IR 05000354/2025004
| ML26035A159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek, Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/2026 |
| From: | Nicole Warnek Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Mcfeaters C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| EAF-NMSS-2025-0222 IR 2025004, IR 2024001 | |
| Download: ML26035A159 (0) | |
Text
February 4, 2026
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2025004 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200048/2024001 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Charles McFeaters:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station. On January 15, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The NRC identified a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.48, paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (d)(1), and provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 that resulted from a certificate of compliance (CoC) holders failure to comply with 10 CFR 72.48 for a CoC holder-generated change for the Holtec continuous basket shim multi-purpose canister variant design.
However, an Interim Enforcement Policy issued in August 2025 is applicable to this violation.
Specifically, Enforcement Policy Section 9.4, Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of Certificate of Compliance (CoC) Holder-Generated Modifications under 10 CFR 72.48, provides enforcement discretion to not issue an enforcement action for this violation. The licensee will be expected to comply with 10 CFR 72.212 provisions after the NRC dispositions the noncompliance for a CoC holder-generated change that affects the general licensee.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 205550001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hope Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hope Creek Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Nicole S. Warnek, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000354 and 07200048 License No. NPF-57
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000354 and 07200048
License Number:
Report Number:
05000354/2025004 and 07200048/2024001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-004-0037 and I-2024-001-0108
Licensee:
Facility:
Hope Creek Generating Station
Location:
Hancocks Bridge, NJ
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
P. Finney, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Bresson, Resident Inspector
A. Christiano, Project Engineer
B. Dyke, Senior Operations Engineer
N. Floyd, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Kostick, Health Physicist
J. Morgan, Senior Operations Engineer
R. Rolph, Senior Health Physicist
A. Turilin, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Nicole S. Warnek, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Unattended High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating Systems Green
Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," when PSEG did not properly implement proper barrier controls in
accordance with station procedures during maintenance activities that could have affected the
performance of safety-related equipment.
Additional Tracking Items
Type
Issue Number
Title
Report Section
Status
EAF-NMSS-2025-0222
Noncompliance Related to a
General Licensees Use of
Non-Qualified Spent Fuel
Casks (IEP 9.4)
60855
Closed
Lube Oil Heat Exchanger
Maintenance Practices
Closed
Lube Oil Heat Exchanger
Complex Troubleshooting
Closed
Unresolved Item Regarding
the NRC's Grant of a Notice
(NOED) for an EDG under TS 3.8.1.1
Closed
PLANT STATUS
Hope Creek began the inspection period in Mode 5 during a refueling outage. PSEG
commenced a reactor startup on October 31, 2025. Hope Creek reached rated thermal power
on November 5, 2025. On November 6, 2025, the unit was reduced to 70 percent for a control
rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power the following day. The unit was
reduced to 70 percent on November 11, 2025, for another control rod pattern adjustment and
returned to 100 percent power on November 13, 2025. Hope Creek remained at or near rated
thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,
Appendix DProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 2515,</br></br>Appendix D" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1)
Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) during high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)
unavailability for steam admission valve troubleshooting, November 25, 2025
(2)
'C' service water loop post-maintenance walkdown during 'B' service water loop
unavailability, December 11, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
125 volts direct current '1E' system, November 25, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
RCIC room, fire plan 3412, November 4, 2025
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)
'B' reactor auxiliaries cooling system heat exchanger, October 7, 2025
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The following non-destructive testing was evaluated by the inspector through remote
document review from November 19 - December 30, 2025:
(1)
1. Ultrasonic Examination of RPV1-W9 Lower Head to dome weld (HCGS-UT-
25-006)
2. Ultrasonic Examination of RPV1-W16-1 through -W16-8 Meridional Seam
welds (HCGS-UT-25-024, -023, -021, -020, -019, -015, -014, -012)
3. Ultrasonic Examination of RPV1-W17-1 through -W17-4 Bottom Meridional
