Text

Proposed Tech Specs Assoc W/Various ESF Sys Following Design Basis Fuel Handling Accident
	ML20087B506
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	08/04/1995
From:	; ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20087B498	List: ML20087B496; ML20087B503; ML20087B506;
References
	NUDOCS 9508080141
	Download: ML20087B506 (82)
	v • d • e

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GNRO-95/00090

. Attichment 3 Ptga 2 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.5.1.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. (continued) J.3.1 Initiate action to Immediately restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

M J.3.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore one standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8.!!E J.3.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

K. As required by K.1 Isolate the affected Immediately Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

98 K.2.1 R ;;;;d C" AmaAnen. i- : h^..ii) -

-61!E-

. f- Suspend movement of lamediately 3 irradiated fuel

- # assemblies in the (6CMf primary and secondary containment.

AR (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.3-51 Amendment No. 120 1

9500080141 950804 PDR ADDCK 05000416 p PDR !

r--

GNRO-95/00090

~' Att+chment 3 P:ga 3 _

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation i 3.3.6.1 -1 l

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME K. (continued) K.2.) Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

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GRAND GULF 3.3-52 Amendment No. 120

g-; e 7

b

,,- ^* GNRO-95/00090 -i

~

-- Attachment 3 ' Page 4 - ;

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 i Tante 3.3.6.1 1 (pose 2 of 5) :

Primary Centelruent and Drywell Isetetten Instrimentation 1 l

"4-APPLICASLE .

CONDIT!Out .

Mt3ES OR Risu! RED REFERENCED 4

OTNER CNAmutLS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REeJIREO suRVE!LLANCE ALLOWASLE ]

FUNCTION CONDITIONS sYsitM ACTION C.1 REsWIRBENTS VALUE i

' 2. Primary Centelnment and-Drywell Isoletten (continued) ~

i

b. Drywell Pressure-Nish 1,2,3 2(b) N sa 3.3.6.1.1' s 1.43 pois st 3.3.6.1.2 at 3.3.6.1.3 ;

et 3.3.6.1.6 ]

st 3.3.6.1.7 i

c. Reacter veneel Water 1,2,3 2(b) F sa 3.3.6.1.1 t 152.5 'i Level - Low Lew Law, sa 3.3.6.1.2 inehee .

Level 1 (ECC8 at 3.3.6.1.3 .!

Olvielene 1 and 2) at 3.3.6.1.6 :

se 3.3.6.1.7 l J. Drywet t pressure - Nish 1,2,3 2 F st_3.3.6.1.1 s 1,44 pois )

(ECCs Olvistene 1 et 3.3.6.1.2 j and 2) SR 3.3.6.1.3 sa 3.3.6.1.6 l st - 3.3.6.1.7 l

e. R4ector veneet Water 1,2,3 4 F sa 3.3.6.1.1 a 43.4 ,

Level -Low Law, Lovet ~ st 3.3.6.1.2 Indese 2 (NPCS) at 3.3.6.1.3 )

sa 3.3.6.1.6 i sa 3.3.6.1.7

f. DrywelL Preneure-Nish 1,2,3 4 F st 3.3.6.1.1 - 5 1.44 pois i (NPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.2 l 3R 3.3.6.1.3 at 3.3.6.1.6 3R 3.3.6.1.7

s. Centalruent and Drywett 1,2,3 2(b) F st 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 et/hr.

Ventitetten Enhaust 3R.3.3.4.1.2 Radlet t en - Nish at 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.7 (c) 2 K sa 3.3.6.1.1 s 4.0 et/hr 3R 3.3.6.1.2 sa 3.3.6.1.5 et 3.3.4.1.7 '

h. menuet inittetten- 1,2,3 2(b) 6 st 3.3.6.1.7 an (c) 2 8 at 3.3.6.1.7 mA (centtnued)

(b) Atse reeaired to inittete the eseecleted drywelt feeletten functlen.

(c) Durig movement e irradiated fuel necedstles in primary er - . 1:y contal and ePerettone w ential for eining the reacter vessel.

f'8CCnf b

.l GRAND GULF 3.3-55 Amendment No. 120.

l

f, . , GNRO-95/00090 - 1 Attichment 3 PtDa 5 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 table 3.3.6.2 A1 (page 1 of il secondary Containment Isolation Instroentation I

l APPLICA8LE NODES AND REQUIRED

)

OTHER CHANNELS I

SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FuuCTlou CONelfl0ms system REeu!REMEuts VALut l

1. Reactor vessel Water 1,2,3,(e) 2 sa'3.3.6.2.1 t 63.8 inche9 Level -Low Low, Level 2 sa 3.3.4.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 ,

SR 3.3.6.2.5 .

st 3.3.6.2.6 !

2. DrywelL Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 st 3.3.6.2.1 5 1.63 psig !

st 3.3.6.2.2 )

st 3.3.6.2.3 l SR 3.3.4.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6

3. Fuel Mandling Aree 1,2,3, 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 s 6.0 aft /hr ventitetton Exhaust (e),(b) st 3.3.6.2.2 Radietion- Nigh utch at 3.3.6.2.A SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.4.2.7

6. Fuel Mandling Aree Peel 1,2,3, 2 st 3.3.4.2.1 s 35 et/hr sweep Exhaust (a),(b) st 3.3.6.2.2 Radiation-Nigh Nigh at 3.3.6.2.6 I st 3.3.6.2.6 l SR 3.3.6.2.7

5. Manuel Initiation 1,2,3, 2 sa 3.3.6.2.6 uA

]

(e),(b) ,

1

)

I (e) During operations with a potentist for draining the reactor vesset.

(b) During Y 6 T r ?: r rd _ ..}z _ .t Irradiated fuel assemblies in the priency or secondary contet. - . . .

(1~e#'cently

)

1 l

l i

I l

GRAND Gut.F 3.3-62 Amendment No. 120 l l

l "a

GNRO-93/00090

. AttIchment 3 Pcg3 6 CRFA System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 i

febte 3.3.7.1 1 (pose 1 of 1)

Control Room Fresh Air system instrumentation APPLICA8LE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FRGt sPECIFIED PER TRIP REGutRSD sURVE!LLANCE ALLOW 48LE FUNCTION CONDIT!0Ns sTsTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor vesset Ueter 1,2,3 2 a st 3.3.7.1.1 t -43.8 inches Level- Low Low, Level 2 sa 3.3.7.1.2 fa) SR 3.3.7.1.3 i i

sa 3.3.7.1.5 st 3.3.7.1.6 ,

2. Drywell Pressure-Nish 1,2,3 2 C sa 3.3.7.1.1 s 1.63 pois SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 sa 3.3.7.1.5 sa 3.3.7.1.6 ;

3. Controt Room 1,2,3 2 0 sa 3.3.7.1.1 s 5 ma/hr ventitetion Redietton st 3.3.7.1.2 Monitors (a),(b) SR 3.3. 7.1.6 i sa 3.3.7.1.6 ,

6 Merwet Inittetten 1,2,3 2 5 st 3.3.7.1.6 NA (e),(b) to) During operations with a potentist for dretning the reacter vesset, j I

(b) Duringt - . ^T-^-- - " 1 ' g x _ .t o hirrediated fuel assentettee in the primary or escendary contal. - ... f' (F ec.ently i

i i

I GRAND GULF 3.3-76 Amendment No. 120 !

g, l e

]

w . . - -

+

GNRO-95/00090 9- "' Attachment 3 : P:ge 71 .y-g

, )

-PCIVs.

, _3.6.1.3f

n ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION LCOMPLETION~ TIME E .~ Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion g Time of Condition A, _A_q L B, C, or D not met in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months MODE 1, 2, or 3. E.2 Be in MODE 4.

F. Required Action and F.1 --------NOTE---------

E associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not Tiw of Condition A, applicable.~ ;

B, C, or D not met ---------------------

for PCIV(s) required i T to be OPERABLE during Suspend movement of Imediately - )

reccrdfy J moviment ohirradiated irradiated fuel J fue' assemDIits.in assemblies in primary the primary or and secondary secondary c tainment.

containment. g/

d.RequiredActionand :--_- M "* ';

f associated Completto #.1 G Sunnand CORE AL uvuluna.

