Text

Proposed Tech Specs Associated W/Various ESF Systems Following Design Basis Fuel Handling Accident
	ML20079B450
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/09/1994
From:	; ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20079B445	List: ML20079B443; ML20079B450;
References
	NUDOCS 9501060109
	Download: ML20079B450 (125)
	v • d • e

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5 DEFINITIONS l

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

) !',

1.35 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor l

until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response' time i may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping se total steps such !

that the entire response time is measured. .

-9 e

REPORTABLE EVENT 1.36 A REPORTA8LE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

R0D DENSITY l .

1.37 ROD DENSITY shall be the number of control rod notches inserted as a fraction of the total number of control rod notches. All rods fully inserted '

is equivalent to 100% ROD DENSITY.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.38 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: l, 4g 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERA 8LE secondary containment automatic isolation system, or !

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( 2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, rupture disc I

H or deactivated automatic valve or damper, as applicable, secured [

in its closed position.

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b. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed. !'

c. The standby gas treatment system is in compliance with the require- r ments of Specification 3.6.6.3. j

d. The door in each access to the Auxiliary Building and Enclosure f Building is closed, except for normal entry and exit. l l i

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each Auxiliary Building and l Enclosure Building penetration, e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings, is i

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j GRAND GULF UNIT 1 17 Amendment No. 40, M ag i

' 9501060109 941109 !

PDR ADOCK0500g6 P ,

-- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_. . -- - -.-~ - _ . _ . _ - _. . ., . :

Attachment 3 to GNMO-94/pofyf Peos 3 of 20 i

INSERT A When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary l containment and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor j vessel. {

INSERT B ;

suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuelin the primary or secondary l containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. i i

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h $mb 3 k b/ M Q '9 f e t3r "ABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLA" ION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 20 -

Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 21 -

Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour or:

gb a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT I

"^.A SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN

'^5 *'+ T within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

b. In uspend CORE ALTERATIONS, IRATIONALCORN ITN*

~~ ;

andling of'irr'adiated fuel in the primary containment ana l o eratio s with_ a_ potential for draining the_r_ tactor _ vessel.

ACTION 22 -

Restore e manual initiation runction to vrt uBCE status w-48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 23 -

Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 24 Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 25 -

Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within one hour.

ACTION 26 -

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system inoperable. !

ACTION 27 -

Close the affected system isolatio.n. valves within one hour and declare the affected system 'in' operable.

ACTION 28 Within one hour lock the affected system isolation valves closed, i

or verify, by remote indication, that the valve is closed and electrically disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s) and declare the affected system inoperable. ;

ACTION 29 -

Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour and ;

declare the affected system or component inoperable or: !

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 be in at least HOT i SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION # suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and t operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. .

ACTION 30 -

Declare the affected SLCS pump inoperable. !

ACTION 31 -

Isolate the shutdown cooling connon suction line within one hour y, g if it is not needed for shutdown cooling or initiate action gg y within one hour to establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. i Wh handling irradiated fuel in oItainmentand during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the ;

re ctor vessel. - -- -

e ow c n e ser vacuum MSIV closure may be manually bypassed during ;

reactor SHUTDOWN or for reactor STARTUP when condenser vacuum is below the trip setpoint to allow opening of the MSIVs. The manual bypass shall be '

removed when condenser vacuum exceeds the trip setpoint. !

Trip function commom to RPS Instrumentation.

l During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. '

H With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 74. W ,IG4,___ i i

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5 1ABit 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued) o (4 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS ,

CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL 3a TRIP TUNCTION CHECK FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN taitCH TEST CALIBRATION w SURVElLLANCE-REQUIRE 0 6.

RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION (Continued)

e. Drywell Pressure - High S f.

Manual Initiation Q R(c) I. 2. 3 MA Qg ,) NA 1. 2, 3

/ cx # l- I.^5eN

__ ~- ~- -

c - -

=----c n handling r i irradiated fuel in the primary or secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS an

- The 5yitbap Aolp1_for ,drai gnithe_ reactor _ vessel. m -

g STARTUP when condenser vacuum is below the trip setpoint to allow opening The manual

bypass shall be removed uhen condenser vacuum exceeds the trip setpoint.

Y N#During With anyCORE controlALTERATION rod withdraun. and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

M or 3.9.10.2. Not appilcable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 (a) Manual initiation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdeun. All other b circuitry associated with annual initiation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once g per 92 days as part of circuitry required to be tested for automatic system isolation. R (b) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 92 days.

(c) Calibrate trip unit at least once per 92 days. p L

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T, IABLE 3.3.7.1-1 6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTAll0N I &

j 7, MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT

, INSIRUMENTAll0N OPERABLE CONDITIONS SEIPOINT RANGE ACil0N

! 9

1. Component Cooling l Water Radiation

~ Monitor 1 At all times 5 il x 10 cps /NA 10 to 100cpm 70 l

2. Standby Service Water System Radiation 1 Monitor 1/ heat 1, 2, 3, and* 11 x 10 5cpe/NA 10 to 106cpm 70 exchanger ,

train 1

3. Plant Service Water p 4-w System Radiation 5 0 1 Monitor 1 ## 11 x 10 cps /NA 10 to 10 cpm 70 h6 y 4. [bELETE0] % f-

TN

5. Carbon Bed Vault 6 Radiation Monitor 1 1, 2 < 2 x full power 1 to 10 mR/hr 72 Eackground/NA 0

6. Control Roon Ventila- 2/ trip (h) 93 b tion Radiation Monitor system 1,2,3 and** -<4 mR/hr/ 10' to 10 2mR/hr 73 N o

g

-<5 mR/hr L.

7. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust 2/ trip (h) -2 to 102mR/hr Radiation Monitor system At all times <2.0 mR/hr/ 10 74 k' rpg -

~<4 mR/hr(b)#

11/st RE '

Fuel Handling Area 2 9S (' 8.Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor 2/ trip (h) system 1,2,3,5 and**

<2mR/hrfd)#

10 to 10 er 75

{q 14 mR/hr L 9. Fuel Handling Area Pool

., Sweep [xhaust Radiation ~ 2/ trip (h) -2 to 102mR/hr

< 18 mR/hr/ 15

[" Monitor system (c) 10 h35mH/hrIdI#

9

4 TAsir 3.3.7.1-1 (Continued) 88EIAII(E_NB11mIIII; liesimsEllTATIGI o IEASUREMENT MINifRIM CHAIBIELS APPLICABLE ALA191/ TRIP E C0181110115 SEIFOINI RAlelif Agilge INSTORREllIATION GPERABLE l [

= ,

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10. Area Monitors

a. fuel Hand 11mg Area -

,Q y

y y Monitors %M Ilow Fuel (e) 52.5 mR/kr/ IIA le a to IM mR/hr 72 j I) 1

, m x i Stwase Vault Spent Fuel 1 (f) 52.5 mR/hr/ IIA le- toIp d/hr 72

M

2) rH Sterace Pasi (g) le a to IM eN/hr 72 O Oryer Storage 1 52.5eN/br/NA ,

3)

Area gy At all times se.5 d/hr/NA le a to It' mR/hr 72 9

b. Centrol Room I Radiatten Monitor A" -

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W h IBM beat en es_in g ration. _--

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- lis WMIiagdled 'In the - _i ry_er_ secondary,_ contg @ Asy;regelred change to 4 T Setpelet~te h during start _up test program.

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this setpelat shall be submitted to Ceemisstem within 30 days after test co gletten.

1. With ADNR heat e in operation.

(a) Trips system with 2 1s upscale-Ni N1 Ni, or one chamael upscale NI NI Ni and one channel dounscale er.

(h) se s en T1purgepenetrattens. [#h'M_ , = - -

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1c (c) With irradiated feel in spent fuel storage peel. .

Venti,^latten Y

1se _Isolatet the Agill_a - qk.

(d) =

bi (e) Nisa raiiT in the new fuel storage vae .

(f) With fuel in the spent feel storage peel. %e (g) With fuel in the dryer stor area. ,.

g (h) Two upscale NI Nt. ene opsca e NI Ni and one demnscale, or two dounscale signals from the same tripA cha system actuate the trip system and Ieltlate isolatten of the asseclated Iselatten valves.

l 3 h l g-3 placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for reguired servelliance 4

" that parameter. 8 E

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TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 (Conti;:ued) M e d J fo 9 0 i RADIATION IGNITORING INSTanaseNTATION Pgg & zo / !

EllE ACTION 70 -

With the required monitor inoperable, obtain and analyze at least one grab sample of the monitored parameter at least once 7er 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 71 -

[ DELETED)

ACTION 72-With the required monitor inoperable, perform area surveys of the monitored area with least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . portable monitoring instrumentation at ACTION 73 -

a. 1 With one of the required monitors in a trip system inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the downscale i tripped condition within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ; restore the inoperable ,

channel to 0PERA8tE status within 7 days or, within the !

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , initiate and maintain opera, tion of at least i one control room emergency filtration system in the isolation mode of operation. i

b. With both of the required monitors in a trip system -

inoperable, initiate and maintain operation of at least L one control room emergency flitration system in the l isolation mode of operation within one hour. L 9 /A2_t ACTION 74 -

a.

With one of the required monitors in a trip system inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the downscale i tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b. With two of the required monitors in a trip system inoperable, isolate the containment and drywell purge and vent penetrations within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . i ACTION 75 -

a. With one of the required monitors in a trip systes '

inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the downscale tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,

b. With two of the required monitors in a trip system inoperable, establish SECONDARY CONTA! MENT INTEGAITY with at least one standby gas treatment subsystem operating within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , i

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GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-61 .

Amendment No. -W/;

I 1AB(l; 4.3.1.1-1 RA01All0N MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVElttANCE REOUIREMENTS OPERATIONAL CHANNEL COISITIONS FOR CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHAfMIEL WHICM SURVEILLANCE f;

c INSTRUMENTATION EHECK TEST CAL 19 RATION REOUIRED h 1. Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor S M A At all times T

@ 2. Standby Service Water System Radiation Monitor M A 1, 2, 3, and*

q S

3. Plant Service Water System Radiation Monitor S M A f

4. [ DELETED] I, 2 Tc Carbon Bed Vault Radiation Monitor S M A

5. 131

6. Control Room Venttiation Radiation and**

i Monitor -_ _ - S 4 A I, 2,-

l 7. ft1Tiiiieift anil Drywell Ventilation ' At a?1 times "Q

l , Exhaust Radiation Monitor S

8. , Fuel Handling Area Ventilation .

S Q A I, 2, 3, 5 and**

i 4 Radiation Monitor .

g. I Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep

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10.

a. Fuel Hand 11mg Area Monitors

a. 1) New Fuel Storage Vault S M R (c)

2) Spent Fuel Storage Pool S M R i (d)

3) Dryer Storage Area S M R (e)

b. Control Room Radiation Monitor 5 *M R At all times

Jith RHRJea_1 tNChangers la_operatih /

/E/sec gM s'ssvY

- 1rr ~ ~f 'Is inaD TEST shall R~1in theIliatarcontro1 demonstrate fdhs]

R ~ room annunc ation occurs if any of the following %

p a C L FUIIC I conditions exist. A 1

1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alars/ trip setpoint. *

2. Circuit failure.

Instrument indicates a downscale failure.

b g 3.

nstrument controls not in operate _ mode. C.

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j (b) 4 ith trrigtai3ifJi4Ciri5rswat M' ' p rProt. ;

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= (c) W t fueT In the new 1 7me storage va t. 9g#K2J o

" (d) With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. g '

g (e) With fuel in the dryer storage area. N

With ADHR heat exchangers in operation.

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS g /d d 2.8 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY l LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -

t 3.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. I ACTION: . . . .

Without SECONDARY CONTAlletENT INTEGRITY:

3. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least NOT SHUT 00WN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . ,

r

b. r onal Condition _ ~_

Mlandling of irradiated fuel in I

, the pr sary o eo ry containment, CORE ALTERAT ONS d_operati_ons ;

with_ a Do_tential ofor _ draining ,th re ctor vessel he pr6 visions of- i

' Specification 3.0.3 Wnet appl c

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS bf N*

4.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAIWlENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by: I

a. Verifying at least once per 31 days that: I

1. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment !

hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed. j

2. The door in each access to the Auxiliary Building and Enclosure l' Building is closed, except for routine entry and exit.

3. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building penetrations not ;

capable of being closed by 0PERABLE secondary containment automatic '

isolation dampers / valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, rupture discs or ;

deactivated automatic dampers / valves secured in position. ,

P

b. At least once per 18 months

1. Verifying that one standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches

of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 120 seconds, and ;

i 2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and !

saintaining greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of vacuum water '

gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 4000 CFM. , , , ,

\

hen irradiate 5 fuel is being handled in the primary or secondary containment l and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the l c r vesse . we l

L 3/4 6-48 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 Amendment No.-4e -

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h H$dN UCWh) e }l ek E

CONTAINMENT SYSTDis SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAMPERS /VALyf5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2 Each secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation '

< damper / valve shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *.

EIlgli: ,

t With one or more of the secondary containment ventilation system automatic !

isolation dampers / valves inoperable, maintain at least one isolation damper / !

valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open, and within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months !

either: '

a. Restore the inoperable damper / valve (s)' to OPERABLE status, or i

b. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivate.

automatic damper / valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed !

manual valve or blind flange, j Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN ~

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 :

hours.

QW d4k l~se ~4 g th ise, in Operational Conditi * , suspend handling of irradiated !

fue in r ary or secon ry conta nment, CORE ALTERATIONS and opera-f ,

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l

4.6.6.2 Each secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation damper / valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Prior to returning the damper / valve to service after maintenance, repair .

or replacement work is performed on the damper / valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the damper / valve through at !

least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the applicable ;

isolation time. I

b. During COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING at least once per 18 months by verifying I that on a containment isolation test signal each isolation damper / valve l actuates to its isolation position. !

c. By verifying the isolation time to be within its limit when tested [

pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. i

& lace v'd thse d W

hen primary or secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a ' potential for draining tre ,

reactor vessel. l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6 49 Amendment No. 69,402 ._

7 t t h

_ - ~_ , . - -,- - _

M^ J l C b /V/2(). 4 4/ m y j CONTAI WENT SYSTEMS f[eIZe4Lo STAN08YGASTREATMENTSYSTp LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

i 3.6.6.3 Two independent standby gas treatment subsystems shall be OPERABLE. l l

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. l ACTION:

j

a. With one standby gas treatment subsystes inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystes to QPERABLE status within 7 days, or:

1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least H0T SHUTOOWN ,

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following ,

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

pept,ee ayL ;4gc+ "f 3_

2. In Opera _ti__onal_ Condition

suspend handling of irradiated fuel in ~t w prt wry or' eco a containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and i e t_ ions with e potential _for draining the rea$ tor yes_sel._ ;

he provisi6ns of 5peelffcation 3.0.3 are not appifcable.

~

b. With both standby _ga hsr ateent_Jubsystems inoperq$1e in Operational Condit1Msuspe'nd hand 11ng of Wradiated Tuel ' fi the'primaryNor !

sTei:on' d ary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS _ gr opera _tions wi,th a potentia]1 I for draini the_re hi~ prov111ons of Specificadon 3.0.3.

ar p cable.

,,B-let f act w:S isstA l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,

I 4.6.6.3 Each standby gas treatment subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow i through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the ;

heaters OPERABLE. l l

RefL c.e J+L l~std

/

nen irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary er secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-55 Amendment No. -42 __,

)

l

Abcl red J /c bAIRO~9d)ho/31 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS by M 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS STAND 8Y SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 Each of the following independent standby service water (SSW) system l subsystems shall be OPERA 8LE with each subsystem comprised of: I

a. One OPERA 8LE SSW pump, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the associated '

SSW cooling tower basin and transferring the water through the RHR heat exchangers and to associated plant equipment, as required, shall !

be OPERA 8LE as follows:

1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3: two subsystems; and I

2. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and *: the subsystems associated !

with the systems and components required to be OPERA 8LE by Specific.ations 3.4.9.2, 3.5.2, 3.8.1.2, 3.9.11.1'or 3.9.11.2. I APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and *. .

t ACTION: 8 l

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3:

1. With one SSW subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable sub-system to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT *

' SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within ,

the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . !

2. With both SSW subsystems inoperable, be in at least NOT SHUTOOWN l within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLO SHUTDOWN ** within the i; following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4 with the SSW subsystem, which is asso-1 i

ciated with an RHR loop required OPERA 8LE by Specification 3.4.9.1 or j 3.4.9.2, inoperable, declare the associated RHR loop inoperable and e take the ACTION required by Specification 3.4.9.1 or 3.4.9.2, as i applicable. I l,

c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with the SSW subsystem, which is associated with an ECCS pump required OPERA 8LE by Specification {

3.5.2, inoperable, declare the associated ECCS pump inoperable and !

take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2. l 1 1

s gEefMTty ZLMotAT&b t.

'==Wrien handling irr:d.:teduel in the primary or secondary containment, f l

Whenever both SSW subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN

l as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

I :

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

i

jflac & d J h h A O~9 YCO/.fl PLANT SYSTEMS ULTIMATE HEAT SINK 4 g g 2.0

" C LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

{

3.7.1.3 At least the following independent SSW cooling tower basins, each with:

1 a.

A minimum basin water level at or above elevation 130'3" Mean Sea i Level, USGS datum, equivalent to an indicated level of >87". !

b. Two OPERA 8LE cooling tower fans,#

shall be OPERABLE: i

a. In OPERATIONAL Condition 1, 2 and 3, two basins,N :

b. In OPERATIONAL Condition 4, 5 and *, the basinsN associated with systems !

and components required OPERA 8LE by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2. '

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and *.

ACTION: i

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and

with one SSW cooling !

tower basin inoperable, declare the associated SSW subsystem inoper-able and, if applicable, declare the HPCS service water system inoper-able, and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and i

3.7.1.2, as applicable. !

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 with both SSW cooling tow'er basins inoperable, declare the SSW system and the HPCS service water system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.7.1.. .

and 3.7.1.2. '

c. In Operational Condition

with both SSW cooling tower basins inoperable, declare the SSW system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.1. The provisions of ,

Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. !

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3 At least the above required SSW cooling tower basins shall be deter-mined OPERABLE at least once per:

i

a. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying basin water level to be greater than or equal to 87". !

b. 31 days by starting from the control room each SSW cooling tower fan :

not already in operation and operating each fan for at least 15 minutes. !

c. 18 months by verifying that each SSW cooling tower fan starts auto- i matica11y When the associated SSW subsystem is started.

'Mkrdc4& '

When handling el in the primary or secondary containment.

The basin cooling tower fans are not required to be OPERA 8LE for HPCS service water system 0PERA8ILITY.

l "An OPERABLE basin shall have a 30 day supply of water either self-contained !

or by means of an OPERA 8LE siphon.

i l

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. ,

l.

- - - - . . . - ~ . . - . _ - . . . . . .-

~

YK ^ b 6dk9Y{m/3; PLANT SYSTEMS g4p 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 Two independent control- room emergency filtration system subsystems shall be OPERABLE. -

APPLICA8ILITY:

),i_'s - g -

OPERATIONAL CONDITION nd *. _9gifg_ ,

ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 with one control room emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUT OWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . !

b. InOPERATIONALCONDITIOQ,fr. *: @Ol

1. With one control room emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, i restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERA 8LE status within 7 days :

or initiate and maintain operation of the OPERA 8LE subsystem in l the isolation mode of operation. !

2. With b t ontrolm- r en f1r to s s ino erable, suspend COR L ERATIONS, handl ng of irradiated fue n he .

primary or secondary containment and operations with a potential l for draining the reactor vessel. 4

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in ;

Operational Condition *. g/ hed "d" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.2 Each control room emergency filtration subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least i 10 continuous hours with the heaters OPERA 8LE. .

I

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance i on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following ,

painting, fire or chreical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the subsystem by:

1. [0ELETED]

c l

. - -_- fefactu)Nkistr$"b"}

hen irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary or secondary containment.

~%- l l

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. y _____. ;

i% cA d J /c W O- W / vt.si ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS /y M d 20 A.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. elect-ital power sources shall be ! OPERABLE: !

a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite ;

Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Diesel generator 11 or 12, and diesel generator 13 when the HPCS system .

is required to be OPERABLE, with each diesel generator having- '

1. A day tank containing a minimum of 220 gallons of. fuel. l

2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of: '!

a) 62,000 gallons of fuel for each OPERABLE diesel generator 11 l ! or 12. b) 41,200 gallons of fuel for diesel generator 13. l l

3. A fuel transfer pump. !

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ACTION: 8k"7

a. With all offsite circuits inoperable and/or with diesel generators 11 ,

i and 12 inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of 4ecad4eh fuel in the primary or secondary containment, operations with a i potential for draining the reactor vessel and crane operations over the spent fuel storage pool and the upper containment pool when fuel l assemblies are stored therein. In addition, when in OPERATIONAL .

CONDITION 5 with the water level less than 22 feet 8 inches above the reactor pressure vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action l to restore the required power sources to OPERABLE status as soon as I practical.

l

b. With diesel generator 13 inoperable, restore the inoperable diesel ;

generator 13 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the HPCS : system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 l and 3.5.3. j

c. The provisions c' Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. i

                                                                            =                   i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS                                                                    !

4.8.1.2 At least the above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 and j 4.8.1.1.3, excep* for the requirement of 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

i

   *When handling i- ed'-td4uel in the primary or secondary containment.

f pscurry Etasom7ED GRAND GULF-UN 1 3/4 8-9 Amendment No. q - l i

if/hc/med J l0 W OM/931 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS g j7 d b 2.0 D.C. SOURCES - SHUTOOWN , LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, Division 1 or Division 2, and, when the HPCS system ! is required to be OPERA 8LE, Division 3, of the O.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE with: i

a. Division 1 consisting of:

1. 125 volt batter / 1A3.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger 1A4 or 1AS.

b. Division 2 consisting of: '

1. 125 volt battery 183.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger 184 or 185.

c. Division 3 consisting of: >

1. 125 volt battery 1C3.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger IC4.

JPPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ' 9 SCTION: . A

a. With both Division 1 battery and Division 2 battery of the above required 0.C. electrical pwer sources inoperable, suspend CORE

ALTERATIONS, handling of /gedi:t:d-fuel in the primary or secondary l containment and operatfors with a potent I for r ining the reactor i vesse1. ggcgarey zwAoisrso r

b. With Division 3 battery of the above required D.C. electrical power :

sources inoperable, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the i ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. l

c. With any of the above required full capacity chargers inoperable, demonstrate the OPERA 8ILITY of its associated battery bank by }

performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.a.1 within one hour and ^ at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in ; Table 4.8.2.1-1 is not met, declare the battery inoperable. i OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Specification 3.0.4 are not permitted. ; l

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 At least the above required battery and charger shall be demonstrated ; OPERA 8LE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1. When handlingx"i g g t:1:d' fuel in the primary or secondary containment. esim itiAotA GRAND P ^ - R~- 3/4 8-14 Amendment No. q -

hec lNJ l* SNed-99/mgj ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the'following power distribution system divisions shall be energized:

a. For A.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:

1. Division 1 consisting of: ,

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 15AA. b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 15811, 15821, 15831, 15841, 15851 and 15861. . c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels in 15P11, 15P21, 15P31, 15P41, 15P51 and 15P61. d) LCCs 158A1, 15BA2, 158A3, 158A4, 158A5 and 158A6. *

2. Division 2 consisting of:

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 16A8. ; b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 16811, 16821, 16831, 16841, 16851 and 16861. c) 120 volt A.C. distributiois panels in 16P11, 16P21, 16P31, 16P41, 16P51 and 16P61. d) LCCs 16881, 16882, 16883, 16884, 16885 and 16886.

3. Division 3 consisting of:

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 17AC. b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 17801 and 17811. ! c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels 17P11. '

4. The OPERABLE load shedding and sequencing panel associated with the division (s) required to be energized.

b. For D.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when ;

the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with: -

1. Division 1 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel 10A1 !

and IDA2.

