ML20237J471
| ML20237J471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1985 |
| From: | Gregor F, Lehnert D OGDEN ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY SERVICES (FORMERLY MULTI |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237J435 | List: |
| References | |
| DECO-04-3336, DECO-04-3336-R01, DECO-4-3336, DECO-4-3336-R1, TAC-65174, NUDOCS 8708180192 | |
| Download: ML20237J471 (47) | |
Text
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Attachment 4 MDC Report No. D E O-04-3336 Rev 1 (August 1985) and Supplemental Letter (July 14,1987) i D 2 B70914 P kDO{K050003, PD
.l . l +
i ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT UNIT 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
' NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS
.f' PREPARED BY MULTIPLE' DYNAMICS CORPORATION 23200 SOUTEFIELD, SUITE 103 SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN 48076 MDC DOCUMENT NO. DECO-04-3336 REVISION 1 AUGUST 1985 i
APPROVED BY l- % WN h ISSUED BY fYh b'{f.(.e. '
D. F. LEHNERT F. E. GREGOR VICE. PRESIDENT PRESIDENT
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - ~
REVISION CONTROL SHEET Document No. DECO-04-3336 Revision 1
Subject:
Fermi 2 Primary Containment Negative Pressure Analysis i
D. F. Le hnert Principal Encineer .- _
Name Title init'al K. A. Hagan Senior Enaineer I . 77 Name Title Initial J. E. Lewis Engineer I -'
Name Title Initial Name Title ~ initial Name Title Initial Name Title Initial Name Title Initial'~
Name Title Initial Name Title Initial Name Title Initicl Name Title Initial Name Title Initial
-i-FORM MDC-15-145
1(LV1SION CONTitOL LilEET
Subject:
Fermi 2 Docuntent No. DECO-04-3 336 Primary Containment Negative Revision 1 Pressure Analysis 1
Page Rev. Prepared Checked Page Rev. Prepared Checkea '
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-ii-Form MDC-15-146
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE iii i
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 Introduction 1 i 2.0 DEPRESS Model Overview 3 2.1 Model Description 4 2.2 Model Assumptions 5 3.0 Description and Basis of Initial Conditions 12 3.1 Steam Leak in Drywell (SBA) 13 3.2 Design Basis Eccident (DBA) 21 3.3 Inadvertent Drywell Spray 25 4.0 Analysis Results and Conclusions 30 36
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5.0 References .
1 Figure 1: DEPRESS Model 9 Figure 2: Wetwell Butterfly Valve Opening Time 34 Sensitivity, Inadvertent Drywell Spray Case Figure 3: Wetwell Butterfly Valve Opening 35 Setpoint Sensitivity, Inadvertent Drywell Spray Case l Table 1: Analysis Parameters 10 Table 2: Analysis Initial Conditions 29 Table 3: Analysis Results 33 Attachment 1: DEPRESS Output, Steam Leak in Drywell (SBA) j Attachment 2: DEPRESS Output, Design Basis ?
Accident (DBA)
Attachment 3: DEPRESS Output, Inadvertent Drywell Spray Attachment 4: DEPRESS Output, Inadvertent Drywell Spray, Butterfly Valve Opening '
Sensitivity Case Appendix A: DEPRESS Computer Code Verification
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. FERMI 2 Auaust 1985 DECO-04 3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE iv
SUMMARY
OF REVISION 1 The Primary Containment Negative Pressure Analysis Report, DECO-04-3336, was revised to incorporate Edison comments made on Revision 0 of the report. The revisions are briefly summarized below.
I
- 1. The drywell volume was revised in the DEPRESS computer program and in' Appendix r. o be consistent with the j drywell volume given in Table 1. ,
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- 2. The minimum torus airspace volume was revised throughout '( )
the entire report to reflect the volume given in the l~~
1atest revision of the Technical Specifications. j
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- 3. A note was added to clarify the Containment S1: ray l )
Throttle valve opening time used in the analysis, which i .
is given in Table 1. l j
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- 4. The method used in the DEPRESS computer program for determining the flow rate from the Reactor Building to the torus was revised to account for the fact that the !
I butterfly valve and vacuum breaker are arranged in l series. Appendix A was also revised to reflect this change.
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SUMMARY
OF REVISION 1 (cont'd)
- 5. All computer runs in the report were rerun with the revised DEPRESS computer program.
- 6. The DEPRESS verification run for comparison with CONTEMPT was originally run with butterfly valve delay time, actuation time and the opening differential pressure setpoint provided as input. This was rerun with the butterfly valve assumed fully open at the beginning of the analysis for more accurate comparison with the CONTEMPT run, which assumed the valve to be open.
- / . The hand calculation for comparison with the computer run i I
was revised to reflect all the changes made to the DEPRESS computer program.