Time of Conditi ,

B, C, or 0 set for PC required to PERABLE during p .j C E ALTERATIONS.

Imediately h' Required Action and associated Completion Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs. !

Time of Condition A, B, C,'or D not met for E l' PCIV(s) required to be I OPERABLE during MODE 4 2 Initiate action to Imediately or 5 or during restore valve (s) to operations with a OPERABLE~ S'ATU.S.

potential for draining b the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

b GRAND GULF 3.6-13 Amendment No. 120 ;

. I.

l GNRO-95/00090 l Attachment 3 P;ge 8 j Secondary Containment i 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3,6.4.1 Secondary Containment LC0 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary n _ or secondary containment, Tuv. ; ., 00^2 ^1 TE".".I:^':C.)

During operations witn a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l

(continued) l l

GRAND GULF 3.6-42 Amendment No. 120 l

l l

GNRO-95/00090 Attichment 3 Pigi 9 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. . Secondary C.1 --------NOTE---------

containment LCO 3.0.3 is not inoperable during applicable.

mentojeirradiated -----------------

FC ent 2; uel assemblies in theI primary or secondary apend movement of Immediately reconll/ sontainment irradiated fuel

! -.S A n?E"T!* , or assemblies in the during OPUMys. primary and secondary containment.

AND C.2 b;=d E^"I# I--d';tC" N k!"2TI^"_Sy A i h nitiate action to uspend OPORVs.

Immediatap SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all auxiliary building and 31 days enclosure building equipment hatches snd blowout panels are closed and sealed.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify each auxiliary building and 31 days enclosure building access door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.

L (continued)

[

l l GRAND GULF 3.6-43 Amendment No. 120

~ -

+ '

' GNRO-95/00090 '

..- !*' Attichment 3 Pig 310 l SCIVs ~'

3.6.4.2 3.6.~ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS !

3.6.4.2 -Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) +

LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE. ,

i

' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, ee c.entlu/

During movement of rradiated fue assemblies in the primary ar secondary containment,

.E dr' .; C^- " "? '^1 )

Juring operations witi i potential for draining the reactor. i vessel (OPDRVs). j

I ACTIONS ,

..................................... NOTES------------------------------------

I. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under ,

administrative controls. l

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made q inoperable by SCIVs. ]

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration flow paths ')enetration flow path with one SCIV )y use of at least inoperable, one closed and de-activated automatic valve or damper, closed manual valve i or damper, or blind '

flange.

8!@

(continued) :

l GRAND GULF 3.6-45 Amendment No. 120

GNRO-93/00090

Attichment 3 Paga 11 SCIVs 3.6.4.2 j

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i D. Required Action and D.I --------NOTE---------

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not l

n licable.

Time of Condition A

6 W g/

or B not met during movement ofMrradiated k - g I- -----------------

fuel assemblies in the Suspend movement of Immediately primary or secondary irradiated fuel containment d .c'. # assemblies in the

m n A;! = T!'":0,[or primary and secondary :

containment.

~

during OPDRVs. l AND l D.2 d ^^ -

!..d;.;e',j ~

i 4TE"". TIC!.'*[E g

- l l

D \

h nitiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately i

l i

1 l

\

GRAND GULF 3.6-47 Amendment No. 120

~ -

L)[

- GNRO-95/00090 1

' A AttichmInt 3 Pag 312 SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

,> LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement o rradiated fuel a;semblies in the primary nr secondarv containment,

_,--,.----....,3 uring operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPORVs).

i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

i B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

associated Completion Time of Condition A AND l not met in MODE 1, 2, l or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months -l 1

.j i

C. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable, Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during ggcef)ffy movement oftirradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately

/ fuel assemblies in the subsystem in primary or seenndary operation.

03 during urunvs. -

(continued) 1

)

i 1

GRAND GULF 3.6-49 Amendment No. 120

Ql' )

GNRO-95 00090 Attachment 3 Pcgs13 SGT System 3.6.4.3 .

ACTICTS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CrecentJI C.2.1 \ Suspend movement of Immediately l

C. (continued)

) irradiated fuel i assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

AND C.2.2 "-a-ad ra

, 4, , , , ; ,_,"._." -f

.............,.f A l f l

C. . nitiate action to Immediatelyl suspend OPDRVs. >

l I

D. Two SGT subsystees D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately-inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Insediately inonerable_during irradiated fuel assemblies in the ege m ffq y ( [ movement fuel assemblies ofh rradiated in the primary and secondary

_y/ primary or seco r corlta inment.

containment.,

e - - ..

r' "

- y e 37 Snt y) during ODDR C *---- " '-

r^

E2 33gg'g""y

--- -'-' 7 i i

g Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Imediately GRAND GULF 3.6-50 Amendment No. 120

GNRO-95A)0090 Attachment 3 Page 14 CRFA System j 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEM 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System LCO 3.7.3 Two CRFA subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary A -

e uu .iny".17/paryjony,31nment, m_ .. ..... . .. . .)

During operatio.w with T potential for draining the reactor vessel, (OPOR'Is) .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CRFA subsystem A.1 Restore CRFA 7 days inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A A.NQ not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued) l GRAND GULF 3.7-6 Amendment No. 120

\

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._- - . - - - - - _ _ ___ a

GNRO-95/00090

,. . Att:chment 3 Pega 15 CRfA System 3.7.3 l

ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

C. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------- l associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. l Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during movement 4of irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE CRFA Immediately )

remnY V/) _ fuel assemblies in the subsystem in primary or secondary isolation mode.

" containment W COE Z TC.'?!^"',f6r OR ,

during urunus. - l C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary l can inment. l i l l

.____2 rnor

-- 2,. _, 7A h2iE5'3:553! '

o 4

. 61tiateactionto Immediately kpendOPDRVs. __

D. Two CRFA subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Imediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

GRAND GULF 3.7-7 Amendment No. 120

f..- *- GNRO-954)C090 ,

Att:chment 3 PIge 16 '

CRFA System j 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

E. Two CRFA subsystems E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately I inoperable during irradiated fuel 7 movement ofmirradiated assemblies in the cenffy 7 fuel assemb' lies in the primary and secondary cont l

lj primary or secondary nt.

4 A

[

during OPDRVs. ^ --- '

i E2 ty._.;.;.

' - " ' " ' .,l 8 -

--.-~y :

Q .

3'^^' /

R._.- h I A

1

. Initiate action to Immediately suspetd. OPORVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j i

l SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each CRFA subsystem for a: 10 31 days 1 continuous hours with the heaters i operating. l 1

SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required CRFA filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.7.3.3 Verify each CRFA subsystem actuates on an 18 months actual or simulated initiation signal.

1 GRAND GULF 3.7-8 Amendment No. 120 I

GNRO-95/ COO 90 i

.. Attichment 3 Pega 17 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEh5 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3.7.4 Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary cantainment, q ,L ':;; :^^: "

( --

""'T GQ During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPORVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC A.1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Two control room AC B.1 Verify control room Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months subsystems inoperable. area temperature 1 90*F.

6N.R B.2 Restore one control 7 days room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or AND 8 not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4, 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

F I

f l GRAND GULF 3.7-9 Amendment No. 120

GNRO-95/00090 j .

AttCchment 3 Page 18 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during 7 movement o hirradiated D.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately re(ff)ify F fuel assem5fies in the control room AC subsystem in JI primary or seco ar containmen operation.

% SE ",LTE^4TIG G or during UPUKVs. @

D.2.1 Suspend movement of. Immediately irradiated fuel l# assemblies in the re, d 'fy primary and secondary j/ containment.

8N_Q D.2.2 Egrd CSC # :

u troart ..e

d ht-'u"l 0-A 1 I !

