ML20247D797

Order Imposing Civil Penalty in Amount of $75,000 within 30 Days

ML20247D797
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/28/1989
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	ALABAMA POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML20247D787	List: ML20247D779 ML20247D797
References
EA-88-113, NUDOCS 8903310217
Download: ML20247D797 (11)

Text

. . . . . _ - -

r, j 5 .

, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  ;

In the Matter of' Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 Farley Units 1 and 2 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 1 Dothan, Alabama EA 88-113 -ls ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY j I j Alabama Power Company, Birm:ngham, Alabama (licensee) is the holder of Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 (licenses) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Comis-sion (Comission or NRC) on June 25, 1977, and March 31, 1981, respectively.

The licenses authorize the licensee to operate the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 at Dothan Alabama, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

II NRC inspection of the licensee's activities under the licenses was conducted on February 22,1988 - March 11,1988. The results of this inspection indicated that the licelisee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated August 3,1988.

The Nctice stated the nature of the violation, the provision of the NRC's requirements that the license had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violation. The licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated October 3, 1988. In its response, the licensee denied that the violation occurred as stated and contended that the NRC staff had not provided an adequate ,

basis to justify the Notice. The licensee also requested reduction of the severity level of the violation and mitigation of the civil penalty.

8903310217 890328 PDR ADOCK 05000348 Q PDC u

_____-__-________-_A

3  :

III i

After consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanations, and argument for full nitigation of the civil penalty contained therein, the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violation occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the violation should be mitigated by 50% of the base penalty in recognition of the licentee's previous good performance in the area of plant operations.

IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (Act) 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

A The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Do'ilars ($75,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order,. by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTH: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C. 20555.

V The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as c Requent for an Enforcement ed Hehring" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcernent, i

l

~3-i

,0.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Regional Administrator, Region II,101 Marietta Street, N.W., Atlantc, Georgia 30323, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the mtter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.

In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be whether the licensee was in violation of the Comission's requirensnts as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Prnposed Iniposition of Civil Penalty, and whether, on the basis of the violation, this Order should be sustained.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS:0N

- /_-

a s M. Taylo , Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations, and Research Dated a "Rockville, Maryland thisc7 day of March 1989

d APPENDIX EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION On August 3, 1988, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Irposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was issued for a violation identifled during an Operational Performance Assessment (OPA) Inspection conducted February 22 - March 11,1988.

Alabama Power Company (APC or licensee) responded to the Notice on October 3, 1968. In its response, the licensee denied the violation as stated in the Notice. The licensee asserted that although there was hydrogen gas trapped in the A train charging pump suction line from the RHR pump to the charging pump, its associated flow path was operable in the recirculation mode. Additionally, the licensee asserted that if the staff concluded that the violation occurred, it should merit no more than a Severity Level IV violation. The licensee also stated that since prou:pt corrective action was taken, mitigation of the base civil penalty is appropriate.

Restatement of the Violation Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires that two independent emergency core cooling system (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE in Modes 1, 2, an6 3, with each subsystem comprised of, in part, one OPERABLE centrifugal charg.ng pump and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the .

containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation. OPERABLE is  :

defined by Technical Specification 1.18,as, in part, " capable of performing its specified functions."

l The functions of the charging pumps as high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps are delineated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). FSAR Chapter 6, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Section 6.3.2.2.7, System Operation, paragraph B, Recirculation Mode, states, "[a] portion of each one of the RHR pump's dfscharge flow would be used to provide suction to two operating charging pumps

( which would also deliver directly to the RCS cold legs," and, "[this] mode of operation assures flow in the event the depressurization proceeds more slowly so that the reactor coolant system pressure is still in excess of the shutoff head of the residual heat removal pumps at the onset of recirculation."

Contrary to the above, the licensee operated the reactors in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and failed to maintain two independent ECCS subsystems OPERABLE as defined in Technical Specification 3.5.2 and FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.7 because the "A" train ECCS subsystems on Units 1 and 2 were rendered inoperable for use in the l recirculation mode due to the presence of substantial amounts of hydrogen gas in the crossover piping from the RHR pumps to the centrifugal charging pump suctions. Specifically, on February 26, 1988, approximately 56 cubic feet of l hydrogen gas was discovered in the crossover piping of Unit 1, and on February 29, 1988, approximately 40 cubic feet of hydrogen gas was discovered in the crossover piping of Unit 2.

Summary of Licensee's Response of Violation A. The licensee denied the alleged violation occurred. APC contended that it has determined through engineering evaluation and consultation that such a condition would not cause catastrophic failure of the pump.

L .

Appendix ,

The licensee stated that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), for -

purposes of Technical Specification 3/4.5.2, was operable. The licensee relied on a statement made in a Westinghouse evaluation enclosed with.the licensee response, that surveillar.ce. requirement 4.5.2.1 requires HHS1 Single Pump Flow greater than or equal to 193 gpm (each injection line).

