ML13164A237
| ML13164A237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/2012 |
| From: | Monninger J D Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| To: | Andrea Russell, Bhalchandra Vaidya Plant Licensing Branch 1, Division of Policy and Rulemaking |
| References | |
| 2.206, FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189 | |
| Download: ML13164A237 (19) | |
Text
Monninger, JohnFrom: Monninger, John ,'Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2012 12:37 PMTo: Russell, Andrea; Vaidya, Bhalchandra
Subject:
RE: G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendationbased on 3rd meeting and comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)Attachments: With comments from Monninger and OGC addressed-ME8189 (G20120172) Final PRB Notes08-23-2012.docxAndrea, Bhalchandra:I concur. The attached file contains a few minor editorial changes for your consideration. Also, I provided acomment reanrdinn our resnanse-to-Questinn 3,.nane 5) on whether the netitinn meets the renuirements forreview,. (b)(5)(b)(5)Thanks for your efforts,John M.From: Russell, AndreaSent: Tuesday, September 04, 2012 7:11 AMTo: Lee, Samson; Blckett, Brice; Doerfleln, Lawrence; JennerIch, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Fretz, Robert; Jefferson,Steven; Eul, Ryan; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timothy; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy; Lemoncelli,Mauri; Miranda, SamuelCc: Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan; Pelton, David
Subject:
RE: G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation based on 3rdmeeting and comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)Good morning,I have not received comments or concurrences from the majority of the PRB members. In order to moveforward with the initial recommendation, we need consensus from the PRB. Please reply to Bhalchandraand myself stating that either you concur on the attached or that you have comments by COBThursday September 6t".Thanks,Andrea2.206 CoordinatorFrom: Russell, AndreaSent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 8:29 AMTo: Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence; Jennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony;MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robert; Jefferson, Steven; Eul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David;Collins, Timothy; Scott, Catherine; Albert, Michelle; Cook, William; McCarver, SammyCc: Valdya, Bhalchandra; Thadanl, MohanSubject- G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation based on 3rd meetingand comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)Good morning,On behalf of Bhalchandra, I am providing you with the revised Final PRB internal meeting notes on the initialrecommendation, for your review, These meeting notes have been updated since the last meeting on July 19,2012, to incorporate changes from OGC and John Monninger. The changes are shown in tracked format.131 Please provide your comments/concurrence on the notes to myself and Bhalchandra by COB Thursday August30th.Thank you for your time,Andrea2.206 CoordinatorAndrea RussellProject ManagerNuclear Regulatory CommissionNRRIDPR/PGCBPh: 301-415-85532 10 CFR 2.206PRB Closed Meetina Notes -0711912012
SUBJECT:
PETITIONER:2ATEGUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONAGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)Paul Gunter, et alMarch 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012,and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB In the Public Meeting onApril 17, 2012.PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORSSamson LeeBhalchandra VaidyaSam MirandaRobert DennigRobert FretzJohn MonningerAndrea RussellDavid PeltonBrice BickettMathew JennerichLawrence DoerfleinRyan EulMauri Lemoncelli(PRB Chair- Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)(Petition Manager -NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)(Branch Chief(A) -NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor SystemsBranch)(Branch Chief -NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment andVentilation Branch)(Senior Project Manager -NRR, Japan Lessons Learned ProjectDirectorate, Projects Management Branch)(Associate Director -NRR, Japan Lessons Leamed Project Directorate)(Agency 2.206 Coordinator -NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)(Branch Chief -NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, GenericCommunications Branch)(Senior Project Manager -Region 1, Branch 2. Division of ReactorProjects)(Project Engineer -Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)(Branch Chief- Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)(Enforcement Specialist -Office of Enforcement)(Senior Attorney -Assistant General Counsel -Materials Litigation andEnforcement -Office of General Counsel)................. ........ ............................................................... ........................... .FormatUed: Fonttcoior: AutoSUMMARY OF REQUEST:On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,arubmitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be Immediately suspended asthe result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's relianceon non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability ofFitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that therisks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, In regard to NRCGeneric Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plantnow constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that thesuspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge toI the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima 08iichiDai-ichi nuclearaccident. The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now Install theDirect Torus Vent System (DTVS) as It is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures tomitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima DairhiDai-ichi.The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operatinglicense immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to publichearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and theadequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardenedvent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operatoruniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwiseknown as 'the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as Installedon every other GE Mark I in the US;2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for Independent review its post-Fukushlma re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existingcontainment vent system as previously Identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRCGeneric Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent Systemand as outlined In