ML20202J031
| ML20202J031 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Dingell J HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202H992 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-244 NUDOCS 8607170012 | |
| Download: ML20202J031 (30) | |
Text
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)b.{d O ENCLOSURE 17.A January 9, 1986 The Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman Committee on Energy and Comerce 4917 Schaefer Road *
Dearborn,
MI 48126
Dear Congressman Dingell:
This is in response to your letter of August 23, 1985, to'NRC Chairman Palladino regarding the premature criticality event which occurred on July 2, 1985 at the Femi 2 plar t. Chaiman Palladino's letter to you dated October 1,1985, addressing this subject has been forwarded to me for followup as the Regional Administrator with regulatory responsibility and oversight for the Fermi facility. Enclosed is a copy of the NRC Region III inspection report which was issued January 7, 1986. This report contains the results of our review of not only this event, but also encompasses other technical issues and related enforcement matters as well. Additionally, management meetings held by Region III with Detroit Edison Company on July 23 and September 10, 1985 related to the premature criticality are discussed. .
In addition to this techn'ical rep' ort, two additional investigations have been conducted by both the NRC's Office of Investigations and the Office of Inspector and Auditor. The thrust of these efforts were to examine, not only licensee actions concerning the premature criticality, but the NRC staff actions relative to the event as well. The results of these investigations are currently being evaluated and NRC will keep your office informed of any l findings and action taken once a decision is made.
In order to ficilitate a review of the subject matter contained in this report by you and your staff. I previously forwarded a copy of this report directly to your office by express mail. I have also provided an expedited copy to Mr. Richard Petticrew, Chaiman of the Monroe County Board of Comissioners.
As a matter of information, the Monroe County Comissioners were recently briefed on the technical aspects of the premature criticality event and on other outstanding technical issues at the Femi facility of interest to your Michigan constituents.
i g71 2 860709
PUNTENN86-244 PDR
Congressman Dingell -?- Je 9 10 ?-
Please note that the utility will be notified of our conclusions and decision concerning enforcement actions under separate correspondence when we complete our actions in this regard.
briefing for you or your staff should you so desire.At that time I would be pleased to arrange Sincerely.
Orl *c'I SIMN e e;.ier N
James G. Keppler Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-341/85040 et w/ enclosure:
Rep. J. Broyhill J. O'Reilly bec w/ enclosure:
- 5. Connelly, OIA C. Kannerer, CA V. Stello EDO H. Denton, NRR J. Roe, EDO T. Rehm, EDO G. CunninShan ELD J. Taylor, IE S. Kent, CA -
N. Chrissotimos, RIII G. Wright, RIII P. Byron,3RI g, RIII RIII 5
RII R I RI Grernman/Is Lickus 01/09/86 Paw 1%k Nor li s Davij 3pler 01/9/86 01 g,f/86 01/q/86 01///86 01/7/86 1
l i
Enclosure 18 l Response to Richard Petticrew, Chairman, Monroe County Board of Commissioners By letter dated August 13, 1985, Mr. Petticrew requested that the Monroe County Board of Commissioners be kept appraised of our evaluation of the premature criticality event of July 1, 1985. By letter dated January 9,1986 (Enclosure 18A) James G. Keppler responded by transmitting Inspection Report No. 841/85040.
Region III has committed to brief the Board on the premature criticality event and other significant events prior to allowing Fermi 2 to exceed 5% power. An initial briefing has been held. (public meeting)
Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRP 21
Enclosure 17 Response to Congressman Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce By letter dated August 23, 1985, U.S. Congressman John D. Dingell requested from Chairman Palladino information pertaining to the premature criticality cvent of July 1, 1985. By letter dated January 9, 1986 (Enclosure 17A)
James Keppler responded to Congressman Dingell by transmitting Inspection Report No. 50-341/85040 which dealt with the premature criticality issue.
The OI and OIA investigation results are to be provided to the Congressman when they become available.
Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRP 20
Enclosure 11 Seismic Reviews An allegation was made to the Safeteam stating that required seismic reviews were not performed on Engineering Change Packages starting when Deco Engineering was transferred from Troy, Michigan to the site.
As a result of the allegation the licensee and Giffel Associates reviewed those design change documents issued by DECO's Nuclear Engineering organization for which there was no evidence of any previous seismic qualification / review having been performed. The Division of Reactor Safety then reviewed the licensee's reviews. All of the Seismic Design / Qualification Reports reviewed by the DRS inspectors were found satisfactory and seismically justifiable. No hardware codifications were required.
