ML20214C898
| ML20214C898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1986 |
| From: | Mccleskey K HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214C890 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8611210278 | |
| Download: ML20214C898 (52) | |
Text
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1 LILCO, November 17,1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOLKETEP NUCLEAR P.EGULATORY COMMISSION UWm
~86 NOV 20 All :41 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board CFFIE c
OCCKl_I:. ;
a s
%F' In the Matter of
)
)
^
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
(
LILCO's Revised Standard Version of the Intervenors' August 1,1986 Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13.1986 Exercise TABLE OF CONTENTS i
l' Contentions EX 15, 16, 19: Limited Scope of the Exercise Precludes a Reasonable Assurance Finding...............................
1 Con ten tion E X 15. A-I, K,M.................................
1 f
Contention EX 16.E, K, L.................................
10 Contention EX 19 [for argument only].......................
12 Contentions EX 21-22: FEMA's Conclusions Preclude a Reasonable Assurance Finding................................................
13 i
Contention EX 21. A-F...................................
13 Contention EX 2 2. A.....................................
24 Contention EX 36: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Protective A c tion Recommendations...........................................
26 Con ten tion E X 36.........................................
Contentions EX 38-30. Fundamental Flaws Relating to Public Information......
27 Contention EX 38. A-J, L-Q...............................
27 Contention EX 39.A-C, plus 1st sentence of EX 44...............
33 Contentions EX 40-41: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Implementation of Protective Actions........................
41 C611210278 861117 PDR ADOCK 05000322 l
O PDR J
s 4 Conten tion EX 4 0. A-C, E.................................
41 Contention EX 41. A-B, E.................................
45 Contentions EX 47,49: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Post-Evacuation Services f or Evacuees............................................. 51 Con tention EX 47. A-E................................... 51 Contention EX 49. A-C...................................
55 Contention EX 50: Fundamental Flaws in LILCO's Training Program...........
58 Conten tion EX 5 0. A-I....................................
58
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j CONTENTIONS EX 15-16: LIMITED SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE PRECLUDES REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING CONTENTION EX 15. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results on imple-mentation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include dem-onstrations or evaluations of major portions of the Lilco Plan. The data set forth in subparts A-I, K, and M of this contention individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could or would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that' adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and 4
major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Nei-ther the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the following elements of j
emergency preparedness required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654:
A. Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were ex--
cluded from the exercise, in that sirens, the LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notifica-tion capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the notification capabilities of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are I
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s t required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 SS ILE and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demonstrated in the exercise. Objec-tives EOC 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reason-able assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a " prompt notification test" would cor-rect this deficiency (see letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demon-strate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single por-tion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented.
B.
Procedures for notification of, and issuance of protective action rec-ommendations to, the members of the public in the water portion of the plume expo-sure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S.
Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise (other than perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assum-ing arstuendo there was any). Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR Part 50, App. E,5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 SS II.3 and F, Appendix 3, and the exer-cise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. S_ee, g, FEMA Report at 9; ob-jective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise i
precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and g.>--
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I will be taken in the event of. a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
C. Procedures for public education and the dissemination of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from the exercise. Such pro-grams and materials are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.G. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
D.
Procedures relating to evacuation of EPZ hospital patients and pa-tients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demonstration of the capability of implementing such an evacuation, were excluded from the exercre. There are approximately 850 pa-tients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), of which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric. Procedures to evacuate these persons and the capability and re-sources to implement them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
E.
Procedures relating to the sheltering of school children (s_ee OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP3.6.1; App. A at 11-19 thru -21) were excluded from the exercise. Such pro-cedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10. Officials of
most of,the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of the protective action of sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The ex-l clusion of LILCO's proposed school sheltering procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Ac-cordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
i F. FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability t
necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the exercise objectives. See objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38.
Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary protective actions for school children. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A at II-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, pro-cedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and the ability to implement them are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S ILJ. Officials of most of the i
school dbitricts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of early dismiss-als have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or ef-fectively implementing an early dismissal during a Shoreham accident. FEMA's f ailure to observe any demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective j
action of early dismissal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable sssurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a i
Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
G. Procedures relating to the evacuation of school children, as set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 and in Appendix A at 11-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobilize neces-i sary personnel and equipment to implement an evacuation, were excluded from the T
, s exercise. Such procedures and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10. Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of school children during a Shoreham accident. And, the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simu-lated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of officials of that school or of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the re-sources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacuation of school children set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective mea-sures can and will be taken in, the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met.
Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
H.
Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume exposure EPZ, or for tran-sients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4,. and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 re-quired a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration of any ability to ef-fect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
s
,8-I.
Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective ac-tion recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommen-dation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.C-Ja of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement such procedures even for the portion of the ingestion path-way EPZ located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F, and NUREG 0654 S II.J. and by ob-jectives EOC 9,12. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facilities who, according to the LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special reception centers, were excluded from the exercise.
Such procedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(10); NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assur-ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
M. Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities to imple-ment recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.H, and NUREG 0654 S II.M.
Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that
4-adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham acci-dent, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamen-tally flawed.
CONTENTION EX 16. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results regarding LILCO's capability to implement its Plan, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to implement the LILCO Plan. In addition, the exclusion of these entities from the exercise precludes a finding that the exercise eval-uated major portions of emergency response capabilities, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14). The failure of each of the persons and entities identified in subparts E, K, and L below to participate in the exercise both individually and collectively means that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Rather, the exercise results were so limited that they demonstrated a funda-mental flaw in the scope of the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures.
can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50,47(a)(1).
Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of the organizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not participate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did not address the willingness, avail-ability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entitles and individuals identified in subparts E, K and L below, each of which is necessary to imple-ment the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The fact that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding
t that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.
E. According to FEMA, Marketing Evaluations, Ire. did not participate in the exercise. FEMA, Report at 111. It is relied upon for verification of siren operation and evacuation. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-4g, App. A at V-9, and App. B; OPIP 3.3.4.
K. The following bus companies or yards did not participate in the exer-cise:
(1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - East Northport Yard (50)
(2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - Amityville Yard (74)
(3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100)
(4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29)
(5) United Bus Corp. - Ronkonkoma Yard (46)
(6) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. - Lakeland Yard (40)
(7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. - Bayshore Yard (147)
(8) Coram Bus Service - Coram Yard (39)
(9) Coram Bus Service - Rocky Point Yard (27)
(10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines,Inc. (39)
(11) Starlite Bus Co.,Inc. (60)
(12) Seaman Bus Co., Inc. (35)
They are "elled upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity would provide for LILCO's use the num-ber of buses indicated in parentheses above. See LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.4.
, L.
The following ambulance companies did not participate in the exer-cise:
(1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (8)
(2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5)
(3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service (7)
(4) Nassau Ambulance Service (11)
(5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18)
(6) Orlando Ambulance and Ambulette Service,Inc. (6)
(7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. (10)
(8) Transportation With Care (9)
(9) Weir Metro AmbuService, Inc. (62)
They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company will provide the number of ambulance and ambulette-vehicles,' manned with-the~necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list. See LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.5.
CONTENTION EX 19.
( Admitted for argument only.]
The exercise demon-strated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan resulting from FEMA's inability to make a reasonable assurance finding in LILCO's favor regarding the implementability of the LILCO Plan. FEMA stated in advance of the exercise that it would not be able to make a favorable reasonable assurance finding based on the exercise results. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel W. Speck, FEMA, to William J. Dircks, NRC, October 29, 1985. Af ter the exercise, FEMA reiterated this point. See, e_.&, FEMA Report at ix. In fact, however, FEMA's former Region II Director, Frank Petrone, stated on February 15,1986, that a "no reasonable assurance" finding was necessary: "Since this Plan cannot be imple-mented without state and local government participation, we [ FEMA] cannot give rea-sonable assurance under NUREG 0654 that the public health and safety can be i
protected."
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-l'2-The NRC's tegulatiord require, as a prerequisite to licensing, that the NRC have and review FEMA " findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergen-cy plans-are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented...." 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2) (emphasis added). The exercise results were so limited that FEMA was unable to make the required reasonable assurance finding.
