ML20247A709

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Safety Insp Rept 70-0036/89-01 on 890320-23.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection, Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Maint,Surveillance & Transportation
ML20247A709
Person / Time
Site: 07000036
Issue date: 05/11/1989
From: France G, Sreniawski D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247A679 List:
References
70-0036-89-01, 70-36-89-1, NUDOCS 8905230250
Download: ML20247A709 (5)


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.c U.- S.: NUCLEAR RE6ULATORY' COMMISSION-n - .-  ;

REGION III' l e . _

Report No. 70-36/89001(DRSS)

, Do'cket No.~.70-36.

License No. SNM-33  :!

Licensee: Combustion Engineering', Inc.

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. Nuclear Power Systems:

. Windsor, CT 06095 Facility NE..e: Hematite- i r Inspection;At: Hematite, Missouri Inspection Conducted: March 20-23, 1989 tm H:pwu LG .

Inspector: G. M.. France, III Uf f 9-

' Date ' .

Approved By: _D. J. Sren awski, Chief I'[89 i Nuclea aterial Section 2 Date j

~ Inspection Summary-  ;

l Inspection on' March 20-23, 1989 (Report No. 70-36/89001(DRSS)) _j Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection including radiation  !

H protection (IP 83822), criticality safety (IP 88015), operations review l (IP 88020), maintenance and surveillance (IP 88025), and transportation j (IP 86740). 1 Results: The-violation identified in Inspection Report No. 70-036/88003

,, .(audit requirements 10 CFR 71.137) was withdrawn. The licensee completed ,

application:of Regulatory Guide 3.1, annual inspection of Raschig rings l

-(Neutron _ absorbers, Section 4, Criticality).

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i 8905230250'890512 O PDR ADOCK 07000036  !

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.1 DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted
  • L.' Deul, Engineer .

H. Eskridge, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing, Safety and Accountability

  • R. Miller, Manager, Administrator and Production Control
  • A. Noack, Production Superintendent h

- *J. A. Rode, Hematite Plant Manager The inspector. conducted interviews with Health Physics Technicians and several plant operators.

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2. General  !

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. i This inspection began at 2:30 p.m. on March 20, 1989 and was concluded on ,

- March 23, 1989. The normal plant mode included the production of uranium I oxide powder and pellets. The construction of a new warehouse and a new pellet line was also observed during tours of the facility.

3. Radiation Production The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal and external exposure programs including the. required records and notifications.

a .- Internal Exposure Control ,

Bioassay records for workers on the monthly urinalyses schedule indicated that the 40 MPC-hour intake limit for uranium had not been exceeded. Data for the highest reported value estimated j

.at 28 MPC-hour was submitted to the licensee's Corporate Radiation  !

Protection Office for further review and evaluation. Results of  !

this review will be monitored during a future inspection. (0 pen i Item 70-36/89001-01) i

b. Surveys  !

Records of surveys of materials and equipment in the new construction areas were reviewed. These results were significantly lower than the contamination guidelines posted in the license.

c. Criticality Alarms The Nuclear alarm test log indicated that the criticality nianitors  ;

were tested once per week during the December 1988 through 3 February 1989 operating period.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4. Criticality Safety (IP 88015)

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The inspector toured the pellet plant, scrap recovery plant and SNM L

material storage locations and observed the spacing requirements and controls required for the safe handling of SNM materials.

a. Production Operations Nuclear safety control for process equipment relies primarily on safe geometry. The inspetor observed that the storage and process containers met the posted control limits for the specified enrichment. There was no indication that the double contingency principle, as used in ANSI /ANS-8.1-1983, was violated. This principle allows that " process designs incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two ur ikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible."

Moisture control is also used to maintain nuclear safety. The uranium oxide (U02 ) powder blender is equipped with a humidity monitor located in the exhaust line. An increase in moisture will cause an alarm in the control room. The control room operator demonstrated (via walk through) the operation of this safety control device. No problems were noted.

b. Examination of Unsafe Geometry Containers In the scrap recovery plant uranium bearing batch solutions are processed in vessels that are geometrically unsafe. Nuclear safety is provided by determining the concentration of uranium in each batch (prior to processing) and by immersing Raschig rings into each geometrically unsafe vessel. Raschig rings are impregnated with boron which hcs the properties to act as a neutron absorber.