the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. Thepublicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of allassumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment ventingand specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened ventsystem and;b) 'unlikely Ignition points" as claimed In the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system thatwould otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with thedetonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the TemporaryInstruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the 'Follow-up to the FukushimaDaii 'Dai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to whatis described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basisvulnerability" involving the FitzPatrick operators refusal to install the D'VS as recommended byNRC in Generic Letter 89-16.To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:* The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirementand existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events suchas the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident Is unlikely to occur In the US. Therefore, continuedoperation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to publichealth and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents havebeen In place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a widevariance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."* The NRC Inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and"current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containmentventing" which is further Identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The jointpetitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existingplant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that"FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primarycontainment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containmentimprovement program."2
- The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliablehardened vent does not address In a timely way the unique condition" of FitzPatrick.P FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark Icontainment As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyonddesign and licensing bases vulnerability, In that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis didnot require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened ventsystem as part of their Mark I containment Improvement program." Given that theFitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the'licensing basis vulnerability" of Its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants thesuspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure forits adequacy and capability In the event of a severe accident The additional identified"vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places thepublic health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-dayoperations where 'current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations duringprimary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of theGE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima gailfeW1L-ichil nuclearpower station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the jointpetitions seek the prompt and Immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:0 The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified asinherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.* The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severeaccident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.e The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies uponnon-conservative and faulty assumptions.e The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for asevere nuclear accident to be released at ground level.9 The Fukushima Dai;GhiDai-ichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentiallychanges the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.9 The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containmentvent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrickMark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.e The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of"no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptableconsequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place bothgreater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonablyjustified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)NO.In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safetyconcern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the requestfor emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the FukushimaDalahiDai-ichi nuclear event, concludesd in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continuednuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public3 health and safety and are not Inimical to the common defense and security because of thelow likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and thecurrent mitigation capabilities at those facilities.-,.t__e. Comrmission has-endorsed the .Formattd'. Font: Not soad, Not HIghlightNTTF Report, Including Its conclusions as evident by the Cormttic ta Font: Not Bold, Not HighightRequirements Memorandum for D0eiesiGntem.-SECY-1 1-0093, dated Auu 2011,and ,;4 .... :.............................................. .... ................ 1 =.,: Not sl, No ,Hghligh2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark IIcontainments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order wasbased on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum(SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated thatCurrent regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to concludethat a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dal-ichi accident is unlikely to occur inthe U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose animminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operationof hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and thisunderstanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required,hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for manyyears but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally,hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although asdiscussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliablehardened venting systems In BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments areneeded to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.LThe NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented In its Safety Evaluation (SE) datedSeptember 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered thisinformation in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and MarkII containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In add.tie.,theThe NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system anddocumented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued April 18. 