ML20247A854
| ML20247A854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1989 |
| From: | Curran D HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8353 LBP-88-32, OL, NUDOCS 8903290209 | |
| Download: ML20247A854 (47) | |
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Qr DOCHi II;p' ' (, Uwac UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY ~ COMMISSNN MARk l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL, BOARD. 00Cs?;, ,. , g_ _
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In the Matter of )
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Public Service Company of ') New Hampshire, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL !
)' 444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) OFFSITE' EMERGENCY
) PLANNING ISSUES ,,
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NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S CRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENERS' APPEAL OF LBP-88-32 Diane Curran HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY 2001 "S" Street N.W. Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 ) (202) 328-3500 March 24, 1989 1
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7 TABLE OF' CONTENTS j Introduction...'...'...................... ...................... 1 'i4
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' ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL....................... 1 'l A. Background..............................................1
= i B. Applicants' Testimony and Personnel. Survey........... 2 1
. C. ' Interveners' Testimony............................... 5- a D. FEMA Testimony...................................... 11' AR 3 UME N T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 1
I. THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPLICANTS =HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL RESOURCES TO RESPOND TO AN ACCIDENT,AT SEABROOK. ...................................15'
- The' Licensing: Board's interpretation of.NRC emergency-1 A.
,3 response personnel requirements is erroneous as a mat- ' '3 ter of law.................................. ...... 15 B. The Board' erred in affirming the adequacy of. workload quantification...................................... 19 ! 1
.C. The Licensing Board was arbitrary and capricious in failing to credit Mr. Earl's testimony............. 21-D. The Board's decision on adequacy of personnel resources is not based on FEMA's review of a suffi-ciently completed plan,.in violation of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(2)........'.............................,..22
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.i E.. .The Licensing Board, erred when it concluded that 24-hour staffing is not required for decontamination cen-ters...................... ........................ 24 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES..................................... 27
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I .THE BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CORRECT NUMBER OF BEACH i VEHICLES TO USE FOR CALCULATING THE SUMMERTIME ETES WAS i 31,000. ............................................ 27 A) . - The Board arbitrarily selected 31,000 as the l appropriate number of vehicles to use after its own methodology. led them to 32,800...................... 27 B). The Boards' confirmatory ETE calculations and observa-tions were seriously defective, both mathematically and logically........................................... 30
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-i1-II. THE BOARD ERRED IN' FINDING'THAT THE DELAYED STAFFING OF THE ^
TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS BY THE STATE POLICE WILL-'HAVE NO
' IMPACT ON THE NHRERP'S ETES.............................. 36 III. THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED WHEN IT CONDITIONED ITS FINAL APPROVAL OF THE NHRERP'S ETES ON ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE
. APPLICANTS, RATHER THAN ON PLAN CHANGES'THEMSELVES.. .... 40. .
CONCLUSION.................................................... 42 l j i i o q l i i l 4 i l . l 1 1 l l l _-.__n..____a_--.--- - - - _ - - - - - - - "
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIF,S 4 Administrative Decisions i Cincinnati Gas &' Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 775 (1983).................................. ................ 23 Epaulations 10 C.F.R. S 5 0 . 4 7 ( a ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 ,16 , 41 { 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(2)...............................22,24 10 C.F.R. 5 5 0 . 4 7 ( b ) ( 1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 I Regulatory cuidgece NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (1980).................................... 15,24,25,27-30,41 ) i NRC/ FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,485 (April 18, 1985).. ...................................... 22
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e i3 .t , , ri- , o U4 g - ' d ' March'24, 1989-n- UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION ~ J BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD ' l
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In'the Matter of ')
).
. Public Service Compahy of ,) .
.New Hampshire, et al. ) Dockot Nos. 50-443 OL -j
)~ 50-444 OL .j
; (Seabrook' Station, Units 1 & 2) )' OFFSITE EMERGENCY. ,
) PLANNING ISSUES l
.- )
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S-BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENERS' APPEAL OF LBP-88-32 1
.I Introduction '
On behalf of itself and Interveners Seacoast Anti-Pollution -j i League,' Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Town of Hampton,'the L{ New England Coalition'on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") hereby sub- j
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mits a brief in appeal-of LBP-88-32 (December 30, 1988), the i Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision with respect to the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan'{"NHRERP"). 1 This Frict addresses issues regarding personnel adequacy and y evacuation time estimates. In light of the Appeal Board's directive to avoid repecitive t) arguments, NECNP has not briefed all of the issues that are of concern to it. Therefore, wa adopt and incorporate by reference the briefs filed by the other Interveners. I~ t ADEQUACY OF EMERGENOY RESPONSE PERSONNEL A. Background ! }. In its Memorandum and Order of April 29, 1986, as supple-mented by the Memorandum and Order of May is, 1988, the Licensing t .
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4 t i 4 Board admitted'a number.of contentions challenging the adequacy of' personnel to respond to a radiological emergency at Seabicok. 1
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These included fou'r contentions relating to the personnel ' resources of specific towns (Town of Hampton-VI, Town of South. . Hampton 2,. Town of Hampton Falls 2, and Town.of Kensington 1)~.
.{c They.also included three contentions addressed to the general staffing capabilities of the New. Hampshire. towns, as well as the State's capability to provide compensatory measures (NECNP NHLp-2, SAPL 8, and SAPL SA).
These contentions generally challenged the capability of the. I EPZ's sinall town governments, staffed largely by.part-time .] employees and volunteers, to provide adequate, continuous staff-- ing of an emergency response under the state and local-emergency j plans for New Hampshire. They also challenged the State's'capa-
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bility to provide adequate compensatory staff for the six local 1 governments that had dec]ined to participate in the emergency planning process for Seabrook. B. . Applicants' Testimony and Personnel Survey At the hearings on the New Hampshire RERP, Applicants sub-mitted testimony whose purpose was to i l 1 demonstrate (1) the availability of personnel to each of the 17 towns / cities in the New Hampshire portion of ]{ the EPZ to perform the radiological emergency response ' plan functions called for under t. heir respective local ', plans; (2) the availability of personnel to staff and ! implement state emergency response functions called for under NHRERP Rev. 2; and (3) the availability of per- ] t sonnel to provide state assjstance to local communities in the absence of local emergency response plan imple- 1 l mentation. j l l' s : l 1 l l l
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1 App. Dir. Test, at 1-2, ff. Tr. 3228. According to Applicants' i testimony, "in order to establish personne) resources are avail-able to fulfill all state and local response functions con-templated in the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response } Plan (NHRERP), a personnel resources survey was conducted and an ongoing assessment program established." Id. at 3. This survey was described in h document entitled " Summary of Personnel Resource Assessh6nt for the New Hampshire Radiological Evergency Response Plan." App. Ex. 1, as corrected by App. 'Ex. 1A, ff. Tr. 4685 (hereafter " Summary"). As described by Applicants, the Sum-mary catalogues and records the information obtained regard- l ing the number of personnel available to perform State and Local emergency response functions and describes ) q the steps taken to identify personnel requirements and ' availability to support the implementation of local and Stato plans and proceduras. Id. at~3. J Applicants claimed to have utilized a " systematic approach" to " define the types and numbers of personnel required and avail-l able" to carry out the responsibilities of local governments, j Id. The process was broken down into two major steps. The first l was a " walk-thrcugh of the implementing p stu@tres" in order to j
" identify, by position and functional responsibility, all tasks required to be performed in fulfilling the emergency response ,
functions." The walk-throughs " led to the determination of the specific staffing requirements to implement each plan, and the l 1 identification of those positions requiring staffing for 24-hour I J operations." Id. ! l i
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b/ < positicnt for each municipality: identified in the procedural walk-throughs." Id. This was done.through the review of pub-s licly available documents such as Town Plan Appendices, Town 1, Annual Reports,Ethe New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Commission records, the. Bureau of Emergency Mecical Service 1 1 G ' records, and the NewLHempshiro' Fireman's Association records. l 3 i The surveyors also interviewed local offici.als and other individ- j m uals " knowledgeable.about the specific communities" in order to
" verify and adjust the nuuber of required and available person-1
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1 As a result of.this process, Applicants prepared summaries ! l and matrices for each local government, showing the number of l
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l people from each department that are "rcquired" and "available" ; to fulfill a' municipality's responsibilities in the NHRERP. See l i: Summary, Section 2. ff. Tr. 4685. :ll A similar approhch kas taken to assess personnel needs and availability'with respect to the emergency response functions of the state government. See Summary, Section 3. Applicants l l reviewed the plan'and conducted a " walk-through of each implementing procedure." Id. at 9. Applicants then.conaucted j i interviews with principal emergency response organizations and ) prepared " assessment worksheets" purporting to document "the nume ber, location, and type of personnel available to perform emer- ) gency response functions." Id. at 10. l 1
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IN' y, sC.,. Interveners' Testimony (( Interveners. challenged the. adequacy.of the: personnel p.DDL ,-
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q L'J ,,s a resources survey through, inter alig, the testimony of.Clifford . I'" J.' Earl, _an' experienced. personnel resource planner. Earl Dir. { v
; h Test. , ff. Tr. - 37 76;- Earl Rbtl. Test. , . f f. 'Tr. 8915. 'In addi-tion, Interveners, submitted testimony from! numerous municipal officals.from.New Hampshire towns in.the EPZ.
