ML20235X042

Applicant Rebuttal Testimony 9 (Traffic Mgt & Evacuation of Special Populations).* Supporting Documentation Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20235X042
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	02/28/1989
From:	Baldacci S, Callendrello A, Lieberman E, Mileti D COLORADO STATE UNIV., FORT COLLINS, CO, KLD ASSOCIATES, INC., PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20235W814	List: ML20235W811 ML20235W833 ML20235W884 ML20235W975 ML20235X042 ML20235X098 ML20235X147 ML20235X168 ML20235X220 ML20235X278 ML20235X312
References
OL, NUDOCS 8903130293
Download: ML20235X042 (162)

Text

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'89 MAR -3 A10:23 February 28, 1989 I On ju. i.-  :

UNITEF5fNTESd[ AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of )

I. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF

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) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL I (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

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(Off-site Emergency Planning Issues)

APPLICANTS' REBUTTAL TESTIMONY NO. 9 (TRAFFIC I MANAGEMENT AND EVACUATION OF SPECIAL POPULATIONS)

[ Panel Members: Stephen M. Baldacci, E-P Technical Issues 5, Coordinator, New Hampshire Yankee Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager of Emergency I Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee Edward B. Lieberman, President, KLD Associates i

Dr. Dennis S. Mileti, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment I Laboratory, Colorado State University I

I 8903130293 DR 890228 ADOCK 05000443 T

PDR 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. Objective of Traffic Management . . . . . . . 1 B. Summary of Traffic Management /ETE Development Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 C. Determination of Traffic and Access Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 D. Traffic and Access Control Point Diagrams . . 13 E. Traffic Control Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 17 7 F. Mobilization of Traffic Guides . . . . . . . . 23 G. Implementing Traffic Control at TCPs/ACPs . . 28 H. When ACPs Are Activated . . . . . . . . . . . 33 I. Traffic Control at Traffic Control Point 36 B-AM-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

J. Evacuees' Response to Trafffic Guides . . . . 39 K. Dr. Adler's Concerns on the Effects of I " Staffing" or "Not Staffing" Traffic Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 40

1. Adler's " Figure 1" Case . . . . . . . . .

2. Adler's " Figure 2" Case . . . . . . . . . 42 L. Impediment / Road Crew Response . . . . . . . . 43

1. Road Crew Deployment Locations . . . . . 43

2. SPMC's Road Impediment Response . . . . . 46

3. Impediment Response / Communications Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8

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l 4. -Rerouting Evacuation Traffic in Response to Traffic Impediments ......... 52 l

5. Flooding of Plum Island Turnpike as an Impediment' . .............. 53

6. FEMA's Evaluation of the SPMC's Impediment Response Procedures ..... 53

7. Gillis Bridge as an Impediment ..... 54

8. B&M Railroad Bridge as an Impediment .. 56 II. SPECIAL POPULATIONS . . .............. 57 A. Bus Route Selection ............. 57 B. Field Study Conducted to Evaluate Routes ... 59 C. Bus Route Maps . . .............. 60 D. Evacuation Process . ............. 63

1. Transfer Point Operations . ....... 63

2. Estimate of Transit Dependent Persons . . 64

3. Number of Runs Per Bus Route ...... 65

4. Route Guides .............. 67

5. Buses Crossing Evacuating Traffic . ... 68

6. Flooding . . .............. 69

a. Area Wide Flooding . ........ 69

b. Localized Flooding . ........ 69

7. Convoys . . . .............. 70

8. Bus Resources .............. 71 E. Specific Evacuation Capability Contention (JI-07) . . . . . .............. 71 E

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1. BASIS A .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

2. BASIS D.1.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3. BASIS D.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4. BASIS D.4.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

5. BASIS D.5.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6. BASIS D.5.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

7. BASIS D.5.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

8. BASIS D.6.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

9. BASIS D.6.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

10. BASIS D.6.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

11. BASIS D.6.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

32. BASIS E.1.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

13. BASIS E.2.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

14. BASIS E.2.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

15. BASIS E.2.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

16. BASIS E.3.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

17. BASIS E.3.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

18. BASIS E.3.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

19. BASIS E.3.e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

20. BASIS E.4.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

21. BASIS E.4.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

22. BASIS E.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

23. BASIS F.1.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 88

24. BASIS F.1.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

25. BASIS F.1.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

26. BASIS F.1.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

27. BASIS F.1.e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

28. BASIS F.2.a-c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

29. BASIS F.2.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

30. BASIS F.2.e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 1 31. BASIS F.3.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

32. BASIS F.3.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

33. BASIS F.4.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

34. BASIS F.4.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

35. BASIS F.5.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

36. BASIS F.5.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

37. BASIS G.1.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

38. BASIS G.1.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

39. BASIS G.1.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

40. BASIS G.2.a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

41. BASIS G.2.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

42. BASIS G.2.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

43. BASIS G.3.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

44. BASIS G.4.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

45. BASIS G.4.c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

46. BASIS G.4.d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 l 47. BASIS G.4.e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

48. BASIS G.4.f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

49. BASIS H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

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50. BASIS I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

51. BASIS J.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

52. BASIS J.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

53. BASIS J.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

54. BASIS K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

55. CON 3 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

56. CON 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Attachment A: TCP Diagram B-SA-06 Attachment B: Amesbury Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Appendices 1 and 5 i I Attachment C:

Attachment D:

TCP Diagram B-SA-02 FEMA Final Exercise Report, 9/1/88, page 202, Objective #2 Attachment E: TCP Diagram B-AM-06 i! Attachment Attachment F:

G:

Tow Truck Travel Time Study TCP Diagram B-SA-08 Attachment H: TCP Diagram B-SA-01 Attachment I: Field Study of Evacuation Bus Routes 9 Attachment J: Criteria for Bus Drivers Attachment K: Results of Analyses Performed Per NHRERP, Volume 6, pages 11-11 through 11-15

i. Attachment L: Revised Route Guide Map Bus Route Maps (from Public Information Attachment M:

Materials)

Attachment N: Newbury Route #4 as of Amendment 3 of the SPMC i Attachment 0: Newbury Route #4 as of Amendment 5 of the SPMC Attachment P: Newbury Route #4 post-Amendment 5 Attachment Q: Most current Newbury Bus Route #4 Attachment R: Newbury School Bus Route #9 Attachment S: Newbury Bus Route #1 g Attachment T: Flood Plain Map y Attachment U: Newbury School Bus Route #7 Attachment V: Newbury Evacuation Bus Route #3 Attachment W: Flood Plain Map I Attachment Attachment X:

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Newburyport Daily News, 9/2/88, p.

Newbury Evacuation Bus Routes #1 and #5 3

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I This testimony addresses the Joint Intervenor (JI) contentions JI 4, 5, 7, 60 regarding the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts communities' (hereafter the SPMC) traffic management plan and the plan for evacuation of transit dependent and special populations.

I. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT A. Objective of Traffic Management The primary objective of traffic management is to support emergency evacuation operations to ensure an adequate and efficient evacuation from the area of concern. To support this objective it is necessary to recommend evacuation routes and implementable traffic control strategies to efficiently utilize the available roadway network capacity. In some instances, control strategies which enhance existing roadway capacity can significantly expedite evacuation traffic movements. Since such treatments are frequently resource-intensive, they should be limited to those locations which offer the greatest potential benefits.

Thus, a well-designed traffic management plan identifies the most effective control strategies, quantifies the resulting benefits, and balances these benefits with the available resources to define the most effective and implementable plan responsive to the stated objective.

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B. Summary of Traffic Management /ETE Development Process The SPMC's traffic management plan was developed as an outcome of the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) development

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process. The following is a summary of that process:

(1) The temporal and spatial (geographic) distribution of population throughout the plume exposure EPZ was estimated. These estimates were stratified by population group: residents, transients, employees, and transit dependent. Estimates of the peak number of vehicles in the beach areas during the summer season were based on aerial photographic surveys.

(2) A preliminary layout of the roadway network was developed. Then, a physical survey of the roadway system within the EPZ was conducted to measure roadway length and determine the number of lanes on each link (roadway section), the channelization of these lanes, whether there were any turn restrictions or specific traffic treatments at intersections, terrain (i.e., general estimates of vertical grade and horizontal curvature) and to gain the necessary insight required for estimating realistic values of roadway capacity and free flow speed. A telephone survey of residents was E

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conducted to acquire demographic, employment, car-ownership and work-trip information. These data were used, in part, to estimate the number of j l

evacuation trips for residents and employees.

(3) The evacuation network representation of the 1 physical roadway system was developed and estimates of the capacities of each link were calculated

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using the procedures of the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual. The trip generation time distribution and evacuation traffic volume based on the resident, employee, tourist and beach population distributions were determined. This information was then compiled in the form of input data for the IDYNEV traffic assignment and simulation models.

(4) Evacuation scenarios which represent the spectrum of seasonal, day of week, time of day and weather factors which can influence ETEs were defined.

(5) The traffic assignment model was then executed to assign paths of travel from each specified origin (representing a point where evacuating trips are loaded onto the network) within the EPZ to one or more specified destinations on the periphery of the EPZ in such a way as to generally satisfy motorists' desire to minimize their evacuation travel time, subject to the condition that evacuees

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will travel in directions generally away from the power station.

(6) The traffic assignment and simulation model outputs were then analyzed to identify locations within the roadway network exhibiting congested traffic conditions caused by an excess demand relative to capacity.

(7) Implementable traffic control treatments were then developed to minimize congestion. These treatments included the routing'of evacuating traffic so as to disperse demand and fully utilize available roadway capacity to the extent practicable:by: applying appropriate guidance for evacuees; specifying control treatments at critical intersections to improve service or increase capacity (e.g., adding an extra travel lane by traffic management policies); and prescribing specific treatments for channelizing flow so as to expedite the movement of traffic.

3 (8) The traffic strategies employed at the individual h

I traffic control points (TCPs) specified in the SPMC l

formed the basis of the traffic management plan.

I They.were then represented in the IDYNEV input data.

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(9) The traffic assignment and simulation models were then executed in tandem to evaluate the effects of these strategies.

(10) The resultant IDYNEV output describes traffic operations of evacuating vehicles on the roadway network over time and produces statistical measures of effectiveness describing the performance of traffic operations on each link of the network.

This output was then analyzed to determine if additional treatments or modifications in the traffic control plan were advisable.

This procedure was recursive and iterative: the process of analyzing output, prescribing traffic control modifications and rerunning the IDYNEV model continued until the results were considered satisfactory (NHRERP, Vol. 6).

Steps (9) and (10) were repeated, iteratively, until no material improvement in ETE was obtained. The resultant traffic management plan is documented in the NHRERP, Volume 6, and the SPMC Appendix J.

3 C. Determination of Traffic and Access Control Points f The implemented strategies of the traffic control points l (TCPs) and Access Control Points (ACPs), which were I

determined as part of the ETE development process, either l

provide directional guidance for evacuating traffic,

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discourage specific movements, increase capacity, or

i otherwise expedite traffic movement. Specifically, traffic control points are designed to perform a number of functicns:

(1) facilitate evacuating traffic movements which serve to expedite travel out of the EPZ along the planned evacuation  :

routes; (2) discourage traffic movements which permit evacuating vehicles to travel in a direction which takes them significantly closer to the power station; and (3) resolve l potential conflicts between traffic streams at intersections by assigning right-of-way so as to promote safe operations and to keep traffic moving.

In addition, the Traffic Guides at the TCPs serve to reassure the public and provide a surveillance function. In computing the ETE, the capacity-enhancing and route guidance functions potentially influence evacuation time.

The number of Traffic Guides assigned to each TCP and ACP is indicated on the diagrams in Appendix I of the NHRERP, Volume 6, and was determined based upon the complexity of the point's traffic strategy, the location's general configuration, and the type of equipment assigned for use.

To assist with this, Police Chiefs in the Massachusetts EPZ communities were requested to provide input on the traffic routing, TCP and ACP strategies, and how many personnel and what equipment would be required to implement the desired strategies. Detailed inputs to the design of the traffic control plan were received from five of the Police Chiefs

(all except that of the Town of Amesbury) during interviews Mr. Lieberman conducted with them and through subsequent correspondence (NHRERP, Volume 6, pp. 8-3 through 8-10). All inputs received from the police chiefs were incorporated into the NHRERP, Volume 6, Appendix I.

Occasionally, the recommendations of one police chief would influence the control strategy at an intersection located in another jurisdiction. One example is the intersection of Routes 1, 1A and 110 at Salisbury Center.

The westbound, Route 1A (Beach Road) approach to Route 1 at Salisbury Center services traffic exiting Salisbury Beach.

These vehicles generally travel through the intersection onto Route 110 westbound or turn left and travel southbound on Route 1/1A.

Most of the traffic stream proceeding west on Route 110 either accesses I-95 southbound or I-495 southbound, via on-ramps directly servicing westbound traffic on Route 110.

This pattern of westbound traffic movement (i.e., vehicles from the beach utilizing both I-95 and I-495) is also

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described in Chief Beevers' testimony at page 9.

The original control policy developed for this i

intersection (which is TCP B-SA-06, the diagram for which is i

Attachment A hereto) was to facilitate both the westbound I

l travel along Route 110 toward I-95 and I-495, and the southbound travel along Route 1. The police chiefs in 1

Newbury and Newburyport, however, objected to this policy.

They believed that Route 1 would be congested with evacuating traffic from Salisbury Beach to the extent that evacuees from Newburyport and Newbury would be unduly delayed as a result.

To respond to these concerns, the traffic control policy at Salisbury Center was revised and took its present form, whereby all traffic is routed over two lanes along westbound Route 110 to I-95 and I-495. This revised policy was reviewed with the Salisbury Folice Chief (Chief Olivera), who approved it and stated that the town police could implement it.

The TCPs and ACPs from Appendix I of the NHRERP were also incorporated into the Massachusetts RERP, Appendix 3, Section C-3 of the Area I MCDA Operations Plan for Seabrook Station (April 1986). The Commonwealth has indicated that the Massachusetts State Police would look toward this plan for guidance and "that plan directs the State Police to coordinate the implementation of traffic and access control,

" (Massachusetts Attorney General's Answers to NRC Staff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, dated December 19, 1988, Response to Interrogatory No. 2).

The traffic control strategies of the SPMC Appendix J are based largely on the NHRERP, Volume 6, Appendix I strategies. The SPMC reflects minor corrections, one

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additional TCP and a revised strategy at one other TCP presented-in the'NHRERP, Volume 6.

In the simultaneous evacuation of the entire Massachusetts portion of the EPZ, the resulting. traffic control plan employed by the SPMC. utilizes 37 TCPs staffed by 73 Traffic Guides, and 14 ACPs staffed by 22 Traffic Guides.

Many of these individual points cover more than one intersection or roadway segment. (See SPMC Appendix J.) If less than the full Massachusetts portion of.the EPZ is evacuated, up to 6 supplemental ACPs may be manned by 6 Traffic Guides; the actual number which need to be manned depends on the region evacuated.

While additional TCPs may be helpful'in providing assurance to evacuees and in assisting traffic movements, they would have a minimal impact on reducing evacuation times. The identification of needed and advisable TCPs was

-an integral part of the ETE development process, as previously described. We believe, as an outcome of the ETE

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process, that the specified TCPs and their respective traffic control strategies are adequate.

L Placement of additional TCPs at non-capacity constrained locations would not further expedite evacuation traffic flow because traffic demand is less than capacity at these locations. Placement of additional TCPs at capacity constrained locations could potentially expedite local

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traffic flow. However, this benefit isLuinimal if this expedited flow encounters'a more restrictive bottleneck downstream; in this event, gains that are' realized locally would.be canceled at the more restrictive location. Because' the existing plan. accounts for the restrictive' locations that

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.have ultimate control of the traffic flow, the. placement ~of additional TCPs would not reduce the ETE.

As. indicated earlier, the Police Chief from the Town of Amesbury rejected a. request to provide inputs and did not participate in the development of the town's traffic plan..

Accordingly, the TCPs and. Traffic Guide requirements for the Town of Amesbury were determined by KLD Associates..

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The resulting SPMC traffic plan designed for the Town of Amesbury specifies 9 TCPs staffed by 17 Traffic Guides. This is adequate for this town. It is interesting to note that the June 13, 1986 Amesbury Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan developed by town and state officials specifies only two-

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TCPs for evacuation of the entire town (Amesbury Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Appendix 1 and

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Appendix 5, Attachment B hereto). One of the TCPs specified 5 in.the Town of Amesbury Plan is located at the intersection of Route 110 and Elm Street, which is part of the SPMC's TCP l

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-B-AM-06. The Town of Amesbury Plan identifies the location of its other TCP as " Route 110 and 495." The accompanying sketch shows this TCP at Hillside Avenue and Route 110. In

any case, Route 110 and I-495 is the location of SPMC TCP B-AM-08, while the intersection of Hillside Avenue and Route 110 is the location of SPMC TCP B-AM-06.

Allegations, that additional traffic control is required to maintain two-way-traffic flow on EPZ roadways was addressed as part of testimony on the NHRERP. On this issue and on other aberrant driver behavior issues, testimony was provided before this Board during litigation of the NHRERP.

Specifically, it was stated that unstable or aberrant driver behavior is not expected to be a significant factor in the event of an emergency at Seabrook and there is no aspect of human behavior in the population of the Seabrook EPZ which will prevent an adequate emergency response in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook.

Allegations that additional TCPs are necessary at entrances and exits to schools and other facilities to perform an evacuation are insupportable. For example, the Town of Newbury's testimony states that TCPs are needed at

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the police station / town hall and the town's schools. While traffic control at these locations might assist the ingress 1

) and egress of vehicles to these facilities, such assistance would not influence the ETE. While the absence of such traffic control might delay, somewhat, vehicles evacuating from these facilities, other evacuating vehicles in tia traffic stream would benefit accordingly, and there wou'F not

be an effect;on ETE. Thus, placement of traffic guides at these locations would not provide any systemic benefits and would constitute a wasteful use of emergency response resources.

Allegations that the TCP diagrams and traffic control strategies are deficient because they do not utilize vehicles with flashing lights are incorrect. For example, the Town of Newbury feels it is necessary to park vehicles with flashing lights in the center of many intersections during an evacuation. These parked vehicles with flashing lights would serve no useful traffic control function, would instead distract motorists, and would reduce the available travel 3

lane width thus constituting an unnecessary impedance which -l is antithetical to the objective of expediting traffic flow.

While parking vehicles in the traveled portion of a roadway is an accepted' traffic control strategy when it is necessary or desirable to prevent access to a roadway or substantially reduce the speed of oncoming vehicles, the application of i I

this tactic within intersections is inappropriate for j j

expeditina evacuation traffic flow.

l I The Traffic Management Plan is defined in terms of the ACPs and TCPs, the allocation and assignment of traffic guides, the pattern of traffic movements " facilitated" and

" discouraged" by these guides, and the traffic cones deployed f

to expedite travel out of the EPZ. This plan represents the

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,I combined contributions of 5 of the 6 Massachusetts town's police chiefs at the time of development. As such, the plan has been carefully designed to implement effective control strategies to support the evacuation process.

