05000285/LER-2012-002-01, Regarding Inadequate Qualifications for Containment Penetrations Renders Containment Inoperable

Regarding Inadequate Qualifications for Containment Penetrations Renders Containment Inoperable

ML13184A270
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	07/02/2013
From:	Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LIC-13-0085 LER 12-002-01
Download: ML13184A270 (6)

LER-2012-002, Regarding Inadequate Qualifications for Containment Penetrations Renders Containment Inoperable

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2852012002R01 - NRC Website

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Omaha PublIc PowsrO/slrlct 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 UC-13-0085 July 2,2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Reference: 1.

Docket No. 50-285

2.

Letter from D. J. Bannister (LlC-12-0043) to Document Control Desk dated May 1, 2012

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2012-002, Revision 1, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2012-002, Revision 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.

fa [ouis P. Cortopassi Site Vice President and CNO LPC/rjr/epm Attachment c:

A. T. Howell, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV J. M. Sebrosky, NRC Sr. Project Manager L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Employment with Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

, the NRC may not conduct or sp onsor, and a person is not required to respond to, th e

information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285

3. PAGE 1 OF 5

4. TITLE Inadequate Qualifications for Containment Penetrations Renders Containment Inoperable

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 3

2 2012 2012 - 002 -

1 7

2 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 5

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The two causal analyses found that there was a lack of managerial and technical oversight to ensure the information associated with Teflon material used in EQ CEPFSs was applied to non-EQ CEPFSs.

This lack of managerial and technical oversight is being addressed across the organization through the resolution of the Fundamental Performance Deficiencies.

The Teflon degradation issue will be resolved by replacing or capping the remaining CEPFSs containing Teflon seals or conductor insulation prior to plant startup.

The FCS USAR will be updated (post-restart) to describe the as-left replacement configuration of the electrical penetration assemblies.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The inboard Teflon seals on the Conax series 2325-7780 multi-conductor electrical penetrations would degrade in a DBA environment, which would reduce the safety margin and leak integrity would be dependent on the outside Teflon seals. However, recent testing showed that these CEPFSs satisfied the USAR 5.9.1 design requirement for containment integrity.

Under accident conditions, failure of the CEPFSs would challenge the operability of the following EEQ equipment (even though the insulation is held in place by the surrounding tube and it is very unlikely these feed-throughs would have failed to perform their design function):

a. Radiation monitors RM-091A and RM-091B, containment area high range radiation monitors.

These monitors provide high-level radiation measurements, which would be required during accident conditions. These monitors extend the range of the containment area radiation monitoring system.

b. HCV-383-3 and HCV-383-4, containment sump recirculation isolation valves. The containment sump isolation valves provide isolation between the high pressure safety injection system and the containment sump. These valves automatically open when a recirculation actuation signal is generated.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS EVENTS Three LERs with event dates since May 1, 2010, were identified discussing penetration issues. Only one LER, 2011-003-3, Inadequate Flooding Protection Due to Ineffective Oversight, identified a lack of oversight as a cause of the condition which resulted in unsealed abandoned penetrations exposing the intake structure to flooding. However the conditions discussed in the current LER are legacy issues that would not have been prevented by the corrective actions identified in LER 2011-003.