ML20151S147
| ML20151S147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151N259 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-227 NUDOCS 8808150085 | |
| Download: ML20151S147 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES p
i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.f OFFICE oF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE RE0loN ill CL EL LL i
137 REPORT OF INTERVIEW Interviewee Location Paul CHILDS Detroit, Michigan On October 1,1986, NRC:01 Investigators John W. McMahon and Richard C. Kazmar interviewed Paul CHILDS, who is currently assistant to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations at the Detroit Edison Company (Deco). Present at the interview was Deco Attorney John H. FLYNN.
CHILDS is a degreed mathematician with an emphasis on computer science.
In 1985, CHILDS stated that he was the Supervisory Engineer of the Process Control Computer Division, and during 1985 became involved with the final stages of the implementation of DECO's Computeri:ed Electronic Office (CEO),
CHILDS stated that he has a working knowledge of CEO software and is fully aware of procedures for handling Safeguards Infomation and related NRC regulations.
CHILDS was shown a DECO memorandum dated July 1,1985, from Stuart LEACH, Director of Nuclear Security Administration (Attachment A)(.DNS), to James PIANA, Director of Nuclear CHILDS recalled seeing the memo, which had been brought to his attention by one of his subordinates, and which indicated that certain members of the Nuclear Security (NS) staff thought the CEO system may not adequately protect inputted Safeguards material. CHILDS stated that at the time he saw the memo, he was not surprised as to the concerns raised.
CHILDS recalls having a conversation with Sam THOMPSON, Assistant DNS, about CEO and Safeguards Infomation some time after the July 1 memo, but could not recall any specifics, CHILDS stated that during the time period of about July through November 1985, that terminals with access to information inputted at CEO tenninals at Fenni cxisted at three locations at the Deco building in downtown Detroit. CHILDS elaborated, saying that a CEO terminal existed on each of the following offices:
Chuck HEIDEL's office, President of Deco; William PENCE, Vice President of Operations (retired); and Ann POUGE, Comunications Engineer.
CHILDS was shown a CEO printed message (Attachment B) and he explained that to him it meant that Joseph KORTE, a Nuclear Security Specialist, who had transmitted a memo (Attachment C) to Wayne HASTINGS, DNc on September 30, 1985, at 12:23 p.m., had been entered into HASTINGS' account and had been called up and viewed at 5:09 p.m. by HASTINGS or some person using HASTINGS'
- password, CHILDS reviewed Attachment C, which is the memo referred to in the preceding paragraph and which had been sent by KORTE to HASTINGS on September 30, 1985 via CEO.
CHILDS stated that he agreed with each item and in addition, stated that in regards to item 5, he is not satisfied that a line by line deletion would completely destroy the contents of the memo, but suspects that the EXHIBIT - /O Case No. 3-86-006 1
PAGE-I OF O _ PAGES) 8908150085 E00600 PDR F01A MAXWELLBO-227 PDR //
l i t i document could still be recalled unless a complete memory dump was performed. CHILDS also stated that in his opinion, the CEO should not be used for i Safeguards Information handling under any circumstances, including as a word processing system, due to existence of offsite access. CHILOS commented that to his knowledge, the CEO system can be accessed not only from offsite terminals, but from other terminals using KACPAC, a separate Deco computerized information system. CHILDS stated that in his opinion, he felt HASTINGS would be knowledgeable of offsite access to CEO, since HASTINGS had been Director of Computer Services at some time period before assuming his position as DNS. CHILDS stated that when HASTINGT assumed duties as DNS, his management style was dif ferent than LEACH. CHILDS elaborated, saying that LEACH sought the advice not only from his staff, but was willing to interface with NRC Inspectors in order to get a "calibration" in regards to NRC regulations, whereas HASTINGS' approach was not to seek input from his staff and by innuendo, did not want any "calibration" by the NRC, and had an attitude described by "let's see what we can get away with." i i I i l l f i EXHIBIT IO -- ES -PAoE(s) dk OF PAGE Case No. 3-86-006 2
g@1 9 Date: July 1, 1985
- 13-85-0096 To:
James L. Piana Director-Nuclear Admi istratisn From: Stuart B. Le Director-Nulcear M ecurity
Subject:
CEO - Protection of Safeguards Information Certain members of my staff have expressed a concern ov possibility of Safeguards Information and other confidential er the material being inputted into the CEO System. reflect deficiencies in adequately protecting mate Preliminary this nature. Please contact me as I would appreciate your assist researching this matter more extensively. ance in I ( SHL/as L. Wayne Hastings cc: EXHIBIT de 5-86-006 PAGE O OF M PAGES) %marr A Enclosura 3 pty.[(.R.()C6.9
Kort?, Joe T 5 :im: Bastings, Wayne taark Sep 39,85 5:09 PM tus: Previously read
- iect: Bastings, Wayne has seen, SMB3UP$DS No (E0
.ge: 2he above inessage which you sent Sep 39,8512:23 PM was seen by Bastings, Wayne EXHIBIT - fO, 4 b - PAGE(S) 3-86-006 PAos-OF Annenmeer e
WAYNE, PER YOUR REQUEST KATE AND I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE POSSIBLE USE OF SO FOR HANDLING SAFEGUARDI 'NFORMATION i i (S.I.). WE TOOK INFORMATION FROM NUREG-8794, PROTECTION OF l UNCLASSIFIF.D EAPEGUARDS TMPORMATION. NRC INSPECTION AND l ENFORCEMENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE 81813, PHysicAr. PROTECTION ? SAI2 GUARDS INPORMCIQi, AND NOIP 11.888.114. WE HAD A CONVERSATION WITH J. CREED AND T. MADEDA CONCERNING THE MATTER, AND TALKED WITH COMPUTER SERVICES PERSONNEL. AFTER RESEAkCHING THESE SOURCES AND TALKING WITB THE NRC, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY WE COULD NOT USE CEO FOR HANDLING SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. I 1. THE SYSTEM IS NOT SELF-CONTAINED WITHIN THE PACILITY. WE HAVE FOUR LINES THAT GO DOW% TOWN. 2 THE LINES ARE UNPROTECTED PHONE LINES BECAUSE THEY ARE MOT PROTECTED BY ANY KIND OF ENCRYPTION DEVICE. 3 PERSONNEL, "SUPER USERS' HAVE THE AVAILABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS OTHER THAN THEIR OWN. b 4. DOCUMENTS DISCARDED INTO THE WASTEBASKET ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO ANYONE GAINING ACCESS TO THE ACCOUNT UNTIL THE JANITOR CLEANS THE ACCOUNT. 5. THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING A SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT ON CEO WAS RESEARCHED. THE ONLY SAFE WAY TO DISPOSE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT IS TO DELETS THE DOCUMENT ONE LINE AT A TIME. KATE SURVEYED. LAURA PIMPSON, KAREN HARBAUGB, DOROTHY BALENT, AND JAN SYPE, EACH OF THEM STATED THAT IT POULD TAKE MORE TIME TO CREATE THE DOCUMENT ORDER TO PRINT IT AND THEN HAVE TO DELETE EACP LINE THAN IT g WOULD TAKE TO TYPE THE DOCUMENT ON THE TYPEWRITER. 6. IN CONJUNCTION WITH NUMBER 5, IF THE DOCUMENT HAD TO BE EDITED Arc WAS FTORCD FOR A PERIOD OF TIME DURING PROOF READING, THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE ACCESSIBLE FOR THIS PERIOD. k ]F d H 3-86-006 EXHIBIT r PAGE b OF $ - FAGE(S) A au u man-A -}}