ML20151S208

Discusses Info Obtained from Facility Employee During 860415 Telcon Re Alleged False Info Provided by Lw Hastings to Region III Security Inspector G Pirtle During Insp Conducted at Plant on 861112-1227

ML20151S208
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	Weil C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20151N259	List: ML20151N257 ML20151N281 ML20151P289 ML20151P320 ML20151P345 ML20151S060 ML20151S069 ML20151S096 ML20151S101 ML20151S125 ML20151S147 ML20151S208 ML20151S213 ML20151S249 ML20151S263
References
FOIA-88-227 NUDOCS 8808150103
Download: ML20151S208 (4)

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jack A. Hind Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards FROM:

Charles H. ,Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist

SUBJECT:

ALLEGED FALSE INFORMATION FURNISHE0 TO REGION III IN BY FERMI'S DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR SECURITY (50-341)

(AMS NO. RIII-86-A-0069)

Region III recently received a letter from an employee of the Fermi Huclear Security Department (Enclosure 1).

the Femi Director of Nuclear Security, provided false infortnation toAccor Region III Security Inspector Gary Pirtle during an inspection conducted November 12 through Decembs:- 27, 1986, at the Fenni plant. The following infomation was obtained from the employee during an April 15, 1986 conversa":

Report o. ion in which the individual referenced pages 36-38 of Inspectiontelephone 50-341/85047 (Enclosure 2).

The individual stated, according to the Inspection Report, Hastings told Pirtle that he (Hastir.gs) did r.ot know a security department ' computer had the capability to transinit to offsite locations. The individua.1 further stated that Hastings knew of the computer comunications limitatLns as both the individual and Joe Korte had informed Hastings of the computer's offsite communications capability. The individual went on te say that prior to the inspection, Hastings had seen at least two Detroit Edison memoranda nn the computer's offsite comunications capabilities. The individual agreed to mail the memoranda to Region III and on April 21, 1986, they were received by Region III (Enclosures 3 and 4).

The individual also stated that the Inspection Report indicated Hastings

. . . briefed appropriate security and administrative staff members that no (See Safeguards the last Ir 'ormation was to be entered in the. . . system. . . ."

Enclosure 2.) paragraph on Page 38 of Inspection Report No. 50-341/85047 -

ihe individual stated that Hastings never briefeo the security staff, rattier the "security staff briefed Hastings."

Anally, the individual stated that in reference to the potential

...on discussed in the Inspection Reptrt (see Paragraph 4 on Page 37 -

Enclosure information into 2), Hastings the computer. never considered that he would be placing security it (security information) on CEO."Also, Hastings "never discussed putting tta acronym for the "electronic office computer.)(According to the individu ry 3 y - - ~ - -

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70 h Jack A. Hind April 30, 1986 Also, the individual stated that Detroit Edison "was punishing (the individual)fortalkingtotheNRC." According to the individual, the individual spoke to Region III Inspector Terry Madeda abe the computer offsite comunications capabilities during an inspection in we Sumer 1985. The individual further stated that the conversation with Nadeda took place "out in the office in front of a lot of people." The individual also stated that tne issue of the computer comunications capabilities was discussed with Pirtle during a November.1985 inspection.

The individual stated that "the punishment" for speaking to the NRC was a pending transfer from a "nonuniformed" admini;trative security position on the day shift to an "unifonned" position on the midnight shift. The transfer was scheduled to be effective on April 25, 1986. The individual j did not know if a loss of wages would occur, only "a loss of prestige."

The individual was verbally informed of the employee protection prot .sions of 10 CFR 50.7 on April 15, 1936, and by letter on April 16, 1986.  !

Additionally, the individual had concerns pertaining to the Region III Staff's handling of the matter (Enclosure 6).

Prior to the April 15, 1986 telephone conversation with the individual, the individual's involvement in Inspection 50-341/85047 was discussed with Pirtle. On April 4,1986, Pirtle provided the following infonnation.

' The individual contacted Pirtle on site during Inspection 50-341/85047.  !

The individual informed Pirtle that Hastings' staff had entered safeguards information into a computer which had offsite communications )

capabilities. The information entored into the computer concerned a 3 security incident and the action taken after the incident. The )

l individual told Hastings' secretary that the inforination should not be i entered into the computer since the computer was not secure. The '

individual also told Pirtle that the individual had informed the Assistant Director of Nuclear Security of the individual's intention of  !

discussing the issue wIth the NRC.

i Pirtle advised that he had not considered the individual's information to i' be an allegation. Rather, he considered it to be a concern raised by an employee during the course of a routine inspection. Therefore, the individual's concerns were not treated as an allegation. Pirtle stated that he did furnish the individual with an oral briefing of his findings at the conclusion of the inspection.