D. Traffic and Access Control Point Diagrams The traffic and access control point diagrams provided in Appendix J of the SPMC clearly describe the desired traffic control strategies, equipment placement, and general positioning of the Traffic Guides. Specifically, the diagrams identify each evacuating traffic movement which is to be facilitated or discouraged, the placement of cones, and the positioning of traffic guides. Additionally, the diagrams indicate which approaches are expected to have

" light" traffic (volume) under evacuation conditions. These approaches are labeled " light."

I For example, Attachment C hereto is the TCP diagram for B-SA-02. This TCP covers the intersections of Forest Street (Route 286) and High Street, and Main Street, Forest Street and Willow Street in Salisbury. As shown on the diagram, the movements to be facilitated are indicated with arrows and the movements to be discouraged are indicated with blocked arrows. For example, at the intersection of Forest Street ,

I I and High Street traffic movement westbound on Forest Street l is facilitated while southeastbound movements on High Street are discouraged. Additionally, traffic entering the I

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intersection of Main Street and Willow Street from the south on' Willow Street is expected to be " light" (low volume)-and is labeled as such.

The TCP diagrams are drawn with the traffic cones (indicated.as circles on the diagrams) shown oversize relative to the scale of the rest of the diagram. Thus, in some cases, it appears on the diagram as if cones completely block roadways, which is not the. case. It was necessary to draw the TCP diagrams this way to clearly indicate'where cones should be deployed.

In many cases the TCP diagrams do not indicate the presence of driveways or access roads to parking lots or shopping centers in the immediate vicinity of the TCP.

Additionally, some secondary roads nearby may not be shown if they do not affect implementation of the TCP strategy. The omission of these details does not affect the traffic guides' ability to implement the desired traffic control strategy.

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.The TCP diagrams also indicate a general position for the traffic guides at the TCP (indicated by a circle with an

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"X" through it). During the course of evacuation operations i' the traffic guides are free to move within the TCP, as necessary, to implement the control strategy. In addition, j

1 the SPMC Appendix J TCP and ACP diagrams for multi-staffed points will be revised to include an internal staffing priority to indicate which Traffic Guide locations should be I

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staffed first. This will allow the first arriving Traffic Guides to. assume a position and establish that portion of the overall traffic strategy which best expedites the evacuation.

Despite the criticism contained in.Dr. Adler's testimony, the diagram.for TCP B-SA-06 (Attachment A hereto) is clear and unambiguous'for the intended audience. All.

recommended traffic movements are clearly indicated.- The absence of. arrows with bars (or blocked arrows) in the vicinity of Mudnock Road serves to eliminate the clutter of a

" busy" diagram, but does not invite any confusion. The recommended paths of travel of traffic exiting Mudnock Road and.those along School Street are clearly shown, as are cones discouraging access onto Mudnock Road and onto the sh' ort streets intersecting School Street from the north.

Dr. Adler's observation that "The intention of the TCP diagram (for B-SA-06] appears to totally exclude westbound

" (page 10 of Route _110 from entering the intersection . . .

his testimony) is incorrect. This sentence should read, j

"[e]xclude eastbound Route 110 traffic from entering . . .

Furthermore, there is no "[i]ntended diversion of heavy westbound evacuating traffic . . . into the eastbound lane at this location" as contended. This lane of westbound traffic moves throuch the intersection and across the overpass along Route 110 -- there is no " diversion" of traffic. ]

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The " BLOCK TRAFFIC FLOW" which appears in the Legend of this diagram applies to the accompanying symbol of 3 X's )

I enclosed in a rectangle. This symbol in the diagram at the 1 0

western end of the overpass clearly applies to the light {

l traffic in the eastbound lane of Route 110. Note that a traffic guide is located there to facilitate the westbound flow along two lanes on Route 110 and to monitor those few vehicles in the eastbound lane who may have ignored the guidance of the traffic guides at TCP B-SA-07 (located just west of B-SA-06) which also discourages eastbound movement. i To respond to any lingering concern on this matter the diagram will be revised to add the following note to the documentation of B-SA-06:

NOTE: The " BLOCK TRAFFIC" control differs from the usual control policy which permits vehicles to move in " discouraged" directions. Here, in the interest of safety, eastbound traffic is prohibited from crossing the narrow railroad overpass against two westbound evacuating traffic streams.

Additionally, with respect to this TCP, Dr. Adler's I testimony (on the top of page 11) identifies two " crossings" of double yellow lines. This is simply not the case: two f

lanes of traffic are formed at the westbound Route 1A approach to the intersection and are maintained through the intersection by 3 traffic guides and the deployment of cones delineating these lanes of travel.

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Any errors or material improvements in the TCP and ACP

. diagrams identified by the interveners or through subsequent field surveys as part of the annual update process will be

' corrected and incorporated into the-diagrams. Specifically, all priority 1 and 2 TCPs and ACPs will' indicate a minimum'of 3 cones (instead of 2) for all " discouraged" directions of travel. In addition the diagrams will be refined so that all

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elements are drawn-to a reasonable scale, and clarity of exposition will be improved.

E. Traffic Control Equipment Barricades are no longer utilized by ORO traffic guides at TCPs or ACPs. As indicated in the SPMC, Appendix J (Traffic ~ Control Summary for each town), three traffic cones are to be used in place of each barricade.

As documented on pages 9-14 through 9-21 of NHRERP Volume 6, KLD recommended the development of signs, barricades, cones and illumination devices (blinkers) at traffic and access control points. As noted above, the SPMC calls instead for the deployment of large 28-inch traffic cones with reflectorized surfaces. While the recommended l-f devices are generally preferable to traffic cones alone, it .

-is viewed that, for emergency conditions in the short term, cones would be adequate to perform the traffic control strategies indicated in the TCP and ACP diagrams as implemented under the SPMC.

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Control devices for implementing short-term traffic strategies under emergency conditions need not be in strict )

compliance with the Manual on' Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) recommendations for work zones. For example,.it'is not unusual for police to employ cones and flashing lights under emergency conditions to control traffic at or near the scene of an accident even on high speed limited access highways. The use of cones rather than barricades in such accident situations' reflects the fact that police cruisers have limited storage space and do not generally carry barricades.

The MUTCD provides guidance on the use of barricades and traffic cones. Specifically, for highway construction sites, the MUTCD recommends the use of Type I (one reflective

-banner) barricades to block traffic on conventional two-way roads and Type II barricades (two reflective banners) to block traffic on freeways or expressways. The MUTCD also states that cones may be preferable replacements for Type I barricades " Traffic cones may be easily stacked on a truck and one workman can carry and distribute several cones with ease. This mobility and flexibility (which cannot be equalled by Type I barricades) increases the usefulness of these devices." (MUTCD 6C-4) The recommended size of the traffic cones is a minimum of 18 inches, while larger sizes f

are advised when more conspicuous guidance is required.

Traffic cones "[m]ay have greater use than barricades for transition sections" [on freeways] (MUTCD,'6C-4). Thus the use of. traffic cones, especially during the initial response period, is adequate and preferable:

(1) 'The locations originally recommende' for barricades involve both two-way roads and expressways (See SPMC Appendix J). As per the MUTCD, cones are adequate to control inbound traffic on the two-way road ACP locations.

(2) The MUTCD guidance citing the use of barricades, arrow boards, etc. addresses long-term work zones rather than the need to rapidly establish control during an emergency.

(3) Larger traffic control devices are warranted at construction sites because of their long-term presence, the need to protect construction workers, and the fact that ongoing construction activities often distract motorists' attention from the task of driving. The larger control devices provide heightened conspicuity which serve to attract the drivers' attention when the visual scene is " cluttered" due to construction activity. During an evacuation, there is l

no such activity. In addition, motorists will likely be f aware that traffic control measures have been implemented

( (through EBS messages) and thus should be alert to traffic h, J'

guidance functions and devices.

f (4) The traffic cones utilized by NHY ORO traffic guides are approximately 28 inches tall. These are

significantly larger than the minimum of 18 inches recommended by the MUTCD.

f5) Traffic cones are highly portable, thus suitable for emergency operations.

(6) Traffic cones utilized by traffic guides are reflectorized to increase nighttime visibility, thereby providing the same function as blinking lights attached to cones. This is in accordance with standard procedure.

" Traffic cones . . . for nighttime use . . . shall be reflectorized or equipped with lighting devices for maximum visibility . . . The target value . . . may be enhanced . . .

at night, by reflectorization or the use of lighting devices." (Vol. 6 of the NHRERP, Rev. 2, Exhibit 9-4, pg. 9-20, " Excerpts from the MUTCD on Cone Design and Application.")

Thus, the traffic cones, suitably reflectorized, provide a highly visible means for alerting and channelizing traffic, and will be an adequate alternative to barricades for short-term control of emergency evacuation operations.

It is reasonable to expect under a best effort response that State and local police will be available to assist with traffic and access control activities. Specifically, in addition to TCPs, police will likely assist in establishing and activating ACPs and in screening vehicles, when ORO guides are instructed to do so approximately two hours after I

i

.the Order to Evacuate (OTE). In the process, the police cruisers' emergency flashing lights would provide additional conspicuity for alerting approaching motorists. In addition, all State police cruisers are equipped with microphones and loudspeakers which can be used to inform and guide motorists approaching the EPZ.

.The location of the State Police Barracks in Newbury (off Scotland Road adjoining the interchange with I-95) would facilitate an expeditious response by State police. Cruisers dispatched from the barracks can reach ACP GT-2 within 5 minutes, and HA-4 within 10-15 minutes.

For longer term control, it is reasonable to expect that the State Department of Public Works (DPW) would be able to provide additional traffic control devices (e.g. barricades, arrow boards, advisory and warning signs) for ACPs as specified in NHRERP Volume 6 and the MUTCD. If these devices .

are not in the State DPW inventory, they can be requisitioned from other sources.

l Allegations that concrete barricades are necessary to control traffic in an emergency evacuation are contrary to I current practice. First, the obvious nonportability of such devices effectively preclude their use in an emergency response. Second, in most situations access must be for vehicles to travel in directions which are " discouraged", as f

some drivers have legitimate reasons (e.g. emergency response

personnel, evacuation buses, returning commuters) for such movements. Installation of concrete barricades,.even if feasible, would prevent such travel. Third, immobile concrete barriers would restrict the traffic management plan by inhibiting or precluding rerouting of evacuating traffic in response to road impediments. Fourth, concrete barriers pose a potential hazard to moving vehicles. As stated in the

'MUTCD at'6C-8, "The effect of impacting the ends of barriers should be mitigated." For any and all of the reasons stated above, concrete barricades are totally inappropriate for emergency response activities.

NHY maintains an adequate number of traffic cones to support traffic control operations. A total of 615 traffic cones (including the amount necessary to replace barricades) is required to perform traffic and access control functions.

(SPMC, Appendix J, at J-13.) The NHY ORO maintains a total of 800 traffic cones at the staging area for use at ACPs and I

TCPs. An additional 50 cones are available at the Emergency Worker Facility (EWF).

Traffic guides utilize their personal vehicles for l transporting traffic control equipment from the staging area 1

to TCPs and ACPs. TCPs and ACPs with large amounts of equipment generally require more than one traffic guide and the equipment is distributed among these guides accordingly.

This procedure was adequately demonstrated during the 1988

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a-FEMA evaluated exercise when traffic guides transported all required equipment to-their respective TCPs and ACPs.- FEMA

-Final Exercise Report, 9/1/88, Objective'#2, page 202, Attachment D hereto.

F. Mobilization of Traffic Guides The "most important" ACPs'and TCPs are those locations where traffic guides' actions, to enhance roadway capacity or facilitate movements'(such as discouraging vehicles from entering congested areas) on heavily-trafficked roads, may influence evacuation time. These "most important" points can generally be represented as the ones staffed by the first 27 traffic guides listed in the ACP/TCP staffing priority for Region 1 in the SPMC Appendix J. Even at these "most important" traffic control points, guides can only influence evacuation time at "significant levels" of congestion

.(traffic volumes at which traffic guides' actions could benefit evacuation flow and potentially reduce evacuation time). At lower traffic volumes the actions taken by the Traffic Guides would be of value in guiding traffic and in

' providing surveillance, but would not influence _the ETE.

l-Analysis of the mobilization process for Traffic Guides 1

reveals that the TCPs and ACPs can be manned prior to the  !

l onset of congestion for all but very fast breaking accidents.

However, during the summer, a beach closure recommendation f

may be issued upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency. In

S this event, since Traffic Guides are mobilized at the Site Area Emergency, traffic control would not be immediately available to guide motorists exiting the beach areas. To illustrate the availability of traffic control, it is helpful to outline the mobilization process for Traffic Guides.

1. Traffic Guides are notified to report to the  :

Staging Area at the site area emergency classification level  !

(ECL). Empirical results from the 1988 FEMA Evaluated Exercise indicate that Traffic Guides begin arriving at the Staging Area within approximately 45 minutes from notification and all Guides will report within approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 27 Traffic Guides, or 28 percent of the total, would be available at the Staging Area. This is the number required to adequately staff the "most important" ACPs and TCPs which have the most potential for affecting evacuation time. During the Exercise, a simulated Staging Area in Salem, New Hampshire was used instead of the one in Haverhill, Massachusetts. The use of the Salem staging area rather than the one in Haverhill does not materially affect exercise reporting times because, on I

the average, the distance from the Traffic Guide work locations to either of the staging areas is approximately the same.

2. Upon arrival at the Staging Area, which would be activated earlier by key personnel reporting at the alert

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ECL, the Traffic Guides are processed to prepare them for their assignments. This processing includes briefing and assignment of the Traffic Guides, and distribution of dosimetry equipment, emergency kits, radios and field equipment. Empirical results from the Exercise indicate that this processing takes approximately 30 minutes. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the response, Traffic Guides are assigned TCPs/ACPs in a priority order (i.e., " manning sequence") which expedites the establishment of the more important control points. This staffing priority listing, which is in Appendix J of the SPMC starting at page J-163, specifies the sequence in which the Traffic / Access control Points are manned based on the projected evacuation region.

3. Upon completion of the Staging Area activities, each Traffic Guide is immediately dispatched to his/her control point with instructions to establish the point upon notification of the evacuation recommendation.

Note that the ACPs may be activated at some time after the evacuation recommendation (see discussion in Section I.H.).

During the Exercise, Traffic Guides were dispatched from the simulated Salem Staging Area to the Haverhill Staging Area and then to their posts. This was to demonstrate that they knew where the Haverhill Staging Area was located. However, during a real emergency they would be dispatched directly from Haverhill to their control points. Therefore, it was I

l necessary to subtract the time it takes for the Traffic Guidos to travel from Salem to Haverhill from the travel times recorded during the Exercise. Based on empirical data available from drills, this extra travel time from Salem to Haverhill is approximately 25 minutes. The adjusted travel times from the staging Area to the TCPs and ACPs range from approximately 15 to 75 minutes. The range of travel times to the "most important" ACPs/TCPs is approximately the same with an average value of about 40 minutes.

4. In order to quantify the time when Traffic Guides will be available to start implementing their traffic control strategies, it is necessary to sum the times to complete each of the activities indicated above and to compare this sum with the actual elapsed times needed to staff the TCPs/ACPs reported during the Exercise. The first traffic guides will be in place at the "most important" ACPs/TCPs within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> from the declaration of a Site Area Emergency (45 min. + 30 min. + 15 min. = 90 min. = 1.5 hrs.) and the remaining guides will be in place at these "most important" ACPs/TCPs within approximately 2.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> (60 min. + 30 min. + 75 min. = 165 min. = 2.75 hrs.). These estimates are consistent with the actual Exercise reporting times for control points. Similarly, summation of individual activity times reveals that all ACPs/TCPs can be fully staffed within approximately 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> (120 mins. + 30 min.

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+ 75 min. = 225 min. = 3.75 hrs.). This estimate is verified by the actual reporting times from the Exercise which )

l indicate that ACP/TCP staffing could be completed in j approximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Based on this data, control will be progressively established over a period of time ranging from 1 to 2.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after the declaration of the Site Area Emergency, at the "most important" TCPs and ACPs, and over a period of 1 to 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> for the balance of the TCPs and ACPs.

Thus, the SPMC procedures allow for staffing of traffic and access control points prior to the onset of congestion (other than for beach closure as discussed previously) for all but very fast breaking accidents. As determined by the Shoreham ASLB in the Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, LBP-85-12, dated April 17, 1985, 21 NRC 644 at 724, "there are accidents that could progress to the general emergency stage before the EOC'or staging areas could be activated, and that would allow inadequate time to go through LILCO's planned mobilization process before evacuation began. The Board can find no i

I defect in planning, however, since complete and timely mobilization under those conditions is simply impossible.

The consequences of a failure to mobilize LERO before evacuation begins are relatively small because an evacuation f

unaided by LILCO traffic guides could still be accomplished 4

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although it would take more time than the controlled evacuation."

G.- Implementing Traffic Control at TCPs/ACPs The NHY ORO traffic guides are provided with adequate information to implement the traffic control strategies at their assigned locations. .In addition to the TCP diagrams (see Section I.D) and the training traffic guides receive on utilizing their TCP diagrams and implementing traffic control strategies (to be discussed in Applicants' Part Two testimony to be filed in April), the traffic guides are provided with procedures on how to establish both traffic control and access control points.

The procedures instruct the traffic guides, upon arrival at their assigned TCP, to park their car out of the way of the traffic flow and then to perform a radio check. In response to the Town of West Newbury's concern that "there are no plans providing for parking for emergency response personnel along roads in West Newbury that have no provisions for off-street parking," it should be noted that there is no need for such plans. Traffic guides will park their vehicles I in any location out of the path of traffic. Since guides are equipped with portable radios that are carried on their person, there is no need for their vehicles to be near the TCP location.

f

The procedures instruct the traffic guides to then wait at the side of the road until notified (via radio) that the TCP should be activated. At this time, they follow the procedures which instruct them to arrange traffic cones in accordance with the TCP diagram. The procedures provide additional direction on positioning traffic cones so as to permit the passage of vehicles. Specifically, SPMC, Appendix J, at J-2, 5 states: " CAUTION-DO NOT POSITION CONES OR BARRICADES TO COMPLETELY BLOCK PASSAGE THROUGH ANY INTERSECTION."

The traffic guide procedures provide additional instruction for ACPs, or TCPs which are converted to ACPs later in an evacuation, so that vehicles which need to travel counter or across the flow of evacuating traffic will not be blocked. SPMC, Appendix J, Traffic Guide Procedures pp. J-2, 5, states:

"A) Discourage persons from passing, except for:

- Federal, state and local emergency response personnel; emergency response vehicles with specific missions and destinations (i.e., buses, ambulances, tow trucks);

employees of the utilities responding to the I

plant who have appropriate identification; and f - commuters returning to EPZ to gather household members for evacuation."