Dollar Plate Seam welds (HCGS-UT-25-008, -009, -010, -011)
4. Liquid Penetrant Examination of Control Rod Drive Housing T-T Welds RPV1-
CRDW 339, 326, 291, 358, 248, 242, 345, 357 and 428 (HCGS-PT-25-002)
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure
rates for the requalification annual operating exam completed on August 8, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during reactor startup and heatup on October 31, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
'B2' safety auxiliary cooling system heat exchanger flange leak, October 9, 2025
(2)
'A' residual heat removal heat exchanger safety auxiliary cooling system return valve
pin failures, October 17, 2025
(3)
Loss of 'C' 4.16 kilovolt (kV) bus, October 18, 2025
(4)
Unresolved Item (URI) (05000354/2025050-03), Emergency Diesel Generator Lube
Oil Heat Exchanger Maintenance Practices, November 18, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
HPCI turbine wheel flaw, October 29, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)
Temporary Modification - 'A' service water loop replacement of degraded spring cans
with temporary dunnage supports, work order (WO) 60165383 and technical
evaluation 80140023, October 30, 2025
(2)
Permanent Modification - 1AD481 inverter replacement during refueling outage -
Design Change Package 80132748, October 31, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 26 activities from October 1 to
November 2, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system
operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)
Replacement of ITE-50H relay following loss of 'C' 4kV bus during the 'C' integrated
diesel generator test, October 22, 2025
(2)
Emergent repair of 'A' safety auxiliary cooling system to 'A' residual heat removal heat
exchanger cooling outlet valve throttling capability, October 29, 2025
(3)
Machining of RCIC outboard steam supply isolation valve following local leak rate
testing failure, October 30, 2025
(4)
HPCI following 12-year overhaul, increase in maximum revolutions, and hydraulic
actuator replacement, November 5, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)
'C' integrated emergency diesel generator (EDG) test, October 18, 2025
(2)
'D' main steam line flow channel calibration, November 18, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
Feedwater seal boundary valve water leak rate test of 'A' feedwater injection header
valves 1AEHV-F032A, 1BJHV-8278, and 1AEHV-F039, on October 1, 2025
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of
radiation levels, identifies the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials,
and assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related
radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect
workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and
controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)
Workers exiting the radiologically controlled area at Hope Creek during condenser
tube leak repairs
(2)
Workers exiting the radiologically controlled area at Hope Creek during traversing
incore probe room work.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following
radiological work:
(1)
Condenser tube leak repairs
(2)
Traversing incore probe work (down posting area from locked high radiation area to
very high radiation area)
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas and very
(1)
Turbine condenser bay 87'
(2)
Traversing incore probe detector room
(3)
A reactor water cleanup (RWCU) pump room
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section
03.06) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician
performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
(1)
April 1, 2024 through September 30, 2025
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
(1)
July 1, 2024 through September 30, 2025
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
(1)
July 1, 2024 through September 30, 2025
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024 through September 30, 2025
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample
(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024 through September 30, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed PSEG's corrective action program to identify potential trends
that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated URI 05000354/2025050-02, EDG Lube Oil Heat Exchanger
Complex Troubleshooting, on October 1, 2025.
Notice of Enforcement Discretion (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated URI 05000354/2025001-03, URI Regarding the NRC's
Grant of a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for an EDG under TS 3.8.1.1,
and PSEG actions surrounding NOED EAF-RI-2025-0048 (Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML25036A046)
which can be accessed at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/enforcement/notices/noedreactor.html, on October 1, 2025.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the IPs in effect at the beginning
of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision
histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete
when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with
IMC 2690, Inspection Program for Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel and Reactor-Related
Greater-than-Class C Waste at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and for
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 71 Transportation Packagings."