. Interveners'also-elicited' evidence through the cross-examination of. Applicants' witnesses and witnesses' for the Federal Emergency Managemerit !
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Agency;(" FEMA"). Mr. Earl testified that he found four serious weaknesses in ) , the Summary:. (1), failure to provide' definition of the key term
" availability"; (2)- failure to quantify the workload for each Lposition toJbe filled;-(3) the ambiguity of the "walkthrough" procedure performed by Applicants for tne purpose'of assessing staffing requirements; and (4) the apparent lack of. consideration of potentially critical variables, such ao the amount of time '
required to implement protective actions. Earl Rbtl. Test. at 2, q ff. Tr. 8915. i Concent of " Availability" I Mr. Earl's principal criticism of the Summary was that it '
. failed to explain or define the meaning of.the key term it 37 employs:' " availability." According to Mr. Earl, the term could ;
.I have'significantly different meanings fer different people under j i
l' - different circumstances. Ear. Dir. Test. at 2,3. Mr. Earl !
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stated that in this case "the concept of ' availability' should l I i i l
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-s- y include a clear understanding of which people will respond to a Seabrook accident, how they will become available, and how and ;
4 when they will appear at their duty stations." M. He found ! that, given the lack of information on how Applicants used the I term "available," there were "no means for evaluating whether the alleged staffing capability is actually adequate for a response i to a nuclear accident at Seabrook."1 M. j I In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Earl stated that his views l d were confirmed by Applicants' testimony. Ld2 at 9. Mr. Earl i nohed the inconsistencies and ambiguitities in the term " avail- j able" as used by Applicants' witnesses, and the absurd results yielded by the failure to apply a consistent and meaningful i definition of the term.2 For example, 24 temporary employees, i I most of whom are high school students eraployed to pick up trash, i are considered "available" to perform emergency response func- j { tions of the Hampton public Rorks Department. Tr. at 3341. I Workload cuanitificataign The Summary asserted the completion of a " .. a walk-1 through of each implementing procedure...to identify, by position j and functional responsibility, all of the tasks required to be k 4 1 For instance no uritten definition of the term "available" or " availability" was previced to the parties gathering or com-piling data for the Summary, Tr. 3253. No definition of the term is given in the survey materials that Applicants apparently used to interview ctate and local officials regarding the availability of their employees to perform emergency response functions, } Earl Rbtl. Test. at 8. { 2 l For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Earl Rbtl. Test. at 9-11.
J . la q performed in fulfilling the contemplated emergency response func-tions." Summary at 2-1. However, the'authers of the Summary did
.not define the term " walk-through" clearly.enough to determine if they actually calculated the amount of work involved ~1n:each task and position,~or merely matched up tasks to' responsibilities and responsibilities to, positions. .In this particular case,'at e minimum, a walk-through should hhvo i~ncluded calculation of work load for each position. Earl Dir.. Test.'at 4-5.
The record does.not show that workloads we.re fully taken
.into account in'the walk-throughs.. First, in some instances, for example telephone calling, the' amount'of time taken by a,given task was assumed rather than calculated. Tr,. 3271-75. Second, arrival times were not taken into consideration. Tr. 3271, 3282-
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' 86. The survey assumed that people werr_already at their emer-
<. i gency response posts bacause they had been called in at an ear-lier emergency classification. Tr. 3286.
4 Mr. Earl testified that the Summary does not contain.suffi-cient information to either suppert the basis for this assump- j tion, or to demonstrate that either J.ocal or state compensatory l staff could, in fact, arrive at their assigned posts'in time to ! i fulfill their responsibilities. Earl Rbtl. Test. at 17. For ,'J. instance, while Applicants' witness strome alleged that sono per-sonnel that are within a " reasonable distance," he conceded that "I'm not sure that I have a clearly defined empirical standard for reasonable distance." Tr. 3372. t 1 l l
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I t ' Failure to consider potentially critical variables Even where they had been estimat9d during the underlying l survey, the Summary also failed to chow consideration of mobilization times. For instance, while the Summary stated that 185 state police will be available during'a Seabrook emergency, l the survey documents provided t'o NECNP during discovery in Decem-ber show that on en average day, onlv 100 will be available I within the first three to four hcurs, Earl Rbtl. Test. at ?7. , 1 In Mr. Earl's opinion, notification and mobilization times are critical factors which would affect the quantification of I workload and therefore personnel needs in an emergency response. l r Eael Rbtl. Test. at 15. The Summary gave no explanation of why these factors were not considered. Moreover, there is no means of determining in what instances mobilization and travel times actually were considered. Id. Mr. Earl testified that a sound staff resource methodology would involve prediction of the number of staff needed for each position based on a calculation of the amount of work required to fulfill the responsibilities associated with each position. Otherwise, it cannot be reliably concluded that persons filling specified positions can perform all of their required tasks effectively. Earl.Dir. Test. at 5. Unteliable data Mr. Earl aluo testified that Applicants' testimony demonstrated a failure to manage the conduct of the survey in such a way as to achieve reliable results. Applicants failed to
t S take necessary steps to (1) < assure a common understanding of key terms used in the survey, (2) assure the appropriateness and cen-1 sistency of data sources used for all organizations, (3) assure ' \ that personnel are sufficiently experienced in staff assessments, (4) assure that staff conducting the study are effectively super-vised, (5) assure that the analysis and interpretation of the ) data is consistent, and that the recults are objectively verifi-able (i.e., different persons utilizing the methocclogy would prod >1ce the same results). Earl Rbtl. Test. at 18. Applicants'. testimony nhowed that none of these important steps were taken to assure the reliability of the personnel data 3 collected. The testimony demonstrated an utter lack of coordina-tion in the managerial and supervisory structure for the conduct
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of the survey. Id., Tr. 3198- 3208, Earl Rbtl. at 18-21. l Although their work theoretically was coordinated, the general l supervisor of the survey (Mr. Callendrello), the State's super-visor of the survey (Mr. Nawoj) , and the New Hampshire Yankee aupervisor (Mr. Frechette) riid not consult and agree about (1) the methodology to be used, (2) any common assumptions, or (3) procedures to be used in the interviews with local officials. Id. A private consultant (Mr. Enoch) was also retained to super-visb data collection for the survey. It is not clear from the testimony how Mr. Enoch (1) provided instructions to the persons gathering inf6rmation or (2) how they were supposed to accomplish the task. When asked how Mr. Enoch actually (1) supervic'd a process, involving approximately 25 staff persons from d_- erent m__ _ _ . - _ _._. _m-__ . - - - - - -
10 - organizations, and (2) assured that overy one of those 25 people had a consistent understanding of what it was that they were uup-posed to do, general supervisor Mr. Callendrello stated thau he did not know. Tr. 3247. While other members of Applichnts' panel stated that the methodology was described in the survcy forms, Mr. Earl testified that the survey forms used by Applicants do not adequately document the existence of an ade- ) q::iate or consistent methodology for conduct of the survey.3 Earl l Rbtl. Test, at 21-22. In addition, Mr. Earl observed that the survey forms pro-vided no comprehensive methodology for the gathering of informa-tion; in fact, most of the personnel resource questior;c csked by q the savey forms were quite selective, and appeared designed only to confirm information already gathered by some other, unspecified means. tio criteria 9ere provided for comparing the previously gathered information to the information provided in the local interviews. Thus, there is no means for evaluating the reasons why some of the data provided in the Summary differs from
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the data provided on the survey forms. l l 3 For instanco, the key term " availability" is nowhere defined, although it is used throughodt the materials. There is thus no indication that the interviewers who used the forms, or the people that they interviewed, shared a common, clear, and consistent understanding of the term; or that the planners who analyzed the data obtained by the interviewers had the same understanding as the interviewers and the interviewees. - 1 Morerover, there is no reference whatsoever to " walk-throughs," which allegedly constituted the principal mears of determining j staffing rescurce needs. Lcl. L_-- _ _-_ _ .__ O
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;< Yinally, the survey forms fa!. led to provide interviewers or 1
I, evaluators with meaningful criteria for defi"ing the type of I information they are to obtain. Id. at 22-23. Fo'r example, Question # 2 -on the survey form entitled " Resource Analysic, Requests /Quentions for EPZ and Host Towns," instructs inter-viewers to Etisure there are primaries and alternates for each EOC ) position designated in the plan as.24 hour staffing. Attach a list / roster identifying positichs which require primary and alterr< ate staf fing. (Interviewe: to obtain 24 hour staffing information. Refer to Sec- { tion III, selectman's Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities and1 Appendix A.) H i There is no instruction to the interviewer as to how to obtain 24 $ ( hour staffing information, how to determine staffing needs for each position, or what it means to."ensureh the existence of primaries and alternates for each porition. Absent any instruc- j i tion, there is great room for variability in the conduct of these !