I I

I The procedures also instruct the traffic guides at ACPs to

" advise persons that they may be subject to radiation exposure if they proceed beyond the ACP," and "do not allow lines to form at the ACP entering the EPZ" (SPMC, Appendix J at J-2, 5).

If during the course of evacuation operations traffic guides are questioned by evacuees, they are instructed by

}

pro.:. dure to " advise persons to listen to the local Emergency Broadcast System station for specific information on the emergency." (SPMC Appendix J, pg. J-2, 5). This ensures I that traffic guides will not be distracted from their duties by inqu' ring motorists.

The TCP diagrams indicate which traffic movements should be " facilitated" and which should be " discouraged."

" Facilitating" traffic movement means to encourage and direct vehicles, using appropriate Nand and arm movements, to travel in a direction which is consistent with the traffic strategy at that location. " Discouraging" traffic movement means to dissuade and direct motorists from travelling in a direction which is contrary to the recommended evacuation paths, as delineated in the traffic control diagram. Such

" discouraged" movements may disrupt evacuation movements or move the vehicle closer to the power station. By definition, the guidance provided by the traffic guides are recommendations; no movements are mandated or prevented.

Hand.and arm movements (consistent with normal traffic

. directing-techniques) are employed by.the guides,.in addition-to the' deployment of reflectorized traffic cones as applicable, to encourage positive responses to recommended and discouraged movements. It is expected that the traffic guides will fulfill their tasks independent of any traffic signal. indications.whose timing is designed for normal traffic conditions. To increase the visibility of traffic guides, especially at night, and to identify them as trained members of the emergency response organization, they are issued' reflective safety vests and flashlights (SPMC Appendix J, at J-1 through J-7).

Instructions'are provided to SPMC traffic ~ guides'on how to assist police if police personnel arrive at the TCPs/ACPs to assist evacuation operations (as expected under a best-efforts response). Specifically, the traffic guides are instructed to remain with the police to support traffic direction activities (SPMC Appendix J, J-1 through J-7).

( They would brief the police on the TCP diagram and the importance of facilitating the recommended movements which reflect the recommended routes provided in the public information materials, and of discouraging contrary movements.

The traffic guide procedures and TCP/ACP diagrams which are used by the traffic guides to implement the SPMC Traffic l

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Management Plan have been demonstrated effectively. The i

traffic guides participating in the 1988 FEMA Evaluated Exercise met the objective of demonstrating the l I

organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. (1988 FEMA Final Exercise Report, Page 226, Objective #20.) Specifically, Traffic Guides at 34 ACPs/TCPs in the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ were interviewed by FEMA in the field and found to be well equipped and prepared for their mission.

Additionally Traffic Guides from 16 ACPs/TCPs were interviewed at the Staging Area and the same finding was determined. During this evaluation the Traffic Guides were asked to explain how their post was to be set up and how they would implement the traffic control strategy. To do this the Traffic Guides had to utilize the TCP diagrams. NHY Field

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Controller records indicate that all of the Traffic Guides evaluated answered these questions satisfactorily. Thus, the 1 SPMC's TCP diagrams and procedures are clear and understandable.

As indicated earlier, it is possible under fast breaking accidents that some evacuation routes may experience congestion prior to the time when traffic guides arrive at the TCPs. Under these conditions the traffic guides would have to astablish the TCP's traffic control strategy in a congested traffic environment. While activating a TCP may potentially be more difficult under congested conditions than when traffic volume is light, it is not expected that the existence of congestion would preclude activation. It is quite common for police to establish control during congested conditions, say, at the scene of an accident. Evacuating traffic would be moving slowly under congested conditions.

Motorists would not exhibit aberrant behavior and would likely cooperate with the traffic guides' efforts to establish control. In general, motorists would welcome the implementation of traffic control strategies which increase capacity or otherwise expedite evacuation movements. (See also discussion on motorists response to traffic guides in Section J of this testimony).

H. When ACPs Are Activated Traffic Guides will be instructed to activate the ACPs approximately two hours after the OTE, providina that traffic volume has declined to the extent that the activity of screening motorists will not result in the formation of long queues of inbound vehicles. This provision is based on the analysis presented in NHRERP Volume 6, which indicates that virtually all commuters will have returned home within two hours following the evacuation recommendation. Furthermore, other travelers, who will most likely be informed of the I

g

"i j

i emergency by this time through EBS and other media messages, will avoid the area due to the potential risks.

f Upon ACP activation, the traffic guides will screen vehicle occupants in accordance with their procedure. As l

discussed previously, it is expected that State police will I If traffic volumes remain high participate in this activity.

after the elapsed two-hour period following the OTE, such that the screening process creates long queues (approximately l 20 or more vehicles), the traffic guides will temporarily 1 stop the screening activities until the queue dissipates. )

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Once the gueues dissipate, the screening process will resume. l Dr. Adler's argument, that the function of ACP screening procedures is infeasible, is insupportable based on the statistics he presented, as shown below:

f 1

- "[A]1most one vehicle per second will arrive at the l northbound I-95 ACP . . . )

i - "[A] total of over 5,000 vehicles will be generated 1

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at this point by returning commuters."

If we accept these figures, then 5,000 vehicles f

representing returning commuters arriving at the rate of one per second (3,600 vehicles per hour) implies that all l

commuters "during normal rush hour conditions" will return

) within 5,000/3,600 = 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. It is reasonable to expect I that most of the initial 5,000 inbound vehicles will be

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commuters, since discretionary travel into the area will be discouraged by the emergency conditions.

In fact, Distribution B on page 4-16 of NHRERP, Vol. 6, which is the time distribution of commuters arriving home, indicates that 95 percent of all commuters will have arrived home within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the OTE. This figure of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is consistent with the calculation of 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, above, since some of the first 5,000 vehicles to arrive will not be commuters. Thus, some commuters would, indeed, arrive between 1.4 and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Thus, using the above figures negates the suggested assumption that these 5,000 commuters should be averaged over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Subsequent to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Order to Evacuate (OTE),

few commuters remain to arrive, and there will be still fewer travelers who are unaware of the emergency and who will arrive at the ACP location. At this time of low traffic volume, it is reasonable for the ACP to be activated and for screening to commence. Such screening at the anticipated low traffic volume levels will not cause large delays to those subsequently arriving vehicles whose occupants have a valid 1

l emergency response function, and whose entrance to the EPZ l will be facilitated.

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• To fully address Dr. Adler's testimony which alleges that the "ACPs, particularly those along I-95 (GT-2) and I-495 (HA-4), are poorly designed and are more likely to disrupt rather than expedite the evacuation," it is necessary i I

to examine their effect on outbound flow. Particularly for these two locations, the inbound and outbound roadways are physically separated. Thus, traffic operations at the ACPs installed on the inbound roadway would have no influence on (

outbound evacuating traffic.

I. Traffic Control at Traffic Control Point B-AM-06 The TCP diagram for Amesbury traffic control point (TCP)

No. B-AM-06, Attachment E hereto, depicts all turn movements associated with this interchange.

The original traffic control strategy developed for this intersection was as follows:

- Two lanes of westbound flow approaching the interchange along Route 110, forming three lanes within the interchange.

- The outside (right-hand) lane of outbound flow travels onto the on-ramp to southbound I-95 from westbound Route 110.

The inside (left-hand) lane of outbound flow turns left through a cut in the Route 110 median, then crosses a grass median onto the other on-ramp to southbound I-95.

- The center lane of outbound flow continues through along westbound Route 110 toward the on-ramp to southbound I-495, located 3/4 mile to the west of this interchange.

The traffic control plan at this TCP called for the crossing of the grass median as an option. The preferred routing for traffic not entering southbound I-95 via the on-ramp from westbound Route 110 was to continue west to the on-ramp to southbound I-495.

In response both to concerns expressed at the hearings on the NHRERP and to a suggestion by Dr. Urbanik, the traffic control strategy at this interchange has been modified to provide for the following three outbound movements:

- The outside lane services traffic onto the on-ramp to southbound I-95 from westbound Route 110, as before, f

- The center lane services traffic continuing westbound on Route 110 toward I-495, as before.

- The inside lane services traffic that elects to execute the optional U-turns onto eastbound Route 110 within I

the intersection at Route 110 and Elm Street, then onto the on-ramp to southbound I-95 from eastbound Route 110. This movement differs in detail from the left-turn and " median-crossing" maneuver recommended earlier.

The TCP diagram for this intersection has been modified to reflect the new traffic control strategy (SPMC Amendment 5, Appendix J, page J-28).

It should be noted that while the optional U-turn )

1 movement is possible for virtually all passenger cars and pick-up size vehicles, larger vehicles such as trucks may ,

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- _ _ _ _ _ - l

have difficulty negotiating such a turn. These vehicles, which do not enter I-95 southbound via the on-ramp servicing westbound traffic on Route 110, would be directed to continue through (west) on Route 110 toward the on-ramp to westbound I-495 and to not perform the U-turn.

To clarify Dr. Adler's misinterpretation of this TCP's available capacity, it is necessary to recognize that there are three travel lanes on westbound Route 110 within the interchange with I-95. An auxiliary lane (on the right) on westbound Route 110 provides service to traffic entering the on-ramp to I-95 southbound, preserving the two through lanes.

Thus, traffic may continue west on Route 110, past this auxiliary lane (which is delineated with cones and manned by a traffic guide) and either move through the intersection at Elm Street, along Route 110 westbound to the on-ramp to I-495 westbound, or accept the U-turn option. Those vehicles who accept the U-turn option from the left lane on the westbound Route 110 approach to the intersection at Elm Street will not interfere with the westbound traffic in the other lane on this approach. Cones delineate the separation of these two lanes on this westbound approach to this intersection and a traffic guide is assigned to expedite traffic movements there.

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J. Evacuees' Response to Trafffic Guides i

Testimony has already been given in Seabrook hearings on  ;

1 how emergencies analogous to those which would elicit a Seabrook evacuation transform the fundamental character of ,

social life. This is also. summarized in Applicant's Rebuttal Testimony No. 6 (Protective Actions for Particular

. Populations). In short, people abandon personal forms of identifications and interests, and they' identify with the entire human collective or community that is threatened.

In such emergency situations, arguments and confrontations rarely occur since these are based in individual identifications and not collective interests.

Additionally, public-behavior is not kept in check because of organized authority figures imposing order; rather, behavior is. ordered along lines that maximize safety for the l

collective.

In an emergency setting, people would perceive traffic l

guides as people who are trying to help those who are evacuating. This is particularly likely since traffic guides would be engaged in illustrating the safest and fastest way b out of the EPZ; and most would hear in EBS messages that guides would be encountered. How these guides are dressed, or what amount of pre-emergency recognized auth6rity they may as may not have would not detract from the general public f

perception that they are providing helpful emergency

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information and guidance. It is not likely that their presence would make the evacuation worse because they are not armed, uniformed authority figures. In fact, it is most I

probable that they will make the evacuation better as people interpret their advice as help and follow it.

K. Dr. Adler's Concerns on the Effects of " Staffing" '

or "Not Staffing" Traffic Control Points The ETE analysis and cases studied by Dr. Adler in his testimony on staffing and non-staffing of Traffic Control Points are not representative of real-world conditions. It i is invalid to assert that only three traffic control posts (his Figure 1) or two Massachusetts control posts (his Figure

2) are not staffed, while all the others are staffed. Such a  !

condition simply would not exist because of the sequence in which these three control points are staffed during an emergency, relative to the other TCPs.

To perform a valid sensitivity study to test the effects of " staffing" or "non-staffing" of the TCPs one must assume:

- none of the TCPs are staffed, gr all of the TCPs are staffed, or

) -

- the TCPs are staffed, over time, in accord with the plan's manning sequence and estimated f manning times.

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1. Adler's "Ficure 1" Case This case apparently examines the effect of not i

staffing TCPs D-HA-02, B-SA-06, and B-AM-06 while all the other TCPs in New Hampshire are staffed. But this conjecture is contrary to the manning sequence contained in the Traffic l

Management Plan. In the real world, if TCP D-HA-02 is not staffed, then virtually every other TCP in New Hampshire would not be staffed. A similar statement applies to the two other TCPs, in Massachusetts. Thus, the " scenario" considered is a paper scenario, only: it bears no resemblance to the real world and offers no insight whatever to what would be the actual differences in ETE between

" staffed" and "unstaffed" conditions.

If none of the TCPs were staffed, then the cattern of traffic flow would be markedly different than that when all the TCPs are staffed. For example, Highland Avenue in Hampton Beach would remain one-way eastbound and would not service evacuating traffic flow; the bridge connecting f

Hampton and Seabrook beaches would be open and attract traffic to travel south over that bridge, and other key TCP locations would operate at reduced levels of capacity. These j

conditions are totally different from those which would 1

prevail if the TCPs are manned. Thus, it is essential to conduct both Traffic. Assignment and Traffic Simulation analyses, for the "non-staffing" and for the " staffing"

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i conditions, to generate ETEs which can be used in the context of a sensitivity study to study the realistic respective responses of traffic flow.

1 k For the third staffing condition, i.e., TCPs staffed over time, it is necessary to represent, not only the local I

effects of the absence or presence of control strategies, but also the consequent changes in the routing pattern of traffic throuahout the network. No mention is made in Dr. Adler's testimony of any traffic assignment calculations.

2. Adler's "Fiaure 2" Case l

The arguments presented above apply here as well.

In addition, we focus on other elements of his testimony:

+ The ETE data for the "with staffing" case exhibits an ETE for Salisbury Beach which is some three hours longer than the ETE computed with IDYNEV for the New Hampshire hearings by KLD for the identical staffina condition (i.e., full staffing). Clearly, the input data for the runs executed by Dr. Adler differ in some important ways from that used in the KLD runs. Based on the statements on page 5 of Dr. Adler's testimony, it appears that the capacity of westbound Route 110 at TCP B-AM-06 was restricted to only right-turns onto the on-ramp, and to U-turns. The through movement toward I-495 appears to have been improperly eliminated for the "with staffing" condition, thereby producing the longer values of ETE.

- The data provided in his testimony is limited to " Salisbury Beach ETE", with no ETE results I provided for the 5-mile area (Region 5) or for the larger 10-mile area (Region 13). As discussed in Section I.C, the absence of TCP staffing at Salisbury Center (B-SA-06) will result in heavier congestion along Route 1 in Newburyport and Newbury. It is improper, in

)

l

my-view, to focus only on the. salisbury Beach area and to.use those (apparently incorrect)

ETE results to arrive at a general conclusion concerning the efficacy _of " staffing"Evs. "no staffing". Rather, one must view the larger areas, including the 2-mile, 5-mile and EPZ-wide' areas, as well as the key-hole shaped regions-of interest, in arriving at any such 4 evaluations.

There also appears to be'a misunderstanding-concerning the functions performed by traffic guides. Dr. Adler's testimony suggests that

"[t]raffic guides [are) actively re-directing the traffic flow." As discussed in Section.

I.G, traffic guides do not " actively redirect" I

traffic' movements.

In summary:-

- These sensitivity tests were-improperly designed, leading to' invalid results.

- The TCP control was misrepresented and probably improperly input to the IDYNEV model,

-thereby producing incorrect results.

L. Impediment / Road Crew Response i 1. Road Crew Deployment Locations The SPMC provides for two (2)' road crew vehicles (tow trucks) to be deployed at each of the six (6)

Massachusetts communities' transfer points. These vehicles l

will be available to respond to roadway impediments which could delay evacuation traffic flow. These deployment locations are geographically dispersed at radial distances which range from 4 to 9 miles from Seabrook Station (the area from 0 to 2 miles is within New Hampshire) and are located

.near major evacuation routes (SPMC, Appendix J).

l 1

4.

l l

Studies were conducted to estimate the average times needed for road crews to respond to hypothetical traffic impediments. One study was based on the tow truck l

f deployment locations recommended in Volume 6 of the NHRERP and the other on the transfer points utilized as deployment locations in the SPMC (Attachment F hereto). An

" impediment", as considered here, is assumed to be a physical blockage of a road which cannot be removed without the assistance of a tow truck. Travel times were calculated from the SPMC transfer points and from the NHRERP Volume 6 deployment locations that would most likely respond to impediments at the specified set of " impediment locations."

These impediment locations were assumed to be located at the SPMC transfer point locations in the other Massachusetts towns. The transfer point locations were chosen as the impediment locations because their geographic distribution reasonably represents the distances road crews would have to l

travel from another town to respond to impediments during an emergency evacuation.

Travel by tow trucks to these hypothetical impediments are in directions both with, and counter flow to, evacuation j traffic throughout the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ.

Travel time was calculated by dividing the distance traveled by the appropriate evacuation traffic speeds on each route as predicted by IDYNEV for Region 1 Scenario 1 (full EPZ I

1 evacuation, . summer. weekend, good. weather) . A speed.of.20 aph I

e-" ,

was used for all non-evacuation routes and for inbound.

travel, while 55_ mph was used for inbound. travel on the Interstate Highways. 1 The travel time estimates indicate that as many as-six of the twelve available SPMC tow trucks could' respond to an impediment in-any' Massachusetts community within 15 minutes. Note'that the likelihood of sig impediments requiring-tow' trucks, occurring in the same town,' over the -

Egme time frame,.is very. remote. Even so, the available resources and associated response times are more than -

adequate to cope with such an unlikely situation.

The' study also indicated that travel times from the-

, tow truck locations depicted in the SPMC, and from those specified in volume 6, were comparable. However, becauseithe SPMC-provides more than twice the number of tow trucks (a total of 12) as recommended in Volume 6 (a total of 5),

response times to multiple impediments under the SPMC would 1

be correspondingly shorter.

}

Based on vehicle-miles of travel expended during an evacuation and available accident statistics, the expected number of accidents within the entire Seabrook Plume EPZ would_ number 10 or 11 during an evacuation. (Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 7, Post Tr. 5622 at 63). Within the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ this number would be four or l

I five. However, few of the vehicles involved in these accidents would be disabled to the extent that they would I

need to be removed by a tow truck. Additionally, it is expected that evacuees themselves would assist in pushing disabled vehicles to the side of the road (NHRERP, Volume 6, pp. 12-3, 12-4).

Sensitivity studies conducted with IDYNEV have shown (as depicted in Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 7, i

Eost Tr. 5622 at 62-63) that ETEs are relatively insensitive to the occurrence of 10 random traffic impediments, even when l

up to two hours elapse before they are removed. The results of the tow truck travel time study (Attachment F) indicate that much faster response and removal times are likely.

As detailed in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8 (Transportation Resources), NHY has contractual agreements with tow truck suppliers which call for a total commitment of l

up to eighteen (18) manned vehicles. These eighteen tow l

trucks form a resource pool from which to draw the planned need of twelve tow trucks; two at each of the six ORO Transfer Points.