Accordingly, the exercise confirmed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan,14, that the Plan, as exercised, cannot provide a basis for a FEMA reasonable assurance finding.
Thus, the exercise precludes the NRC from finding reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
CONTENTIONS EX 21-22: FEMA'S CONCLUSIONS PRECLUDE A REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING CONTENTION EX 21. FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its con-clusion that certain exercise objectives identified in subparts A-F below were met or were partly met during the exercise in that even with respect to the events and activi-ties which FEMA did observe, the samples which FEMA reviewed were much too small to permit valid generalizations or to support FEMA's conclusions concerning these ob-jectives. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions on such objectives cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The LILCO Plan is, therefore, fundamentally flawed.
A.
Under the LILCO Plan, 60 Route Alert Drivers are expected to be avall-able to drive through the EPZ to notify the public of an emergency in the event of stren failure. See Plan, Fig. 2.1.1.; OPIP 3.3.4, Att.1. Specifically, a total of 20 Route Alert Drivers are to be available at each of the Port Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to drive 33, 26 and 30 routes, respectively. See Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 9
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- 13-3.3.4, Att. 3. During the exercise, however, only three Route Alert Drivers (one from each Stging Area) were dispatched by LILCO and observed by FEMA. ' FEMA Report at i
57,64 and 74; see also FEMA R2 port at 20. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34,56,57,62,64,72 and 74. The sample upon which FEMA based these con-clusions was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Route Alert Drivers, or LILCO's ability to notify the public in the entire EPZ.
Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found that the time necessary to brief, deploy, and drive even one route (i_&, assuming only one failed siren for each Staging Area) was excessive. FEMA Report at 57,64 and In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with re-74.
spect to the three Route Alert Drivers it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 'are without basis and invalid. The exercise re-sults concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-l quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
B.
According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the transit-dependent popula-tion requires 333 LILCO bus drivers to retrieve 333 buses from 20 bus company loca-
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tions, and to make 377 bus trips (using 236 buses) over 43 separate routes within the l
EPZ, plus 97 trips to the Nassau Coliseum.
See OPIP 3.6.4; App. A, at IV-74a thru -1650. According to the Plan,108 bus drivers are required to make 169 bus trips from the two transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson Staging Area, l
100 bus drivers are required to make 139 bus trips from the five transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Riverhcad Staging Area, and 125 bus drivers are required to make 166 bus trips from the four transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Patchogue Staging Area. See OPIP 3.6.4. Att.11; c1 Plan. Fig. 2.1.1.
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f During the exercise, FEMA observed only two bus drivers from each of the Riverhead and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58,74. Af ter retrieving a bus from the assigned bus company yard, they each drove one EPZ route, then re-turned to their assigned transfer point and proceeded to the Nassau Coliseum. Based solely on its observation of two bus drivers making one run each, FEMA concluded that objective FIEI,D 9 was met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58 and 74. In addition, FEMA observed four bus drivers from the Patchogue Staging Area attempt to retrieve buses and drive bus routes. FEMA Report at 64-65.
FEMA concluded, on the basis of those drivers' inability to pick up buses or to drive routes properly or in a timely manner, that objective FIELD 9 was not met at the Patchokue Staging Area. & Nonetheless, based upon its observations of eight drivers making a total of eight bus runs, at least thre of which were judged unsatisfactory by FEMA, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met. FEMA Report at 34.
In light of the small sampling of bus drivers reviewed by FEMA, and FEMA's cen-clusions regarding the entire sample of bus drivers reviewed at the Patchogue St, aging Area, FEMA's conclusions as to objective FIELD 9 for Port Jefferson and Riverhead, and as to EOC 16 for the entire EPZ, are without basis and invalid, and fail to justify FEMA's generalizations about all LILCO bus drivers under the LILCO Plan. The exer-cise results concerning those objectives thus preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
C.
Eleven school districts (with 33 schools), one BOCES supervisory district, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings located within the EPZ. In addition, there are seven school districts with no school buildings within the EPZ but whose district boundaries include residences within the EPZ (4, with children I
who live in the EPZ); and there are three parochial schools and one BOCES supervisory y
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O district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ boundary. See OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3; cL App. A at IV-169 thru-171. During the exercise, FEMA observed two. buses report to one school (Shoreham-Wading River High School), where two bus drivers allegedly re-ceived maps and instructions. FEMA Report at 43. FEMA was not able to observe the organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools, however. FEMA Reprot at
- 38. FEMA also observed one bus, driven by a LILCO employee, arrive at the Ridge Ele-mentary School (almost three hours af ter it had been " requested" in a free play mes-sage). FEMA Report at 38.
Neither of the two Shoreham-Wading River buses observed by FEMA drove any early dismissal or evacuation routes or transported any children, nor had either of the bus drivers received any training or information concerning any plans for protecting or evacuating school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. See FEMA Reprt at 4445. The free play message " requesting" a bus to Ridge Elementary School was in-jected by FEMA at 10:30; however a bus driver was not dispatched to pick up a bus until 40 minutes af ter the request was received by the Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA Re-port at 66. The bus did not arrive at the school until 1:23 (FEMA Report at 38) and, ac-cording to LILCO, even as late as 4:23, it had not arrived at the Reception Center. The bus did not transport any children, and neither the driver, the FEMA evaluator, nor any other exercise player, had any contact with any officials from the Ridge School or the Longwood School District. The FEMA evaluator merely observed the bus arrive at and leave the school.
l Based solely upon these observations, however, and despite FEMA's acknowl-edged failure to observe LILCO's ability to effect an early dismissal, and the irrelevance
<>f the situation postulated in the Ridge School free play message to the evacuation pro-cedures in the LILCO Plan (s_e_e Contention EX 20.G), FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 were met. FEMA Report at 38,43.
, The limited observations and irrelevant sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions do not justify FEMA's generalization about the ability to evacuate all schools, school districts, and school children in the EPZ and the ability to accomplish an early dismissal of all such schools, districts and children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In light of FEMA's limited observation, the irrelevance of the Ridge School free play message, and the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 are without basis and invalid. The exer-cise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham acci-dent.
D.
According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the institutional 1 zed, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ (excluding residents at facilities which LILCO assumes would not require transportation assistance and those in the three hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (4 App. A at IV-175 and OPIP 3.6.5, Att.2) requires 23 ambu-lances and 178 ambulettes from 11 ambulance companies to make runs from the ap-proximately 10 special facilities in the EPZ requiring transportation assistance fromo LILCO (there are, altogether,19 health care facilities, excluding hospitals, at 23 loca-tions throughout the EPZ) to unidentified reception centers outside the EPZ. See OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-173 thru -178.
During the exercise, FEMA observed only one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver each drive one route. Based solely on its observation of these two ac-tivities, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 13 was met. FEMA Report at 43. The sample upon which FEMA based this conclusion was much too small to justify FEMA's generalization about all ambulance and ambulette drivers and LILCO's ability to evacu-ate institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals from all the special facilities locat-ed in the EPZ. In addition, based upon its observation of two drivers, FEMA concluded
that obj,tetive EOC 16 was met with respect to all the institutionalized, mobility-i impaired residents of the EPZ. FEMA Report at 34. In light of the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16 are with-out basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a find-ing of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
E.
Under the LILCO Plan,165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points (TCPs) in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.3, Att.
4.
More specifically,72 Traffic Guides from the Port Jefferson Staging Area are ex-pected to man 58 TCPs; 41 Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area are expected to man 28 TCPs; and 52 Guides from the Riverhead Staging Area are expected to man 44 TCPs. LILCO Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. During the exercise, however, FEMA apparently only observed a total of 27 TCPs manned by 32 Guides (10 TCPs with 10 Guides from Port Jefferson; nine TCPS with 14 Guides from Patchogue; and eight TCP3 with elght Guides from Riverhead). See FEMA Report at 57,64 and 74. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 6 and 11. SA 9 and EOC 16 and 19 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 38, 56, 57, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74 and
- 75. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small, howev-er, to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Traffic Guides, all TCPs, and evacuation and access control of the entire EPZ.
Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found (1) that the time between deployment from the staging area and arrival at TCPs was excessive - 14, two hours af ter declaration of a general emergency and well over an hour af ter the first evacuation recommendation - for the eight TCPS from the Riverhead Staging Area (FEMA Report at 74); (ii) that only one out of the 14 Guides in-terviewed from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Reception Center
(FEMA Report at 64); and,(iii) that communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was sometime difficult due to pour radio reception (FEMA Re-port at 56). In addition, FEMA acknowledged that it was unable to render any evalua-tion regarding the timeliness of TCP set-up with respect to any of the 10 TCPs within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction. FEMA Report at 57. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the few TCPs it did observe, FEMA' conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those ob-jectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
F.
During the exercise, FEMA chose only two locations to observe LILCO's ability to deal with impediments to evacuation (objective EOC 17). These two locations
- in the vicinity of TCPs 41 and 124 - both involved simulated traffic obstructions; they were the result of a simulated accident involving a gravel truck and three cars (TCP 124) and a simulated accident involving a fuel truck (TCP 41). FEMA Report at 30, 36-38.
FEMA was unable to observe LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (s_eg FEMA Report at 37,57-58), found LICO's response to the gravel truck impediment inad-equate (FEMA Report at 36-38), and concluded that objective EOC 7 was only partly met and objective EOC 17 was not met (FEMA Report at 29-30, 36-38).
FEMA f
nonetheless concluded that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area were met and that objective FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was I
partly met (FEMA Report at 34, 58, 65).
Those conclusions are without basis and invalid, in light of the following iacts:
(i) FEMA never even observed LILCO's response to the fuel truck impedi-ment (which occurred within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction (s_ee App. A.
Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 57-58);
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(ii) LILCO did not respond to the fuel truck impediment until more than three hours af ter the free play message had been injected at 11:00 (FEMA Report at 36-37, 57);
(iii) There were substantial delays in LILCO's response to the gravel truck impedinient (which occurred within the Pathogue Staging Area's jurisdiciton, see App.
A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 65);
(iv) The response was inadequate for removal of the gravel truck impedi-ment (only one tow truck was dispatched even though the simulated accident involved three cars and the gravel truck, and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road)(FEMA Report at 37,65);
(v) At least two hours elapsed before LILCO's Transportation Support Coordinator was informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck impediment (FEMA Report at 36).
In addition, the sample upon which FEMA based its conclusions regarding objec-tives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with re-spect to the entire EPZ and LILCO's ability to implement an evacuation during a Shoreham accident. Under the LILCO Plan,165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. App. A, Fig.
8; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4.
These locations are manned by LILCO because traffic must be kept moving through them in order to permit evacuees to follow the routes prescribed in the LILCO Plan. The evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO Players during the exercise were premised on the assumption that such prescribed routes were in fact available for full capacity use throughout the evacuation process. Thus, there are a substantial number of places where impediments are likely to occur because of antici-pated heavy traffic, and where their occurrence would have significant impact upon i
. the ability to implement an evacuation, but which were ignored in FEMA's evaluation of LILCO's ability to remove impediments. Furthermore, the two locations actually cho-sen for the impediment demonstrations during the exercise are virtually the only loca-tions on the evacuation routes chosen for the impediment messages which would allow easy re-routing of evacuation traffic around the traffic impediments, assuming arguendo, LILCO had been able to respond to the locations of the impediments in a timely manner.
In light of the small sample of. traffic impediment locations observed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to the single attempted impediment response it did observe, and the unique and unrepresentative impediment locations chosed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area are without basis and invalid, thereby precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shorehant accident.
CONTENTION EX 22. The exercise scenario and the activities, reports, and events which occurred during the exercise include or are premised upon certain as-l l
sumptions, enumerated below, which conflict with established facts, uncontroverted evidence, and ASLB findings. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and conclusions identified
'in subpart A below, which incorporate or are based upon such false assumptions, are without basis and invalid, and cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise 1
precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and P
will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 l
l (a)(1), and, accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
A.
In the LILCO Plan, the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is identified l
as the only " reception center" for evacuees other than those with special needs. Thus,
o under the Plan, evacuees would be directed to report to the Coliseum for radiological monitoring and decontamination, registration, and direction to facilities for sheltering.
Plan at 4.2-1 thru 4.2-2: OPIP 4.2.3. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9,17,19 and 21, are all based upon an assumption that the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is available for use by LILCO and the American Red Cross as a Reception Center for the registration and radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles pursuant to the LILCO Plan. That assump-tion is false. In fact, there is no valid agreement permitting the use of the Coliseum as set forth in the LILCO Plan. Nassau County had expressly refused to agree to, or per-mit, the use of Nassau County facilities as part of, or to implement, the LILCO Plan.
See Nassau County Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 782B-1986, June 16,1986. Since the basic underlying premise of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9,17,19, and 21 were met or partly met (see FEMA Report at 34,58,74 and 80) is fac-tually and legally incorrect, those conclusions are without basis and are invalid. Be-cause the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumption that the Nassau Coliseum would be available as a reception center, the results of the exer-cise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
CONTENTION EX 36-37: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Contention EX 36. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that subsequent to their adoption of the original recommendations from the onsite staff at the EOF, LERO personnel made protective action recommendations without apparent basis, failed to consider alternative protective measures that could have resulted in more dose savings, and made inappropriate recommendations, in viola-tion of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.m. Thus, LILCO f ailed to satis-fy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance
. s that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Specifically, LERO personnel had no apparent basis for the decision to recom-i
. mend that people in the original downwind zones -i.e, zones A-M, Q, and R - should 2
as late as 3:48 leave their homes and attempt to evacuate if they had not done so earil-er. EBS messages simulated every 15 minutes between 12:06 and 3:48 contained such a recommendation. The documents generated at the EOC fail to indicate that any calcu-lations or dose projections were performed to determine if this remained an appropri-ate recommendation for the entire period during which it was broadcast. There is no indication that the continuing appropriateness of such a recommendation was ever even carefully considered by LERO personnelin the EOC.
In fact, while such EBS messages were being simulated (beginning at 12:06), the EOF was projecting that a wind shift would direct the plume away from the original downwind zones as early as 3:00. LERO personnel were aware of that projection. In light of that projection, however, it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet lef t their homes by, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes af ter the wind had shif ted, rather than f
.getting on the roads with no protection before the wind shif t.
Af ter the shif t, such persons may have been able to evacuate with a likelihood of less exposure and smaller 4
doses. The failure even to consider such an alternative protective action for those in the original downwind zones who had not yet evacuated is significant because the LERO l
players knew that as of 2:40, according to the exercise controller, there were still sup-i-
posedly 20,550 people who had not yet evacuated.
I CONTENTIONS EX 38-39: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC INFORMATION CONTENTION EX 38. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and
._,-__.r._
. - non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center (" ENC"),
f thus failing to implement Section 3.8.B and OPIP 3.8.1 of the LILCO Plan. The Plan f
(
provides, in pertinent part, that: "All Public Information personnel will con er on a regular basis to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed" (Plan at 3.8-4); news briefings at the ENC "shall serve three pur-poses:
to provide accurate information on a timely basis a
to ensure public and media confidence to prevent misinformation and rumors" a
(Plan at 3.8-5); and, press conferences will" provide up-to-date information, respond to l
any rumor received, and answer any questions the media may have." Plan at 3.8-6.
Similarly, OPIP 3.8.1 provides that the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is to
" confer with the Director of Local Response...and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to maintain consistent information content"; "obtain up-to-date information regarding offsite emergency response in preparing press releases"; and,
" correct misinformation by...providing accurate information to LILCO Rumor Control i
personnel and answering questions regarding local response."
As the examples in subparts A-Q below reveal, however, during the exercise LILCO was incapable of com-plying with these directives. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives ENC 1 and 3-6, l
and the exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be implemented by LERO personnel and falls to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 S II.G.4.