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tasks. Moreover, thero is no means for assessing whether the l ( steps chosen by the interviewers were adequate to provide reli- l l cble information. Id. I 1 D. PEMA Testimony I Based on its review of the New Hatapshire R2RP, FEMA con-cluded that the State of New Hampshire had not demonstrated that i i it had sufficient personnel resources to compensate for the non-participation of local governments in emergency planning for Seabrook. FEMA Direct Test. at 3, ff. Tr. 4051. FEMA also con-cluded that there !? no assurance that there exists the capabil-ity to staff local emergency response positions for an initial
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.since there are nuraerous positions in the l'ocal emergency
' response' organizations which do not,have alternates. FEMA Direct !
" l Test. at'13.-
4 FEMA's opinion regarding the lack'of adequate emergency response r 'rsonnel- was based 'in part on the sobering results of the 1986,exercisa, in which FEMA found 55 deficiencies, or i a. demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding j that off-site emergency. preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assuracce that appropriate protective measures can be-h taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in l the vincinity of a nuclear power facility,.in the event of a radiological emergency. Tr. 4182. Thase deficiencies precluded I a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Seabrook emer- 1 i gency plans. Id. FEMA considered this high a number ~of observed 'I m . deficiencies to be " unique." Tr. 4183. , i Egrsonnel Summary not reviewed I In preparing its prefiled testimony on the adequacy of emer-i gency response personnel, FEMA did not have the opportunity to review the Personnel Resources Assessment Summary prepared by L Applicants. Tr. 4053. FEMA further testified that "until New Hampshire develops this information as a part of its planning' " i
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L base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate personnel o S . resources to compensate for the rion-participation or supplemental l~ needs of the EPZ communities." FEMA Direct Test., ff. Tr. 4051, l- , at 17.
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, At thel time of the hearings, FEMA had conducted a o.
]. : preliminary review of the Summary. Tr. 4081. FEMA stated that l it considered the Sur. mary to be just a step .on. the way to meeting j o . . .
the inadequaples.that are cited by FEMA in the area of personnel
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' resource adquacy.. .Id. While FEMA considered the submission of the' Summary to constitute substantial progress toward remedying the RERP's deficiencies with respect to personnel resources, FEMA stated thatLit eould not co_mplete its evaluation of the adequacy L
of personnel resources until rosters and equipment lists were completed and. plans and procedures were revised-and updated. I d
; Finally .an exercise of the plan must be conducted. Tr. 4109-10, 4174-77, 4196.
Eggsonnel rosters found incomplete T
<- FEU testified that personnel resters for a number of state o
agencies, submitted as part of Rev. l 2, were incomplete. Tr. ) 4058. l For example, personnel rosters were inadequate for the 1 1 Rockingham Sherriff's Department, and for local l'iasons. Tr. r i 4055-56, 4059. Staffing rosters would have a liet of names for { at least two shifts, or three shifts depending upon the particu-lar local or state government that is. involved. Tr.-4056.. The l missing information was considered significant. Tr. 4058. FEMA l l i testified,that New Hampshire must submit and FEMA must evaluate I L personnel rosters and alerting plans in order to remedy the per- J sonnel resource inadequacies and deficiencies identified by FEMA j and the RAC (Regional Assistance Committec). Tr. 4060. These 1 rostars and lists are not contained in the Summary. Id. i I
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r ' J' Additional information recuired to complete' review FEMA concluded that the State of New' Hampshire has not chown a, e-
'the capability to staff a-24-hour response ~over a protracted period. Tr. 4072. In' order to evaluate the adequacy of emer-gency response staffing, FEMA and RAC would need'tu conclude the
. ongoing technical assistance. review of the resource assessment.
and provide comments to the-state. The state would then make- j whatever changes are necessars and provide rosters of personnel. 'l 1 Following tha',.the t state would make whatever changes,are neces- l sary in the parts of,the plan,that deal with mobilizing emergency
*$i ' ~ workers, and:they would conduct table top exercises and drills on d
. i that. Finally, the Statt would conduct a full-scale exerc ise.,
which would be evaluated by FEMA. Tr. 4073. F3MA's witness Etated that in older to reach a reasonable assurance finding on the adequacy'of personnel resources, FEMA requires that tae state demonstrhce that emergency response per-i sonnel understand their responsibilities under the plan and ara i willing to carry them out. Tr. 4073. The evaluation of under-standing and willingness'to perform emergency response functions j is based on a number of factors. first, in the state's annual )I
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certificat.iun, it provides information on training that emergency I workers ha.'e undergone. Willingness to respond is evaluated by , t looking a't who combs to training sessions, who comes to drills, I i y, and..who turns out for exercises. Tr. 408U. TEMA a).so looks at whetuer there is a sufficient paci of people at various locations I who are ready, willing, and able to iespond to an accident. Tr. I 407E-74. 1 f j,\ ' 6 w L - ___ ________ - _- - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _- __ . . ._ ._ - --
l' 15 - ARGUMENT (, I '. THE LICENSING BOARD. ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPLICANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL RESOURCES'TO RESPOND TO AN ACCIDENT AT SEABROOK. 1 The Licensing Board concluded that Applicants "have demonstrated that,there is reasonable assurance that'there:are sufficient response personnel" to carry out both direct and com- ' pensatory measures for the State and.for each of the towns in the
, tiew Hampshire sector of the 1:PZ. PID 0.72. In doing so, the Board made'a number of fundamental errors.
i r A. The.7.icensing Board's interpretation of NRC emergency ! response personnel requirements is erroneous as a mat-ter of law. , , Pursuant to its emergency planning regulations, the NRC may
- a not issue a nuclear' power plant' operating license unless and until it determines that "there is reasonable a'surance s that ade-quata protective measures can and will be taken in the avent of a radiological emergancy." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a). In . r.ddition , 10' O.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(1) requires, inter alia, a showing that "each principal response organization has staff to respcnd and to aug-ment its initial response on a continuous basis." .This require-
' mont is fleshed cut in NUREG-0654, which reguires1that "Each p principal' organization shal]. tie capable of continuous (24-hour) <
, operations for a protract 6d period." f II.A.4.
p This case ^ raises the issue of what is necessary to l lT - demonstrate a reasonable assurance of capability to respond to a radiological emergency on a cor.tinuous, twonty-four hour basis. 1 ?