1995, TheNRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of Inspections performed under TI 183at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) followingthe events at Fukushima. The ogiensal staff has c.mmunlatod with N..F r-r. .'g ..theVent sysetom con~figWration at FzitzPatrick, including the difo-na fro fL 80 16recommendations (La..r D, a rF)ln issuing the March 12, 2012, order, the NRCstaff explicitly recognized the wide variance in the reliability of hardened vent designsamong Mark I plants. The design at Fitzoatrick is one example of that variance. Thepetition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relatingto the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?Fom atted: Lst Paragraph, Numbered +,Level: + Numbenrh Style: 1, 2, 3, ... + Startat: I + Allgnment: Left + Aligned at: 0.06" +9Indent at. 0.31"Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an ordermodifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or withouta proposed civil penalty.YES.2. .The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. Thepetitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The4 supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.YES.3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party andthrough which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.Formatted: Font color. AVj._ .. -Formatfted Fot: Not Bold, Font color: Auto,0 Not HIlghllghtCriter or Ree ln Petit ns Under 10 CFR .0 .. ............. .....................................: .1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to ..',provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations .mted Font colo Autoof NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns. Fw=w--..on. olor---Formatted: Font color: AutoYES, In part ............ Formated: Font color. Am2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review andevaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution Isapplicable to the facility in question.YES, In part.On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark IIcontainments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order wasbased on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum(SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.Accept on the basis of the staffs ongoing review of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 andRecommendation 6. Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliablehardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containmentsa for the prevention of coredamage. This order Included performance objectives for the design of hardened ventsto ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during aprolonged SBO. Rocammondltion 6 r...mm.nds, as part of the longor tSrm, ra'oW,-that thW NRC identify insghts abutAs discussed in SECY-12-0025. the staff determinedthat consideration of severe accident conditions in the design and operation of thehardened vent involved policy matters that are still under consideration by the staff. Assuch, venting under severe accident conditions is currently being evaluated by the staffon a -generic basis. The staff is also evaluatinQ NTTF Recommendation 6 conceminghydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additionalInformation is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.- Assuch, the design of hardened vent systems to handle hydrogen gas is currently beingevaluated by the staff on a generic basis.FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was-alse reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1992, Including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures-;ad iThe NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick'spositions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met thedesign bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. In addition, the NRC inspected thedesign of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in5 an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued April 18, 1995.With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTTF rd the subsequontCommass..ipn Order hav NRC has concluded that a sequence of events such as theFukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continuedoperation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to publichealth and safety.,. Fr" atted: Font color: Auto.....jhr~~!ýistdeny alicense appicto or amendmentAt.------- ... ...ca.Uonq ~r_. e.ndment ...................... .............. F a"t l t4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules, NO. ................ ............ [Formttei: Font coir: AutoIS THERE A NEED FOR QE. 01, OIG, or OGC INVOLVEMENT:The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However,the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):Accept, in part, and hold in abeyance the foliew;g-parts of the petition addressing containmentventing under severe accident conditions and the design of vent systems being able toaccommodate hydrogen gas (issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table) (see Table for a detailedexplanation).Three of the issues in the petition, identified and discussed as Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in theTable, will be accepted for review by the NRC staff. However, as indicated in the Table, theNRC staff notes that these concerns are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learnedfrom the Fukushima event. Even though the Commission has issued the Order concerningHaFdenod Ventreliable hardened vent for accident prevention, the NRCMJL- staff is conductingfurther review of additional aspects of the ..ardonod Vent S'....hardened vent system, suchas WadtftieAventing under severe accidept conditions, In addition, the staff is evaluatinghydrogen control and mitigation measures. Since Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table willtake longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition, the NRC plans onaccepting those issues, and holding them in abeyance.All the other Issues in the petition, identified and discussed in the Table are denied for thereasons discussed in the TableThe next steps would be to:" Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.* Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.* Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make thearrangements for an acceptable date and time.6 Table (This table summarizes each Issue for the following criteria).IsueNo.1Specific Issue RaisedDoes thismeetcritria forreviewunder 2.206process?RecommendationFitzPatic operating license be immediatelysuspended as the result of the undue risk to thepublic health and safety presented by the operatorsreliance on non-conservative and wronaassumptions that went into the analysis of thecapability of FitzPatdic's pre-existing ductworkcontainment vent system. The risks and uncertaintypresented by FitzPatdck's assumptions anddecisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89.16, asassociated with the day-today operations of thisnuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk topublic health and safety.No.I J Jl