2. SPMC's Road Impediment Response The SPMC provides the following means for identifying potential impediments to the use of evacuation routes, as recommended under NUREG-0654, J.10.K.

l l

l

f f

Personnel at thirty-seven (37) TCPs and at any supplemental ACPs provide a readily available source of feedback information regarding impediments to evacuation traffic along prescribed evacuation routes within the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ. These personnel will be in place during the evacuation regardless of weather conditions and time of day. These TCPs and ACPs are located at interchanges and intersections along major evacuation routes and traffic guides may directly or indirectly observe road impediments. Even if a blockage occurs beyond their visible range, the effects would be observed by either a sharp decline of evacuating traffic or by having downstream traffic back up past their post (NHRERP, Volume 6, pg. 12-3).

l l

It is also probable that a passing motorist will inform the traffic guide that a blockage has taken place. (Id.) These

! traffic guides are instructed to contact the Evacuation l

Support Dispatcher via radio if traffic is blocked or if 1

there is no evacuating traffic. SPMC, Appendix J, pp. J-3, 5.

Traffic guides are dispatched to their assigned TCPs and ACPs at the site area emergency classification.

They are instructed to wait at the side of the road until notified that the point should be activated. However, even prior to the activation order, they are instructed to report I

l

l-

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traffic problems to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. (Id.

f pp. J-2, 4.)

t Additionally, up to 20 route guides for backup notification of the hearing-impaired may be traveling roads within the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ while L

I performing their emergency duties. They are instructed to

! report any obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments to traffic flow to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher via radio.

SPMC, IP 2.11, Attachment 3, Item 3C. Route guides for notification of the hearing-impaired are dispatched at a site i area or general emergency classification, and at a sheltering or evacuation recommendation.

A total of 146 route guides are also assigned to buses to assist the evacuation of schools, special facilities, and the general population transit dependent.

These route guides travel through the Massachusetts portion j

of the plume EPZ and are instructed to report any obstacles, l

)

stalled cars, or other impediments to traffic flow by radio to the Staging Area Leader for those assigned to schools and special facilities, or to the Transfer Point Dispatcher for those assigned to transfer points. SPMC, IP 2.10, Attachment 3, Item 10.

Twelve Transfer Point Dispatchers are dispatched to the six Massachusetts transfer points (one transfer point for f

s each town) at the Site Area Emergency classification. Two

l road crew vehicles (tow trucks) are also assigned to each transfer point at this time. Road crews are issued NHY ORO radios upon arrival at the Transfer Points (SPMC, IP 2.10, I 5.4.7H). These radios allow them to communicate with the Transfer Point Dispatcher, Staging Area and EOC. Transfer Point Dispatchers are responsible for deploying road crews to identified road impediments. SPMC, IP 2.10, 5.4.

Aerial surveillance of road network impediments is available by helicopters during acceptable flight conditions.

SPMC, IP 1.3, Attachment 1; Plan, Appendix C, LOA for use of helicopters. The helicopter pilot is briefed and dispatched by the Evacuation Support Coordinator or his designee.

Communications are routed through the helicopter company which maintains radio contact with their aircraft.

Traffic impediment, road construction, and flood information will also be available from local police and road departments via the local Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs).

The six Local EOC Liaisons, who are to report to the local EOCs at the ALERT classification, maintain contact with the Local EOC Liaison Coordinator throughout emergency operations. SPMC, IP 1.8. Any information on road impediments is expected to be available to the Local EOC Liaison Coordinator.

The Communication Coordinator at the NHY Offsite Response EOC monitors all communications on the Massachusetts

2"

~

[

Governmental Interface radio' system. The frequencies monitored include state and local public~ safety frequencies (SPMC pg. 4.6-1). The Communication Coordinator keeps the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Response Implementation informed of important events (e.g., traffic impediments) f~

taking place'as monitored from the Massachusetts communities l (SPMC, IP 1.4, Attachment 2, Step 7).

f The SPMC Section 3.6.5 and IP'1.11 will be modified l

l in future revisions to include reference to bridges as potential impediments to evacuation traffic. Specifically, IP 1.11 will be revised to have the State Liaison coordinate with the Massachusetts Department of Public Works to ensure l-continued operation of the drawbridges. Any problems with  !

bridges would be reported to the Evacuation Support Coordinator in the EOC.

Thus, the SPMC utilizes extensive means for identifying potential impediments to evacuation traffic flow.

3. Impediment Response / Communications Procedures Communications procedures, as indicated above, call for field personnel to report traffic impediments via radio to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher at the Staging Area or to the Transfer Point Dispatchers at the transfer points.

The Transfer Point Dispatchers provide this information to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. This information is then provided to the Staging Area Leader who informs the

/

l-Evacuation Support Coordinator in the EOC. Additionally, personnel:in the EOC monitor all radio communications and they. forward impediment information to the Evacuation Support Coordinator as it is received.

The Evacuation Support Coordinator, in conjunction with

.the-Staging Area Leader, evaluates the impediment's impact on J. the evacuation roadway network. A road crew is selected to l l

l respond and a determination is made whether there is a need l i

to reroute evacuation traffic (SPMC, IP 1.3, Attachment 1). j l

In making the road crew selection, consideration is given to which crews are closest to the impediment and their l respective direction of travel to respond to the impediments.

The Staging Area Leader.then has the Transfer Point Dispatcher contacted, via radio, to have the appropriate crew dispatched.

Following this, the Evacuation Support Coordinator and-Staging Area Leader continue to monitor the road crew's progress in responding to the impediment. If the crew encounters delays, the situation is evaluated and additional crews are dispatched or other appropriate responses are formulated. After the road crew (s) complete their response they are available to be dispatched via radio to other locations.

i The redundancy of the impediment response procedures (e.g., Staging Area Leader and Evacuation Support  !

Coordinator-concurrently evaluating impediments; radio communications to road crews and other' field personnel from both the EOC and Staging Area) provides flexibility to ensure that an appropriate and coordinated response is formulated' and implemented for road impediments under all scenarios.

4. Reroutina Evacuation Traffic in Response to Traffic Impediments Any. impediment, including localized flooding of roadways,'which is determined by.the Evacuation Support Coordinator in consultation with the Staging Area Leader to have a significant impact on evacuation traffic flow may require rerouting. .This evaluation considers the impediment location, time of occurrence, extent of roadway blockage, estimated time to remove.the impediment, and evacuation routes affected. To implement' rerouting, the Evacuation i

Support Coordinator and Staging Area Leader modify strategies at appropriate TCPs or relocate traffic-guides to direct evacuees along the new route. Upon determination of the rerouting plan, the Evacuation Support Coordinator. informs the Public Notification Coordinator for incorporation into EBS messages.

During the 1988 FEMA Evaluated Exercise two simulated traffic accidents were reported in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ. One simulated accident blocked a major evacuation route and traffic guides were

reassigned to establish new TCP/ACPs in a timely manner. The second simulated accident required the dispatch of road crews to remove the impediment. ORO assessed and responded to both of these field problems correctly. (1988 FEMA Final Exercise

- Report for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station, pg. 227.)

5. Floodina of Plum Island Turnpike as an l i

Impediment It has been alleged in the Town of Newbury's testimony that the SPMC's traffic management plan is deficient because Plum Island Turnpike, which is the sole access road to Plum Island, and other roads on the island periodically become " impassible at times of high water levels and ice cakes and other debris float onto them during high tides and remain after the tide recedes." An impediment of this magnitude would be identified and considered in the ,

I early stages of an emergency and responses would be formulated, coordinated, and implemented with the appropriate governing bodies. If the roadway remained impassible at the declaration of a General Emergency, that fact would be considered in the Protective Action Recommendation development process.

6. FEMA's Evaluation of the SPMC's Impediment Resoonse Procedures The SPMC's Procedures for the identification of, and the means for dealing with, potential impediments to use of evacuation routes and the development of contingency measures were evaluated as adequate in FEMA's October 1988 Review and Evaluation of the SPMC (Evaluation Criteria J.10.K). Specifically, the evaluation indicated:

"The plan describes the means and process for identifying and dealing with potential impediments to the use of evacuation routes. NHY ORO will preposition 12 road crews at 6 transfer points to clear road impediments and ensure that roads remain passable (Section 3.6.5). Traffic Guides'will.be stationed at predetermined.TCPs to expedite the flow of traffic. If alternative evacuation routes become necessary, Traffic Guides will be repositioned by the evacuation support dispatcher (Section 3.6.5, IP 1.3, IP 2.10, and Appendix J)."

7. Gillis Bridae as an Impediment The-Route 1 Gillis Bridge spanning the Merrimack River is a link on the evacuation route servicing those Salisbury residents and transients, with access to Route 1, who initiate their trip south of~the Route 1A/ Route 110 east-west roadway (NHRERP, Volume 6, Appendix J). For summer l scenarios an estimated 312 evacuating vehicles will use this route. For winter or off-season scenarios this estimate is 193 vehicles. ( & Appendix M).

It is not expected that the Gillis Bridge would )

f remain open (i.e. impassible) for a long period during an evacuation. Even if it did, evacuation traffic would not be substantially delayed or impeded. The capacity of Route 1 at h this location is approximately 1,440 vph (vehicles per hour).

l' (Id. Appendix N). Assuming, conservatively, that 312 trips

}-

are generated over only two hours, approximately 156 vehicles per hour for the first two hours would attempt to cross this bridge. Even assuming that the bridge was open to permit passage of boat traffic 50 minutes of each hour, evacuation traffic could still use it for 10 minutes each hour. The available vehicular capacity is then 240 vehicles per hour, (1/6 hour x 1,440 vph), far in excess of the demand of 156 vph. Thus, even under this highly unlikely scenario, these evacuees would not experience delay that would extend the ETE: any queue that developed as a result of the bridge opening would quickly discharge when it closed.

If the Gillis Bridge remained open due to mechanical trouble or due to some other unforeseen event during an evacuation, such that it substantially delayed evacuation traffic, the emergency response would be similar to that applied to other traffic impediments. The situation (bridge open) and resulting traffic backup would be reported I

to the Staging Area by the Traffic Guide at TCP B-SA-08 which is located on Route 1 just north of the bridge. (The TCP

! diagram for B-SA-08 is Attachment G hereto.) As with any traffic impediment, this situation would be evaluated at the Staging Area and EOC. A potential reroute of evacuation f

traffic for this situation would have the Traffic Guide at TCP B-SA-08 direct all traffic northbound on Route 1 away from the bridge. This traffic would proceed north to School Street where the Traffic Guide at TCP B-SA-06 would direct it

to travel westbound on Route 110 with'other evacuation traffic. (The TCP diagram'for B-SA-06 is Attachment A hereto.) The relatively small volume of traffic which would be impacted'by this rerouting would not materially impact the overall ETE.

8. B&M Railroad Bridae as an Imoediment It has been' alleged that the B&M Railroad Bridge crossing Route 1 in Salisbury could become an impediment to d'

evacuation traffic as tall tractor trailer trucks might become stuck under.the limited height railroad overpass.

This allegation stems from the criticism that TCP B-SA-01 at the intersection of Route 286 and Route 1 (just north of the B&M Bridge) directs " light" eastbound traffic on Route 286 south on Route 1. (The'TCP diagram for B-SA-01 is Attachment' H hereto.)

In its response to Applicants'-interrogatories, the Town of Salisbury indicated that the minimum clearance for the bridge is posted at 13 feet, 3 inches and.that "TOS does not j assert that all tractor trailers will encounter difficulty with this bridge, but larger, taller trailers (such as moving vans and certain other freight trailers) cannot clear" (Town l of Salisbury's Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to I Document Requests Concerning Joint Intervenor Contentions 1-26, Responses to Question 48). Massachusetts law limits truck height to 13'-6" without a special permit. The vast s

r I-majority of trucks are of lesser height than 13'-3".

F j Furthermore, signs on both Route 1 approaches to the bridge overpass inform motorists of the 13'-3" vertical clearance limitation; truck drivers of larger trucks would reverse direction and return to Route 286. j l l I

While it is thus highly improbable that a truck would l l

become stuck under the bridge, the diagram for TCP B-SA-01 l will be revised to include a note to the traffic guide that j i vehicles turning right'(south) onto Route 1 should be limited l; y to those whose height does not exceed 13'-3". Tall trucks t

will either be directed to perform a U-turn using the store I

parking area in the northeast corner of the TCP and return I

westward on Route 286 or be instructed to proceed south on 1

(

Route 1, turn right (west) onto New Toll Road - (just north of the bridge) and proceed to I-95. Reflecting the few vehicles i

I potentially involved, this routing will not have any material impact on the ETE.

II. SPECIAL POPULATIONS l

A. Bus Route Selection The SPMC includes provisions for people who do not have transportation out of the EPZ similar to those arrangements I

contained in the NHRERP. Specifically, evacuation bus routes were developed and established to fulfill these needs.

(SPMC, Appendix J).

/

).

I Evacuation bus routes were developed for the six f 1

l Massachusetts communities by emergency planners under the direction of Massachusetts civil Defense Agency (MCDA) with input from EPZ planning contacts (e.g., local civil defense I directors, Selectmen) in.each of the six Massachusetts 1

communities. The routes were designed to start at the Local I

Staging Area (i.e., Transfer Point) and extend through the town to form a closed path while generally following the I guidelines stated below:

a. No house would be more than approximately one-half l

mile from a bus route;

b. Buses would not back-track on the same route where possible; and

c. Buses, in general, would follow the directions provided at the Traffic Control Points.

Once the routes were designed, a field verification was done to ensure the roadways were correctly shown on the map. KLD used the bus transit route information to calculate the

)

l Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) for these buses by scaling distances from the maps showing the developed routes.

(NHRERP, Volume 6, Section 11.) In developing the SPMC bus plan, NHY relied on the bus routes developed by MCDA. Due to changes in the locations of the transfer points (i.e., local staging areas), the evacuation bus routes were slightly l

modified..KLD has reviewed the SPMC bus route changes and 'l updated the ETEs accordingly.

B. Field Study Conducted to Evaluate Routes A comprehensive field study was conducted of the evacuation bus routes...for all six SPMC communities-between'

'11/7/88 and 11/15/88. Standard full-size school buses.were used for field verification of the evacuation bus routes.

The buses were 9'6" wide with both mirrors extended and 7'6"

' wide with mirrors retracted. Thus, at least 17 feet of road-width.(pavement plus shoulders) was needed for two buses to pass each other. The weight of the bus was 26,600 pounds when empty. The field study consisted of three separate runs. First, specific roadways where potential problems had been identified through drill comments, exercise comments, and contention bases were driven with a bus to assess the existence or severity of the stated problems (see Report, Attachment I hereto). Road measurements, where applicable, were taken at the observed narrowest point on roadways to determine if the road was wide enough to accommodate an evacuation bus and opposing traffic. Second, all routes were driven with automobiles to verify the information on the bus route maps regarding the existence of street signs, landmarks, roadway configuration and correct labeling of streets. A set of criteria was developed and given to the personnel to direct them in the method which should be followed when driving the routes (see Attachment J hereto).

Third, all bus routes were driven with buses to verify that a bus could perform all turn movements and to record route distances.

As a result of_the field survey of all the evacuation bus routes for the six SPMC communities that was conducted by the Applicants on'11/7/88 to 11/15/88, 4 out of the 26 evacuation bus routes were revised and rerun to record route distances. An analysis was then performed to determine new bus route transit. times, total trip completion times and the number of buses to be allocated to each route using the methodology described in the NHRERP, Volume 6, Section 11.

Specifically, route transit times were calculated by dividing measured route segment distances by an appropriate travel speed. For route segments that were coincident with evacuation traffic flow, travel speeds as predicted by the IDYNEV simulation model were used. For the remaining route segments a mean speed of 10 mph was used to account for time to stop and pick up passengers. The results of these analyses are presented in Attachment K hereto.

C. Bus Route Maps I Each evacuation bus route map will be updated to reflect l

the following modifications to clarify the maps and make them more uniform.

l. The map scale indicator will indicate one-tenth q l

mile intervals to aid Route Guides in judging distances using the one-tenth mile based odometers on the buses.

2. Landmarks and a legend explaining the landmarks will be added to the maps where applicable to. aid Route  ;

Guides in following the routes.  ;

3. Left and right turns off a given route will be clearly identified so that in the absence of a road sign the Route Guide will be able to count off the correct number of intersections. In addition, the distances between turns have been specified.

t

4. The bus route will be represented on the map by a thick bold line containing clearly visible directional

> arrowheads.

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5. The streets which comprise the route will be I

labeled in thick bold letters.

An example of a revised map that will be used by the f

Route Guides is Attachment L hereto. These maps are 11" x 17" and clearly readable. The 8 " x 11" bus route maps contained in Appendix J of the SPMC are used for reference only. The large evacuation bus route maps are contained in the packages stored at the ORO Staging Area for use by the l

bus Route Guides. In addition, the public information materials include simplified evacuation bus route maps. (A sample map is Attachment M hereto.)

The contentions concerning Newbury Evacuation Bus Route

1. 4 were based on Amendment.3 of the SPMC (see Attachment N hereto). Since then Newbury Evacuation Bus Route #4 has been amended several times. Repagination of SPMC Appendix J resulted in only the page number changing from Amendment 3 to Amendment 5. (See Attachment O hereto.) Prior to the FEMA evaluated exercise Newbury Evacuation Bus Route #4 was reversed in direction from going counterclockwise to clockwise (post Amendment 5). This revision permitted buses to take right turns into adjacent traffic lanes instead of left turns across a lane of traffic. (See Attachment P hereto.)

An additional change to Newbury Bus Route #4 will be incorporated in the next revision of the SPMC. During the field verification survey it was determined that Spring Hill Road, a dirt road, was not the best roadway to use on this  !

route and an alternate roadway was designated. The change involves the following: The bus will follow the present route until reaching the corner of Moody and Spring Hill Road. Instead of going right on Spring Hill road, the bus will continue straight entering West Newbury where Moody Street turns into Ash Street. The bus will then turn right i on Brickett Street and then right on Moulton Street. The bus will follow Moulton Street back to South Street where it will turn left and continue on South Street as depicted on the J

latest route map. This route change eliminates traversing Spring Hill Road. 'The residents on Spring Hill Road ~are within a quarter of a' mile of the revised bus route and can walk north to South Street or south to Moody Street to get to 1

the route. (See Attachment Q hereto.)

D. Evacuation Process l i

1. Transfer Point Operations Details of how the buses are mobilized to the Transfer Points is provided in the Applicants' Rebuttal l

Testimony No. 8 (Transportation Resources). Once deployed from the Transfer Points, the buses travel the. assigned routes picking up any residents encountered along the way.

Each bus continues along the route until the route is complete or the bus is full. If full, the bus returns to the L

Transfer Point to be directly dispatched to the appropriate Reception Center. If'the bus is partially full upon its return to the Transfer Point the passengers are transferred to one of at least two buses specifically designated to collect evacuees at the Transfer Point and to go to the Reception Center with evacuees. (IP 2.10, Attachment 9).

I The empty route bus remains at the Transfer Pc_tt awaiting instructions from the Transfer Point Dispatcher (IP 2.10 Section 5.4.12) to travel the route again if an additional run is necessary. The collector bus at the Transfer Point l

waits until it is full or until the time that the last bus

route runs have begun, and then is dispatched to the Reception Center. The use of' Transfer Points allows for the redeployment of buses along the bus routes on a continuous basis'to assure'the expeditious evacuation of persons to the Transfer Point.and subsequently to the Reception Centers.

