ML20056B379
| ML20056B379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1990 |
| From: | Sniezek J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056B373 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-88-040, EA-88-40, GL-88-07, GL-88-7, NUDOCS 9008280200 | |
| Download: ML20056B379 (51) | |
Text
,7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
-In the Matter of Alabama Power Company Docket Nos.
50-348 and 50-364 Joseph M. Farley_ Nuclear Plant _
License Nos.
NPF-2 and NPF-8 Units-1 and 2 EA 88-40 i2 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY.
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1AlabamaPowerCompany, Birmingham, Alabama (APCoorlicensee)istheholder i
of Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 (licenses) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Comission or NRC) on June 25, 1977 and March 31, 1981, respectively.-- The licenses authorize the licensee to operate the Joseph'M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 located near Dothan, Alabama
'in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II NRC inspections of the licensee's activities under the licenses were conducted on September 14-18, 1987, November 2-6, anu November 16-20, 1987. The results of these inspections indicate'd that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of L
Violation ~and Proposed Imposition-of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated August 15, 1988. The Notice reflected application of the " Modified Enforcement Policy Relating to 10 CFR 50.4f, ' Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power l
Plants" (Modified Policy) enclosed with Generic Letter 88-07 (April 7,1988).
The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provision of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty L
proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the Notice by letter
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- dated November 14', l'988'..In its response, the licensee denied all but two of' theviol5tionsand'contendedthat'theNoticeofViolationandProposedImposition of Civil Penalty should be dismissed or that the proposed civil penalty should be fully l mitigated.-
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After cens'ideration of the licensee's response and the statements'of fact, explanations, and argument for full mitigation containeditherein, the Deputy d
Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations,.and D
Research.has determined that, as set forth in Appendix A to this Order, the violations occurred as stated, the Modified Policy was properly applied, th'e-violations were properly classified as a Category A' problem under the Modified Policy, and the escalation and mitigation factors of the Modified Policy wer'e.
- properly applied to -the base civil penalty. - Accordingly, a. civil penalty of
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.$450,000 should be imposed.
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'In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act -
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of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2282 (Act), and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Four Hundred Fifty j
ThousandDollars($450,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order,
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by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555.
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The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a Request for an Enforcement Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, 4
D.C.
20555, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555;.
the Regional Administrator, Region II, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323; and to the NRC Resident Inspector, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing.
If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings.
If payment has not been made by that-time, the matter may be referred to the U.S. Attorney General for collection.
a In the' event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
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(a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Consission's requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil
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Penalty referenced in Section II above, and i
(b) whether, on the basis of such violations, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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%,a14 4m, yOsmesH.Sniezek j
(feputyExecutiveDirectorfor Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations, and Research i
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this.2 ) *3 day of August 19?O 0
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o' APPENDIX A On August 15, 1988, the NRC staff issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed linposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) to Alabama Power Company (APCo or licensee) for failure to qualify elactrical equipnent in.portant to safety as required by 10 CFR 50.49. The Notice identified three violations with eight exas.ples, identified as I.A.1, I.A.2 I.B.1, I.B.2, I.C.1, I.C.2, I.C.3, and I.C.4, a
which were judged to be significant and marranting escal6ted enforcenent under I
the
- Modified Enforcement Policy Reitting to 10 CFR 50.49, Environnental Qualification (EQ) of Electrical Equipment licportant to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" (Modified Policy) enclosed with Generic Letter (GL) 88-07 (April 7,1988). One additional violation was cl6ssified in the Severity Level IV category (Violation II), for which no civil penalty was proposed.
APCo responded to the Notice in a letter dated Noveiaber 14, 1966.
In this reply and answer to the Notice, t
- denied all the violations except for two items of Violation I.C.I.
In a lon, APCo argued that (1) the Modified Policy is legally deficient; (1, che Notice fails to apply the Modified Policy properly; (3) enforcement is not warranted because the ' clearly shoulo bave known* test set forth in the Modifieo Policy was not met; (4) the NRC staff incorrectly classified the violations as significant; anc, (5) the Notice does not appropriately apply tht mitigation and escalation factors. Thus APCo sought
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eitherwithdrawaloftheNoticeorfullmitigationofthecivilpnalty. The NRC staff's evaluations and conclusions regarding the licensee's response, including a restatement of each violation and a sumary of the liter.see's positions on each issue follow.
PART I - DISCUSSION OF GENCEAL HATTERS F. ELATED TO THE MODIFIED POLICY Attachnent 1.Section II.A and Attachment 2. Section III: The Modified Policy 15 Legally Deficient.
~.Section III.A: The Modified Policy Fails to Consider the Safety significance of any EQ violations.
Attachn.ent 2.Section III.B: The Modified Policy was not Properly Promulgated.,Section V.F: The Staff's Assessment of the EQ Violation Category was Flawed.
The licensee contended that the Modified Policy is contrary to Comission policy and practice and fails to consider sufficiently the safety signifi-cance of any alleged EQ deficiency. The licensee has therefore taken the position that "the hodified Enforcement Policy is legally flawed and any action pursuant to it shculd be set aside."
1he licensee argued that (1) the NRC staff n.ust consider actual safety significance to set the severity level of a violation and to essess civil penalties} and in failing to do so, improperly categorized these viola-tions;(2 the NRC staff errs in declining to consider additional informa-tion regarding the qualification of equipment obtained or developed after
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.,a c-Appendix A an inspection; (3) the NRC staff was required to use notice and comunent rulemating procedures to adopt tht: l'cdificc Folicy; and (4) the effects of the f odified Policy are retrot.ctive, and not prospective.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachoent 1.Section II.A and Attachment 2, Section Ill,Section III.A. Section Ill.E. and Section V.F j
The licensee orgoed that the NRC staff r.ust consiotr cctual safety significance item-by-item to set the severity level of a violaticn and to assess civil penaltits. However the Consission in promulgating 10 CFR I
50.49 determined that a licenset s failure to d aonstrate the environmental qualification of electrical ecuipn4nt in>portant to safety was a significant safety m.atter.
In the area of environmental qualification, a licensee's iriability to present doccu.ented knowledge of whether equipment important to safety is capable of operating in a harsh environnient indicates that the licensee cannot predict whether such equipment will operate in the event of an accident in which it is called upon to perform its intended i
safety function. Accordingly, a licensee who lacks such knowledge cannot assure prottction of the public health and safety in the event of an i
accident resulting in a harth environnent.
The environnental qualification regulations require licensees to qualify each item of electrical equipn.ent important to safety.
The regulations l
further require each licensee to list cach item of electrical equipment important to safety on a master list. All such listed items, by defini-tion, perform in.portant safety functicns.
Thus, safety significance is inherent with respect to each item on the list or each iten, that should be on the list.
In this case, all the electrical equipn4nt fcr which the NRC staff found violations was inportant to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b).
As explained in the Modified Policy, the Cornission has aggregated indivioual violations of 10 CFR 50.4g to determine the extensiveness of the qualification probleni represented by those individual violations in order to assess a civil penalty. The Conaission developed Categories A, B, and C based on the extensiveness of the violations, which reflect the overall pervasiveness and general safety significance of the significant EQ violations.
In instances where a licensee con.n.itted isolated individual violations, the licensee could not assure the operation during an accident of a limited number of systems affected by the isolated individual viola-tions. Because a sn.all number of safety systems or components could fail during an accident as a result, such violations are classified as Category C.
If the violaticns affected a moderate number of systems, the violations would be more significant than those in Category C because the licensee could not ensure that a correspondingly greater nunber of systems would operate in the event of an accident. Accordingly, the likelihood that an accident could endanger public health and safety would be increased and i
Appendix A such violations are classified as Category B.
An extensive problem would be most significant because the licensee s lack of knowledge of equipment qualification would extend to many systems and the licensee would be unable to assure that these systems would perform their intended functions in an accident resulting in a harsh environment. Therefore, such violations are classified as Category A.
In summary, while this method does not consider the specific effects of the postulated failure of each unqualified item of electrical important to safety, it does provide an appropriate measure of the safety significance of environmental qualification violations.
In this case, the licensee properly classified many components as important to safety as required by 10 CFR 50.49 but, as specifically described below, failed to have adequate documentation to support qualification of some of those components. Additionally, as described below, the licensee failed to classify other electrical components as important to safety and there-fore did not demonstrate whether these components would function as required. Because the licensee failed to qualify many electrical compo-nents important to safety, which affected many systems, the licensee could not assure that these components and systems would function if called upon to do so, and thus committed a significant safety violation, which the NRC staff properly classified as Category A.
As an example of the NRC staff's alleged failure to consider actual safety significance, the licensee argued that the violation is not safety signifi-cant if the unqualified component would have been qualified had the licensee performed the appropriate analysis or collected the appropriate data before the deadline given in 10 CFR 50.49. The NRC staff rejects this argument. As stated above, the licensee's failure to provide assur-ance prior to the deadline that the electrical equipment important to safety was qualified is a safety significant violation. The NRC staff requires licensees to have detailed knowledge of the quality of installed electrical equipment important to safety in the plant to ensure that licensees have a technically sound basis for making assessments of plant safety. While the licensee's action to qualify equipment after the discovery of the violations is important corrective action, which the NRC staff considers in deciding whether to take further enforcement action, including assessing further civil penalties, the licensee's performance of new analysis or collection of new data that yield fortuitously positive results does not affect the licensee's prior lack of knowledge. Neither the licensee nor the NRC staff could have known in advance whether the new analysis or data would indicate that such equipment would function when called upon to do so during an accident resulting in a harsh environment.
The regulations required a licensee to know whether electrical equipment important to safety would function as intended during and following a design basis event before operating its nuclear reactor after November 30, 1985.
In this case, the licensee's failure to qualify electrical equipment important to safoty, and its consequent lack of knowledge concerning that equipment, resulted in the licensee's inability to assure that such equip-ment would function in the event of an accident, which is a significant safety violation.
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Appendix 4-The licensee also argued that the NRC staff erred in ceclining to consider additional information Jegarding the qualification of equipent obtained or developed after an itspection. As stated above, the NRC staff rejects this argument because 10 CFR 50.49 requires that the licensee have advance knowledge that its equipsent is qualified. Favorable information cleveloped after identification rf a violation does not reduce the significance of the
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preexisting lack of knowledge concerning equiment qualification. The only exceptions to this rule incluce cases in whic1 a documentation deficiency is essentially ou of a minor nature which is readily correctable based on knowledge, tests: or analyses that existed prior to the qualification deadline and was then readily available to the licensee. The NRC staff j
would consider such violations as Severity Level IV or V.
Accoroingly, i
the licensee was incorrect in assertit.g that the NRC staff erred by failing to consider additional test cata or analyses, whether already existing or developed after identification of the violations.
In this case, the licensee failed to have sufficient documentation, including adequate analyses, in qualification files prior to November 30, 1985, to support the environnental qualification of equips,ent important to safety affecting many systems and components. Moreover, the licensee could not have corrected the deficient files prior to the deadline because it did not have information, tests, or analyses available in any location that would demonstrate qualification. This is discussed in detail in j
other sections of this Appendix.
The licensee argued that the NRC staff was required to use rulemaking notice and coment procedures to adopt the Modified Policy. The Modified Policy is not a rule or regulation and, therefore, the Acniinistrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking requirerents, including the notice and coasnent provisions, do not apply. The Comission's " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcerent Actions," 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C (General Enforcenent Policy), provides general guidance cn how the Comission intends to achieve the purposes set forth in it, namely, to promote and protect the health and safety of the public from radiological lazards. The General Enforcement Policy itself states, "this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Comission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure an is appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case." The Comission has consistently taken this position since the proposed interim General Enforcement Policy was first published l
in October 1980. The General Enforcement Policy clearly allows such F
deviations, and the Comission need not promulgate a rule to do so. The Modified Policy sets forth how the Comission has deviated from the General Enforcement Policy in the context of environmental qualification violations existing af ter the Novenber 30, 1985 deadline. Accordingly, neither the APA nor any other statute required the Comission to promulgate the Modified Policy or any other policy staterent by using rulemaking notice and coment procedures.
I The licensee argued further that the effects of the Modified Policy are retroactive, and not prcspective. With respect to this argument, the licensee contended it did not have prior notice of how the NRC was going
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Appendix A l to exercise its enforcement discretion in environmental c,ualification cases. However, on August 6,1985, the NRC's Director of Licensing sent Generic Letter (GL) 85-15 to all licensees of operating reactors informing them of how the Cor.saission intended to exercise its enforcement discretion, in accordance with the General Enforcen.ent Policy, in response to viola-
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tions of 10 CFR 50.49. Thus, on August 6, 1985, well before the 10 CFR 50.49 deadline of November 30, 1985, the Consiission informed licensees that i
violations of environmental qualification requirements would be dealt with i
differently from most other violations.
Furthermore, GL 85-15 stated that the NRC staff would impose daily civil penalties for any unqualified item i
of electrical equipment and that such an ites is unqualified if there is j
not acec,uate documentation to establish that it will perform its intended safety functions in the relevant environment. GL 85-15 prospectively gave notice that the Connissior, would treat every individual violation of 10 CFR 1
50.49 as safety significant. Additionally, insofar as application of the i
Nco1fied Policy would lower the amount of civil penalties proposed for violations of 10 CFR 50.49 occurring prior to November 30, 1985, which is the general case, a licensee cannot claim that the Modified Policy prejudices it.
Section 11.8, and Attachment 2, Section IV: The Notice
[a,i,ls to Apply the bodified Folicy Properly.
j The licensee contended that the hotice issbed by the NRC staff is deficient in the application of the Modified Policy in that: (1) the Notice fails to articulate citarly anc concisely a suificient f tctual basis for its conclu-sion that the licensee clearly shoulo hase known of the alleged violations; l
(2) such basis cannot be develt d; (3) if (.onsideration of APCo actions were to be based on the state of kncwledge that existed in the industry in Novenber 1985, the proposec siolaticos wculd be unsupported; (4) the Notice L
fails to consider technical sitions pcviously acce;ted by the NRC staff and now niodifies those positions without performing tie requisite backfit chalysis; and (5) the Notice fails to consider the licensee's legitin. ate l
exercise ci engineering judsnient.
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liRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachn.ent 1.Section II.B, I
cnd Attachuent 2,Section IV The NRC staff disagrees with the licensee's contentions and concludes that the Notice provided to the licensee was consistent with the Modified Policy.
In sunmary, and as further discussed in later sections, the NRC i
staff described the basis for its conclusion that the licensee clearly shculd have known of the EQ deficiencies in the cover letter transmitting the Notice to the licensee.
In addition, the NRC staff considered the industry's state of knowledge and the NRC staff's past technical positions l
prior to Noveniber 1985, anc n.aintains the conclusion that the licensee L
clearly should have known of the EQ deficiencies.