Revision bars have been provided in the right-hand margin at all revised locations.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report describes an updated negative pressure analysis of the Fermi 2 primary containment. An evaluation of events which could lead to negative pressure conditions within containment was performed in the mid-1970's and the recults presented in the FSAR. These analyses were based on normally open butterfly valves in the wetwell vacuum relief line.
Subsequent to these evaluations, the butterfly valves were changed to normally closed. This change was made to more closely comply with General Design
( Criteria, and containment leakage test requirements.
Therefore, the negative pressure analyses needed to be updated to account for the opening time of the butterfly valves.
Since the time that the analyses as presented in the FSAR, Amendment 1, were completed, the Fermi 2 Technical Specifications and Emergency Procedure Guidelines have been issued. These documents, plant test data, and system performance calculations have provided a basis to moderate the initial conditions and assumptions applied in containment depressuriza-tion evaluations.
The adequacy of the Fermi 2 containment vacuum relief capability is demonstrated in this report. A descriptica of the model employed, the assumptions and bases for initial conditions, and analysis of l- _. ______________________
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 ~
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 2 the results is presented. A validation of the model used is provided as an appendix to this report.
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 3 2.0 DSPRESS MODEL OVERVIEW The containment negative pressure response is predicted using an updated version of Detroit
]
Ed ison's " DEPRESS" computer program. This program ]
was prepared in the mid-1970's, and is documented in j Reference 16. The program was originally written in l PL-1 language and subsequently translated into )
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!. Fortran as described in Reference 17.
MDC modified the Reference 17 Fortran version of DEPRESS to include the following features:
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- 1. Provision for modeling superheated steam in the {
drywell.
- 2. Incorporation of a time dependont wetwell butterfly valve model with variable opening time as an input. j
- 3. Refinement of the containment spray throttle valve flow vs. opening time characteristic. l l
I 4 Variable total run time.
Appendix A of this report contains a detailed development of the mathematical basis for the DEPRESS code, and a verification of the code by I comparison to results obtained in the Reference 18 report. The following sections describe the basic
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: i PAGE 4 assumptions and conservatism within the DEPRESS program as now configured.
2.1 Model Description The DEPRESS model consists of two control volumes as shown in Figure 1; one representing the drywell, and the other representing the torus airspace. There is a one-way flow path between the control volumes which is modeled to represent the drywell to torus vacuum breakers. Another one-way flow path is modeled between the torus airspace and the Reactor
' Building to represent the wetwell vacuum breakers and butterfly isolation valves. Subcooled spray w .er is admitted to the drywell volume via a n;arized model of the spray valve. The parameters ad in the analysis and their bases are summarized in Table 1.
The depressurization event is simulated by the DEPRESS corim by the calculation of mass and energy balances at successive time intervals. The state of the air and vapor (steam) masses within each control volume is established using the models for mixtures of ideal gases. An iptegrated spray flowrate added at each time step, in*,'.tially begins to drive the drywpil pressjare down. Once the drywell vacuum
- bretiker diff8rential pressure setpoint is reached, cool air from the wetwell airspace enters the drywell, thereby reducing the torus airspace pressure. Once the setpoint of the wetwell
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isolation butterfly valves is reached, these valves begin an opening cycle. When the differential pressure between the torus airspace and the Reactor Building reaches the wetwell vacuum breaker setpoint, cool secondary containment atmosphere is admitted to the torus airspace. The minimum pressure eventually reached in a control volume is determined by the depressurization rate, and makeup mass flow.
2.2 Model Assumptions
! The DEPRESS model incorporates the following conservative assumptions:
- 1. The model is adiabatic. Since all the events analyzed occur with the plant at power, heat transfer from the hot NSSS components and containment metal would be expected. Heat input to the containment atmospoere would attenuate the depressurization under any circumstances.
- 2. The spray water is not accounted for in the drywell mass balances. The spray only serves as l a heat sink, and does not itself vaporize. The addition of water mass to the control volume atmospheres would tend to increase pressure.
Some vaporization of spray water would be expected, especially under superheated conditions within the drywell.
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PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 6
- 3. The spray water undergoes the full available temperature difference from torus water temperature, to that of the drywell atmosphere.
A 100% spray efficiency would not be expected, and would therefore reduce pressure decay.
- 4. The flow coefficients used for the various l I
flowpaths are referenced to the smallest area in the path, thus restricting the flow of makeup mass to the control volumes.
( 5. The butterfly valve opening setpoint was arbitrarily set at 0.5 psi. The actual setpoint is 0.25 psi. Any delay in butterfly valve opening time tends to increase depressurization.
- 6. All makeup mass flow is dry air, that is, no vapor enters the torus airspace or exits the torus to the drywell. This assumption is consistent with "line break" scenarios analyzed.
