ML20202J016

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Delineates Various Outstanding Problems,Presents Current Status & Designates Responsible Organization for Outstanding Issues Re Emergency Diesel Generator Failures/Reliability
ML20202J016
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/1986
From: Greenman E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20202H992 List:
References
FOIA-86-244 2.206, NUDOCS 8607170009
Download: ML20202J016 (4)


Text

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t.a ue UNITED STATES g i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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, o j 799 moostvELT moAD oLEN ELLYN. ILUNOl5 601 M e....

l MAR 11 1986

'2- @ f y 7 7 MEMORANDUM FOR: James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator THROUGH: Charles E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Proj(2dsh 3L lb.

FROM: E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects  ;

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SUBJECT:

FERMI STATUS Comencing shortly after initial criticality and continuing to the present, the Detroit Edison Company experienced numerous problems spanning a number of site departments at the Fermi 2 site. The issues were of sufficient magnitude to result in a Confirmatory Action Letter containing a five percent power hold, escalated enforcement action consideration and a 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter which was issued on December 24, 1985.

As recently as late February the facility had projected the capability to support a restart effort in mid 14 arch 1986, assuming successful resolution of a number of outstanding issues. One technical issue related to Emergency Diesel Generator failures / reliability is approaching resolution and both DRP and DRS are of the view that this issue will be resolved in March. As of this date DRP cannot project a date when the overall engineering issue can be resolved and this may be the critical path item for restart. A working level meeting was neld March 10, 1986 with Detroit Edison in the Region III office. The

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initiative still rests with the licensee at this time.

The purpose of this memorandum and enclosures is to delineate the various

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problems outstanding, present the current status and to designate the responsible organization for each outstanding issue from a project management perspective.

Since status is changing rapidly, I will be providing updates periodically to reflect diesel generator test completion, the recent 2 J06 petition status and other changes or additions as appropriate. It is also noted that a Comission meeting regarding Fermi is scheduled for March 12th. For ease of identification each issue has been addressed in a separate enclosure as identified in the composite index.

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8607170009 860709 l

PDR FOIA E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, PUNTENN86-244 PDR Division of Reactor Projects.

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/ enclosure: b ThU i A. Bert Davis, RIII C. J. Paperiello, RIII J. A. Hind, RIII E. G. Adensam, NRR

/.Lickus,RIII g E. T. Pawlik, 01, RIII

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INDEX Enclosure 1: 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter - overview 1A: 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter 18: Reactor Operations Improvement Plan (ROIP)

IC: Region III response to ROIP '

1D: Deco ROIP Supplemental Information IE: DECO Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter Enclosure 2: Augmented Inspection Plan overview ~

2A: Draft Augmented Inspection Plan Enclosure 3: Confirmatory Action Letter overview 3A: Confirmatory Action Letter 38: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85043 Enclosure 4: Diesel Generator - overview 4A: Detailed list of D/G failures 48: Deco Letter " Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft Bearing Reliability Demonstration Test Program" Enclosure 5: Main Steam Bypass Lines overview 5A: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85045 5B: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85049 Enclosure 6: South Reactor Feedpump Turbine - overview Enclosure 7: Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) Purge Line Penetration overview 7A: Youngblood to Jens letter dated November 21, 1985 78: DECO Letters of December 20 and 31,1985, dealing with TIP issue.

Enclosure 8: Condensate Storage Tank Rupture - overview Enclosure 9: Remote Shutdown (3-L) Panel - overview 9A: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85050 '

Enclosure 10: Environmental Qualification (EQ) Review - overview ,

10A: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85051 '

i Enclosure 11: Seismic Review overview '

Enclosure 12: Embedments - overview a

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Enclosure 13: Stress and Hanger Design - overview 13A: DECO DER documentary stress report / hanger design Enclosure 14: Security - overview Enclosure 15: Allegations - overview Enclosure 16: Escalated Enforcement Package - overview Premature Criticality, LCO and License violations 16A: Inspection Report No. 50-341/85040 Enclosure 17: Response to Congressman Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce 17A: Letter Keppler to Dingell dated January 9,1986 Enclosure 18: Response to Richard Petticrew, Chairman, Monroe County Board of Commissioners 18A: Letter Keppler to Petticrew dated January 9, 1986 Enclosure 19: Office of Investigation Enclosure 20: Office of Inspector and Auditor Enclosure 21: Shift Operations Advisors 21A: Internal DECO memo on SOA requalification Enclosure 22: Brief Chairman's Office (Phil Polk) on Shift Operations Advisors

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Enclosure 1 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter  !