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1 j l l 1 1 interveners contend that in order to meet NRC emergency planning standards, Applicant s must demonstrate the existence of emergency l 1 response personnel who "can and will" carry out their functions during a radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(a). Particu-( larly in this caLe, where state employees, National Guard mem-bers, and other individuals from dintant parts of the state may l be called upon to take up compensatory roles in the non- ' participating towns, it is important to provide some reasonable assurance that emergency response personnel are actually capable of reaching their posts and performing their duties. Inter-venors' testimony Uns supported by FEMA's witnesses, who stated that their judgment regarding the adequacy of personnel resources is generally based on a number of factors, including personnel ! rosters, drilla, and exercices that allow FEMA to judge,whether ome.rgency responso personnel understand their responsibilities and are prepared to carry them out. The Doc.rd rejected these arguments, taking an extremely i simplistic view of the concept of emergency response capatility. According to the Board, the adequacy of emergency re$pance per- i sonnel was demonstrated by the existence of a " pool" of state and 1 local employees and volunteers hwho can be made available"4 to ! i 4 The question of whether the individua2r' in this vaguely described "pcol" would actually be available tc respond ir an emergency was answered with a tautology: Applicants' s'irvey "does not address response personnel avaliability in the tenpcral sense; the survey assumes that people vill be available when they are needed." PID 3.25. It is simply irrational for the Board to assume this critical fact. __ i
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fulfill emergency response functions. PID 3.25. In short, in ) the Board's view, a body count is all that is required. The Board essenti6lly declared such " temporal" issues as whether and when emergency response personnel will arrive at their posts to bo irrelevant to the question of whether emergency response staffing is adequate.5 Id. However, the regulations and regulatory guidance clearly embody temporal considerations by requiring "continuouc" and "24-hour" capability to respond to an accident. Clearly, if the emergency response personnel relied on in an accident reside or work several hours away from the EPZ, or are unable to reach their response posts, they cannot provide'the irrediate and continuous response required by the rule, j l The concept of " capability" to carry out an emergency response also carries with it the notion that emergency response personnel understand their responsibilities and are " ready, will-ing and able" to carry them out. Eng FEMA Testimony, Tr. 4073- i
'/ 4 , Kathout rosters, or completion of training, drills, and exercises,. FEMA was unable to conclude that personnel resources were cufficient to respond to an accident at Seacrook. The . Board simply ignored this testimony, finding the enumeration of an {
l unidentified " pool" of individuals sufficient to support a find- ! ing of adequacy. , I ! l I k e S In the Board's view, these issues are relevant to " planning and impleroentation," but not to " personnel rescurces." PIB 3.25. I This distinction is not explai.ned, nor does it make any sense. j If emergency response personnn1 are not available when they are needtd, they might as well not be available at all. I 1 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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l l 1 The Board is wrong as a matter of law. " Capability" of ' \ providing a continuous emergency response amounts to more than a l body count. It entails such " temporal" considerations as the 1 ability of emergency response personnel to reach their posts, as well as their understanding of and commitment to fulfill them.6 The Board also claims that Interveners make the
" unrealistic" argument that the " Applicants' attempt to identify available personnel would fall unless all response personnel are available at every moment of the day or night to respond to a radiological emergency." PID 3.22. Comparing the NHRERP to )
plans for other types of industrial and natural disasters, the Board argues ~that emergency plans generally "are flexible enough to make contingencies with regard to absentees, either explictly or presumptively. They are predictive in nature and can only provide a reasonable assurance that adequate measures can be taken in the event of an unpredictable emergency." PID 3.24. The Board is wrong on Interveners' position, and it begs the question of what consitutes "reasonble assurance." First, Mr. 6 For this reason, the Board is wrong in concluding that by itself, a roster of National Guard members, including off-duty individuals, is sufficient to show their availability in satis-f actio'il of NRC's emergency planning standards. PID 4.18. The Loard states that "(w]hile some Guard personnel may not be avail-able when an emergency arose, those who could be contacted would be required to report to duty. Others would report as they could be notified." While the Board states that "no more" can be expected of the Guard than with respect to any other type of emergency response, that is simply not the case. A response to a radiological emergency must be reasonably prompt in order to be ) effective. A Guard response that takes hours to implement may not provide sufficient protection to the public health and safety.
( Earl testified that his criteria do not include complete accuracy of personnel resource data. Earl Rotl. Test. at 7. The key question posed by Mr. Earl's testimony was whether the Applicants' survey was sufficiently reliable to provide "rea-sonable assurance" that adequate personnel would be available during an emergency at Seabrook. Moreover, there was no testimony in the record regarding emergency plans for other types of disasters, their characteristics and success rates. The Board cannot judge what is required to make a reasoned prediction of the adequacy of personnel in this case by a general and baseless reference to other kinds of emergency plans. B. The Board erred in affirming the adequacy of workload quantification. The Board also refused to recognize the significance of
" temporal" issues for personnel resources in considering Applicants' measures for quanitification of workload. According to Applicants, a " systematic" approach was used to determine the
( workload of emergency responders, thereby yielding the number of l I { personnel required to implement the plan. Mr. Earl criticized ' the workload calculations in a number of respects.7 In particu-I lar, he challenged Applicants' failure to take into account potentially critical variables, such as time needed to contact ! personnel, travel time, and time to implement respense proco- j dures. These mobilization times are critical factors which would i 7 See discussion, gup_ra, at 6-8.
i 1 i affect the quantification of work load, and therefore, personnel needs in an emergency responso. The Board rejected Interveners' testimony, stating that l we do not understand the survey to be an attempt to fix I the methods and procedures to implement the emergency ' response functions called for under the NHRERP. Rather, the survey was conducted to demonstrate that a l sufficient resource pool.is available to provide the J manpower necessary to carry 'out the specific functions of the plan at the time of an emergency. PID 3.32. As with the Board's overly narrow interpretation of-l the term " availability," its refusal to recognize'that temporal considerations affect the determination of resource needs is an error of law. .A radiological accident does not wait to happen until the emergency response personnel are in place. If,:as.in. this case, compensatory emergency response personnel will bc traveling to the'EP2 from some distance, workload calculations must take into account how much time an individual will have to per. form' a . task. If that individual spends a signficant portion
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of his/her time traveling to the emergency response post,.more people may be needed to complete the job.8 The Licensing Board erred in failing to recognize the importance of these considera-tions. 8 For this reason, the vagueness and ambiguity of Applicants' description of'the " walk-throughs" of the emergency procedures is also significant. While one of Applicants' witnesses stated that the surveyors " read through" the procedures,. another witness stated that "one goes through" them. Ac Mr. Earl testified, reading procedures does not yield sufficiently accurate informa-tion regarding such factors as the time necessary to repare to implement a procedure, to make communications links, to marshal resources necessary to carry cut a procedure, or to effectively carry out a procedure. Earl Rbtl. Test, at 13-14.