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspector conducted a periodic in-office follow-up that focused on the review of
the general licensees (GLs) implementation of the 10 CFR 72.48 process and
associated corrective actions related to ISFSI activities. The review included:
10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations and Screenings: Reviewed the GLs 10 CFR 72.48
process and associated evaluation associated with the adoption of the
continuous basket shim (CBS) variant.
Corrective Action Program: Reviewed condition reports related to the design
change of the CBS variant.
71003 - Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal
Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 license renewal inspection at Hope Creek from
November 19 to December 19, 2025. The following aging management programs
(AMPs) were evaluated by the inspector remotely through document review:
1. BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds (AMP 4) and BWR Feedwater Nozzles
(AMP 5), Commitment 4 and 5
o 24M Visual Exam/RPV Internal (WO 50250751)
2. Open-Cycle Cooling Water System (AMP 13), Commitment 13
o LR CD 36M Insp A SSW HDR 1EA026-SWI (WO 30376078)
3. ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE (AMP 28), Commitment 28
o LR - Drywell: UT Air Gap AZ 225° (WO 50239965-0090)
o LR - Drywell: UT Air Gap Drains - EL 88' (WO 50239965-0100)
4. Structures Monitoring Program (AMP 32), Commitment 32
o LR Perform Reactor Cavity Seal Plate Inspection (WO 30357508)
5. Metal Enclosed Bus (AMP 38), Commitment 38
o LR-10.5Y /CRIT 10-A-109 SEC 02 INT INS (WO 30265465)
6. Small-Bore Class 1 Piping Inspection Program (AMP 45), Commitment 45 and
One-Time Inspection Program (AMP 22), Commitment 22
o LR-1"-CCA-219A-Recirc Line: Inspection (WO 60146361)
o LR-1-BB-2DBA-192B-6 (WO 60161594-0050)
o LR-1-BB-2DBA-192B-7 (WO 60161594-0060)
o LR Small Bore 'A' Recirc Loop UT (WO 60164723)
INSPECTION RESULTS
Enforcement
Discretion
Enforcement Action EAF-NMSS-2025-0222: Noncompliance
Related to a General Licensees Use of Non-Qualified Spent Fuel
Casks (IEP 9.4)
60855
Description: Holtec International (also referred to as the CoC (certificate of compliance) holder)
implemented a design change to its multi-purpose canister fuel basket, known as the CBS
variant, which altered the structural configuration from welded to bolted shims. This change
resulted in a departure from the method of evaluation (MOE) described in the final safety
analysis report (FSAR) used to establish the design basis for tip-over events. Holtec did not
fully evaluate the cumulative impact of the MOE changes or apply them consistently with the
licensing basis. As a result, the NRC issued three Severity Level IV violations to Holtec for
noncompliance with 10 CFR 72.48 requirements (see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Inspection Report 07201014/2022-201, Holtec International, ML23145A175, and Holtec
International, Inc. - Notice of Violation; The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection
Report No. 07201014/2022-201, ML24016A190).
When the GL chooses to adopt a change the CoC holder made pursuant to a CoC holder's
change authority under 10 CFR 72.48 (referred to herein as a CoC holder-generated
change), the GL must perform a separate review using the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48(c).
Accordingly, when the GL chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change, and that change
results in a non-conforming cask, there is a violation of 10 CFR 72.48 and certain provisions of
10 CFR 72.212 by the GL, in addition to a CoC holder violation of 10 CFR 72.48. As it relates
to the adoption of the CBS variant casks, the GL failed to recognize the noncompliance with
10 CFR 72.48 requirements made by the CoC holders design change and subsequently
loaded the CBS variant casks.
Corrective Actions: The GL entered this into its corrective action program with actions to
restore compliance with the 10 CFR 72.212 provisions that require each cask to conform to
the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214.