Exercise results which individually and collectively evidence these LILCO fail-t ures and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident include the follow-i ing:
1 4
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A.
The ENC was not declared operational until 8:25, and there was appar-ently no contact with the media by LERO personnel at the ENC until'aiter that time.
I The first press briefing was not held until 8:40. Thus, the ENC provided no information at all to the media until almost three hours af ter the emergency was declared, and long af ter the 6:52 EBS message announcing the Alert condition and school closings had been broadcast. In a real emergency such a delay would result in substantial confusion, spec-ulation, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emer-gency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently dissemi-nated by LILCO personnel.
B.
LERO News Release No. I announcing an Alert condition and the alleged fact that there had been no release of radiation was not provided to the press by the ENC until 8:21. Although a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19 and the ENC was informed of that declaration at that time (FEMA Report at 25), no mention was made to the media at 8:21 that a Site Area Emergency had been declared, that a minor release of radiation had occurred, and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed. Thus, the first LERO press release did not contain up-to-date information, and it was inaccurate.
C.
The Site Area Emergency, radiation release, and dairy animal recommen-dation was announced by EBS broadcast at 8:41. Despite the fact that the decision to issue that EBS message was made by the LERO Director at 8:37, LERO News Release No. 2, which included the information in that EBS message, was not approved by the Director until 9:00. As of 9:15, it had still not been distributed to the press.
D.
Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information, including EBS messages and press releases, to the media.
FEMA Report at 53.
=-
, E.
Insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in the media briefing room contributed to the confusing and unclear information being disseminated by LERO per-sonnel. FEMA Report at 52,54.
F.
Copies of EBS messages provided to the media contained extraneous infor-mation that should have been deleted, and thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsis-f i
tent with radio broadcasts. See FEMA Report at 53,54.
G.
LERO press releases were distributed much too late, and were inaccurate and in conflict with other data in'the public domain by the time they were provided to the media. Although the ENC received LERO Press Release No. 3 at 10:15, it was not posted at the ENC for the press until 11:10. LERO Release No. 4 was received by the i
ENC at 10:45, but was not posted until 11:56. LERO Release No. 5 covered the 10:24 7
evacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R. It was approved by the LERO Di-4 rector at 11:02, but did not even arrived at the ENC until 11:36, and was not made available to the press until sometime later. LERO Release No. 6, approved by the Di-i l
rector at 12:25, was not posted at the ENC until 2:10; LERO Release No. 7, approved at 1:11, was received by the ENC at 1:47, but not posted for the press until 3:07.
H.
The LERO Director decided to recommend evacuation to the entire EPZ 4
j j
at 11:46 and the recommendation was announced to the public in a 12:00 noon EBS mes-sage. FEMA Report at 26. However, the ENC did not inform the media of the Direc-tor's decision, or the content of the 12:00 EBS message, which was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes thereaf ter, until 12:47.
I.
Although LERO workers were instructed to ingest KI tablets at 9:45, i
LERO ENC personnel did not decide to inform the media of that fact until 1:05, and the
\\
media was then requested not to print that information. Such a delay and the attempt to conceal pertinent information about the health-threatening effects of the accident f
would result in further reductions in LILCO's credibility and refusals of the media and f*
the public to obey LILCO's advice during a real emergency.
. J.
During press conferences, LERO personnel were unable to respond satis-factorily or accurately to questions about evacuation. In addition, the ENC personnel were unable to provide any information to the media, much less accurate and timely data, concerning traffic conditions, conditions or evacuation activity on the water por-ticn of the EPZ, or protective actions for the correctional facility in the EPZ. They also were unable to respond to questions about manpower at bridges and tunnels on evacuation routes, or the activities of the Nassau County Police. In addition, LERO Public Information personne1'were unable to contact Marketing Evaluations, Inc., in a timely manner and therefore had no information concerning siren activation f ailure.
L.
The log kept by ENC personnel recorded that at 12:01, the gravel truck impediment was being removed. In fact, as of that time, no equipment had yet arrived at the site of the gravel truck impediment, and when it eventually did arrive, it was in-adequate to remove the impediment. See FEMA Report at 36-37. Thus, ENC personnel had inaccurate information which, if released, would have misled the pubile into believ-ing the intersection was clear when in fact it was not.
M.
At the 1:48 press conference, LERG personnel at the ENC were not able to respond to questions about the fuel truck impediment, although that impediment had arisen almost 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier.
N.
At press conference, LERO personnel frequently misstated facts and pro-vided inaccurate information. For example, at 9:16, it was incorrectly announced that the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:23, and that plant shutdown had occurred at 5:15. The correct times were 8:19 and 5:15. Similarly, at 11:38, LERO in-correctly announced that the winter population of the EPZ is higher than the summer population.
O.
Although LILCO Press Releases 4 and 5 were received by the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, they were not given to the Media Monitoring personnel at the ENC until 9:31, i
. P.
The Rumor Control operation, which is coordinated and controlled by LERO Public Information and ENC personnel, was ineffective as described in Conten-tion EX 39.
Q.
Neither LILCO's proposal to expedite the rilanamination of information by substituting summary information for press releases and transmitting it by computer to the ENC, nor its proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC, would resolve the deficiencies revealed during the exercise, including those listed in this contention.
Nor would replacement of copying machines. See letter dated June 20,1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. I at 7; letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1270), Att. I at 2.
CONTENTION EX 39. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain infor-mation and ask questions. Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP 3.8.1. And, during the exercise, simulat-ed EBS messages instructed the public to call LILCO District Offices to have questions answered. Thus, the Plan provides, under the heading " Correcting Misinformation,"
that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases.
If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plant at 3.8-5. During the exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District Offices and Call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and accurate informa-tion to the public, to provide such information in a timely manner, and to provide
. x.
consistent, coordinated, and non-conflicting information to the public. Thus, LILCO failed to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. It also failed to com-ply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy objectives ENC 1,3-6. These ex-amples of repeated errors and failures demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
A.
During the exercise, the LILCO District Offices and Call Boards consis-tently had incorrect or superseded information concerning the status of the emergency, protective action recommendations, and other basic data. Thus, they were unable to l
provide accurate and essentialinformation to members of the public or the prest. In-stead, if Call Board operators received calls from the public, as postulated in the LILCO i
Plan to occur during an actual emergency, they could have provided only information that was inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent and in conflict with that being released i
by other LILCO personnel at other locations (for example, in EBS messages or press re-d l
leases). See FEMA Report at 53. For example:
(1)
The logs kept by all the LILCO Call Board operators, including, for exam-l ple, those kept by the Port Jefferson, Patchogue, and Brentwood Customer Call Board operators, indicate that the information available to them until approximately 11:00 i
stated that a Site Area Emergency existed, even though a General Emergency had been declared at 9:39.
l (11)
The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that people in zones A-M. Q, and R had been advised to evacuate unt11 approximately 12:35, even though that advisory had first been issued to the public at f
10:24.
l l
(iii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that LERO had recommended evacuation of the entire EPZ until ap-proximately 2:00, even though that advisory had first been made at approximately 12:00 noon.
(iv) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the. operators did not receive word of the declaration of an Unusual Event until approximately 8:15, al-though that declaration was in f act made at 5:40; similarly, the Call Board operators did not receive work that an Alert had been declared until approximately 8:30, although the declaration was made at 6:17 and an EBS message was simulated at 6:52.
(v)
The Call Board logs indicated that most Call Board operators did not re-ceive word that schools were supposed to be implementing early dismissals until ap-proximately 8:50, although an EBS message regarding early school closings was simulat-ed at 6:52.
B.
During the exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt re-sponses to simulated rumor messages, which were in the scenario purporting to be tele-phone inquiries from members of the public to LILCO Call Boards and District Offices.
Instead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer. For example:
(1)
A rumor message inquiring whether the appliances in the caller's home were radioactive was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 1:45; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:24.
(11)
A rumor message inquiring what to do about a daughter not yet home from Shoreham-Wading River High School was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 10:00; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:52.
