ML20217A290

Insp Rept 70-0036/97-03 on 970804-08.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Surveillance Testing

ML20217A290
Person / Time
Site:	07000036
Issue date:	09/12/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217A270	List: ML20217A266 ML20217A284 ML20217A290
References
70-0036-97-03, 70-36-97-3, NUDOCS 9709190118
Download: ML20217A290 (10)

Text

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h U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOf4 REGION 111 Docket No: 070-0003G l Ucense No: SNM 33 l Report No:

070-0003G/97003(DNMS) l Ucensee:

ABB Combustion Engineering Facility:

Hematito Nudear Fuel Manufacturing Facility Location:

Combustion Engineering, Inc. -

Hematite, MO 63047 -

Dates: August 4-0,1997 Inspector:

Timothy Reidinger Senior Fuel Cycle inspector Approved by:

Patrick Hiland, Acting Chief Fuel Cycle Branch, Division of tJuclear Materials Safety b

I 97o9190118 970912 PDR ADOCK 07000036 C PDR a

l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

ADD Combustion Engineering Nuc! ear Fuct Manufacturing Facility Hematite, Missouri NRC Inspection Report 0704003G/97003(DNMS) maintenance and surveillance testing.The inspection involved the review Operallons flP 88020) implemented by the licensee. Criticality safety engineering and procedural adm The leaks were due to system leaks or corroded suppor .

system. As a resuh, the licensee implemented compensatory actions as detailed in system until the " wet" scrubber system is installed late 1997. separ Maintenance rmd Surveillance Activities (IP 88025) 3 blocked with " solid" UF. was initiated without a proper va steam supplyisolation valve.

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& port Details 1.0 Operations Review 1.1 Chanae Control

a. , inspection Scooe (88020) the handling and storage trays of the Dry Recycle Reac criticality safety specialist and responsible project engineer. The inspector also conducted a walkdown of the area to confirm the application of criticality safety engineering and administrative controts related to this change. Specific procedures a licensee documents reviewed were: I o .

Operating (Rev) 9, datedSystem (OS)

July 18,1997. Procedure No. 803," Dry Recycle Processing,' Ravision Nuclear dated MarchCriticality 14,1997. Safety Evaluations (NCSE) Procedure Number (No.) RAAP Quality Control Procedure (OCP) No. 5002.04,

• Change Control Management (CCM)," Rev.1, dated April 9,1997,

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Reactor Boxes," dated February 25,1997. Notification of Change Co Nuclear Cnticality Safety Evaluation Plant System (NCSEPS) 330/448, "The D Side and Scrap Recycle Fumaces," dated July 30,1997.

Nuclear 19,1997, Criticality Safety Analysis (NCSA) of the Muffler Box, Rev. O, dated Jul b.

_ Observations and Findinos in accordance with the current change process, a nuclear criticality safety analys (NCSA) must be obtained for each facility change involving nuclear safety, radiolo safety, or industrial safety. The N ms provide a summary of the conditions and spe requirements, derived from the assdated nudear criticality safety evaluation (NC revised operating procedures related to the change are f for confinning approval. conformance to the NASA conditions and change specifications and fina NOSES, in part, summarize and detail the conclusions, and " suggested" limits and control for that change. controls from the criticality safety parameters (CAPS) and The inspector noted that the NASA for the change reviewed adequately summarized conditions and special requirements to be implemented as derived from the respective 3

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i NCTE. The inspector noted that the NCTE provided a summary of boundin conditions, criticality sc'ety limits and controls, oprat '

requirements for reporting of upset conditions that have an effect on the est in the number of safe volumes of enriched uran pans in the recycle fumace.

the NCTE were in existence and being used. In add limits and controls had been incorpone.ed into the applicable operating proce The licensee also initiated operator trairiing on the revised procedures.

c. Conclusions .

Criticality safety implemented. engineering and procedural administrative controls were 2.0 Maintenance and Surveillance Activities flP 88025) 2.1 Feed Une Repairs from the No. 2 Vaporize _ _r

a. hspection Scope

, The inspector reviewed the maintenance activities undertaken in response to th line blockage (" freeze out") of liquid UF observations of activities in progress w. from the No. 2 vaporizer and compared procedures manual. Specific procedures and licensee documents r Operating System Procedure No. 001.02, " Leading and Unloading the Vaporiz and Switching Cylinders," Rev. 9, dated July 21,1997.

Health Physics November 30,1095.Procedure No. 330, " Radiation Work Permit," Rev. O, dated Operating 1997. System Procedure No. 203,

• industrial Safety," Rev. 4, dated Au Nuclear dated MarchIndustrial 15,199G. Safety Procedure (NIS) No. 219, " Control of Hazardous

b. Observations and Findinns During operations of the Oxide Plant on August 4,1997, a full uranium hexaflu cylinder in vaporizer No. 2 was being heated with steam prior to being selected for on-processing. The cylinderin vaporizer No.1 was in the finishing stage of being emptied o UF contents. When the control room operators switched to the No. 2 vaporizer and attempted to establish UF flow, the operators discovered that c solid UF had fonned in the feed line from the No. 2 vaporizer which blocked UFe flow.

