistypeofattentiontodetailissue.3.Trainingwilldevelopandincorporatethiseventintothenextre-qualificationcycleasanin-houseindustryevent.NRCFORM366A(6.1988)
IVRCFORM366A(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-008-00PAGE(3)Page4of4TEXTiifmorespecsisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)AdditionalZnfoxmationFailedComonentsIdentifiedNoneSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORM366A(6-1998)
If,l, DistributionSheetDistri47.txtii/W8lPriority:NormalFrom:ElaineWalkerActionRecipients:NRR/DLPM/LPD2-2KJabbourCopies:1NotFoundNotFoundInternalRecipients:RGNFILE01RES/DRAA/OERABRES/DET/ERABNRR/DSSA/SPLBNRR/DRIP/REXBNRR/DlM/IOLBFILECENTER~ACRS11111NotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFound,NotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundExternalRecipients:NRCPDRNOACQUEENER,DSNOACPOORE,W.LSTLOBBYWARDinternet:smittw@inel.govINEELMarshallNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundNotFoundTotalCopies:16Item:ADAMSDocumentLibrary:MLADAMS"HQNTAD01ID:993400404
Subject:
LER99-006-01,"Sub-CriticalReactorTripDuetoInadvertentMSIVOpening."With991124Letter.Body:PDRADOCK05000389SPage1
Docket:05000389,Notes:N/ADistri47.txtPage2 FloridaPower8LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957FPLNovember24,1999L-99-25810CFR$50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2"DocketNo.50-389ReportableEvent:1999-006-01DateofEvent:June6,1999Sub-CriticalReactorTripDuetInadvertentMSIV0eninTheattachedrevisiontoLicenseeEventReport1999-006isbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFRg50.73toprovidenotificationofthesubjectevent.ThisrevisionexpandsontheinitialunsuccessfuloperatorattemptstoclosetheMSIVs.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LucieNuclearPlantJAS/EJW/KWFAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LucieNuclearPlant NRCFORM366(8.1998)LlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)Estimatedburdencerresponsetocomplywiththismandatoryinformation'ollectionrequesl:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedare'ncorporaledintothe'icensingprocessandfedbacktoIndustry.ForwardcommentsregardingbuidenestimalelotheRecordsManagementBranch{T4F33).U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,Washington.DC205554001,andtothePapenvorkIReductionprelect{31504IOSJ,OfficeolManagementandBudget,Washington,DC20503.IfaninformationcollecbondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor.andapersonfsnotrequiredtorespondto,theinformationcollection.U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAPPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150.0104EXPIRES06I3012001FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389PAGE(3)Page1of4TITLE(4)Sub-CriticalReactorTripDuetoInadvertentMSIVOpeningEVENTDATE{5)LERNUMBER6)REPORTDATE(7OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED81DAYYEARYEAR"~"~'"MONTHDAYYEARNUMBERNuhtBERFACIUTYNAMEOOCKETNVMBEn060619991999-006-011124FACIUTYNAMEoocKETNUMaotOPERATINGMODE(8)UIREMENTSOF10CFR5:(CheckTHISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQ50.73(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2201(b)oneormora){11)50.73(e)(2)(vnl)POWERLEVEL{10)00020.2203(a){1)20,2203(e){2)(i)20.2203{a)(2)(ii)20.2203{a)(2)liii)20.2203{a)(2)liv)20.2203{a)l3)li)20.2203{a)(3){ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)l1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)5073{a)(2)lv)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecrfyinAbstractbeloworInNACForm366AHAMEUCENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER12)TELEFIIONF.NUMBERandueoAresCode)KennethN.Fzehafer(561)467-7748COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT13CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIX.SBVNOSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTEDl14)YESllfyea,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).NoEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYABSTRACT/limitto1400spaces,ie.,epproximetely15single.spacedtypewrittenlines/ll6)OnJune6,1999,St.LucieUnit2wasstableinMode3withallcontrolelementassembliesfullyinsertedfoztroubleshootingoftheUnit2controlelementassemblymotioncontrolsystem.Themainsteamisolationvalveswereclosedinaccordancewithanequipmentclearanceorder.Duringthereleaseoftheequipmentclearanceorderfollowingcompletionofmaintenance,the2Bmainsteamisolationvalve,HCV-08-1B,unexpectedlyopenedtoapproximately90percentoffullopen.Duetotheresultingpressuredifferentialbetweenthe2Aand2Bsteamgenerators,areactortripsignalwasgeneratedandalltripcircuitbreakersopened.Subsequently,the2Bmainsteamisolationvalvewasclosed.Theeventwascausedduetopersonnelerrorwhentheclearancewasreleased.Proceduralguidanceonhowtorestorethemainsteamisolationvalveswasnotfollowed.CorrectiveactionsincludedOperationsupervisioninstructiontotheoperatingcrews,standdownmeetings,operatoraids,andtraining.ThisrevisionexpandsontheinitialunsuccessfuloperatorattemptstoclosetheMSIVs.NACFOAM366i6-1998)
AIRCFORM366A(6-1996)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER205000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-006-01PAGE(3)Page2of4TEXT(lfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)DescriptionoftheEventOnJune6,1999,St.LucieUnit2wasstableinMode3withallcontrolelementassembliesfullyinsertedfortroubleshootingoftheUnit2controlelementassembly(CEA)motioncontrolsystem[EZIS:AA).Bothsteamgenerators(SGs)wereatnormalno-loadpressuresof900psia,withheatremovalbeingaccomplishedusingtheatmosphericdumpvalves(ADVs).Themainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVs)[EZIS:SB:V)wereclosedinaccordancewithequipmentclearanceorder(ECO)2-99-06-011Sinordertomaintainthemainsteamheaderventedforpersonnelsafetyduringani'nspectioninsidethemaingenerator.Followingcompletionofthegeneratorinspection,theECOwassignedoffandwasbeingreleased.DuringthereleaseoftheECO,the2BMSIV,HCV-08-1B,unexpectedlyopenedtoapproximately90%offullopen.The2BSGpressurerapidlydroppedtoapproximately740psiaduetotheimmediatepressurizationofthemainsteamheader.The2BSGpressureslowlyrecoveredtowardsnormalno-loadpressureaspressurebetweenthe2BSGandthemainsteamheaderequalized.Duetotheresultingpressuredifferentialbetweenthe2Aand2BSGs,areactortripsignalwasgeneratedonasymmetricsteamgeneratortransientatapproximately1859hours.Thereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)triplogicwasmadeupandalltripcircuitbreakers(TCBs)[EIZS:JC:BKR]opened,althoughnorodmotionoccurredasallCEAswerealreadyfullyinsertedpriortothetrip.DuetothecooldownresultingfromtheMSZVopening,pressurizerlevelbeganto'ecreaseandthecontrolroomcrewisolatedtheletdownsystemtoconservereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)inventory.Attemptstoclosethe2BMSIVfromthecontrolroomwereunsuccessful,andthecrewenteredemergencyoperatingprocedure,EOP-5,"ExcessSteamDemand,"at1910hourstoverifyplantsafetyfunctions.Asthemainsteamheaderwasintactatthetimeoftheevent,thesteamdemandeffectivelyceasedoncepressuresbetweenthe2BSGandmainsteamheaderequalized.Initialattemptstolocallyclosethe2BMSZVlocallyusingAppendixI,"MSIVLocalClosure",ofEOP-99,"Appendixes/Figures/Tables",wereunsuccessful,butthe2BMSZVwasfinallyclosedat1953hours.CauseoftheEventThecauseoftheeventwaspersonnelerrorinthefailuretoutilizeoperatingprocedure(OP)2-0810020,"MainSteamSystemInitialValveAlignment,"duringthereleaseofECO2-99-06-011S.Contributingfactorsincludeaninadequatepre-jobbriefbythelicensedoperator,theassistantnuclearplantsupervisor(ANPS),andinadequateoperatorknowledgeoftheMSZVairsystem.TheUnit2MSZVshaveacomplexhydraulicandpneumaticcontrolsystemandaredesignedtofailopenonalossofDCcontrolpower.Becauseofthis,aspecificsequencemustbefollowedtorestoreairandpowerinordertopreventinadvertentopeningofthevalve.Thebasicsequence,asdiscussedinOP2-0810020,istorestoreDCcontrolpowertothevalvefirst,andthenholdthecontrolswitchintheCLOSEpositionwhileatotalofeightaizisolationvalvesazeopened,DuringthereleaseoftheECO,airwasbeingrestoredtothevalvepriortothecontrolpowerfusesbeingre-installed,andthecontrolswitchwasnotbeingheldintheCLOSEposition.InordertoclosetheMSZVs,thecrewdeterminedthattheyneededtoimplementprocedureOP2-0810020,"MainSteamSysInitialValveAlignment,"Step8.10,Returningthe2BMSIV(HCV-08-1B)toservice,whichstatesinpart:1.Stationanuclearplantoperator(NPO)attheMSIVwitharadio.Ensureallairvalvesarefullyclosed.NRcFORM366AI61996) 0 VRCFORM366A6-1998)jLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER205000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAlREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-006-01PAGE(3)Page3of4TEXT(Ifmorespeceisreqoired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366A)(17)CauseoftheEvent(cont'd)2.InsertmaincontrolcircuitfusesforHCV-08-1BatRTGB206DCSBF-27andF-28.P.3.TakeHCV-08-1BhandswitchattheRTGBtoCLOSEpositionandholditthere.However,anoversightonthepartoftheANPSwhowasworkingthroughtheprocedurecausedstepnumbertwotobemissed.contributingtothisoversightwasthefactthattheMSIVindicatinglightswerelit(theselightsazenotdependentoncontrolpower)whichledthecrewtoerroneouslybelievecontrolpowerwasavailable.Therefore,the2BMSIVcontinuedtoopenduringthisattempttoclosetheMSIVs.Thereforetheinitialattemptstoremotelyclosethevalvefromthecontrolzoomwere.unsuccessful.Additionally,the2BMSIVairsystemhadnotbeenfullyrestoredandwasnotinaproperconfigurationtosupportlocaloperationofthevalve.Therefore,initialattemptstolocallyclosethe2BMSIV,bydisconnectingpressureswitchfitti.ngsinaccordancewithAppendixIofEOP-99toallowtheairtovent,werealsounsuccessful'ater,theproperconfigurationoftheairsystemwas'chievedandAppendixIwassuccessfulinclosingthevalve.AnalysisoftheEventThiseventisreportableunder10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)as"anyeventorconditionthatresultedinamanualorautomaticactuationofanyEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF),includingtheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)."AlthoughtheRPSsafetyfunctionhadbeenalreadybeencompletedbeforetheevent,theeventisstillreportableasavalidtripsignalwasgeneratedinresponsetoactualplantparameters.Analysisof.SafetySignificanceThecooldowntransientresultingfromtheopeningofthe2BMSIVresultedinthefollowingchangesinRCSparameters:~Pressurizerpressuredecreasedfrom2250psiato2150psi.a.