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l C. The Licensing Board was arbitrary and capricious in failing to credit Mr. Earl?s testimony-As discussed above, the principal evidence relied on by 1 Applicants in support of their position was an allegedly " system-atic" professional survey of personnel resources for the Seabrook j EPZ. Mr. Earl, usjng the chills of a personnel resource planner, made a comprehensive and detailed evaluation of the survey and j
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found that it did not meet even 'the minimum standards for such an l f effort. The Board gave absolutely no credit to Mr. Earl's testimony, { l characterizing it as "nothing mere than a statement of how the
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survey would have been conducted if Mr. Earl hed been in charge." i PID 3.35. The Board swept over Mr. Earl's specific, carefully l i explained criticisms of the survey's methodology with general ; i statements regarding the " reasoned opinions" of Applicants' panel on the matters criticized by Mr. Earl. Id. The Board's justificati6n for crediting Applicants' testimony over Mr. Earl's was that Mr. Earl's expertise relates to the "relatively static and predictable business and adminis-trative environment," which are "as different from the regular business or administrative environment as night is from day." PID 3.36. This extraordinary judgment springs from the Board's own prejudices and has no basis in the underlying record. Applicants produced no testimony whatsoever to rebut Mr. Earl's qualifica-tions or the relevance of his judgments.9 As demonstrated by his
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9 Had the Board or Applicants made any attempt to cross exam-ine Mr. Earl, they would have found that his experiences include crisis management and that his comments on Applicants' survey l reflected his informed judgments regarding reasonable measures for disaster response planning.
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resume [ attached to Earl Dir. Test.), Mr. Earl has many years of personnel resource planning experience. In contrast, while h Applicancs' witnesses are emergency planners, none of them have any spesial expertise in personnel resource planning. Moreover, the survey on which Applicants rely was conducted in part by trainees and entry-level emergency planners, with minimal super-vision. Earl Rbtl. Test, at 23.10 D. The Board's decision on adequacy of personnel resources ! is not based on FEMA's review of a sufficiently com- 1 pleted plan, in violation of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a) (2) . Under the Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and FEMA, FEMA is to take the " lead" in assessing offsite radiological ; emergency response plans and prepared.nuss. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,485 i (April 18, 1985). This division of responsibility is codified in 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47 (a) (2) , which requires the NRC to base its rea-
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sonable. assurance findings "on a review of the Federal Emergency l Management Agency [ FEMA] findings and determinations as to ] I whether State and local emergency plans are adequete and whether j t there is reasonable arsurance that they can be implemented." These findings are entitled to a rebuttable presumption. Id. l I While the NRC need not wait for FEMA's final findings on the ! adequacy of emergency plans, it mu'st postpone hearings until FEMA l has had the opportunity to review anct testify on a plan that is "sufficiently developed to support a conclusion that the state of 10 See also discussion at 8-9, suora.
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l emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and'will be taken..." sincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 775 (1983). l At the time of the hearings, Applicants had not submitted an l emergency plan that was sufficiently complete to provide the basis for a finding that personnel resources are reasonably ade- ) l i quate to protect the public during a radiological emergency at ! i Seabrook. As FEMA testified, Applicants had not yet provided significant elements of Applicants' emergency plan with respect to personnel resources, including staff rosters and alerting lists, and the results of training sessions and drills. In addi-tion, FEMA had not been able to use its primary tool for evaluat-ing the adequacy of personnel resources, observation of a full-scale exercise of Rev. 2, because no exercise had been conducted at that time.11 As FEMA Witness Thomas stated, an exercise was necessary to evaluate whether "the number of personnel designated in the plan are sufficient to carry out the tasks..." Tr. 4055, 4056. FEMA also stated that che normal process by which FEMA finds out that people understand their duties and are willing to carry them out is through the process of identifying staff, training thein, and observing their participation in drills. Tr. 1 i 11 While it may be possible for the Licensing Board to fully evaluate some issues without benefit of an exercise, in this par- , l ticular instance FEMA declared that an exercise was necessary for l its evaluation. It should be noted in this regard that an exercise had already been conducted in this case, resulting in an unusually high number of deficiencies. l l l l
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4088. ' Finally, FEMA-had not: reviewed the principal. document-
! relied upon by Applicants-in the hearing te' prove the adequacy'of personnel resources, the Personnel Resources Summary.12 .j While the decision as to whether aniemergency plan'is suffi- > d ciently developed to support a reasonable assurance finding rests .!
ultimately with the Licensing Board,.[ggg ALAB-727, 17 NRC.at ,t 775], the Board must give considerable deference to FEMA's judg-ment, given.its primary rolefin the review of emergency plans.; l 10 C.F.R. 50.47 (a) (2) ._. In this case, the: emergency response per- q sonnel contentions should be remanded for hearings on the results of. FEMA's subsequent review of the Summary, the' submittal of.per-sonnel rosters, and training,. drills and exercises that had not- j l been conducted at the time of the previous hearings. ' E. The Licensing Board erred when it concluded that 24-
-hour staffing is not required for decontamination cen-
"ters.
NUREG-0654, 5 II.A.4, requires that principal organizations must.be' capable of continuous (24-hour) response.for a protracted period. The NHRERP, however, provides'that decontamination and ! reception centers will'be operated for only a twelve-hour period.- i PID 5.67. The Board affirmed the adequacy of one twelve-hour shift'on I the ground that decontamination and reception centers do not con- i
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stitute principal response organizations. According to tue Board, the applicable planning standard is 5 II.J.12, which pro- l 1
.12 The Summary was not submitted by the State until after FEMA had filed its Direct Testimony. PID 3.65.
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.s .a : x vides thEt "the personnel and equipment available should be
~ capable of monitoring within about a 12-hour period all residents and transients in the pluma exposure EPZ arriving at relocaticn centers."- Id.
.The Board's interpretation of NUREG-0654 is incorrect as a matter of law. . Appendix 5 to NUREG-0654 defines " principal" organizations as " Federal, State, Local agencies or departm'ents i or executive offices and nuclear utilities (licensaes) having i
maiqr or, lead roles in emergency planning and preparedness." (emphasis in original) There can be no question that decontamination and reception centers, which may process thou-sands of contaminated individuals in the EPZ, have " major" responsibilities for protecting the health and welfare of EPZ residents and emergency response workers. Given that the overall-objective'of emergency planning is to " provide dose savings" to the public [NUREG-0654 at 6), decontamination facilities must i
, factor as critical emergency response organizations. l Section II.J.12 of NUREG-0654 is not inconsistent with this interpretation of 5 II.A.4, which refers to the rate at which the decontamination centers must process evacuees, not the total num-ber of hours that the centers must operate. That provision l requires that personnel and equipment should be capable of monitoring within "about a 12 hour period" all EPZ residents and tansients arriving at relocation centers. The words "about" and
" period" signify general goals for decontamination capability, not limitations on the hours of staffing shifts.
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-e Finally, the result yielded by the Board's decision does not provide a reasonable assurance that Seabrook EPZ evacuees arriv-ing at reception and decontamination centers can obtain decontamination services. Applicants' most recent Evacuation Time Estimates show that evacuation times may be as long as ten hours on a summer weekend.13 NRC Staff Ex. 1, Post Tr. 6742.
Moreover, the NHRERP seeks to staff and mobilize reception cen-ters before an evacuation is even ordered.14 Given the poten-tial length of the ETEs and the fact that a General Emergency, with an evacuation, might not be called for many hours after the reception / decontamination centers are staffed, it becomes very I possible that staff could be on duty for 15-20 hours or more before their tasks are completed.15 In light of the extremely long evacuation times for Seabrook, it is irrational to suggest l that decontamination of arriving evacuees could be accomplished i i within 12 hours of the commencement of an evacuation. ] 13 Now that the Licensing Board has found that the number of beach area vehicles used by the Applicants to compute these ETEs is too low [see PID 9.89-9.122), the realistic ETEs will be even longer. 14 Egg, e.a., Manchester Host Plan, Section III, Emergency Pro-cedures (New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency will request the activation of reception center when emergency conditions at j Seabrook "may result in an evacuation or have resulted in an s evacuation recommendation.") 15 The Board does recognize that emergency response workers may require decontamination services after the reception and n decontamination centers have closed, and orders that the NHRERP ! should be revised to provide either for delayed opening'of the Manchester secondary center or a second shift. PID 5.68. How-ever, this requirement is directed at decontamination of.emer-gency workers only, and not evacuees. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________O
ll .. I m ) 1 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES 16 In Part 9 of its PID, the Board addressed a' series of' issues raised in the NHRERP litigation over the accuracy and usefulness 1 of the evacuation time estimates ("ETEs") contained in Volume 6 1 of the NHRERP. ') Egg Volume 6, Tables 10-4 through 10-9, pp. 10-6 ) I through 10-10. In. resolving.these issues,17 the Board'made a i J
. i number of material errors. j k
II. THE BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CORRECT NUMBER OF BEACH j VEHICLES TO USE FOR CALCULATING.THE SUMMERTIME ETES WAS 1 31,000.