Jht t nitiate action to Immediately]: l

spend OPDRVs. -

(continued) i

)

l I

l GRAND GULF 3.7-10 Amendment No. 120 I

GNRO-95/00090

. - Attichm:nt 3 Pagt 19 Control Room AC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and associated Completion ------------NOTE-------------

Time of Condition B LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

not met during ----------------------------- ,

movement ofmirradiated uel assemblies in the Suspend movement of Immediately D[f primary or secondary cnntainmar YLcir E.1 irradiated fuel assemblies in the ;

D"I "iT :'.' " = , o r primary and secondary conta nt.

l during 0):lRVs.

a crecently e.2 s . . . .. .a - -- - ~ . , . w AiiEnart f;h'[ #

" ~ ~ ~

~j A

x -

g "

kitiateactionto Immediateh l

M spend OPDRVs.

l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has 18 months the capability to remove the assumed heat load.

GRAND GULF 3.7-11 Amendment No. 120

i 1

GNRO-95/00090 i Attachment 3 Page 20 l AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 l l

l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERA 8LE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission -

network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power l distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8, '

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class lE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8; and i

c. One qualified circuit, other than the circuit in LCO 3.8.2.a, between the offsite transmission network '

and the Division 3 onsite Class IE electrical power i distribution subsystem, or the Division 3 DG capable of- !

supplying the Division 3 onsite Class IE AC electrical l power distribution subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite 1 Class IE electrical power distribution subsystem is I required by LCO 3.8.8.

4 l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, j During movementAof irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary '

or secondaryfcontainment.

Qcently l

l GRAND GULF 3.8-18 Amendment No. 120 l l

p-GNRO-95/00090 Attichmsnt 3 Page 21 AC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS i

..................................--NOTE--...-----------..------.-..--...----

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. l 1

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TINE A. LCO Item a not met. .---- ------NOTE-------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, when any required l division is de-energized as a '

result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature (s) with no offsite power available from a required circuit inoperable.

QB A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately l

' irradiated fuel PCCdCt}l )" ' assemblies in the primary and secondary !

containment.

8HE I A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPORVs).

AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.8-19 Amendment No. 120

j'

, .- GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 22 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 q ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

B. LCO Item b not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

E B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately t

_) ' irradiated fuel

'assablies in primary F6Cenily)i and secondary

> containment.

M B.3 Initiate action to Inmediately suspend OPORVs.

M B.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERA 8LE status.

C. LC0 Item c not met.- C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Core Spray System inoperable.

GRAND GULF 3.8-20 Amendment No. 120

GNRO-93/00090

Attchment 3 P:ge 23 DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 i 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS !

l 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown i

LCO 3.8.5 The following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One Class 1E DC electrical power subsystem capable of -

supplying one division of the Division 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s)-

required by LCO 3.8.8, " Distribution Systems -

Shutdown";

b. One Class 1E battery or battery charger, other than the DC electrical power subsystem in LCO 3.8.5.a. capable of supplying the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.8; and

c. The Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem capable of '

i supplying the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.8.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irr:diated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. .

(ecently

)

i GRAND GULF 3.8-31 Amendment No. 120 l

'*1 GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 24 DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS

...................................--NOTE-------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required battery ------------NOTE-------------

charger inoperable. Entry into MODE 4 or 5, or

_ comencing movement of

irradiated fuel is not' NN) __4 allowed, except entry into MODE 4 or 5-can be made as part of a unit shutdown.

A.1 Verify battery cell I hour parameters neet Table 3.8.6-1 #fD Category A limits.

Once per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months s-thereafter B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Imediately associated Completion battery inoperable.

Time of Condition A not met.

C. One or more required C.1 Declare affected Imediately DC electrical power required feature (s) subsystems inoperable inoperable.

for reasons other than Condition A. OR C.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.8-32 Amendment No. 120

l

, ,, GNRO-95/00090 ,

Atttchnnnt 3 Page25

)

i DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 l ACTIONS l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately j g irradiated fuel ,

h assemblies in the primary and secondary

?

(dcenI}lv containment' 1 i

E

l l

C.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for i draining the reactor l vessel. I 1

AND l C.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERA 8LE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

-SR 3.8.5.1 --------------------NOTE-------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.

For DC sources required to be OPERA 8LE, the In accordance following SRs are applicable: with applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.1 .SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 GRAND GULF 3.8-33 Amendment No. 120

GNRO-95/00090 Attichment 3 P:ge 26 Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LC0 3.8.8 The necessary portions of the Division I, Division 2, and Division 3 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement o rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. .

1 ACTIONS

..................................... NOTE------------------------------------- l LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately i AC or DC electrical supported required I power distribution feature (s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable.

O.8 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

$ irradiated fuel recentiy assemblies in the primary and secondary containment. j AND (continued)

GRAND GULF 3.8-40 Amendment No. 120 4

GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 27 LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0A provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES -

(continued) or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or-to a specific Required Action of a Specification.

LC0 3.0.4 is only applicable when entering MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, or MODE 1 from MODE 2.

Furthermore, LCO 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3. The requirements of LC0 3.0.4 ao not apply in MODES 4 and 5, or other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the '

remedial measure to be taken.

l The ACTIONS for an inoperable required battery charger in LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown," include a Note explicitly precluding entry into specific MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability while relying on the ACTIONS. With an inoperable required battery charger this Note in LCO 3.8.4 4 prohibits entry in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except during power l decrease and in LCO 3.8.5 prohibits starting movement of Ora irradiated fuel, entering MODE 4 from HODE 5, or loading fuel into the vessel if the vessel is defueled.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, either in compliance with LCO 3.0.4, or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of i SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or j variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO. j LC0 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment j to service under administrative controls when it has been j removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.0-6 Revision No. 0

a_ .a. #. , C:

.s- . GNRO-95/00090 Att:chment 3 Ptg's 28 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation l B 3.3.6.1 ;

BASES i

APPLICABLE 2.a. Containment and Orvwell Ventilation Exhaust .

SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hiah (continued) !

LCO, and i APPLICABILITY Four channels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation j Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be ,

OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. :

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross ,

failure of the fuel cladding-and to ensure offsite doses ,

remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits. :

to150 fan - #

The Function is requiredwithtoa be OPERA for8LEh uring N g the fM49 g%nec.nf OTE."".T:^" ,) operation reactor vessel (0PDRVs potential dr and movement ofeirradiated fuel - gi i

i j assemblies in the pria y or secondary containment because t j the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel- --

failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not I pyf-T exceededy ,

813~ These Functions isolate the Group 7 valves. !

E I 2.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce ' signals into the primary containment and'drywell isolation logic '

that are redundant to the automatic protective j instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability.

There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no ,

Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are j

~

mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-148 Revision No. 0 )

l

I

+-

.~ GNRO-93/00090

. Attachment 3 Ptge 29 .

L: INSERT B 3.3-148A

~

Due to radioactive' decay, this Function is only required to isolate primary

(. containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently l :- irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core l- within the previous 12 days).

1

[.

l u

l l

1 1

i 1

1 l

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1 I

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l I

1

~

s x 'GNRO-93/00090 g

,, ' Attichment 3 Page 30 -

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation !

B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS' J.l. J.2. J.3.1. J.3.2 and J.3.3- (continued ,

associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in i each secondary containment ' penetration flow. path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated.to. mitigate a radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an

administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to_ determine if the components are out of, service for maintenance or other reasons. It-is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrateL

the OPERABILITY of the components. If,:however,~any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored 1 to OPERA 8LE status. In this case, the Surveillances may .;

need to be performed to restore the component to OPERA 8LE '

status. Actions must continue until all rec,uired components are OPERA 8LE and .

K.l. K.2.1. K.2.2 6 d 5.2. O . -

I If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated '

penetration flow path (s) should be isolated (Required Action K.1). Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the; inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, the plant must be placed.in a 4 co'dition in which the LC0 does not apply. If applicable.