Evacuees are not~ congregated or sheltered at'the Transfer.

Point.-

2. Estimate of Transit Dependent Persons The method used to estimate the number of transit-dependent. persons and assign the number of buses required for each Massachusetts community is described in the NHRERP, Volume 6, Section 11.

Specifically, a survey of persons residing in the six Massachusetts communities was conducted to estimate the 1 l

number of transit dependent persons in the Massachusetts  ;

I portion of the EPZ. A number of assumptions were applied to l

the results of the survey to arrive at the final. estimation of transit dependent persons. First, it was assumed children would be at home and in need of rides due to the fact that it was calculated that they would only be in school ,

J approximately 15 percent of the year. Based on suggestions I by FEMA, it was assumed that 50 percent of the transit L

dependent persons would ride share with neighbors or relatives (Applicants' Direct No. 7, Post Tr. 5622, pp. 18, 19). This leaves 50 percent who will be in need of rides.

w In addition, the number of transit dependent persons was increased by 6 percent to account for vehicles out of service -i 1

(NHRERP, Volume 6, pp. 11-2 to 11-8 and Applicants' Direct No. 7, Post Tr. 5622, pp. 20, 21).

Second, the number of persons served on each bus route within a community was estimated by dividing the total number of transit dependent persons by the number of routes.

This estimate, however, assumed that people were uniformly distributed over a community, by route -- an assumption which will overestimate the actual demand for some routes and i underestimate the actual demand for some routes. To counter the prospect that a non-uniform spatial (i.e., route-specific) distribution of population would yield a higher Ei demand for transit service than estimated on some bus routes, all route-specific estimates of transit demand were increased

!! by 20 percent. (This is equivalent to increasing the total ll estimated demand by 20 percent.)

B

3. Number of Runs Per Bus Route The standard capacity of an evacuation bue is 50 adults (Grade 7 and older) or 60 children (Grade 6 or younger). A conservative estimated passenger demand of an average of 30 evacuees per bus trip was used in calculating the number of bus trips needed per route and 36 evacuees per bus in calculating the total number of buses needed per Transfer Point (i.e., from the Transfer Point to Reception I

Center). The results of all calculations were rounded up to the next higher number of buses. The low estimations of bus-occupancy allow excess capacity for any additional transit dependent persons who may be picked up along the bus evacuation routes or at the Transfer Points. The number of bus. trips needed for a particular route is subject to change at the discretion of the Transfer Point Dispatcher. If additional trips are needed, returning buses will be dispatched to repeat the trip (SPMC, IP 2.10). Although an t..

option, this is unlikely due to the fact that seat availability is in excess of the estimates of transit dependent individuals as demonstrated in the following two examples.

The Town of Newbury is provided four bus evacuation routes run by seven buses, plus two additional buses assigned to the Transfer Point for the purpose of transporting residents to the Reception Center. -The town has an estimated

.194 transit dependents (NHRERP, Volume 6, pg. 11-10). Using the conservative estimated passenger demand of 36 evacuees j- per Transfer Point bus mentioned previously, there is J

available a total of 324 seats to evacuate an estimated 194 transit dependents to the Reception Center. This leaves an excess of 130 seats for additional transit dependents not accounted for.

l

)

The Town of West Newbury is provided three bus evacuation routes run by three buses plus two additional buses assigned to the Transfer Point for the purpose of transporting residents to the Reception Center. The town has an estimated 64 transit dependents (NHRERP, Volume 6, pg. 11-10). Using the conservatively estimated passenger demand of 36 mentioned previously, there is available a total of 180 seats to evacuate an estimated SA transit dependents to the Reception Center. This leaves an excess of 116 seats for additional transit dependents not accounted for.

4. Route Guides Each bus assigned to a designated evacuation bus route is provided a Route Guide. Route Guides report to the Staging Area, receive a radio, and are dispatched to a bus company. At the bus company they are assigned to a bus and are dispatched to their assignment. When assigned to a Transfer Point, the bus driver obtains a bus route assignment and package from the Transfer Point Dispatcher (IP 2.10, Attachment 4 - Step 6.a). The bus route package contains a map binder which has all the necessary maps to run the bus routes. The Route Guide's main responsibility is to aid the Bus Driver with directions while traveling the route. Route Guides also report any obstacles or road impediments encountered along the route to the Transfer Point Dispatcher (SPMC, IP 2.10, pp. 25, 26).

I

5. Buses Crossino Evacuatina Traffic Evacuation buses are not expected to encounter undue delays when crossing heavily congested evacuation routes.- The evacuating vehicles will permit the bus to get through. The amount of time spent by evacuees waiting in i personal vehicles for the bus to cross the evacuation route will be minimal. The backed up traffic will quickly rejoin the original'line of evacuating traffic due to the. fact that minimal forward progress would have occurred in the time span it took for the bus.to cross the evacuation route. The evacuees will reason that the impact on their exiting the area would be insignificant. Dr. Urbanik has testified that "there is no evidence that aberrant driver behavior has been a factor'in any evacuation in the United States history" (LBP-88-32, para. 7.83).

During actual emergencies people abandon personal forms i

of identification and personal interests, and they identify with the entire human collective or community that is f threatened. There is a dramatic decline in activities and i behavior that run counter to the good of the collective and f' those that are based in individual or personal interests, and i-a dramatic increase in acts and behavior that bring people l

together and help one another. People respond by helping f other human beings who are in need of help. This would include stopping to enable an evacuation bus to cross an

intersection so it could pick up people in need of transportation.

6. Floodina l

a. Area Wide Flooding To evaluate the potential for area wide flooding, flood plain maps were obtained from the Flood Map-Distribution Center in Baltimore, Maryland for the communities of Newbury, Newburyport, Salisbury and West Newbury in Massachusetts. Flood plains are classified into 1 year, 10 year, 50 year, 70 year, 100 year and 500 year intervals based on the expected occurrence of a major flood incident in the respective time period. The roadways identified in the Interveners' contention bases all fall into either the 100 year or 500 year flood plain intervals. This translates into the probability of these roadways being subjected to major flooding once in a 100 year or 500 year period. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that these roadways will be rendered impassable by flooding concurrently with an emergency at seabrook station,

b. Localized Flooding Due to certain weather conditions, evacuation buses may encounter sections of roadway that may be flooded.

An evacuation bus would still be able to traverse roads and pick up transit dependent evacuees depending on the level of flooding. Buses used in picking up transit dependent

residents have a clearance of approximately 15 to 20 inches from the road surface to the tailpipe. This distance is the limiting factor in buses traversing flooded routes. If a segment of roadway which appears to be impassable due to local flooding or some other obstacle is encountered, the Route Guide is to contact the Transfer Point Dispatcher and,

} using the detailed route map (Attachment L hereto), determine alternate roadways available to rejoin the assigned route.

The Route Guides will " report any obstacles, stalled cars, or other impediments to traffic flow . . . to the Transfer Point Dispatcher . . .

" (SPMC, IP 2.10, pg. 26). IP 1.3, Evacuation Support Coordinator, Attachment 1, page 2 of 4, Item 9, calls for the evaluation of constraints such as " road conditions, current weather conditions, and special evacuation problems." If a significant rerouting is necessary, as determined by the Evacuation Support Coordinator, Traffic Guides will be reassigned as necessary.

(IP 2.11, pg. 5, step 5.1.7)

7. Convoys The evacuation of a school or special facility is accomplished by dispatching all necessary buses with one Route Guide to the facility. This has been referred to as the use of convoys. Forming convoys of vehicles is a common practice in the military. The formation of buses into convoys provides greater assurance that all buses will reach

i l

j their common destination in a timely manner. Convoys will i

travel at posted or prevailing speeds, whichever is lower, subject to maximum speeds of 50 mph on the interstate highways and 45 mph on all other roads. Any difference in travel speed for a convoy relative to a collection of single buses has a negligible impact on response time. For example, the time difference to travel 60 miles at 50 mph instead of 55 mph is less than 7 minutes.

Convoys of buses should encounter less difficulty than single buses when entering an EPZ during an evacuation.

It is far more efficient to move buses through an intersection as a convoy than it is to move single buses.

The competing traffic flow is interrupted only once by a convoy instead of multiple times for individual buses.

8. Bus Resources A detailed description of NHY's bus resources is contained in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8 Regarding Transportation Resources.

{ E. Specific Evacuation Capability Contention (JI-07)

The following is a compilation of the JI-07 contention J

) bases which allege inadequacies in the bus routes or other i evacuation capabilities and the corresponding responses to f

those contentions. Certain bases are addressed generically in previous parts of this testimony and are referenced 1

accordingly. Due to the specificity of the bases each one is addressed individually.

1. BASIS A: "The SPMC, Appendix D-5, relies on the Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Estimate Study in projecting the capability of evacuation routes. The time study recognizes that control at critical intersections, to a large extent, determines the capacity of a roadway (Time Study, 3-1). .The SPMC provides

~

for the control of one intersection on Plum Island, i.e., Plum Island Turnpike and Sunset Drive. A second major intersection, Plum Island Boulevard and Northern Boulevard, is uncontrolled. Approximately 60 percent of the traffic evacuating Plum Island would converge at the-second intersection and would result in a significant bottleneck and impediment to timely evacuation. The SPMC accordingly does not provide a reasonable assurance.that adequate protective measures'regarding relocating and traffic capabilities exist."

Response: An analysis of the IDYNEV output indicates that the rate at which evacuating traffic flows off Plum Island is controlled by the congested conditions within Newbury in the vicinity of Newbury Town Hall. This can be seen by examining Figures 10-2a through 10-2d (NHRERP, Volume

6) which show that congestion extends upstream from the cited j location eastward onto Plum Island. Thus, establishing a TCP at the intersection of Plum Island Turnpike and Northern f

i Boulevard would not impact the ETE for the vehicles there.

Even if congestion were localized on Plum Island, the controlling intersection which services 100 percent of all evacuating traffic from Plum Island is at Plum Island Turnpike and Sunset Drive, where TCP E-NB-01 is established.

Thus, under these circumstances the congestion at Plum; Island Turnpike and Northern Boulevard would be caused by a queue extending from the bottleneck at the manned intersection which is downstream of the subject intersection.at Northern Boulevard'(again assuming that congestion further downstream near Town Hall did not control), rather than any capacity shortfall at Northern Boulevard.

In'either case, the congestion at Northern Boulevard

.would be caused by a bottleneck located elsewhere; thus the establishment of a TCP at Plum Island Turnpike and Northern

' Boulevard would-' provide no material benefits.

Newbury Bus Route #1 services Plum Island. The bus travels east'along the Plum Island Turnpike (counterblow to evacuation traffic) then turns left (north) onto Northern Boulevard. This turn maneuver does not conflict materially with evacuating traffic and will not delay evacuating

. vehicles for the reasons cited earlier. The bus continues north on Northern Boulevard to its end and then returns south I on the.same route. During this southbound portion of the

trip the bus mingles with evacuating traffic. Upon reaching the' intersection of Northern Boulevard and Plum Island Turnpike the bus turns right (west) onto Plum Island Turnpike

'with other evacuation traffic. A traffic guide at Northern Boulevard and Plum Island Turnpike is not needed in order for this bus to perform its evacuation role.

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2. BASIS D.1.a: "Old Point Road is narrow. It j actually is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width with narrow.or no shoulders. The SPMC unrealistically assumes that out-flowing traffic will not impede the ingress of .

vehicles into the evacuation zone. At the terminus of Old Point Road there is insufficient room for the bus to. turn around as is provided in the route map."

Response: Old Point Road is a two lane paved roadway measuring approximately 17' wide (for 0.3 mile) at its narrowest point. There are ample packed sand shoulders on-both sides of the road to accommodate any troubled vehicles and two way traffic. The road is normally used by two way traffic year round, and is subject to high usage during the tourist season. Newbury school bus route #9, bus 9 to Whittier Technological School (see Attachment R hereto)

I specifically calls for a bus to go to the end of Old Point l

Road, turn around, and proceed back to Plum Island Turnpike.

f This is precisely the action that the contention alleges cannot be accomplished. In addition, as part of the field

)

verification of bus routes by NHY, a bus was driven down Old Point Road, turned around and exited with no maneuverability problems at all. Old Point Road ends with a paved area designed for vehicle turnaround. Two way car and truck traffic was observed during the field survey. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

3. HASIS D.3: "There is no area at the end of Reservation Terrace which would permit a bus to turn around and reverse its direction."

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I Response: Newbury Bus Route #1 no longer traverses 58th Street or Reservation Terrace. (SPMC, Appendix J, Amendment 5, p. J-56). Amendment 3 of Bus Route #1 did call- ,

for the use of this road, but this was deleted in Amendment j i

5. The residents of 58th Street and Reservation Terrace are within a quarter of a mile of Newbury Bus-Route #1 and can walk to it to be picked up. (See Attachment S hereto.)

4. BASIS D.4.a: "The SPMC fails to provide for bus evacuation of any portion of Plum Island south of Plum Island Turnpike / Boulevard despite the location of numerous streets and dwellings south of that street. The SPMC wholly fails to provide for the evacuation of those residents or transients without transportation on that portion of Plum Island."

Response: The residential area of Newbury on Plum I

i Island extends south of the Plum Island Turnpike a distance l

of approximately one-half mile. Bus evacuation' routes were I

designed so that no house was more than approximately one-half mile from a route. Therefore a bus route is within

)

reasonable walking distance of any resident who may need transportation during an evacuation.

The Department of Interior Standard Operating Procedure

)

(SOP) for the Parker River Wildlife Refuge instructs Park Rangers to check all unattended vehicles at least twice in the event an evacuation of Plum Island is recommended. A notice would be placed on unattended vehicles advising the owners to evacuate the' Refuge. If any persons were to become stranded at the Refuge because of disabled vehicles, Park Rangers would assist them or they would obtain rides with other Refuge visitors who would be evacuating.

5. BASIS D.S.b: "While traffic on Rolfe's Lane apparently has the option of turning left (south) onto Route lA or of proceeding straight to Hanover Street, the SPMC fails to provide any information as to which route will be. chosen by most drivers or what criteria, if any, the drivers should consider in making that choice. Drivers familiar with the area will~probably proceed straight to Hanover Street as that road provides relatively.

straight access to Route 1 and brings one closer to I-95."

Response: Hanover Street provides direct access to Route 1, a major southbound evacuation route. Route 1A is also a major southbound evacuation route. Either route is an efficient evacuation path; motorists will select that route which is more attractve in the sense that it offers an expeditious path out of the EPZ. Individual vehicle movements toward one route or the other have no bearing on the timely manner in which the evacuation buses complete their assigned route.

L 6. BASIS D.5.c: "At the three-way intersection

) of Route 1A, Parker Street and Green Street (providing egress from Newburyport), traffic is discouraged from turning right onto Parker Street from Route 1A. One traffic guide is located in that area but is sited at Route 1A and Green Street, apparently to encourage drivers to turn onto Green Street instead of continuing south on Route 1A. Thus, no guide

will discourage drivers from turning right from Route 1A onto Parker Street."

Response: The placement of cones is designed to provide visual cues for motorists, identifying the directions of travel which are discouraged; the absence of cones identifies those directions which are recommended evacuation paths. The presence of cones at the entry to westbound Parker Street at its intersection with Route 1A/ Green Street coupled with arm movements by the traffic guide at that location (TCP E-NB-02), reinforced by the movement of traffic southbound on Green Street or on Route 1A will suffice, either individually or in aggregate, to discourage drivers  !

from turning right onto westbound Parker Street.

Furthermore, all traffic guides are free to move in their assigned location to respond appropriately to any indecision on the part of a motorist. The guide's position is within a few steps of Parker Street.

7. BASIS D.5.d: "At the intersection of Rolfe's Lane, Green Street and Hanover Street (Appendix J, p. N-4), traffic from three directions will merge and flow onto Hanover Street. One traffic guide is located at that intersection. As this intersection will be handling evacuation traffic from Plum Island and Newburyport, it is unrealistic to assume that one guide will be able to adequately direct the traffic flow and ensure that f opposite travel for emergency vehicles will be possible. Moreover, the merging of these traffic flows will create a significant

}.

J bottleneck and vast reductions in or the cessation of travel speed."

Resoonse: At the intersection of Green Street, Rolfe's Lane and Hanover Street (TCP-E-NB-02), only two evacuating flows merge.onto southwestbound Hanover Street.

Note that Hanover Street is a continuation of Rolfe's Lane.

A single traffic guide at this intersection is sufficient to guide these movements. Any inbound flow (i.e., north on Green Street or northeast on Hanover Street) will be light and can be accommodated by the traffic guide at this location.

It is worthy of note that this control was suggested and sketched by George Riel, Chief of Police for the Town of Newbury, in his office.

Newbury Bus routes #1, #2, and #4 travel through this TCP. Buses on Route #1 enter the TCP from the southwest on Hanover Street and continue northeast onto Rolfe's Lane.

These same buses' travel in the opposite (southwestbound) direction through this TCP with evacuating traffic on the return trip to the transfer point. Buses on Route #2 enter the TCP from the south on Green Street, then turn left onto southwestbound Hanover Street. Buses on Route #4 enter the TCP from the west on Parker Street, turn right (south) onto Green Street, then right again onto southwestbound Hanover Street.

Each of these three routes is serviced by two buses. Thus, a total of six buses will travel through this

->e-

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TCP over a period of several hours. With one traffic guide

(

assigned to each of the three intersections located at TCP E-NB-02, there should be little difficulty in accommodating such turn movements. Note that this area clears between about 3-4 hours after the Order to Evacuate; see Figures 10-l 2d and 10-2e in NHRERP, Vol. 6. Thus, at least half of these bus trips will likely pass through this TCP after the evacuating traffic has cleared.

8. BASIS D.6.a: "At the intersection of Hanover Street and Route 1, cones are placed so as to discourage travel in any direction except south on Route 1. The SPMC, if followed, would require the cones to be temporarily moved over for the bus to drive over them.

The bus also will have to cross southbound traffic on Route 1. Route 1 is a major southbound evacuation route and the SPMC fails t

to address the problem of the Route 1 l southbound drivers who will not permit the bus to cross, an eventuality patently possible in the event of an emergency evacuation. If the

! bus does somehow cross Route 1, it is likely I that automobiles will follow it as their drivers may realistically conclude that the l

bus is following a preferred or less congested I route."

Besconse: Traffic Guides are cautioned to "not position cones or barricades to completely block passage I through any intersection." (App. J, p. J-2) Thus, cones i

need not be moved or run over by a bus or other vehicle to obtain access to a roadway whose access is discouraged.

Traffic guides are instructed to discourage traffic except l

" emergency response vehicles with specific missions and

I destinations (i.e., buses, ambulancec, tow trucks) App. J, p.