Further, the NRC staff considered the licensee's use of undocunented engineering judgment, but also considered the requirenents of 10 CFR 50.49 which specify that a record of qualification be maintained in an auditable form. Undocuniented engineering jud9nent is not auditable. As described in detail in the following sections, the NRC staff believes that it has applied the flodified Policy properly and that the violations have been properly categorized.
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Appendix A '
'.Section IV.A: The Notice of Violation Fails to Establish.
In Accordance with Section II of the Modified PolTcy. That Alabama Power Company " Clearly Should Have Known" of the Alleged Violations.
The licensee contended that the Counission directed the NRC staff to take enforcement action under the Modified Policy only if a licenset clearly r
should have known that it was not in compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 by November 30, 1985, and that the Notice failed to establish that the licensee clearly should have known of the alleged violations.
In addition, the licensee contended that the HEC staff wcs to balance the four factors described in GL 86-15 and GL 88-07 for each violation to determine if the.
- clearly should have known" stancard was tret. The licensee argued that the Notice failed to include a specific analysis of the four factors and the factors relied upon to concluce that the " clearly should have known" criterion had been met. The licensee concluded, therefore, that the htC staff's action is contrary to law and violates the spirit of the General Enforcement Policy.
The licensee further contended that the NRC staff must recognize the evolving nature of EQ knowledge and that knowledge developed after the deadline should not serve as a basis for enforcement action.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 2.Section IV.A The NRC staff, in the context of apslying the Modified Policy, agrees that the licensee should be provided wit 1 sufficient information regarding the staff's finding that it clearly should have known of the unqualified equip-rcent to provide the licensee with an opportunity to contest that finding.
The NkC statf agre n that, in neral, a licensee's knowledge of the L
requiresent alone might be insufficient to satisfy this test, as would the mere recitation that a licensee " clearly should have kncwn" of a problem.
Several steps have been taken so as to provide the licensee with the appro-priate infors.ation.
First, the Modified Policy was made available to tie licensee, which describes how the test n.ay be satisfied. Second, the NRC inspection report, which was sent to the licensee before the enforcement conference, ano upon which the enforcement action is based, docunents the NRC staff's findings that formed the basis for the " clearly should have l
known" conclusion. Third, an enforceraer.t conference was held prior to issuance of the Notice at which each finding was discussed in detail.
Finally, the NRC staff articulated in the cover letter which transmitted l
the Notice the reasons why it believes the licensee clearly shculd have known of the EQ deficiencies.
In the cover letter the NRC staff has high-lighted the significant facts supporting the staff's conclusion. The NRC staff disagrees that the cover letter's explanation of the staff's basis for the conclusion n.ust be exhaustive and incluce discussion of all facts and 1 actors considered. The HEC sta4 's approach is consistent with the apprccch taken undcr the General Enforcement Policy whenever the NRC staff nakes certain judgments in detersiining the severity level of a violation, applying the escalation or mitigation factors to a base civil penalty amount, or detemining the degree of willfulness surrounding a violation.
i Io Appendix A In those ',ases, the NRC staff provides the licensee with notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The cpportunities for the licensee to i
more fully explore the NRC staff's basis include a reply to the inspection 1
report, discussions during the enforcement ccnference, a formal reply to the hetice, and a forn.al reply to the Order imposing the civil penalty requesting a, hearing.
The NRC staff rejects the licensee's position that the NRC staff has to
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balance the factors in deciding whether the licensee clearly should have known of the lack cf proper enviror. mental qualification before the dead-line. The Modifiec Folicy states that the NRC staff will examine the i
circumstances in each case to determine whether the licensee clearly should have known that its equipu nt was not qualified. The factors set forth in the Modified Policy sinply include the types of information the NRC staff will consider in examining the circumstances of each case.
If one factor demonstrates that the licensee clearly should have had the required know-ledge, the absence of facts under the other factors to demonstrate that knowledge does not negate the NRC staff's finding. The NRC staff does consider all available information and circumstances in making its finding, including extenuating factors that would prevent a licensee from knowing that it had urqualified equipnent where otherwise the licensee clearly should have known of the deficiencies before the deadline.
However, the Modified Policy does not instruct the NRC staff to balance factors that do l
i not cenionstrate that the licensee clearly should have known of unqualified equipment against those that do, nor is there any reason to do so. Accor-dingly, the NRC staff does not balance the factors listed in the Modified Policy to-decide if the licensee clearly should have known that it had not qualified electrical equipment important to safety, but examines the totality of the circumstances for facts that demonstrate that the licensee clearly should have had the knowledge. A specific discussion of the NRC staff's bases for concluding that the licensee clearly should have known of each violation is provided herein.
-The licensee further contended that the NRC staff must recognize the evolving nature of EQ knowledge and that knowledge developed after the
. deadline should not serve as a basis for enforcement action. The NRC staff agrees, and in making a determination of whether the licensee clearly should have known of an EQ deficiency, the NRC staff considers whether the nature of the issue was an evolutionary process or whether sufficient knowledge was available prior to the EQ deadline to conclude j
that the licensee clearly should have known of the deficiency. The NRC staff exercised careful judgment in reviewing the state of knowledge which existed in the industry prior to the November 30, 1985 deadline and based its findings only on information available prior to the deadline.,Section IV.B: The Notice of Violation is Fundamentally Flawed in that the Staff has f ailed to Adhere to Consnission Requirements Applicable to Changes to NRC Staff Positions.
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o Appendix A The licensee contended that in some of the alleged violations the NRC staff has proposed ci on what is nece,tations which are based on new or changed staff positions sscry to demonstrate qualification due to evolving or more detailed EQ requiresents. The licensee argued that enforcenent action is inappropriate where the licensee's position has been presented to the NRC staff and the staff did not ccseiunicate its lack of acceptance of the position in a timely manner. Similarly, the licensee argues that once the-NRC staff has accepted qualification of a particular item or a licensee's position in the hRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER), any new position on what is necessary to demonstrate qualification should be addressed as a backfit issue.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment ?,Section IV.B The NRC staff agrees that a change in position on a particular EQ issue from those positions previously accepted should not be considered for enforcemer.t action. however, this principle cannot be construed so broadly as to encon. pass broad a> proval of a licensee's EQ program plan. A program to qualify equipment ac11 eves its goals only to the extent a licensee implements it;_ the NRC staff's acceptance of a licensee's proposed prograr.
approach does not mean acceptance of each and every ccmponent on the EQ master list.
The NRC staff specifically stated in SERs that the impluien-tation of the licensee's EQ program would be subject to future inspections.
The NRC staff recognizes that the specific approval of a particular item or coa.ponent would weigh in the licensee's favor in the evaluation of whether the licensee c1carly should have known of the EQ deficiency, but in this case the licensee has not demonstrated that the NRC specifically accepted any of the equipnient configurations identified in the Notice.
Additionally, other factors would also be considered, such as whether there was 6 change in the underlying basis of the NRC staff's ccceptence due to the licensee's mistakes, including improper installation of the ccnoonent causing the qualification to be invalid, which the NRC staff would 1 ave no reaschable op)ortunity to identify withcut doing an inspection. NRC staff approval of t1e licensee's proposed approach to the solution of a problem
-cces not constitute NRC staff approval of the licensee's actual actions in correcting the problem.
The NRC staff maintains, as described in the following sections, that it has not changed its positions from those consiunicated to the licensee and therefore believes the NRC staff has valid bases for concluding that the licensee clearly should have known of the EQ deficiencies. Accordingly, 10 CFR 50.109, the Backfit Rule, does not apply.,Section V.A.1: Consideration of Undocumented Engineering Judgnent to Support Equipment (ualification.
The licensee asserted that the Notice fails to properly consider the licensee's legitimate (and necessary) exercise of engineering Oudpent in making determinations as to the qualification of electrical equipment.
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I Appendix A The licensee argues further that a qualification file need only contain sufficient facts on which an experienced engineer cculd use (r.gineering judgment to establish qualification in order to satisfactorily document qua lifice, tion.
ARC Staff's Evaluation cf Licensee's Response in Attachment 2.Section V.A.1 10 CFR 50.49(f) requires that each itern of electric equipment important to safety be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or similar equiprent under conditions identical or similar to postulated harsh environ-mental conditions, with a supporting analysis to show similarity, or by analysis in combination with partial type test data.
In addition, 10 CFR 50.49(j) requires that a record of qualification be maintaineo in an audit-able form for the entire period during which the covered item is installed i
in the plant. The 00R Guidolines (Enclosure 4 to IE Bulletin 79-018),
issued on November 13, 1979, discuss qualification methods in Section 5.
These guidelines state that the choice of qualification method employed for a particular. application of equipment is largely a matter of technical judgment based on such factors as:
(1) severity of service conditions, (2) the structural end rcaterial con.plexity of the equipment, and (3) the degree of certainty required in the qualification procedure.
The D0R Guidelines further state that, based on these considerations,. type testing is the preferred method of qualification and that, at a minimum, (4ualifIcation for severe temperature, pressure, and stecm service condi-tions for Cicss IE equipnent should be based on type testing. Also, Section 8 of the D0R Guidelines states that com'plete and auditable records raust be available in oroer to document and validate qualification of equip-r nient by any of the nethods cescribed in Section 5 of the DOR Guidelines.
It further states that "these records should cescribe the qualification method in sufficient detail to verify that all of the guidelines have been satisfied."
The regulations as amplified in the D0R Guidelines establish the basis for the NRC staff position on the use of engineering judgment. The NRC staff l
has in the past and continues to find engineering judgment acceptable when used as part of a documented engineering analysis.
For example, if testing a piece of equipment is precluded by physical size, then engineering judgments l
can be made as part of the qualification method to support engineering l
analysis.
In addition, when equipment is qualified in accordance with L
10 CFR 50.49(f), as noted above, and analysis is used as part of the l
qualification method, engineering judgent is an inherent part of the assumptions used. Therefore, the licensee is correct in its assertion that "the NRC has long recognized that engineering judgment is an is,portant element of the nuclear regulatory scheme," and that " engineering judgment must necessarily be exercised in matters of design, calculation and assess-ment and compliance."
Hchever, the licensee is incorrect in its assertion that the NRC staff l
should accept enginecting judgc.ent as a basis for demonstrating qualifica-l tion in all cases. A record of qualifnation should be sufficiently detailed so that an individual knowledgeable in equipment qualification l
l Appendix A ;
issues would be able to review and understand the basis for the determina-tion that a component is qualified. As stated above the record shall contain " partial type test data...to support the analytical assumptions ar.o conclusions reached."
(NUREG-0588, Parti,Section2.1(2)).
The 00R Guidelines state that "[t]he type test shoulo only be considered valid for equipment identical in design and material construction to the test specinen. Any deviations should be evaluated as part of the qualification docunentation." further,"[t]hebasisofqualificationshallbeexplained to show thc rcictionship cf all fccett of proof needed to sup) ort adequacy of the conpletc equipnent." In short, in nrder to occument tie proper use of engintering judgan.ent in qualifying)under 10 CFR 50.49, the record should ccr.tain in an euottable form, (1 the partial-data used in the analysis, (2) the assumptions on which the analysis is based, and (3) the reasoning that leads to the judgement of qualifi:ation. Therefore, the cc(qutcy of information ccntained in the qualification file can only be determirac on a case-by-case basis.
Undocumented engineering jud ptnt dces not provide a complete auditable record nor can it be independently scrutinized. Undocumented engineering Judgment creates a void in that a licensee will not have an auditable record of the basis upon which a con.ponent was determined to be qualifit:d.
Such an c sproach chn lead to significant problems over the life of a plant. T1e basis and details of the jud gent coulo be re-defined by each individual who might attempt to reconstruct the rationale concerning qualification.
Equipurnt qualification based on undocupented assumptions could later be inadvertently invalidated. Ccnsequently, undocumented engineering Judgment cannot demonstrate coa.pliance with the EQ rule.
Moreover, the licensee may not rely on engineering judgu.ent to qualify equipnent, even if-docupiented, if that judgment is unreasonable. The NRC staff accepts dccumented engineering judgnient only if it is technically sound.
. Attachnent k.Section V. A.2: The Staff's Position Regarding the Nature and Sccpe of Walkdc~wns Expected of Licensees.
The licensee asserted that neither the Conaiission's EQ regulations (10 CFR 50.49) nor written NRC staff guidance prior to the deadline stated that a
-licensee was required to conduct detaileo walkdowns and disassembly of all equi > ment to confirm subconoonent part qualification. The licensee argued t1at the NRC staff has cianged its position to require detailed walkdowns and that the staff failed to con. ply with 10 CFR 50.109, the Backfit Rule, in changing its position. Moreover, the licensee argued that the regulations (which provide bounds for an acceptable EQ program).
requireo that licenstes have reasonable assurance that the equipment required to be qualified was identified and that the qualification documen-tation (coupled with acceptable engineering judgment) provided reasonable assurance t1at the equipment was qualified as installed. The licensee reasoned that it could rely on its Quality Assurance Program to install equipnent as qualified and that it need not have disassenbled components to inspect subcomponents therein.
Appendix A NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachsent 2.Section V.A.2 j
The licensee asserts that "the Staff takes the position that 10 CFR 50.49 requires that licensees conduct detailed walkdowns and disassembly of EQ equipment to assure that the equipment is in the tested configuration and to provide an independent verification that subcomponent parts are indeed j
qualified."
(APCo Response, Attachment 2, pg 15.) This assertion is
)
incorrect.
10 CFR 50.49 does not explicitly require walkdowns or component disassembly, and the NRC staff does not assert that it does. Rather, the NRC staff's position is that at times licensees may need to rely on walk-downs to verify qualification of equipment. When a review of documentation or other information available to a licensee reveals or clearly should reveal apparent deficiencies, licensees are required to take additional J
action to establish compliance with 10 CFR 50.49.
In this case, the failure by the licensee to serform walkdowns is not the reason for the violation; the essence of tiis enforcement action is the failure by the licensee to take appropriate action to establish equipment qualification when the nature of the existing EQ documentation and other information available to the licensee clearly did not establish that equipment was j
qualified. As stated in the Notice, "[APCo] failed to adequately review qualification files and walk down electrical equipment important to safety...to ensure that the as-built configuration of electrical equip-mentandcomponentswereinaccordancewith[its]qualificationfiles."
J (Noticeat2.) As the Notice emphasizes, adequate walkdowns would have assisted the licensee to discover a number of the violations.
Given the i
inadequacy of the documentation and other information available to the licensee for the individual violations discussed below, the licensee clearly should have known of the violations. While not required by 10 CFR 50.49, walkdowns would have been an appropriate action to take in certain cases in order to identify equipment, its location, and the need to qualify equipment at that location and thereby assist in establishing equipment qualification.