For these events, no further vapor is added to the drywell volume after spray begins.
Additional vapor mass tends to decrease depressurization.
- 7. The drywell spray flow ramps linearly to the maximum expected flow in 60 seconds. The containment spray throttle va ses hav- a minimum opening time of 98 seconds to reduce the
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 7 potential for water hammer. Therefore, the DEPRESS program spray injection model is conservative.
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- 8. The vacuum breakers are assumed to have a closing setpoint of 0.5 psi. Physically, the vacuum breakers will not reclose until differential pressure is very nearly zero.
Reclosing the vacuum breakers at the opening setpoint limits makeup air flow and tends to increase depressurization.
I
- 9. The vacuum breakers are assumed not to open below differential pressures of 0.5 psi. In reality, the vacuum breakers will begin to open at some lower differential, and be full open at
- 0. 5 psi, thus allowing a higher makeup air flowrate.
- 10. The primary containment negative pressure design value of (-)2.00 psig is used as the acceptance criteria in this analysis. The containment can tolerate pressures below this limit as described in Reference 11. In particular, the 7/8 inch thick cylindrical portion of the drywell is the limiting vessel region with an allowable negative pressure of (-)2.63 psig.
The assumptions described above, and the conservative conditions selected for the limiting
)
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l scenarios ensure that the DEPRESS results for minimum containment pressure are lower than would be expected.
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FERMI 2 .
August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 10 TABLE 1 ANALYSIS PARAMETERS Parameter Value Reference Drywell Free Volume (ft3) 163,730 (1)
Wetwell Free Volume (ft3) 127,760 (1) LIi Downcomer Submergence (a) (ft) 3.33 (9)(10)
Drywell Vacuum Breakers (V21-2001 through V21-2012)
. Opening Differential Pressure (psi) 0.5 (1)
(' . Flow Coefficient (b) 1.85 (4)
. Inside Diameter (in) 16.00 (4)
Wetwell Vacuum Breakers (V21-2015 and V21-2016)
. Opening Differential Pressure (psi) 0.5 (1)
. Flow Coefficient (b) 2.42 (4)
. Inside Diameter (in) 19.25 (4)
Wetwell Butterfly Valves (V21-2013 and V21-2014)
. Opening Setpoint (c) (psi) 0.5 (7)
. Inside Diameter in 18.62 (4)
. Opening . Time ( d) (( se) c) 25 (8)
Containment Spray Throttle Valve (V8-2167 or V8-2168) ,
. 1
. Opening Time (sec) (e) 60 (19) a-
. Maximum Flow per Valve (GPM) 11,060 (5)(20) l l
l Table notes follow on next page. ;
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1 NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 11 q TABLE 1 (Cont'd) j (a) Submergence corresponding to a maximum torus water l level of 14 '-8 " (El. 572'-2"). DEPRESS does not model "
d rywell to torus flow, but this value is required to set initial conditions.
(b) Coefficients include connecting piping.
( c) The butterfly valve opening pressure setpoint used in the analysis is conservative to account for instrument d rif t and error. The actual setpoint is 0.25 psid (Reference 22) .
(d) Opening time includes a 5-second " dead time" . The DEPRESS model incorporates a time dependent flow coefficient for the butterfly valve which utilizes field test data.
(e) The containment throttle valves have a minimum fully open time of 98 seconds. The drywell spray is assumed ;
to ramp linearly to the maximum expected flow in 60 , _ .
seconds. !
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August 1985 D EC O 333 6 FERMI 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 9 Drywell Free Volume P,T vapor mass . Subcooled air mass Dryw ell "O ' + Spray Spray Throttle Valves
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! I Drywell .
Vacuum f'
' Breakers Wetwell Free Volume P,T vapor mass Reactor air mass lgl j/ eBuilding Atmosphere Wetwell W etw ell Butterfly Vacuum Valves Breakers i
FIGURE 1 DEPRESS MODEL 1
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3.0 DESCRIPTION
AND BASIS OF INITIAL CONDITIONS The primary containment could be subject to
. pressures below ambient under conditions of condensing steam or rapid air temperature reduction -
within. containment. The most severe. negative pressuresfwould result for events which challenge-the containment vacuum relief system; that is, those events resulting in high depressurization rates.
These events are associated with operation of the
' containment spray mode of the RHR System, under accident and transient conditions.
The bounding accident events involve actuation of the drywell spray following a steam leak in the drywell (SBA) and a design basis accident (DBA).
All intermediate line break events are enveloped by these cases. The limiting plant transient case is inadvertent drywell spray actuation during plant operation. The depressurization rate for each of these events is determined by the containment spray flowrate and temperature, and the assumed initial conditions of the containment and Reactor Building atmospheres.