CCC'I MTC"",TCC-.3 movement oftirradiated fuel assemblie must De immediately suspended. Suspens'on of these gg#

activities shall not preclude completion of movement of~a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be inmediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize ,

the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent ',

potential for fission ' production release. Actions must continue until 0PDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, .the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Isolation Instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate- "1 that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be, delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided,the associated Function maintains (continued)

P GRAND GULF B 3.3-167 Revision No O' CW HK

GNRO-954)0090 f

Attachment 3 Page 31 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3, 4. Fuel Handlina Area Ventilation and Pool Sweep Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hiah Hiah (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY channels of Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High High Function and four channels of Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation-High High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation-High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In a<dition. t1e Functions are required to be OPERABLE duringM" 8P"=Q OPDRVsh and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or MMti/ dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that

//

offsite dose limits are not exceeded.f

5. Manual Initiation h sert g y,3. pjg The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-177 Revision No. O l

1

.,,- '.- GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 32 INSERT B 3.3-177A Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate secondary containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part.of a critical reactor core within the previous.12 days).

1

GNRO-95/00090 Attichment 3 Prg) 33 Secondary Containment Isolation instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 5. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are APPLICABILITY available and age _reauired to_ be_0PERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during L^RC 4 = TP" O OPDRV nd movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the seconda ontainment, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions in FCCeg/g which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic l

Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. j Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a '

Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, ;

subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the j Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits .

will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable I secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry f,or each inoperable ,

secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

]

M i i

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , depending on the Function, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 3 and 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. Functions that share common instrumentation with the RPS have a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed out of service time consistent with the time provided for the associated RPS instrumentation channels. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated ,

Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the~ channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.l. Placing the (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-178 Revision No. O

. ._ . _ = - . __

6 GNRO-95/00090 Attichment 3 Pag 2 34 CRFA System Instrumentation ;

B 3.3.7.1 !

-BASES APPLICABLE 2. Drywell Pressure-Hiah (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, .

LCO, and (two channels per trip system) and are required to be l APPLICABILITY OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation.

The Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Secondary Containment Isolation Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.2). j The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be l OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that control room i personnel are protected during a LOCA. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the drywell to the Drywell Pressure-High setpoint.

3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors measure radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR.

A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel; thus, a detactor indicating this condition automatically signals initiation of the CRFA System.

The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors Function !

consists of four independent monitors. Four channels of Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors are available and are required to be OPERA 8LE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation. .The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the l control room personnel. !

, The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors Function is PcorNM , reauired to be OPERABLE jn MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during i

l gwn;=;;;QOPDRVsp; w econdary containeenand to movement of.control ensure that irradiatedroon fuel in i personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling even ,q g p/

or a vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, w gh

, these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g LT = T:C O), the probability cf a LOCA L = M, low; thus, the Function is nr,t required.a *f i Tnsert

, (OPDRVs}

83.3-2.l"7A (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.3-217 Revision No. O

[-,

.< *- GNRO-95/00090 ,

Attachment 3 Page 35 -

INSERT B 3.3-217A ;

Also due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to initiate the :

CRFA System during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated. fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core ,

within the previous 12 days). ;

6 i

s l

1 1

i ..

p g ,,- GNRO-95/00090 _.

Attachment 3 Pcge 36 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES-(continued).

APPLICABLE The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES ' to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, 'and -

establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY. supports. leak tightness of primary-containment. Therefore,.the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable'to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequences are mitigated by PCIVs are a loss-of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break'(MSLB),

and a fuel handling accidentsinside primary containment

.I L ,,y& (Refs..l and 2). In the aslysis'for each of these.

accidents' it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or

{ g 'g, g ,

function to close within.the required isolation time

_ following event. initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs are minimized. Of the events analyzed in Reference 1, the LOCA is the most limiting event due to radiological consequences.. An analysis of the affect of the purge. valves being open at the initiation of a LOCA has been performed. This condition was found to result in dose contributions of a small fraction of 10 CFR 100. It is assumed that the primary containment is ,

isolated such that release of fission products to the. '

environment is controlled.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO PCIVs form a part of the pristry containment boundary and some also form a part of the RCP8. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.

The power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic valves are required to actuate on an automatic.

isolation signal.

The normally closed PCIVs are considered OPERABLE'when,'as -l applicable, manual' valves are closed or open in accordance l with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves ;

are de-activated and secured in their closed position, or i blind flanges are in place. The valves covered by this LCO-l l

(continued) :I i

GPAND GULF -B 3.6-15 Revision No. 0 )

0.* ' +'-

. GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 P ge 37J :

' INSERT B 3.6-15A l I.' involving handling recently irradiated fuel l(i.e., fuel that has occupied part .

of a critical reactor core within the previous 12. days) j

-i e

6 h

9

.i s

t i

I i

l 1

i i

iI i

I l

. i LL__ ]

GNRO-95/00090 1 L*- * - Attachment 3 Page 38 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in the (continued)- applicable plant procedures. Purge valves with resilient-seals, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage ,

rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, " Primary Containment," I as Type B or C testing. J l

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform 1' their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of ,

radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 '

and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are )

reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of l these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be i OPERABLE. Certain valves are cauired to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent a potentiai flow path (the RHR Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel) from !

lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel'. These valves are those whose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1,

" Primary Containment and Drywell isolation Instrumentation,"

Function 5.b. Additional valves are required to be OPERABLE to prevent release of radioactive material during a

, LA postulated fuel handlino ci en . These valves are those C-whose associated isolatlon ins r mentation is required to be q O 3'U d , OPERABLE according to LC0 3.3.6.1, " Function 2.g." (This

- J does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path (s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous comunication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A second Note has boen added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-16 Revision No. 0

L. A , s, p:

E*.' ta -

GNRO-95/00090 t .: ._ i . Attachment 3 Page 39

, INSERT'8 3.6-16A involving handling recently irradiated fuel' (i.e., fuel that has occupied part cf. of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days)-

6 7

h 3

'l l

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+

l i

t L. . . ._., _ . _ . , . _ , ,. . , , , - , . . . - .

s GNRO-CS/00090 e= M . Attichment 3 Paga 40 E -

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES L ACTIONS 0.1. D.2 and 0.3 (continued) verification that those isolation devices outside primary containment and potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside primary containment, the time period specified as

" prior to entering MODE 2 or 3, from MODE 4 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering

~ judgment and is considered reasonable in view of administrative controls that will ensure' that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

For.the primary containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action 0.1, SR 3.6.1.3.5 must be performed at least once every 92 days.

This provides assurance that degradation of the resilient

-seal.is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the primary containment purge valve does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. - The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.1.3.5 is 184 days. Since more reliance-is placed on-a single valve while in this Condition,'it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per 92. days was chosen and has been shown acceptable based on operating experience.

E.1 and E.2 I If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating-( experience, to reach the required plant conditions.from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without.

challenging plant. sy ens.

F.1. G.I. and .Z

~

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a c>ndi". inn n which the LC0 does not apply. If applicable, GCT "i"r ;; =OL movement of m irradia+ad fuel assemblies < n the pr< mary and (continued)_

GRAND GULF B 3.6-20 Revision No.'O

. ,- ~ -- .- .- . , ,

~

f

~

Ji '

4. ' GNRO-95/00090

. Attichret 3 P:ge 41I

+ PCIVs.

8 3.6.1.3.

~ '

BASES h, i ACTIONS F.1. G.I. and 2-(continued).

v -

secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these' activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be'immediately initiated to suspend-operations with a potential for' draining the reactor vessel = 3 (OPDRVs) to minimize the_ probability of a vessel draindown.

and subsequent potential for fission product release. d Actions must continue until OPDRVs are_ suspended. If 1 suspending the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual I heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an l alternative Required Action is provided to imediately initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status.