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While the Board's reconstruction of the testimony regarding the accuracy of the Volume 6 beach vehicle estimates is rea- j sonably accurate, PID 9.89-9.127, the Board has drawn a number of- . j erroneous and insupportable inferences.from this testimony. I A.- The Board arbitrarily selected 31,000 as the -) appropriate number of vehicles to use after its own .j methodology led them to-32,800. .) 1 The guidance offered in NUREG-0654 with respect to ETE i;
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studies is that estimates of transient populations "shall be $ l developed using local data such as peak tourist' volumes." NUREG-l 0654, App. 4, 5 II.B at 4-3 (emphasis supplied), l i 1 l 1 16 1 While the parties recently attempted to settle a series of j their outstanding ETE disputes in a stipulation, that attempt j failed before the Stipulation had been approved by the Licensing i Board. Egg transcript of Board conference call of March 13, i 1989. The Appeal Board should disregard the copy of the Stipula- I tion which was sent at the end of February.
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17 The Board has reserved jurisdiction on one aspect of the ETE dispute, i.e., the impact returning commuters will have on the , ETEs. Ege PID, 59.60. l E E l C _---- _ - _ - . I
l { l The authors of Volume 6 sought to estimate the number of ! vehicles in the beach areas during " peak" conditions by estimat-I ing the total parking " capacity" of the beach areas. See Volume j i 6 at 2-8, 2-10 through 2-12, 10-2, 10-16. On page 10-15, the '! authors write that the ETEs in Volume 6 are " based on the assump- ) tion that all real estate available for parking vehicles is fully j l utilized for that purpose." Interveners did not challenge this methodology of using I
" parking capacity" to estimace " peak" vehicle population in the beach areas. Instead, using the same aerial photo counting meth-odology employed in Volume 6, the Mass AG's experts took photos i
on two weekends in July 1987 and demonstrated that the Volume 6 i estimates of a " reasonable upperbound" for " capacity" were sub- j J stantially low. High, et al., ff. Tr. 6849, { Applicants' testimony did not seek to support the volume 6 t i j numbers (indeed, they were insupportable) because they themselves l 3 had taken new aerial photos at mid-day on Saturday, July 18, 1987, which displayed substantially more cars parked in the beach 1 area than Volume 6 had estimated was the parking capacity. Com- l t pare App. bir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622 at 38 (26,850 vehicles) with i Volume 6 at E-5 (25,470 vehicles). At this point the Applicants ! dropped the " parking capacity" approach to estimating the "paak" heach population; instead they claimed simply that July 18, 1987, j was a " representative peak day." See App. PF 6.1.81; Tr. 6075, l 6083-84 (Lieberman). Projecting forward from their mid-day
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photos, the Applicants then estimated how many vehicles would be ]
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I r e s !; f 'O '. i l parked in the beach areas at the " peak" hour, i.e., about 2 p.m. j App. Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622, at 31-38. The estimate was { 29,293. Id. at 38. Interveners vigorously contested that July 18, 1937, was j{ representative of a " peak" day, Mass AG PF 6.1.117-6.1.164, and
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the evidence they presented was substantial and compelling that July 18, 1987, was something less than representative of a peak , day. Id. 1 At this point, the NRC Staff witness sought to straddle the j i fence using semantics; he agreed that July 18 appeared to have ' had a beach population which was not the " peak of the peaks" but was something more like a " reasonably expectable peak," whatever 4 that was. In his view, the vehicle population on such a day was ) l preferable in an ETE study. See PID 9.106. The Board, without offering any foundation or explanation j i for doing so, found that such an approach "makes good sense and j l is based on sound experience." PID 9.106. Such a deviation from f the NUREG-0654 guidance (" peak" tourist volumes) without explicit i rational justification is arbitrary and capricious, and it con- j stitutes error. Then, having agreed in S 9.106 of the PID to adopt this 4
" good sense" approach and use the data from July 18, 1987, to J
develop the beach vehicle inputs for Seabrook's summertime ETEs, the Board examines that data and finds that on that day, 32,800 l l a l t >
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lg # . .- 3 x y 0* . 30 - I vehicles 18 !wereilikely- present :in the beach areas.: PID 9.120.
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, _( The Doard also' finds that . 35,000-36,000 vehicles may be rea-E 3 sonably postulated as.the " peak of the' peaks l" PID 9.121, a y l
l LL < vehicle numbe'r which is apparently equal to,the " peak" number on; j w , the busiest' day ever'in the beach areas. But having.followed its " good sense" approach to its logical l L' ' conclusion:that 32f800. vehicles were present in the beach: area'on-L' July 18, 1987,.the Board then arbitrarily abandons " good sense"
-(and 1,800 vehicles)'and states-flatly that "31,000-is an-appropriate number for. reasonably expectable peak' occupancy."
PID 9.122. Basing Seabrook's summertime ETEs on this number is completely' Insupportable by either NUREG-0654, App.-4, or'.the 7 . 1
" logic" of the' Board's-own substituted " good sense" approach. j 1 ,
a This arbitrary finding constitutes error. M l B. The Boards
- confirmatory ETE calculation and observa- 1 tions were seriously defective, both mathematically and
.1 logically. .l In.a sophomoric attempt to confirm the appropriateness of l
1
.using 31,000 vehicles for summertime ETE calculations at lj
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Seabrook, the' Board, in its PID,odoes a rough calculation of the j Scenario 1/ Region 1 ETE, compares that result to the length of an 1
- observed beach exodus on a good beach day, and finds " good agree- i ment." PID 95122-9.126. Although this confirmatory effort is i j
18 The Board added togethcr (1) the 29,300 vehicles the i Applicants had estimated were parked in the beach areas at 2 p.m., (2) 1,50C vehicles likely to have been on the roads in the beach area, and (3) 2,000 more which likely were parked under hotels:and motels, in garages, ai!d in spaces hidden from aerial view. PID, 9 9.s120. x, <
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$I' : fraught w'ith' miscalculate'on and bad logic, fit proves that the- $
v ETEs are-likely to be much longer than the Bocrd has estimated; , 6 . and that its rellance on 31,000Lvehicles is unfounded. First, the Board' attempts to calculate :the "clearanceirate'! 4 (in) vehicles per'minut'e) at which the beach area vehicles can { 1 i, 1 flow out of the beach areas. The Board's calculation is made:by- ] dividing tho various beach vehicle estimates available by their I corresponding ETEs'-(expressed in' total minutes). In calculating '
" clearance rates," the Board displays sloppy math. Its conclu- -
sions of 686 vehicles per minute (Vol. 6 " clearance rate") and 687 vehicles per Nini'e ~ (for Interveners' ETE) are hoth-too large by a. factor of 10. Ege PID 9.122. '
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, Undaunted by this error, the Board nevertheless findo a'near l i
constant beach " clearance rate" and uses it to calculate an : estimated ETE for 31,000 vehicles of'7:32.19 d Next, the Board seeks confirmation thet this ETE (based on 31,000 beach vehicles) is likely to be close to the realistic ETE
-for the-near-peak days. Turning'to the Fallon videotape taken on j July 19, 1987, a day Mrs. Fallon claimeu had " considerably heavier" traffic than July 18th, see PID 9.124, the_ Board finds
" good agreement" bJtween its 7:32 ETE and the beach exodus Mrs.