(111) A rumor message inquiring whether the caller, from Bellport, should evacu-ate was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 12:05; a response was not re-layed to the caller until 1:00.
(iv) A rumor message inquiring about how extensive evacuation will be, and what to do about trucks going into the Shoreham area, was given to the Hicksville Call Board operators at 7:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:20.
i (v)
A rumor message inquiring whether the ecoling towers on the Shoreham plant had blown up was given to the Riverhead Call Board operators at'1:30; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:48.
t j
(vi) A rumor message inquiring if lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty that morning were safe to eat was received by the Riverhead District Office at 11:30; a re-sponse was not relayed to the originating party until 12:28.
(vil) A rumor message from a caller whose husband works at the plant and was not home yet, inquring whether he had been hurt, was given to the Brentwood Call Board operator at 12:43; a resppnse was not relayed to the caller until 1:30.
(vill) A rumor message inquiring whether the plant had been taken over by Arab terrorists was received at 9:54; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:37.
l (ix) A rumor message inquiring what to do with a horse was given to the Port Jefferson Call Board operator at 10:14; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:47.
(x)
A rumor message inquiring how to get off Shelter Island because the ferry i
had been cancelled was given to the Hamptons Call Board operators at 2:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:24.
(xi) A rumor message from a caller who lived in Medford, but worked in Melville, inquiring what he should do was given to the Huntington Call Board operator at 2:32; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:05.
(xil) A rumor message inquiring if he could eat the food in his refrigerator was given to the Babylon Call Board operator at 11:59; a response was not relayed to the caller until 12:29.
(xill) A rumor message from a dairy farmer asking what to do if he is asked to evacuate was received at 9:38; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:12.
l
. C.
During the exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide accurate, satisf actory, or reasonable advice or information to simulated public inquiries set forth in rumor messages. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or superseded information or demonstrated poor judgement in responding. For example:
(1)
In response to an inquiry (at 7:51) from a person who "has trucks going to I
Suffolk," as to how extensive evacuation would be, the Hicksville Call Board operator responded (at 8:20) that the only protective action was the closing of schools, and that there had been no evacuation recommended. As of 8:20, however, LERO was already beginping to " pre-stage" for an evacuation, and a Site Area Emergency had been de-clared. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate and dangerous to advise the simu-lated caller to proceed as planned with sending trucks into the EPZ area.
(11)
In response to an inquiry at 11:30 (Rumor Control Question No.11) whether lobsters caught that morning on the Shoreham jetty were safe to, eat or touch, the Riverhead Call Board operator responded (at 12:28) that there was no reason to believe, and no data to indicate, that anything was wrong with the lobsters. As of 12:28, howev-i er, there had already been a major release of radiation, and the entire EPZ had been ad-vised to evacuate. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate to advise the simulated caller to eat the lobsters, without even inquiring as to when that morning they had been caught, and where the caller was located.
(iii)
In response to a rumor message from The New York Times, simulated at 8:45, and inquiring "what's going on" at the Shoreham plant, the rumor control re-sponder related that at 5:40 an Unusual Event had been declared, and at 6:17 an Alert had been declared.
By 8:45, however, a Site Area Emergency had been declared, schools had been closed and simulated EBS messages had advised that dairy animals be put on stored feed. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
. (iv)
In response to a rumor message simulated at 3:15, inquiring whether there had been a release, the rumor control responder provided data as of 1:00. Thus, the in-formation provided was inaccurate at the time given, and was misleading and inconsis-tent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
(v)
A rumor message simualted at 11:45 was purportedly from Dan Rather, who wanted "to take a TV crew into the Shoreham plant," and inquired how to get there. In response, the rumor control responder stated "We don't advise going to the plant. There is a Site Area Emergency. You will be in the way." The responder then gave directions to the plant. At 9:39, however, a General Emergency had been declared and as of 11:45, LILCO was recommending that almost all of the EPZ be evacuated. (At 11:46, the decision was made to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ.) The suggestion that going to the plant was inadvisable but nonetheless possible was incorrect, and such sugges-tion, combined with the giving of road direc.tions to the plant, indicated extremely poor judgment.
(vi)
In response to a rumor message simulated at 1:17 inquiring "what areas are to be evacuated." the rumor control responder at 1:21 related that zones A-M, Q and R should evacuate. By 12:00, however, a simulated EBS message had advised that the en-tire 10-mile EPZ was to evacuate. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
(vil) A rumor message was simulated at 1:15 from a caller in Wading River who reported that people on his street were evacuating, that he could not walk, and did not know what to do. The response to this call apparently was a recording that the office had been " closed due to conditions at the Shoreham plant," and giving the telephone numbers for electrical emergencies. The failure to properly advise the caller how to arrange for transportation for the mobility impaired was grossly improper.
i 5
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the exercise demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of implementing its proposed rumor control procedures, or providing accurate, necessary, and consistent information to the public during an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654,5 II.G.3.c. Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
[ CONTENTION EX 44. First sentence admitted as additional basis for 38-39.]
s The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that as a result of LILCO's inability to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public (see Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 40.C) there would be a substantial evacuation shadow --or voluntary evacuation of persons not advised to evacuate - in the event of a Shoreham accident. See 21 NRC at 644,670.
CONTENTIONS EX40-41: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS CONTENTION EX 40. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Plan falls to provide any traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long af ter they are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate.
Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Controls Posts, " guiding" motorists and implementing traffic control strategies to assure that evactees will follow the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan, during the entire evacuation process. See e_.1, App. A at IV-5 thru -72e and V-2: OPIP 3.6.3. Indeed, every LILCO EBS message supposedly broadcast every fif teen minutes, beginning with the message simulated at 10:24, stated that LERO Traffic Guides would be in place along evacuation routes to guide evacuees. However, for the reasons set forth in more detail below, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654
. II.J.9 and J.10, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 7,11,16, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 9,10, FIELD 9,11 and the exercise precludes a finding that the protective action of evacua-tion can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Specifically:
A.
During the exercise and pursuant to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Figs.
3.3.3 and 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Traffic Guides were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until af ter the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. That declaration occurred at approximately 8:19, and the Traffic Guides were presumably notified of the emergency beginning shortly thereaf ter. By 9:00, only two Traffic Guides had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (52 Traffic Guides are required under the Plan); only one had reported to the Port Jefferson Staging Area (72 are required under the Plan); and one had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (41 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, still only 19 had reported to Riverhead, 10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared - 9:39 - only 40 percent of the LERO Traffic Guides essential to the imple-mentation of evacuation according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were at their posts in the field to perform their duties under the Plan.
B.
Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3 and during the exercise, no Traffic Guides were dispatched from the three staging areas until af ter the evacuation recommenda-tion had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. And, subsequent to their being dispatched, it took substantial amounts of time before Traffic Guides arrived at their posts and were in a position to perform the functions which the Plan and the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise assumed will be performed throughout the entire evacuation process. Specificially:
(1)
During the exercise, the EBS messages recommending evacuation were simulated at 10:24 (zones A-M, Q, and R) and 11:46 (entire EPZ). The dispatch of Traf-fic Guides began at Riverhead at 10:25 and 12:00, and was not completed until shortly
_ _ -. ~
after 11:00 and approximately 12:20, respectively. Traffic Guides at Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at 10:30; the process was not completed until either 12:20 or
~
12:49. Dispatching at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at approximately 10:59.
(11)
Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging Areas did not begin arriving at their posts until 11:00, with the last Guide reporting his arr'ival at 11:40. From the Port Jefferson Staging Area where dispatching was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49. Traffic Guides took up to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10. See FEMA Report at 74. And, other Riverhead Traffic Guides were still not at their posts as of 12:50, even though in at least one case (TCP 26), the Guide had been dispatched at 11:08 - almost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> earlier.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that no one would attempt to evacuate prior to the EBS announcement at 10:24, the LILCO Plan, as demonstrated during the exercise, fails to provide any evacuation assistance, or the " guidance" necessary to ensure that evacuees follow the prescribed routes which form the basis of the evacuation time esti-mates used during the exercise, until long af ter evacuees would be on the road at-tempting to evacuate. Indeed, LILCO does not even have the potential capability to provide such assumed assistance and guidance under the Plan as written, since ac-cording to the Plan no Traffic Guides are to be dispatched until af ter there has been an i
cvacuation order.