A licensee may have decided that walkdowns were not necessary and that qualification could be determined otherwise. However, this approach to j
equipment qualification has a significant liability. Specifically, this liability is that modifications made in the field are not always reflected
~1 in final design documentation or other documents. As a result, in some cases, this approach, absent adequate engineering or quality controls, may lead to the failure to qualify some pieces of equipment that 10 CFR 50.49 requires to be qualified. As previously stated, walkdowns are not a requirement of 10 CFR 50.49, however, because walkdowns provide a very reliable method of identifying equipment and its location, they help to identify field modifications. Moreover, the verification of equipment identity and location has arisen in regard to requirements other than equip-ment qualification. System walkdowns have repeatedly, both before and after November 30, 1985, been demonstrated as an important part of deter-mining whether or not a system meets applicable NRC regulatory requirements; such walkdowns frequently have shown that system configuration is different from that which is documented.
l
O.
Appendix A '
As for the licensee's assertion of an NRC staff requirement of disassembly of all equipment to confirm subcomponent part cicalification, the NRC staff's position in this regard has not changed.
It has always been-required that the installed configuration s.ust represent the tested confi-guration.
KRC Information Notice 83-72 provides an example where con;po.
nents (terminal blocks, wiritig, etc.) internal to a Limitorque valve operatur, wh'ich was obtained frca a vendor, were found to be unqut.lified for the anticipated service condition. Therefore, if equipment is obtained for use in a plant, the licensee n.ust verify that the test report used to demonstrate qualification is representative of the obtained equipment.
This verification a4y involve disasseuibly. For exataple, in the use ot Limitorque operators, as discussed in IN 83-72, different internal wiring, insulation, terminal blocks, or other components different froni those tested were found in installed Limitorque operators. Additionally, as discussed above, the licensee is responsible to ensure that modification, made in the field after the eciuiement is installed in the slant do not invalidate the equipment's environnental qualification. Tius, it is the NRC staff's position that the degree of disassembly, if any, necessary to assure that components are properly qualified is subject to a case-by-case determinatio.l.
Attachn.ent 2.Section V. A.3: The NOV Incorrectly Equates Documentation Deficiencies with Unqualifiec Equipment, Contrary to Regulation and Staff Fositions Taken Frior to November 30, 1955.
The licensee contended that the hRC staff is misinterpreting 10 CFR 50.49 in declaring that t.quipment for which c,ualification is merely undocumented is unqualified. APCo maintained that " unqualified" means exactly whet it says, i.e., for whatever reason, the piece of equipent will not perform its intended function. APC0 considered that this meaning is fully consis-tent with previous NRC staff practice. APCo contended that an appropriate application of this princi violation of 10 CFR 50.49(ple would result in the NRC staff finding af) only in those neither qualified nor qualifiable, i.e., where there are severe anomalies or failure of the test speciraen that would indicate the inability of the equipment to perform its intended safety function.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 2.Section V.A.3 According to 10 CFR 50.49(f), equipment can be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or similar equipnent under conditions identical or similar to postulated harsh environmental conditions with analysis sufficient to demonstrate similarity, or by analysis in combination with partial type test data.
If documented test data and experience, together with analyses, do not demonstrate equipment will operate in a harsh environ-nent during an accident when called on to do so, t1at equipment is unqualified.
Section 50.49(j) has required licensees to document qualification by data and appropriate analyses since it was issued in 1983. Accordingly, the NRC staff rejects the licensee's definition of " unqualified."
Prior to issuing GL 85-15, however, the NRC staff generally used the expression " unqualified equipment" to refer to equipment that had failed a qualification test.
Equipment lacking the necessary qualification 1
Appendix A !
documentation was classed as " equipment qualification not established."
This approach allowed licensees to pursue qualification by testing in order to comply'with the EQ rule within the deadline. When the ARC staff issued CL 85-15 on August 6,1985, it specifically stated that " unqualified 4
equipment" meant equipirent for which there was not adequate documentation to establish that the equipment woulo perform its intended functions in the relevant environment, as defined in the regulation. This definition was established tefore Novenber 30, 1985, the EQ deadline.
It is this definition which the NRC staff has used in its enforcement actions.
The approach or definition proposed by ApCo woulo lu.it 10 CFR 50.49 c ylicebility to equipn.ent which has been tested. APCo's definitior, would perrait the use of untesteo equipn.ent, sinply because such cquipctent would nct have demonstrated any anomalies or failed any tests. Such an approach wculd defeat the clear purpose of the regulation.
Therefore, as established in GL E5-15, ano ccnsistent with 10 CFR 50.49,
" unqualified equipirent neans equisent for which there is not adequate cocunentation tv csteblish that tiis equipnent will perform. its intended functions in the relnant environnent."
Attachc.ent 2.Section V. A.4: The Modified Policy Allows the Staff to Categcrize as "Uct tuf ficinitly Signiticant" Under Section III Certain Violations Identified By Licensees.
The. licensee contended that lice.nsee-icentified violations, as well as -
NRC-identified violations, should not be deened significant EQ violations if the deficuncies are promptly corrected by determining the equipment is qualified or qualifiable.
ARC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 2.Section V.A.4 The NRC staff agrees that there should not be a distinction between licenste and hRC-identified violations if the equipnent affected is denion-strated to be qualified with existing information within a short period of tine.
The licensee's identification cf the violation, however, does not lessen the violation's significance.
Rather, the scope of the corrective action required to achieve compliance with the regulations indicates the violation's significance. The intent of the Modified Policy was not to call EQ violations, for which in'ormation was readily available or acces-sible, significant. Minor file ueficiencies, which are resolved by adding references or inserting pertinent occuments to the file are intended to be i
Severity Level IV or V violations, regardless of who found them. On the i
other hand, violations which take some effort to prove qualification such assignificantanalysis, testing,orextendedeffortstoproduceorfind the necessary information, will be considered significant violations and therefore considered for a possible civil penalty. The NRC staff considered this when evaluating the severity of the proposed violations.
I
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Appendix A Contrary to APCo's suggestion, this policy does not put a licensee in a better posture if that licensee relies on NRC inspections to identify EQ violations before correcting tht.a!, rather than proactively identifying and correcting violations.
In short, a licensee that proactively identi-fies and corrects violations may be granted mitigation of civil penalties proposed for significant violations, while a licensee's failure to so act may prompt escalatior, cf a proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, the licensee's identification and correction of a violation does not affect the violation's significance, tut influences the NRC staff's application of the escalation and mitigation factors..Section V.A.5:
Certain Potential Violations impacting EQ are Inappropriately Assesseo br. der Reguldtory Provisions of 10 CFR 50.49.
The licensee contended that enforceraent action under the Modified Policy is inappropriate in those cases in which the underlying violation is not within 10 CFR 50.49, but within other NRC requirements.
The licensee's basis is that scue deficiencies may cause deviations from EQ requirements, but the regulatory concern is not with 10 CFR 50.49, but with the underly-ing practices which procuced the deficiency, such as a failure of the quality assurance process.
NRC Staf f's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachnent 2.Section V. A.5 The NRC staff disagrees with this view in that under 10 CFR 50.49 licensees were expe.cted to take appropriate actions (e.g., field walkdowns, review of installation ano ciuality control reccrds, and hardware examinaticns) in order to assure that equipnent has maintained its qualification status through appropriate cesign, procurenent, installation, and maintenance practices.
EQ is not solely an engineering function.
Further, it is not sufficient for licensees to rely only on design and procurement records to assure that components are qualified as installed in the plant. While the licensee may have violated regulatory requirements other than 10 CFR 50.49 this enforcement cction is focused on problems in environner.tal qualification.
(The hRC staff expects the licensee to correct any other violationitmightidantify.)
In sunmary, failures in any of the above functional areas can aaversely affect the qualification of equipment and can be considered violations of EQ requirements.
PART !! - DISCUSSION OF lh0IVIDUAL ALLEGED VIOLATIONS, Section 111.A, and Attachment 2.Section V.D Alleged Violations Relating to Electrical Splices (Alleged Violations I.ATI and I.A.2).
RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS 1.A.1 and I.A.2 A.
10CFR50.49(d),(f)and(j),respectively,requireinpartthat (1)thelicenseeshallpreparealistofelectricequipmentimportant to safety covered by 10 CFR 50.49, (2) each item of electric equipment in.portant to sufety shall be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or sirailar equipment, and that such qualification l
O, L
Appendix A shall include a supporting anal,ysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable; and (3) a record of the qualification of the electric equipment important to safety shall be maintained in an auditable fonn to permit verification that such equipnent is qualified and that it meets the specified performance requirements under postu-lated environmentai conditions.
Contrary to the above, from November 30, 1985 until the time of the inspection which was completed on September 18, 1987:
1.
ApCo had V-type electrical tape splices installed on numerous safety-related electrical components including solenoid and motor operated valvcs.
These tape splices were installeo in 4
various configurations and material compositions which were not docusented as being environmentally qualified to perform their function under )ostulated accident conditions at the Farley NuclearPlant(NP) Units 1and2. The various configurations of Y-type electrical tape splices had not been previously tested or desenstrated to be similar to an appropriately tested confi-guration.
Furthermore, these tape splices were not installed in accordance with approved electrical design details or notes for splices or terminations, and were not identified on the env'.ron-mental cualification (EQ) Master List of electrical equipment requirec to be c;t.alified under 10 CFR 50.49.
2.
Apco did not have documentation in their EQ file to desenstrate that the in-line 5-to-1 field-to-pigtail tape splice configura-tion, used on the Hydrogen Recombiners, which are important to safety, in both units, would perform its intended function during a design basis accident. The tape splices had not been tested nor demonstrated by supporting analysis to be similar to a tested configuration, and wtre not identified on the Master List of electrical equipment required to be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49..Section III.A. and Attachnents 2 Section V.B: Alleged Violations Relating to Electrical Splices (Alleged Violations 1.A.1 and
~
I.A.2).Section V.B.1:
V-Type Electrical Tape Splices (Alleged Violation I.A.1).,Section V.B.2:
In-line 5-to-1 Pigtail Tape Splices.
(Alleged Violation I.A.2).
The licensee argued that the qualification of Y-type electrical tape splicesisnotappropriateforenforcementunder10CFR50.49(d)or(f) because the violation was not attributable to the licensee's EQ program, but rather to a violation of some other requirement, for exam >1e, the licensee's quality assurance program. The licensee submits t1at, at most, a documentation violation of 10 CFR 50.49(j) may have existed. The licensee stated that the n.ethodology used in preparing the siaster list was reviewed and approved by the NRC staff in 1984, and, therefore, if
1 l
.v
~
Appendix A l 10 CFR 50.49(d) requires the licensee to include splices on its master list, the staff must comply with 10 CFR 50.109, to impose the requirement and prepare a backfit analysis. The licensee also argued that splices are parts or subcomponents of electrical equipoent irtportant to safety and, therefore, are not "equippent" that must be qualified.
The licersee attempted to demonstrate qualification of the splices by using a Wyle Laboratories test report prepared for Comonwealth Edison Cotpany (Ceco). Additionally, the licensee had a test performed specifically for APCo which was to demonstrate qualification of the V-ty>e tape splices in their "as-found configurations." The licensee states t1at tie qualifica-tion status of Y-type tape splices was, at most, uncertain on November 30, i
1985. APCo argued that, while its docurentation did not directly address V-type splices, it oic c,valify the procedure for sealing qualified straight-line splices, or terminations, and because the licensee used this procedure to install V-type splices, it provided reasonable assurance of qualifica-tion of V-splices. APCo submitted that the failure to directly address i
Y-type splices at nest could be construed as a documentation deficiency.
The licensee argued that, even if the NRC staff still considers these issues violations of 10 CFR 50.49 after considering the technical arguments presented above, the NRC staff has not satisfied its obligation to demon-sitate that APCo clearly shculd have known of the violations before November 30, 1985. The licensee contended that for the V-type splices the NRC staff's hotices and Circulars are not acequate to support a finding of L
clearly should have known for this concern and that there was no require-
-ment-for the licensee to perform detailed walkocwns of equipment to inspect interconnections such cs V-type splices. The licensee furtier contended that, in balancing the factors of the bodified Policy, its documentation and existing installation and installation review process provided reason-abic assurat.ce that these splices were in.plemented in accordance with approved instructions ana produced a qualified triterconnection. Addition-611y, APCo argued that it laa no prior notice of this concern and was e
unaware of other licensees' actions regarding splice qualification.
l Finally, with respect to V-type splices, the licensee asserted that ary i
violation was not sufficiently significant to warrant a civil penalt) because the licensee prornptly demonstrated qualification of the splices by testing and with Wyle Report 17859-02.
The licensee also denied the alleged violation that the in-line 5-to-1 pigtail-to-field tape splices in the hydrogen recombiners were unqualified.
The licensee claired that the splices were qualified by WCAP-9347, "Qualifi-cation Testing for Model B Electric Hydrogen Reconbiner", and WCAP-7709-L.
" Electric Hydrogen Reconbiner for PWR Containments." The basis for quali-fication as stated by the licensee is similarity between the splices. The licensee also made the same generic arguments with respect to the appro-priateness of the violation and claim of tacit NRC staff approval of the connection as it made with respect to V-type splices.
With respect to the in-lire 5-to-1 pigtail-to-field tape splices the licensee reiterated its position that there was no requirement to perform detailed walkdowns to inspect interconnections.
Further, the licensee
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l
. Appendix A' ;
argued that the information provided by Westinghouse regarding the proper nethcdology for connecting tae hydrogen recca.biner to -its power supply and adherence to that n.ethodology and accepted practices provided reason-able assurance that the 5-to-1 splices were qualified. APCo asserted that, accordingly, 6 fair application of the factors set forth in the -
Modified Policy would not show that APCo clearly should have known of this violation.
Finally, the licensee acknowledged that the available EQ documentation did not clearly identify the termination configuration within the hydrogen recombiner. The licensee contended that since these were documentation problems, they should not be considered for escalated enforcement. Addi-1 tionally, the licensee argued that since JCOs were promptly developed, there was not sufficient safety significance to impose a civil penalty under the Modifiec Policy.
NRC Staff's Evaluation _ of Licensee's Response in Attachnent 1.Section III.A i
and Attachment 2.Section V.B.1 and Section V.B.2.
The licenstte's argument that EQ splices, such as those involved in the Notice, are not required to be separately identified on the EQ Master List is not supportable. As ciscussed in many NRC generic issuances, splices as well are other connections, are ituts of electrical equipment important 50.49(d)y,and10CFR50.49(d)and(f)applytothem. Accordingly, 10 CFR to safet required APCo to list the splices. Even though the facts may establish other violations, such as violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, those violations do not preclude the NRC staff from making citations for violations of environmental qualification requirements. The following shows in detail why the NRC staff did not expressly or tacitly approve f
the way the licensee handled qualification of splices.
The SER issued December 13,1984 (See Appendix B, Reference 3), states that equipment for farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Units 1 and 2 is to be qualified to the requiren.ents of either D0R Guidelines or NUREG-0588.