Adequacy of design Control Procedure will be reviewed by I&E Headquarters.
f Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRS i
l 14 l
Enclosure 12 Embedments During a design review, a Detroit Edison contractor identified approximately 103 safety related concrete embedments in which the applied loads were greater than the allowable loads developed by the original design organization. The main component of the load, which exceeded the allowable load, has been detemined to be from the required seismic load cases.
The licensee has been evaluating and refining the loading and embedment acceptability. The licensee has evaluated all embedments against the Safe Shutdown and the Operating Bases Earthquake criteria and found all to be acceptable.
The NRC has been closely monitoring both the review methodology and progress of the licensee's reviews and evaluations. An inspection the week of January 13, 1986 to review the licensee's findings and conclusions resulted in the licensee having to re-evaluate a number of embedments due to errors found by the inspector.
While the original technical issue was resolved, subsequent infomation pertaining to stress reports and Hanger Design calculations (Enclosure 13) may require re-review of the embedme.rts, j Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRS 15
Enclosure 13' Stress Reports and Hanger Design Calculations On Friday, January 31, 1986 the licensee informed the NRC that since September 1, 1984 design changes were made to about 20 systems at Fermi 2 without the stress
} reports or hanger designs having been evaluated or reviewed by appropriate personnel.
In response to the finding, documented in a DER (Enclosure 13A) the licensee asked Stone and Webster to provide a proposal for evaluating the problem. A meeting was held Friday, February 14, 1986, to discuss this issue with DECO.
The licensee cancelled the meeting to prepare additional respondes to various NRC questions. The licensee and Region subsequently held a working level meeting on March 10, 1986, to discuss this issue. This issue has the potential for the embedment issue (Enclosure 12) being revisited and could constitute the pacing item for restart.
Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRS 16
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Enclosure 14 Security During inspection activities in December 1985, Region III specialist inspectors identified approximately fourteen violations of the licensee's security plan ,
(some items were licensee identified).
As a result of the number and types of findings and the fact that a majority of the items dealt with management, an Enforcement Board was held on January 2, 1986. Based on the outcome of the board an Enforcement Conference was held on January 17, 1986, and an enforcement package presently is being prepared.
Further discussion between the licensee and Region III were conducted Friday, February 21, 1986.
Lead Responsibility: Region III DRSS 17
Enclosure 15 Allegations Shortly after problems at Fermi 2 started to surface, a number of allegations were received from various individuals. The allegations were entered into the Region III Allegation Management System and forwarded to the appropriate divisions. A number of Allegation Board meetings were held resulting in the action plan. DRP is evaluating what items need closure before restart, if any.
DRP and Government and State Affairs will be meeting with the alleger during March, 1986.
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l l Responsibility: Region III, DRP/DRS/DRSS l l
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Enclosure 16 Escalated Enforcement Package Premature Criticality, LCO and License Violations As a result of the numerous events which occurred between July and October,1985, a special Inspection Report No. 50-341/85040 (Enclosure 16A) was issued on January 6, 1986.
The report set forth the facts surrounding the premature criticality event of July 1, 1985; six LCO violations; a license condition violation; and numerous procedural violations. Based on the conclusions of an Enforcement Board an escalated enforcement package was prepared by Region III and forwarded on December 13, 1985, to IE for action. Enforcement action is pending.
)
1 Lezd Responsibility: I&E Headquarters I J. Axelrad )
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i Enclosure 10 Environmental Qualifications (EQ) Review As a result of an allegation, made to the Safeteam at Fermi 2, that required snvironmental qualification reviews were not being performed, both the licensee and Region III reviewed post ECP's to identify where or not the allegation had any substance.
Both the licensee's review and the NRC inspection concluded that appropriate EQ reviews were performed where necessary. The NRC inspection is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-341/85051 (Enclosure 10A)
Lead Responsibility: Item closed, no problems identified.
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Enclosure 8 Condensate Storage Tank Rupture At about 12:30 a.m. (CST), on Novemoer 17, 1985, between 17,000 and 35,000 gallons of water was released from a ruptured seam in the condensate storage tank. The water soaked into the ground surrounding the tank. The radioactivity of the tank water was 3.38 x 10-7 microcuries per milliliter (principally cobalt 60), which is less than 0.4 percent of the regulatory limit for off-site release (Maximum Permissible Concentration).