- A(In I~ IT-1 1..1 Mn JLU in- inn .Lmm.~~ uror n.,-,,Jdud that the NRCq.cn.d..ued..ta.ta sequenoe.of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely tooccur in the United States and 6emeappron)date.mitigation measures have been Implemented,reducing the likelihood of core damage andradiological releases. Therefore, continuedoperation and continued licensing activities do notpose an imminent risk to public health and safetyand there is no immediate safety concern toFitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the pubric,and therefore, the request for immediate actionshould be rejected. The Petitioners have notprovided andequaebasis f eir argue..........regarding the operator's reliance on non.conservative and wrong assumptions that went intothe analysis of the capability of FiRzPatMcl(s pre-existing ductwork containment vent system,.The petitioner's oncenms regarding this issue do notrequire immediate shutdown of FitzPatick based onthe conclusions reached by NTTRhe NRC and the.fRmrWtte Forl Won A*tCommission OrdAr reaardina RMigble HardenedVent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.U. S. plants have implemented 'beyond-design-basis' requirements such as ATNS, SBO,combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment,mitioation of maior fires or explosions, and extensive7 IssueNo,Specific Issue RaisedDoes thismeetcriteria forreviewunder 2.206process?Recommendationdamage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing thelikelihood of core damage and radiological releases.A sequence of events like those occurring in theFukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GEMark I BWRs.The NRC based on the NITF report onJuly 12, 2011, bacd on ....i.w of insights from theFuku,'hima Dai ichi accdent, made arecommendation to the Commission to include areliable hardened vent system,,2 The suspension of the operating license be in effect No. This is merely a statement to support the petition inpending final resolution of a public challenge to the general, This is not an enforcement related actionadequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process andFukushima Dai Dai-ichi nuclear accident, therefore, this request should be rejected, pursuantto Criterion 1 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR2206.3 The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This is merely a statement to support the petition inFitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus general. This is not an enforcement related actionVent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, and is outside the scope of the 2,206 process andas it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple therefore, this request should be reiected, pursuantfailures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at to Criterion 1 for reieding a petition under 10 CFRFukushima Da"ihiDai-ichi. 2.206,FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full No. Thepeptioner raises issues that.have al#rdy.been.hearing rights on the continued operation of the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation eitherMark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genericpre-existing containment vent which is not a fully basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, thehardened vent line as recommended by NRC issues have been resolved, and the resolution isGeneric Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated-operator uniquely did not make ontainment September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met theFormatted: Font oor: Auto...... Formatted: Font cor: Auto8 Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this RecommendationNo. meetcriteria forreviewunder 2 206process?modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.known as 'the hardened vent,' as requested by NRC Tee ln addition, the NRC inspected the desinGeneric Letter 89$16 and as installed on every other of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system andGE Mark in the US; documented the results in an inspection report (50-333195-06) issued April 18, 1995Therefore.this .......issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for_ __,__reiet a petition under 10 CFR 2.206,5FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independentreview its post*Fukushima re.analyses for thereliability and capability of the FitzPatck pre-eisting containment vent system as previouslyidentified as 'an acceptable deviation' from NRCGeneric Letter 89.16 which recommended theinstallation of the Direct Torus Vent System and asoutlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Repor datedSeptember 28,1992. The publicly documentedpost-Fukushima analysis shall include thereassessment of all assumptions regarding thecapability and reliability of the pre-existingcontainment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:a) the FitzPatck cost-benefit analysis used tojustify not installing a fully hardened ventsystem and;There is no requirement for the licensee to conducta re-analvss of their existino containment ventsystem. The licensee's response to theOrTeliable hardened vent order will be publiclyavailable, Sub,.quont .NR do FrB@@ding additional *Ase i.e., hydrnnrolwould teo. be publicly avilblle.FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 wasreviewed and approved by the NRC in September1992, including the staff review of the licensee'sprocesses and procedures, and inspections. TheNRC staff evaluation stated, while approvinqFat~d FcobCAkNo.9 Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this RecommendationmeetcUteda forreviewunder 2.206.. proces?FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-8916, thatFitzPat6cl's containment vent system met thedesign bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.With respect to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, theNTTF evaluation and the subsequent CommissionOrder have concluded that a sequence of eventssuch as the Fukushima Daichi accident is unlikelyto occur in the US and some appropriatemitigation measures have been implemented,reducing the likelihood of core damage andradiological releases, Therefore, continuedoperation and continued licensing activities do notpose an imminent threat to public health and safety.Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1and Recommendation k, hydrogen control andmitigation. The staff is evaluatinQ hydrooen controlb) 'unlikely ignition points' as daimed in theFitzPatrick preexisting vent line system thatwould otherwise present increased risks andconsequences associated with the detonationof hydrogen gas generated during a severeaccident.Yes.and mitioaaion an a aenedic basis.The results of thatand.... a o on.'