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The control room operators discovered that the feed line (approximately 20 fe l

point)" of liquid UF.. " Freeze out" typically occurs .

feed line from the No. 2 vapodzer was last closed by i

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• steam line piping. The maintenance staff had installed level detedors for the No. 2 vapodzer which were located near heat trac After maintenance work was conducted dudng a period the plant and proce .

were shut down in July 1997, the steam trace heating sysicm to the feed line was no restored to ks normal configuration pdor to resuming plant operations.

During routine tours of plant facilities, the inspector observed the in-progress maintenance activities to " change out" the feed line from the affected vaporizer. O of the *UF, freeze out" by removing various sections o Radiation Work Permit (RWP). The RWP is typically used to authodze repair work addition to establishing health physic controls for non-routino activities that involve potential forintake or exposure to radioactive matedal.

The inspector reviewed the RWP and observed that the control room operator wearing a face shield with the full face respirator as required by the RWP during removal of various valves and associated piping, The control room operators when physicist (HP) authorized an exemption for wearing the fa level of protection as a face shield. *n addition, the face s a face respirator would Impede work activities as it would be physically cumbersome reach various sections of piping that would be later inspected for

• freeze out." The HP control requirements for the scheduled maintenance activities. s As a followup, the inspector asked other control room operators on later sh did not wear the face shield as required on the RWP after they completed va activities on the affected vaporizer feed line. The control room operators sta signed the RWP as required and neglected to read all the listed health phys they indicated that they followed the example of what the other control rcom opera had wom on previous shifts. They all noted that the RWP required full face shields The licensee agreed at the exit that plant staff were required to adhere to the requirements in the RWP and the staff were encouraged to have a ' questioning to resolve any conflicts noted on the RWP. Ti,e licensee indicated that senior m would re-emphasize that work health physics controls associated with RWP requi shallmanagement.

senior be followed unless a conflict was noted on the RWP which required res On the afternoon of August 7 the inspector identified that the repair work activities still ongoing v311te T and that the steam trace supply isolation valve was not tagged with eith the str .a supply isolation valve that supplied steam heat to th piping. Several shift forepersons, when asked what positive measures were used to S

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prevent opening the steam trace supply to the affected feed line, stated that *ali

! inspector expressed concem that a positive meas personnel (scrap of yellow injury paper) and wasaplaced UF. release on the steam fromtrace en supply inadvertent valve. valve open i

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Select control room operators and shift forepersons were questioned hazards would be present if the steam trace supply valvt was inadver ,

i feed line that contained " solid" UF., All correctly responded that stea s

{ applied to the vaporizer feed line blocked with solid UF. could potent UF, to expand resulting in the feed line rupture and a UF, release. . 1 i-  !

1 Safety Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear Material License SNM 33 requires t 4

Chapters 1 through 8 of the application dated Octobe thereto.

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t Procedure NIS No. 219, Section 6.2 states, in part, that a tagout shall be us affects the safety of affected personnel, in addition,  ;

lockout shall be used to remove equipment if work to be performed can or c while hazards are exposed. The failure of the licensee t -

the feed line that con'alned " solid" UF, is a Violation N 4

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c. Conclusions h

Activities observed were generally conducted in accordance with applicabl l

permits, and postings. Operators used appropriate protective clothing and eq

• 4 with one exception, in addition, the failure to ensure that a tagout orlockout was identified as a violation.on a steam supply valve that supplied trace steam heating

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3.0 Hydrocen Fluoride Release 4

a. inspection scope  !

!- The inspector scrubber system. reviewed the circumstances that resulted in two HF leaks fro 4

b.

Observations and Findinos

1. Dercrintion of Event 1

3 During a tour of the UF. cylinder storage yard on August 5, the inspectoridentified an i

t unusual strong smellin the air in the vicinity of the dry scrubber system. The inspecto was concemed that the unusual smellindicated that a HF release had occurr presence of the smell was communicated to a licensee staff member who was in the t

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the HF emissions as a corroded pipe to the dry scrubbers. cylin As an immediate response to the release the licensee ensured that the ap were notified, and the control room opera, tors initiated an investigation of the system and associated support piping. The control room operators discovered

• purge line" to the dry scrubbers was severed in half by corrosion and was the HF emissions. The maintenance staft subsequently replaced the purge line i

We dry scrubber system was used to treat the HF prior to releasing the pro out the stack by reacting it with limestone rocks. The corrosive nature of the H deteriorates gaskets, valve seats and seals rapidly. Additionally, the limestone /C

' rocks" needed to be replaced on almost a daily schedule. ,

again identified an unusual strong smell in the air in th system. The inspector immediatelyinformed was concemed that another HF release had occurred ahd the licensee.

to atmospheric conditions and when the wind shifted, ifoccasionally smelled anyone smelled HF in the in this area. cylinder yard. In addition, HF level tests would be cond The inspector requested that a health physics technician perform a HF level tes

% area. The licensee's investigation deteanined that the sou fium valve packing, gaskets and gate seals in the primary scrubber. A malfunc secondary scrubber created high back pressure to the primary scrubber which res times during the history of the dry scrubber, corrosion Although these fugitive releases of HF roleases still occurred.have been greatly reduced by the use of a new gasket

2. _ Compensatory Actions Fo!!owing telephone discussions on August 20,1997, the licensee implemented emissions from the dry scrubber system until a

• wet" se replaced with a new wet scrubber system. The engin vias installed ongoing, and during and operating interviews the lastwith licensee quarter of 1997. personnel indicated that the system m

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c. Conclusions Two hydrofluoric acid (HF) leaks from the dry scrubber system identified by th The licensee implemented actions to limit future HF cmissions from the dry scrubb system until the

• wet" scrubber system was installed late 1997.

4.0 inspection Follow-Up System (IFS) issues (92702) 4.1 fClosed) IFl No. 070-0003G/97001-05: Lack of a formal program to cahi,l the incinerator's system safety devices.

The licensee revised OS No. 862," Periodic Testing Requirements," to ensure that the safety interiocks will be tested to verify the intended safety functions once the incinerator was determined operable.

' 4.2 (Closed) IFl No. 070-00036/970010G: Lack of operator training to help eliminate ope crTors and root cause investigation training for the high sample followup reports'(HSFR The licensee conducted additional training for the operators and senior staff to help operators better understand radiological conditions on the worksite during non-routine work the HSFR.

activities. Roci cause training was conducted for the senior staff to better evaluate 4.3 l (Closed) VIO No. 070-0003G/97001-03: The licensee failed to include the specifie instructions for reporting of potential damt go to criticality safety barriers.

ho. The licensee revised procedures OS No. 3260.00 and OS No. 3310.00 to incorporate criticality revised procedures. safety reporting requirements. The licensee completed operator training on the 4.4 (Closed) VIO No. 070-0003G/96002-02: Failure to ensure that a vehicle gate was locked or attended and that vehicles were escorted by constant surveillance in the controlled area.

The inspector interviewed the security staff, reviewed the licensee's escort log book maintained by the security staff and determined that all vehicles were being escorted on site appropriately by plant staff, in addition, the inspector observed on several occasions that plant staff were provided as escorts for visiting vehicles entering the controlled area of the plant.

4.5 (Closed)

Units."

IFl No. 070-0003G/96002-01: Lack of understanding of criticality "In-Transit The licensee conducted additional training for the operators that addressed "in-Transit Units" and also issued pocket size cue cards to all the operators to use as a pocket reference on criticality related terms. Discussions with several operators indicated an adequale understanding of criticality terms.

5.0 Manacement Meetina 8

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1 on August 8,1997, for the exit meeting. The insp findings of the inspections, '

t The licensee propriotary. did not identify any of the information discussed at the mo 4

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EARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel Contacted

• 8. Kaiser. Vice President D. Sharkey, Director of Regulatory Affairs M. Easthm, Hudear Criticakty Specialist R. Free,iian, Nuclear Criticality Specialist H. Eskridge, Senior Consultant Regulatory Affairri G. Page, Director, Ceramic Operations G. Jordan, Production Manager E. Saito, Health Physicist K. Funke, Health Physics Supervisor J. Long, System Engineer E. Criddle, Training Manager .

D. Harris, Production Support Manager

• K. Hayes, Industrial Safety Engineer D. Alkler, Industrial Process Engineer B. Griscom, Facility Engineer

• Senior licensee officht at exrt meeting on August 8,1997, insoection Procedures Used IP 88020: Criticality / Operations Review 1:

IP 88025: Maintenance / Surveillance 8

Item Opened 070-0003G/97003-01 VIO:

The licensee failed to establish a lockout nor install a danger tag on the steam isolaticn valve that supplied trace steam heating to the feed line that contained

• solid" U F. ,

List of Acronyms HF Hydrogen fluoride HP Health physics hr Hour NASA Nuclear Cdticality Safety Analysis NCTE Nuclear Cdticality Safety Evaluations Nls Nuclear Industrial Safety Procedure OS Operating System IP inspection Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCP Quality Control Procedure UF. Uranium hexafluoride VIO Violation 10

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