2. Division 2 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel 1D81 -

and 1D82. i

3. Division 3 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel 10C1. ~

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ; i When handlirg 4rcedietwe# fuel in the primary or secondary containment. I ECEAny .NA0/f76]& _ GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-17 g/s,.jg 1

                                                                                    $ $$ h d I b SWlf g
                                                                                               /) e ./9 A ZO ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS                                                                                         ;

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) EI1QH: . l

a. For A.C. power distribution:

4

1. With both Division 1 and Division 2 of the above required A.C. ,

distribution system not energized and/or with the load shedding and sequencing panel associated with the division (s) required to . energized inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of l Im8NV3N -red et W uel in the primary or secondary containment and i operations with a poetnial for draining the reactor vessel. ! OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Spec <fication 3.0.4 are not . pemitted. !

2. With Division 3 of the above required A.C. distribution system not !

energized, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION ; required by Specification 3.5.2.and 3.5.3.

b. For D.C. power distribution:

1. With both Division I and Division 2 nf the above required D.C. ,

distribution system not energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, ' handline of.4epadiated fuel in the primary or secondary con-MYpomo tain1mnt and operations with a potential for draining the reactor - vessel. OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Specification 3.0.4 are not permitted. ! 2. With Division 3 of the above required D.C. distribution system not

 .                     energized, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.2.1 At least the above required ,ar distribution system divisions shall be detemined energized at leas' .:e per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment on the busses /LCs/lGCs/ panels and voltage on the busses /LCs. l 4.8.3.2.2 The above required load shedding and sequencing panel (s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by performance of a manual l test and verifying response within the design criteria to the following test inputs: a) LOCA. b) Bus undervoltage. c) Bus undervoltage followed by LOCA. d) LOCA followed by bus undervoltage. I GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. 69,%8,-

YkN 3 oS 6fRC-Qg, 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS -

                                                                                ##       M BASES 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH                                                                          {

Locking the OPERA 8LE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These ! conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of , inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and l exposure of personncl to excessive radioactivity. ; i 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY.of at lecst two source range monitors en:;ures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. > 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE , ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel _ will not_be loaded in_to_ a cell wit %ut a_ control rDC- % K iz.4 y Wm1 beeJ ls deGiE4iis I. s l f, n. Hn. , o'&y 11t2ACIArno 4e l'~~'.+ +Le. sa S.se{'\o.sc/*ehaf te .s\ co ESFgrkm

                                                                                               .ieae s      ;

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME see e4 x y k et M itg e ided 4.gg< h g f.4, ! yM

The* 4 ' M equirement' forreactorsubcriticaIitypriortofueImovement ', ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive deca of the short lived fission products.Y .TMedecay $4as. 4e consistent u.ith assump-tiens used in the accident analyses. y are i ti m

                                                      =^ -
                                                                                                            \

3/4.9.5 C0mVNICATIONS l The requirement for communications capability ensuras that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the far,ility status or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure i vessel, 3/4.9.6 REFUELING EQUIPMENT ,, The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that (1) only the main hoist of the refueling platform or the main hoist of the fuel handling platform will be used for handling fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel, (2) platform hoists have sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and/or control rods, (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations, and (4) a fuel bundle is protected from excessive lifting force in the event it becomes stuck during lifting operations. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 8 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. ~

Attachment 4 to GNRO-94/do/3J

                                                           ' P;g) 1 cf 19 t

t PROPOSED CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES ; FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT OPERATING CONDITIONS Unformation Only) l

                                                                          -F i

f

.+

I

Attachment 4 to GNRO 94/do/3s Page 2 of 19 DEFINITIONS , REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.35 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured. RECENTLY IRRADIATED 1.35a RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel shall be any nuclear fuel assembly that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days. REPORTABLE EVWI l 1.36 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in l Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50. R0D DENSITY 1.37 ROD DENSITY shall be the number of contro} rod notches inserted as a fraction of the total number of control rod notches. All rods fully inserted is equivalent to 100% ROD DENSITY. . SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.38 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation system, or

2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, rupture disc or deactivated automatic valve or damper, as applicable, secured in its closed position.

b. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.

c. The standby gas treatment system is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.6.3.

d. The door in each access to the Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building is closed, except for normal entry and exit.

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building penetration, e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings, is OPERABLE.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 1-7 Amendment No. 42, 102,

Attachment 4 to GNRO-94/Oo/J/ Pag) 3 cf 19 TABLE 3.3.2-1 icomim e ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 20 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. . ACTION 21 - within one hour or: ! Close the affected system

a. In OPERATIONAL isolation CDNDITION 1, 2,valve (s)in at least HOT or 3, be SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *, suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling ,

of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY , IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ACTION 22 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within ' 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. ACTION 24 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours. ACTION 25 - Establish SECONDARY C9NTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within one hour. ACTION 26 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system in operable. ACTION 27 - Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 28 - Within one hour lock the affected system isolation valves closed, or verify, by remote indication, that the valve is closed and electrically disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s) and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 29 - Close the affected system isolation valves within 'one hour and , declare the affected system or component inoperable.

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION # suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and opera-tions with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

ACTION 30 - Declare the affected SLCS pump inoperable. ACTION 31 - Isolate the shutdown cooling common suction line within one hour if it is not needed for shutdown cooling or initiate action within one hour to establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. l NOTES

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel l

potential for draining the reactor vessel.and during operations with a l

 **  The low condenser vacuum MSIV closure may be manually bypassed during l     reactor SHUTDOWN or for reactor STARTUP when condenser vacuum is below the l     trip setpoint to allow opening of the MSIVs. The manual bypass shall be i     removed when condenser vacuum exceeds the trip setpoint.
  #  During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
 ## With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 70, 97, 102,

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 sc-w ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED

6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION tc-- e .

e. Drywell Pressure - High S R(c) 1, 2, 3

f. Manual Initiation NA Q(a)

Q NA 1, 2, 3

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

      ** The low condenser vacuum NSIV closure may be manually bypassed during reactor SHUTDOWN or for reactor STARTUP when condenser vacuum is below the trip setpoint to allow opening of the NSIVs. The manual bypass shall be removed when condenser vacuum exceeds the trip setpoint.
          # During CORE ALTERATION and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

k H With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 f or 3.9.10.2. a (a) Manual initiation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other 4 circuitry associated with manual initiation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days as part of circuitry required to be tested for automatic system isolation. h m (b) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 92 days. .gg tQ (c) Calibrate trip unit at least once per 92 days. E' GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. 97 ,

    . . -             - . - ,   . . . , . -     n. -, , .,. , , . - . -   , + . . , - -       - . - . . .                      ,-.         ~w.     , . -   ~    . . . ,

TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTATION OPERABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT RANGE ACTION

1. Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor 1 At all times s1 x 10 5cpm /NA 10 to 106cpm 70

2. Standby Service Water System Radiation Monitor 1/ heat 1, 2, 3, and* s1 x 105cpe/NA 10 to 106cpm 70 exchanger train

3. Plant Service Water System Radiation Monitor 1 ## s1 x 105cpe/NA 10 to 106cpm 70

4. [ DELETED]

5. Carbon Bed Vault bJL 6

Radiation Monitor 1 1, 2 s2 x full power 1 to 10 mR/hr 72 $ !' background /NA 3k

6. Control Room Ventila- 2/ trip (h) %

tion Radiation Monitor system 1,2,3 and** 2 8 s4 mR/hr/, 10-2 to 10 mR/hr 73 s5 mR/hr

7. [ DELETED] @ i-o A

8. [ DELETED] f

9. [ DELETED] f N

1 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-59 Amendment No. 59 7 l l _ - _ - _ _ . . . . - - , . . -. , . .-

d

                                                                                        .                                                                                 TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 sconu
                                                                                        .                                                                        RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS                                APPLICABLE                              ALARM / TRIP                    ME/WMENT                                        :

INSTRUMENTATION - OPERABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT RANGE ACTION

10. Area Monitors

a. Fuel Handling Area Monitors 3

1) New Fuel 1 (e) 2.5 mR/hr/NA 10-2 to 10 mR/hr 72 Storage Vault

2) Spent Fuel 3 1 (f) 2.5 mR/hr/NA 10~2 to 10 mR/hr 72 :

Storage Pool

3) Dryer Storage (g) 3 1 2.5 mR/hr/NA 10'2 to 10 mR/hr 72 Area

b. Control Room 3 1 At all times 0.5 mR/hr/NA 10-2 to 10 mR/hr 72 Radiation Monitor i

With RHR heat exchangers in operation.

I o* When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel'in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ;

                                                          # Initial setpoint. Final Setpoint to be determined during startup test program. Any required change to this setpoint shall be submitted to Commission within 90 days after test completion.
                                                         ## With ADHR heat exchangers in operation.

(a) Trips system with 2 channels upscale-Hi Hi Hi, or one channel upscale Hi Hi Hi and one channel downscale or h-M 2 channels downscale. % 7 (b) [ DELETED] - (c) [ DELETED] @gr-g t (d) [ DELETED] p g (e) With fuel in the new fuel storage vault. w , (f) With fuel in the spent fuel. storage pool. (g) With fuel in the dryer storage area. (h) Two upscale Hi Hi, one upscale Hi Hi and one downscale, or two downscale signals from the saw trip . system actuate the trip system and initiate isolation of the associated isolation valves. 1* channel may be

placed in the tripped condition, provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter. g s-GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-60' Amendment No. 5?, 1"E, r_ ,,.,s.e--- c. #e---<- * ,+1-=,w- .+ .-eev--- -eev z,w e w mi--z igw..c-w e w-e eer ,a w 1em v w 4 e----w+t-e--se a-es-m -w-r .we, - . , .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .     ....%_%     w

Attachment 4 to GNRO 94/00/J/ . Page 7 of 19 j INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 icw RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ACTION : ACTION 70 - With.the required monitor inoperable, obtain and analyze at least one grab sample of the monitored parameter at least once per 24 hours. . ACTION 71 - [ DELETED] f ACTION 72 - With the required monitor inoperable, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours. ; ACTION 73 - a. With one of the required monitors in a trip system -: inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the downscale ; tripped condition within 6 hours; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status witMn 7 days, or, within the ! next 6 hours, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system in the ; isolation mode of operation, j

b. With both of the required monitors in a trip system f inoperable, initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration system in the isolation mode of operation within one hour.

o ; P ba hs A l N l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-61 Amendment No. M&r l I

TABLE 4.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS OPERATIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL WHICH SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENTATION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION REQUIRED

1. Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor S M A At all times

2. Standby Service Water System Radiation Monitor S M A 1, 2, 3, and*

3. Plant Service Water System Radiation Monitor S M A i

4. [ DELETED]

5. Carbon Bed Vault Radiation Monitor S M A 1, 2

6. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor S Q(a) A 1, 2, 3 and**

7. 8. [ DELETED] [ DELETED] do

9. [ DELETED] ji "

10. Area Monitors M

a. Fuel Handling Area Monitors

1) New Fuel Storage Vault 5 M R (c)

2) Spent Fuel Storage Pool S M R (d)

3) Dryer Storage Area S M R (e)

b. Control Room Radiation Monitor S M R At all times

With RHR heat exchangers in operation.
- When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ))

(a) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall demonstrate that control room annunciation occurs if any of the following jf conditions exist. D

l. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarnVtrip setpoint.

2. 3. Circuit failure. Instrument indicates a downscale failure. k.a

4. Instrument controls not in Operate mode.

o [ (b) [ DELETED) (c) With fuel in the new fuel storage vault. $gl p (d) With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. in (e) With fuel in the dryer storage _ area.

 #   With ADHR heat exchangers in operation.

5 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-62 Amendment No. 59, 105,

I i i Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO-94/CC/3/ j Page 9 of 19 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT-SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY i l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I 3.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. j APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. , i ACTION: l Without SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT !

INTEGRITY within.4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next ! 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. In Operational Condition *, suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling of fuel assemblies ?

within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor i vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ; The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. { SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.6.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by: l

a. Verifying at least once per 31 days that: f

1. All Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches and l blowout panels are closed and sealed.

2. The door in each access to the Auxiliary Building and Enclosure a Building is closed,'except for routine entry and exit. i

3. All* fuxiliary Building and Enclosure Building penetrations not capable I of being closed by OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation !

dampers / valves and required to be closed during accident conditions i are closed by valves, blind flanges, rupture discs or deactivated ! automatic dampers / valves secured in position. j i

b. At least once per 18 months:

1. Verifying that one standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the j secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of ,

vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 120 seconds, and

2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and maintaining greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 4000 l CFM. ;

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary ;

containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when ! RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-48 Amendment No. 48r _

. 1

Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO-94/ 00/31 Page 10 of 19 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS I SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DAMPER / VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2 Each secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation dampers / valve shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. ACTION: With one or more of the secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolatioA dampers / valves inoperable, maintain at least one isolation damper / valve OPEPABLE io each affected penetration that is open, and within 8 hours either:

a. Restore the inoperable damper / valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic damper / valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange.

Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. Otherwise, in Operational Condition *, suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicabit. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.2 Each secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation damper / valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Prior to returning the damper / valve to service after maintenanco, repair or replacement work is performed on the damper / valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the damper / valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time.

b. During COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING at least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each isolation damper / valve actuates to its isolation position.

c. By verifying the isolation time to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-49 Amendment No. 60, 102, _

I Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO-94/M/1/ Page 11 of 19 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.3 Two independent standby gas treatment subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. ; ACTION: i

a. With one standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, restore the ,

inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or:

l. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. l

2. In Operational Condition * , suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are nnt applicable. i

b. With both standby gas treatment subsystems inoperable in Operational Condition *, suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling of fuel assemblies within the reactor -

vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3. are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.3 Each standby gas treatment subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters OPERABLE.

.~

l

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when '

RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with , a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ; GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-55 Amendment No. 43r ,

Attachment 4 to GNRO-94/CDU/ Page 12 of 19 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS ETANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 Each of the following independent standby service water (SSW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of: t

a. One OPERABLE SSW pump, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the associated SSW cooling tceer basin and transferring the water through the RHR heat exchangers and to associated plant equipment, as required, shall be OPERABLE as follows. .

1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3: two subsystems; and ,

2. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and *: the subsystems associated with i the systems and components required to be OPERABLE by Specifications 3.4.9.2, 3.5.2, 3.8.1.2, 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and *. f ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3:

1. With one SSW subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

2. With both SSW subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN ** within the following ,

24 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4 with the SSW subsystem, which is asso-ciated with an RHR loop required OPERABLE by Specification 3.4.9.1 or 3.4.9.2, inoperable, declare the associated RHR loop inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.4.9.1 or 3.4.9.2, as applicable. :

c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with the SSW subsystem, which is associated with an ECCS pump required OPERABLE by Specification 3.5.2, inoperable, declare the associated ECCS pump inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment.
- Whenever both SSW subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD 3HUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. 69r _

Attachment 4 to GNRO-94/do/J/ + Page 13 of 19 j PLANT SYSTEMS MLTIMATE HEAT SINK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION f 3.7.1.3 At least the following independent SSW cooling tower basins, each with:

a. A minimum basin water level at or above elevation 130'3" Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, equivalent to an indpated level of 2B7".

b. Two OPERABLE cooling tower fans, shall be OPERABLE:

a. In OPERATIONAL Condition 1, 2 and 3, two basins ##

b. In CPERATIONAL Condition 4, 5 and *, the basinsI # associated with systems i and components required OPERABLE by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and *. i ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and with one SSW cooling tower basin inoperable, declare the associated SSW subsystem inoperable and, if applicable, delcare the HPCS service water system inoperable, and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2, as applicable. ,

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 with both SSW cooling tower i basins inoperable, declare the SSW system and the HPCS service water system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.7.1.1 and 3.7.1.2. ;

c. In Operational Condition

with both SSW cooling tower basins inoperable, declare the SSW system inoperable and take the ACTION re' quired by Specification 3.7.1.1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3 At least the above required SSW cooling tower basins shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per:

a. 24 hours by verifying basin water level to be greater than or equal to 87".

b. 31 days by starting from the control room each SSW cooling tower fan not already in operation and operating each fan for at least 15 minutes.

c. 18 months by verifying that each SSW cooling tower fan starts auto-matically when the associated SSW subsystem is started.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment. ' The basin cooling tower fans are not required to be OPERABLE for HPCS

## service water system OPERABILITY.

An OPERABLE basin shall have a 30 day supply of water either self-contained or by means of an OPERABLE siphon. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. 69r _

Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO-94/ CC/J/ Page 14 of 19 ; PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM , LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 Two independent control room emergency filtration system subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and *. g) , e ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 with one control room emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to l OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *:

N

1. With one control room emergency filtration subsystem inoperable, !

restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the OPERABLE subsystem in the isolation mode of operation.

2. With both control room emergency filtration subsystems inoperable, suspend handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, handling of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in Operational Condition *.

SURVEILLANCE, REQUIREMENTS 4.7.2 Each control room emergency filtration subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: l

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the'HEPA filters and charcoal j adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates for at least j 10 continuous hours with the heaters OPERABLE. ;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance )

on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone ) communicating with the subsystem by:

1. [ DELETED]

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, when handling fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel when RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel is in the reactor vessel, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 69r __ l

Attachment 4 to GNRO 94/OO/3 / l Page 15 of 19 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system, and

b. Diesel generator 11 or 12, and diesel generator 13 when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, with each diesel generator having:

1. A day tank containing a minimum of 220 gallons of fuel.

2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of:

a) 62,000 gallons of fuel for each OPERABLE diesel generator 11 or 12. b) 41,200 gallons of fuel for diesel generator 13.

3. A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ACTION:

a. With all offsite circuits inoperable and/or with diesel generators 11 and 12 inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and crane operations over the spent fuel storage pool and the upper containment pool when fuel assemblies are stored therein. In addition, when in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with the water level less than 22 feet 8 inches above the reactor pressure vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required power sources to OPERABLE status as soon as practical.

b. With diesel generator 13 inoperable, restore the inoperable diesel generator 13 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 At least the above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 and 4.8.1.1.3, except for the requirement of 4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-9 Amendment No. 837

i Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO-94/CDu/ l Page 16 of 19 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS j D.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, Division 1 or Division 2, and, when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, of the D.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Division I consisting of: ,

1. 125 volt battery 1A3.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger IA4 or IAS.

b. Division 2 consisting of: '

1. 125 volt battery 183.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger 184 or 185,

c. Division 3 consisting of: '

1. 125 volt battery 103.

2. 125 volt full capacity charger 1C4.

l APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *. ACTION:

a. With both Division 1 battery and Division 2 battery of the above required D.C. electrical power sources inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment and operations with a potential for draining the i reactor vessel.

b. With Division 3 battery of the above required D.C. electrical power '

sources inoperable, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.

c. With any of the above required full capacity chargers inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery bank by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.a.1 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in ,

Table 4.8.2.1-1 is not met, declare the battery inoperable. OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Specification 3.0.4 are not permitted.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 At least the above required battery and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-14 Amendment No. Mr f

Attachment 4 to GNRO 94/ 00/3/ Page 17 of 19 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS , DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION , 3.B.3.2 As a minimum, the following power distribution system divisions shall be energized:

a. For A.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:

1. Division I consisting of:

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 15AA. b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 15B11, 15B21, 15B31, 15B41, 15B51 and 15B61. c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels in 15Pll, 15P21, 15P31, 15P41, 15P51 and 15P61. d) LCCs 15BA1, 15BA2, 15BA3, 15BA4, 15BA5 and 15BA6. -

2. Division 2 consisting of:

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 16AB. , b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 16B11,16B21, f6B31,16B41,16B51 and 16B61. I c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels in 16P11,16P21,16P31,16P41, t 16P51 and 16P61. d) LCCs 16B81, 16BB2, 16BB3, 16BB4, 16BBS and 16BB6.

3. Division 3 consisting of:

a) 4160 volt A.C. bus 17AC. b) 480 volt A.C. MCCs 17B01 and 17B11. c) 120 volt A.C. distribution panels 17P11.

4. The OPERABLE load shedding and sequencing panel associated with the division (s) required to be energized. ;

b. For D.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:

1. Division 1 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel IDAl and j IDA2. l

2. Division 2 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel 10B1 and IDB2,

3. Division 3 consisting of 125 volt D.C. distribution panel IDCI.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5 and *.

When handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 B-17 Amendment No. l

Attachm:nt 4 to GNRO 94/OO/II Page 18 of 19 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(Continued) ACTION: ,

a. For A.C. power distribution:

1. With both Division 1 and Division 2 of the above required A.C.

distribution system not energized and/or with the load shedding and sequencing panel associated with the division (s) required to be - energized innperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. > OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Specification 3.0.4 are not permitted.

2. With Division 3 of the above required A.C. distribution system not energized, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. *

b. For D.C. power distribution:

1. With both Division I and Division 2 of the above required D.C.

distribution system not energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling ; of RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel in the primary or secondary containment t and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. l OPERATIONAL CONDITION changes per Specification 3.0.4 are not i permitted.

2. With Division 3 of the above required D.C. distribution system not energized, declare the HPCS system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.2.1 At least the above required power distribution system divisions shall be determined energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker-alignment on the busses /LCs/MCCs/ panels and voltage on the busses /LCs.

4.8.3.2.2 The above required load shedding and sequencing panel (s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by performance of a manual test and Verifying response within the design criteria to the following test inputs: a) LOCA. b) Bus undervoltage. c) Bus undervoltage followed by LOCA. d) LOCA followed by bus undervoltage. GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. 50, 100, i

AttCchment 4 te GNRO 94/ COW l Page 19 of 19 ; 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES l 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the. Shutdown or Refuel position, ! as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and ' refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the ! probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel 1 assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity, j 3/4.9.2 ' INSTRUMENTATION s The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant i monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition ! of the core. 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION i The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE ! ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control ; rod. F 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME - The 24 hour requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel move'nent [ ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay cf the _ i short lived fission products. During the 12 day interval used in definition 1.35a for RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, selected ESF systems are required to 3imit . the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident to within regulatory ! limits. These decay times are consistent with assumptions used in the acci: lent l . analyses. ... 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status i or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure , vessel. I 3/4.9.6 REFUELING E0VIPMENT The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that (1) only the main hoist of the refueling platform or the main hoist of the fuel handling platform will be used . for handling fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel, (2) platform l hoists have sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and/or control i rods, (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive , lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations, and (4) a fuel bundle is protected from excessive lifting force : in the event it becomes stuck during lifting operations. ! I GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. SSr

i. Attachment 5 to GNRO-94/00131 Page 1 of 73 i e i

                                                                                               .i i

MARKED-UP IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES { FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS , t (GGNS PCOL 93/08) - (Information only) Note: In this attachment, changes associated with this request are denoted by a circled marked-up change. i i i P l l l l i 1

94/D01 1 Page 2 of 73 Definitions 1.1 ! 1.1 Definitions , LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL be performed by means of any series of sequential, TEST overlapping, or total system steps so that the (continued) entire logic system is tested. MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power RATIO (MCPR) ratio (CPR) that exists in the core for each class of fuel. The CPR is that power in the assembly , that is calculated by application of the < appropriate correlation (s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power. MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel i head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel. OPERABLE-0PERABILITY A system, subsystem, division, component, or - device shall be OPERABLE'or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function (s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component, or device to perform its specified safety function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s). RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer (RTP) rate to the reactor coolant of 3833 MWt. REACTOR PROTECTION The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS TIME trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is Y U sq 4 a7 d 5 n

S* **S

          ~_           occ1 g,%

9 h <} f,^% p m fous Q Jo,qs.

                                  ;w,,

(continued) GRAND GULF 1.0-5 Draft C

T r Attachment 6 tr GNR4DMC131 Pge3 W 73 t Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS + CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME r J. (continued) J.3.1 Initiate action to Immediately j restore secondary : containment to OPERABLE status. AND J.3.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore one standby l gas treatment (SGT) subsystem to OPERABLE status. AND i J.3.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore isolation , capability in each - required secondary

containment 1 penetration flow path :

not isolated. ! K. As required by K.1 Isolate the affected Immediately Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s). Table 3.3 6.:-l. E _ - - - K.2.1 Suspend CORE itnmedittely- .