The assumed scenarios and respective bases which lead up to the initial conditions for each of the three cases are described in the following sections.
In general, the resulting initial conditions minimize spray water temperature and makeup (relieving) air temperature under " mechanistic" or
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 13 physically realizable circumstances. A summary of the initial conditions for the three events is providedyin Table 2.
3.1 Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis Initial Primary and o Reactor Building pressure Secondary Containment is being maintained at Conditions Prior to approximately 0.25 inch the Event vacuum water gauge (14.687
( psia) by the RBHVAC system (Reference 14). The Tech-nical Specifications require verification at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the vacuum within secondary containment is greater than or equal to 0.125 inch vacuum water gauge.
o Reactor Building tempera-L ture is being maintained at a less than normal 65'F.
The winter normal tempera- l ture is anticipated to be 70*F. The RBHVAC system is designed (Reference 15) to maintain the Reactor
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l l Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis Initial Primary and Building at 65'F when the Secondary Containment outside temperature is at Conditions Prior to (-)10
- F . In Michigan near the Event the. Monroe area, climatic data (Reference 21) has established that the ambient temperature will be greater than 4*F, 99% of
(. time. Therefore, it is very likely the Reactor Building temperature will be greater than 65*F.
o Drywell pressure is within the range required by the Technical Specifications,
(-)0.1 to 2.0 poig.
o Drywell temperature is at or below the maximum ave-rage temperature allowed by the Technical Specifica-tions, 135'F.
o Suppression chamber pres-sure is at the minimum required by the Technical
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FERMI 2 Auaust 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 15 Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and j Sequence Associated Basis Initial Primary and Specifications, (-)0.1 ;
Secondary Containment psig. ]
Conditions Prior to ]
the Event o Suppression chamber air-space and pool temperatures are the same as the torus room or Reactor Building l temperature of 65'F. There
-( would be no justifiable j reason to assume the oper- I ator will have the suppres- )
I sion cooling mode in opera- i i
tion at these temperatures. l l
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Steam Leak or Small o The operator observes an Break Occurs increase in drywell average temperature above the Tech-nical Specification limit I of 135'F. Per Emergency i Procedures, the operator places all available dry-well coolers in service.
l Vent System o It is assumed that the i
Downcomer Clearing drywell pressure and temp-erature continue to rise.
When the differential
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Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis j pressure between the drywell and torus reaches 1.44 psid, the vent system downcomers clear (based on a submergence of 3.33 ft).
Even though energy is added to the pool, no increase in temperature is assumed.
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Drywell Pressure o It is assumed the pressure Exceeds 2.00 psig and temperature continue to rise. At 2.00 psig and increasing, and with the average temperature assumed to be less that 212*F, the Emergency Procedures direct the operator to vent the drywell to the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System.
SGT System Removes o When the average drywell All Air from temperature exceeds 212*F, Drywell the Emergency Procedures require the operator to isolate the SGT System.
The drywell temperature is
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FERMI 2 Aucust 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIHARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 17 Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd) l Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis predicted to rise very quickly for the SBA case (Reference 2) so very little air would be exhausted to the SGT System. . However, the SGT System is assumed to oper- l ate long enough to exhaust all of the air from the drywell (approximately 48 minutes).
Drywell Average o After all noncondensibles Temperature Exceeds are removed from the dry-212*F well, the average tempera-ture is assumed to exceed 212*F. The operator iso-lates the SGT System in accordance with the Emer-
.gency Procedures. Drywell pressure rebuilds, and vent system clearing begins again. However, since all mass flow into the pool is vapor, it is condensed, and the torus free volume remains at 14.596 psia.
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FERMI 2 Aucust-1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVIS40N: 1 PAGE 18 Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and.
Sequence Associated Basis Drywell Average o The drywell pressure and Temperature Reaches temperature are assumed to-335'F continue to rise. At-335'F~
(17 psig), the Emergency Procedures require the operator to initiate dry- )
well spray, and limit the flowrate to 720 GPM (100
( lbm/sec). General Electric Mark I Containment analyses 1
(Reference 2) predict temperatures in this range j long before 17 psig is reached. 1 Drywell Spray Loop o The operator turns the four Opened and Flow is keylock control room Limited to 720 GPM switches which open the isolation and throttle valves of one of the dry-well spray loops. The 65'F water from the suppression chamber is injected through the spray header into the drywell. At this point the evaluation begins with
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Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis primary containment conditions as follows:
Torus airspace pressure:
-0.1 psig Torus airspace temperature:
70*F i
(Assumed increase from 65*F to account for nominal heat transfer from the vent system).