NUREG-0588 states that "...it is necessary to recognize and address equipment interfaces (e.g. mounting, seals, terminations) in the qualifi-cation process...." The NRC staff agrees that its review accepted the licensee's methodology or approach used to identify systems and equipnent within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
However, the NRC staff's review did not include verification of completeness of the licensee's listing of safety-related equipment. AsstatedintheFranklinResearchCenter's-(FRC's)
TERforFNP,"[t]opicsnotwithinthescopeoftheevaluation[ include]
completenessoftheLicensee'slistingofsafety-relatedequipment[.]"
(FRC TER for FNP Unit 1, at 3-4.) The list of equipment that was reviewed I
was supplied by the licensee ano for the purposes of the TER assuned to be complete.
IthasalwaysbeenthepositionoftheNRCstaffthat splices (terminations)aretobequalifiecand,therefore,mustbeincluded on the EQ master list with supporting cocumentation.
Because this has i
I always been the NRC staff's position, and the licensee should have been aware of that position by virtue of NUREG-0588, among other documents, the licensee's claim of backfit is not supported by the fhtts.
i
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n.
y Appendix A V Type Splices The licensee admitted that the docunentation for the qualification of the V-type tape sp)lices did not exist on November 30, 1985 (a violation of 10 CFR 50.49(j ).
Istfact, the licensee aamitted that the qualification status of these V-type tape splices was uncertain requiring additional testing, inspections, and analysis in an attempt to qualify the V-t/pe tape splices.
'The licenste's claim that the splices were subsequtntly shown to be qualified by the test report prepared for Ceco is not actquately supported because there were failures of splices in that test. Those failures were not evaluattd to demonstrate they would not ir.salidate the qualification of the splices used by APCo and therefore, without further analysis or testing, qualific6 tion was not ccmonstrated.
Further, the licensee did not have 6n analysis that comonstrated the similarity of the splices installed at FNP ano those tested for Ceco. APCo's later tests do not qualify the V-type splices because they, as the test discussec above, were conducted in 1987, well after the EQ deadline. Putting aside the date of the later testing, APCo was again unable to show that the tested configurations APCo' passed all installed configurations.
encom That situation resulted from s failure to ensure that the installed s accetCance With appropri6te oesign drawings. plices had been installed in Therefore, while APCo was able to approxis. ate the various insta11ec configurations during the testing it could not exactly reproduce any of then. because there were no records of how they were installed. That being the case, qualification of the installed configurations could not be assured.
In summary, as of November 30, 1985, APCo had not tested the V-type splicts nor had it analyzed them to show similarity to a tested splice. Accoroingly, APCo had not qualified or docuniented qualification cf V-type splices.
1he assertion that the NRC staff has not satisfied its obligation to cemonstrhte that APCo clearly should have kncwn that it had not qualified these splices by the deadline is also incorrect. The basis on which the NRC staff concluced that escalateo enforcement was warrented for tape splices was stated in the hotice dateo August 15, 1988 (page 2). The NRC staff consiaered all four factors listed in the Hodified Policy in n.aking the determination that APCo clearly should have known that the V-type tape splices were not qualified. As explained earlier, the NRC staff does not balance these factors. Noreover, all four of the factors provide infor-mation to show that APCo clearly should have known of this violation before the deadline.
Factor number one was applicable because the Okonite splice documentation, available in the qualification file prior to the deadline, clearly only addressed shicided power cables and therefore should have alerted the licensee to the need for more specific information.
Factor two applied because APO. records dio not show what kind of splice was installed in a particular 4ccation, nor did its quality control procedures assure that these splices were installed according to drawings for an environmentally qualified splice.
In fact, cnly one qualified splice, for 4160 volt power circuits, was shcwn on the drawings. Moreover, licensee walkdowns or field
1 Appendix A >
verifications were inadequate because they did not consider electrical connections which were components that licensees were required to account
.for in demonstrating qualification.
Factor three was considereo applicable because NUREG-0588 states that it is necessary to recognize and address equiprent interfaces to qualify equipment.
In addition, while the NRC staff cid not specifically identify Y-type splices as causing qualification deficiencies, the NRC staff did give the licensee prior notice of splice problems by issuing generic docurents, as described below. Factor four was considered applicable because other licensees had identified qualifi-cation prcblems with cable splices.
For exce.ple, NRC Circular 78-08, at page 3, describes when electrical cable sp11res associated with electrical penetration assemblies were determined to be unqualified by a licensee i
during a search for qualification docurentation.
In addition, NRC Circular 80-10. identifies another example where the wrong class of insula-ting material had been used on the n.otor leads of a containnent fan cooler.
In that Circular the NRC staff emphasized tre "...in'portance of properly installing and maintaining environmentally.1ualified equips.ent niici clearly requires more than a review of QA records."
{
The NRC staff reviewed the various NRC inspection reports referenced by the licensee to support its position that the safety significance of the viola-tion was judged to be inappropriately higher than that of similar viola-tions cited at other plants. Based on that review, the NRC staff concluded that there were two important differences between the condition found at.
FNP and those cited by APCo that make the FNP condition more significant.
First and most importantly, the other licensees cited by APCo had accurate records of the splice configurations used and therefore, similarity arge-ments to qualified configurations, albeit after-the-fact could be made.
Second, in at least one case (Grand Gulf) the type of splice used was substantially different thaq that used at FNP. Therefore, given the dissimilar circumstances Of the two actions, it is not apparent to the l
NRC staff what the licensee's specific basis is for concluding that similar dispositioning of these two issues is appropriate.
10 CFR 50.49 required splices to be on the master list as separate items or to be explicitly considered as parts of other listed equipment. Because 10 CFR 50.49 required the above and also required the demonstration of splice qualification by testing and necessary similarity) analysis, the licensee clearly was in violation of 10 CFR 50.49(d)Ica(f and(j)atthe time of the finding.
A second test developed specif lly for APCo which i
ostensibly confirsed qualification of the V-type splices in their as-found i
configuration is outside the bounds of GL 88-07 because it was viewed by the NRC staff as done after-the-fact in a situation where APCo clearly should have known that its docunentation was not sufficient. Moreover, as described above, this test was technically insufficient to establish qualification of the splices.
Therefore, classification of this item as significant, as set forth in the Modified Policy, is warranted.
The licensee's contention that this violation should not be considered for enforcement action under 10 CFR 50.49 or the Modified Policy is also i
considered invalid because the EQ program implemented by the licensee must ensure that the equipment is installec similar to the way it was tested.
In the case of the V-type tape splices, at the time of the inspection the m.
Appendix A,
licensee did not have documentation in its EQ files which would support the qualification of V-type tape splices inside containment in instrument circuits, control circuits, or power circuits other than in-line shielded power cable tape splices. Moreover, APCo could not correct the docunenta-tion deficiencies with information already in its possession, but had to obtain new information by testing end through analysis. The Modified Policy ev61uates such deficiencies cs significant. Therefore, the violation stands as stated.
5-to-1 Tape Splice The licensee's claim that the hydrogen recorbiner splices were qualified by similarity to splices qualified by Westinghouse reports WCAP-9347 and WCAP-7709-L is not valid. These reports do not indicate the materials used or the configuration of the splices. Therefore, a similarity analysis cannot be n.ade nor, at the time of the inspection, was there sufficient cocumentation provided to support a similarity argument.
The NRC letter from J. Stolz, dated June 22, 1978, which approved qualification of the hycrogen reconbiners, did not approve the specific type of s alices APCo installed at FNP and did not provice further inforn.ation wita which APCo could have performed a similarity analysis to the splices discussed in the Westinghouse reports.
The NRC staff agrecs that the Westinghouse test reports discussed above demonstrate qualification for the heaters and pcwer cables that are subcom-ponents of the recoh.biner. The NRC staf f also agrees that the tested suple had some type of splice configuration. However, Westinghouse states in its installation literature for hydrogen reconbiners that the purchaser l
is'to use its cwn installation procedures to install qualified splices on l
the pigtail connections. Therefore, it was incLabent on APCo to ensure a i
l qualified splice was used.
Further, given that the type of splice used by Westinghouse was not specifically described, it was APCo's responsibility to provide other docun,entation of the qualification besides a reference to an unknown splice, in croer to qualify the particular type of splices that i
were used.
The assertion that the NRC staff has not satisfied its obligation to demonstrate that the licensee met the " clearly should have known" test is incorrect. As stated earlier in the response to V-type tape splices, the NRC staff's position regarding escalated enforcement for 5-to-1 tape splices on the hydrogen recombiners was stated in the Notice dated August 15, 1986 (atpage2). The NRC staff considered all four factors of the Modified Policy in making the determination that APCo clearly should have known that i
the 5-to-1 tape splices on the hydrogen reconbiners were not qualified.
The NRC staff did not balance those factors but, each of them provide infornation to demonstrate that APCo clearly should have known of the violation before the deadline.
Factor one was considered applicable because the vendor documentation does not address what type of splice was used in the test report. The licensee indicated that the splices were made in accordance with vendor instructions which provided direction regarding the construction of connections with
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g e
Appendix A the power leads. Because the vendor instructions referred to the unidenti-fied splice of the test report, the licensee should have clearly known that its procedures were inadequate to construct a qualified splice similar to the tested configuration. Additionally, the licensee also clearly should have known that the configuration was not sin.ilar to the qualified shielded power cable configuration. Specifically, the qualification file for power shielded cable splices only addressed a one-to-one splice and not the 5-to-1 splice used by APCo.
Factor two was considered applicable because the licensse's documentation end walkdowns or field verifications were inadequate as discussed earlier for V-type tape splias.
F6ctor three hos ccnsidereo appl uable because fWREG-C588 states that it is necessary to recognize and address equipment inttrfaces to qualify equirnent.
In addition, while the NRC staff had not previously >rovided notice s)ecifically identifying c,ualificStion questions regarding tw hydrogen seconoirer pacr leac splices or terminaticos, the liRC staff cid_ gise prwr nctice of splice problems. Factcr f0ur was considered applicable because other licensees had reported problenis with unqualified splices (hRC Circulars 78-08 and 80-10, as described above),
although not specificelly on hydrogen recombiners.
The licensee argues that at least two other licensees had not addressed this question to the satisfaction of the NRC inspectors and that this suggests that the matter was not so clear that APCo " clearly should have known" of the existence of the problem. The NRC staff rejects this 6rgun.ent. The failure of two other licensees to address similar problems does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that APCo should not clearly have known of the violation. The information provided under the four factors, considend collectively as described, supports the NRC staff's determination that AFCo clearly shculd have known of this violation as of the deadline.
In the case of the 5-10-1 tape s alices, factors one, two, three, and four L
were determined to demonstrate tlat the licensee clearly should have known, therefore, the violation stands as stated.
The NRC staff's position concluding that all of the cited violations were significar,t is addresseo in the response to Section III.B of Attachment 2 of APCo's response (See supra p. 2.) Further, that position was previously l
addresseo in a letter from the NRC staff to the Nuclear Utility Group on l
EQ (see Appendix B Reference 6).
With respect to 5-to-1 tape splices in i
particular, APCo had to develop new information by test or analysis to qualify such splices.
The Modified Policy describes cases where the data already exists or can be developed to establish qualification in a very y
short time as insufficiently significant to warrant a civil penalty. Such was not the case with 5-to-1 tape splices. Accordingly, this was a significant violation.
For both 5-to-1 and V-type splices, the licensee's preparation of a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) is irrelevant to safety signi-i I
ficance. A licensee that failed to prepare a JC0 in response to identified violations of 10 CFR 50.49 would have been required to shut down. The i
l w
Appendix A !
Modified Policy clearly states how the NRC staff will evaluate the signifi-i cance of violations of 10 CFR 50.49, as described earlier, and nothing in a JC0 can change that determination.
The licensee argues that escalated action is not warranted because the NRC staff chose not to impose escalated action on at least two other licensees with similar problems. The NRC staff rejects this argument because the action taken for apparently similar problems at other plants, for whatever reason, are irrelevant to this action. Moreover, the differences in the equipment involved and the circumstances surrounding the violations at the other facilities (Grand Gulf and Catawba) resulted in the NRC staff classifying those violations at Severity Level IV.
L RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS I.B.1 and I.B.2 B.
10 CFR 50.49(f) and (k), respectively, require in part that (1) each item of electric equipment important to safety shall be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or similar equipment, and that such qualification shall include a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable; or (2) electric equipment important to safety which was previously required to be qualified in accordance with NUREG-0588 (for consient version)
Category II, "... Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" need not be requalified to 10 CFR 50.49. NUREG-0588, Categcry II, Section 5.(1), states in part that, "the qualification documentation shall verify that each type of electrical equipment is qualified for its application and meets its specified performance requirements, and data.used to demon-strate the qualification of the equipment shall be pertinent to the application and organized in an auditable form."
Contrary to the above, from November 30, 1985 until the time of the inspection which was completed on November 20, 1987:
1.
The documentation in APCo's FNP qualification file did not demonstrate by testing, supporting analysis, or verification that Statesterminalblocks(ModelNos.NTandZWM)wouldmaintain acceptable instrument accuracy, a performance requirement, during design basis accidents.
In addition APCo did not have adequate documentation to demonstrate General Electric (Model No. CRISI) terminal blocks would maintain acceptable instrument accuracy during design basis accidents in that a qualification file for these components did not exist.
2.
APCo did not document qualification of the Chico A/Raychem seals used for limit switch and solenoid valve cable entrance seals in that the available file was incomplete, and test data and suppor-ting analysis provided by the licensee were insem eient to demonstrate qualification. Specifically, the te og performed did not consider possible chemical interactions em the tempera-ture profile used in the testing did not simulate cne initial thermal shock of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) transient.
Appendix A Attachment 1.Section III.B and Attachsent 2,Section V.C: Alleged holations Relating to Instrument Accuracy and Cable Entrance Seals (Alleged Violations 1.B.1 ar.c I.B.2).
Attachuent 2,Section V.C.1: States / General Electric Terminal Blocks (Alleged Violation I.B.1)
The licensee denied that it lacked cocumentation for States terminal blocks models Nos. NT and ZWM to sctisfy EQ requirenents. The licensee based its denial on the assertion that such documentation should be considered with the then ongoing process of evaluating terminal block performance. The licensee claimed that on November 30, 1985, its files contained "Wyle Test Report 44354-1," dated March 8, 1979, which demon-strated the overall LOCA qualification of those blocks. -The licensee stated that the report, while not specifically recording leakage current values during the test, did record leakage current values at the conclu-sion of the ter,t-for terminal point-to-point an;: point-to-ground, and that those values were recorded for multiple connections with an applied voltage of 137.5 VDC.