Corrective Action References: Long Term Corrective Action 70233688-0010, 72.212 Report
14A, ECO-5014-320 Rev. 2
Enforcement:
Significance/Severity: This violation was dispositioned in accordance with Section 9.4,
Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of CoC Holder-Generated Changes
Under 10 CFR 72.48, of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Specifically, as stated in the Policy, the NRC will exercise enforcement discretion and not
issue an enforcement action to a GL, for a noncompliance with the requirements of
paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) and (d)(1) of 10 CFR 72.48 and with provisions of 10 CFR 72.212
that require GLs to ensure use of casks that conform to the terms, conditions, and
specifications of a CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214, when the noncompliance results from a CoC
holders failure to comply with 10 CFR 72.48 for a CoC holder-generated change.
Violation: 10 CFR 72.48 (c)(1) requires, in part, that a GL or certificate holder may make
changes in the facility or spent fuel storage cask design as described in the FSAR (as
updated), without obtaining: (ii) CoC amendment submitted by the certificate holder pursuant
to § 72.244 if: (c) The change, test, or experiment does not meet any of the criteria in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
10 CFR 72.48(c)(2) requires, in part, that a GL shall request that the certificate holder obtain a
CoC amendment, prior to implementing a proposed change, if the change would: (viii) Result
in a departure from an MOE described in the FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in
the safety analyses.
10 CFR 72.48(d)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee shall have a written evaluation which
provides the bases for the determination that the change does not require a CoC amendment
pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2).
10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) requires, in part, a GL must ensure that each cask used by the GL
conforms to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an amended CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214.
Contrary to the above, in May 2023, the GL loaded the first CBS design variant and failed to
maintain records of changes in the spent fuel storage cask design made pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c) that include a written evaluation which provided the bases for the determination that
the change did not require a CoC amendment. The GL failed to request that the certificate
holder obtain a CoC amendment, prior to implementing a proposed change, if the change
would: (viii) result in a departure from an MOE described in the FSAR used in establishing the
design bases or in the safety analyses. Further, the GL failed to ensure each cask conformed
to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or amended CoC listed in 10 CFR 72.214.
Basis for Discretion: When a GL chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change, and that
change results in a non-conforming cask, there is a violation of 10 CFR 72.48 and certain
provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 by the GL, in addition to a CoC holder violation of 10 CFR 72.48.
And, when a GL chooses to adopt a CoC holder-generated change without performing a
separate 10 CFR 72.48 analysis, the GL is in violation of 10 CFR 72.48. These requirements
could lead to enforcement actions being issued against both the GL's 10 CFR 72.48 program
(as well as certain 10 CFR 72.212 violations) and the CoC holder's 10 CFR 72.48 program for
changes that originated with the CoC holder. The NRC has concluded that this enforcement
approach would be inconsistent with efficiency, which is one of the NRC's Principles of Good
Regulation, and NRC's mission of efficient and reliable oversight.
Since this violation meets the conditions of the NRC's Enforcement Policy, Section 9.4,
"Enforcement Discretion for General Licensee Adoption of Certificate of Compliance Holder-
Generated Changes under 10 CFR 72.48" (ML25224A097), and the GL has entered the
noncompliance into the corrective action program, the NRC is exercising enforcement
discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for this violation.
Unresolved Item
(Closed)
Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Heat Exchanger
Maintenance Practices
Description: The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) for a potential performance
deficiency related to the implementation of the maintenance plan for the 'D' EDG lubrication
system. The inspectors noted that the as-found degraded condition of the 'D' EDG lube oil
heat exchanger lantern seal and packing assembly was identified by PSEG to be the likely
cause of the 'D' EDG being declared inoperable. These components were not included in a
formal maintenance plan, and inspectors questioned if these components should be monitored
and maintained in accordance with a preventative maintenance program as required by TSs.
As a result, the NRC opened a URI to evaluate if a performance deficiency exists related to
the implementation of the maintenance plan for the 'D' EDG lube oil system. Inspectors follow-
up actions included reviewing PSEG's root cause evaluation and WOs, and interviewing PSEG
staff.
This URI is closed to the White finding and associated violation in Inspection Report 05000354/2025091 (ML25237A290).