Region III, with concurrence of I&E, NRR and the EDO, issued a 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter on December 24, 1985, (Enclosure IA). The letter requested a response within 30 days to the following issues:

1. The adequacy of management, management structures and systems that have contributed to the performance of Fermi 2;.the adequacy of training to assure that responsible personnel recognize and respond, as appropriate, to significant safety conditions; and, changes in controls needed to assure i

improved regulatory performance. The areas of operations, maintenance, i engineering and security were to be included in the evaluation.

2. Actions planned to be taken by Deco to ensure readiness of the facility to support restart of the unit and power escalation after testing is completed at each power ascension plateau. Also to be included was DECO's assessment on how they will perfom the review, objective criteria for determining adequacy of performance at each plateau, and the manager who will authorize proceeding to the next plateau.
3. Actions to be taken to improve rege atory and operational perfomance during and after the startup testing phase of operations.

DECO's response to the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter (Enclosure IE) was received in Region III on January 29, 1986. A response currently in preparation, states that the letter generally is responsive to our concerns and no action will be

taken at this time to modify, suspend, or revoke the license.

! Prior to the issuance of the 50.54(f) letter Detroit Edison, at Region III's request, developed and implemented a Reactor Operations Improvement Plan (Enclosures 1B). In our response (Enclosure IC) to the original plan we

' indicated that the plan was acceptable; however, quantitative acceptance criteria was missing. Detroit Edison's response (Enclosure 1D) forwarded to Region III their specific goals for numerous man.itored parameters.

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Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRP Support Region III, IE; NRR 3 I

129'U W ENCLOSURE 1.A Docket No. 50-341 Detroit Edison Company ATTN: Wayne H. Jens Vice President l Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Gentlemen: i The Detroit Edison Company's Femi 2 Nuclear Power Plant has experienced numerous events involving operational errors and degraded plant equipment.

Furthermore, programatic weaknesses have been identified by the NRC concerning cngineering and security. A number of the events occurred despite the efforts of your Company to improve the regulatory perfomance of the Femi 2 station.

i The events of concern can be attributed te four functional areas: operations, maintenance, engineering and security. % e operations group, and to a lesser

, extent, the maintenance group, were responsible for a number of the events in::1uding; (1) the premature criticality, (2) a license violation which shut off cooling water for an entire ECCS Division. (3) six technical specification limiting condition of operation violations, (4) multiple personnel errors, (5) rupture of the condensate storage tank and (6) an "unmonitored" release of slightly contaminated water from the site. The engineering staff was responsible in part for (1) failure of the south reactor feedpump turbine, (2) failure to perfom proper stress analysis following system modifications, and (3) error in routing a 4160 volt bus in the same vicinity as the remote shutdown cables without proper fire protection. The security organization has been unable to properly implement the provisions of the security plan as

! evidenced by the numerous violations identified by both Detroit Edison and the NRC.

The diversity of problems and functional areas involved with these problems indicate to the NRC that the present management systems have been ineffective.

3 If left uncorrected, and current trends continue, significant safety problems may develop at the Fermi 2 facility. Accordingly, to enable us to detemine whether or not the Femi 2 license should be modified, suspended, or revoked, you are requested, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), to evaluate and address the following:

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l Detroit Edison Company 1

1. The adequacy of management, management structures and systems that have contributed to the performance of Femi 2; the adequacy of training to assure that responsible personnel recognize and respond, as appropriate, to significant safety conditions; and, changes in controls needed to assure improved regulatory perfomance. The areas of operations, maintenance, engineering and security should be included in your evaluation.

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2. Actions you plan to take to ensure readiness of the facility to support restart of the unit and power escalation after testing is completed at ,

each power ascension plateau. Include in your assessment how you will l review the management and system performance at each plateau, who will l l

perfom the review, objective criteria for detemining adequacy of perfomance at each plateau, and the manager who will authorize proceeding to the next plateau.

3. Actions you will take to improve regulatory and operational perfomance during and after the startup testing phase of operations.  ;

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to furnish, under oath or l affimation, no later than 30 days from the date of this letter, your plans and programs to address the items identified aboye. i Sincerely, original sinsd by J.?:cs G. Kcppler James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc: L. P. Bregni, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department DCS/RSB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Comission Harry H. Voigt, Esq.

Nuclear Facilities and l Environmental Monitoring Section Monroe County Office of Civil Preparedness n

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