                                        -AND kre        t    $ef assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

AND (continued) l GRAND GULF 3.3-51 Draft C

. 1

Anschment 5 tx GNRO4440131 Page 4 of 73 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolatien Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME t K. (continued) K.212 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations - with a potential for , draining the reactor vessel. , 1 i i k i i i i i r i GRAND GULF 3.3-52 Draft C

Anadiment S'.x GNRO g4/00131 Page 5 of 73 Pricary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation ; 3.3.6.1 l Table 3.3.6.1 1 (page 2 of 5) Primary Containment and Drywell isolation Instrumentation l APPLICABLE CONDITIONS ' MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FR/1M SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWAsLE i FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment and Drywett Isolation (continued)

b. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2(b) N st 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.43 pelg ;

SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 : st 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2(b) F sa 3.3.6.1.1 2 -152.5 Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches Level 1 (ECCS st 3.3.6.1.3 Divisions 1 and 2) st 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Drywell Pressure -High 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.44 psig (ECCS Divisions 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 and 2) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 4 F st 3.3.6.1.1 t -43.8 Level - Low Low, Level SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches ,

2 (HPCs) sR 3.3.6.1.3 ' st 3.3.6.1.6 st 3.3.6.1.7 ,

f. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 4 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.44 psig i (HPCs) sR 3.3.6.1.2 ;

SR 3.3.6.1.3 ' SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7.

g. Containment and Dryweti 1,2,3 2(b) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 aft /hr Ventitation Exhaust SR 3.3.6.1.2 Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 -

(c) 2 K SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 sit /hr SR 3.3.6.1.2 , st 3.3.6.1.5 i SR 3.3.6.1.7

h. Marual Initiation 1,2,3 2(D) G SR 3.3.6.1.7 NA (c) 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.7 NA b

(continued) (b) Also required to initiate the associated dryweLL isolation function. , (c) Durt, ;Z: :F:= : =" voment o \rradiat h fuel assemblies in primary or secondary contalrnen f and op tons a o ntist for draining the reactor vessel.

ceir5TLY , i i i GRAND GULF 3.3-55 Draft C ;

g

     =.                                                                          -
                                                                                          ,                          1 emato-sem0131 Page 6 of M   I 1

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ) i Tabte 3.3.6.2 1 (page 1 of 1) Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation j I APPLICABLE , MODES AND REQUIRED' OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE l FUNCtl0N CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3,(a) 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 m -43.8 inches Level- Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 '

SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 1.43 psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3

SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

3. Fuel Handling Area 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 4.0 aft /hr ventitation Exhaust (a),(b) SR 3.3.6.2.2 Radiation- High High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.6 .

SR 3.3.6.2.7 4 Fuel Handling Area Pool 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 35 aft /hr , Sweep Exhaust (a),(b) SR 3.3.6.2.2 ! Radiation- High High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.7 '

5. Manuat initiation 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.6 NA (e),(b)

(a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. (b) During n * == movementofbediatekfuelassembliesintheprimaryorsecondary containment. j fdECEbLY t i e GRAND GULF 3.3-62 Draft C ;

Anschmard 6in . a GNRO-te/00131 Papa 7 of 73 f t CRFA System Instrumentation , 3.3.7.1

Table 3.3.7.1 1 (page 1 of 1) Control Room Fresh Air System Instrismentation ' ! APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM i SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE ; FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE ;

1. Reactor vessel Water 1,2,3 2 s SR 3.3.7.1.1 t -43.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.7.1.2 i (a) SR 3.3.7.1.3 '

SR 3.3.7.1.5 SR 3.3.7.1.6 l

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 C - SR 3.3.7.1.1 5 1.43 psig )

SR 3.3.7.1.2 , SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.5 SR 3.3.7.1.6 a

3. Control Room 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.7.1.1 s 5 aft /hr Ventilation Radiation SR 3.3.7.1.2 Monitors (a),(b) SR 3.3.7.1.4 l SR 3.3.7.1.6

4. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 2 B SR 3.3.7.1.6 NA f

(s),(b) (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. f (b) movementof\rradiatbfuet assemblies in the primary or secondary Durin h ^^'.r.- k @ h _ containment RCIktJTL4 t i GRAND GULF 3.3-76 Draft C

Attadiment 5 C2 GNRO-94/00131 Pa0e 8 of 73 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.3.5 Once per 92 days for the resilient seal purge valves closed to comply with Required Action D.I. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, or D not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours F. Required Action and F.1 --------NOTE--------- associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A, applicable. B, C, or D not met --------------------- Jt b AB r uspend movement of Immediately L movement of trradiat!% preadiat/dfuel fuel assemblies in f~ assemblies in primary the primary or I and secondary secondary M containment. Qcq,q ,47)_ntainment.

                                                               %s                      A G. Required Action and      G.1       Suspend CORE          lmmedht1!iy           (

associated Completion ETFm!0NW Time of Condgiti( B , C , .a D not met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS. (continued) l l l GRAND GULF 3.6-13 Draft C l

e GNRO-94/00131 Page 9 of 73 PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4 Required Action and .1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend OPDRVs. Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met OR for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during .2 Initiate action to Immediately MODE 4 or 5 or during restore valve (s) to operations with a q OPERABLE status, potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1 ------------------NOTES------------------

1. Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

2. Not required to be met when the 20 inch primary containment purge valves are open for pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry. Also, not required to ' e met during Surveillances or special testing on the purge system that requires the valves to be open. The 20 inch primary containment purge valves shall not be open with the 6 inch primary containment purge or the drywell vent and purge supply and exhaust lines open.

Verify each 20 inch primary containment 31 days purge valve is closed. (continued) GRAND GULF 3.6-14 Draft C

M 1 Pay 10WD j l Secondary Containment 1 3.6.4.1 ! l 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment l LC0 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE. RecE4TC) APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement o yradiatdk fuel assemblies in the primary _ or secondary containment, : Dst'k C0; M Til$ l YS 3 L uring oper&tions witn a' potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). , ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME : A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore set'oddiry 4 hours inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status. ! B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours (continued) t l t i GRAND GULF 3.6-41 Draft C

m oo i GNRO-W00931 Page 10 of F3 l Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 : ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Secondary C.1 --------NOTE--------- containment LCO 3.0.3 is not 1_noperable during applicable. EC M k movement of4 b radiatAl --------------------- fuel assemblies in thi kCcOMLD primary or seco_ndary Suspend movement of Immediately geo tainmen K A + LORE ALT SAT M , or h 2 td fuel , J assemblies in the i M iiVs. primary and secondary containment. - AND C.2 g_rg y p y

                                                        - - ~ ~ , -

m . w ,.r.-

                                                                             ...... w . m y   (
                               /" y                                   A wm =
                                  -G+      Initiate action to                Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

w )- 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE l FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all auxiliary building and 31 days , enclosure building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed. , SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify each auxiliary building and 31 days enclosure building access door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. i (continued) i GRAND GULF 3.6-42 Draft C . p

N te , GNRO 200131 Page 12 of 73 , SCIVs - 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS , 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) i LC0 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE. Q Cct.hlh APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement o _rradiate'k fuel assemblies in the primary

                  ,(r nu _: 5._. .. M y mnm N    m fd
                                                    .. =  d? M, **"

Uuring operations wirn a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS .....................................N0TES----------------------------------- . ;

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable, one closed and de-activated automatic valve or damper, closed manual valve or damper, or blind fl ange. AND (continued) GRAND GULF 3.6-44 Draft C

ma GNRO-942131 Page13of 73 SCIVs

                                                                         -                 3.6.4.2       <

ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 --------NOTE--------- associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

                                                         ~
 > mov m t         %rr    tok fuel assemblies in the            Suspend govement of         Immediately primary or sec d                 \rradiate fuel contaj nmen c urir -              assemblies in the

.E' CCOP; SLlEPT!T!S; or primary and secondary during OPURVs. con _tainment. AND D.2 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . , - y;g..;,g.;.

                                                 - ; ~ .   =_x __

a

                                -Bra-   Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

MbImmediatily

                                                                  & ")

GRAND GULF 3.6-46 Draft C

Anschment 00: ~^ GNRO-94/00131 Page 14 of 73 I SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS t 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System . LC0 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE. RECA.MTLY APPLICABILITY: MODES During movement 1, 2, and of 3, irradiatek fuel assemblies in the primary I""*"

                  ,n -      vu, ,,,             w,n
                                                         ..%. @Q uring pera io s w                         t1 a potential for draining the reactor                     <

vessel (OPDRVs). ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours : associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours , C. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition A ----------------------------- t

  - f not met during fGM         movementofQrradiatel                         C.1              Place OPERABLE SGT       Immediately fuel assemblies in the                                        subsystem in primary or se ondar                                           operation.                                                 ,

e Aiivd5 or - OR DUrTnhPDIVs'.O (continued) l l l GRAND GULF 3.6-48 Draft C

mg GNRO-94/00131 Page15of 73 SGT System ; 3.6.4.3 l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately radiateY fuel (gg,qsTr.,9 assemblies in the primary and secondary containment. AND

                                                                                   '--  " '*^

C.2.2 - p'gmIst A i n :---:- .

                                 &     r- _.        Initiate action to             Immediately
                               '                    suspend OPDRVs.                         _

D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately f4 g9T[p inoperable duringmovementofWrradiateh fuel assemblies in the [Nrradiate% assemblies in the fuel primary and secondary primary or gntainment. 7 duringOkdhT.I.0g ys. AND w E.2 S : pad 0^RE wI....aqA d i a te ly-- ALTERATI^ A

E.; Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. GRAND GULF 3.6-49 Draft C

Anne ==n s tr GNR06131 Page16 of 73 CRFA System 3.7.3

 ~3.7   PLANT SYSTEM 1

3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System LC0 3.7.3 Two CRFA subsystems shall be OPERABLE. l RCCCNITLh , APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and During movement o 3, \_rradiatAl fuel assemblies in the primary M SY"1NM -t l$Fi tea potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs). , ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CRFA subsystem A.1 Restore CRFA 7 days inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

   'B. Required Action and        B.1     Be in MODE 3.           12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A        AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.                      B.2     Be in MODE 4.           36 hours                     i i

(continued) i t GRAND GULF 3.7-6 Draft C l

Am evn.nises GNROM00131 Pe0817of 73 CRFA System

                                                                                                  -3.7.3 ACTIONS     (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during W CC"* y movementof4"trradiateh C.1 Place OPERABLE CRFA Immediately fuel assemblies in the subsystem in primary or se n isolation mode. _ tontainmen enr-

            ^RE KTEPf"^5, or        OR
    > "N F9ig^ WUK S.               ~

C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately

                                                'irradiateh fuel gchn,assembliesinthe primary and secondary containment.

AND C.2.2

                                                             ;u y
                                                                                -- M........-..., >

_ = -

                                   -E-+-3         Initiate action to               Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

_p - ' D. Two CRFA-subsystems D.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. (continued) GRAND GULF 3.7-7 Draft C

Anachment 6 h GNRO-94M131 Page 18 of 73 CRFA System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued) __ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i E. Two CRFA subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during b m aatak fuel gotOM . movement ord rradiath assemblies in the fuel assemblies in the primary and seconda.y primary or sec r g ainment. I __containme_n ur-4

   ) F 'OROLIC'AT:0Z, or AND dD ing 0PDRVs.                                              A E.2     -E= Anu c6kE             L..di st &
                                               ^LTEP"_ !0i'%

g _-x:n Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

                                              . s __ - -   ._ A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                                FREQUENCY SR   3.7.3.1      Operate each CRFA subsystem for 2: 10            31 days continuous hours with the heaters operating.

SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required CRFA filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP). SR 3.7.3.3 Verify each CRFA subsystem actuates on an 18 months actual or simulated initiation signal. GRAND GULF 3.7-8 Draft C

Anomment 5 t* ' GNRO-94/00131 Page 19 of 73 I Control Room AC System j 3.7.4 ' 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ; 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System ; LCO 3.7.4 Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE. , APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and During movement of 3.%2 Math fuel assemblies in the primary l Cfrgggg_mg ( ,

                     ~MratihnDia' u                 potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).                                                          ;

ACTIONS ' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One control room AC A.1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. ! l

B. Two control room AC B.1 Verify control room Once per 4 hours ! subsystems inoperable. area temperature s 90*F. ' AND ! B.2 Restore one control 7 days room AC subsystem to ; OPERABLE status. ! i i C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Cor.dition A or AND ;

  ,. B not met in I'0DE 1,                                                                          '

2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours l (continued) i j GRAND GULF 3.7-9 Draft C i f

i Anschment 5CD: GNRO-94@131 Page 20 of 73 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. Time of Condition A ----------------------------- not met during 9ECE ND movement ofd tradiatJhl D.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately fuel assemblies in the control room AC primary or se . subsystem in containmen . d"ricc operation. F ~ COP 1 ALTH " TIC S , or ring 0 s. OR D.2.1 uspend movement of Immediately rradiateh fuel ,

                                 'gcctJL assemblies in the                                             l primary and secondary                                ;

containment. l l AND c ^ ' '^"" '-- " '- '* I D.2.2 S"~EE^Ibi5$ I

                                  'D 2 -S         Initiate action to       Immediately                 >

suspend OPDRVs. (continued) l l l 1 I l l GRAND GULF 3.7-10 Draft C

Atischment 5 tr GNRO-942131 Pope 21 of 73 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 , l i ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j E. Required Action and associated Completion ------------NOTE------------- Time of Condition B LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. not met during ----------------------------- _ movement ofd rradiate\ fuel assemblies in the E.I Suspend mov Immediately primary or second ry containmen ' W' ement fuel of or I #Nd assemblies in the primary and secondary J C E M LRATIO"* Uuring I)P . Containment. AND E.2 '--- -a enpr . 5'[TEk_i:^N(. p n M ws -

                                 -E d           Initiate action to            Immediately                   [

suspend OPDRVs. __. _ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY t SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has 18 months the capability to remove the assumed heat load. i GRAND GULF 3.7-11 Draft C

Ammemns atz GNRO-94/00131 Page22of 73 I AC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources--Shutdown LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission ,

network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power ; distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, :

                      " Distribution Systems--Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8; and

c. One qualified circuit, other than the circuit in !

LCO 3.8.2.a, between the offsite transmission network e and the Division 3 onsite Class IE electrical power i distribution subsystem, or the Division 3 DG capable of supplying the Division 3 onsite Class IE AC electrical ' power distribution subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class IE electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.8. APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of $rradiate'd fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. ; R Ec.C NTb) - l f GRAND GULF 3.8-18 Draft C t

                                                                               . _ . . . , , _ . , ~ . . _ _ .

Amachment 5 ts: GNRO 9420131 Page 23 of 73 j AC S:urces--Shutd;wn 3.8.2 l ACTIONS ..................................--NOTE------------.--..-.--_-----..-.-.-... l LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. - .................__..........__..................__.......................... j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LC0 Item a not met. ------------NOTE------------- t Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of ! LCO 3.8.8, when any required division is de-energized as a i result of Condition A.

                                        .............................                                           i A.1              Declare affected        Immediately                    ;

required feature (s) with no offsite power available from a required circuit t inoperable. > 08 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ; ALTERATIONS. ; AND I A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately L PCCE*f7L s_ _Jt \rradiateh fuel ( assemblies in the ! primary and secondary containment. AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).

~^

AND ! (continued) GRAND GULF 3.8-19 Draft C

GNRO-M00131 Page 24 of 73 i AC Sources-Shutdown j 3.8.2 ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status. I 1 B. LCO Item b not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately Eg gt? i j rradiate% fuel assemblies in primary - and secondary containme.nt., . AND B.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. AND l B.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status. l C. LC0 Item c not met. C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours Core Spray System inoperable. GRAND GULF 3.8-20 Draft C

Ameement 6 CB: I GNRO-94/00131 Page25of 73 DC Sources--Shutdown > 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources--Shutdown LC0 3.8.5 The following shall be OPERABLE: 1

a. One Class IE DC electrical power subsystem capable of supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class IE DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems -

Shutdown";

b. One Class IE battery or battery charger, other than the DC electrical power subsystem in LC0 3.8.5.a, capable of supplying the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class IE ,

DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LC0 3.8.8; and

c. The Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem capable of -

supplying the Division 3 onsite Class IE DC electrical power distribution subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class IE DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LC0 3.8.8. APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement gof \rradiate$d fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. t i i i i GRAND GULF 3.8-31 Draft C i

Attachment S CD: GNR4 HEC 131 Pmp 26 d 73 DC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately NrradiatdB fuel (9T[ assemblies in the primary and secondary containment. AND C.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND C.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 --------------------NOTE------------------- The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8. For DC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance following SRs are applicable: with applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8. SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 GRAND GULF 3.8-33 Draft C

Anschment 5 to: GidRO-Ewo0131 Pope 27 of 73 Distribution Systems--Shutdown 3.8.8 i 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.3.8 Distribution Systems--Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 The necessary portions of the Division 1, Division 2, and Division 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required ' to be OPERABLE. i 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of *trradiate'k fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment RCC C N ACTIONS ; ..............____ ___............... NOTE------------------------------------ - LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC or DC electrical supported required power distribution feature (s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable. OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND ,

                    -_   __s   A.2.2     Suspend movement of        Immediately Cgtp Lp  T             ; ArradiatA fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary                                    !

containment. AND (continued) i GRAND GULF 3.8-40 Draft C : i i

Ann o nentaca i owto m m pee norn - Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation ; B 3.3.6.1 i BASES APPLICABLE 2.a. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hiah (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY Four channels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation ' Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

      .             The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross ha cdA             failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite doses gw.es If: e              remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits.

The Function is required to be OPERABLEdd uring GR>S-a EMT!dNQoperations with a potential for draining the T'reador vessel (OPDRVs)gnd movement ordreadiateh C CCCN7LY fu

assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because -

i the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel ; failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) _ must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not ' F J exceeded.3 63 3- r@A\ These Functions isolate the Group 7 valves. 2.h. Manual initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment and drywell isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective , instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing i basis. There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE. (continued) i GRAND GULF B 3.3-148 DRAFT C

ammenent sta 1 GNRO4 WOO 131 Page 29 of 73 - ]

                                                                                                                      )
         - INSERT'B 3.3-148A
                                                                                                                     ]

Due to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, this Function is-only required to isolate primary containment during fuel handling accidents , involving handling RECENTLY. IRRADIATED fuel. l I i

                                                                                                                    !i 1

1 e i b b a i I I s

Attachment 6 Cr GNRO-94/00131 Page 30 cf 73 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS J.1, J.2. J.3.1, J.3.2, and J.3.3 (continued or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is hot necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE. a n d. K.1, K.2.1, K.2.2 p d v 9y & If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path (s) should be isolated (Required Action K.1). Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, the plant must be placed in a

              ? g g g ybich the LC0 does not apply. If applicable, M- m enM~ e immedia  S-and e       movement of kradiateh fuel assemblie suspended.Uuspensionofthese                CCENTLY activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission production release. Actions must continue until 0PDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Isolation Instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1. The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.3-167 DRAFT C l

Attachment 5 to: GNRo-94/00131 Pape 31 of 73 S:condary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3, 4. Fuel Handlina Area Ventilation and Pool Sweep Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-High High (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY channels of Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High High Function and four channels of Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation-High High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding. The Exhaust Radiation-High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE during - m . - - Q PDRVsp and movement of [E2Lh~ \rradiateh fuel assemblies in the primaff r secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.9 Lserdrl

5. Manual Initiation b 'M-0 M j The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.3-177 DRAFT C

ew 088RO-9440131 Page 32 of 73

     '/7 f

INSERT B 3.3-177A l

f Due'to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, this function is- ! only required to isolate secondary containment' during fuel handling accidents !

        -involving handling RECENTLY' IRRADIATED fuel.                                                   i i
                                                                                                     -[

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An.ctrn.ni s a GNRo-H/00131 Page 33 of 73 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 5. Manual Initiation (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are APPLICABILITY available and aregquired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during M "LH rat = Tf 0PDRV and movement of

irradiate % fuel assemblies in the seconda y containment, ggg s'ince these are the MODES and other specified conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separa's Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel. A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours or 24 hours, depending on the Function, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 3 and 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. Functions that share common instrumentation with the RPS have a 12 hour allowed out of service time consistent with the time provided for the associated RPS instrumentation channels. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.I. Placing the (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.3-178 DRAFT C

Anschment 5 tlt i GNRO-9 00131 Pa08 34 of 73 i CRFA Systcm Instrumentaticn B 3.3.7.1 . t BASES APPLICABLE 2. Drywell Pressure-High (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, i LCO, and (two channels per trip system) and are required to be ! APPLICABILITY OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation. ; The Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Secondary Containment Isolation Drywell ' Pressure-High Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.6.2). The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA. In MODES 4 and 5, ! the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize . the drywell to the Drywell Pressure-High setpoint.

3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors measure l radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR.

A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel * ' thus, a detector indicating this condition automatically signals initiation of the CRFA System. The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors Function consists of four independent monitors. Four channels of Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the , control room personnel. l The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors function is r uired to PERABLE in MODES 1,.2, and 3 and during jCOPf ^.LTEP^TIONS, OPDRVgand movement of \rr,adiate% fuel Ntie secondary containment to ensure that $ontrol room - _RETEdL) personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or a vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when ,

               % g --),

fied conditions are notofina LOCA the probability progress (e.g.,43$ or fuel damage isbD-low; thus, the Function is not required.9 oPORVs LM l e s.2-a n (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.3-217 DRAFT C i

memonstr GNRO4 WOO 131 Page36et73 i. INSERT B 3.3-217A 1

                 ~                                                                                                              !
       .Due to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, this Function is
       . only required to initiate the CRFA System during fuel handling accidents-involving handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel.                                                                           t i

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YodiY$ pee.oan PCIVs ) B 3.6.1.3 BASES (continued) APPLICABLE The PCIVs LC0 was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event. , requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to : this LCO. l The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequences are mitigated by PCIVs are a loss MArv-3 of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB), Mgyt and a fuel handlina accident 4inside primary containment f ~~f ANyhEO accidents, (Refs. I and 2). In the analysis for each of these it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or QS\ function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to Oe environment through PCIVs are minimized. Of i the ever.cs analyzed in Reference 1, the LOCA is the most < limiting event due to radiological consequences. An analysis of the affect of the purge valves being open at the initiation of a LOCA has been performed. This condition was ! found to result in dose contributions of a small fraction of 10 CFR 100. It is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled. PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary and some also form a part of the RCPB. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA. . The power operated isolation valves are required to have f isolation times within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The normally closed PCIVs are considered OPERABLE when, as applicable, manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. The valves covered by this LCO (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-15 Draft C

Attechment 6(3 GNRO-94/00131 Page 37 of 73 PCIVs ! B 3.6.1.3 i BASES LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in the (continued) applicable plant procedures. Purge valves with resilient seals, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet ,' additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LC0 3.6.1.1, " Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing. l This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform t their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of ; reactor coolant inventory, and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents. ; i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 l and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are ; reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be ; OPERABLE. Certain valves are required to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent a potential flow path (the RHR Shutdown i Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel) from lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. These l valves are those whose associated isolation instrumentation j is required to be OPERABLE according to LC0 3.3.6.1,

                " Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation,"

y,b;% Function 5.b. Additional valves are required to be OPERABLE ; rec.C M fCy \ to prevent release of radioactive material during a 199 90Tg7F_0 ) p stulated fuel handlina accidente These valves are those t whose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to LC0 3.3.6.1, " Function 2.g." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.) t ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path (s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative ! controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-16 Draft C

Atta@ ment 6 G: GNRO-94rJ0131 Page 38 of 73 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) verification that those isolation devices outside primary containment and potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside primary containment, the time period specified as

          " prior to entering MODE 2 or 3, from MODE 4 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

For the primary containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, SR 3.6.1.3.5 must be performed at least once every 92 days. This provides assurance that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the primary containment purge valve does not increase during the time the nenatration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.1.3 S is 184 days. Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per 92 days was chosen and has been shown acceptable based on operating experience. ' E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. F.1, G.1, an v ~ If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot ! be met, the plant must be placed in co in, whiettthe I LC0 does not apply. If applicable, C0~ ?L EP^ OS d ' % ! movement ofirradiate\ fuel assemblies in e pr mary and PCd Nb (continued) i GRAND GULF B 3.6-20 Draft C , I i