The inspector examined the licensee's data for the annual inspection and testing of Raschig rings used in two filtrate tanks and a uranyl nitrate blend tank. The boron content of the Raschig rings and the effects of corrosion were not significantly different than data collected during previous years. It appears that the licensee has met the general specifications and criteria, stated in the American National Standard (referenced in Regulatory Guide 3.1) which described the use of borosilicate glass Raschig rings as a neutron absorber in solutions of fissile material.

c. Internal Audits The licensee corrected these violations, discussed below, during the course of a quarterly audit performed by the Nuclear Licensing, Safety, and Accountability Supervisor.

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  • A mop bucket appeared too large for safe volume and or safe batch limits.
  • Mop water sludge container. Uranium content not shown.
  • CE-250 shipping container. Empty tag not shown.
5. Operations Review The inspector observed the licensee's performance of plant operations, including pellet production operations.
a. Observations and Interviews During a tour of the facility, the inspector interviewed and observed operators engaged in the production of uranium oxide pellets. One operator demonstrated how ventilation controls are engineered as an integral part of the pellet press to reduce ALARA airborne exposures (to pellet plant operators).
b. Instrument Review Quarterly calibrations of survey instruments were up to date.

Instruments such as flowmeters, velometers, and rotameters are calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

The inspector noted that the manufacturer's certificate of calibration for the velometer (stack measurements) had not been decertified since 1983. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection (0 pen Item 70-36/89001-03).

c. Posting, Labeling, and Control During plant tours, the inspector observed posting and labeling of radioactive material with particular emphasis on posted instructions for criticality control. SNM material was being stored or processed in containers that met the posted instructions. Waste containers located in the control room were sized geometrically favorable, but were dedicated for contaminated office waste disposal. No problems were noted.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Maintenance and Surveillance The inspector determined that the licensee utilizes instrumentation and control systems and preventative maintenance and surveillance programs to help assure safe operations.

The Panametric Model 1000 Moisture Analyzer is used in UO2 (powder) process units to maintain a dry air system. Records indicate that the analyzer is calibrated annually with a factory prepared sensor traceable 4

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.; to ASME standards. Preventative maintenance performed on moisture sensitive alarm devices along with periodic calibration assures proper storage and/or processing of UO2 Powder.

No violations or deviations were identified.

-7. Transportation The inspector reviewed the licensee's Quality Assurance program for

' shipping and receiving radioactive materials.

Records indicate nat a Quality Assurance audit of the licensee's transportation program to include the shipping and receiving of radioactive materials was performed during 1987 and 1988 operations.

The audit indicated that storage and handling of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was in accordance with established procedures and checklists. The auditors were trained personnel working independently of the shipping and receiving departments. These audit reports were not reviewed by the~ inspector during a previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 70-0036/88003). This resulted in a violation which was issued on February 3, -1989. However, based on the inspectors review of. records during this.inspe: tion, the violation was invalid and withdrawn by letter dated April ~20, 1989.

In response to'the inspectors-inquiry, the licensee agreed to review 10 CFR 71.137, and the QA Manual Section 13, Handling, Storage and-Shipping Packages for Radioactive Materials to assure that procedures and checklists for handling uranium hexafluoride (UFs) certified packages, uranium oxide powder and pellet packages and various waste handling packages are specifically included and/or referenced and reflected during independent audits. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection (0 pen Item 70-36/89001-02).

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Exit Interview The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives (Section 1) at the close of the onsite inspection on March 23, 1989. The inspector stated that licensee programs in the areas of exposure control, criticality safety, surveillance and transportation met regulatory requirements. The licensee agreed to review 10 CFR 71.137 and expand the audit requirements as listed in the Quality Assurance Manual (Section 7). During the course of the inspection and the exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any documents or inspector statements and references to specific processes as proprietary.

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