C.
Assuming arguendo that no members of the public would seek to evacuate f
prior to the simulated EBS evacuation advisory at 10:24, once that radio broadcast had been made people would expect LILCO Traffic Guides to be in place to provide assis-tance and guidance with respect to evacuation routes. The EBS message supposedly l
aired during the exercise at 10:24 so states, and that message was supposedly repeated i
,-.,.,,.-..,._,._,..-m...,-,-
,-..,n.nn,.
,,..n..
.,.-.,.---_-_,-,n.--._,w..
. every 15 minutes. Thus, according to LILCO's own emergency information repeatedly disseminated to the public beginning at 10:24, Traffic Guides would be in place. This information was false, and the LILCO personnel who issued it knew or should have known that it was false. The provision in the LILCO Plan requiring the issuance of such a false and misleading statement, and the actual use of such a message during the exer-cise, is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, and constitutes a violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7).
In addition, by creating public expectations that such evacuation assistance, including directions and guidance as to evacuation routes, was available when in fact it was not, the likelihood is substantially increased that none of LILCO's recommeadations or other emergency information would be believed or followed by the public.
E.
Finally, attempting to dispatch Traffic Guides to those Traffic Control l
Posts within a 2-mile zone of the plant upon the issuance of an evacuation order, even assuming arguendo that the " dispatch" activities could be accomplished more expedi-tiously than they were during the exercise, would not correct or even substantially less-en the defect inherent in the LILCO Plan. (See letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl.1 at 16.) In light of the notification and reporting provisions for Traffic Guides, and the realities that an evacuation order can swif tly follow a Site Area Emergency declaration and evacuation will begin prior to an official evacuation advisory, such an attempted "fix" to the fundamental defect in the LILCO Plan would be ineffective.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in subparts A-C and E, the LILCO Plan is l
fundamentally flawed in that it fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and l
NUREG 0654 5 II.J. The exercise thus precludes a finding of a reasonable assurance I
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
_f7_
CONTENTION EX 41.
The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan and in LILCO's ability to control and manage an orderly evacuation of the EPZ pursuant to that Plan in that the Plan fails to provide - and LILCO failed to demonstrate - an ability to remove impediments from the roadways until long af ter evacuation had begun. There are likely to be accidents and other events creating blockages on evacuation routes during a Shoreham emergency. LILCO's inability to deal with such impediments will cause delay in the implementation of protective actions and preclude LILCO from managing an orderly evacuation of the EPZ. Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, It is assumed that evacuees will be able to, and will, follow the LILCO-prescribed evac-uation routes, and that Road Crews will remove impediments efficiently so that the prescribed routes remain open and available for use at full cap' city during the entire a
evacuation process. See, g, App. A at IV-19, -23, V-1 thru -5, Table XII, and Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3. Not only did the exercise reveal that LILCO's proposal for the removal of impediments to evacuation is inherently unworkable, but it also demonstrated that the LERO players were incapable of properly responding to, much less " removing," the "im-pediments" created by FEMA's free play messages. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan, noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.k, and failure to satisfy exercise objectives, including EOC 5, 7, 8,11,16,17, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9,10, and FIELD 9,10. Thus, the exercise results preclude a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident.
A.
During the exercise and according to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Fig.
3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.2; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Road Crews were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until af ter the declaration of a l
Site Area Emergency. Such declaration was made at approximately 8:19. Even on I
t
. m. -
-$8-February 13, when the LERO personnel were on notice that they would be called to re-port for duty, most Road Crew personnel did not arrive at the staging' areas until well af ter 10:00. Thus, at 9:00, only one Road Crew member had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (10 are required under the Plan), none had reported to Port Jefferson (14 are required under the Plan), and none had reported to Patchogue (14 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, af ter a General Emergency had been declared, only two had re-ported to Riverhead, none to Port Jefferson, and two to Patchogue. And at 10:20 -
+
about the time of LILCO's EBS announcement advising evacuation - still only 8 had re-ported to Riverhead, seven to Port Jefferson, and 10 to Patchogue. By 10:00, eight had reported to Riverhead, one to Port Jefferson, and five to Patchogue. And at 10:20 -
about the time of LILCO's EBS announcement advising evacuation - still only 8 had re-ported to Riverhead, seven to Port Jefferson, and 10 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared - 9:39 - only 10.5 percent of the Road Crew person-nel essential to the implementation of the LILCO Plan was mobilized, even though the circumstances - a pre-announced exercise - were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance. In fact, even at the time of LILCO's evacuation advisory, only about 65 percent of LILCO's Road Crew personnel were mobilized, even though the circumstances - a pre-announced exercise - were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance. Thus, even assuming that no member of the public at-tempted to evacuate prior to the evacuation order, at the time of that order the LERO l
personnel essential to the implementation of the recommendation according to the LILCO Plan were not even fully mobilized.M 1/
Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3, during the exercise the Road Crew personnel were not dispatched from the three staging areas until af ter the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. The dispatch of Road Crew person-nel began at Riverhead at about 10:47 and was completed at about 11:00; it began at about 10:46 at Port Jefferson and was completed at about 12:40 (with two Road Crews (footnote continued)
B.
LILCO was incapable of responding as required to either of the two 4
free play messagen indicating existence of major road impediments,'one involving a gravel truck and three cars, and the other involving a fuel truck. See FEMA Report at
]
30, 36-38, 57-58, 65. For example, although FEMA's free play messages were injected at about 10:40 for the gravel truck accident and 11:00 for the fuel truck accident i
(FEMA Report at 36):
l (1)
The Evacuation Route Coordinator f ailed to advise the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews of pertinent facts, including that the 1
t gravel truck impediment was a multiple vehicle accident, that the fuel truck impedi-ment involved the possibility of tire since fuel was leaking, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked by the fuel truck. Such facts were required to be communicated i
under LILCO's Plan (m OPIP 3.6.3), and the consequence of not doing so during the ex-l ercise was to delay substantially LILCO's response to the impediments (by approxi-mately three hours for the fuel truck impediment). See FEMA Report at 30,36-37,57.
(11)
The LERO Evacuation Coordinator, who is to be kept informed of any prob-lems with implementing an evacuation of the EPZ, including impediments or suspected impediments (m OPIP 3.6.3), was not informed of either the gravel truck or the fuel truck impediment until af ter about 12:13, and even then it was FEMA, not any LERO personnel, which brought information regarding the impediments to the Evacuation Coordinator's attention.
FEMA Report at 36.
Only thereaf ter did the Evacuation Coordinator discuss LILCO's response to the impediments with his staff.
Notwithstanding that FEMA prompted discussion, however, (footnote continued) having to travel to Brentwood to pick up their tow trucks); it began at about 11:28.
Subsequent to their being dispatched, it to substantial time before crews were in a posi-tion to drive to an identified impediment in the field and attempt to remove it. Thus, for example, as noted in subpart B of this contention, a Road Crew to' deal with the simulated fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the impediment scene until about
(
~
2:10, three hours af ter it had been dispatched. FEMA Report at 37, 57-58.
(a)
As late as 12:30, the Transportation Support Coordinator had not been informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck; (b)
As late as 1:48, the Road Logistics Coordinator had not been in-formed that equipment needed to be sent to the site of the fuel truck accident (despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with respect to road logistics with members of his staff as early as 12:16). As a result, the Road Crew assigned to the fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the scene of the simulated im-9 pediment until approximately 2:10 - over three hours af ter the impediment had first been made known to LILCO by FEMA. FEMA Report at 36,57.
(c)
There was no EBS broadcast, or other public dissemination of infor-L mation about the impediments, until 1:45.
(iii)
LILCO's response, once it had finally begun, was inadequate with respect to i
both simulated impediments.