4 The licensee stated that it supplied Westinghouse the leakage current values to have a set-point accuracy analysis performed. The licensee informed the NRC staff of the analysis and responded to a question regarding the effects of leakage current on the equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The licensee contended that it supplied this analysis to the NRC staff on February 29,.1984, in response to the NRC staff's ques-tion, and that the NRC staff accepted this answer because the SER concluded that "the proposed resolution for each of the environmental qualification deficiencies...is acceptable." APCo further asserted that, because the NRC staff issued its SER for Farley after it issued IN 84-47, the NRC staff j
tacitly tpproved APCo's approach to answering the questions raised in IN 84-47. Furthermore, the licensee claimed the NRC staff acknowledged this dispute as a reasonable difference of professional opinion in a meeting on November 25, 1987.
The licensee further denied that documentation for General Electric terminal blocks was nonexistent. The licensee admitted that "certain of 1
the docur,entation for the General Electric terminal blocks was not in the EQ file at the time of the audit." The licensee also stated that such i
documentation was u ce available for audit at the exit interview. The licensee argued that the NRC staff tacitly approved its approach to the leakage current problem for the GE terminal alocks, just as the NRC staff did for States terminal blocks.
The licensee asserted that it qualifieo all these terminal blocks in September 1987 by similarity analysis; under the licensee's definition of " qualified," there would be no violation.
The licensee argued that if these deficiencies do represent a violation, they are not of sufficient safety significance to impose a civil penalty under the Nodified Policy. The licensee relied on its JC0 presented on lluverber 25, 1987, to support this position.
The licensee asserted that
j
.O Appendix A IN 82-03 and 84-57, and IE Circular 78-08 were insufficient to clearly lead it to this issue because they do not refer to instrument loop i
accuracy.. Secticn V.C.2: Chico A/Raychem Sea's (Alleged Violation I.B.2)
The licensee denied the failure to document the qualification of the Chico A/Raychem seals for NAMCO limit switch cable entry seals. The licensee contended that there was sufficient documentation in an auditable form tc qualify the seals for their intended application. The licensee-stated that the Notice ilhplies that the perforn.ance requirement is "to prevent possible degradation of the metal pipe nipple." The licensee contended that the purpose of the seal was to prevent short circuits and not pipe nipple degradation. Because of this implication, the licensee argued that the requirements in the hctice exceed those of the approsriate regulations. The licensee also argued that the test condition for tiermal shock was iaore extreme than the postulated accident environment. Moreover, the licensee asserted that test reports it possessed before the deadline showed that the Raychem bonding inaterial would not cause the inetal pipe nipple to corrode.
The licensee further argued that thcre was no evidence to support the clearly shoulo have known test. The licensee contenced that if this is fouho to constitute a violation, there is not sufficient safety signifi.
cance to in. pose a civil pentity under the Modified Policy..Furthermore, the licensce alleged that the NRC staff has consicered similar violations by other utilities at Severity Level IV.
I NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachn.ent 1 Section III.B. and Attachment 2.Section V.C.
Violttion 1.B.1 (Terminal Blocks)
The SER dated December 13, 1964, stated that APCo was performing additional analysis or submitting new documentation for deficiencies identified in i
theFranklinResearchCenter(FRC)TER.
The SER went on to state, however, that the NRC staff had not reviewed the additional analysis or docuinenta-tion, but had discussed with APCo what the content of the new analysis or docuinentation would have to be to resolve the identified deficiencies.
(SER at 4.) The SER continues by stating that the qualification files would be audited at a later date to verify that they contained the neces-sary documentation to support the licensee's conclusion that the equipment was qualified. At no time did the NRC staff expressly or tacitly approve the use of le6Lage current i.;easurec af ter a test, rather than during a test, to qualify tcrininal blocks used in instrument circuits. While the NRC staff approved APCo's proposed approach of referencing a particular test report to resolve this deficiency, the NRC staff did not then review or approve what APCo actually did. Had the test report contained the l
appropriate data, further analysis could have resolved the issue. Wyle Test Report 44354-1, however, contained data for circuits operating at 137.5VDC(controlcircuits)andnotcircuitsoperatingatnominally45VDC orbelow(instrumentationcircuits). The effects of small leakage currents
Appendix A on a control circuit may be inconsequential, but, demonstrating that fact would not necessarily demonstrate the acceptability of the coa.ponent for use in an instrument circuit where even a small ar.ount of leakage current can have a significant effect. Accordingly, because the Wyle test repcrt contained data for only control circuits, it cid not qualify States terminal blocks for use in. instrument circuits. Addition lly, while IN 84-47 relates to the deficiency identified in the TER, the SER does not l
refer to it but only to information that APCo related to the NRC staff before the NRC staff issued IN 84-47. Accordingly, the December 13, 1984, SER did not approve APCc's resolution of the issues raised in 84-47 for any terminal blocks.
Finally, the NRC staff disagrees with the licensee's assertion that this dispute was only a reasonable difference of profes-sional opinion.
In the November 25, 1987 neeting which was documented in a letter fron. the NPC staff dated December 2,1987, it was acknowledged that there was cisparity in EQ test data for like and different terminal blocks.
Further, it was acknowledged there were differences in interpre-tation of the EQ test data to be applied at ThP. The NRC staff never agreed that the data presented demonstrated qualification for the terminal bloc ks.
In fact, the NRC staff considered the licensee's argur.ents to be non-conservative. hcwever, any exchange at that neeting could not affect either APCo's pre-deadline knowledge of what was required to qualify q
terminal blocks in instrument circuits or the documentation that existed a
j in the APCo files at the November 30, 1985 deadline.
i At the time of the inspection, the FNP files for the States terminal blocks
]
did not contain sufficient information to support qualification for use in instrunent circuits. The licensee admits in the reply to the Notice that the leakage current values were taken af ter the LOCA testing was completed.
not during as was required, and that the voltage level was for control circuits, not instrument circuits. The values of insulation resistance provided to Westinghouse, after the deadline, were not the values supported sy test data for the States terminal blocks and were not supported by other
)
tnt data and accompanying analysis. Therefore, the conclusion that the i
use of the terminal blocks in instrument circuits was acceptable was not j
adequately supported.
The NRC staff agrees that the licensee did present a test report that included information on the subject GE terminal _ biccks, but disagrees that the report demonstrated qualification of the terminal blocks. The cualifi-cation file for the GE penetrations was not auditable in that it did not t
i include any test data or reference any test report for the installed GE J
l terminal blocks and therefore, qualification was not denionstrated by the FE penetration qualification file. At the time of the inspection the licensee did not present any additional information that would specifically qualify the GE terminal blocks for instrumentation circuits. Ilowever, 1
the licensee did attempt to show qualification by siniilarity to Connectron Inc. terminal blocks tested by Conax but failed to analyze design, material and construction differences between the terminal blocks. Additionally, as addressed above for States terminal blocks, the licensee failed to analyze acceptability of instrument accuracy if the GE terminal blocks were used in instrument circuits. Accordingly, GE terminal blocks number CR 151 were not qualified for use in instrument circuits.
J r
t
Appendix A APCo's contention that GE and States terminal blocks were qualified by additional analysis and testing in 1987 and that there was no violation fails because the regulation requires qualification by November 30, 1985.
The violations were significant in that the terminal blocks were not qualified for use in instrumentation circuits and involved instrumentation penetrations for the safety-related instrurents within containment (See supra pp. 2-4).
The assertion that the NRC staff hcs not satisfiec its obligation to i
Oct.onstrate that APCo clearly should have kncwn that the terminal blockc
)
were' not qualified before the deaalinc is incorrect. The basis on which the NRC staff concluded that escalated enforcement was warranted for Statas
)
and GE tern:inal blocks that were unqualitiec for use in instrunent cil 'uits was stated in the Notice dateo August 15, 1988 (page 2). The NRC staff l
i considered all four factors listed in the Modified Policy in making the d' termination that APCo clearly should have known that these terminal blocks wt not qualified.
It is the NRC staff's position that, as described earlier in this Ap;enoix, any cne of the factors can establish that the licensee clearly siculd have known of the violation.
For terminal blocks, each of the four factors provioed information to establish that the licensee clearly shculd have had the required knowledge.
l L
Factor nun 6er one was applicable because the documentation provided by the licensee was not only inadequate to demonstrate qcalification of either the t.
l States or GE terminal blocks but clearly appliec only to control circuits.
Therefore, the licensee should have clearly recognized that qualification l
in instrument circuits was riot demonstrated.
Factor two was a >plicable because the licensee's docurentation was inadequate tc demonstrate t1at the installed configuration was the sane as the tested
'I configuratior.. Moreover, the licensae's walkdowns or field verifications did not consider whether the installed configuration was similar to the tested corfiguration. This is significant in that the installed cen-figurations differed from the tested configuration because they hao top entry conduits, the terniinal boards were vertical, and the boxes did not have weep-holes, all of which would make the installed configuration more likely to fail than the tested configuration for ccntrol circuits. There-fore, the licensee's contention that it should not have clearly known that the terminal blocks were unqualified is not supported.
Factor three was considered applicable because the NRC staff had previously issuec Information hotices specifically adoressing the qualification of terminal blocks.
Inforruation Notice 82-03 specifically stated that NRC p
requires qualification of all electrical connections, a ble splices, as L
well as terminal blocks, for accident cor.oitions.
provided guicar.cc cn appropriate corrective action when leakage current data was niissing from tests to qualify terminal blocks. This available I
information should have led a knowledgeable engineer to conclude that 1-terminal blocks were not qualified for use in instrumentation circuits in I
a harsh environment.
l l
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l M
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y7
.i-l#
}
s
' e c' ; Appendix A '
L Factor four.was considered applicable because other licensees had-3 identified qualification problems with terminal blocks and had replaced them with qualified cable splices.
For example, NRC Information Notice 84-47, even though not specifically sentioned in the' Notice, should have.
l j
been evaluated by the licensee and appropriate corrective action taken.
This snould have led the licensee to determine that terminal blocks were a
not qualified for use in-instrumentation circuits.
The NRC' staff does not accept the licensee's argument that the issuance of an SER relating to EQ at about the time of the issuance of Information Notice 84-47 was a reasonable basis for the licensee to conclude the licensee need not review the Notice and the information evaluated. As stated'above, the SER was clearly issued to resolve only issues previously
,1 identified by the NRC consultar.t's review of-the APCo EQ program. ' Any conclusions' drawn by the SER were based on the licensee's satisfactory i
resolution of the previously identified issues and not on the licensee's actions relating to energing issues such as those discussed in the
-i Information Notice, which just happened to come to light at about the same L
time.
1 For the reasons set forth above, the NRC staff determined that the licensee i-
- J clearly should have known prior to November 30, 1985, that the States and GE terminal blocks were not qualified for use in instrumentation circuits-in a harsh environment. Thus, the violation stands as issued.
. Consistent with the NRC staff's earlier position, the States and GE
- terminal blocks are clearly a safety significant issue warranting escalated enforcement under the Modifit.d Policy. APCo did not provide information L
- during or shortly af ter the inspection that qualified these terminal l
blocks; accordingly, APCo did not satisfy the criterion set forth in the Nodified Policy for considering a violation insufficiently significant to T
warrant assessment of a civil penalty.
l Violation I.8.2'(Chico A/Raychem Seal Configuration)
With respect to the Chico A/Raychem seal configuration, the licensee contended that the NRC staff had only two concerns which were the failure to consider possible chemical interactions and the adequacy of the tested L
ter..perature profile. The NRC staff considers the licensee's reading of b
the Notice as overly narrow. The Notice states that the temperature l
profile must simulate that of a LOCA transient.
In other words, tempera-ture cannot simply be considered in isolation from other effects. Clearly, both moisture and pressure must be considered because they are LOCA effects j
that are inseparable from the temperature profile. The NRC staff's posi-tion to that effect is stated on page 40 of NRC Inspection Report 50-348 i
and 50-349/87-30 dated February 4,1988. As discuss:.d in that inspection report the NRC staff concluded that the Chico A/Rtychem configuration used i
by APCo was unqualified not only because the tedin3 relied on by the licensee did not include chemical spray but also beuuse the environment of the testing was not as harsh n that of the plant LOCA profile. Specifi-cally, the test was deficient decause moisture was absent and peak pressure was not simultaneously applied with peak temperature.
L
s h
' Appendix A' 1
~
By relying on testing that did not include moisture and the application j
of maximum pressure on that moisture during the perioc of maximum tempera.
H ture the licensee would 'never know if scisture could intrudelinto the y
electrical components. With the application of peak pressure simultane-L
,ously with peak temperature. in a steam /noisture environment it might well l'
have be., demonstrated that moisture leakage through the seal would occur L
duringfa period of differential expansion between the pipe nipple and the seal material and electrical shorting, which is clearly the NRC staff's concern, could occur.
In the NRC staff's Judgment, the examination of the thermal profile-without the LOCA factors of simultaneous-pressure and moisture, is meaningless'and arguments about the i.nitial temperature o
conditions are of little import without considering the other factors.
With respect to chemical interaction, the licensee provided information i
that stated Raychem material (including the bonding material) had previ-L ously been qualified with= chemical sprays. A separate stataent was made that there were no known deleterious effects from chemical sprays on the Chico A/Raychem seal configuration, and separate information was provided to demonstrate chemical spray would not affect galvanized steel conduit.
3 From the information provideo, the licensee concluded that its engineers made a reasonable engineering judgement to determine that chemical spray -
would not impact qualification of the seal configuration.
It wts incumbent on the licensee to demonstrate that-there would be no deleterious effects from chemical spray on the Chico A/Raychem' seal confi-guration before the deadline. There are presently no known deleterious L
effects on the Chico A/Raychem configuration simply because, to the NRC L
staff's knowledge, the testing has not been conducted.
Wyle Test Report 56730, relied on by the licensee to support its position that chemical spray would not affect galvanized steel, was not present in the FNP files at the' time of the-inspection, was apparently not kr.cwn to the licensee at the time of the enforcement conference, and clearly was not relied on by-i APCo engineers in making their judgment about the qualification of the s
seal configuration prior to November 30, 1985.
Finally,:the licensee has not provideo any basis to show how a test report on the effects of chemical
[.
spray on Raychem material and another report on the effects of. chemical l
spray on galvanized steel demonstrate that the adhesion betw'een the two f
materials will be unaffected by the chemical spray.
The licensee argres that such a level of documentation is beyond that required by the appropriate regulations. Further, specific to possible chemical interactions, the licensee asserts that the NRC staff provided no basis in the Notice as to why AFCo clearly should have known of the possibility of interaction between metal and the chemical spray causing an adhesion problem between the metal surface and the Raychem material.
L With respect to the licensee's general argument about the level of l
documentation it had, the NRC staff must reiterate that it is clear from L
the licensee's response, that not all of the documentation now relied on to make a qualification argument, was available at the time of the inspec-tion. More importantly that documentation was not in the FNP files prior to the EQ deadline. Nevertheless, the NRC staff concludes that even with L
I l
t.