- ...... genei c ..... ......... re ut ........evaluation will aDolv to the FitzDatrick olant..Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include areliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark IIcontainment p o r Thisorder included performance objectives for the designof hardened vents to ensure reliable operation andease of use (both opening and closing) during aprolonged SBO. The gaff is continuing to evaluatevuntinn inrdar ovra 2r"Jint mndifinner - -.1 110 IssueNO.Speck Isue R-aisedDoes thismeetcrftera forreviewunder2.206process?RecommendaUonRecommendation 6 recommends, as part of thelonger term review, that the NRC identify insightsabout hydrogen control and mitigation insidecontainment or in other buildings as additionalinformation is revealed through further study of theFukushima Dachi accident. ,6 The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the No. The petitioner raises issues that have already beenNRC inspection results in the'Follow-up to the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation eitherFukushima aiiDai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genericDamage Event.' The joint petioners draw attention basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, theto what is described at page 8 of the inspection issues have been resolved, and the resolution isreport as an 'apparent beyond design and licensing applicable to the facility in question. The Order onbasis vulnerability involving the FitzPatrick hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has aoperator's refusal to install the DTVS as timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing therecommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16. reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, thisissue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 forreiecting a Petition under 10 CFR 2.206.7 The NRC inspection report [per Ti-2515/183] Yes, Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1identifies that FitzPatrick's'existing plant and Recommendation 6.capabilities' and 'current procedures do not addresshydrogen considerations during primary containment Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include aventing' which is further identified as a 'current reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mad 11licensing basis vulnerability.' The joint petitioners containments- for prevention of core damage Thisfurther reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that order included performance objectives for the designFitzPatrick's 'existing plant capabilities' as assumed of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation andby the Order are in fact negated by the finding that ease of use (both opening and dosing) during a'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require prolonged SBO. The staff is still evaluating on athe plant to have a primary containment torus air generic basis venting under severe accidentspace hardened vent system as part of their Mark I conditions.rommod.Fort c*: AM11 IssueNo.Specific Issue Raisedcontainment improvement program.'Does thismeetcritea fo,reviewunder 2206Drocess?RecommendationRecommendation 6 recommends, as pan of thelonger term review, that the NRC identify insightsabout hydrogen control and mitigation insidecontainment or in other buildings as additionalinformation is revealed through further study of theFukushima Dai.Ichi accident.- The staff is alsoevaluating hydrogen control and mitigation on anoanp=re inj mw.tc* A&Z8The Commission Order timeline setting December31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order doesnot address, in a timely way, the unique condition ofthe FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.No.The petitioner raises issues that have already beenthe subject of NRC staff review and evaluation eitheron that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genericbasis, for which a resolution has been achieved, theissues have been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the facility in question. The SE datedSeptember 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick mel theBWROG criteria recommended by GL 89.16. Inissuing the March 12, 2012, order, the NRC staffexplicitly recoonized the wide variance inithereliability of hardened vent designs among Mark Iplants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example ofthat variance. Therefore, this issue should bereiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting anetition under 10 CFR 2.206.-I.9The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely doesnot have a fully hardened vent system on thevulnerable Mark I containment. As a result,FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with 'abeyond desion and licensina bases vulnerabilitv, inNo.The petitioner raises issues that have already beenthe subject of NRC staff review and evaluation eitheron that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genericbasis, for which a resolution has been achieved, theissues have been resolved, and the resolution is--I I I -12 IssueNo.Specific Issue Raisedthat FitzPatridck's current licensing basis did notrequire the plant to have a primary containmenttorus air space hardened vent system as part of theirMark I containment improvement program,'Does thsmeetcriteria forreviewunder2,206process?Recommendatonapplicable to the facility in question. The SE datedSeptember 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met theBWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Inissuing the March 12,2012, order, the NRC staffexplicitly reconized the wide variance in thereliability of hardened vent designs among Mark Iplants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example ofthat variance. Therefore, this issue should berejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting anetition under 10 CFR 2.206.Font ~ALIto10Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused toinstall the D"VS, the documented discovery of the'licensing basis vulnerability' of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspensionof operations pending closer scrutiny, publichearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy andcapability in the event of a severe accident,No.GL 89.16 urged-he licensees to voluntanly installhardened vent capabilities at their Mark Icontainments. If licensees chose not to install thehardened vent capability, the NRC staff requestedthe licensee to provide their plant-specific estimatesof cost-s of installation of hardened vent capabilities.The licensees were informed that the NRC staffwould use the cost data to perform plant-specificbackdit analyses, and to determine, if hardened ventinstallations could be imposed as backfits inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.109.In response to GL 89-16, FitzPatridck indicated that ithad decided not 1o commit to install hardened ventcapabilities. The NRC staff performed a backfitanalysis and concluded that there will be substantialadditional increase in protection to public health andsafety i hardened vent capability is implemented atFitzPatrick and therefore, the backfit is justified. Byletter dated June 15,1990, the NRC staff urced13 Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this RecommendationNo. meetcriteria forreviewunder2,206process?FitzPatrck to reconsider its decision and Implementthe hardened vent installation by January 1993,Otherwise, the NRC staff intended to impose thebackfit under 10 CFR 50.109.By letters dated January 24,21991, the NRC staffapproved the licensee's request dated July 25,1990, to integrate the results of its IPE program intoits decision regarding making any modifications toexisting vent system to implement GL 89-16hardened vent design crteria. Fi:af" ....idedBy letters dated December 6,1991, and August 14,1992, FitzPatrick provided its final position regardingimplementation of the hardened vent design critena,use of IPE to re-examine the venting proceduresand training of operators, insights gained fromperforming the IPE program, and the status ofinvestigations into accident management strategiesassociated with severe accidents.By letter dated September 28,1992, based on thereview of the information provided by FitzPatrick,and the results of the NRC inspection of theFitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent path, the NRCstaff determined that the current vent path meets thehardened vent design citeria or their intent.Furthermore, the NRC staff found that the plantprocedures and training are adequate to provideinformation and guidance necessary for operators toeffectively use FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent14 IssueNo.Specific Issue RaisedDoes thismeetcriteria forreviewunderZ2206Drocess?Recommendation - 4. L. 4capability. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded thatthe existing wetwell vent capability at FitzPatrick isadequate. In addition, the NRC inspected thedesign of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell ventsystem and documented the results in an inspectinreport (50-333195-06) issued April 18,1995.Temporary Instruction 2515/183. 'beyond designand licensing basis vulnerabilhy for beyond designbasis accidents]" was not a consideration during GL89-16 inspections,The petitioner raises issues that have already beenthe subject of NRC staff review and evaluation eitheron that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genericbasis, for which a resolution has been achieved, theissues have been resolved, and the resolution is ...applicable to the facility in question. The SE datedSeptember 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met theBWROG criteria recommended by GL 89W6 ...........Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant toCriterion 2 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR2.206..Formatted: Font Wor: Auto... Fo at: Font Wor' Auto11 The additional identified 'vulnerability' and the Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy and Recommendation 6.places the public health and safety unduly andunacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include aoperations where 'current procedures do not reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II15 IssueNo.Speciffc Issue Raisedaddress hydrogen considerations durng primarycontainment venting' and will not for neary five (5)more years.Does ibismeetcriteria forreviewunder 2206Drocess?IRecommendalloncontainments- for prevention of core damage. Thisorder included performance objectives for the designof hardened vents to ensure reliable operation andease of use (bothopeni .and .dosi.ng) du.ng aprolonged SBO. The Commission has alreadyconsidered and deliberated the issue of continuedoperation in establishing the requirements and duedates in the order rather than calling for immediateaction.- The staff is still evaluating on a genericbasis venting under severe accident conditions.Recommendation 6 recommends, as pad of thelonger term review, that the NRC identify insightsabout hydrogen control and mitigation insidecontainment or in other buildings as additionalinformation is revealed through futher study of theFukushima Dai-ichi accident.. The staff is also .........evaluating hydrogen control and mitigation on aaeneric basis.iFwo*; o*A*oL. L16 SUMMARY:... .. .... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ............ ..... ............ --------I orm at d: r- t co r Auto(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information orfacts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's ContainmentVent System.(2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1992, Including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures,and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick'spositions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met thedesign bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. In addition, the NRC inspected thedesign of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results inan inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued April 18, 1995.S............................. .. ............FormattEd: Fontco r: Auto(3) Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR MarkI and Mark II containments- for prevention of core damage. This order includedperformance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operationand ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. The staff is stillevaluating on a generic basis venting under severe accident conditions.Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRCidentify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in otherbuildings as additional information Is revealed through further study of the FukushimaDal-ichi accident. The staff Is also evaluating hydrogen control and mitigation on ageneric basis.(4) After the Issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regularand necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. TheCommission has not found it necessary to issue any generic based onthe Indus."' op..ating c Or the plant specific communications, based on thelicensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operatingrequirements of the Containment -Von. Syt.....containment vent system. The plantcontinues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensingbases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and naturalphenomena. Fukushlma events have been characterized as 'Beyond Design BasisAccidents.' The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design BasisAccidents' for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.