Torus airspace relative humidity: 100%
Drywell pressure: 17 psig (saturated) (Reference 1)
Drywell-to-Wetwell o The actuation of the dry-Vacuum Breakers Open well spray depressurizes the drywell. When the dry-well pressure becomes 0.5 psi less than the suppres-sion pool airspace, 10 of 12 vacuum breakers are u_____-_-____---
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Steam Leak in the Drywell (SBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis assumed to open. The other 2 valves fail to open.
Torus Vacuum Vent o The drywell and torus air-Line Butterfly space pressures continue to Valves Open decline. When the differ-ential pressure between the torus and Reactor Building exceeds the butterfly valve assumed setpoint (0.5 psi),
an actuation signal is sent to the valves. The valves open in 25 seconds, which includes an initial 5-second " dead time" (Refer-ence 8).
Wetwell to Reactor o When the pressure in the Building Vacuum torus airspace becomes 0.5 Breaker Opens psi less than the Reactor Building pressure, 1 of 2 vacuum breaker valves opens. The other valve fails to open.
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3.2 Design Basis Accident (DBA)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis Initial Primary and Identical to those condi-Secondary Containment tions as previously Conditions Prior to described for the SBA.
the Event Design Basis Break o The drywell quickly pres-Occurs surizes. The noncondens-ibles in the drywell are discharged through the vent system into the torus airspace. This pressurizes the torus airspace to approximately 31.8 psia (Reference 16). This evaluation is assumed to commence when the drywell l pressure is larger than the torus airspace pressure by the depth of the downcomer submergence (3.33 ft) or 33.24 psia. Beyond this )
point, continued vapor l 1
condensation in the drywell l will result in the wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker valves opening.
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FERMI 2 Auoust 1985 DECO-04-3336 P RIMARY. CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE. ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 22 Design Basis Accident (DBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis Design Basis Break o It is ascumed the signifi-Occurs cant amount of energy dis-charged into the suppres-sion pool during the clear-ing event, increases the pool temperature to approx-imately 90*F. This corre-lates with the FSAR DBA
( pool temperature response (Figure 6.2-12) for the equivalent duration required to pressure the torus airspace to 31.8 psia (approximately 120 sec-ond s) . The FSAR response uses an initial pool temp-erature of 95'F. The pool temperature rises approxi-mately 25'F in 120 seconds.
The torus airspace tempera-ture is assumed to be at 100*F. This value accounts for the energy input from the pool heatup, compres-sion of the noncondensibles
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Event Description of Conditions'and Sequence Associated Basis in the torus airspace and vent system heat transfer.
The relative humidity in the torus free volume is 100%.
Drywell Spray Loop o Because of peak pressure Opened and Flow is conditions in the drywell Limited to 720 GPM after the DBA, the operator follows Emergency Proce-dures. Since the drywell pressure has increased above 30 psig, the operator turns the four keylock control room switches which open the isolation and throttle valves of one of the drywell spray loops.
The 90*F water from the suppression pool is injected through the spray header into the drywell.
Drywell-to-Wetwell o The actuation of the dry- 1 Vacuum Breakers Open well spray depressurizes the drywell. When the l
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l Design Basis Accident (DBA) (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis drywell pressure becomes 0.5 psi less than.the suppression pool airspace, 10 of 12 vacuum breakers are assumed to open. The other 2 valves fail to open.
Torus Vacuum vent o The drywell and torus free Line Butterfly volume pressures continue valves Open to decline. When the dif-ferential pressure between the torus and Reactor Building exceeds the butterfly valve setpoint (0.5 psi), an actuation signal is sent to the valves. The valves open in 25 seconds.
Wetwell to Reactor o When the pressure in the Building vacuum torus airspace becomes 0.5 Breaker Opens psi less than the Reactor Building pressure, 1 of 2 vacuum breaker valves open. .
The other fails to open.
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3.3 Inadvertent Drywell Spray Event' Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis Initial Primary and o The Reactor Building pres-Secondary Containment sure and temperature are Corditions Prior to identical to those of the the Event SBA and DBA cases. j o Drywell pressure is established at (-)0.1 psi, the minimum permitted by the Technical Specifications.
o Drywell temperature is at the maximum average temper-ature allowed by the Tech-nical Specifications, ,
135'F.
o Torus pressure is established at (-)0.1 psi, the minimum allowed by the Technical Specifications, o Suppression chamber air-space and pool temperature are the same as the torus room or Reactor Building h
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Inadvertent Drywell Spray (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis temperature of 65*. There would be no justifiable reason to assume the opera-tor will have the suppres-sion cooling mode in opera-tion at these temperatures.
o The relative humidity in l the drywell and torus air-space is at 100% for the respective temperature conditions.