F J-2, item 12. Traffic Control Post E-NB-03 at the intersection of Hanover Street and Middle road has three traffic guides available to assist with bus travel across Route 1 if necessary (Appendix J, page J-55). Drivers of personal vehicles are highly unlikely to follow the evacuation bus rather than their evacuation directions, since virtually all will know that southbound Route 1 is a major evacuation route. Those who do tend to follow the bus will be corrected by a Traffic Guide, who will indicate that southbound Route 1 is the correct direction of travel. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

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I 9. BASIS D.6.b: "Highfield Road is unmarked and not readily visible."

Resnonse: The intersection of Middle Road and Highfield Road is marked by a sign for Highfield Road.

Highfield Road is clearly depicted on the evacuation map as the first right turn after the bus turns onto Middle Road.

The bus returns to the Transfer Point on Highfield Road after completing the route; therefore, the driver will be familiar with the road entrance. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

10. BASIS D.6.c: "It is likely that vehicles exiting Newburyport on Scotland Road will, due to traffic congestion, turn onto Highfield Road in the opposite direction to that taken

l by the evacuation buses in order to gain access to Route 1 south. Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width and drivers attempting to gain access to Route 1 will render opposing travel impossible.

Resnonse: Highfield Road.is-a two lane. roadway approximately 16' wide at its narrowest point. The road has sufficient shoulders to allow two way travel and is marked by a street sign. During the field verification the NHY bus had to let a second bus pass and there was ample room to do so.

Evacuees are expected to remain on southbound Scotland Road as it is a direct route to I-95, with wide lanes and paved shoulders. The ETE study revealed that Scotland Road will not be congested. Motorists would not be motivated to change their outbound direction along a major route which is undersaturated, to turn onto a local road such as Highfield Road _which is far less attractive for evacuation. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

11. BASIS D.6 d: "The transfer point is a narrow (approximately 15' wide) driveway which leads from Highfield Road to a Massachusetts Electric transformer which is in a fenced enclosure at the end of the approximately 100' drive. No area is provided for buses to be able to turn around or for vehicles to park.

The area around the transfer point is heavily wooded and overgrown with brush. No area is available for use of those evacuees'who are dropped off at the transfer point."

Response: The Newbury transfer point is located at Massachusetts Electric Substation #6 on Highfield Road. A

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field study was done to determine the ability of buses to access and egress the Transfer Point (see Report, Attachment I hereto). The field study revealed that buses could pull in but would have to back out. The Transfer Point Dispatcher or l

Route Guide will stop traffic and aid in directing the bus l l

out of the Transfer Point. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.D.1 and II.D.4 of this testimony.

12. BASIS E.1.a: "The SPMC is defective in that l the intersection of Route 1 and Elm Street is J marked by no sign indicating the name of the latter street. A driver unfamiliar with the area will be unable to identify the road he/she is expected to follow when exiting Route 1."

Response: Elm Street is the second Right once the bus is on Route 1. There is also a flashing yellow light at the intersection of Elm and Route 1 which can be used as a landmark. The flashing light will be incorporated into the evacuation bus route maps in Appendix J of the SPMC. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

13. BASIS E.2.a: "The intersection of School Street and Elm Street is unmarked by any signs identifying either road for drivers traveling in any direction. The SPMC thus fails to provide a reasonable assurance that the bus driver will be able to correctly follow Route

1. 2."

Response: As shown in SPMC Appendix J, p. J-57, bus route #2 proceeds along Elm Street, turns right onto Central Street and then to Orchard Street. School Street is

1 1

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[-

['

1never traversed. No street' sign is needed to identify School l'

} Street. Central Street is traversed but is not labeled on

.theLbus route map. Bus route map #2 (SPMC Appendix J, pg. J-

57) will be updated to correctly reflect Central Street.

I' This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4  !

I of this testimony. l

."No signs identify Orchard' L 14. BASIS E.'2.b:

Street where the bus is to turn left (south)  :

from School Street. Indeed, what appears to  !

be Orchard Street at that intersection in fact is Central Street. The SPMC fails to i

-demonstrate that the driver will' correctly follow Route #2."

Response: Appendix J, pg. J-57 Newbury bus evacuation route #2 ' hows the route following Elm Street to north on Central Street to northeast on Orchard Street.  !

There is no left taken from School Street onto Central Street. School Street is never traversed. Central Street is i traversed but is not labeled on the bus route map. Bus route i

map #2 (SPMC Appendix J, pg. J-57) will be updated to correctly reflect Central Street. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

15. BASIS E.2.c: " Central Street is narrow, approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. The SPMC fails to provide an adequate assurance that this portion of Route

1. 2 will remain passable in the event of opposing traffic."

Response: Central Street is a two lane roadway which is approximately 18' wide at its narrowest point. The

narrow section only continues for 1/4 of a' mile then turns 1 back into a regular two lane roadway. This street commonly accommodates 2 lanes of traffic, including' heavy industrial-trucks from the Byfield Pearson Construction Company, as well as school buses.

16. BASIS E.3.b: Boston Road intersects.with Route 1, a. major southbound evacuation route from the entire EPZ~ south of Seabrook Station.

Route 1 will thus be heavily congested.- The SPMC calls for no traffic control points at that intersection and it is unlikely that the bus will be able to cross Route 1, .

particularly in light of the fact that two lanes of southbound traffic will be encouraged only one mile, more or less, north of that intersection."

ResDonse: Newbury Traffic Control Post E-NB-03 is located at the intersection of Route 1 and Hanover Street / Middle Road (Appendix J, p. J-55). This is just over 1 mile north of the intersection of Boston Road and Route 1.

Traffic at TCP E-NB-03'is facilitated to proceed south on Route 1 utilizing only 1 lane, not 2 lanes. Southbound traffic should not unduly delay the two buses which cross

).

Route 1 on Boston Road. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this Prefiled Testimony.

17. BASIS E.3.c: "The map of Route #2 (Appendix 7, p. N-7) indicates that Boston Road intersects at a right angle an unidentified L road about 1/4 mile east of Route 1 but that the route continues straight on Boston Road.

In actuality, that intersection is a "Y" intersection, or fork in the road, with Boston Road bearing to the left and the other road bearing to the right. No sign identifies

which of the roads is Boston Road. The SPMC lacks reasonable assurance that the bus drivers will be able to accurately follow Route #2 at this intersection."

Response: Evacuation Bus Route 2, Amendment 5, correctly illustrates the intersection of Boston Road with the first intersecting road'as a "Y", not a right angle.

(Appendix J, page J-57.) Boston Road does have a standard street sign. The evacuation bus route map (Appendix J, pg.

J-57) clearly depicts the route continuing left on Boston Road. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.4 of this Prefiled Testimony.

18. BASIS E.3.d: " Boston Road, particularly after the fork, is about 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. Persons familiar with Newbury can be expected to evacuate the EPZ to the south via Boston Road to Route 1, especially if travel on Hanover Street (see Newbury Bus Route #1, App. J, p. N-6) becomes congested. This portion of Route #2 will accordingly become impassable for northeast I

bound traffic."

Response: Boston Road is a two lane roadway approximately 16' wide at its narrowest point, but there is 3

sufficient shoulder space for two buses to pass each other.

Boston Road is the road which leads to the Newbury Town Dump.

I Accordingly, large vehicles frequently encounter opposite moving passenger vehicles on this road under normal conditions, and thus there would be no problem in passing i l under emergency conditions. During the NHY field survey, the 4

bus was passed on Boston Road by a dump truck, thus clearly l

j

showing that two large vehicles can traverse the road. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

19. BASIS E.3.e: "The intersection of Boston Road and Green Street is unmarked. Bus drivers thus will be unable to follow Route #2 in the absence of route guides and/or directional signs."

Response:. The evacuation bus route map (Appendix J, page J-57) clearly shows Boston Road ending and the route continuing left on Green Street. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C. and II.D.4 of this testimony.

20. BASIS E.4.a: " Green Street southbound) will in all likelihood be recognized by drivers as an alternative route to Route 1 or Route 1A, both of which are major southbound routes. Ar-Green Street is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width, southbound traffic will render travel to the north on that street impossible."

Response: Field verification showed Green Street to be a well maintained two lane roadway with ample room for two way traffic. The bus was passed by oncoming traffic during field verification.

3 Green Street is a local street. Evacuees will either proceed south on Route 1A, or travel southwest on I

Hanover Street to southbound Route 1. These are the movements f acilit att.d by the Traffic Guides at TCP-NB-02. It is unlikely evacuees would disregard the control strategy and exit the TCP onto Green Street south of Hanover Street. This J

subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

21. BASIS E.4.b: " Green Street, as well as other roads on all Newbury bus routes, is subject to flooding and becoming impassable. The SPMC makes no provision for such an eventuality."

Response: Green Street is not located in a flood plain region, as is shown by the flood plain map obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. (See Attachment T hereto.) In the event flooding were to occur on Green Street, it is not expected that the flooding would be severe enough to prevent bus travel, based on the fact that i

school bus route #7 for the Town of Newbury traverses the same section of Green Street (see Attachment U hereto). This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

22. BASIS E.5: "After merging with Hanover Street I evacuation traffic, the buc follows Newbury Bus Route #1 to the transfer point. The bases for the preceding contention regarding the adequacy of this portion of the route are incorporated herein by reference."

Response: The intersection of Middle Road and f f

Highfield Road is marked by a sign for Highfield Road. '

I Highfield Road is clearly depicted on the evacuation map as the first right after turning onto Middle Road. The bus i

returns to the Transfer Point on Highfield Road after completing the route; therefore, the driver will be familiar with the road entrance. l l

Highfield Road is a two lane roadway approximately 16' wide at its narrowest point. The road has sufficient shoulders to allow two way travel. The road is marked by a street sign. During the NHY field verification the bus had l to let a second bus pass and there was ample room to do so.

23. BASIS F.1.a: "The inadequacy of Boston Road for eastbound traffic noted suora is incorporated herein by reference."

Response: Boston Road is a two lane roadway approximately 16' wide at its narrowest point, but there is sufficient shoulder space for two buses to pass each other.

Boston Road is the road which. leads to the Newbury Town Dump.

Accordingly, large vehicles frequently encounter opposite moving passenger vehicles on this road under normal conditions, and thus there would be no problem in passing under emergency conditions. During the NHY field survey, the i bus was passed on Boston Road by a dump truck, thus clear 5.y showing that two large vehicles can traverse the road.

24. BASIS F.1.b: "The intersection of Boston Road and Hay Street is not a right angle as Route

1. 3 depicts. Rather, it is a "Y" intersection or fork which will cause the driver, if unfamiliar with the area, to become disoriented or lost."

i Response: Evacuation Bus Route 3, Amendment 5, correctly illustrates the intersection of Boston Road with the first intersecting road as a "Y", not a right angle.

(Appendix J, page J-57.) The evacuation bus route map i

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l

clearly depicts the route continuing right on Hay Street.

This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

25. BASIS F.1.c: " Hay Street is inadequately marked for vehicles traveling northeast on Boston Road."

Response: The route is clearly depicted as bearing right at the fork in the evacuation route map (Appendix J, page J-58). This subject is further addressed in Sections f

)

II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

26. BASIS F.1.d: " Hay Street is about 1-1/2 lanes in width and has no shoulders. Opposing traffic to Route 1 via Boston Road, which is l called for in Newbury Bus Route #3, will render travel in both directions impossible."

Response: Hay Street is a two lane roadway approximately 20' wide at its narrowest point, between the i

intersections of Boston Road and Hay Street, and Hay Street j and Newman Road. Hay Street normally supports two way traffic, which would include heavy equipment trucks going to

) the dump on Boston Road. The amount of evacuating traffic that will be encountered on Hay Street by evacuation buses i

should be relatively small. Hay Street is a secondary road not normally used as an evacuation route for people leaving the EPZ. The only evacuating traffic that should be encountered is that of the residents living in the Hay Street area. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

27. BASIS F.1.e: " Portions of. Hay Street are within a flood plain and are subject to flooding, but the SPMC identifies no means of dealing with the impassability of Hay Street due to flood waters."

Response: This subject is addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

28. BASIS F.2.a-c: "Newman Road is not identified by any sign."

"Newman Road is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width, has no shoulders and crosses about 1/2 mile of marsh. Opposing traffic will render southeasterly travel possible."

"Newman Road is extremely low and, for approximately 1/2 mile, is within a flood plain area. The road is subject to flooding and becoming impassable."

Response: Newbury evacuation bus route #3 has been revised as a result of the field survey (see Attachment V hereto). Newman Road has been eliminated as part of the route. A portion of the bus route on Hay Street between the intersection of Hay Street and Newman Road, and the I intersection of Hay Street and Green Street has also been I

eliminated. The revised route remains within the bounds of i

evacuation route planning, since residents living along those portions of the route that were changed are no more than one-half mile from a revised bus evacuation route. The revised route will be incorporated into Appendix J of the SPMC. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.4 of this testimony.

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29. BASIS F.2.d: "No intersection control is provided by the SPMC to enable the bus to merge onto Route 1A southbound. As that road is one of few southerly evacuation routes, it will be necessary to provide some form of control if the bus will realistically be able to join the Route 1A traffic."-

Response: Newbury evacuation bus route #3 has been revised as a result of the field survey (see Attachment V hereto). This subject is addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

30. BASIS F.2.e: "Old Rowley Road is 1-1/2 lanes in width and has no shoulders. It is unpaved, crosses a flood plain area and is subject to flooding and becoming impassable due to flood waters."

Response: Old Rowley Road is a two lane roadway approximately 15' wide at its narrowest point. There are ample shoulders for large vehicles to get by each other.

During field verification large trucks were observed traversing this road in opposite directions with no problems.  :

i A portion of Old Rowley Road is located in a flood plain I

{

area. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of 3

this testimony.

31. BASIS F.3.a: "To travel north on Route 1A

. from Old Rowley Road will require southbound I evacuees on Route 1A to permit the bus to gain access to a northbound lane. Yet no traffic control or route guide is provided at that intersection. It is thus unlikely that access to a northbound lane will be achieved."

l Response: Old Rowley Road becomes Red Gate Road at l-the Rowley town border; the intersection is that of Red Gate

} i c________________ _ _ _ _

i;

Road and Route-1A in the town.of Rowley. There is no reason that' southbound' traffic should unduly delay the few buses which-attempt to. gain access to northbound Route 1A. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5'of this testimony. l

32. BASIS F.3.d: " Hay Street is inadequately marked."

Response:- Once'the bus starts the return trip on High Road (Route 1A), Hay Street is the third left after crossing'over the Parker River. Newbury Bus Route Map #3 will be updated to reflect Parker River as a landmark. This subject is further addressed'in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

33. BASIS F.4.a: "Before arriving at its intersection with Newman Road, Hay Street is very low and, indeed, is in a flood plain area. Hay Street is subject to flooding and

) becoming impassable."

Response: Newbury Bus Route #3 has been revised

(see Attachments I and V hereto). The portion of Hay Street used for the return trip is not located in a flood plain I area. This subject is addressed in Section II.D.6 of this -

testimony.

34. BASIS F.4.b: "After passing Newman Road, t evacuation buses on Hay Street will be traveling in opposite directions. The Road is of insufficient width to readily permit two-way bus traffic."

-,2-

)

l Response: The field verification survey found the narrowest part of this section of Hay Street to be 20 ft.

wide. It was observed that two way travel on this portion of Hay Street would not pose a problem.

35. BASIS F.5.a: "The impracticability of crossing Route 1, as noted suora, is incorporated herein by reference."

Response: This subject is addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

36. BASIS F.5.b: "Highfield Road is marked by no sign and drivers will likely miss the turn onto this portion of the route."

Response: The intersection of Highfield Road and Middle Road is marked by a street sign for Highfield. The bus drivers are now on the return trip and are already j familiar with Highfield Road and the location of the Transfer Point. Highfield Road is clearly depicted on the bus route map as the first left once the bus starts traversing Middle Road. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

37. BASIS G.1.a: "In the likely event that traffic is congested on Scotland Road, drivers 4 l

will realistically attempt to use Highfield Road to gain access to alternate southbound evacuation routes. As Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width with no shoulders, cars traveling to those alternate routes via Highfield Road will render travel from the transfer point to Scotland road difficult or impossible."

1 I

- -- - -- i

Response: As shown on Figures 10-2, NHRERP, Vol.

6, Scotland Road does not become congested during an evacuation. Evacuees are expected to remain on Scotland Road as it is a direct route to I-95. They would not be motivated to change their outbound direction and turn onto Highfield Road because it is a less attractive road for evacuation.

This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

Highfield Road is a two lane roadway approximately 16' wide at its narrowest point. The road has sufficient shoulders to allow two way travel. The road is marked by a street sign. During the NHY field verification the bus had to let a second bus pass and there was ample room to do so.

38. BASIS G.1.b: "Moreover, vehicles on I-95 will likely exit onto South Street if the former is I congested while the latter is lightly l traveled. Yet no traffic control at the  ;

intersection (I-95 and Scotland Road / South Street) exists."

Response: The ETE studies indicate that southbound I-95 will not be congested during an evacuation; see Figure 10-2, NHRERP, Vol. 6. It is not expected that evacuees would exit I-95, a 4-lane interstate highway, to take a local road while still within the Seabrook Station EPZ. They would continue south along I-95 in the outbound direction in accord with the recommended routing, to a point outside the Seabrook Station EPZ. Additionally, buses on Newbury Bus Route #4, I

~"~

I

i $

due to the change described in Section II.C of this l 1

testimony, travel northbound on South Street, which is

{

f l counterblow to any traffic hypothetically exiting I-95 onto southbound South Street. Even in this unlikely event, i

evacuation buses would not encounter undue delay or congestion.

39. BASIS G.1.c: "The turn the bus driver is to make from Spring Hill to the left (southeast)  !

onto Moody Street is poorly marked and would I T easily be missed. Indeed, South Street intersects Main Street before intersecting i

Moody Street and it is likely that incorrect turns onto Main Street will be made as the roads are inadequately marked."

Response: The left turn from Spring Hill Road onto I Moody Street was eliminated in the post Amendment 5 change.

Spring Hill Road is completely eliminated in a change resulting fron the field survey. This subject is addressed I in Section II.C of this testimony.

40. BASIS G.2.a: "These series of turns are i poorly marked and it is likely that drivers will become disoriented or lost in this area."

Response: The contention basis G.2.a is no longer applicable due to the route change described in Section II.C of this Prefiled Testimony. The latest route map depicts the series of turns in question as now being Orchard Street to Central Street to Church Street to Lunt Street to Moody l

Street. These streets are clearly indicated on the Evacuation Route Map. The field survey verified that there t

are street signs clearly indicating the above mentioned intersections.

41. BASIS G.2.b: " Vehicles traveling south on I-95 will likely exit to Church Street / Central Street in the likely event of congestion on I-95 and travel west, thereby impeding eastbound travel."

Response: 'The ETE studies indicate that southbound I-95 will not be congested'during an evacuation; see Figures 10-2 of NHRERP, Vol. 6. It is not expected that evacuees would ' e>'.it I-95, a 4-lane interstate highway, to take a local road while.still within the Seabrook Station EPZ. Evacuees would continue south in the outbound direction in accord with the recommended routing and travel along I-95 to a point which-is outside the Seabrook Station EPZ. The relatively few vehicles which might exit I-95 onto Church or Center Streets would not cause undue delays or congestion for evacuation buses.