It was Westinghouse's position that this flow ratc applico only to flow requirements during the injection phase and does not address' flow require-ments during recirculation. The licensee claimed that a recent evaluation has shown that the 56; cubic feet of. trapped gas discovered in the Unit 1 Train A suction line and the 40 cubic feet in Unit 2 Train A suction'line would not have caused the destruction of the pump in either unit prior to the gas being completely pumped out of the system. In addition, pump _ tests:

on similar pumps at Palo Verde and 4 fossil plant confirmed that this type of pump can operate unoer similar concitions for at least several minutes without pump damage. The licensee's evaluation concluded that, although the pump may stall, the system will reflood the pump suction in a relatively short period of time, est1 mated to be less than 13 seconds.

Even assuming that the charging pump failed to celiver its full capacity flow, the licensee's analysis of reactor coolant system conditions at the time of switchover to recirculation concluded that full capacity flow as dictated by the initial injection was unnecessary during the subsequent recirculation phase.

The Westinghouse evaluation states that, "Given the systems evaluation and assuming the pump continues to operate, Westinghouse has cencluded that the hydrogen gas is not capable of degrading HH511 low for a long enough time to result in core uncover. Therefore, more than adequate HHSI flow would be available."

B. The licensee also stated that the alleged deficiency does not warrant escalated enforcement because it lacks requisite safety significance.

'Its Emergency Event Procedures and operator training would have guided operators to assure adequate core cooling with or without HHS1 pumps.

Switchever to the recirculation mode is performed well into the accioent aftcr decay heat has lessened; therefor 7, time is not a critict.1 factor and procedural guidance specifies manual operator actions.

The licensee's operating procedures are based on and consistent with NRC-approved Westinghouse Owner's Grcup guidelines, and are provided with specific instructions for cooldchh oepressurization of the RCS both with and without HHSI pumps.

C. The licensee argued that it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of hydrogen accumulation in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) line. The licensee summarized the incidents since 1979 to the present in which gas accumulation ut the charging pumps was identified and provided arguments to support the position that it acted responsibly in addressing the various problems with hydrogen accumulation. Additionally, the licensee stated that in September 1980, the NRC reviewed a wealth of documents essociated with the charging pump issues and did not identify hydiogen I accumulation as a potential issue. Finally, the licensee claimed that the

____ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - _ -)

, q

, Appendix "

NRC. staff's use of the term " stripping"'in the Notice is based on hindsight, although it is currently believed to be the. primary source of the accumu-lating hydrogen. . The licensee went on to state that it is hypothesized that some hydrogen could be desorbed at localized. sites and become-  !

entrained in the fluid. As the entrained hydrogen flows through the

. charging' pump supply piping, it collects at the system high points, such as the 2B charging pump suction. piping or the Train A RHR to charging-pump suction piping, or is pumped through the charging pump where it is forced into solution by the large pressure increase.-

APC asserted it did not know, nor does it now know, the source of the j hydrogen accumulating in the 2B charging pump suction piping. The licensee's only conclusion was that once it is there, buoyancy will cause it to ' I accumulate in the high point of the 2B charging pump suction. It was not ,

until after gas was' discovered.in the Train A RHR line that speculation developed that localized pressure effects at various locations in the suction system could cause some hydrogen to desorb, thereby suggesting that accumulations would not be unique to the 2B charging pump.

NRC Evaluation The evaluation performed by the licensee was based upon consultation with pump experts, inferences from performance of pumps (not the Farley HHSI pumps) with gases present in their suction lines, and a qualitative assessment of system

-performance. The licensee concluded that the pumps would be capable of running although' intermittent stalling or oscillatory pump behavior would result. While

_ the pumps may perform as the. licensee claimed, there have also'been instances where gas binding has rendered' pumps inoperable (

Reference:

IE Information Notice 83-77 1983.}."AirGasEntrainmentEventsResultinginSystemFailures"datedNovember14, A assumed adequate pump lubrication would be maintained and postulated gas behavior within the piping and pump which was not adequately substantiated. Actual pump behavior under the described conditions is highly dependent on the specific pump and system and therefore must be considered on a case-by-case basis. As stated earlier the system may have responded as the licensee postulated, however, that has not been conclusively demonstrated as discussed above. Therefore, given-the licensee's inconclusive and untimely (after-the-fact) operability determination of pump operation in a condition clearly outside the approved licensing basis, the NRC concludes that the system operability was not assured and lacking such assurance the system was appropriately described as inoperable.