~Pressurizerleveldecreasedfrom33percentto25percent.I~RCStemperaturedecreasedfrom532degreestoapproximately517degrees.Oncethe"2BS/Gandmainsteamheaderpressuresequalized,thetrendingbacktowardtheirinitial'valuesduetotheinfluencereactorcoolantpumpheat.Atthetimeoftheevent,allCEAsandboronconcentrationwasconservativelyelevatedtosupportplannedfuturereactorstartup.Adequateshutdownmarginwastimes.RCSparametersbeganofcoredecayheatandwerefullyinsertedCEAtestingandamaintainedatallBasedontheabove,thiseventhadnoadverseimpactonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Althoughthereactortripsignalwasincidentaltotheevent,areviewofthesequenceofeventsrecorder(SOER)printoutindicatesthatRPSrespondedproperlytotheevent.ThecorrecttripsignalwasgenezatedonallfourRPSchannelsandalleightTCBsopenedwithin0.040secondsofcompletingthetriplogic.CorrectiveActions1.OperationssupervisionimmediatelyprovidedshorttermreinforcementbymemorandumtoallOperationspersonnelthatECOsneedtobereferencedagainstplantNRCFORM366A(61998) 6ICFORM366A61998IJLlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)KXTCONTINUATIONUA.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)St.LucieVnit2Imorespeceksreqkkkred,kkseedCkeorkelcopkesoIVRCorm36&VNUMBERI2I05000389LERNUMBERI6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-006-01PAGEI3)Page4of4procedures.Thisinstructiondictatedthatifaplantprocedureprovidedinstructionsforremovingequipmentfromserviceorreturningequipmenttoservice,thentheevolutionistobeconductedinaccordancewiththeprocedureandtheECOmodifiedasnecessarytoensurecompliancewiththeprocedure.2.Theoperatorsinvolvedweretemporarilyremovedfromlicensedactivitiesinordertodevelopthezootcauseandcorrectiveactionsforthisevent.Theyparticipatedinthestanddownmeetingsofcorrectiveaction3below.Theoperatorswerereturnedtolicenseddutiesafterde-briefingtheplantgeneralmanagerontheirfindings.3.Operationsmanagementissuedanightorderandconductedseveralstanddownmeetingsconcerningtheuseofprocedurestorestoresystemstotheirinserviceconditionaswellastheuseofchecksheet9ofprocedureAP0010120,"ConductofOperations,"anaidthatprovideitemstoconsiderwhenplanningevolutions,duringtheperformanceofpre-evolutionbriefs.4.OperationshasinstalledplacardsateachMSIVcautioningagainstmanipulatingcomponentspriortoenabling/disablingMSIVwithoutconsultingOP2-0810020,"Main.SteamSystemInitialValveAlignment."5.Trainingwillcoverthis'vent/MSIVdesigninlicensedoperatorzequalificationtraining(industryevents).AdditionalInformationFailedComonentsIdentifiedNoneSimilarEventsNoneNRCORM3BBAIB-1898)
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Subject:
St.LucieUnit2DocketNo50-389LERNumber98-009NotUsedBody:PDRADOCK05000389SDocket:05000389,Notes:N/APage1 Distri99.txtPage-2 0F(oridaPower8cLightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957November15,1999L-99-21310CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555Re:St.LucieUnit2.DocketNo.50-389LERNumber98-009NotUsedPleasebeadvisedthatLERnumber98-009willnotbeusedforSt.LucieUnit2,docketnumber50-389.Pleasecontactusshouldtherebeanyquestionsregardingthisinformation.Verytnilyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LuciePlantJAS/KWFcc:RegionalAdministrator,RegionII,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlantanFPLGroupcompany'DGAQcc~
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Subject:
St.LucieUnit2DocketNo50-389LERNumber98-009NotUsedBody:PDRADOCK05000389SDocket:05000389,Notes:N/APage1 Cr Distri99.txtPage2 FioridaPower&LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957November15,1999L-99-21310CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389LERNumber98-009NotUsedPleasebeadvisedthatLERnumber98-009gillnotbeusedforSt.LucieUnit2,docketnumber50-389.Pleasecontactusshouldtherebeanyquestionsregardingthisinformation.Verytnilyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LuciePlantJAS/KWFcc:RegionalAdministrator,RegionII,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlantg>>~guns'(IanFPLGroupcompany l'