42. BASIS G.2.c: "The turn onto Orchard Street is unmarked."

Response: There is a sign present for Orchard Street at the intersection of Orchard and Central. Field verification identified that Orchard Street ends at the intersection of Orchard Street and Central Street. The L evacuation route map will be updated to clearly show that f.

Orchard Street ends at Central Street and the route goes l

l l

I This subject is further addressed right on Central Street.

in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

43. BASIS G.3.b: " Buses will likely not be able j to cross Route 1 without control of evacuees a utilizing that major southbound route."

Response: Buses on the latest Newbury Route #4 travel from Green Street onto southwestbound Hanover Street, l across Route 1 continuing south on Middle Street and then continue southwest on Orchard Street. Traffic Control Post E-NB-03 is located at the intersection of Hanover Street -

Route 1 - Middle Road. There are three traffic guides at this traffic control post to guide the bus across Route 1.

This subject is further addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.5 of this testimony.

44. BASIS G.4.b: "Left (easterly) turns from Green Street to Parker Street are discouraged (see Traffic Control Post No. E-NB-02, appendix J, p. N-4). The bus driver would thus be required to disregard traffic cones located at the turn or be obstructed by inbound traffic on Parker Street."

Resocnse: Contention basis G.4.b is no longer applicable due to a route change described in Section II.C of this Prefiled Testimony. The latest route map depicts the bus traveling east on Parker Street, turning right (south) onto Green Street and then turning right (west) onto Hanover Street. This route follows the flow of evacuation traffic and is consistent with the movements facilitated at TCP E-NB-

02. In addition, it eliminates the left turn from Green

_ = _ _ _ _- - - _ _ .

f 1

-]

1 i

Street to Parker Street which was the movement cited in the contention.

45. BASIS G.4.c: "It is unrealistic to expect that evacuation buses will be permitted by traffic flows'to cross State Street and Route 1 in Newburyport.as provided by the bus route.

State Street will be congested and Route 1 will contain heavy numbers of southbound evacuees. To cross Route 1, the bus will need to' cross two northbound and two southbound lanes."

Resoonse: Traffic Control Post E-NP-01 includes the intersections of' Route 1, Parker Street and State Street in Newburyport. Five traffic guides at this traffic control post will guide the bus through the intersections. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.5 of this testimony.

46. BASIS G.4.d: " Congestion of Route 1 will result in evacuees turning from that road onto Parker Street'and the eventual' congestion of traffic there. The bus route will thus likely be-impassable."

Response: The Traffic Guides at Traffic Control Post E-NP-01 direct evacuation traffic outbound and south on Route 1. Guardrails at the intersection of Parker Street and Route 1 block movement along Parker Street. Eastbound traffic along Parker Street is forced to turn right onto Route 1 southbound which leads to a rotary approximately 75

~

yards away. The bus follows the designated bus route three

?

quarters of the way around the rotary, takes the State Street

(

exit and follows State Street northbound to the intersection c.

.with Parker Street. The evacuation bus will turn right onto Parker Street and' continue along the designated evacuation bus route. The Newbury Evacuation Bus Route #4 map has been changed to reflect this maneuver. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.D'.4 arti II.D.5-of this testimony.

47. BASIS G.4.e: . %faf Road / Scotland Road will in all likelihood be jammed with evacuees attempting to Qain access to I-95. Timely travel Ln this y srtion of the bus route is accordingly unlikely."

Response: Due to the route onange described n Section II.C of this Prefiled Testimony buses on Newbury Route #4 will travel north on Scotland Road away from I-95 and in the opposite direction'of evacuees traveling to access I-95. Travel of buses will not be impeded or delayed by evacuating traffic exiting the EPZ.

48. BASIS G.'4.f: " Entry onto Highfield Road from Scotland Road will be impeded or blocked by evacuees and buses attempting to reach I-95 via Scotland read from Plum Island, Newbury and Newburyport."

Response: Due to the route change described in Section II.C of this Prefiled Testimony buses on Newbury Route #4 will now travel north on Scotland Road, in the opposite direction of evacuees traveling I-95. The bus will turn right onto Highfield Road and will not be impeded by traffic traveling toward I-95.

l l 49. BASIS H: " Appendix J, p. N-10, of the SPMC l I

includes a map showing a proposed bus evacuation route. The route depicted in that

map includes Downfall Road as one of the streets the evacuation bus is to travel upon.

Downfall Road is a " paper" street only and, in actuality, is nonexistent and impassable."

Response: The map the contention is referring to is a map from the Transfer Point to the Reception Center.

The map in Appendix J is no longer used by the Route Guides.

This map will be deleted from Appendix J. A new map was

! developed.

50. BASIS I: "Many of the roads, e.g. Boston Road, Hay Street, Old Rowley Road, constituting bus routes and potential evacuation routes lie in whole or in part within flood plain areas and are subject to periodic flooding. The SPMC fails to provide a reasonable assurance that these routes will be passable during flooding periods. The SPMC fails to identify alternate bus routes in the event that those which have been identified become impassable due to flooding and other I seasonable impediments."

Response: Specific roadways designated as evacuation routes which allegedly lie in areas subject to flooding have been identified in bases E.4.b, F.1.e, F.2.b, F.2.c, F.2.e and F.4.a. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

51. BASIS J.1: " Appendix J, Amendment 2, p. WN I 11 consisted of evacuation bus routes in West Newbury. There are no street signs at a number of the intersections at which bus drivers were required to turn in order to I follow the routes. Parts of River Road (Route

1. 1) are subject to flooding, rendering segments of the road impassable at certain time of the year. A part of Ash Street (Route

1. 2) is a dirt road which is regularly underwater during portions of the year and is

~' ~

I

l closed to traffic during portions of the year."

l I Response: The Town of West Newbury's Answers to Applicants' Interrogatories specify for basis J.1 exactly which intersections along each bus route are alleged to have no street signs. For Bus Route #1 the intersection of River Road and Coffin Street allegedly lacks a street sign. River Road, in actuality, turns into Coffin Street at a fork in the road. The map clearly depicts the bus going right at the fork on Coffin Street. The left part of the fork is a very short dead end road. There is ample room for a bus to turn around if this road was inadvertently taken.

For Bus Route #2 there allegedly are no signs for the intersections of Crane Neck and Georgetown, Ash Street and Brickett, or Moulton Street and Bachelder Street.

Georgetown Road is clearly depicted as the second left once on Crane Neck Street. Brickett Street is the second left after the intersection of Middle Street and Ash Street, which is marked with a street sign. The route then goes left on Moulton at the end of Brickett. The route follows Moulton bearing right at the lake and ending at the intersection of Bachelder, Cherry Hill and Moulton. The route is clearly depicted as going left on Bachelder at the end of Moulton Street.

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e

)

For Bus Route #3 there allegedly is no sign for the intersection of Stewart and Middle. The map clearly shows that Stewart Street ends and the route goes left onto Middle Street. The intersection of Middle Street and Indian Hill ,

allegedly does not have a street sign. Indian Hill is the first right after taking a left on Middle Street. There allegedly is no sign at the intersection of Turkey Hill Road and Rogers Street. The route follows Turkey Hill Road to a left on Rogers Street. Rogers Street is depicted as the third left once the bus is on Turkey Hill Road. Rogers Street is also the first paved road the driver will see once on Turkey Hill Road. Rogers Street is the left just prior to a bridge. If the driver comes to the bridge, he will know he went too far and will have to turn back and take the first right after the bridge. West Newbury bus evacuation map #3 will be updated to reflect the bridge for use as a landmark.

There allegedly is no sign at the intersection of Rogers Street and Garden Street. The route follows Rogers Street to a right on Garden Street. The bus route map clearly depicts the route going right on Garden Street where Rogers Street ends. This subject is also addressed in Sections II.C and II.D.4 of this testimony.

River Road and Ash Street were cross checked against flood plain maps for their particular area. Ash Street was found not to lie inside a flood plain area, I

g

-I l

1 according to flood plain maps obtained from the Federal ]

Emergency Management Agency. River Road was found to lie in i

a flood plain region (see Attachment W hereto). However, it is not expected that flooding on River Road would be severe enough to prevent bus travel, based on the following school I

bus listings which travel River Road for most of the year:

Town of West Newbury school bus route 65 - Bus 40 to the High j School; route 3 - Bus 61 to the Elementary School; and route i

30 - to the West Newbury Kindergarten. All these routes

)

travel the entire length of River Road. The school bus routes were published in Newburyport Daily News, September 2, 1988, pg. B3, Attachment X hereto. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

52. BASIS J.2: "The transfer site for the bus routes located at Stewart Street, is inadequate. It consists of a 26 foot by 29 foot paved area which is inadequate for a bus turn around. n area for people Nor is there a'y to congregate in the area while awaiting transfer or for emergency personnel vehicle parking. There are no sidewalks in that area of Stewart Street, and the sides of the road fall off into gullies which are often wet.

There was no provision for traffic guides to assist and facilitate bus movement at the transfer site."

Response: The Town of West Newbury transfer point is located at Massachusetts Electric Substation #47 on Stewart Street. A field study was done to determine the ability of buses to access and egress the Transfer Point.

The field study revealed that buses could pull in but would

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have to back out. The Transfer Point Dispatcher or Route Guide will stop traffic and aid in directing the bus out of the Transfer Point.

On the morning of 2/27/89 New Hampshire-Yankee had a bus travel to and enter the Stewart Street Transfer Point in West Newbury. This was done-just after a snow storm had gone through the area. The bus encountered no problems negotiating the hill prior to the Transfer Point or the Transfer Point itself.

Transfer Points are not used to shelter 'cnr congregate l

transit dependent evacuees. The Transfer Point is only a location for the transit dependent evacuees to transfer from

.the route buses to the waiting transfer buses which will transport them to the Reception Center. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.D.1, II.D.4, and II.D.5 of this testimony.

53. BASIS J.3: " Appendix J, Amendment 2, p. WN 8 consisted of sketch maps of traffic control points in West Newbury. The control point at Crane Neck Street and Georgetown Road provided for traffic cones blocking the turn north onto Georgetown Road -- a turn used on prior bus route #2. The control point at Church Street and Main Street provided for cones blocking L the turn from Main Street to Church Street --

a turn used on prior bus route #1."  !

Besponse: Traffic Guides are cautioned to "not position cones or barricades to completely block passage through any intersection." (App. J, p. J-2) Thus, cones

] ,

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need not be moved or run over by a bus or other vehicle to i

obtain access to a roadway whose access is discouraged.  ;

Traffic guides are instructed to discourage traffic except f)

" emergency response vehicles with specific missions and destinations'(i.e., buses, ambulances, tow trucks)." (App.

J, p. J-2, item 12.) Traffic Guides are available'to guide buses through TCPs if necessary.

54. BASIS K: " Parts of various streets in West Newbury are subject to flooding and may be I closed during part of the year. The plan does i not adequately address the seasonable 1 impassability of the roads as required by NUREG-065d J.10.k or provide a reasonable assurance that adequate means exist to deal with seasonal impassability of roads due to j L flooding. Nor does it identify contingency measures to deal with such impediments."

Response: According to flood plain maps obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency the following roads used in the evacuation routes fall in flood plain regions: Church Street, River Road, Coffin Street (small l

section), Georgetown Road, Crane Neck Street (small section),

Rogers Street, Turkey Hill Road, and Indian Hill Street (see Attachment W hereto). However, it is not expected that i flooding on these above mentioned roads would be that frequent or severe enough to prevent bus travel, based on the fact that school bus routes traverse all the above mentioned bus evacuation roads. The school bus routes for West Newbury were published in the Newburyport Daily News 9/2/88, pg. B3

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(see Attachment X hereto). This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

55. CON 3 and 4: "The five pre-designated bus routes that have been included in the Plan for the City of Newburyport are designed to expedite the retrieval of transit dependent individuals as opposed to door to door pick up. However, these bus routes will have, in fact, the opposite effect of actually prolonging the evacuation of transit dependent persons. This will occur because the bus route assignments follow along the heaviest traveled roads in the City, which will already be congested with evacuees. Five out of the six bus routes cross through a major intersection with no TCP in place. And because the routes are circuitous in design and bypass all the major concentrations of the population, it will then be necessary for transit dependent persons, including the mobility-impaired, to leave their homes and to locate the pre-designated bus routes during a radiological emergency. This will require those persons to remain outdoors.

Additionally, this method of circulating buses significantly reduces the reliability of actually accomplishing the retrieval of these individuals and increases the potential for a broad spectrum of populace (elderly, non-ambulatory, etc.) to be left behind." l 1

" Pre-designated bus routes #1 and #5 include in their route assignments, return trips that go the wrong way down a major one-way street (State Street) in the plan. This is further complicated by the lack of any TCPs at the intersection of State Street and High Street and at the intersection of Water Street and State Street. It is likely that because this thoroughfare is utilized by area residents as a primary route out of the City l

and that there are numerous in-feed streets

)

from the Central Business District, the North End and the South End, that lower State Street will be extremely congested with evacuees and returning buses could not be directed through the grain of traffic under any circumstances."

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I I Response: The City of Newburyport is provided with five (5) evacuation bus routes (SPMC, Appendix J, pp. J-74 to J-78) to which twelve (12) buses are assigned, with two (2) buses in reserve standing by at the Newburyport Transfer Point (IP 2.10, Attachment 9, pp. 3 and 4 of 8).

The evacuation bus routes are designed to travel in proximity to the heaviest populated areas in a town, so as to shorten the walking distance transit dependent persons have to walk. This also ensures that all transit dependents are accounted for, in that they have accessibility to at least i

one evacuation bus route within close proximity to their j location. This subject is further addressed in Sections II.D.1 and II.D.2 of this testimony.

Mobility-impaired residents, including the elderly and non-ambulatory, identified by the special needs survey would be contacted by the Special Population Liaisons at the Site Area Emergency to verify special transportation requirements. Upon an evacuation recommendation the Special Population Liaisons would dispatch the appropriate special needs vehicles to their homes to pick up these residents. If an individual was not identified in the special needs survey, q the public information brochure and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages include instructions and a phone number to get special transportation.

i

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Newburyport evacuation bus routes #1 and #5 were found to travel return trips down State Road the wrong way.

Each route map will be updated to reflect a change involving the bypassing of State Street and taking a left onto Federal Street instead. From Federal Street the route goes right on Water Street to the Transfer Point. (See Attachment Y ]

hereto.)

The proposed construction projects would be addressed as would any other road impediment encountered by the evacuation J

buses. The Route Guide would notify the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. If a re-route was deemed necessary the  !

appropriate EOC decisionmakers would designate the alternate  !

route and communicate it back to the Route Guide accordingly.

56. CON 7: "There are several physical inadequacies with the identified Transfer Point in the plan. First and foremost, it is located in a flood plain along the banks of i the Merrimac River and as such is subject to periodic flooding and severe tidal conditions.

Secondly, it is primarily an electrical sub-station for the Massachusetts Electric Company and as such is not suitable for the safe sheltering or even staging of large numbers of people. And thirdly, it offers poor visibility and turning access for buses coming into and out of the facility."

l l Response: The City of Newburyport Transfer Point is located at the Massachusetts Electric Substation #36, Water Street, Newburyport (SPMC, Appendix M, p. M-127). This facility, according to the official flood plain boundary map, )

is located in the flood plain area. In the event the (

f l

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Transfer Point is flooded to a level where operation is-significantly impacted, an alternate Transfer Point would be designated at that time. This subject is further addressed in Section II.D.6 of this testimony.

There is no intention by the SPMC to " shelter" or f

" stage" large numbers of people at the Transfer Points. Bus Drivers are instructed to "(r)eturn to the Transfer Point upon completing the bus route, and either unload or drive to the Reception Center, as directed by the Transfer Point Dispatcher." SPMC, IP 2.10, p. 27. Transfer Point Dispatchers are instructed to "(r)eassign drivers to repeat route or to transport passengers to the Reception Center."

Thus, there is no intention to congregate and/or shelter evacuees at this location.

A field test was conducted to determine if there were accessibility problems at the City of Newburyport Transfer Point. Buses entered and departed from both the right and left direction of the entrance to the Transfer l Point with no problems. (See Attachment I hereto.)

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Attachment D (Page 1 of 1) 202 I All NHY ORO staff were aware of the curren.t ECL and acted accordingly.

Objective #2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillze and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. (See Objective 34 for 24-hour, continuous staffing function within a 6-year time frame).

Evaluation: Met.

Narrative I Summary: The NHY ORO met the objective to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for facilities and field based emergencies.

s I Staff for the NHY ORO EOC were mobilized at the Alert notification by the METS and/or pager system. The NHY ORO EOC was fully staffed in about one and one-half hours.

The Media Center personnel were notified at the Alert notification.

Personnel began to arrive at the Media Center in about one-half hour.

The Media Center was activated in about one and one-half hours.

Staffing at the Salem Staging Area occurred after the Alert I notification. Stage 1 personnel were notified by the METS system. At -

the SAE, stage 2 personnel were notified by the pager system. All ,

emergency personnel who staff the Staging Area or who are dispatched from the Staging Area, including the Staging Area Leader, dispatchers, -

security, traffic guides, route guides, State and local llatsons, field .

monitoring teams, record keepers, administrative staff, and monitoring and decontamination personnel, reported in a timely and expeditious -

manner. I.

Field Personnels Traffle guides for 51 ACP and TCPs were notified at t the SAE and reported to the Staging Area. They were dispatched to .

taelt locations in an expeditious manner.

I Field monitoring teams were notified at the Alert ECL. The teams were ready for dispatch to the field in about one and a half to two hours after notification and were dispatched to the field about 20 i minutes later. L Staff for the Beverly and North Andover Reception and '

I Decontamination Centers were notified after the declaration of the SAE. The mobilization of emergency workers went smoothly and both facilities were fully staffed by a coordinator and staff members in a '

• timely manner.

- 114 -

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I' Attachment I (Page 1 of 7) 1

.. .; -ATTACM4ENT 11 Page 1 J BUS ROUTES 4

I l MASSACHUSETTS I

Newbury Route #1

)

Ran bus route #1 out to Plum Island. Old Point Road starts out as a marked two- s lane highway (street) 24 ft. wide. It is .9 miles long ending in an open paved area. There are 2 lanes marked for .6 miles (20 ft wide) at this time it l l I narrows to 17 ft wide for the next .3 miles. The shoulders are packed sand with l telephone poles offset 2-3 ft from the side of the road. While on the road (17 ft wide part) several cars and a truck passed in the opposite direction with no problems.

Transfer Point Transfer point substation on Highfield Road is very small. Bus can't pull

through the station and out the other gate. Wide paved road to front gate -

gravel road to side gate - also on side road, a gravel road branches off to tra-vel under high tension towers running southwest. We pulled into both roads,

! then backed out onto Highfield Road. I acted as a route guide would, and went i

behind bus to direct out onto the street. Oncoming traffic could be stopped by route guide standing in road.