The plant has been shut down since October 11, 1985, for maintenance and installation of NRC-required equipment, including a remote shutdown panel. The release occurred after an electrical bus was deenergized for work in connection with the installatior,of the plant's remote shutdown panel. With the bus deenergized, the control room level indicators were lost for the condenser hotwell and for the condensate storage tank. In addition, the hotwell reject valves automatically opened and water was pumped from the hotwell into the condensate storage tank. The pumping of water at 2,600 gallons per minute into the condensate storage tank may have overpressurized the tank, causing a welded seam to rupture.
At the present time the licensee does not plan to repair the tank during the current outage. The rupture was between the side wall and the top of the tank.
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l Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRP 10
Enclosure 9 Remote Shutdown (3-L) Panel During a special inspection of the 3-L panel installation four items of concern were identified. The concerns, as identified in Inspection Report No. 50-341/85050 (Enclosure 9A) are as follows:
- 1. The action statement (3/4.7.9) as proposed for the loss of Combustible Turbine Genarator (CTG) No. 11 requires verification that 120 KV offsite power is available to supply power to the shutdown panel and establishment of a roving fire watch for all fire areas where alternative shutdown capability is utilized. The licensee believes the availability of 120 KV power and a roving fire watch in the fire areas of concern to be sufficient to allow a period of up to 30 days in which either to restore CTG No. 11 to an operable status or provide an alternative power supply. Within 60 days, the licensee proposes to restore CTG No. 11 to an operable status or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and be in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4 The inspectors informed the licensee that, based on discussions with NRR during the inspection, a designated backup power supply other than 120 KV offsite power will have to be made available within 30 days if CTG No. 11 is inoperable for more than 30 days.
The licensee has agreed to designate this backup power supply either by providing one of the remaining CTG units with black start capability or by supplying another alternate source of power. The licensee indicated that this commitment would be formally transmitted to NRR and reflected in the proposed technical specification bases or in some other document.
The inspectors informed the licensee that this issue must be resolved prior to startup from the current outage.
- 2. Electrical feed cable No. R.I. 005 2P, supplyir.g power to distribution cabinet No. ZPB-2, which supplies power to safety relief valve (SRV)
No. F013G solenoid (enabling control of the SRV from the independent alternative shutdown panel), is routed into Fire Zone 8 at the 631 foot elevation of the auxiliary building. This cable originates at the Division II battery room, passes through Fire Zone 8 of the auxiliary building and terminates at the ZPB-2 distribution cabinet.
To~ correct this condition, the licensee installed a 3M brand one-hour fire barrier wrap on this cable throughout its exposure to Fire Zone 8.
Fire Zone 8 is protected by an automatic carbon dioxide fire suppression system and automatic fire detectors.
The inspectors informed the licensee that the corrective actions taken for this condition were found to be in conformance with Section III.G.2.c of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. However, the condition and corrective actions taken must be formally submitted by the licensee to NRR for acceptance prior to startup from the current outage.
11
- 3. The 4160 volt feed between the Division 1 Switchgear Room Buses and the Radwaste Switchgear Room Buses was found to be routed through the cable area at the 603'-6" level of the Auxiliary Building. The 4160 volt feed is also known as the Calvert Bus and is part of the power supply for the Appendix R Dedicated Shutdown System (3L). The inspectors verified the Calvert Bus location visually and by reviewing the drawings 6E721-2988-1 through 5.
Because the Calvert Bus is unprotected, a fire in the Auxiliary Building Fire Zone 2 could cause the loss of power to the SBFW pumps as well as the loss of normal shutdown systems. To correct this condition, the licensee has proposed wrapping all the divisional power, instrumentation, and control cables in the Fire Zone 2 in a 3M brand one-hour firewrap material. By wrapping the Divisional cables, the licensee's intent is to meet the requirement of Appendix R,Section III.g.2 in this zone. This zone is provided with an automatic suppression system and fire detection.
The inspectors infomed the licensee that the proposed corrective actions for this condition deviates from a previous commitment to conform to Section 3.L of Appendix R in this zone. Therefore, acceptability of the resolution to this condition must be pursued with NRR with acceptance prior to startup from the current outage.
- 4. Reactor pressure, reactor level, torus temperature, torus level and EECW instrumentation cables for the independent alternative shutdown panel are routed in Fire Zone 1 at the 551 to 562 foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building (basement). Some cables in this zone are partially wrapped in 3M brand one-hour fire barrier material. This zone is protected by an automatic sprinkler system and automatic fire detectors.