Drywell Spray Loop o One of the RHR spray mode is Inadvertently loops is being tested. It Opened is assumed that the opera-tor inadvertently turns the four keylock control room switches which open the isolation and throttle valves in the loop. The 65'F water from the sup-pression pool is injected at a flowrate of 11,060 GPM (1,538 lbm/sec) through the spray header. This is the l
I
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-Inadvertent Drywell Spray (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis expected flowrate as predicted by the system hydraulic analysis (Refer-ence 5).
Drywell-to-Wetwell o The actuation of the dry-Vacuum Breakers Open well spray depressurizes the drywell. When the dry-
! well pressure becomes 0.5 psi less than the suppres-sion pool airspace, 10 of 12 vacuum breakers are assumed to open. The other 2 valves fail to open.
Torus Vacuum Vent o The drywell and torus air-Line Butterfly space pressures continue to Valves Open decline. When the differ-ential pressure between the torus and Reactor Building exceeds the butterfly valve assumed setpoint (0.5 psi),
an' actuation signal is sent to the valves. The valves !
open in 25 seconds, which includes an initial " dead
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 28 Inadvertent Drywell Spray (Cont'd)
Event Description of Conditions and Sequence Associated Basis time" of 5 seconds (Refer-ence 8).
Wetwell to' Reactor o When the pressure in the Building Vacuum torus airspace becomes 0.5 Breakers Open psi less than the Reactor Building pressure, both vacuum breaker valves open.
I Since this event is a plant transient, and not an accident, single failure of the valves is not consistent with the plant design basis.
4 e
1 l
MULTIPLE DYNAMICS CORPORATION j l
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 i PRIMARY CONTAINMENT l NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 29 TABLE 2 l ANALYSIS INITIAL CONDITIONS Steam Design Inadvertent !
Initial Leak in Basis Drywell Condition Drywell Accident Spray Drywell Pressure (psia) 31.7 33.24 14.60 Drywell Temperature (*F) 335.0 256.0 135.0 Drywell vapor Pressure 31.696 33.24 2.537 (psia)
Torus Airspace Pressure 14.60 31.8 14.6 (psia)
( Torus Airspace Tempera- 70.0 100.0 65.0 ture (*F)
Torus Airspace vapor 0.363 0.940 0.305 Pressure (psia)
Reactor Building Temper- 65.0 65.0 65.0 ature (*F)
Reactor Building Pressure 14.69 14.69 14.69 (psia)
Torus Water Temperature 65.0 90.0 65.0
(*F)
Number of Drywell Spray 1 1 1 Loops Number of Drywell 10 10 10 Vacuum Breakers Number of Wetwell 1 1 2 Vacuum Breakers Time Step (sec) 0.5 1.0 0.1 Total Simulation Run 600 3000 50.0 Time (sec)
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l FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 30 4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS The results of the containment negative pressure analysis for the three limiting cases of initial conditions are summarized in Table 3. The complete DEPRESS output is attached tc this report. For all cases, the containment negative design pressure of
(-)2.00 psig is never violated.
The results of the Steam Leak in Drywell (SBA) case show that the drywell depressurization rate is relatively slow. The minimum drywell differential ,
pressure predicted is (-)1.37 psig. After this 01 1 minimum occurs, the vacuum breaker system continues to cycle as containment pressure stabilizes. Even assuming all noncondensibles have been removed from the drywell prior to spray activation, the SBA scenario is not the limiting case for assessing vacuum relief capability.
i The results for the Design Basis Accident (DBA) case exhibit an even slower containment depressurization {
rate. The minimum drywell pressure is predicted to l'
,}
be (-)0.99 psig, occurring 1489 seconds after spray fL initiation. The wetwell vacuum relief setpoint is attained three times during the event at 1331, 1490 ;
and 1691 seconds after spray activation. Following these short periods of makeup air flow, the containment pressures eventually stabilize. The stabilization period for this case, and that for the SBA, are artificially lengthened by the assumption a
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FERMI 2 Aucust 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 31 l
of reclosing the vacuum breakers at 0.5 psid. The drywell pressure stabilizes at a pressure (-0.88 b psig) slightly below the sum of the vacuum breaker setpoints, i.e., (-)1.00 psig.
1 The inadvertent drywell spray case provides the l limiting case for assessing containment vacuum l relief capability. The depressurization rate is relatively rapid, and a minimum drywell pressure of
(-)1.41 psig is predicted. Following this minimum, d. j the containment begins to repressurize. Although this simulation was truncated with the drywell pressure still at approximately (-)1.30 psig, no i pressure lower than the initial cinimum will be reached. Drywell pressure will c/entually stabilize near (-)1.00 psig as previously described for the SBA and DBA cases. i A limited parametric study was performed to i determine the sensitivity of the minimum containment pressure to butterfly valve opening pressure ,
setpoint and valve opening time. Since the )
inadvertent drywell spray case resulted in the most severe pressure transient as previously shown, it was chosen as the base case. Plots of the resulting minimum drywell pressures for variations in wetwell butterfly valve opening time and setpoint pressures are provided in Figures 2 and 3.