Corrective Action References: Root Cause Evaluation 70239337; WO 70239337-0410, -0417,
-0419, -0420, -0430, and -0440; WOs 60163187-0190, 60163188-0200, 60163189-0190, and
60163110-0130.
Unattended High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Green
Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," when PSEG did not properly
implement proper barrier controls in accordance with station procedures during maintenance
activities that could have affected the performance of safety-related equipment.
Description: Hope Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, section 3.6.1.2.1.7 describes
the RCIC steam supply line that transits the RCIC pipe chase. Protection against over
pressurization of the RCIC pipe chase as a result of a steam supply line break is provided by
steam venting paths to the suppression chamber compartment and then to a steam vent
containing blow out panels leading to the outside atmosphere. For a RCIC steam supply line
break outside the drywell, the steam supply line containment isolation valves are closed
automatically on high steam flow, or high steam temperature of the RCIC piping outside the
drywell, terminating reactor vessel blowdown.
During refueling outage preparations on September 18, 2025, NRC inspectors observed the
RCIC pipe chase door 4319 fully open and unattended. PSEG procedure OP-HC-103-103,
High Energy and Internal Flooding Barrier Control Program, Rev. 1 and evaluation H-1-ZZ-
FEE-1803, Separation Barrier Control Aid for Hope Creek, Rev. 0 identify door 4319 as a
water-tight/pressure-tight door as well as a fire Class I, high energy line break (HELB), and
internal flood door. Inspectors contacted the control room and requested an equipment
operator come and secure the door. PSEG subsequently determined that a scaffold crew had
left the door open for at least two hours unattended.
CC-AA-201, Plant Barrier Control, Rev. 8, implements compensatory measures when HELB
barriers are impaired. Step 4.1.1 states that, Doors should always be placed in their required
position and secured properly after use in order to be considered capable of performing
credited barrier functions. Step 4.1.2.4.a states that, "A plant barrier impairment is required
when the barrier is credited as a HELB barrier since a HELB is a rapidly occurring event and
creates an adverse environment that is difficult to justify an attendant will be able to restore
before the barrier is challenged.
FP-AA-002, Fire Protection Impairment Program, Rev. 6, step 4.1.1 states that work activities
affecting fire doors shall be controlled through the fire protection impairment program that
ensures appropriate compensatory measures are implemented. FP-HC-004, Actions for Non-
Functional Fire Protection - Hope Creek Station, Rev. 9, Att. 7, Table 6 requires an hourly fire
watch when door 4319 is impaired.
The inspectors determined that PSEG was not properly implementing their procedures for an
impaired HELB, internal flood and fire barrier, in accordance with their Barrier Control and Fire
Protection programs. Additionally, Hope Creek Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9,
Unavailable Barrier, establishes conditions under which systems described in TSs are
considered to remain operable when required barriers are not capable of providing their related
support function. The improper implementation of the barrier impairment process also
precluded Hope Creek Operations review of this 30-day LCO.
Corrective Actions: A PSEG operator secured the door and checked the status of remaining
HELB doors in the reactor building. PSEG also stood down all scaffold crews.
Corrective Action References: Notification 21001283
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that PSEGs improper implementation of
barrier controls during maintenance activities in accordance with station procedures CC-AA-
201, "Plant Barrier Control," and FP-AA-002, "Fire Protection Impairment Program," was within
PSEGs ability to foresee, correct, should have been prevented, and was, therefore, a
performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, plant design documents and procedures assume HELB barriers
will only be open during normal ingress and egress. Leaving the door open challenged
assumptions within the plant's design basis regarding the impacts of a RCIC steam line break.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609,
Appendix AProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 0609,</br></br>Appendix A" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The
inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) by
answering 'No' to all of the questions in Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions."