This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being- l taken to restore the valve. l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the 20 inch primary containment' purge valves are closed.as required or, if open,. open' for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the:

inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakagg ,

outside of the limits The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1) stating that primary containment purge valvas are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. At times other than MODE 1, 2, or 3 when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel _ geef1tl assemblies) pressurization concerfFs are not present and In purge valves are allowed to be open (automatic isolation capability would be required by SR 3.6.1.3.4 and SR-3.6.1.3.7). ..

The SR is modified by a Note (Note 2) stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for .i the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may i be opened for pressure control, ALARA, or air quality. l considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances, or .j special testing of the purge system that require the valves !

to be open (e.g., testing of the containment and drywell j ventilation radiation monitors). These primary containment '

(continued)-

4

GRAND GULF B 3.6-21 Revision No. O i

- GNRO-95/00o90 Attachment 3 Pige 42 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS primary containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established. Additionally, this SR must be performed within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that which occurs to a valve that has not been opened).

Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.

FC.CCn V SR 3.6.1.3.6 I Verifying that the full closure isolation time of each P)S}V is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABIt.ITY. The full closure isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment i ulation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.7 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance '

under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating q (continued)

GRAND GULF 3 3.6-24 Revision No. O

GNRO-93/00090

. . Attachm nt 3 Pcge 43 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment l

BASES BACKGROUND The function of the secondary containment is to contain,-

dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment '

(SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment (e.g., during operations with a notential for ng the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)CiM;;; 0^"O '

g y^'TE fR'*S,)or during movement 06eirraatated fuel' Amfh t .

-assemblies in the primary or secondary containment), wne /

primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump / motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the secondary ,

containment boundary are a part of the secondary containment barrier. To maintain this barrier:

a. All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation system, or (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-83 Revision No. O

.-

GNRO45/00090 Attachment 3 Page 44 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 ,

BASES ,

BACKGROUND 2. closed by a manual valve, blind flange, rupture -

(continued) disk, or de-activated automatic valve or damper secured in a closed position, except as provided in LC0 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation i Valves (SCIVs)";

b. All auxiliary building and enclosure building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed;

c. The door in each access to the auxiliary building and ,

enclosure building is closed, except for normal entry and exit;

d. The sealing mechanism, e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings, associated with each secondary containment penetration is OPERABLE; and l

e. The standby gas treatment system is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment l System." '

APPLICABLE There are three principal accidents for which credit is l SAFETY ANALYSES taken for secondary containment OPERA _BILITY. These are a j J .Tn g LOCA (Ref. 1), a fuel handling accidenhinside primary l r a n.-WA containment (Ref. 21. and a fuel hand 1jng accidentnin the ;

m g auxt11ary puiiotng (Ref. 3). The secondary containment ,

g"3[.g performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to

'l j

ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the i primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, and that fission products entrapped within the secondary ,

containment structure will be treated by the SGT System I prior to discharge to the environment. !

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release (continued) <

GRAND GULF B 3.6-B4 Revision No. O

j- : ,

GNRO-95/C0090 '. ..

Att chment 3 P;ge 45 I INSERT B'3.6-84A s

-involving handling recently' irradiated fuel. (i.e., fuel that has occupied. part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12. days)

INSERT B 3.6-84B involving handling recently'. irradiated fuel

, .- . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . .. . - . -. .-

GNRO-95/00090

' Attachment 3 Page 46

~

Secondary Containment

-B 3.6.4.1 BASES.

LCO to the environment. For the secondary containment to be

.(continued) considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ,

ensure that the required vacuum can be established and

)

maintained. )

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary

, containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

J In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations-for which significant releases of radioactive material. can be postulated, such as during operations with a notantial

'^*r ' =

fordrainin

-e ?2 RT:^" the , or reactor vessel (OPDRVs)f"'-

during movemen M irradiated fuel

- 7*g ' l assemblies in the rreektM primary or5=coadary containment.%{81.G 1 N

ACTIONS A.1 Ifsecondarycontainmentisinoperable,itmustberestafed to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . -The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

i B.1 and B.2 If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least !

MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The I J

allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to. reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-85 Revision No. O I

c . !

'> -. GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3. Page 47..

INSERT B 3.6-85A Due to radioactive decay, secondary containment is only required to be !

OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel i (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the-previous 12 days). ;

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GNRO-05/00090

Att"chment 3 Pag) 48 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C . lWC .

V ' A (continued)

Movement ofeirradiategel assemblies in the primary or

(( secondary containmen Z S "=:GQ and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause ission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to releasu of fission products to the 6,56'9*g environment. t al ,, - .

w .,

.n@ movement ofgirradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the Thed% secondary containment is inoperable.

(('ezr nu Al Suspension of these activities shall not preclude comp eting an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be imediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPD Ve m r"enended.

rec 4n MI Required Action C.1 has been modified by a ote stTting that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving rradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If movinhirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor N- operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend l[ movement o irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a suffici eason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building equipment hatches, blowout panels, and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency for these Srs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other controls on secondary containment access openings.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-86 Revision No. O

GNRO-93/00090 ;

y .

Attachment 3 Page 49 SCIVs. '

B 3.6.4.2 BASES BACKGROUND Analyses have shown that in addition to building leakage (continued) paths, the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has the capacity to maintain secondary containment negative pressure ;

assuming the failure of all nonqualified lines 2 inches and smaller.or with the failure of a single nonisolated line as ;

large as 4 inches. As a result, the following lines which .

penetrate the secondary containment and terminate there (i.e.,.they do not continue through the secondary containment and also penetrate the primary containment) are provided with a single isolation valve, rather than two, at j the secondary penetration: ;

a. 4-inch makeup water supply line

b. 3-inch domestic water supply line

c. 4-inch RHR backwash line

d. 3-inch backwash transfer pump discharge line

e. 3-inch floor and equipment drain line The single isolation valve for each of the above lines is an ,

air-operated valve which fails closed; in addition, each !

operator is provided with redundant solenoid valves which receive actuation signals from redundant sources. In this manner, it is ensured that, given any single failure, onfyl one of the above lines will be nonisolated, which as stated j above is within the capacity of the SGTS. '

)

APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary I L 3 /T l SAFETY ANALYSES containment barrier to fission product releases is B 3.4 %"

established. The principal accidents for which the ' ,

secondarycontainmentboundaryisrequiredarealossjof !

coolant accident (Ref. 1), a fuel handling accidente nside l I rnsu4 l primary containment (Ref. 3), and a fuel handling accident ;

d % #f)/P kin the auxiliary building (Ref. 4). The secondary j containment performs no active function in response to each l of these limiting events, but the boundary established by l SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary ,

containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) ;

System before being released to the environment. !

I (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-89 Revision No. C

T .

GNRO-95/00090 '

i t*3 Attachment 3 Page 50 INSERT B 3.6-89A' i involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel .that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days)

-INSERT B 3.'6-89B involving' handling recently irradiated fuel l

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. . GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Prge 51 '

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within SAFETY ANALYSES limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped 1 (continued) inside secnndary containment so that they can be treated by ,

the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. ;

SCIVs satisfy Critorion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated isolation dampers and valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation tiles are within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic dampers and j valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation i signal, l The normally closed isolation dampers and valves, rupture disks, or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual I dampers and valves are closed or open in accordance with l appropriate administrative controls, automatic dampers and l valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, rupture disks or blind flanges are in place. The ,

SCIVs covered by this LCO, along with their associated !

stroke times, if applicable, are listed in the applicable plant procedures.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product !

release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these ;

events are reduced due to pressure and temperature i' limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIV, OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a ootential "or draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs

'^*

( *^"" ^' "" ~'0%Q or during movement o irradiate ;

assemblies. MoH ng rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ISC60T

- (continued) 816-9CA GRAND GULF B 3.6-90 P.evision No. O

7; I ig, ,

~

<;f ~*

GNRO-9500090 Attachment 3 Page 52 -

4

INSERT B 3.6-90A Due to radioactive decay, SCIVs are only. required to be OPERABLE during fuel =

handling -involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has-occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days).