~~tr Attachment 5 tr GNRO 94/00131 Page 39 of 73 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS F.1, G.1, 2 (continued) secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion , of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a patential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspenoing the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately l initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being . taken to restore the valve. l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 i REQUIREMENTS ! This SR verifies that the 20 inch primary containment purge ! valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an i allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of i this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive : leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage i outside of the limits. i The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1) stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be_ i closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. At times other than MODE 1, 2, or 3 when the purge valves are required to be capable o - q i closing (e.g., during movement ofg rradiateN fuel _ It4CFLYJ assemblies) pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open (automatic isolation , capability would be required by SR 3.6.1.3.4 and SR ! 3.6.1.3.7). ; The SR is modified by a Note (Note 2) stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances, or special testing of the purge system that require the valves to be open (e.g., testing of the containment and drywell i ventilation radiation monitors). These primary containment (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-21 Draft C i

Attachmerd 5 t3: GNRO 94/00131 Page 40 of 73 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i BASES t SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS primary containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established. Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that which occurs to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened. The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, E, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits. At other times when the purge valves are required to bq capable of closing ' (e.g., during handling of badiat Al fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria. 95cCUTLN SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verifying that the full closure isolation time of each MSIV j is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate i OPERABILITY. The full closure isolation time ' test ensures ; that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not ! exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. The Frequency ; of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing l Program. , SR 3.6.1.3.7 i Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation : signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that l each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position ! on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM i FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.7 overlaps this SR to provide , complete testing of the safety function. The 18 month l Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-24 Draft C I l

Anschment 5 tp: GNRO-94/00131 PeGe 41 of 73 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS , B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment ! BASES BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). l In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment ' (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines : penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the : fission products prior to release to the environment and to ! isolate and contain fission products that are released . during certain operations that tale place inside primary containment (e.g., during operations with a Qontial for d leHP C'L -

             ? W_ra_ining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs.RAMTor during                  RECE movement  M of(ti n the primary or secondary containment), when                       r primary conL 'nment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

P The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that : may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump / motor heat load , additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at ; less than the external pressure. j The isolation devices for the penetrations in the secondary i containment boundary are a part of the secondary containment barrier. To maintain this barrier: l i

a. All secondary containment penetrations required to be i closed during accident conditions are either: j

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary i containment automatic isolation system, or i

l (continued) l GRAND GULF B 3.6-82 Draft C I l l

y q N S t$1 e.g.42arra Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ; BACKGROUND 2. closed by a manual valve, blind flange, rupture (continued) disk, or de-activated automatic valve or damper secured in a closed position, except as provided in LC0 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation valves (SCIVs)"; ;

b. All auxiliary building and enclosure building '

equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed;

c. The door in each access to the auxiliary building and enclosure building is closed, except for normal entry and exit;

d. The sealing mechanism, e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings, associated with each secondary containment penetration is OPERABLE; and

e. The standby gas treatment system is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment System."

t APPLICABLE There are three principal accidents for which credit is SAFETY ANALYSES taken for secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a

                 < LOCA (Ref. 1), a fuel handling accioentvinside primary md ," 3           containment (Ref. 2). and a fuel handling accident $ in the RCcE tJTL Y         auxiliary building (Ref. 3). The secondary containment TA R r4 DTA-r CD    performs no active function in response to each of these             >

Ge.1 limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ' ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. Secondary gontainment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-83 Draft C

Atischment 5'E GNRO 94/00131 Page43 of 73 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES LC0 to the environment. For the secondary containment to be (continued) considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations wit te tial or_ d rai n ' g"I?!F^90" theor reactor i C0"I' O

           ?                         duringvessel movement          (0PDRVs                             of*trraru  iate fue Y u ies in the primary or second                                                              containment. %        b5MQ (RCtU4TL.D                                        16 3.G-Y'M ACTIONS         A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-84 Draft C

amme.nem s tz : i GN131 Pege M of M - 4 l INSERT B 3.6-84A Due to reduced source: terms in non-RECENTLY' IRRADIATED fuel, Secondary containment is.only required during fuel handling accidents' involving handling. - RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel. . I i i t i I f t b l 1 m . - - , - , . - - - - - -

NS$$i poe.4sor7 Secondary Containment i B 3.6.4.1 BASES an ACTIONS C.1, C.2(5hbW

                           '        ~

(continued) g 77d _ M vement ofdrradiateh fuel _ ammtLEes in the primary or J secondary containment $0EE /d!"""mW}{and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause trssion product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier environment. G DR_EtoAL'TCRATl0NSTa1% release of fission ~ productq

                                                                                                                                        %ovement      to the of,Tream  ate \

fuel assemblies secondary containmentmustis inoperable. tie immediately[gccIs suspendedfif

                                                                                                                                                            -     the @

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of z vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continu(e until OPDRVs are suspended.

ezCc.c ui Required Action C.1 has been modified a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If movi bradiate% fuel

    - - - - --                                                                                                                      LC0 3.0.3 would not specify         '

go Jr[,h assemblies any action. while in MODE 4 or 5,h fuel assemblies while in Ifmovingderadiate MODE 1, 2, or 3, tne tuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore in either case, inability to suspend movement of irrMiatgi, i fuel assemblies would not be a sufficNndeasontorequireareactorshutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches, blowout panels, and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application the term " sealed" his no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency for these Srs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience, and is considered cdequate in view of the other controls on secondary containment access openings. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-85 Draft C

p 1 1 Page 46 of 73 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 , i BASES ; BACKGROUND Analyses have. shown that in addition to building leakage (continued) paths, the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has the capacity'to maintain secondary containment negative pressure assuming the failure of all nonqualified lines 2 inches and ! smaller or with the failure of a single nonisolated line as large as 4 inches. As a result, the following lines which penetrate the secondary containment and' terminate there ' (i.e., they do not continue through the secondary . containment and also penetrate the primary containment) are provided with a single isolation valve, rather than two, at f the secondary penetration:

a. 4-inch makeup water supply line

b. 3-inch domestic water supply line

c. 4-inch RHR backwash line

d. 3-inch backwash transfer pump discharge line

e. 3-inch floor and equipment drain line The single isolation valve for each of the above lines is an air-operated valve which fails closed; in addition, each operator is provided with redundant solenoid valves which

receive actuation signals from redundant sources. In this i manner, it is ensured that, given any single failure, only-one of the above lines will be nonisolated, which as stated above is within the capacity of the SGTS.

t APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary SAFETY ANALYSES containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the j n u(g; secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of g g-hn coolant accident (Ref.1), a fuel handlina accident,inside primary containment (Ref. 3), and a fuel handling accident TRf,M N7g in the auxiliary building (Ref. 4). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events, but the boundary established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-88 Draft C

Anschmwt 6C3 l GNRO-94/00131 Page47of 73 j SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ! t i APPLICABLE Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within SAFETY ANALYSES limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped " (continued) inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite ; radiation releases resulting from DBAs. i The power operated isolation dampers and valves are l considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic dampers and i valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation i signal. The normally closed isolation dampers and valves, rupture : disks, or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual ! dampers and valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic dampers and valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, rupture disks or blind flanges are in place. The i SCIVs covered by this LCO, along with their associated I stroke times, if applicable, are listed in the applicable ; plant procedures. APPLICABILITY In MODES I, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs , OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive : material can be postulated, such as during operati ith a y aining the reactor vessel ; A C0iu. ALTRAU^N;,- or during govement adiat ofArr(OPDRVs es.7civing bradiated fuel assemblies in the , primary or secondary containment may also occur in MODES I, < 2, and 3. 4 ggt. ! L ekU (continued) 3' GRAND GULF B 3.6-89 Draft C

sY1 p e.aswn e I. INSERT B 3;6-89A Due to reduced source' terms'in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, the SCIVs are only required during fuel handling accidents involving handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel. y )- r

EEE1 Popedeof 73 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES , ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderl manner and without challenging plant systems, an ' D.1,D. N 4 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a omdiggjn w ic the LC0 does not apply. If applicable, .m m.-.- the movement ofArradiate fuel assembl(ies irr the p i ary and

secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not aoolicable. Nrradiat A fuel RiET Ifmoving$.3wouldnotspecify LCO 3. {m assemblies any action. while in M0 E radiate If movi 4 or 5,% fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the el movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore in either case, inability to suspend movement ofhradiatei, fuel assemblies would not be a sutticient~ reason to require a reactor shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies each secondary containment isolation manual valve, damper, rupture disk, and blind flange that is , required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary , containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does - not require any testing or SCIV manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are enable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal unit operation and verification of their position is , i (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-92 Draft C , 1 l

A Aasenmwn sca ! GNRO-94/00131 Page 60 of 73 SGT System i B 3.6.4.3 ; BASES BACKGROUND humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The ! (continued) prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA l filter is provided to remove fine particulate matter and l protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber j removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and ! the final HEPA filter is provided to collect any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber. . 1 The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident ' that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both enclosure building recirculation fans and - both charcoal filter train fans start. SGT System flows are i controlled by modulating inlet vanes installed on the charcoal filter train exhaust fans and two position volume control dampers installed in branch ducts to individual ; regions of the secondary containment. ; APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the : SAFETY ANALYSES consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling l

   ,m.            accidents.(Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System                ;

V"W is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via -

RECCMN filtration and adsorptinn, the radioactive material released (gMO}AN W to the environment. t The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. l LC0 Fol'owing a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure , with respect to the environment and to process gaseous , releases. Meeting the LC0 requirements for two operable , subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem . in the event of a single active failure. l APPLICABILITY In MODES l' 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES. (continued) l GRAND GULF B 3.6-96 Draft C

Anschment 6 h GNRO-M/00731 Page 51 of 73 SGT System : B 3.6.4.3 j BASES APPLICABILITY .In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these ; (continued) events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature l limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT ! System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations _with a_Dotghdgtning _the eactor vessel at phin or o ry containment. g 7 g 63,G -97 A) ACTIONS A.] With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this ; Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate ! to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. B.1 and 8.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within , 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

                          . n c(

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.

~~

l RECE r&L Durinamovementofdrrad eh fuelassablg ge primary I or secondary containmen - l.i.J Lid 1CXLTP s O ., during OPDRVs, when Required A ion .r casnot be compleYed within the required Completion Time,.the OPERABLE SGT subsystem (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.6-97 Draft C

Amechment 8 te GNAO4440131 Page52at73 INSERT B 3.6-97A Due to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, the SGT System is; only required during fuel handling accidents involving handling RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel. l i i i

Anschmere 6 72 l GNRO-9000131 Page 53 of 73 SGT System i B 3.6.4.3 i BASES

                              ~
                                                                                               \
                            %d ACTIONS           C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2 ( k C      . J (continued) should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the unit in a Co If applicable,4bH ALTERf!'ONc ion that minimizes 1 movement risk. dd fue of \rradint assemblies must be immedia ely suspended. Suspension of wEcE47Lh these activities shall not preclude completion of movement _ of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and

subsequent potential for fission product release. This action should be chosen if the OPDRVs could be impacted by a loss of offsite power. Action must continue until 0PDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving

      --- mphrradiateh fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 ptJTLp would not specify any action. If moving rradiateh fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the{fuei movement independent of reactor operations.      Therefore, in either case,inabilitytosuspendmovementofderadiat4lfuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

D.1 If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. and E.1 E . 2. hECE

               &gtwo_SGT          subsystems arejinoperable, if applicable, E nLTeXJ'OQ4n@ movement ofdrradiatei fuel assemblies the primary arid secondary containment must be immediately (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-98 Draft C

E d iYi e.g.s4or73 l SGT Systea l B 3.6.4.3 : BASES m 'i ACTIONS continued)

~-

suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not i preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a i vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission ; product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are ! suspended. : SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 I REQUIREMENTS i Operating each SGT subsystem for 2 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all [ associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive - vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain i temperature) for a 10 continuous hours every 31 days ; eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known l reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy , available in the system. l SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is : performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing ' Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specified test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. SR 3.6.4.3.3 This SR requires verification that each SGT subsystem starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. i (continued) l GRAND GULF B 3.6-99 Draft C

N E s P.o.ssor7 , CRFA System B 3.7.3 BASES nud$g d #Y btd APPLICABLE is assumed to operate following a loss of coolant accident, SAFETY ANALYSES main steam line break, fuel handling acciden , and control (continued) rod drop accident. The radiological doses to control room ' personnel as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in < Reference 4. No single active or passive failure will cause , the loss of outside or recircul.?.ted air from the control room. , The CRFA System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC. Policy i Statement. - LC0 Two redundant subsystems of the CRFA System are required to ; be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in a failure to meet the dose requirements of GDC 19 in the event of a DBA. The CRFA System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are t OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered ' OPERABLE when its associated: '