Newbury Bus Route #2 Ran Route 2 - proceeded down Rt. 1 to Elm Street. There is a sign for Drummer Academy (high school). Proceeded down Elm Street to Central Street. Noted C/BK6395-1 f - 119 -

)

Att achment I (Fage 2 of ~)

BUS ROUTES - continued Page 2 i horse farm at corner - proceeded down Central - stopped at several points and I l measured the width of road - road was 18 ft wide at narrowest point. This por-tion is slightly longer than % of a mile, then it turns into a full 2 lane high-way again. Turned right on Orchard Street - ar.other paved 2 lane road.

Approximately 1.5 miles in " ROAD NARROWS" sign was observed. Road went from 24 l ft wide to 20.6 ft wide and then at its narrowest to 17'. Even at 17 ft wide, our school bus was passed by a dump truck at the time - we were stopped on the l

l shoulder of the road for a measurement. Orchard Street turns into Hiddle Road -

a 2 lane street. We next turned right onto Boston Road which runs % of a mile to Route 1 - this section was 21' wide. At Route 1 we crossed to pick up Doston i

Road - again, another % of a mile there was a Y intersection for Boston Road to the left and Hay Street to the right. There are no regulation street signs but a local resident has put up homemade signs nailed to a tree. Following Boston Road we found the narrowest point to be 16 ft wide. Although the shoulders were L

somewhat narrow with trees and rocks close to the road - two school buses would be able to pass each other. Green Street and Hanover Street were 2 lane streets well maintained - no problems.

1 Newbury Route #3 Leave Transfer Point, travel down Highfield Road, turn right onto Middle Road -

then left on Boston Road - across Rt. 1 to Boston Road and take the right Y fork split to Hay Street. Hay Street is a 2 lane road wide enough for 2 way travel -

20 ft at this point. Proceeded to Newman Road - turned right on Newman Road.

Came to small bridge - 3/4 mile down road. Marked load limit, 4 tons - bus was

- 120 -

C/BK6395-2

Attachment I (Page 3 of' 7)

BUS ROUTES - continued Page 3 I 12 tons - no houses up to this point. Recommend deleting Newman Road from route. We used the reroute described in the summary to get to High Road.

Proceeded down High Road to Old Rowley Road (street sign). Old Rowley Road turned into a dirt road and narrowed down to 15'. However, there was a land fill along the road and large trucks made the trip over this road. Old Rowley Road turned into Red Gate Road and intersected back into High Road (1A). Went north on High Road to Hay Street and turned left. Hay Street was 17 ft. wide at this end. The reroute for the return portion of this route is also in the summary. This reroute will solve a few problems including (1) Hay Street is in a flood plain, very low and subject to flooding: (2) there are also two bridges, one on Hay Street after Newman Road and one on Newman Road itself that are marked " Load Limit 4 tons". The empty bus is 12 tons.

Summary The new proposed route for Newbury Rt. 83 is to leave the transfer point, down Highfield Road to take a right on Middle Road, then turn left on Boston Road -

cross Route 1, travel 1/4 mile down Boston Road, take the right Y fork to Hay Street - travel down Hay Street to Newman Road. At Newman Road turn around and travel back over Hay Street to Boston Road. Turn right onto Boston Road - tra-vel down Boston Road to Green Street - turn right on Green Street for 1/4 mile to Hay Street - turn left on Hay Street to High Road (Rt. 1A). Run the route down High Road to Old Rowley Road - turn right on Old Rowley Road - follow the road around until it returns to High Road. Travel back north on High Road to

- 121 -

C/BK6395-3 I

I

s Attachment I (Page 4 cf 7)

BUS ROUTES - continued Page 4 1

Hay Street - turn left onto Hay Street - travel until reaching Green Street. 4 Turn right onto Green Street for 1/4 mile to Boston Road - turning left. Travel down Boston Road across Rt. 1 to a right on Middle Road to Highfield Road . turn' left on Highfield Road to transfer point.

Newbury Bus Route #4 )

(1) -Width of Highfield Road at narrowest point is 16 ft. While pulled over in bus to take this measurement, a fully loaded school bus passed us with no problems. . Route 4 leaves the transfer point and travels northwest on Highfield Road. Contentions listed on Page 20 of SPMC Contention Document appear to have us traveling Route #4 backwards. The route leaves Highfield Road and turns right onto Scotland Road. The route travels through the industrial park to Parker Street and turns right. We travel down Parker Street until it intersects with Route 1. The route continues across Route 1 at this point. There has been a recent change to Route 1 which included a metal barricade being constructed to divide Route 1 in half - north-bound from south-bound lanes. It is now required to make a right hand turn onto Route 1, travel south to the rotary, go around the rotary, exit off to State Street and reconnect with Parker Street, 1/2 block north of the rotary - turn right down Parker Street until it intersects with High Road and Green Street. This is directly in front of Newbury Town Hall.

Turn right on Green Street for 1 block, then turn right on Hanover Street to Route 1. Cross Route 1 to Middle Road which turns into Orchard Street. One sec-tion of Orchard Street, pari Maple Street, narrows to 17 ft then widens back l

- 122 -

C/BK6395-4

Attachment I (rase 5 of 7)

BUS ROUTES - continued Page 5

)

f- out. Orchard ends at Central Street. We turned right on Central Street and proceeded past I-95 to Church Street - left at Lunt Street - then right on Moody k

y.

Street. The map route shows travel down Moody to Spring Hill Road. Turning right on Spring Hill Road which eventually (1/2 mile) meets up with South Street. We found this route to be unacceptable. Spring Hill is a very narrow I dirt road that would not allow traffic to pass a bus. I recommend travel from 1

Moody Street into West Newbury Where Moody Street turns into Ash Street. Take the first right onto Brickett Street and follow it to the end. At the end of Brickett Street turn right onto Moulton Road which will lead back to a left onto South Street where Newbury Bus Route 24 is rejoined. Spring Hill Road is approximately 1/2 mile long so transit dependent persons can walk to South Street or Moody Street to reach bus route. At this point, South Street is a full 2 lane highway, 20 ft wide, with no limitations. The route continues down South Street to meet up with Scotland Road back to Highfield Road.

l CONTENTION OUESTIONS l

Newbury Bus Route #1 - ORO-030101 l 1. Can a bus turn around at the end of Old Point Road?

Yes. Old Point Road was paved the entire length with a paved circle at the end of the road. The bus turned around with no problem.

l l

l C/BK6395-5

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Attachment i'(Page 6 of 7) -

' BUS ROUTES - continued Page 6

2. Width of.01d Point Road at narrowest point.

The narrowest point was 17 ft wide asphalt. The shoulders were packed sand approximately 2-3 ft wide.

I Newbury Bus Route #2

1. Width of Boston Road at narrowest point?

Boston Road was 16 ft wide, not including shoulders, at narrowest point; it was noted that 2 buses would have no problem passing each other on this road.  !

2. Width of Central Street at narrowest point?

Central Street was 18 ft wide at narrowest point.

Newbury Bus Route #3

1. Is two-way bus travel possible on Hay Street just after passing Newman Road?

No, however, route will be changed to bypass this section of Route #3.

l l

2. Width of Hay Street at narrowest point?

17 ft was narrowest point, however, this portion of Hay Street will be deleted from the route. Then the narrowest point would be 18% ft wide.

)

)

C/BK6395-6

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4

BUS ROUTES'- continued Page 7

s. t-

3. Width of Old Rowley Road at narrowest point?-

Old Rowley becomes a dirt road and is 15 ft wide, not including shoulders, 1

at narrowest point. Large trucks were observed traversing this road with k no problems.

1:

Newbury Bus Route #4 ORO-030104

'1.

l l 1. Width of Highfield Road at narrowest point?

I The width was 16 ft, however, we were pulled off on the shoulder and a bus passed us. So even at the narrowest point 2 buses could pass each other.

2. Width of South Street at narrowest point? 3 This route will be changed to eliminate Spring Hill Road. The reroute I replacing Spring Hill. Road uses Moody Street to Ash Street, right on j Brickett Street, right on Mociton Road which leads back to a left onto South Street (20 feet wide) rejoining Newbury Bus Route 84.

l

}- Newbury Transfer Point Newbury Transfer Point is a substation on Highfield Road. There is a paved road to the front gate approximately 75-100 ft long. One or two buses could pull into this drive, however they would have to back out onto Highfield Road and would need a guide to stop traffic and act as an observer or director to guide bus out.

C/BK6395-7

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Attachment J (Page 1 c_" h)

ATTACHMENT 12 l

MAP VERIFICATION GUIDELINES Before Attemptina to Drive Route

1) Obtain an "Information Only" copy of the latest revision to the map from the Technical Issues Engineer.

la) Check to ensure vehicle has full tank of gas. Identify any anticipated t expenses, i.e., tolls, lunch, etc.

2) Review the route as marked on the map paying particular attention to the quantity, order, and orientation of the roads intersecting the route.

3) After arriving at the " starting point", i.e., Transfer Station, Staging Area, Reception Center, etc., and before driving, set odometer to zero, and/or record beginning mileage.

First Pass Alona Route

4) Verify that the CORRECT NUMBER of left and right turns exist on the map, in.

the CORRECT ORDER, with the CORRECT NAME. (If street sign is not visible check mailboxes, homes, businesses, etc.) Note any landmarks which would help identify the intersection, and mark "No Street Sign" on the map.

NOTE: If, after completing the route, a street remains unidentified by name, use name as it appears in the Universai Atlas for the appropriate area.

5) Concurrent with Step 4, record mileage as required on checklist.

6) Record all traffic lights, both flashing and three-position, along the route using the appropriate standard symbol (Table 1).

7) When approaching a turn in the route, record, permanent landmarks (Attach-ment 1) that would be helpful in identifying the turn.

NOTE: When approaching an exit after a long segment of road, i.e., " travel on Rt. 495 North for approximately 35 miles", record the exit or two just prior to the desired exit.

L

8) Make note of any restrictions to traffic flow, i.e., low bridge or weight limits on bridges, road narrowing, surface changes, or one-way streets.

Second Pass Alona Route

9) Return to " starting point" and complete the route in its entirety. On long trips, i.e., bus yards to EPZ Town, do not return to bus yard. Return to the beginning point of route within the EPZ (exit cloverleaf for example).

10) When presented with a " decision point" (turn in the route), make the wrong turn.

L/1269LS.1

- 126 -

N '~,  :( ;

' Attachment J (Fage 2_c' h;

11) Follow wrong turn. Identify streets,l1a'ndmarks,_etc.,.to ensure the driver-can nav_igate back onto desired route,.using the most expeditious routes.

12)' Proceed to next " decision.' point" in route, repeat Step 11.

~

13) After completing'the second pass in'this manner, return to " starting point", review comments on map.

14)' The follcwing comments / items should appear where appropriate:

Mileage Distance between landmarks Correct street names Correct orientation and order of streets on map (number of lefts, rights and in proper order)

Permanent landmarks: Street Bridge RR tracks Underpasses Overpasses' Water Public building Commercial building Church ,

Cemetery Park or field Homes (only as last resort in rural area)

Any restrictions noted, such as low bridges, or weight limited bridges, one-way streets, etc.

NOTE: Make judicious use of landmarks!

Definition: Landmark, a conspicuous and easily recognized permanent feature of.a landscape.

Landmark Example: Landscene Good Bad i Urban Park or Field Commercial Building Rural Commercial Building Park or Field p

[;

15) If you are satisfied with comments on map and confident in the accuracy of the map, sign and date it on the back of the map (include your phone num-ber) and submit to the Technical Issues Engineer (during the debriefing session immediately following completion of your work).

L/1269LS.2

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1

I At t achment J (Fage 3 of 4)

MAP VERIFICATION TASK - MASSACHUSETTS I

I. MAP ORO - 050101 - Salisbury Evacuation Bus Route #1 i

A. The entire bus route was run with a bus. Most of the bus route was paved with the exception of a 0.3 mile stretch at the west end of Baker Road which is hardpacked dirt. The entire route is passable.

The entire length of Baker Road is developed as a residential area.

B. The railroad bridge on Route 1 Just prior to the left hand turn onto True Road should be marked on the map. This would provide a good landmark.

II. MAP ORO - 50103 - Salisbury Evacuation Bus Route #3 The entire evacuation bus route was run with the bus. The entire bus route was paved and passable. The section of this route along Ferry Road was run to verify road conditions. The entire stretch is paved, and is passable.

III. MAP ORO - 040101 - Newburyport Evacuation Bus Route #1 The Newburyport Transfer Point (Mass Electric Substation on Water Street) was looked at to identify any potential problems. The facility consists of the substation switchyard, several service buildings, a number of large open areas and equipment (transformer) laydown areas. Normally, a bus can make a complete turn in the yard area. However, the presence of a series of transformers immediately adjacent to the switchyard required an addi-tional maneuver. This did not present an overly difficult task.

The second potential problem addressed was the ability of the bus to access and egress the transfer point. Egress from the transfer point was accomplished for both left and right turns with no difficulties. In both cases the driver had sufficient down(up) road visibility to carry out the turns safely. Access to the transfer point was demonstrated with the bus coming from the west as well as from the east. Access from the west pro-vided no difficulties with the bus able to accomplish an easy, safe turn into the Transfer Point. Access from the east proved to be somewhat more difficult, but was easily and safely accomplished using an additional maneuver. This was required due to the shorter turn, a slightly angled fence and the presence of a fire hydrant.

C/BK5897-1

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Attachment J-(. age 4 of'4)

Page 2 Again entry was safety accomplished, however.

)

IV. MAP ORO - 060102 - West Newbury Evacuation Bus Route #2 The entire bus route was run using a full size bus with particular i attention being paid to the Transfer Point and Ash Street. J Ash Street is completely paved and passable between Georgetown Road and

! Middle Street. Between Middle Street and Montclair Road there is a stretch of approximately 1/2 mile of dirt road. In addition, the road appeared to have been recently graded.

}.

l The West Newbury Transfer Point was also investigated. This is a Mass Electric Substation which consists of a switchyard and an open area.

Exact measurements of the area were not conducted. However,~ observations l as to the esse of bus movement were made. This point of Stewart Street is wide enough to allow two buses to pass comfortably. This was demonstrated when a town school bus passed the observation bus on the road. Turning of the buses can be made using the driveway area of the substation.

l l

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I C/BK5897-2

- 129 -

D Attachment . K - (Fase 1 o f 1)

ATTACHMENT 20 MASSACHUSETTS BUS ROUTES: SCENARIO 1 l BUS ' TOTAL

( BUS ROUTE TRAVEL BUSES TRIPS- ROUTE ROUTE LENGTH TIME PER PER TIME. 1 COMMUNITY NO. (MILE) (HOUR) ROUTE ROUTE (HOUR)-

Amesbury 1 8.6 0.9- 2 3 1.8 2 7.0 0.8 2 3 1.6 ]

3 5.7 0.6 2 3 1.2

[ 4 7.4 0.7 2 3 1.4 5 5.6 '0.5 2 3 1.0 6 2.2 0.6 2 .3 1.2

f. 7 '8.2 1.0 2 3 2.0 At Center 4 18 Merrimac 1 17.2 2.1 3 3 2.5 l 2 12.6 1.3 2 3 2.6 5

Newbury 1 13.7 2.3 2 2 2.5 2 13.3 1.2 2 2 1.4 3 17.3 1.6 2 2 1.8 4 15.6 1.6 2 2 1.8 8

Newburyport 1 11.3 1.4 3 3 1.8 2 3.3 0.5 1 3 1.5 3 2.7 0.5 1 3 1.5 L 4 6.2 1.5 3 3 1.9 j 5 5.7 0.7 2 3 1.4 At Center 3 13 Salisbury 1 6.4 0.6 1 2 1.2 2 8.6 1.0 2 2 1.2 l- 3 10.8 1.0 2 2 1.2 l 4 9.9 1.4 2 2 1.6 5 7.3 1.2 2 2 1.4 9

West Newbury 1 5.6 0.5 1 1 0.5 2 8.1 0.7 1 1 0.7 p 3 9.1 0.9 1 1 0.9

3 Bus times derived from September and October 1987 Simulation Results.

i l- L/1245SS.1 l - 130 -

051:E11.2.i:EP010142.uuNu Attachment " (Page 1 of 2)

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Attachment (Page 2 e 3)

ATTACHMENT 23-2 To determine it flood insurance is asailabit in ines communitv, contact vour insurance agent,or cati the National Flood insurance Program. at 18001 638 6620.

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PANEL 4 OF 10 ISEE MAP INDEX POR PANELS NOT PMtNTED)

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COMMUNITY PANEL NUMBER ZONEC 250096 0004 8 l MAP REVISED:

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' ]ULY 17,1986

( Fedem! Emergency Management Agency y%._ }

ArTAcmiENT 23-3 Attache,ent T (Page 3 of 3) i

)

500 Year Flood Boundary Og 100-Year Flood Boundary Zone Designations *

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i 100 Year flood Boundary-g

$06 Year Flood Bocndary I

Base flood Elevation Line 5ff_

With [levation in f eet" i Base Flood Elesation in Feet IEL9BM y 1 Where Undorm Withm Zone"

' I Elsation Reference Mark RM7x 8

Zote D Boundary

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Rur Alde e M 1.5

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teferenced to the Nationai Geodetic Vertical Datum or 1929 EXPLANATION OF ZONE DESIGNATIONS Z'N E EXPLANATION 4 Areas of 100 year flood; base flood elevations and flood hazard factors not determined.

'60 Areas of 100 year shallow flooding where depths are between one (1) and three (3) feet; average depths of inundation are shown, but no flood huard factors I are determined.

H Areas of 100 year shallow nooding where depths are between one (1) and three (3) feet; base flood elevations are shown, but no flood hazard factors

) are determined.

Ai A30 Areas of 100 year flood; base flood elevations and

\  ; flood hazard factors determined.

\

AD9 Areas of 100 year flood to be protected by flood protection system under construction; base flood elevations and flood hazard factors not determined.

3 Areas between limits of the 100 year flood and 500-year flood; or certain areas sutuect to 100 year flood.

ing with average depths less than one (1) foot or where the contributing draertage area is less than one souare

) mile; or areas protected by levees from the base flood.

(Medium shading)

C Areas of minimal nooding. (No shading)

J D Areas of undetermined, but possible, flood hazards.

V Areas of 100 year coastal flood with velocity (wave

) ZONE C action); base flood elevations and flood h42ard factors noi determined.

V1.V30 Areas of 100 year coastal flood with velocity (wave action); base flood elevations and flood hazard factors determined.

NOTES TO USER I corsain areas not in the specla! flood hazard areas (zones A and V) mar be protected by flood control structures.

This map is for flood insurance purposes only;it does not neces-sarlPy show all areas subject to flooding in the community or all planimetric features outside special flood hazard areas.

}

For'adioinirq aap panels, see separately printed index To Map Panels.

Coastal base flood elevations apply only landward of 0.0 NCVD.

INITI AL IDENTIFICATION:

MARCH Ig 1977

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