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t GNRO-95/00090 -

Attachment 3 P:ge 53 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the ,

required plant conditions from full power conditions in an manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.hD.2kd 0.b]

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed i ga condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable,di % " =05 f@ the "secondary containment must be immediately suspended.

FCCentif

-. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

D Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that gg" y \ LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while TIFNODE 4 or 5, LCO . 3 would not specify

- f >LX any action. If envineirradiated fuel assemblies while in l

l MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Tuel movement is independent of reactor I operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement o irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient eason to require a reactor shutdown.

l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies each secondary containment isolation manual valve, damper, rupture disk, and blind flange that is 1 required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or SCIV manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal unit operation and verification of their position is (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-93 Revision No. O

'* GNRO-95/00090 l Attachment 3 P:ge 54 I SGT System B 3,6.4.3 BASES i

BACKGROUND humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The j (continued) prefilter' removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter is provided to remove fine particulate matter and

. protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter is provided to collect any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber, i The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both enclosure building recirculation fans and both charcoal filter train fans start. SGT System flows are controlled by modulating inlet vanes installed on the charcoal filter train exhaust fans and two position volume control dampers installed in branch ducts to individual regions of the secondary containment.

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the !

SAFETY ANALYSES consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents,(Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System bU

~ is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via B 3.(o-T7 8 . filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. l LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required >

to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure I with respect to the environment and to process gaseous ]

releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two operable l subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

(continued) l l

1 GRAND GULF B 3.6-97 Revision No. O _;

,,f ',, g .

GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 55 :'

n.

INSERT B 3.6-97A . i

~

. involving handling recently irradiated fuel '( i.e., fuel that has' occupied part-off a critical' reactor core within the previous 12 days) .

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.-

GNRO-95/00090 .i Attachment 3 P ga56 !

SGT System l B 3.6.4.3 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these (continued) events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT l System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for i other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a notential For craining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs h _ t MaE _.. _ _m.,,) or during movement of i rece/ iffy irradiated fuel assemblies - n the Drimary or secondary i

/

containment.4 { Tnser167.6-9% A }

ACTIONS Ad With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. ,

B.1 and B.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withou allenging plant systems. I

<d

. 2. Zr t;d C . [.h

- D[3 C.During I .movement C.2.1. oflirradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containmentP '- '^- """"'^"Q or during OPDRVs, when Required Acu on A.1 cannot be Completed within i the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem l l

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-98 Revision No. 0 4

. = .. - . , ..

3: i

' , l- ..

- GNRO-95/00090 ,, ;

1'.

Attrchment 3. Page 57 -

t INSERT 8'3.6-98A Due to-radioactive decay, the SGT System is only required to'be OPERABLE

--i during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 :

days).

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--.-; f* GNRO-95/00090

- Att:chment 3 Pcge 58 _

l SGT System ~ l

< B 3.6.4.3 ,

4 BASES

-)

ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1.SC.2. C.O.h.(continued) should be imediately placed in operation. .This Required l Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, l that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have '

occurred, and that any other failure would be readily i detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately A suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing 1 g'5j.h,8 radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus unit < n a caaM *4aa that minimizes risk. If

(' c2dm A placing applicable, th(C: a!:ZTZ r3 movement of irradiated 4 fuel -1 assemblies must-De immed'ately suspended. Sirspension o these activities shall not preclude completion of movement th ,

of a component to a safe position. Also. . if applicable. -

action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPORVs to minimize the prcbability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. This action should be chosen if the OPDRVs could be impacted by a loss of offsite power. Action must continue until 0PORVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of. Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0 f3, y gf] would not specify any action. 'If moving irradiated fuel '

assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the uel movemont is independent of reactor operations. .Therefore,ine<ther(ftCCMly case, inability to suspend movement irradiated fuel -

assemblies would not be a sufficient eason to require a reactor shutdown. .

Ed If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required-radioactivity release control function. Therefore, LCO

3. st be entered immediately. '

E.1L .

g Wha two SGT su ystems are inoperable, if applicable G4.7 ZT ""! M uovement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary o inment must be immediately NCf- w F (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.6-99 Revision No. 0

.y. ; _

7_

~ ~

!A: c . ' GNRO-954)0090 !

, ,le; Mi ' . Attachment 3 Page 59.

4 <

SGT-System t B 3.6.4.3: l

-BASES-ACTIONS E f. '(cont'inued).

^

suspended. Suspension of these' activities shall not

, preclude completion of movement of a: component to.a safe . i position. Also, fif applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a H vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission ;

^

product release. Action must continue until.OPDRVs are- 1

suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR '3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS . .

Operating each SGT subsystem for a 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive .)

vibration can be detected for. corrective action.. Operation with the heaters.on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for a 10 continuous hours every 31 days .

eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. -The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls ~and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the. required SGT filter testing is-performed in accordance with the-Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests are in

accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency.. minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties .of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specified test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3 This SR requires verification that each SGT subsystem starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal.

(continuedi GRAND GULF 8 3.6-100 Revision No. 0

GNRO-95/00090 l

Attachmer.t 3 Page 60 f CRFA System i B 3.7.3 1

In sd BASES L6 3 3 -/ %

1 APPLICABLE is assumed to operate following a loss of slant accident, SAFETY ANALYSES main steam line break, fuel handling accidenA and control (continued) rod drop accident. The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in Reference 4. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the control room.

The CRFA System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two redundant subsystems of the CRFA System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem.

Total system failure could result in a failure to meet the dose requirements of GDC 19 in the event of a DBA.

The CRFA System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CRFA System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRFA System

! (continued) l I

l

! GRAND GULF B 3.7-12 Revision No. O l'

[,y; 1 _ , '

C ._

'# 1

' GNRO-95/00090 rg ,5' _

q- Attachment 3": Pag 2 61 ,

r ,

V t f INSERT B 3.7-12A'. ;

involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied p' art i

, , 'of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days) .

' 3 C'

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GNRO-93/00090

.? Attachment 3 Pag) 62 CRFA System B 3.7.3 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the !

(continued) following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs);g W : L e.ne e . . . . . . , .... .... - ,. .... }_

u,--,

. During movement ofMrradiated fuel assemb s in the primaryorsecondarycontainment.gyn3,,79 g3. l ACTIONS A.1 With one CRFA subsystem inoperable, the inoperable CRFA subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRFA subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of CRFA System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2 i In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.I. C.2.1.

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving Qt.can irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-13 Revision No. O l

- .~ . . . . - . . . . .

. or ..-

,, y. GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 63 . ,

i INSERT B 3.7-13A Due to' radioactive decay, the CFRA System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently . irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within.the previous 12

days)'.

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GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 P:ge'64 )

CRFA System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1.N C .2. .M 0. (continued)

Therefore, inability to suspend movement ofsirradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason /to require a reactor shutdown. g During movement o irrad ated fuel assemblien in the primary l orsecondarycontainment{6L ..., C^^i "'.HS";Q, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRFA subsystem may be placed in the isolation mode. 1 This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is-OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing j radioactivity that might require isolation of the control .:

room. This places the unit in a condition that minimi !

risk. pe g fl j If applicable RE ALTEMT!" ? r 3 movement of irradiate l fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment '

must be suspended imediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated imediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

l

.D d l If both CRFA subsystems are inoperable in MODE'1, 2, or 3, the CRFA System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered i =aM o aly, and E.Ig .2 & rgeenfl During movement o trad ated fuel assemblien in the primary or secondary containmen p trir.; 0^^; ALTC^A";^g or during (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-14 Revision No. O

GMRO-93/00090

-"' # . Attrchment 3 Prg) 65 CRFA System B 3.7.3 .;

BASES ACTIONS E .1$fT . (continued)

~

OPDRVs, with two CRFA subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in = ,

condition that minimizes risk.