Specifically, systems, structures, and components potentially affected by the deficiency
maintained their operability and functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures
knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill
nuclear safety values. Specifically, PSEGs investigation revealed many of those in the work
crew were new to nuclear plants or had been away for several years resulting in proficiency
challenges.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1.a states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented,
and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9,
Procedures for Performing Maintenance, states that, Maintenance that can affect the
performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in
accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the
circumstances.
CC-AA-201, Plant Barrier Control, Rev. 8, implements compensatory measures when HELB
barriers are impaired. Step 4.1.1 states that, Doors should always be placed in their required
position and secured properly after use in order to be considered capable of performing
credited barrier functions. Step 4.1.2.4.a states that, A plant barrier impairment is required
when the barrier is credited as a HELB barrier since a HELB is a rapidly occurring event and
creates an adverse environment that is difficult to justify an attendant will be able to restore
before the barrier is challenged.
FP-AA-002, Fire Protection Impairment Program, Rev. 6 step 4.1.1 states that work activities
affecting fire doors shall be controlled through the fire protection impairment program that
ensures appropriate compensatory measures are implemented. FP-HC-004, Actions for Non-
Functional Fire Protection - Hope Creek Station, Rev. 9, Att. 7, Table 6 requires an hourly fire
watch when door 4319 is impaired.
Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2025, PSEG performed maintenance activities that
impaired a credited barrier but did not ensure appropriate barrier controls were implemented
as required by station procedures CC-AA-201 and FP-AA-002.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of
the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend
Foreign material (FM). During the R26 refueling outage, PSEG identified an adverse trend in
FM that stemmed from a series of reactor cavity intrusions as well as FM discovered in the A
reactor recirculation pump mechanical seal area and main turbine lube oil reservoir
(Notification (NOTF) 21004660). While PSEG completed a common cause evaluation of these
events, inspectors noted additional FM events during this period outside of the evaluation's
scope:
1. FM in the torus (NOTFs 21004382, 21004197).
2. Shavings were discovered in the B RWCU purge flow y-strainer (NOTF 21005335).
FM was generated as a result of the A control rod drive (CRD) pump inboard seal leak
and failure (NOTFs 21004782, 21005935). Subsequently, debris and metal shavings
were found in the A CRD downstream filter (NOTF 21005086). PSEG experienced
challenges restoring CRD backfill stations to reactor vessel instruments which cited the
A CRD filter and B RWCU strainer NOTFs (NOTFs 210055562, 21005946(7,8)).
3. In the turbine building, an air sampling monitor was bumped through an FM barrier into
the condenser (NOTF 21004769). Sand blast media was discovered on main
condenser tubesheets and in some tubes from a circulating water waterbox project
(NOTF 21004762). During subsequent closeout inspection of the waterboxes, PSEG
discovered plastic debris-cleaning devices for that blast media in the outlet (NOTF
21005053).
Bus losses. On August 12, 2025, the B reactor protection system bus tripped (NOTF
20999460). During the R26 refueling outage, Hope Creek experienced two bus losses. On
October 18, 2025, during performance of the integrated C EDG test with the C EDG
paralleled with offsite power, the safety-related C 4kV bus tripped (NOTF 21004799). At the
time, the C 4kV bus was not credited in applicable TSs. On October 27, 2025, while restoring
the A primary condensate pump to service, the pump and its non-safety-related 7kV bus
10A110 tripped (NOTF 21005183). PSEG determined in these latter two events that the cause
was age-related due to stuck contactors on ITE-50H relays that had not been replaced in the
life of the plant. PSEG generated NOTFs 21008085 through 210008106 to replace the ITE-
50H relays on all 4kV safety-related bus offsite power source breakers as well as other non-
safety-related busses. The NRC issued Information Notice 84-20 regarding the service life of
Unresolved Item
(Closed)
Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Heat Exchanger
Complex Troubleshooting
Description: The inspectors identified a URI for a potential performance deficiency related to
complex troubleshooting associated with the 'D' EDG that occurred between January 31 and
March 4, 2025. Following an initial water intrusion event discovered on January 31, 2025,
PSEG developed complex troubleshooting plans to diagnose the cause of water intrusion in
the lube oil system for the 'D' EDG. PSEG exited the complex troubleshooting effort on
February 9, 2025, without refuting all the potential faults identified in failure mode 3, lube oil
heat exchanger leak, of their complex troubleshooting. PSEG entered complex troubleshooting
a second time on February 19, 2025, following the second water intrusion event, and failure
mode 3 was confirmed. Due to the confirmation of failure mode 3, inspectors questioned if
PSEG had exited their initial troubleshooting preemptively. Additionally, the inspectors
questioned the completeness of PSEG's refutation of other failure modes. As a result, the NRC
opened a URI to evaluate if a performance deficiency exists related to the implementation of
complex troubleshooting for the D EDG lube oil system. Inspector follow-up actions included
review of PSEG's root cause evaluation.