According to the licensee, corrective action taken for these conditions will be in conformance to Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
The inspectors informed the licensee that the corrective actions taken for these conditions must be fomally submitted by the licensee to NRR for acceptance prior to startup from the current outage.
In addition to the above items the licensee has identified a problem with three valves all of which are required to be open for monitoring of torus water level. Two of the valves, if closed due to a hot short followed by
' stripping of the power supply, per procedure, will result in torus water l level indication being lost. The third valve is an air to open valve and I presently the 3-L panel procedure strips the power to the control solenoid thus venting the valve operator and closing the valve. Again torus water level indication is lost. The licensee is studying appropriate modifications.
Lead Responsibility: Licensee /NRR/ Region III, DRS 12 i
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Enclosure 6 South Reactor Feedpump Turbine On July 22, 1985, the licensee experienced problems with the south reactor turbine during demonstration testing. Visual inspection of the turbine on July 23 revealed extensive damage to the thrust bearing housing, including; radial cracks in the bearing housing pedestal, loose end cover bolts and bolts with stripped threads.
Licensee documentation shows the SRFP turbine has had vibration problems since 1983 and the condition has steadily deteriorated. During pre-operational testing, the turbine vibrated 7 to 8 thousandths of an inch between 1600 and 1700 rpm. Normal vibration is less than one thousandth of an inch. The vibration decreased, however, during normal running speeds of 5000 to 6000 rpm.
The vendor, Transamerica DeLaval, Inc., told the licensee that the SRFP turbine rotor is bowed approximately 20 thousandths of an inch.
The vibration problem had been reviewed by DECO engineering and found to be ccceptable.
The licensee is presently in the final stages of reessembly of the turbine and pump.
Region III has made arrangements through Parameters Incorporated (NRC Contractor) to have an individual review the failure and DECO engineering acceptance of the higher than normal vibration. The review was completed the week of February 2, 1986. A final report from Parameters, INC is under Region III review.
Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRP 8
Enclosure 7 Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) Purge Line Penetration By letter from B. Youngblood (NRR) to W. Jens (DECO), dated November 21, 1985, (Enclosure 7A) the licensee was informed that the isolation configuration for the TIP purge line passing through penetration X-35 did not meet GDC 56.
Presently DECO is working on an interim design change. Deco's submittals describing the interim design change and a request for an exemption from.GDC 56 until the first refueling outage are included as Enclosure 78.
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Lead Responsibility: DECO /NRR 9
Enclosure 4 Diesel Generators I
The Emergency Diesel Generator sets at Fermi 2 have exhibited a high bearing !
failure rate. In January 1985 (prior to licensing), Diesel Generator No. 11 failed with numerous bearings and journals being damaged. At the same time the No. 12 diesel generator was inspected and bearing damage was observed. The failures in January were attributed to lack of pre-lubrication. No additional failures occurred until November 13, 1985, when the No. 13 diesel generator failed and, upon inspection of the other diesels, No. 11 also exhibited damaged bearings. The failures in November were attributed to the lack of engine preconditioning (break-in). Further damage to diesel generator bearings, involving diesels 11 and 13, was identified on December 23 and 27, 1985. In some cases the latest identified bearing damage or distress involved bearings with less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of run time. A detailed breakdown of failures is enclosed as Enclosure 4A.
After the initial problems in January 1985, the licensee instituted a monitoring program to sample and analyze lubricating oil and check bearing clearance in an i attempt to identify early degradation of bearings. The results of the program '
were negative up through the failure of Diesel Generator No. 13 on November 13, 1985. Subsequent to the November 13, 1985 failure Detroit Edison, per the vendor's recommendation, instituted a testing / engine break-in program which involved running the diesel generator set loaded for a number of hours and then performing a series of slow and fast starts. With the recent failure in December of Diesel Generator No. 13, the one diesel generator which had completed the testing program, the licensee is renewing their efforts to identify the root cause of the problem.
After the original failures in January 1985 the NRC devoted resources from I&E, NRR, and NRC contractors to evaluate the problem. From February through November Region III followed the results of the licensee's monitoring program.
Prior to the November 13, 1985 diesel failure Region III had cor.cluder! that the monitoring program was not providing sufficient data. With the failures in November the NRC assembled the same team of individuals who had evaluated the initial failures. At the present time Franklin Research Institute is also involved in analyzing a number of the bearings and oil samples taken from the failed units. In addition, one Region III inspector has been assigned full time
.to monitor and evaluate the licensee's actions.