=
Appendix A the information provided subsequent to the ins)ection the licensee has not demonstrated qualification of the Chico A/Rayciem seal configuration (which was subsequently replaced) and clearly should have known that qualifica-tion had not been demonstrated.
First and most fundamentally, none of the testing relied on by the licensee demonstrated that the Chico A/Raychem seal configuration or a similar configuration would function in a full LOCA environment. APCo clearly should have known what parameters it would have to evaluate, including temperature, pressure, humidity and chemical spray, because 10 CFR 50.49 specifically identifies them. Second, with regard to the licensee's specific argument about possible chemical spray inter-actions the NRC staff stands by the conclusion reached in the cover letter to the Notice. Possible chemical interactions are a fundamental area of concern specifically identified in the regulation which APCo clearly should have considered.
All Raychem installation instructions provide detailed guidance for surface preparation to ensure proper adhesion of the bonding material. Clearly, if the surface to which the bonding material is applied might corrode, as indicated by Wyia Test Report 58730, the physical and chemical properties of that surface may change and there would no longer be any assurance that the bonding material will properly adhere.
Therefore, water could leak past the seal and cause an electrical short circuit. With respect to this violation, it was not necessary for the NRC staff to consider any of the factors of the Modified Policy to conclude that the licensee clearly should have known before the deadline of the failure to qualify the seals. As described earlier, the NRC staff determined that APCo clearly should have had the appropriate knowledge because (1) it acknowledged that the seals required qualification and (2) the testing did not apply harsh conditions simultaneously, nor did analysis demonstrate that the ttsting established qualification. Accordingly, the testing and analysis to qualify the seals was inadequate on its face so that it could not satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Under such circumstances, the licensee clearly should have known before the deadline that the seal < ^ figuration was not qualified.
As described above, even the licensee's after-the-fact analysis failed to demonstrate qualification. Accordingly, this violation does not fall within the Modified Policy's exception for violations not sufficiently significant to warrant assessment of civil penalties.
Failure to demon-strate the qualification of the Chico A/Raychem seal configuration is clearly a significant violation in accordance with the NRC staff's position detailed earlier in this Appendix.
In its response APCo cited a nunber of violations issued by the NRC staff related to " seal qualification" problems in an attempt to show that the general position of the NRC staff on such problems was that they are of lesser significance.
Consequently, the licensee argued that the severity level of the problem at FNP should accordingly be reduced. The NRC staff has reviewed the cited violations and cuncluded that while it is true that all the violations deal with " seal qualification" problems, the similarities end there.
In at least one of the cases (Callaway) the seal in question was only one of two seal mechanisms that existed in that
l
.l o
1 m
Appendix A-- 'j particular configuration. Clearly, in such a case the lack of qualifica-tion of.one of:two seals is'less significant than the lack of qualification of the single Chico A/Raychem configuration at FNP.
In short,-the licensee hasLfailed to demonstrate, beyond stating that all the cited violations are " seal-qualification" problems, how thcse issues are directly_ applicable-
=;
to the FNP-violation. _ Further, the hRC staff, based on the facts of the
' individual _ cases,.has. taken:other escalated enforcement. actions unoer the-Modified Policy and issued proposed civil enalties for " seal qualificaticn" l
s violations.
However, it should be noted t1at those-actions were taken subsequent to issuance of the Notice in this case.
~
RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS I.C.1, l.C.2, I.C.3, and I.C.4 i
r C.
10 CFR 50.49(f) and (a), respectively, require in part that (1) each
'j item _of electric equipment important to safety shall be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or similar equipment, and the qualification shall incluce a supporting analysis to-show the equipment.to be qualified is acceptable, and (2) a record of the qualification of the electric equipment shall be u.aintained in an-auditable form to permit verification that the required equipment is
-qualified and that the equipment meets the specified perforn.ance requirerents under postulated environn. ental conditions.
Contrary to the above, from November 30, 1985, until the time of the inspection which was completed on November 20,1987. (September 18, 1957 for #4.):
1.
The APCo EQ files cid not document qualification of several Limitorque valve operators in that the plant equipment was not identical in cesign and material construction to the qualifica-tion test specimen and deviations were not adequately evaluated as part of the qualification cocumentation. Specifically, in one or mort of the operators, unqualified or mixed grease was used in the gear compartment, T-crains were missing, motor leads had unqualified splices, terminal blocks were unidentified dric unqualifico, and a limit switch with an aluniinum housing, i
which does not meet environmental qualification standards, was used inside containuent (Valve No. M0V34410).
2.
The APCo EQ files did not document qualification of the cable entrance seals for the Target Rock head vent solenoid valves.
3.
APCo found wide range and narrow range containment sump level transmitters, on both units, in a configuration for which exis-ting-test data dio not demonstrate qualification. Specifically,-
one or more of the GEMS type level transmitters did not contain the required silicone oil in the housing, and/or wires were terminated using an unqualified V-type tape splice configuration.
4.
APCo did not have docun,entation in a file to demonstrate qualification of Premium RB grease for use on fan motors inside containment and room coolers outside containment.
LL -
m b.
' 41 1
h Appendix A: !,Section III.C. and Attachment 2 Section V.D; Alleged Violation Relating to Limitorque Valve 0perators. Target Rock Solenoid Valves. Sump Level Transanitters, and Grease (Alleged
/folations I.C.1,
- 1.C.2. I.C.3, and I.C.4.)
'Section V.D.1:
Limitorque Valve Operators (Alleged Violation 1.C.1)
Attachment L Section V.D.2:
Target Rock Cable Entrance Seals (Alleged Violation I.C.2)
- Section V.D.3
Containment Sump Level Transmitters (Alleged Violation I.C.3).
.l
,,Section V.D.4:
Premium RB Grease on Fan MotorsL(Alleged
?
Violation I.C.4)
Violation I.C.1.
O The licensee responded by addressing the specifics stated in the Notice.
'l By responding in this manner, the licensee denied that there was a viola-tion of 10 CFR 50.49 as stated in Violation I.C.I.-for Limitorque operators J
because of unqualified or mixed grease, T-drains, Land unqualified splices.-
The licensee admitted that the examples regarding terminal' blocks and the aluminum limit switch housing existed; however, it contended that these-examples do not warrant imposition of a civil penalty under the Modified-Policy.
The licensee contended that grease is not within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
Specifically, the licensee argued that~ grease is not electrical equipment and,-therefore, need not be qualified. The licensee also arguea that its consultant demonstrated the qualification'of mixed grease on June 25, 1986.
The licensee argued that no enforcement action should be'.taken "...since there has been no explicit guidance, applicable to APCo, which states that grease 'or other lubricar.ts should be considered in equipment ' qualification."
Accordingly, the licensee contended it should not clearly.have known that-grease is electrical equipment that must be qualified.
The licensee also contended that this issue was not of sufficient safety significance to impose a civil penalty under the Modified Policy. The licensee supported
. this last argument with the anclysis provided by the-outside consultant.
The licensee contended that the Limitorque test reports, along with engineering judgment, were adequate to demonstrate qualification of the valve operators without the T-drains. The licensee stated that the test reports in combination with engineering judgment established qualification-and that engineering judgment does not need to be documented.
The licensee once again argued that the NRC staff gave no basis in the Notice why the licensee clearly should have known before the deadline that Limitorque operators were not qualified. The licensee contended further that the NRC staff did not require detailed walkdowns before the deadline and that the first real notice of the problem was IN 86-03, which the NRC
4 r
..p Appendix A' staff issued after the deadline.
The licensee also argued that if the lack of.T-drains: constitutes a violation, then it is not of sufficient safety significance to impose:a civil penalty under the Modified Policy.-
l The' licensee stated that the argument for the tape-splices is addressed by 1
the response to the alle.gea violations relating to V-type electrical splices.
While adesitting the examples of unqualified terminal blocks and an aluminum limit switch housing, the licensee contended that there is no requirement to disassemble all equipirent and identify all subcomponent parts, and that' disassembly would have been required to identify these components. ' With respect to terminal blocks, the licensee asserted <that IN 83-72 was insuf-ficient to constitute clear notice of a problem, and-that Limitorque supplied the operators directly, so that no third party could make improper modifications. Moreover, the licensee alleged that the unqualified terminal
)
blocks and aluminum housing were isolated incidents which the NRC staff a
could not reasonably expect the. licensee to find. With respect to the terminal blocks, the licensee: stated that the Notice gives no reason why the licensee clearly should have known the blocks were unqualified and that i
the NRC staff gave tacit approval to APCo's qualification of terminal blocks in Limitorque operators. The licensee characterized the discovery of the
)
aluminum housing as an unforeseeable event. APCo also argued that it informed the NRC staff.during the inspection that the operator with the aluminum housing did not need to be on the master list and, under the Modified Policy, the violation is insufficiently significant to warrant a
-civil penalty.
Violation I.C.2.
The. licensee denied that the lack of qualified cable entrance seals constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.49. The' licensee contended that the valves are designed to operate in conditions which are beyond those of n
design basis accidents according to 10-CFR 50.44(c)(3)(iii)'and need.not be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. Moreover, the licensee argued that it stated this position in its letter to the NRC staff dated February 24, 1984, ano that the staff tacitly accepted this position in its SER dated December 13, 1984. The licensee also stated that the valves were qualified with or without cable entrance seals. The licensee contended that the condition is not of sufficient safety significance to impose a civil-penalty under the Modified Policy. The licensee argued that the NRC staff issued a Severity Level IV violation to the Union Electric Company for an identical violation at the Callaway Plant.
Violation I.C.3.
1 The licensee denied that, even though four of the GEMS level transmitters were found without the required level of silicone fluid, this is a viola-tion of 10 CFR 50.49(f) and (j).
Insofar as the NRC staff asserts the presence of unqualified V-type tape splices, the licensee referred to
-argumen s ma e with respect to Violation I.A.1.
The licensee asserted t
d that any violation resulting from the condition of the containment sump
1.
3 1
v j
- i Appendix A
.33 --
i Llevel transmitters was not of 10 CFR 50.49, but some'other requirement.
APCo further argued that the fluid level in two of the four transmittcrs J
was only one inch low, and, therefore, posed no significant safety concern.
APCo acknowledged that qualification of the transmitters with low silicone fluid was not addressed by test cata available on November 30,1985, but that two of.the four transmitters were qualified even with ths low fluid o
' level. APCo'further argued-that the transmitters' qualification status was undetermined, and none of them were shown to be unqualified.
Should the NRC ' apply 10 CFR 50.49 to the transmitters, APCo conceded a violation-N of 10 CFR 50.49(j).
The licensee contended that it should not have clearly known of the violation by the deadline.because it recognized the i
need to cualify the transmitters, maintained documentation to do.so, and installec them and verified installation according to applicable instruc-tions and normal procedure. APCo argued further that no walkdowns wt?;
required prior to the deadline, and that any walkdowns would have required j
k.
opening the transmitte.rs to inspect the silicon fluid level. The licensee 4
L claimed that the violation is not of sufficient safety significance to -
impose a civil penalty under the Modified Policy.
The licensee contended that a civil. penalty is not warranted because Bechtel analyzed the two transmitters with slightly low silicon levels and determined that qualifi-.
cation was not materially affected, and that the NRC staff was informed of this.at the enforcement conference in March 1988, and in writing on May 27, 1988. 'APCo further contended that there would be no adverse safety consequences if the transmitters did not function.
. Violation'I.C.4.
As discussed above in Violation I.C.1, the licensee contended that grease is not an item of electrical equipment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b). The i
licensee argued that a Texaco evaluation demonstrated reasonable assurance that the Premium P3 Greese would not adversely affect the qualification of the motors and coolers.
Further, the licensee again claimed that it should not have-clearly known that 10'CFR 50.49 required it to qualify grease because (a) grease is not electrical equipment, (b) vendcr information showed that the grease was acceptable for use on the motors in question, (c) APCo stated the grease was inspected on receipt to assure it was in conformance-with specifications, (d) the NRC staff's SER accepted APCo's master list that did net include lubricants, and (e) APCo is unaware of any other licensee that listed grease as electrical equipment before the dea dl ir.e.
Because APCo and Texaco concluded that tests would show the grease. acceptable, and expected testing was to be compit.te by December 1988, APCo concluded that the violation is not of sufficient safety significance to impose a civil penalty under the Modified Policy.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 1,Section III.C and Attachment 2,Section V.D.
Violation I.C.I.a: Unqualified or Mixed Grease: Lubricants are an integral part of motors and motor operated valves. They are subject to degradation as a result of exposure to radiation, temperature, aging, and humidity. The issue concerning this violation is whether the Limitorque motor operators are qualified when used with grease different than that used when those
w e-
,T Appendix A o operators were tested in a simulated harsh environs.ent.
_ requires that each item of electric equipment in.portant to safety shall e
be. qualified by testing of, or experience-with, identical or similar-
_ equipment,- and-the qualification shall inciude. a supporting analysis to-show the equipment to be qualified is acceptable. Additionally, the D0R l'
h Guidelines state that the tested specimen should be the same as that being
. qualified and should be of identical design and material construction.
. In the case of Limitorque motor operators, the licensee's EQ program did.
not evaluate the significance of using a dif ferent grease from that which-was tested, nor-the niixing of different soap bases. The Limitorque_lubri-1 cation data form and other Limitorque inforination state which lubricants
-the licensee could use so that the operators would be qualified for use inside contairanent and specifically warned that lubricants of different soap bases should not be mixed. Material construction'of the tested specimen differed from that installed. Therefore, the licensee did not H
have qualified motors and nietor operators in that they were lubriccted-
'with greases other than that specified by the vendor and the licentee aid not have docuinentation of testing or analysis to support the types of grease or mixed grease used.
Because vendor docurrentation clearly speci-fied the grease used in testing the motor operators, the licensee clearly should have known that using different grease without analysis or further g
testing woulo result 'in the operators not being qualified as installed, l'
The electrical equipment the licensee clearly should1have known was not qualified (because it was lubricated with the wrong grease) included motors and motor operators specified in the Notice.
L The licensee provided an analysis which concluded that the mixing of the greeses was not a significant technical problem in this case, and the NRC staff does not disagree with that conclusion for the particular mixture that was found. However, the NRC staff concludes that there was a violation-ano that it was significant. That determination was made based on three f actors; (1) the analysis was dated June 25,1986, after-the-fact; (2) some grease combinations have been demonstrated as incompatible; (3) the analysis was substantial as evidenced by the use of an outside consultant i-j to determine the acceptability of the mixture.
(As discussed earlier, the licensee's definition of " unqualified" is incurrect and safety significance l
is not determined by subsequent analysis.) Moreover, the licensee had to L
perform substantial analysis to qualify the operators with grease other tSan as specif!ed by the vendor, ano dio not satisfy the Modified Policy's criterion for finding a-violation insufficiently significant to warrant a civil penalty. Therefore, the violation stands as stated.