W f,LT "",T:^% .mhmovement of rradiated-If applicable,uGZ J

fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPORVs to minimize the

-probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential .

for fission product release. Actions must continue until -

the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe,-testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check -

on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated for a: 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available.

SR 3.7.3.2 This SR verifies that the required CRFA testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CRFA filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-15 Revision do. 0

f a

.[ 3.- .

GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 . Pigs 66

^

2 Contro1' Room AC~ System-

~~

~B 3.7.4

^

BASES- (continued)

LCO 'Two~ independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room AC System are required to be OPERABLE-to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room AC System is considered OPERABLE when the.

individual components necessary to maintain the control. room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These l' L components include the cooling coils., fans, chillers, j compressors, ductwork, dampers,-and associated i

instrumentation and controls. The heating coils are not: 1 required for Control Room AC System OPERABILITY. .:

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room AC System must be ;

! OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will )

4 not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits.

L'

! In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a

. , Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room AC System OPERA 8LE is not .

required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be j

- postulated: .]

a. During operations with a o ial for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs); a n a M n,,s.., w- n6 au cn , . ..; --g-b During movement of4rradiated fusi assemb1 4a +ha primary or secondary containment.6IrY5ff

E3,"7 -184_ t ACTIONS Ad

(

With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning (continued) n, GRAND GULF B 3.7-18 Revision No. O

,. j

I , GNRO-95/00090 .!

Attachment 3 - Page 67 INSERT B 3.7-18A^ j Due to radioactive decay, the Control Room AC System is only required to be'

. 0PERABLE during. fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel

-(i.e.. fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days) (Ref. 3). ,

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~ GNRO-95/00090

& Attachment 3 P De 68 1 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES-n ,

ACTIONS 'A,d.(continued) function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room~

isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem-can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2 If both control room AC subsystems are inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the control room area ~-

temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that-temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a control.

room AC subsystem to OPERA 8LE' status. This Completion Time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature..

is being maintained within limits, the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, and the.

availability of alternate cooling methods.

C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the control room area temperature cannot be maintained less than or equal to 90*F or if the inoperable control room AC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . 'The allowed Completion Times'are reasonable, based on operating l.' experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full L power conditions in an orderly manner and without challengin nit systems.

and D.I. D.2.1. .2.

The Required Actions-of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

,l (continued) i GRAND GULF B 3.7-19 Revision No. 0

., . GNRO-95/00090 Attichment 3 Pzga 69 Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES d ACTIONS 0.1. D.2.1; G.2. (continued)

If movin irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, MC-Or or 3, t fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of

]J irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to Y quire a reactor shutdown.

During movement ohirrad ,ated fuel assemblies in the primary 1 uu. . . , _... iTCPS I" Q or during or secondary containmen i OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot De completel within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE control room AC ,

subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This i action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, l that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action 0.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minim - -

risk.

If applicable P.E ALTE"f?!"S =d) movement of rraatated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actiong must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must co until the OPDRVs are suspended.

E.1k-E. .

t

. .1

-_ _ - The Required Actions of Condition E.1 are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving R"gM irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is indcpendent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. '

Ce.h%

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.7-20 Revision No. O

1

.- GNRO-95/00090 i Attchment 3 Pcge 70 j Control Room AC System B 3.7.4 BASES anC, l ACTIONS E 4. (continued)

During movement ofairrad ted fuel assemblies in the primary i ggfb or secondary coniainmen , _ M -- 00"i ^1 T .^.'!0".Sh or during OPDRVs if the Required Action anc associatea Compretion Time j

/ i of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to i immediately suspend activities that present a potential for l releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the I control room. This places the unit in a condition that i minimizes risk. I q -- l'e,Ctr1YIy j If applicable,u.vZ 'i!=T:^": d handling of irradiate fuel in the primary and secondary containment must be i suspended immediately. -Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a conponent to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent. potential for fission ;

product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are >

suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 ,

l REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the ,

system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a J combination of testing and calculation. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate since significant-degradation of ,

the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time i period. ;

1 REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

2m UFSAR, Section

(~3 . UniAR.Zhofer%1. G. )

- s l

I I

GRAND GULF B 3.7-21 Revision No. 0 l

i I

y. ;

GNRO-95/00090 H Att'chment 3 Pcge 71 AC Sources-Shutdown - ;

B 3.8.2 l

~

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown ~

BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for- ~

LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

l 1

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 l SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in l the primary or secondary inment ensures that:

8tc,e.n+ .

a. The unit can be m.mtains in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is .

available for. monitoring and maintaining the unit.

I status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided-to mitigate

~

events postulated during shutdown, such as an MM l inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling (3 33-35 A accide In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical l Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has '!

the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated i accidents. However, assuming.a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the

- fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), which are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3, have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained' l within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses ;

result in the probabilities of occurrence significantly :

reduced or. eliminated, and minimal consequences.. These- !

deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design- y requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the i LCOs for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-35 Revision No. 0

'. , , i- . . GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 P ge 72 -

INSERT B 3.8-35A involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days).

l'

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dL GNRO-93/00090 Attachment 3 PC9e73-AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 )

J BASES j LCO . .

an integral part of offsite circuit and DG OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain

.(continued) i energized loads required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.8. .j

. 1 It is ~ acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required AC electrical power- ;

distribution subsystems. -

As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of }

an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition.such that, even with a single ;

failure, the plant will not be in imediate difficulty. )

I

' APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE _in MODES 4 and 5 and ;

during movement ohirradiated fuel assemblies n the orimary orsecondarpontainmentprovideassurancethat: Ing r.ecch A 34 -3l5A]J f

a Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory newup -

are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in !

case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor- U vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident ;

, - are available, . :

1 IhVYVina J Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events '

c.

("8C that can lead to core damage during shutdown are Irradi available; and

[Mef d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and.3 are covered in LC0 3.8.1.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO'3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fue movement is independent of-reactor operations. Therefo , inability to suspend',

~m ovement of irradiated f.ueli assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor ! shutdown; N (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-38 Revision No. O I

._ ,,, _ . _ . _ _ . _ . - _ . . , , , 2._

. . ,~_ .. . ._ . . _ _ _ - ..

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GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 - Page 74. '

5 a

, . INSERT B 3.8-38A !

' (i.e., fuel .that'has occupied part of a critical. reactor core'within thef f previous 12 days) !

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C X ,, " ~ Attachment 3 -. Page 75 l l

AC- Sources-Shutdown l' B 3.8.2 l

BASES ;

ACTIONS A.1 .

. (continued)' ;

. An offsite circuit is' considered inoperable if it is not available to one' required ESF division. If two or more 1 ESF 4.16 kV buses.are required per LCO.3.8.8, division (s)-

with offsite_ power available may be capable of supporting

- sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE . ,

ALTERATIONS, fuel movement,_and operations with a potential !

for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the

-option to declare required features. inoperable with no- -

offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be- ,

implemented in accordance with the affected required feature (s) LCOs' ACTIONS. ,

i A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 A.2.4. 8.1. B.2. 8.3. and B.4 With the_ offsite circuit not_ available to all required. .

divisions, the option still exists to declare all required ~ ,

features inoperable. Since this option may involve t undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for i sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the- ;

required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required ;

to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement o irradiated fuel l assemblies in the primary and secondary ontainment, and~

activities that could potentially resul in advertent '

draining of the, reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not prec ude completion I of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. l These-actions minimize probability of the occurrence of- -

postulated _ events. It is further required to initiate 1 action immediately to restore the required AC sources and to l continue this action until restoration is accomplished in '

order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources-should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-39 Revision No. O F 1r 97 *r p-w we +e-et - - y- e rt= M-r v- er-- .e-w-- '

--*--r -v-=- er- --r- +1r- e-+r--< ---=re e' v- -

- * 'N dm '-

~ GNRO-95/o0090

'" Attachment 3 Page 76 j DC Sources-Shutdo"::n B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary con nt ensures rectrifly

a. The facility can be maintained in the shu own or I*

refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability.is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling I , accide p 6 33-(,oA l- The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy s Statement. -

LC0 One DC electrical power subsystem consisting of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the division, associated with Division-(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-60 Revision No. 0

.KJ .

y. -- '

Attachment 3 Pega 77 f

.a INSERT B 3.8-60A ~

involving handling 'recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC i electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied.part' ~

of a critical reactor' core within the previous-12 days). ,

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93 yL !GNRO-95/o0090 - -

.g Attachment 3 PCge 78 ,

OC Sources--Shutdown ,

3c ,

B 3.8.5 ;

i i

BASES' l

LCO 1- or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution (continued)- . subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.8,~" Distribution Systems 1 ;

Shutdown" is required to be OPERABLE. Similarly, when the -i High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS). System is required to be: ,

OPERABLE, the Division 3,DC electrical power subsystem ,

associated with the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical.'

power distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE ~by LCO- 1 3.8.8 is required to be OPERABLE. In addition to the l preceding subsystems required to be OPERABLE, a Class 1E :

~ battery or battery charger and'the associated' control .