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISl'ON: 1 PAGE 32 With the setpoint pressure fixed at 0.5 psid, depressurization runs were performed for total valve opening times of 18, 32 and 50 seconds. These total opening times were proportioned into delay and actuation times similar to field test data. The minimum resulting drywell pressures as shown in Figure 2 indicate that doubling the field tested total opening time would not result in drywell pressures exceeding the design negative pressure.
With the total actuation time fixed at 25 seconds,
( depressurization runs were performed for setpoint pressures of 0.25 and 0.35 psid. The actual valve opening differential setpoint is 0.25 psid. The minimum resulting drywell pressures as shown in Figure 3 indicate a relatively large setpoint inaccuracy can be tolerated before approaching the drywell design negative pressure.
Based on the conservative yet mechanistic initial conditions established for the three possible depressurization scenarios, and the inherent conservatism of the DEPRESS model, containment pressures approaching those predicted are not likely. In addition, sensitivity studies of butterfly valve opening time and setpoint show a j significant margin available for these parameters.
l Therefore, it can be concluded that the vacuum 1
relief capability of the Fermi 2 containment is adequate with normally closed butterfly valves.
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FERMI 2 Auoust 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 33 TABLE 3 ANALYSIS RESULTS*
Steam Design Inadvertent Leak in Basis Drywell Results Drywell Accident Spray i
Minimum Differential -1.37 -0.99 -1.41 Pressure Drywell to Reactor Building (psid)
Time of Occurrence 324.0 1489.0 39.0 i After Spray Initiation (sec)
Minimum Differential -0.97 -0.80 -0.92 i Pressure Torus to i Reactor Building (psid) !
Time of Occurrence 316.0 1491.0 39.0 After Spray Initiation (see)
- For parameters and initial conditions as presented in Tables 1 and 2.
I.
I MULTIPLE DYNAMICS CORPORATION
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT .
NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 34 DRYWELL NEGATIVE DESIGN PRES 90RE
-2.00 3- -1. 8 7-E
- - - PROJECTED
'y -1. 7 5- .
- 3 ,, -
w -1. 6 2 -
E w ./
> -1. 5 0 - "I .
N O
g -1. 3 7-t 3 ,
- 1. 2 5 - -
g E
O -1.12-
- 1. 0 0 . i i : .
L^Y 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 Tl (eec)
A CU ATION 0 10 20 30 40 TIME (sec)
TOTAL OPENING 0 12.5 25.0 37.5 50.0 TIME (sec)
BUTTERFLY VALVE DIFFERENTIAL PDESSURE SETPOINT = 0.5 paid FIGURE 2 WETWELL BUTTERFLY VALVE OPENING TIME SENSITIVITY INADVERTENT DRYWELL SPRAY CASE i
i
MULTIPLE DYNAMICS CORPORATION
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FERMI 2 August 1985 DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: 1 PAGE 35 DRYWELL NEGATIVE DESIGN PRESSURE 1
-1. 8 7 -
a i
3 -1. 7 5 - ;
W - - - PROJECTED
$ -1. 6 2-
- so E
-1.50 - '
y ,-
a g -1. 3 7-0
( x
= -i. a s -
/
I
-1.12 -
-1.00 , , , , , , , , , ,
0 .1 .2 .3 4 5 .6 7 .8 .9 1.0 BUTTERFLY VALVE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SETPOINT (psid) *
~
BUTTERFLY V ALVE ACTUATION TIME = 20.0 sec BUTTERFLY VALVE DELAY TIME = 5.0 sec ]
I 1
FIGURE 3 i
WETWELL BUTTIR' FLY VALVE OPENING SETPOINT SENSITIVITY INADVERTENT DRYWELL SPRAY CASE
- - - - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - - -------_-a
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5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Fermi Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Appendix A to License No. NPF-33 dated March 1985
- 2. General Electric Report NEDO-24568, Revision 3,
" Mark I Containment Program Plant Unique' Load Definition, Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2"
- 3. Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2 PSAR, Post-OL Rev. 1, March 1985
- 4. Design Calculation D.C. 3105, Rev. None,
" Containment Vacuum Breaker Loss Coefficients" .