The licensee also indicated that the surveillance requirement 4.5.2.1 which requires HHSI single pump flow of greater than or equal to 193 gpm (each injection-line) does not apply during recirculation. While it can be argued .

that reduced flow rates are acceptable during the recirculation phase, it is  !

required that the surveillance flow rate requirements be met for all system lineups unless the provision is amended to specifically allow a reduced flow rate.

The licensee went on to assert that the alleged violation did not warrant escalated enforcement action because the as-founo condition lacked the requisite safety significance given the availability of traiaed operators and emergency procedures. Reliance on procedures and operator training as a basis for reducing the safety significance of a loss of a safety system or sub-system o

4

t. .

e Appendix ,

is' inappropriate. Such contingencies for responding to off-normal events are

' used to mitigate.the consequences of events in which required equipment is )

' unavailable. = However, they are not a substitute for assuring required equipment is operable during normal: operations. Maintaining the operability of required l safety systems or sub-systems and following technical specification action requirements form the minimum level of plant readiness required by technical specifications. The failure to have a portion of the ECCS system available, as defined by technical specifications, for the recirculation mode is a significant regulatory. concern.

With regard to the~ licensee's arguments concerning the NRC staff's use of the word " stripping" and the NRC staff's supposed use of hindsight, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has apparently misconstrued the NRC staff's concern relating to this violation. In this case an enforcement action was proposed because the licensee did not adequately pursue indications of a hydrogen accumulation problem-in safety-related piping and not because the licensee failed to recognize the specific mechanism that caused the hydrogen accumulations.

In addressing the issue of whether APC should have associated the problem of

~

hydrogen accumulation in the charging pump suction piping with the potential accumulation of hydrogen;in other piping locations, the chronology has been reviewed. The November 1979, Operating Change Request, the June 1981 Production Change Request, the APC ano vendor letters of August 7, 1981, April 15 and 28, 1982, June 11 and 28, 1982, and the March 1987 1A charging pump experience all identifieo hydrogen accumulation or proposed solutions. Specific conditions were postulated, specific solutions were proposed and continuing gas accumulation problems were experienced without adopting corrective actions based up'on an engineering analysis. Apparently, a management decision was made to live'with" this condition. As discussed in the Notice, a thorough engineering analysis at any of several chronological decision points could have identified the full extent of the hydrogen accumulation problem.

Sunmary of Licensee Request for Mitigation APC concluded that because the hydrogen accumulation phenomenon was discovered, reported,' and prompt and extensive corrective action was taken, full mitigation of the civil penalty is warranted. The licensee argued that escalation of the civil penalty because of the failure to act on available information concerning the occurrence of gas generation'and its potential accumulation in the crossover piping is inappropriate, because APC neither knew nor should have known of the accumulation of hydrogen in the Train A RHR loop. In support of that argument the licensee provided a detailea analysis of the various incidents related to hydrogen accumulation as well as information provided by the originator of the initial problem report. That information was provided to show that the author cid not envision hydrogen accumulation as a widespread problem.

The licensee argued that mitigation of the civil penalty is warranted based on the following. *

a. Prompt Identification and Reporting - Once the existence of the accumula-tion of gas was originally recognized on March 1,1988, the Resident Inspector was promptly alerted. APC also notified the industry of its finding, and significant research into the effects was performeo and provided in a detailed LER.

U. -

Lf * -

[ ,

. Appendix b. Prompt and Extensive Corrective Actions - Upon discovery on March 1,1988, APC promptly instituted corrective actions that remedied the problem, implementing a periodic venting program on both units to minimize the

(,utrtity of hydrogen allowed to accumulate.

NRC Evaluation APC documentation first recorded the potential for gas accumulation in the HHSI system in Operating Change Request (OCR) 2-3154 dated November 6,1979. Contrary to the licensee's assertion, that document does, by a reasonable reading, raise M0stions dbout the poter.tibi for hydrogen accumulation in other areas including the crossover piping. It is the NRC staff's position that the intui t. tion provided by the author of the OCR for the licensee's response to the Notice is not extremely relevant to the issue under consideration given that when the OCR was originiateo that individual was merely identifying a conditior, speculating on the cause and suggesting a possible remeoy. It was the licensee's responsi-bility to fully evaluate the documented condition including the possible effect on the crossover piping regardless of whether that was the duthor's primary concern.

The licensee asserted that an adequate evaluation of the problem was accomplished and that all credible indications pointed only to a problem with hydrogen accumu-lation on the suction of the 2B charging pump. The licensee supported that position, in part, by pointing out that an NRC ir,spection of the charging system during the time period in question did not raise any question about hydrogen accumulation. The NRC staff concludes that all the facts do not support the licensee's conclusion. First, the licensee's rejection of the OCR's " potential problem . . . during safety injection" statement was apparently never specifically supported. Additionally, the change proposed by Westinghouse to preclude gas accumulation on Unit 2 proposed some type of venting arrangement for all the charging pumps rather than just the 2B charging pump suggesting that the problem may not have been just a problem with one pump as the licensee had concluded.

