AECM-85-0303, Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Table 3.3.7.4-1, Remote Shutdown Sys Controls by Deleting Item 20, RHR to RCIC Head Spray Line

Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Table 3.3.7.4-1, Remote Shutdown Sys Controls by Deleting Item 20, RHR to RCIC Head Spray Line

ML20135F116
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	09/13/1985
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20135F107	List: AECM-85-0303, Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Table 3.3.7.4-1, Remote Shutdown Sys Controls by Deleting Item 20, RHR to RCIC Head Spray Line ML20135F105
References
AECM-85-0303, AECM-85-303, TAC-59692, NUDOCS 8509170162
Download: ML20135F116 (3)

Text

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l . Attachmnt to AECM-85/0303

SUBJECT:

NLS-85/10 Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.4-1, page 3/4 3-71  ;

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DISCUSSION: It is proposed to delete item 20. RHR to RCIC Head Spray Line Valve, from the subject Remote Shutdown System Controls table. l (It should be noted that the affected technical specification ,

page reflects change NPE-85/06 previously requested by MP&L l serial AECM-85/0228, dated August 12,1985.)

JUSTIFICATION: The original design of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system incorporated coolant injection into the vessel  !

head through the RHR Head Spray line. Design evolution resulted  !

in this injection path design being abandoned in favor of the conventional injection path through the feedwater line used in earlier BWR designs. Operability of the RHR to RCIC Head Spray .

Line Valve is therefore not required for RCIC injection to the vessel. The remaining functions of the valve are to provide l an injection path for RHR Head Spray, which is not a safety

( function, and to provide containment and reactor coolant

! boundary isolation as required. The head spray function could .

be used to aid in the transition from hot to cold shutdown by introducing spray into the steam done to directly cool and condense steam in the vessel, thereby reducing pressure and  ;

temperature. However, RHR Head Spray is not required to effect safe shutdown of the reactor or mitigate the consequences of any ,

event analyzed in the CCNS FSAR.

A design change has been partially implemented which added a second motor operated valve to this line that in intended to serve as the containment isolation valve for this line. Qh valve will be powered from a separate ESF division than that of the valve which this change addresses, and is located inside the drywell. After approval of the requested license amendment which will allow this valve to be credited with the containment isolation function (see the MP&L memorandum dated August 12, 1985, O. D. Kingsley, Jr., to Mr. Harold R. Denton, MP&L serial '

AECM-85/0228), the new valve will be closed and help to provide ,

redundant assurance that the line will remain isolated and  !

diversion of coolant flow through the head spray line during  !

shutdown cooling or LPCI operation will not occur. ]

i Since the valve is not assumed for any safe shutdown or accident '

analysis, operability of it from the remote shutdown panel is not required, and the requirements of specification 3.3.7.4 are  ;

not applicable. Operability of the valve for the containment ,

and reactor coolant boundary isolation function will continue to be maintained in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications 4.6.4 and 4.4.3.2.2.

P DR h PDR

$b J13 MISC 85090401 - 1 l

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Attrchment to AECM-85/0303 l SIGNIFICANT llAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS:

The proposed technical specification change is administrative in nature in that it deletes inappropriate remote shutdown operability requirements for the containment isolation valve in the RIIR to RCIC Head Spray Line from Technical Specification i Table 3.3.7.4-1. The proposed change does not involve a change to the valve itself.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the l valve's primary function is containment and reactor coolant i

boundary isolation, it is normally closed and its operability l 1s not assumed for any safe shutdown or accident analysis.

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l The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in i a margin of safety because remote shutdown operability of the l valve is not required for safe shutdown.

l l Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards l

considerations.

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l J13HISC85090401 - 2

INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3.7.4-1 (Continued)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROLS MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE CONTROL Div 1 Div 2

12. RHR Injection Valves D b 2 2

13. RHR Test Line Valve 1 1

14. RHR HX Cond. to RCIC Valve 1 1

15. RHR HX Flow to Suppression Pool Valve 1 1

16. RHR Discharge to Radwaste Valve 1 1

17. b b RCIC Steam to RHR HX Valve 2 2

18. Diesel Generator HX Inlet Valve 1 1

19. Safety / Relief Valves b b 6 6

20. to k C liead Spray Lir.c Valve 1 " ^ -

21. RCIC Turbine Flow Controller 1 NA

22. RCIC Suction Flow Suppression Pool Valve 1 NA

23. RCIC Injection Shutoff Valve 1 NA

24. RCIC Suction From CST 1 NA

25. RCIC Recire. Nain Flow Bypass Valve 1 NA

26. RCIC Test M V to CST IB va/u OB 1 NA f

00

27. RCIC Test RTN to CSTA Valve 1 NA

28. Steam to RCIC Turbine Valve 1 NA

29. RCIC Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve 1 NA

30. RCIC Turbine Cooling Water Valve 1 NA

31. RCIC Turbine Local Control Select Switch 1 NA

32. RCIC Gland Seal Compressor 1 NA

33. Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve Reset Switch 1 1 NOTE: a. 1 per cooling tower fan

b. I per valve GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-71 Amendmen t No. __ l

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