- 5. Design Calculation D.C. 367, Rev. J, RHR System Calculations, Item 23, RHR System Containment Spray Dynamic Loads f
- 6. Emergency Operations Procedure 29.000.03, Rev. l 4, Primary Containment Control
- 7. Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2 l Instrument List (C00-00-000-JC-003) dated April 3, 1985
- 8. Startup Field Report S.F.R. 3493
- 9. Edison File No. R2-109, R.C.I. Drawing D-4110, j i
Sheet 1 of 2, Rev. 1 l
- 10. Drawing 6C721-2305, Rev. 0
- 11. Chicago Bridge and Iron Containment Stress Report (Doc. No. T23-00-A-900-RA-003)
- 12. Drawing 6M721-3445, Rev. L, " Diagram Nitrogen Inerting and Supply System
- 13. Drawing 7M721-2709, Rev. I, " Diagram Standby Gas Treatment and Primary Containment Purge System Reactor Building" ,
i MULTIPLE DYNAMICS CORPORATION 4
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FERMI 2 August 1985- DECO-04-3336 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE ANALYSIS REVISION: .1 PAGE 37
- 15. Design Instruction No. 32,- Plant Heating System l 16. Design Calculation D.C. 523, Rev. A, "Drywell Negative Pressure Transient"
- 17. MDC Report DECO-04-2611, "Drywell Negative-Pressure Transient FORTRAN Version of Edison's Computer Program DEPRESS", Rev. 0
- 18. Energy Incorporated Draft Report,'"Enrico Fermi Unit 2 Containment Minimum Pressure Analysis",
dated February 1985 f 19. Startup Test 7.8 #20497E, Motor-Operated Valve V8-2168 dated July 3, 1984
- 20. General Electric.RHR System Process Diagram 729E623AB, Rev. 4 (File No. R1-24) 21.. Handbook of Air Conditioning Heating and Ventilating, Third Edition
- 22. MDC Meeting Notes DECO-02-3310 dated May 31, 1985 a
4 9
v h _
MULTIPLE DYNAMICS CORPORATION 29200 SOUTHFIELD ROAD, SUITE 103/SOUTHFIELD, MI 48076/(313) 557 7766 l
July 14, 1987 DECO-01 -63 3 3 The Detroit Edison Company 205 TAC 6400 N. Dixie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166 Attn Mr. A. Lim References (1 ) Detroit Edison Contract NX-274775, MDC Task 18 (2) MDC Report DECO-04-3336, " Primary Containment Negative Pressure Analysis", Revision 1 Subj ect: Impact of Potential Technical Specification Limit Increase for Containment Temperature on the Containment Negative Pressure Analysis
- 1 Dear Als Per your request, we have performed an evaluation to determine the ' f impact of a potential increase in the Technical Specification ;
limit for containment temperature on containment negative pressure l response. The inadvertent drywell spray case was the limiting j case for drywell negative pressures in the Reference (2) report j and is the only case affected by an increase in the Technical i Specification limit since it affects the initial drywell tempera- I ture used for the analysis input. This case was reanalyzed for the proposed 145'F limit for comparison with the Reference (2) j analysis for the existing 135'F limit. Vacuum breaker and l butterfly valve opening differential pressure setpoints of 0.5 j psig and a butterfly valve total opening time of 25.0 seconds were j used for the reanalysis, which correspond to the Reference (2) '
base case for an inadvertent drywell spray.
The computer output for the reanalysis is provided as an attach- '
ment to this letter. 'Drywell gauge pressure is provided in the column labeled "DPD" . The drywell negative pressure response for j the reanalysis decreases slightly over that for the Reference (2) j analysis. The minimum drywell pressure for the proposed 145'F Technical Specification limit is (-)1. 59 psig compared to (-)1. 41 psig for the existing 135'F limit. Although the minimum drywell pressure has decreased, it is still substantially higher than the containment design negative pressure of (-)2.00 psig. Ther e fo re ,
i I
_ - .)
~
Mr. A. Lim July 14, 1987 D2troit Edicen Co. DECO-01 -63 3 3 Pcgg 2 the vacuum relief capability of containment will be adequate if the Technical specification limit for containment temperature is increased to 14 5 *F.
An naditional computer run was made for the proposed 145'F containment temperature limit using a butterfly valve opening time of 50 seconds to determine if vacuum relief capability would be j eopard ized . The results of this run indicate that the minimum drywell pressure ((-)1. 81 psig) would be acceptable for this increased opening time. Drift or error in the butterfly valve differential pressure opening setpoint was considered as part of the base case run. The actual setpoint for the butterfly valves is 0.25 psig compared to the 0.5 psig setpoint assumed. However, Edison should verify that the 0.25 psig opening setpoint and 25.0 second total opening time have been implemented for the butterfly .
valves.
This reevaluation will be fully documented as part of the Reference (1) task.
If you have any questions or require additional analyses, please contact Mr. J. Lewis or me.
Yours truly,
[,/*\:paal' , J -
Daniel F. Lehnert '
Vice President DFL:pw cc: H. Kozub (DECO)
K. Hagan (MDC)
J . Lewis
7
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