Daniel H. Ocharzak, Area Director, U. S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Grand Rapids, Michigan, was contacted on April 21, 1986, and infornxd of the employment discrimination allegation. Ocharzak advised that the Wage and Hour Division would await the filing of the written complaint, required by discrimination.

employment 29 CFR 24.3, prior to initiating an investigation into the alleged TV ~ .

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April 30, 1986 On April 25, 1986, the matter was diset : sed with James R. Creed, Re91on III Security and Safeguards Section Chief, and Pirtle, and the following infomation pertaining to the computer issue was established: .

During an inspection at Fermi during the p riod September 30 through October 4,1985, Hastings approached Pirtle about the possibility of entering security inforination into the "CE0" (the office computer system).

Pirtle infomed Hastings that the NRC had not looked at the particular computer system and could not offer an opinion. Pirtle told Hastings that .

Detroit Ediso should analyze the computer system to detemine if it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21 (Requirements for the Protection of Safeguards Information) and the Femi security program. Hastings told Pirtle that an assessment would be done. Pirtle also asked Hastings if any security information had been entered into that computer system and Hastings answered that none had been entered.

Pirtle believed that the conversation with Hastings took place on September 30, 1985.

In reviewing the matter with Pirtle and Creed on April 25, 1986, it appeared to them that one of the memoranda provided by the individual was the computer comunications assessment promised by Hastings (see Enclosure 4, a Detroit Edison meno dated September 30, 1985,

Title:

"CEO Trensmitting Safeguards").

i Pirtle went on to say that a security incident was identified by the Depoit Edison Company on November 1, 1985.

ir (This was discussed in detai'.

no$ "agraph 10b of Inspection Report No. 50-341/85047.) Detroit Edison tied the Region III Office of the incident on November 1,1985, and on November 2,1985, Detroit Edison determined in consultation with Creed that a written report of the incident was required to be filed with the NRC.

On November 7,1985, that report was filed with the NRC, According to Pirtle, it appears that during the period November 1-7, 1985 the incident was documented by Detroit Edison and entered into the unsecur,ed computer.

On or about November 12, 1985, Pirtle was approached by the alleger and informed that the incident report had been entered into the computer. The

- alleger provided Pirtle with e copy of a July 1,1985, memorandum concerning the entry of security information in the CEO computer system.

In Pirtle's on April recollection, the July 1,1985 memo furnished to Region III 21, 1986 (Enclosure 3) was the same memo furnished to him on Novemoer 12, 1995.

him on November 12, 1985.

Pirtle did not retain a copy of the memo provided to Pirtle or initiated about Novemberan inspection 12, 1985. into the employee's concern he received on pertaining to the October 30 - November 1, 1985 incident, had been en into the computer.

thus sulstantiating the allegation.Pirtle also determined the computer was not secu Inspection Report 50-341/85047 documented and a violationthest. findings (pertinent portions contained in Enclosure 2) was proposed.

(NOTE: The proposed violation was a part of an escalated e.nforcement package which has not as yet been issued.)

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. . .a April 30, 1986 As part of Pirtle's followup to the employee's November 12, 1985 concern, Pirtle asked Hastings, why was the information entered into the computcr?

A portion of Hastings' response was reported in the last paragraph on Page 37 of Inspection Report No. 50-347/83047 (Enclosure 2), ". . . The Director, Nuclear Security stated that he was not aware that the data processing system had an offsito transmitting capability . . . ."

(NOTE: The infonnation furnished by Hastings to Pirtle appears to  !

directly contradict the infonnation contained in Enclosures 3 and 4. .

I Those Detroit Edison memoranda indicated that Hastings had been informed of the computer's offsite comunications capability on July 1 and September 30,1985.)

On April 15, 1986, Office of Inve.tigations Region III Field Office.the matter was discussed with E At that time it was concluded that a decision, concerning the potential wrongdoing, in this matter shculd be postponed until Region III had received and evaluated the Detroit Edison memoranda discussed with Pawlik.from the employee. On April 25, 1986, the matter was again l It was determined that the matter should be referred to the Office of Investigations. The formal referral of the matter to the Office of Investigations is being processed separately from this memerandum, l allegation involving the Region III Staff's handling of the Detro employee's identity (Enclosure 6). I Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist

Enclosures:

1. Individual's Ltr dtd 2/24/86

2. Inspection Report No. 50-341/85047 Pages 36-38

3. Memo from Detroit Edison dtd 7/1/85

4. Memo from Detroit Edison l dtd 9/30/85

5. Allegation Data Form

6. Allegation Against NRC Employee cc w/ enclosures:

RIII:RA0 cc w/ enclosures 1-5 only: " ~~ ~

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