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1; 2, and 3, the CRFA System must be OPERABLE to : control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since , the DBA could lead to a fission product release. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA ; are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations i Therefore, maintaining the CRFA System in these MODES. (continued) l 1 GRAND GULF B 3.7-12 Draft C

Amadunent 5 tt GNRO-9490131 Page C*,of 73 CRFA System B 3.7.3 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the (continued) following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);

{b bh 5LNNI 9) R ECEMTLY

               . During movement ofbadiatdB fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. <         L*MT            l c 6 3.1-13A 1 ACTIONS        A.1 With one CRFA subsystem inoperable, the inoperable CRFA subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRFA subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of CRFA System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities. B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. t u ct C.1, C.2.1, C.2. The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note osyt ndicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapply. If moving renduta fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. i (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.7-13 Draft C

    >.                                                           Amoshment & cit ONft04 WOO 131 Page 87 of 73    .

i INSERT B 3.7-13A l Due to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, the CRFA System. is only required during fuel handling accidents involving handling RECENTLY ) IRRADIATED fuel. , t r 1 i r e i r i n [ t P l h i

s

1 1 Page 58 of 73 l CRFA System

                                                                                ,B 3.7.3         j BASES ACTIONS    C.1, C.2.        2.                   (continued)

Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofkradiate'Wfuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. gect_rJTty ; During movement ofA rradi or secondary containmen g Lprimary

                                         . . . . . .y y un s m. . - . . ., ~ , Or during OPDRVs, if the inoperab                 subsystem canno          e restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRFA subsystem may be placed in the isolation mode.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimize _s risk. (RT CE.tJTL3 If applicable ERAibIkl vement of rradiate fuel assemblies Stne primary a'nd secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. D.1 If both CRFA subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the CRFA System may not be capabh of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. R~CEd During movement o 'trradiate'd fue a the primary or secondary containment Q h { ECRE ALTERATIONe or during (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.7-14 Draft C

Am evnensex GNRO-9440131 Pope 50 of 73 , CRFA System B 3.7.3 BASES A ACTIONS E continued) w w OPDRVs, with two CRFA subsystems inoperable, action must be-taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in condition that minimizes risk. _ gE.cOJrt. If applicable,hk"_h h"b ement o rrarHa Af fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until ! the OPDRVs are suspended. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 . REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated for a: 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available. SR 3.7.3.2 This SR verifies that the required CRFA testing is parformed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program l (VFTP). The CRFA filter tests are in accordance with ! Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing ! HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, i minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additionai information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. (continued, GRAND GULF B 3.7-15 Draft C

Attr>vnent 5 h GNRO44/00131 Page 60 or '3 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued) LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room AC System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits. i The Control Room AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room ; temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These-components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, i compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. The heating coils are not required for Control Room AC System OPERABILITY. APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room AC System must be' l OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will i not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits. l In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a , Design Basis Accident are rcduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated: ;

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs);

                     .kih           5      I      M                                        ,
             <)    . During movement oh'irradiatei fuel assemblies in the                i primary or secondary containment. <                  g ACTIONS           A.1         ,

With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.7-18 Draft C

a J-- s. 6-- -- - 4e 1-J+ c2a.,ak.J-4 - 4a4 A. .- J4.-- M -== r' - d _w&eaa -a-I .=aJ4 -_Aa

     ?-                                                                                                                                                   !

m sa . GNRO DWOO131 Page 61 of 73 -

I INSERT B 3.7-18A

                                                                                                                                                          ?
        'Due to reduced source terms in non-RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel, the Cotrol Room
        =AC System is only required during fuel handling accidents involving handling                                                                     '

RECENTLY IRRADIATED fuel. (Reference 3). l l i l l l

                                                                                                                                                        'i t

i [ i i i I i

                                                                                                                                                     -I i

I i t { l

h

l I i I i i

Anschment 5 Cs GNRo-94/D0939 Page 63 of 73 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods. B.1 and B.2 If both control room AC subsystems are inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its I intended function. Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, and the availability of alternate cooling methods. C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the control rooia area temperature cannot be maintained less than or equal to 90*F or if the inoperable control room AC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. u D.1, 0.2.1, 0.2.2 6 5 .7

                                 ..     ?

The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.7-19 Draft C

Anacrimed 5 kr ; GNRO-9@0131 Page 63 of 73 Control Room AC System ) B 3.7.4 BASES im \ ACTIONS D.1, D.2. 2. continued) l x If'movingairradiatei fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, hCEtFLY or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of . bradiate% fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. - l During movement o N rradiate\ fue]_assemb]ies_in g primary ! or secondary containment @ h d H ~,"O f"4nO Q. or during OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannotle completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE control room AC ; subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This i action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately i suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. risk. Thisplacestheunitinaconditionthatminimizes__h RE M rJ1 _n- - If applicable,N A1.TGAT:0"! L ovement o hadiate% fuel assemblies in the primary an secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must confin,ueuntiltheOPDRVsaresuspended. E , 2M_[ The Required Actions of Condition E.1 are modified by a Note - indicating'that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. ; Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel ! assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor i shutdown, e (continued) , GRAND GULF B 3.7-20 Draft C [

Attachment 6C3 GNRO-94/00131 Page 64 of 73 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES rn ACTIONS E ontinued)

a primary

_Dur movementofhradiate)fue or secondary containment g ._.. q (vnt_np one.._w if during ; OPDRVs if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to , immediately suspend activities that present a potential for t releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. pyqqr@ L.YJ If applicable, C0"E 'EPhkb ndling o read [ ate % i fuel in the primary n seconlary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activitics shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated , immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of j a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are ! suspended. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 I REQUIREMENTS This 3R verifies that the heat removal capability of the : syste:n is sufficient to remove the control room heat load l assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

2. UFSAR, Section J.4.1.

F3. t> P s A R . c k, e%- 1 C ,h ( _ v I GRAND GULF B 3.7-21 Draft C

Anschment 6 *J GNRO-M/D0131 Page 65 of 73 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 ; B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS , i B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 ! SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement ofArradiate fuel assemblies in l the primary or secondary Ocon ainment ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or i refueling condition for extended periods; ,

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is l available for monitoring and maintaining the unit ,

status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate !

events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident. In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has ' the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated , accidents. However, assuming a single failure and ' concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power ' is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), which are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3, have no specific analyses 'in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not . credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained , within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant ! temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design i requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCOs for required systems. During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the . analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed I within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that ; (continued) ; I GRAND GULF B 3.8-35 Draft C r i

Anne a s c3 GNRO44/00131 Page te of 73 AC Sources-Shutdown l B 3.8.2 i BASES LCO an integral part of offsite circuit and DG OPERABILITY since (continued) its inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. , It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required AC electrical power distribution subsystems. As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition such that, even with a single failure, the plant will not be in immediate difficulty. APPLICABILITY _ The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and ggg7g during movement ofdrradiatek fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that.

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup l are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in

_ - , case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; d

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident 9J' F M'OW M ED -- - are available; 4M

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events l that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available 1 for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold ;

shutdown condition or refueling condition. The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note ifidicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If movingderadiatel fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fueA movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore% inability to suspend movement of'irradiatek fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown._ RER.E $3TLV (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.8-38 Draft C

Atladiment 6 tr GNRO-94/D0131 Pope C7 of 73 kC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 P BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, division (s) ; with offsite power available may be capable of supporting ; sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ! ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be $ implemented in accordance with the affected required i feature (s) LCOs' ACTIONS. A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance-for > sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the ' required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiatd, l fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment, and ; activities that could potentially result i inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel. gcy_Dy Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to initiate ; action immediately to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems. , The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to ' minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power. (continued) l GRAND GULF B 3.8-39 Draft C

Atlediment 5(E GNRO-M/00131 Psee 68 et73 l DC Sources-Shutdown i B 3.8.5 1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. I) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the i requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. l The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources duringMODES4and5andduringmovementofdrradiatehfuel , assemblies in the primary or secondary containment en_sures ' that: 9,pcGTh

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or .

refueling condition for extended periods; '

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit

   ,      7y                  status; and inoo\ q pTg

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling

 .t Rfoe.07 \       ATED                 ,

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy , Statement. LC0 One DC electrical power subsystem consisting of one battery, l one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment - and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the I associated bus within the division, associated with Division t (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.8-60 Draft C

Attachment 5 kr ' GNROM00131 Pageesof 73 ) DC Sources-Shutdown ! B 3.8.5 BASES ! LCO 1 or 2 onsite Class IE DC electrical power distribution ! (continue'd) subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems - l

        .                     Shutdown" is required to be OPERABLE. Similarly, when the -                     .j High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is required to be                          :

OPERABLE, the Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem associated with the Division 3 onsite Class IE DC electrical power distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO . 3.8.8 is required to be OPERABLE. In addition to the i preceding subsystems required to be OPERABLE, a Class IE ; battery or battery charger and the associated control i equipment and interconnecting cabling capable of supplying > power to the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class IE DC !

  =                           electrical power distribution subsystem (s), when portions of                    !
  'g
  'E both Division 1 and 2 DC electrical power distribution                           !

subsystem are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. This ! REC E M 60 ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power l pS 4 sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate W the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., j fuel hsndling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel ; draindown). l APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in , MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of \rradiatek fuel assemblies in the primary or seconda ontain_ ment provide assurance that: ggg g

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant !

inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel : assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent l [, draindown of the reactor vessel

     ,.      6, ~ .                                                                                            ,
    /CC CpT05)               b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling                       :

p gyg TEO, agare available; j

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of I events that can lead to core damage during shutdown ;

are available; and l I

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available i for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold i shutdown condition or refueling condition. i The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 i are covered in LC0 3.8.4. j k

(continued) , i h GRAND GULF B 3.8-61 Draft C

[. Attachment 6 C3 GNRO-94/00139 Page 70 of 73 l DC Sr Arces-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES l ACTIONS C.1, C.2.1. C.2.2, C.2.3, and C.2.4 (continued) If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LC0 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE. i with one or more DC power sources inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable battery charger may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow t continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and . operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features , inoperable with associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with j the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this ; option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement (gccc of./krradiateh fuel assemblies, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel). i Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion ' of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is , accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems ! should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may , be without sufficient power. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 - REQUIREMENTS T SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances i required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see ; the corresponding Bases for LC0 3.8.4 for a discussion of ' each SR. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is - to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required ; (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-63 Draft C

Anschmern 5 tm ORO M40131 Pape 71 of 73 Distribution Syste?.s-Shutdown B 3.8.8 - r B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS , B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7,

                         " Distribution Systems-Operating."

l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that a the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power ! sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irrariiatek fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that: REttrJrt,$ ;

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is ,

available for monitoring and maintaining the unit ! status; and Adequate power is provided to mitigate events 6olab y c. postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident,. g g gTED be. he AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.8-80 Draft C L

Attactament 5 'c i GNRO44/00131 Page 72 of 73 l Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 , I i BASES (continued) LC0 Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required systems, equipment, and components-both specifically addressed by their own LCOs, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. (. -

       M I"", 3      Maintaining these portions of the distribution system SEC E N TLN    energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to p RporATED operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the i
            .q,1       consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents,and inadvertent reactor vessel ' draindown). J C APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement cEtJT[ ofAr.r.Ldiateh fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

      'ydQ             b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident gg m                 + are available; 4 "ofATED         c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LC0 3.8.7. (continued) GRAND GULF B 3.8-81 Draft C L _ _ _ _ _ . . - - ._

G 1 Page 73 of 73 Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued) ; ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of 3 reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features

 ,                    associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, theC allowance for sufficiently conservative actionsjis made (i.e.,tosuspendCOREALTERATIONS,movementofdrradiatei fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence 'f i postulated events, .It is further required to immediately ; initiate action to riesto e the required AC and DC electrical l power distribution subsystems and to continue this action ' until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the . necessary power to the plant safety systems. l Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative j Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown I cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS l (continued) i I GRAND GULF B 3.8-82 Draft C I

                                                                        - . _ . _ _ _ _              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _}}

ML20079B450

Text

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