L Violation I.C.1.b: T-Drains:.The hRC staff disagrees with the licensee's aosition that T-drains are not required for qualification. For example, l'
..imitorque test report B0058 (See Appendix B, Reference 4) states that l
T-drains be installed to acconnodate the extreme temperatures and pressures l
of a design basis event environment. As stated earlier in the response L
to Attachment 1,Section II.B, it is the position of the NRC staff that engineering judgment must be documented in order to demonstrate qualifica-tion in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. Therefore, this violation stands as stated. The licensee clearly should have known that the operators were L
1
)
m
+
-1 i t
' Appendix A:
. ^ unqualified because it knew of Limitorque test report B0058; which as described, which requires the installation of T-drains. APCo's argument that:it qualified motor operators in.1986 with undocumented engineering-Judgment shortly af ter it discoverd that T-drains were missing,.and that -
A this renders any violation insufficiently significant to warrant a civil.
penalty under;the Modified Policy; fails because: APCo's undocumented 4
engineering judgment couW not qualify the operators, as described in-the n
c,
. answer to Attachment II,Section V.A.4, so the exception in the Modified s
Policy does not apply. Accordingly, this was'a signification violation.
o The NRC' staff acknowledges that the issue of motor operator, T-drains has 1
been handled differently at different plants.
However, the NRC staff does.
not find such a situation. inconsistent with the Modified Policy, as the licensee implied.
Contrary to the licensee's assertion, the issue of notor l ;'
operator T-drains is not the exact same issue at each plant. Numerous 1
j.
factors went'into the NRC staff's case-by-case determination of the severity J
-of violations involving ractor operator T-drains. Factors considered in making such decisions included the quality of the docunentation sup)orting.
P qualification that was available at the time'of the inspection or siortly L
thereafter, the plant LOCA profile, the type of motor used in the operator, a
l-and the operator orientation. Whether the Limitorque report qualifying a motor operator without a T-drain can be used to qualify operators at a particular plant is-implicit in considering these factors. A plant with a LOCA profile like that in the test report, using the proper type of motor
!~
in the proper orientation would likely be able to denonstrate similarity J
Application of these factors in other-cases distinguish them from this case.
-i 1
Violation I.C.1.c:
Unqualified Splices: NRC staff's position on.V-type e
tape splices is addressed in the response' to Attachn.ent 1,Section III.A.
(Seesupra,pp.17-19).
Violations I.C.1.d and e: Terminal Blocks and Aluminum Limit Switch Housing: The licensee admitted that these violations existed. NRC staff's position on the nature and scope of walkdowns.is discussed in the response to Attachment 2,Section V.A.2 (See supra, pp. 10-11). That discussion forms the general position, that given the information available from the NRC staff and other sources, as discussed below, the licensee should have l
performed walkdowns or other detailed investigations of the problems identified by IN 83-72, and had it done so, clearly should have known of the violations.
With regard to the limit switch hcusing, the licensee clearly should have known of the violation because the test report did not allow the use of aluminum limit switch housings. The licensee's argument that because proper and NRC-accepted procurement inspection procedures were employed, it did not have a reasonable opportunity to detect the use of the alumi-i c num housing-is not persuasive. Given that only a single aluminum housing L
was found, anc given that APCo's records for the operator do r.ot show that environmental qualification was considered and assured, it is far more likely L
that the housing was installed after the operator was in the plant rather than prior to receipt of the operator at FNP. Therefore, it is more likely that the problem was one of the licensee failing to maintain EQ R
rather than a receipt inspection problem. The NRC staff reaches that l
l
[.
l Appendix A. '
' conclusion because there have been few, if<any other, instances in which r
such housings have~ been improperly supplied by motor operator vendors for use'in EQ a>plications.= In sum :because its: equipment records did not show that t1e licensee.had siaintained its equipment in accordance with environmental qualification requirements, the licensee clearly should have.
known of this violation..
The NRC staf f ackncwledges that the licensee did inform the NRC inspectors that the o>erator in question was not required to be on the master list.
However, tie licensee not only n.ade that argunent af ter the fact but based the-argument on-placing adtinistrative controls on the valve to keep it.in its safety position. Such controls may have formed an adequate basis-for removing the valve from the list at the time of tne-inspection but since the controls were not in place prior to the deadline the NRC staff rejects the licensee's arguments.-
/ssdiscussed'aboveforV-typesplices(Seesupra,p.17),theNRCstaff's SER issued December 13, 1984 did not tacitly approve APCo's qualificatien of terminal blocks in Limitorque operators.
The NRC staff acknowledges that identification of problems:with. terminal' blocks in motor operators was handled differently at different plants..The issue was-handled on a case-by-case basis considering such factors as whether the terminal blocks were used in motor operators inside or outside containuent, whether they were used in control or instrument applications, and the quality of the documentation supporting qualification available at the time of the-inspection. After reviewing the specific violation at River Bend referenced by the licensee in its response, the NRC staff concludes that, in retrospect, the ins section report for River Bend (Inspection Report 50-458/87-21) proba)1y should have more fully explained the NRC staff's rationale for reaching the conclusion that the violation was must appropriately categorized at Severity Level IV. Briefly, the violation at River Bend was categorized at Severity Level IV based on two factors, location (outside containment) and application (control).
With regard to the licensee's argument concerning its response to Information Notice (IH) 83-72, the NRC staff concludes that relying on 1980 information to respond to a 1983 issue which-calls into question the applicability of that earlier information (see Attachment 1 to IN 83-72, page 16 of 16, #6) is improper. The thrust of the information provided by the IN was that third party involvement after the operators had been shipped by Limitorque and improperly reviewed modifications after instal-lation were likely causes of the existence of unqualified terminal blocks in the motor operators. Therefore, to do no physical inspections at FNP was unreasonable given the information provided.
Violation I.C.2: Target Rock Cable Entrance Seals: The NRC staff disagrees with the licensee that seals are not required for qualification of Target Rock Solenoid Operated Valves (SOV). The head vent valves were required to be insulled by 10 CFR 50.44. This regulation requires that these valves be operuble post-LOCA (10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(iii)).
In order to
4 ff s*?
o
- Appendix ~A~
.- 37~-
be operable post-LOCA, they must be environmentally qualified.
Even accep-ting;the licensee's argument, the SOVs form part of the reactor coolant) pressure boundary}(as stated in 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(iii), and are defined by -
- 1) as important to safoty. They must then-be qualifiedE mI for a Masign basis ~ accident.-
L L
The NRC staff's SER approved only the licensee's approach and-schedule for.
completing the full environmental qualification of the Target Rock solenoid valves. At no time did the'NRC staff tacitly approve the licensee's claim-that the-reactor vessel head vent valves did not have to ~be environmentally-i qualified to the rule. 'The NRC staff position on TMI Lessons Learned Equipment, as-stated in Supplement 2 to IEB 79-01B, has always been that
'c this equipment is subject to the same requirements as other safety-related
.equipant. This-position was also reiterated in the TER (at page 2-3 and 2-4) as further discussed in Supplement 3 of IEB 79-018. The NRC staff clearly stated in this supplement as it related to TMI Lessons Learned Equipment that, "... no change has occurred in staff position regarding the scope of the 79-01B Supplement 2. review." The licensee's statements.
as 't related to the scope of the 50.49 review were always related in the.
context of a completion schedule for the full qualification of the solenoid I
valves.
In its letter of February 29,1984,-(SeeAppendixB, Reference 8) to the NRC staff, the licensee stated:
"Thequalificationreport[fortheTargetRo'ckS0V's]is-currently-1 under development by Westinghouse with a scheduled completion in 1984. APCo has reviewed the draft qualification report and determined that these solenoids are qualified for use in the FNP containment.
APCo will review the final report when issued to ensure qualification i
is naintained."
The licensee went on to argue that the 50V's were not required to be qualified. However, given the licensee's statements that the SOV's were qualified, there was no reason for the NRC staff to dispute the licensee's assertion that the equipment was not required to be qualified. Therefore, it was not necessary for the NRC staff to respond to the assertion, and the staff's silence on the matter cannot be ennstrued as tacit approval of the licensee's position.
The licensee's response to the Notice mentioned a 1984 test report that has not been provided to NRC staff for evaluation. Therefore, there is no l-basis for the NRC staff to conclude that the test report would demonstrate l
that~the equipment was suitable for its application.
Further, that test report was not in the licensee's files at the time of the inspection. The l
l test report that was in the licensee's files specified that a qualif-ied entrance seal was required, but such a seal was not installed.
By not presenting the'new information during or shortly after the inspection, or even at the enforcement conference held months after the inspection, APCo did not satisfy the Modified Policy's criterion for finding a violation J
insufficiently significant to warrant a civil penalty by allowing for 1
1 1
l i
b l{u
- f' l'f n.,
a
..a
,,i-
- Appendix lA ;
~
' further documentation during -or shortly after.the ' inspection.. Moreover,
't this new: test report does not qualify the ~ seals for the valves because it was submitted long after the deadline.
(See discussion of APCo's 4
'definitionof" qualified", supra,pp.-12-13.)
With regard:to the clearly should have known test,' factor one was considered applicable because'the licensee's test report required a qualified seal to 4
be installed on the valves. This factor alone was sufficient to consider escalated enforcement since only one factor is required to be met.
Therefore, this violation stands as stated.
The NRC staff's position relating to seal qualification issues, including Target Rock valves, is addressed in the response to the Chico A/Raychem
- violations (See supra pp.. 26-29).
Violation I.C.3:
Gems Sump Level Transmitters: With respect to Y-type splices on the transmitters, the NRC staff responds with the same analysis made for Violation I.A.1 (See supra, at pp. 17-19). Although the' licensee
~
argued that these facts formed the basis for citation of a violation other than of 10 CFR 50.49,_the NRC staff identifies no reason why-it could not issue a citation for violation of 10 CFR 50.49 as well. The licensee's-claim that-a citation for violation of 10 CFR 50.49 is inappropriate is simply not supported by the facts. APCo admitted this violation by stating that, by the deadline, it had no data on GEMS level indicator performance
)
with low silicone levels. APCo contended, however, that two of the'trans-mitters were qualified based on its definition of Mat term +ht the NRCt staffrejectedabove(Seesupra,pp12-13). APCo continued by stating that the transmitters were not unqualified, and,-therefore, this was not.a-violation. Such an interpretation of the regulation would require the NRC. staff to demonstrate the equipment would fail rather=than requiring the licensee to assure it woula not.
10 CFR 50.49 requires licensees to qualify electrical equipment important to safety for harsh environments and maintain records of qualification and this requirement clearly a) plies'to the GEMS sump level transmitters. The NRC staff need not prove t1at equip-r, ant will fail in a harsh environment to show a violation of 10 CFR 50.49.
Moreover, the licensee concedes a violation of 10 CFR 50.49(j). Accor-dingly, APCo violated 10 CFR 50.49(f) and (j) by failing to qualify the GEMS level transmitters by the deadline.
The licensee claimed that it should not have clearly known of this violation.
However, vendor test reports indicated that the silicon fluid was required for the level transmitters to remain qualified. The information would have led an engineer knowledgeable in the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 to reach that conclusion, and to verify that the level transmitter fluid levels were correct.
The second factor of the Modified Policy applied because the licensee's equi) ment records did not demonstrate that the installed configuration matcled the tested configuration. Moreover, the licensee did not perform adequate field walkdowns or other verifications to assure that the installed configuration was the same as the tested configuration. NRC staff's position on the nature scope of walkdowns is discussed in response l
l
v a.
\\
((.[I;'
j AppendixA-,
toAttachment'2,SectionV.A.2(Seesupra',pp.'10-11)..' Additionally,the-licensee did not ensure adequate maintenance controls were implemented to -
maintain-the qQalification status of the level transmitters. With regard to identification of this violation,;the NRC_ staff agrees that the licensee l
found the deficient condition. However, theLidentificate rasulted from questioning by an NRC inssector and therefore.was not' considered as independently inntified by the licensee. according to the Modified
' Policy's definition.
i In responding to this issue APCo referred to the fact that the NRC staff' if) had subsequently classified a similar violation to be of lesser significance at another Region II plant.
The NRC staff acknowledges that a similar violation was considered of lower severity. However, given the specifics m
J of that case such a determination was appro)riate.
Specifically, in that 4
case the licensee was able to demonstrate tiat the junction box of concern would not have been subjected to a submerged environment as previously j
assumed. The analysis performed for APCo by Bechtel was performed after 1
the deadline and consistent with the NRC staff's position (See supra pp.-
,H 12-13) such analysis could not demonstrate qualification of the transmitter 1
prior to the deadline, Violation I.C.4: Premium RB Grease: The importance of grease in e~quipment qualification is discussed in the response to Violation I.C.1.a.
Given that the vendor specifically identified the grease used on the fan motors p'
and room coolers, the licensee clearly should have known that those compo-l L
nents would not be qualified with different greases. The documentation ;
that is claimed to be from the licensee's maintenance files (not the EQ qualification file) was not presented during the. inspections, nor at the enforcement conference held months after the inspection. Further, that information alone does not support the qualification of the fan motors and l
room coolers lubricated with Premium RB grease and located in a harsh
'l l
environment.
Specifically, although a reference to operating temperature i
P range for the. grease was provided there was no documentation to support qualification in & full LOCA environment. As demonstrated by the licensee's a
response, grease testing was not completed,as of November 14, 1988. The length of time necessary to establish qualification of these components with different greases clearly falls outside the exception given in the H
Modified Policy. Accordingly, this violation is sufficiently significant-to warrant assessment of a c1vil penalty. Therefore, ti;is violation stands 1
as stated.
The failure to adequately demonstrate the qualifd. cation of each of the items discussed above is e significant violatin in accordance with the p
NRC staff's position detailed earlier in this Appendix., Section 11.0 and Attachment 2 Section V.G: Mitigation, Not Escalation, of the Base Civil Penalty is Appropriate. Attachment 2,Section V.G: The Staff's Assessment of the Mitigation Factors was Flawed.
l L
y J
l e
W Appendix A-
- 40 e The licensee denied that a violation occurred and contended that escalated =
enforcement is not warranted because the alleged deficiencies are not of sufficient safety significance to impose-a civil penalty under the Modified Policy. However, if the violations are sustained, the licensee argued that it;is entitled'to full mitigation of the base civil penalty. APCo alleged that the NRC staff incorrectly applied the escalation and mitigation-factors in the Modified Policy.
NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 1.Section II.D and Attachment 2.Section V.G.
-Identification and Reporting:- Of the eight violations cited in the Notice, APCo independently identified the deficiencies that formed the basis for.
five violations. Of the remaining violations, the NRC staff identified one (terminal blocks in instrument circuits), and APCo,'in response to inquiries from NRC inspectors, identified two violations (GEMS level transmitters and Chico A/Raychem seal configuration).