A meeting with all parties was held on Friday January 24, 1985 to discuss the licensee's findings and proposed corrective action. DECO submitted their
" Reliability Demonstration Test Pro J. G. Keppler of February 5, 1986 Enclosure (gram" in a letter 4B). from F. meeting A followup E. Agosti wasto held Friday, February 14, in Region III. Resolution and an acceptable test program remains outstanding. As of March 10, 1986, the licensee had completed their proposed test program including visual inspection of a number of bearings on I both Diesel Generators #11 and #13. No problems were identified.
Lead Responsibility: Region III, DRS 6
) //6 5b? U T FERMI 2 ENCLOSURE 4.A DIESEL GENERATOR PROBLEMS
> January 1985: Diesel Generator No. 11 tripped on low lube oil pressure.
A. Inspection Results
- 1. Diesel Generator No. 11
- a. Damaged crankshaft journals
- b. Damaged main & connecting rod bearings
- c. Damaged upper pistons
- d. Damaged upper connecting rods
- 2. Diesel Generator No. 12
- a. Damaged upper crankshaft bearings
- b. Damaged connecting rod bearings -
- 3. Diesel Generator No. 13 NO DAMAGE IDENTIFIED
- 4. Diesel Generator No. 14
- a. No damage identified
- b. Gray discoloration noted on some bearings surfaces.
B. Monitoring Program
- 1. Gap check after every 20 starts w/o manual prelube or every 18 months.
- 2. Oil filter inspection & replacement quarterly
- 3. Sample & analysis of lube oil monthly 1
i 4. Spectrographic analysis of material deposits on oil filters
- 5. Trend data obtained from items 1-4 above i
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>}. Novambsr 13, 1935: Dz osr21 G9nGrotor No. 13 msnually trapp2d A. Inspection results
- 1. Diesel Generator No. 11
- a. Damaged upper crankshaf t' main bearings 3,5,6,B,9,and 13
- b. All the damaged bearings had been replaced in February, l 4
\ b.
1985.
- 2. Diesel Generator No. 12 NO DAMAGE IDENTIFIED
- 3. Diesel Generator No. 10
- a. Upper crankshaft connecting rod bearing No. 13 disintegrated.
- b. Upper crankshaft main bearings No. 3& 13 damaged.
- c. No. 3 cylinder liner cracked
- d. No. 3 piston skirt cracked ,
- e. Upper crankshaft No. 3 main & connecting rod journals damaged.
- f. Lower crankshaft main bearing No. 4 damaged.
- g. Other upper & lower crankshaft bearings & upper crankshaft connecting rod bearings showed signs of distress.
- 4. Diesel Generator No. 14 .
- a. Dirt & scoring of upper crankshaft main and connecting rod bearings.
- b. Areas with discoloration, from January, showed signs of l deterioration and were becoming rougher.
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B. Liccncsa'o Actiono
- 1. Replace damaged components
- 2. Test program for Diesel Generator No. 13 to " break in" the t
engine.
- a. Run engine loaded for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />,
- b. Run engine loaded for 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.
- c. 35 slow starts with manual prelubrication.
- d. 3 fast starts with manual prelubrication.
- I. Dacember 23, 1985: Status A. Diesel Generator No. 11: Inspection after 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> into test pregram revealed excessive gap clearance on upper main bearing No. 6.
Licensee replaced the bearing.
D. Diesel Generator No. 12: Low lube oil viscosityi no apparent reason.
Unit was shut down.
C. Di esel Generator No.13: While securing the diesel generator as part of a non-diesel generator test the output breaker opened (as requested) but then closed for no apparent reason. Di esel generator tripped on reverse power. Investigation revealed a wiring error.
D. Diesel Generator No. 14: Low lube oil viscosity.
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Dsccmb r 27 & 28, 1985: Incpcction roculto A. Diesel Generator No. 11: After running the Diesel for approximately one hour, after replacement of failed #6 bearing (11/23/85), an inspection revealed that bearings No. 3,5, and 13 failed to pass the gcp check indicating damage to the bearings. In addition bearing No. 6 showed signs of distress.
B. Diesel Generator No. 12: No change.
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l C. Diesel Generator No. 13: During inspection after completing the test program three bearings showed signs of metal " pickup". Origin of the metal is unknown.
D. Diesel Generator No. 14: No change.
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