It should be noted that the decision not to incorporate the proposed modification was essentially a management cecision without a thorough engineering analysis or plant safety committee review. Further, in 1987 when the gas accumulation occurred at the suction of the 1A charging pump, the plant staff should have more thoroughly investigated that occurrence given the history of such problems

u. Lnit 2 ano the torSeny's conclusion that gas accumulation was testricted to the 2B charging pump. The NRC staff concludes that the explanation of the Unit 1 problem also shoblo have been subject to additional evaluation. By concluding that a failed regulator caused the problem, the licensee was in effect concluding that a pressure drop within the rctnial operating pressure range of the VCT would cause a significant hydrogen accumulation which though possible, does not appear likely. Finally, the NRC staff acknowledges that an inspection of the charging system was accomplished but it was narrowly focused on the charging pump sh4Tt failures er.c should not have reasonably led the licensee to have concludct' that the NRC considered and accepted the licensee's position on hydrogen accumulation.

In summary, the NRC staff concluu s thut the licenses had a reosunabic opportunity in 1979 to discover the fuii extent of the hydrogen accumulation problem.

Furtkr, once the problem was discovered by the licensee on Unit 1 on February 6, 1988 the licensee did not check Unit 2 (the unit that in the licensee's judgment was potentially susceptible to hydrogen problems) for the same condition until

t .

• ~

. ~ Appendix February 29, 1988. Therefore, despite the fact that the licensee did ultimately discover and report the problem, no mitigation for prompt identification and reporting is warranted. Additionally, given the other opportunities the licensee j had to discover and correct the problem, any mitigation that may have been '

appropriate for the corrective actions taken by the licensee was more than offset by the duration of the violation and the licensee's failure to' assess the overall significance of the various indications of hydrogen accumulation that were available. This resulted in escalation of the base penalty by 100%

to $100,000. The NRC has-reassessed the other escalation and mitigation factors and determined that the proposed civil penalty should be mitigated by 50% of the base penalty in recognition of the licensee's overall good performance in the area of plant operations resulting in a penalty of $75,000.

NRC Conclusion The NRC staff maintains that the "A" train ECCS subsystems on Units 1 and 2 were rendered inoperable for use in the recirculation mode due to the presence of substantial amounts of hydrogen gas in the crossover piping from the RHR pumps. The loss of a safety system or subsystem by definition. is a significant regulatory concern. The staff also concludes that a more thorough engineering evaluation of the specific recommendations ) resented as well as further examina-tion of the continuing gas problem at the c1arging pumps' suctions would have revealed the full extent of the hydrogen accumulation problem and the potential effect upon safety-related equipment. For the above reasons, the NRC staff concludes that the violation occurred as stated and was properly categorized.

Af ter reconsidering the escalation and mitigation factors, the NRC staff is mitigating the penalty by 50% of the base penalty for good performance in the crea of plant operations. Consequently, a civil penalty in the amount of

$75,000 should be imposed.

-.e

'~" -

, MAR 281989-

' Alabama Power Company DISTRIBUTION:

NRC Resident' Inspector :

DRS Technical Assistant E. Reeves, Project Manager, NRR DCS PDR-LPDR SECY CA-HThompson, DEDS SEbneter, RII JLieberman, OE JLuehman, OE FIngram, PA .

Enforcement Coordinators RI,'RII, RIII, RIV, RV-TMurley, NRR

'BHayes, 01 EJordan, AE0D FHerr, 01A EA File

Day File GJohnson, RM See previous concurrence 1 OE* RII* OGC*

[ 3/2 OE:D* h.

JLuehman MErnst LChandler JLieberman J Llylor

-2/27/89 2/28/89 3/2/89 3/3/89 3 g/89 r

-l

b j r. -

MAR 281989-

p. . . i iAlabama Power Company.-

! DISTRIBir(ION:

NRC Resident Inspector '

DRS Technical. Assistant.

E. Reeves, Project Manager, NRR "

DCS PDR LPDR.

-SECY CA . -

.HThompson, DEDS h ke0NNn bE  !'

JLuehman, OE.

FIngram, PA i- Enforcement Coordinators- 1 RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV .j TMurley, NRR ,

BHayes 01

-EJordan, AEOD FHerr, 0IA EA File Day._ File

i. ;

I l

p..

p

?fiAY y  :

0 R .0GC 0 DED R i JLu hman MErns LChandler l'erman JTaylor .l 2/f/ /89' 2/gf/89 $/v'/89, 3 /89 3/ /89 I i

L ,

1

(

\

l

__ - - - - - - - - _ - - _ _ . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ - - - - _ -- _ --- .--____ -- ------ -----_-- _ ___ _ ---_ ---- _ --_-----_- _ _ _ -_- J