Reduction of the base civil penalty by 50% is warranted only if a licensee -identifies the full scope of virtually all the violations.
In view of the circumstances described above, 25% mitigation of the base civil penalty is more -
appropriate in this case than.the full 50% mitigation.
The NRC staff does not accept the licensee's argument that some type of notice after the November 30, 1985 deadline is a necessary condition for considering NRC staff. identification of deficiencies under this factor.
.The licensee has a continuing obligation to assure com)11ance with NRC requirements.
If information became available after tie deadline to aid in identifying a deficiency and the licensee failed to do so, that would certainly contribute to escalation of the civil penalty, because that would reflect the failure to take advantage of an opportunity to identify and correct the deficiency. However, escalation or less than~ full mitigation of the civil penalty can also be based on the number and type of_unquali-1 fied.componsnts identified by the NRC staff. NRC inspections are performed on an audit basis, with a relatively small number of inspectors who focus on a small percentage of the plant components to confirm that regulatory requirements are met. Therefore, given the limited scope of NRC'inspec-tions, each item identified is of added significance and escalation or less than full mitigation is appropriate.
In this case, the same reasoning applies far the two licensee identified violations that resulted from inquiries by NRC inspectors.
The NRC s'.aff recognizes that it could not Lerform all the inspections at.approximately the same time. However, t1ere was an extended period of time before the deadline for licensees to conduct programs for self-identification and therefore the advantage one licensee may have gained by being inspected a few months or a year after another is really inconsequential. Further, the issue of inspection timing is not unique to the Modified Policy issues but is inherent in much of the NRC inspection program because of limited inspection resources.
E
(-
x s.
v s
. Appendix A:
- 41'-
I Best Efforts - The NRC staff agrees with APCo that licensees should be i
encouraged to address emerging issues.. Howeve, the NRC staff does not view,the EQ issues discussed in the. Notice or the whole area of equipment procurement as-emerging issues..The need to ensure-that components ~of the i
' proper type and qualification are procured has'been'and continues to be an essential part of any nu_ clear safety-related program including the plant EQ program.
Because EQ'is not solely an engineering function, the NRC l
staff would expect that a licensee demonstrating best efforts to have undertaken an EQ review of procurement records before the deadline to assure that qualification _ of equipment had been maintained despite part
'l replacement-and equipment repair. However, APCo's in-depth review of-procurement records didLnot occur until after the deadline and the NRC~
staff concludes that little at all was done in this area before the: deadline.
The_NRC staff's technical positions on the issues of equipment walkdowns
'I and qualification of equipment using lubricants other than as tested are presented in other portions of this Appendix.
In the context of the factor of best efforts in those two areas, it is the NRC staff's position that APCo's efforts fall well short of the standards which reasonably could be deemed to constitute best efforts in attempting to comply with 10 CFR-50.49.
For example, when APCo's documentation indicated a problem with respect to qualification, its failure to perform walkdowns or other appro-
_priate investigation demonstrate a failure to exert its best efforts to-comply with 10 CFR 50.49. This conclusion is supported by many of the statements summarizing APCo's own evaluation of its EQ program made in
. to the NRC's Enforcement Conference Sumary dated April 13, 1988 (See Appendix B,. Reference 5).
The escalation of the baso civil penalty for a lack of best efforts does not suggest that APCo made no efforts to comply with EQ requirements. The
-NRC' staff recognizes the )rogramatic efforts made by APCo in the 1979-1985 time frame. However, suc1 efforts do not single out APCo over other licensees who also were: assessed a civil penalty despite devoting signifi-cant efforts to establish an EQ program.
Escalation for best efforts does not rest on lack of resources devoted to the equipment qualification program, but on the basic deficiencies in that program. The efforts discussed in the licensee's. response also do not consider-program imple-mentation and verification efforts.
Implementation and verification of a proper EQ program rests with the licensee. Based upon the identified deficiencies in the program, even though in some other areas a satisfactory EQ program was formulated for the FNP units, best efforts were not made in general in the areas of implementation and verification and therefore escalation -of the civil penalty was appropriate. Accordingly, 50% escala-i tion of the base civil penalty based on this factor is appropriate.
Corrective' Actions - When considering a licensee's actions to correct deficiencies under this factor the NRC staff is specifically focusing on the licensee's corrective actions for the identified violations. 'The overall programmatic corrective actions the licensee took before identifi-cation of the violations and prior to the deadline were considered as part of the licensee's best efforts. This application of the corrective actions factor under the Modified Policy is consistent with its application under the General Enforcement Policy.
b
-5:
7 x.'
~
Appendix A.
-Given th'at most of the deficiencies that formed the basis of.the August 15,
^
T 1988 Notice were contained in the February 4, 1988 inspection report, it is clear that the comments referenced by the licensee about "significant
-improvements," which were also contained in that report, were not made with regard to corrective actions taken to correct.the deficiencies at issue.
The violations along with the above referenced comunent were concurrently identified to the licensee and therefore the NRC inspectors were not consnenting on the corrective actions for violations.which were just being transmitted to the licensee. The NRC inspection of the licensee's long-term corrective actions for the violations is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-348 and 50-349/89-23 issued October 31, 1989. Based on both of the above points, the significant improvements" discussed in the earlier s
report do not warrant consideration under this factor. However, as indicated above, any of those improvements made )rior to the deadline were taken into consideration when considering tie best efforts factor.
Regarding the licensee's comments 03 its corrective actions for the fan motor problem, the NRC staff concludes that a number of comunents need-to-be made to clarify the licensee's submittal.
First, the licensee's.inclu-sion, in its reply to the Notice, of a statement from the Systematic -
Assessment of-Licensee Performance (SALP). report might leave the impression that the matter was not of significant concern to the NRC staff and more-importantly that the NRC staff in making the statement had taken a final position on the appropriateness of the licensee's corrective actions.
Neither of those conclusions is correct. The sentence in the SALP. report that follows the one cited by the licensee stated that escalated. enforce.
ment was under consideration making it clear that the matter was both of.
significantconcernand-stillbeingevaluated. The NRC. staff will not consnent on APCo's recollection of statements, regarding the licensee's handling of the fan motor issue, supposedly made at the July 7, 1988 SALP meeting, except to say that the NRC staff's documented position as contained in the SALP report does not su) port the licensee's assertion' that the NRC staff found its action accepta)1e. Second, because the NRC staff had continuing concerns over the fan motor V-type splice ~ issue at FNP, a meeting was held in Bethesda, MD on September 24, 1987. That meeting was followed by a Confirmatory Action Letter dated October 6,1987 which.
confirmed various followu) actions on the part of the licensee in the area of EQ including furtier-specific actions relating to thet V-type splices. Clearly, such a course of action on the part of the HRC staff demonstrates a concern with the licensee's actions to satisfactor.ily resolve this issue.
With specific regard to the handling of replacement of the fan motor splices, the licensee admits in its response to the Notice that a JCO, as called for in GL 86-15, was never completed. The licensee claims that the need for the JC0 was unnecessary given the fact that the splices were M
replaced prior to completion of the JCO. The NRC staff still maintains that the licensee's course of action was non-conservative. Absent a JCO, the licensee had no documented or approved basis to justify the continued o)eration of a system required by the plant Technical Specifications and t1erefore, had no documented basis for the continued operation of Unit 2 that occurred during splice replacement.
Clearly upon discovery of the l
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p Appendix A'
- 43.-
impro wr splices on Unit 1, the licensee had a reasonable basis to' suspect a pro)lem on Unit 2; The delay of nine days in taking action on that unit-without a documented basis was non-conservative. As documented elsewhere.
in this Appendix, the NRC staff does not accept undocusented engineering Judgment or after-the-fact analysis or testing as a sufficient basis-for continued operation and that'is what the licensee in fact relied on.
In-claiming that it went beyond the Generic Letter recommendation, that licensees take inmediate steps to establish a plan with reasonable schedule.to correct the deficiency, the licensee demonstrates a lack of-_
i understanding of the NRC staff's concern. Not only does a JC0 justify long term continued operation should the licensee choose such a-course of' action, but it also justifies short term continued operation (the time it
- takes to effect corrective actions). Prior to any corrective actions, either a documented and approved basis must be provided for continued operation (a JCO) or the licensee must comply with.the applicable require-
= ment, which in this case was the Technical Specification. The mere fact that the licensee plans to take prompt corrective action does not remove l
the obligation.to have a documented and approved basis for operating u
during the time it will take to effect the necessary actions.
In summary, the NRC staff finds that the licensee's arguments for mitigation under this factor are either not applicable or do not demon-a strate a basis for mitigation. Further, in at least one significant instance (V-type splices), the licensee's corrective actions were clearly-inappropriate and thus partial (25%) escalation of the base civil penalty is warranted.
4 Conclusion 1
Based upon the above considerations, no additional information has been provided that would cause the NRC staff to either withdraw a violation or reconsider its categorization.
The violations affect a sufficient number of systems and components that are.important to safety to warrant classi-1 fication of _ this EQ problem as a Category A problem. Therefore, the NRC staff adheres to-its-classification of the violations as a Category A problem under the Modified Policy, and concludes that the proposed civil penalty of $450,000 should be imposed.
RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATION 11 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion I, Organization, requires that persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions shall have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality problems, to reconmend solutions, and to verify implementation of solu-tions.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action further requires that measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to quality are promptly corrected The accepted QA program (FNP-FSAR-17)Section17.2.1.2,whichinpartimplements10CFRPart50, q
Appendix B, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(a), states that Safety (MSAER), has Audit and EngineeringReview(SAER)underthedirectionofthemanager been established to provide a comprehensive independent audit program of safety-related activities to verify that such activities are in compliance
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Appendix A -
with the Operational Quality Assurance Program (0QAP).
FNP-FSAR-17 1
.further. states that the Supervisor-SAER-and his staff-stationed at FNP shall conduct.the audit program, and he has the authority to. identify problems,. recommend solutions, and verify corrective actions.
Section'17.2.16 states that an administrative procedure has been written to assure that conditions adverse. to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, SAER is' not ensuring effective execution of the quality assurance program in that conditions adverse to quality associated with the EQ program have not been pronotly corrected. The following Corrective Action Request-(CAR) descri)e deficiencies identified by SAER
- for which corrective-actions had, at the time of the inspections, not yet been completed.-
CAR No.
Date Identified Estimated Completion Date l
830 November 1983 March 03, 1988 1251 October 1986~
~ March 31, 1988 L
This is a Severity Level IV violati ' (10 CFR 2, Appendix C,.
SupplementI).. Section-III.D: Alleged Violation Relating to the Quality Assurance Program for Safety-Related Activities ( Alleget Violation II.).Section V.E: Alleged Violations Under NOV Section III 1
The licensee denies the alleged violation. The licensee contends that CAR 830, prepared December 29, 1983, was to address only instruction books and vendor drawings for EQ equipment. The licensee expanded the scope to-cover subsequent vendor manual revisions. As items were closed,'the licensee identified new items as a result of the issuance of GL 83-28.
These.new items, the licensee claimed, were the cause of the completion date being revised. The licensee contended that the length of time that elapsed was appropriate.
The licensee further contended that the actions taken to close CAR 1251 were prom)t. The licensee stated that the completion of this item was tied to tie evaluation performed for NRC Bulletin 85-03.
The' licensee argued that a review of the time period in which these CARS were open, along with consideration of the surrounding circumstances, would not indicate a deficiency in the execution of its quality assurance program.
NRC's Evaluation of Licensee's Response in Attachment 1 Section III.D CAR 830 was initially prepared on December 29, 1983, and identified a deficiency that involved failure of the design change program to identify vendor technical manuals and vendor drawings as requiring update upon
as
,l-I Appendix A,
implementation of a plant modification. The licensee's preventive main-
'f tsnance program.for EQ equipment required that appropriate vendor technical
~;~
manuals be referenced for performance of preventive maintenance activities.
Failure of the design program-to identify vendor technical manuals and J
shop drawings. that should have been updated resulted in the preventive maintenance program referencing incorrect vendor documents. The licensee J
~ laimed that completion of this CAR was-delayed because of new issues-c created by GL 83-28.
The NRC staff will not discuss whether CAR 830, in its final expanded form was addressed in a timely manner because discussions with the licensee on GL 83-28 issues have continued for some time..However, the NRC staff t
maintains that the original concerns in CAR 830 were not addressed in a
(
M timely manner.
In retrospect, the' licensee should have issued a separate CAR to address the emerging issues rather than indefinitely extending the-um completion date for the corrective actions of the older issues. The NRC staff recognizes that some of the cmerging GL 83-28 issues could affect E
the resolution of the earlier concerns.
However, it was incumbent on-the licensee, at a mininum, to have. interim guidance in place:to assure vendor L
information was properly referenced and updated for preventive naintenance.
'l L
procedures whose use was on going, while final resolution of all the emerging issues was being addressed.
The licensee stated that completion of CAR 1251 was delayed by the L
completion of the Limitorque evaluation conducted pursuant to NRC Bullctin L
'85-03.
Since this CAR was closely related to the issues covered by i!.RC p
Bulletin 85-03, the NRC' staff is withdrawing CAR 1251 as an example.
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-The violation will be modified in our records to reflect the deletion of the example dealing with CAR 1251.
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- i; APPENDIX B References 1.
Steven A. Varga, NRC Letter' to F. L. Clayton, Alabama Power Company
Subject:
Safety Evaluation Report for Equipment Qualification of Safety-related Equipment Unit 1 NRC February.4', 1983 2.
Steven A. Varga, NRC Letter to F. L. Clayton, Alabama Power Company
Subject:
Safety Evaluation Report for Equipment Qualification of Safety-related Equipment Unit 2 NRC February 4, 1983 3.
Steven A. Varga, NRC Letter to R. P. Mcdonald, Alabama Power Company e
Subject:
Safety Evaluations on Environmental-Qualification of l
Electric Equipment at Farley Units 1 and 2 NRC December 13, 1984 4.
Limitorque Test Report B0058 Limitorque Valve Actuator Qualification for Nuclear Power.
Station Service January 11, 1980 5.
J. Nelson Grace, NRC LLetter to R. P. Mcdonald, Alabama Power Company
Subject:
Enforcement Conference Sununary (NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-348/87-30 and 50-364/87-30)
'NRC April 13, 1988 6..
J. M. Taylor, NRC L
Letter to Nuclear Utility Group on Equipment Qualification-l>
Subject:
Response to Group Provided Comments on GL 88-07 NRC February 13, 1989 7.
F. L. Clayton, Jr.
Letter to S. A. Varga, NRC
Subject:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
' nit 2 J
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment APC0 June'23, 1982 8.
F. L. Clayton, Jr.
Letter to S. A. Varga, NRC
Subject:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Environmental Qualification APC0 February 29, 1984
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