. equipment and interconnecting cabling capable of. supplying '

power to the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class-1E DC i electrical power distribution subsystem (s), when portions of i both Division 1 and 2 DC electrical power distribution .. -

subsystem are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. This _ i f ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power . 1 sources.to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate

^

' lAVdW

('ece h the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

casa ;#: , y g p "' cc 3 ad '" dv rt at r ctar v == i-os -

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power. sources required to be OPERABLE in .

MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or seconda o ment provide assurance that: g( -j

a. Required features to provide adequate olant 7 inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel.

assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;.

] b. Required features needed to milicate a fuel handling.

,. accidenpareavailabl- b,>;n#H L-W h]~

lhV0Wi Required ~ features necessary to m't' gate the effects lof:

gD .

events that can lead to care damage during shutdown.

1

[r radi are available; and-Utd d. Instrumentation and control capability is available; for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold' I shutdown condition or refueling condition. !

1 The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1.- 2, and 3 i are covered in LCO 3.8.4. 1 (continued) i GRAND GULF B 3.8-61 Revision No. 0 rea , < . , - , ,, , ,r ,.y, . , ,. ., ,, _ -.- p

-[

GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 : Page 79 -

(:l

~

INSERT B 3.8-61A:

(Due to radioactive decay, DC-electrical- power is only required to mitigate fuel handling. accidents involving handling fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days).

y a E '

GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 80 i DC Sources-$ hut 0cwn B 3.3.5 BASES -(continued)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend.

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A_d Condition A represents one division with a loss of ability to completely' respond.long term to'an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation.

Since eventual failure of the battery to maintain the required battery cell parameters is highly probable, it is imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The additional time provided by the Completion Time is consistent with the capability of the battery to maintain its short term capability to respond to a design basis event.

A Note is added to take exception to the allowance of LCO 3.0.4 to enter MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability. Even though Condition A Required Actions do not in themselves require a plant shutdown, or require exiting the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, the condition of the DC system is not such that extended operation is expected. Therefore, the Note O would require restoration of an inoperable battery char er, AMM 4 to OPERABLE status prior to starting up or commencing ue -QdM movement. This exception is not intended to preclude the -

allowance of LCO 3.0.4 to always enter MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability as a result of a plant shutdown.

Ed if the battery cell parameters cannot be maintained within the Category A limits, the short term capability of the-battery is also degraded and the battery must be declared inoperable.

(continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-62 Revision No. O

LS' ,' GNRO-95/00090 a Att:chment 3 Prgs 81 DC Sources-Shutdown ,

B 3.8.5' l BASES l l'

ACTIONS C.1. C.2.1. C.2.2. C.2.3, and C.2.4 (continued) l If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE i with one or more DC power sources inoperable for reasons l other than an inoperable battery charger may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow -

continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel. movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. ;

By allowing the option to declare required features :

inoperable with associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with '

the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. l Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative l actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement i of, irradiated fuel assemblies, and any activities that could l g y ] M esult in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel). j Suspension of these activities shall not. preclude completion !

of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. ,

These actions minimize the probability of-the occurrence of 1 postulated events. It is further required to immediately I initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power !

subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is I accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electryical power to the plant safety systems The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may

~be without sufficient power. j SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 ;

REQUIREMENTS ;

SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances i required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see 1 the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR. j This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note'is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required (continued)

GRAND GULF B 3.8-63 Revision No. O t-t ,

t GNRO-93/00090 Attachment 3 Page 82 Distribution Systems-Shutdown l B 3.8.8 j i

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

]

B-3.8.8 Distribution Systems-Shutdown i

BASES I BACKGROUND .A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, l "D#stribution Systems-Operating." ,

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and, SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and l Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power '

distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient l capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure '

the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that-the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. ,

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power 'l distribution system is consistent with the initial l assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements I for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. l TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACandDCelectricalpoweh* ]

sources and associated power distribution subsystems during ,

MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel ~I assemblies in the primary or seconda y inment ensures that:

rM

a. The facility can be maintained in th-utdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events F postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent J l

he draindownofthevesselorafuelhandlingaccidenj6 L6 3,T-ioA y The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy 1

1 Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

i (continued) l GRAND GULF B 3.8-80 Revision No. O I

. .-i

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4- ?*. GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 83

-INSERT B 3.8-80A

'~

involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents ,

involving handling recently irradiated _ fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied _part of. a critical reactor core within the previous IP. days).

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1 GNRO-95/00000 Attachment 3 Page 84 j Distribution Systems-Shutdown l B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

'LCO' Various combinations of subsystems, equipment,.and' l components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition.- Implicit.in.those ,

requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary :

support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical _ distribution: j j

system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required systems, equipment, and j components-both specifically addressed by their own LCOs,. i and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system ';

D energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigste the. 'i jnyglwn \

consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., ,

I '

fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel i i ide/l raindown). j SUtl t APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; . .

required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement :

o irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary' l ntainment provide assurance that: ,

/'cc.cy1tlI a.. Systems to' provide adequate coolant inventory makeup j are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitiaate a fuel handling accident'

, are available-L F% n ach T involv.una J C.

La 2.s-m d Systems necessary to anugate tie effects of events NCTt ed 1 that can lead to core damage during shutdown are itrad available; and Fh d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for' monitoring and maintaining the unit in _a cold shutdown or refueling condition.

The AC and OC electrical power distribution subsystem-requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

l (continued) ;i i

GRAND GULF B 3.8-81 Revision No. 0 l

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GNRO-95/00090 Attachment 3 Page 85 ;

' INSERT B 3.8-81A .

(Due'to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only required to .

mitigate . fuel- handling accidents involving handling fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 12 days). '

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9 i

t 4

i

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i a

9' A' GNRO-95/00090 l L Att:chment 3 Pcgi 86

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Distribution Systems-Shutdown . ]

B 3.8.8 l BASES'(continued)- .

ACTIONS. The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that.LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is' independent of.

reactor operations. 'Therefore, inability to suspend.

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a~ reactor shutdown.

l

. A.I. A 2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 Although. redundant required features may require redundant' 1 divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be.

OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may ;

be capable.of supporting sufficient required-features to i allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and !

operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

By allowing the option' to declare required features -

associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts..-There d T allowance for sufficiently conservative actionsis made /. ate, the [6 .

-(i.e.,-to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement ofM rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary an,d secondary containment and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of-the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion .

of actions'to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately .

initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems' and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the -

necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative .;

Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown i cooling (RHR-SDC) ~ subsystem may be inoperable.' In this ;

case, Required Actions A.2.1_through A.2.4 do not adequately ~

address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and .

heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS i (continued) l L

GRAND GULF B 3.8 82 Revision No. 0 l

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ML20087B506

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