This URI is closed to the White finding and associated violation in Inspection Report 05000354/2025091 (ML25237A290).
Corrective Action Reference: Root Cause Evaluation 70239337
Unresolved Item
(Closed)
Unresolved Item Regarding the NRC's Grant of a Notice of
Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for an EDG under TS 3.8.1.1
Description: By letter (ML25034A230) dated February 3, 2025, PSEG requested that the NRC
exercise discretion to not enforce compliance with the actions required by Hope Creek TS LCO 3.8.1.1.e for two inoperable EDGs and extend the expiration of the completion time by 28
hours to February 2, 2025, at 1:35 a.m., to allow Hope Creek additional time to return the A
EDG to operable status. As communicated verbally to Hope Creek at approximately 9:15 p.m.,
on January 31, 2025, the NRC exercised discretion to not enforce compliance with TS LCO 3.8.1.1.e for the 28-hour period from January 31, 2025, at 9:35 p.m., until February 2, 2025, at
01:35 a.m. Hope Creek returned the A EDG to operable status on January 31, 2025, at
9:21 p.m., and the approved NOED was not utilized. The NRC issued a letter to PSEG
documenting the grant of this NOED on February 5, 2025 (ML25036A046). In accordance with
IMC 0611, 06.05.o, when a NOED is granted, a URI shall be opened in accordance with the
NRC Enforcement Manual, Appendix F, Notices of Enforcement Discretion. Inspector follow-
up actions included review of PSEG's root cause evaluation and additional corrective action
program documents, and interviewed PSEG staff.
This URI is closed to the White finding and associated violation in Inspection Report 05000354/2025091 (ML25237A290).
relays in safety-related systems stating, in part, "preventative maintenance programs should
recognize the service life of relays supplied by other manufacturers."
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance
Corrective Action References: NOTF 20986945 and Root Cause Evaluation 70239337
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this
report.
- On January 15, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Eric
Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 11, 2025, the inspectors presented the 71151 RP PI Verification
inspection results to Robert McLaughlin, Hope Creek Plant Manager, and other
members of the licensee staff.
On December 11, 2025, the inspectors presented the 71124.01 Inspection Debrief
inspection results to Robert McLaughlin, Hope Creek Plant Manager, and other
members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21010436
21010886
Drawings
M-10-1(Q)
Procedures
HC.MD-ST.PK-
0001(Q)
Fire Plans
71111.08G Corrective Action
Documents
21003268
Corrective Action
Documents
21004799
Engineering
Evaluations
80139869-0209
Corrective Action
Documents
21003713
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21004382
21004391
21004744
21004777
21004778
21004823
21004824
21004825
21004826
21004827
21004197
21005537
21005567
21005503
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21009042
21009040
21010456
Corrective Action
Documents
21004031
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21006465
Work Orders
60165347
60165191
50250156
50240503
60165341
30341218
80138538
60151065
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21007428
21007430
21009075
21007977
21009071
21009745
21005320
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21007670
21007668
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21006024
19