(a)
Only one tow truck was dispatched to the scene of the gravel truck j
impediment and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road. As a re-sult, there was inadequate equipment available to remove the impediment, which would have required 30 minutes or more to clear even with the proper equipment. See FEMA Report at 37,65.
(b)
Although Road Crews from the Port Jefferson Staging Area were dispatched by 11:50, the Road Crew assigned to respond to the fuel truck impediment (within Port Jefferson's area of responsibility) did not arrive at the impediment scene until about 2:10, by which time the FEMA evaluator had lef t. FEMA Report at 57-58.
At about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator at the EOC had requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Coordinator to dispatch the Route Spotter on whose route the fuel truck impediment was located. This Route Spotter, however, was l
not dispatched until about 12:02, a delay of over 45 minutes which interfered with verification of the impediment. FEMA Report at 37.
l
-4'l-E.
The proposal to add a Traffic Engineer to the LERO personnel at the EOC (s_ee letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl.1 at 1) would not eliminate the flaws in the Plan which were dem-onstrated by the e,xercise, since that person's assigned task would be "to assist in
)
evaluating road impediments and develophig alternate routing." Even assuming such a person could provide such " assistance," it would have no impact on the basic structural flaws in the Plan and demonstrated incapacities of LERO personnel described in this contention.
CONTENTION EX 47: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO POST-EVACUATION SERVICES FOR EVACUEES CONTENTION EX 47.
The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO failed to demonstrate the ability to register, monitor and decontaminate evacuees from special facilities who are transported to reception cen-ters other than the Nassau Coliseum, or that such activities could be accomplished within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Thus, LILCO has not satisfied ob-jectives FIELD 13 and 21, and the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1),(b)(8),(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.9,10, and 12.
i According to the estimates in the Plan, if there were an evacuation of the entire EPZ, there could be as many as 1600 residents of nursing and adult homes, health care and other special f acilities, all with special needs, requiring that they be sent to special reception facilities (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), plus tens of thousands of school children. This number could be increased by approximately 850 persons if the hospitals in the EPZ and
(
the Suffolk Infirmary also were evacuated. Ld. The LILCO Plan, Rev. 6, which was the subject of the exercise, has no provision for the registration, radiological monitoring or decontamination of such individuals; nor does it include provisions for reception centers i
for the vast majority of such individuals, or agreements indicating that any such recep-tion centers are in fact available or adequate to serve that purpose. Rather,it includes
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,. ~. _
m
. registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures to be imple-mented, and equipment and personnel to be present, only at the Nassau Coliseum and the Emergency Worker Decontamination Center. OPIP 4.2.3; OPIP 4.3.1. This is a defi-ciency in the Plan which violates NUREG 0654 S ILA.3, J.10.d and 12, and 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10). It precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is adequate, or that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Furthermore, the proposal in the new Revision 7 version of OPIP 4.3.1, purport-edly to address this deficiency (see letter dated June 20,1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton, (SNRC-1270), and att. I at 4), fails to correct this deficiency for the fol-lowing reasons:
A.
The proposal to send only one monitor to each special facility re-ception center - assuming arguendo reception centers existed - is unworkable. See OPIP 4.3.15 5.1.6 (Rev. 7). For example, one of the few special facility reception cen-ters designated by LILCO is expected to receive up to 465 evacuees. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2.
One person could not adequately or effectively perform the necessary monitoring, recordkeeping, and related activities that would be required at such a center.
B.
The proposal to have monitoring done as evacuees leave their buses, ambulances or ambulettes (s_ee OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. It could not be done in inclement weather, there is no assurance that reception centers -
assuming arguendo they existed - would be laid out to permit such activities at unload-ing points, and the evacuees, who by definition have special needs, c-annot be subjected to waits in buses or ambulances while lines of others arriving ahead of them are moni-tored by one LERO worker.
C.
The proposal to have bus drivers keep necessary monitoring records (s_ee_ OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. Such personnel have not been trained
o
-d3-for such a function, nor have they been properly equipped to fulfill it. It is also im-practical to expect a bus driver to be able to perform such a function. '
D.
The proposal to have persons found to be contaminated "get back on the bus" and eventually driven to the Nassau Coliseum (see OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.4.9.d (Rev. 7)) is unworkable, impractical and dangerous. The evacuees at special facility re-ception centers are, by definition, in need of special care that cannot be provided at the Nassau Coliseum. To refuse to decontaminate them, and instead to send them to a facility that is not equipped to handle their special needs, and in the process delay their decontamination and also expose them t.o other contaminated people on the bus, thus potentially increasing their exposure, is without justification.
E.
The provision that it is not necessary to provide monitoring person-nel at reception centers for schools (see OPIP 4.3.1. 55.1.5 (Rev. 7)) is wholly inade-quate. Assuming arguendo that such reception centers exist - and they do not - there is no basis for LILCO's refusal to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination services to the school children evacuees who would be taken there. This refusal is a clear violation of NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Furthermore, the LILCO explanation that such services are not necessary "if the parents are going to be picking up the children,"
makes no sense, and f ails to correct the deficiency.
3 Finally, during the exercise, messages apparently were transmitted among cer-tain LILCO players referring to requests that monitoring personnel be sent to certain hospitals and facilities outside the EPZ. The exercise failed to demonstrate, however, that LILCO is capable of providing registration and monitoring at actual reception cen-ters for actual evacuees with special needs during a real emergency, since: (a) such personnel were not actually sent to any special reception center facilities during the exercise (all the referenced facilities were only " simulated" reception centers in any F
event since none of them participated in the exercise); and (b) there was no p
t
. demonstration that the LILCO personnel were capable of (1) performing the necessary registration and monitoring of the number of evacuees with special needs likely to be taken to such facilities, or (ii) otherwise properly implementing necessary procedures for registering, monitoring and decontaminating evacuees at such facilities, even as-suming arguendo that facilities for use as special facility reception centers exist. Ac-cordingly, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
CONTENTION EX 49.
The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plar. in that LILCO is incapable of performing necessary registration and ra-dialogical monitoring of evacuees within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12.
For the reasons set forth below, during the exercise LILCO demonstrated that it has in-sufficient staffing, and insufficient equipment, to perform the necessary registration, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees which is required to effect an evacuation and to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10). Therefore, LILCO does not satisfy objective FIELD 21 and its Plan is fundamentally flawed since it has no capacity to handle satisfactorily the evacuees that may arrive af ter a Shoreham emergency.
A.
Although the Plan asserts that LILCO personnel assigned to the re-ception center to perform radiological monitoring will monitor one evacuee every nine-ty seconds (OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7), in fact during the exercise this procedure frequently took up to five minutes per evacuee. At that actual monitoring rate, the 78 monitors assigned to the reception center in the Plan could monitor only 11,232 evacuees in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (assuming no breaks, and assuming all monitors were constantly available and monitoring). This is far less than the 32,000 evacuees which LILCO used to believe might be directed to the Coliseum and demonstrates the fundamental flaw in LILCO's planning for evacuees needing monitoring and decontamination. In fact, during the
. exercise, LILCO in simulated EBS messages advised over 100,000 evacuees (4, all those in zones A, B, F, G, K, and Q) to report to the Nassau Coliseum for radiological monitoring because they had been potentially exposed to radiation during their simulat-ed evacuation trips. Clearly, under the LILCO Plan, even assuming that no persons other than those advised to do so by LILCO actually report to the reception center for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination, such a number of anticipated evacuees could not be monitored in a timely fashion - 4, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
B.
Furthermore, the LILCO proposal to telephone INPO, other power plants, and other entities to obtain additional monitoring personnel, and other features of the purported " alternate" monitoring plan in OPIP 4.2.3, S 5.11, were not imple-mented or demonstrated during the exercise. Such entities did not participate in the exercise nor was there any demonstration of the capability of those entities either to provide the personnel or equipment which LILCO players pretended would be available, or to provide them in a timely manner. In addition, FEMA did not evaluate the adequa-cy or implementability of any such proposals during the exercise. See FEMA Report at
- 81. Thus, the exercise provides no basis to find that such proposals could be imple-mented, or even if they could, that they would result in an ability to perform the neces-
[
sary monitoring of the number of evacuees anticipated to report to the reception cen-ter.
C.
There is no basis to assume that only those persons expressly ad-vised by LERO to report to the reception center for monitoring because of potential exposure during evacuation activities would actually seek such monitoring. Indeed, upon hearing that all residents of so many zones had potentially been exposed, substan-tially more people than the number expressed advised to report would be likely to seek such monitoring. Thus, the LILCO response would, in fact, be even more deficient than was demonstrated during the exercise.
l l
~,
. For the foregoing reasons, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S ILJ.12. The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
CONTENTION EX 50: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN LILCO'S TRAINING PROGRAM CONTENTION EX 50.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fun-damentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as the personnel of various organi-zations upon which LILCO relles for implementation of the Plan, are unable to carry out effectively or accurately the LILCO Plan because of inadequate training.
Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training and retraining of both LILCO and non-LILCO personnel in LERO. Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, and drills / exercises.
Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-7 and Figs. 5.1.1, 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1.
LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis. Plan at 5.1-1, 5.1-7 and 5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1.
At a minimum, this requires each LILCO worker in LERO, each year, to attend classroom instruction sessions on seven emergency response training modules and to participate in at least one tabletop session / drill / exercise; on average, however, LILCO personnel are required, each year, to attend classroom in-l struction sessions on nine modules and to participate in three tabletop ses-sions/ drills / exercises. Plan, Figs. 5.1.1 and 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1. Thus, as of the time of the February 13 exercise, the bulk of LILCO's LERO personnel had already undergone almost three years of training by LILCO involving, on average, classroom instruction on a total of 27 training modules and participation in nine tabletop session / drills / exercises.
The large number of training deficiencies revealed during the exercise collec-tively demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG 0654, S II.N and O, and violations of LILCO's Plan and procedures (chiefly OPIP
. 4 5.1.1), as well as LILCO's overall inability to implement the LILCO Plan and procedures as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). In its April 17, 1985 Partial Initial Decision, the ASLB found that the "LILCO Plan training program meets the regulatory standards,"
but that conclusion was expressly:
made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made by FEMA af ter a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfac-torily implemented with the training program submitted and that LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.
21 NRC 644, 756. No such findings have been made by FEMA; in fact, as noted below, in its Report FEMA identified a significant number of training deficiencies. The exer-cise results thus disclose fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
Every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the exercise is not described at length in this contention because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a failure of l
I the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary ac-tions. Thus, each " deficiency" and each "ARCA" identified by FEMA, plus each addi-tional error committed during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides a basis for the Governments' allegation that the exercise results demonstrate a funda-mental flaw in LILCO's training program. Because such errors are all identified else-where, in the interest of brevity and to avoid needless repetition, in subparts A-I below, the Governments use cross-references to identify specific examples of the training deficiencies which support this contention.E 4
2/
References in the subparts to FEMA deficiencies ("D") and ARCAs are to Tnble 3.1 in the FEMA Report, where the deficiencies and ARCAs are numbered and identi-fled by LILCO facility. Herein the Port Jefferson Staging Area is referred to as l
"PJSA"; the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas as "RSA" and "PSA"; and the Re-ception Center as "RC.
, A.
The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO program has not successfully or effectively trained or prepared LERO personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergen-cy. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Conten-tions EX.38, EX 39, EX 41, and in the following FEMA Comments: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; PSA-D-1; PSA-D-6; R-D-2; EOC-ARCAs-2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA-2; PSA-ARCAs-5, 7, 8, 9, 10,11.
B.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has been inef-fective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic knowledge and information essential to the i
ability to implement such procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 36, EX 38, EX 41, EX 49, and in the follow-ing FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; R-D-2; PSA-D-6; EOC-ARCAs-2, 5, 6, 7, 9; k
PJSA-ARCA-1; PSA-ARCAS 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; R-ARCAs 4,5,6; RC ARCA 1.
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C.
The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training program has not suc-cessfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to communicate necessary and suffi-cient data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 36-39, EX 38, EX 41, and in the following FEMA conclusions:
EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; EOC-ARCAs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARC A 8, 9, 11, 12; i
I R-ARCA 1.
D.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not suc-cessfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to follow directions given by superiors during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are de-l scribed in Ccntention EX 41, and in the following FEMA conclusions:
EOC-D-1; PSA-D-6; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 9,13,16; R-ARCAS 4,6; RC-ARCA 1.
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. E.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not suc-cessfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to exercise independent judgment or good judgment, or to use common sense in dealing with situations presented during an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 36, EX 38-41, and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-1; RD-2; EOC-ARCAs 2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCAs 5, 7, 8,10,12; R-ARCA 1.
F.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not suc-cessfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, accurate, consistent and nonconflicting information to' the public, through the media, during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 38, EX 40.C, and in the following FEMA conclusions: ENC-D-1; ENC-ARCAs 2,3.
1 G.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO has failed to provide training to persons and organizations relied upon for the implementation of its Plan other than those employed by LILCO. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation l
are described in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
H.
The exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, and related 1
areas. Such training deficiencies are very serious because members of the public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an ad hoc basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO personnel during a real emergency. Since LERO personnel do not understand and know how to use dosimetry equipment and the related procedures, they would be inca-pable of responding accurately or effectively concerning those subjects to members of L
o
. the public, or other workers expected to respond. The following exercise actions and events are examples of dosimetry-related training deficiencies:
FEMA Conclusions EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; RSA-ARCAs 4,5,6.
I.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's proposals to modify training ma-terials or procedures to " emphasize" such things as " accurate use of field data," the need "to relay instructions," "the need to be more precise with information," or other matters already in the procedures and training materials (see letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl.1) - training materials and procedures which have been so unsuccessful for three years - would not correct the flaws revealed by the exercise.
Respectfully submitted,
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Dodald P.Irw'i' Kath / E.B. Mc leskey I
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: November 17, 1986 l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-W.,0 In the Matter of W W 20 All :41 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY l
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
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l I hereby certify that copies of LILCO's Submission of the " Revised Standard Ver-sion" of the Intervenors' Exercise Contentions, LILCO's Response to Suffolk County, State of New York, and the Town of Southampton's First Request for Admissions, and LILCO's Revised Standard Version of the Intervenors' August 1,1986 Emergency Plan-ning Contentions Relating to the February 13,1986 Exercise were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by an asterisk, or by first-class mail, post-age prepaid.
John H. Frye, III, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 East-West Towers 4350 East-West Hwy.
Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.
- Bethesda, MD 20814 Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq.
Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
Dr. Oscar H. Paris
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing 7735 Old Georgetown Road i
Board (to mailroom)
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, MD 20814 East-West Towers 4350 East-West Hwy.
Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
- Bethesda, MD 20814 Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Mr. Frederick J. Shon
- Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Atomic Safety and Licensing Eighth Floor Board 1900 M Street, N.W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20036 East-West Towers, Rm. 430 4350 East-West Hwy.
Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. '*
Bethesda, MD 20814 Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Special Counsel to the Governor Secretary of the Commission Executive Chamber Attention Docketing and Service Room 229 Section State Capitol U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Albany, New York 12224 l
1717 H Street, N.W.
,i Washington, D.C. 20555 Mary Gundrum, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing 120 Broadway i
Appeal Board Panel Third Floor, Room 3-116 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10271 Washington, D.C. 20555
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P Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq.
Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
- Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Suffolk County Attorney 33 West Second Street H. Lee Dennison Building P.O. Box 298 Veterans Memorial Highway Riverhead, New York 11901 Hauppauge, New York 11787 Mr. Philip McIntire Dr. Monroe Schneider Federal Emergency Management North Shore Committee Agency P.O. Box 231 26 Federal Plaza Wading River, NY 11792 New York, New York 10278 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
New York State Department of Public Service, Staff Counsel Three Rockefeller Plaza l
l' Albany, New York 12223 XLEBML F1 athy B. McClesk5yl ' - ~ ~ ' '
Hunton & Williams j
707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
DATED: November 17,1986 l
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