i Fall 1on videotaped that day, which'ran from 2:00 p.m. to after 9:00 p.m. l
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i 19 We read this entire calculation as merely confirmatory and i not as a " finding" that the correct ETE for a Region 1/ Scenario 1 ! ETE is 7:32. The IDYNEV cc guter model proves that ETEs simply ; cannot be calculated in this overly simplistic way. 1 (
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, .Unfortunately,.although it'is sound to assume that the maxi-mum beach area " clearance rate" is a near constant, and-that'this xate-is achievedfduring the vehicular' exodus on busy eummeri 1 weekends, the. Board'siconclusion is fatally illogical. The prob-lem is that~what occurred from 2-9 p.m. on July 19, 1987,'was a- )
I typical, congested Sunday afternoon beach exodus comprised- as l the Board acknowledges in 5 9.126, mostly of ' day-trippers. According to Volume 6, and generally agreed to by all parties at. the hearings,."[r]oughly half of the beach traffic on a crowded a day is comprised of day-trippers." Volume 6 at 10-15. The other j half of the vehicles in the beach area belong to those thousands. of people who are staying in the beach area for a few days, a q I week, a month, the summer season, or as permanent residents. See ! l PID 9.89; see also Volume 6 4t 2-8, E-3 (Item 6). This means ; l that if one seeks to.use the 7 hour exodus videotaped by Mrs. ,j Fallon on July 19, .19 8 '/ , as evidence of how long a full beach l evacuation of day-trippers and all others together would' tabs, j one would roughly double the 7 hours to arrive at an estimated I J ETE in the range of 14 hours.20 l l 3 il 20 1 It would be legical to assume that many weekend vacationers ; L as well as the day-trippers would be leaving in the Sunday aftern6on exodis, but we have no data on what percentage of the non-daytrippests this group comprises. Remainin; in the beach areas would be many vacationers who rent by the week, month, and season, and then ther,c are the permanent residents, merchants, and their employues. Nevertheless, probably more than 50% of tha vehicles present on Sundays at 2 p.m. leave the beach areas later that day. If 60% leave in 7 hours, 100% could do so in 11.7 3 hours., almost exactly what Dr. Adler found the ETE to be. Egg Adler, ff. Tr. 7181 at 10, 52, 52a. I e i
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' d The; Board's. estimate of.7:32 is,hardly in " good agreement" with thisLfigure..
- <, s - In summary, the Board's selection of 31,000 vehicles,as the= I appropriate number to use infan ETE study for.Seabrook is
. insupportable. 'Interranors' position was,.and is, that no sinale l
number is " appropriate"'to use for summertime ETEs. Egg Mass AG
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PF ' 6.1.'177-6.1.12 9. It is not only the highest number of i vehiclesLin'thel bench areas that is of concern. The inflow and outflow of vehicles in the beach nrea is a highl.y variable and. complex phenomenon abcut which the State of New Hampshire and the-Applicants:know'much tooLlittle. Egg Mass AG PF 6.1.17'9. Even ! k if we.al'1 could agree what the appropriate " peak" beach vehicle { figure is, the NHRERP's PAR decisionmakers still will have no
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idea what the-realistic summertime ETEs are at an off-peak time, s' say 5:30 p.m. on a hot Thursday afternoon, or 1:00 a.m. on a i rainy Saturday morning in July. Id. The 'mtmber of vehiclec in tile beach areas at these times -- and the resultant ETEs -- are completely unknown, but we know it is well belowf31,000 vehicles. ' The Board specifically refused to adopt any of the MAG proposed A findings that sought recognition of this problem and proposed X sol!1tions. Ege PID 9.127. As a result, there is no reasonable
, assurance that New Hampshire has a realistic or useful set of ETEs for a wide range of summertime conditions.
In major part, the Board's retusal to require that New Hamp . ] shire have the ability to reference an ETE which is reasonably l 1 _ realistic for the actual size of the beach population at the time l l I 1 l ( I i
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, L c of an emergency stems from its belief that this capability will not contribute to public protection. See FID 9.127-9.129. This
{ belief is seriously misguided. 1 In the Board's view, the ETEs need no "further refinement" i ($ 9.129) with respect to beach vehicle population variations j t because, even though ETEs will vary depending on the time of day when the accident occurs, th'e ETEs are already essentially irrelevant to protective action decisionmaking for the beach pop-ulation. Ege PID 9.127-9.128. Noting that the NHRERP's preferred _ protective action for the summer beach population is-almost always early beach closing and early evacuation, the Board ( concludes "we do not see any reason why the ETE, whether 6, 7, or j i 8 hours, would have any influence on the protective action deci-sion." PID 9.128. The Board's logic here misses the point entirely. While , beach population PARS are substantially predetermined in the i l NHRERP, and are therefore made without reference.to ETEs, the i PARE for all the remaining portions of the New Hampshire EPZ are a not predetermined. In making PARS for all these outlying areas, f public protection will clearly be served by providing decision-makers with a reasonably realistic set of ETEs for the conditions I i at hand. As the Board has acknowledged, there is no dispute that ) the beach area population varies widely, depending on the day of 1 the week, the time of day, and the weather. PID 9.90. There is ; i also no dispute that the NHRERP's ETEs are sensitive to this wide variation in the beach vehicle popula tion. PID 9.91, citina ! i;
i
- 35'-
Volume 6 at 10-12. 'I The Board also recognized Dr. Adler's
]
testimony that "it is precisely the evacuation routes that the beach area evacuees will have to use'which are the most congested and which serve as a bottleneck to the entire region." Tr. 7036. PID 9.92. Indeed, to evacuate the EPZ, these beach vehicles need , to travel out through solae of the EPZ communities 5 and 10 miles i awa/. The beach exodus also affects the time it takes returning commuters to return to their homes to pick up family members in these outlying areas. In sum, this traffic flow from the beaches affects tha ETEs for these outlying areas to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the size of the beach vehicle population at the time and the degree to which beach vehicle traffic impacts each of the outlying communities' returning commuters and evacuees, Thus, a reasonably realistic set of ETEs for these outlying areas for the conditions at hand must be based on a reasonably l realistic estimate of the beach vehicle population present at the l time. Obviously, this means that there is no single ETE which ! l l can be referenced for a given town (or ERPA) on a summer weekend ! with good weather, since the realistic LTE may vary greatly from 7:00.a.m. to 2:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. There can be little doubt that having the ability to reference a reasonably realistic ETE for each of these towns will materially aid protective action 1 decision making foi, the New Hampshire EPZ communities outside of i l the beach areas. The Board hrs erred in finding that New he.op- l shire did not need to undortake "further refinement" of its ETEs l L .
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to provide an adequate data base and methodology for.decisi'en-makers to reterence a set'of,ETEs.which are.reasonab1p?rea'ltistic for the size of the beach population'present'at theLtime oftan L emergnncy, whenever,it' occurs. , ,
\
Dr. Adler hud' described % hat additional information'should j be provided in the NHRERP'to allow decisionmakers.tc reliably j 1 determine the' ETEs Lon a given Cay at a given, time of day. Egg Adler, ff. Tr.7 9524 at 15-17.. The costs of implementing any of the methodologies'Dr.Adler has suggested are reasonable. Egg Mass AG PF 6.1.182-6.1 187.- Tha Appeal Board should adopt Mass AG PF 6.1.188 and 6.1.189 to resolve this matter. III. THE' BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DELAYED STAFFING OF THE TRAFFIC CONTROL POST.S BY THE STATE POLICE WILL HAVE NO. 4 IMPACT.ON THE NHRERP'S ETED. ' The. Mass AG's Ptoposed Findings at 6.1.190-6.1.246 describo l this issue in detail and should be adopted by.the Appeal Board.. Moreover, the Mass AG's March 24, 1989, brief.on appeal of'the l l Board's NHRERP PID- (filed concurrently with this brief) 'contains substantial and convincing argument why the Board erred in find-ing that driver disorderliness, loss of two-way road flow, traf-fic accidents, and vehicle abandonment would not be a significant factor in an evacuation from Seabrook', even if therte were del,yed staffing of the traffic control posts by the State Police. The significantly tardy arrival of the State Police, Gae PID 9.70 and
.the Mass AG's brief on this point, makes the likelihcod of such I events too great.to have reasonable assurance that ETEs vill not be=affected.
_ - = -- - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ - _ - - - - - - - _ _ .
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, The Board wrongfully dismisses any doubts'about such con-
, . ll .m,x :] cerns in a couple-of ways.,,First the' Board points to the'15% s 4
' reduction'in capacity.which is factored-into th6.IDYNEV model,
, o PIDc7.88. The Board,' citing Applicants' testimony,:says this 10%_ k
-{
reduction factor accounts for " driver uncertainty and short term ] , disruptions which can disrupt capacity." Jg.
, l 4
,c neliance on'this capacity reduction factor to satisfy con--
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, 'cerns about the effect of late staffing on the ETEs is misplaced. I
- k Tirst,'all this factor really does in the IDYNEV model.is reduce'
]
)
servicsa volumes by 15% whenever traffic densities become so con-' l gested as to move from Level of Service E to Level of Service F
.( 'f LOS F" ) . S_eA Volume 6 at 304. See also Ceder, ff. Tr. 5169 at.
E' 16-1% This is dono simply to reflect the fact that LOS F traf- . l
.fic is so u'nctable that it cannot attain 1the service volume j (vehicles / hour) achieved by LOS E traffic.
Volume 6 states that thi.s raduction factor is based on
; empiric.O data collecte6 on fre.eways. Volume 6 at 3-4. Dr.
Ceder, a much more credential and qualified witness 21 than the author of Volume 6 (Edward Lieborean), testlijed that he had con-ducted " extensive stutties... on different sections of highways" and is of' the opinion that the appropriate reduction in service i' volume when one mov9s from LOS E to LOS F is 25%, not 15%. l Ceder, ff. Tr. 5169 at 18-19. The Board disregards this j
-{
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l i 1 1 21 Dr. Ceder's detailed resume is' attached as Attachment 1 to hic testimony, ff. Tr. 5169. He is internationally recognized in the field cf transport.ation science. By comparison, Mr. Leverman does not even have a degree in the relevant academic fioldn.
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testimony altoget.her, Thus, not only is the 154 " reduction fac- l l tor" not meant to account for the kind of traffic disorderliness,
) i accidents, and the like at issue here, but the " reduction factor" the Board references is too small for the limited purpose it was !
i intended to serve. In any event, 'lolume 6 assumes that staffing { is in place at all TCPs froin the beginning of a beach closing, Volume 6 at 10-70; gge also Mass AG pF 6.1.191. Thus the 154% j
\
" reduction factor" does not address concerns over the additional )
disorderliness that will likely prevail when staffing at TCPs 10 l i l not in place. The second way the Board attempts to dismiss concerns about {
}
the accuracy of the ETES due to late stafflng is by reference to l i 1 the Applicants' so-called " sensitivity runs" which purport to { show that delayed staffing has little or no impact on ETZs sp. lg E Ag. traffic in Hampton Beach is not " discouraged" from traveling south over the Hampton Harbor Bridge for at least the first two hours of the evacuation. PID 9 75-9.84, . The Board acknowledges, however, that this condition cannot , be assured, because it is up to the State of 11ew Hampshire to I i decide whether ^,o changa !.ts evacuation plan to " discourage" traffic movement 2 over this bridge. e Ses Volume 6 at I-1, I-12. It appears thati the Board believes that the State of !!ew
]
Hampshire should make this change but it refrains from directing i the State to make it as a condition of approving the NHRERP's ETEs or evacuation plar. See PID 9.85-9.86. This constitutes error. 1 1 1 l
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Hampshire with both pros ,snd cons; so the State cannot simply- <i4 be presumed to.makef3t. There are conflicting l safety goals-at it work here,-and'there are some rea3. uncertainties about which
. routing.is best. :Perhsps the adverse impacts of late" staffing on: f
[ l',- , ETEs can be reduced'somewhat if cars are-routed south over the L , j brcidge. But now that the Board has found a higher number of
]
q" beach vehicles l(31,000) than the Applicants used in these sensitivity runs, is this still the case? The testimony of High, -l
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et d., ff. Tr. 6549 at.17, when compared to the Applicants.' 4 latest beach vehicle counts, Egg App, Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622'at
.38, suggests that'the distribution of-treffic from beach to beach- ,
l
--does not necessarj,1y stay the same as the beach population rises.
j i ! and'f. alls.22 q i On days like July 5, 1987, when the Salisbury Beach vehicle
, population was very high, ging High, .e.l d. ,14. , it' may actually
(
- be a bad idea - (resulting :in _hicher ETEs.) to send Hampton Beach ')
, vehiclas'6outh over the bridge toward Salisbury.
Then there is the real concern about routing vehicles c1oser
)
to Seabrook by all.owing them.tc ttove south over the' bridge.- The I Board belittles this concern by saying that it f.s at worst "not' very much" of.a novement closer to seabrook. This, of com: ., is ll \ a value judgment. The facts ara that cars traveling out-of j t I ! i L , i f:
-22 This is another reason to require that the NHRERP adopt one of the methodologies suggested in Mass AC PF 6.1.181 -- New Hamp-shire naeds to know'not'only the approximate size of the beach vnhicle. population; it useds to know its distribution as well.
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'l,y< Seabrook BeachLon i >.e.' 286,are_vell inside the 2-mile' ring, t- j 1
1.'6. or- 1.7 miles from the nuclear plant, reachincj points only , l while. cars traveling out'Raute 51 from Hampton Beach come no- i
- v. closer than about<2.5 miles.to the plant. Eeg Volume 6', Figure L 'g
,1-3.l Cars on Route 51'are therefore over 50% turther away trom '
the: plant.
.In sum, the Board has not adequately resolved the issue of ,
whether the NHRERP's ETEs are realistic in light of the Jate. ! i , staffing of the TCPs/ACPs by the State, Police. As the Board has v. left the matter, there is simply no assurance that the "fix" pro - posed by the Applicants will, or uhould, be adopted by the State of New Hampshire, and the evacuation plan stands as filed in u Volume 6. .This being the case, the Appeal Board should reverse , and remand this portion of the decision'for further review by the State of New Hampshire. IV. THE LICENSING BOARD ERhED WHEN IT CONDITIONED ITS FINAL APPROVAL OF THE NHRERP'S ETES ON ACI' IONS TG BE TAKF,N BY THE APPLICANTS, RATHER THAN ON PLAN CHANGES;THEMSELVES. r q At the conclusion of the ETE portion of its decision, the 3 4 Board was unable to find thdt the NHRERP's ETEs were, sufficiently l { realistic to be found adequate. E E PID 9.130. This; stemmed s
'from its subsidiary finding that the Volume 6 ETE analysis had relied on an inappropriately small number of.braach area vehicles.
PID 9.89-9.129. Instead of holding that New Hampshire needed to adopt an appropriately amended set of ETEs, however, the Licens-
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ing Board held that final ETE approval would occur "providing": t (1) Thet the respective findings modifying the ETEs by this Board q>
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' State of.Now'Hampinire."
s PID 9.130. As a justification for this
.{
action,Ithe Board cites 10 C.F.R."Part' 50, App. F, IV.7. Id.
' i While'our copy of 10 C.F.'R. contains no Section 7 to Appen- d a
dit E, p' art IVj;we'ausume that ths Board is referring to the last , d 1 sentence of :the first paragraph of part. IV, . which requiros .that
- ,. ;the " applicant's emergency plans" contain;"an analysis or.the tl titne reauired .to evacuate" permanent residents and trand$.ents 'in' the plume exposure 1 pathway EPZe '
This requirement does.ndt relieve the' Board from finding t, hat the NHRERP la inadequate 11 it does not'contain rCallstic ETEs. Indeed, NUREG .0654 clearly requires b_ot;h the "Licentiee" and thc-State to'each meet an. evaluation criterion that calls'for- f s ETEs.. sBut NUREG-0654, II.J.10.1. . .The' Board's order implies that l tho NHRERP's ETEs need not be. changed at all, so long ah the '
- ApplicantsETE3 are ' realistic and . Ate provided to the State of e,>
New Hampshire. Suchfan order fails to prov.ide reasonable , i assurance that the State of New Hampshire's PAR decisior. makers will1have ETEs'in their own plans which.will enable them to make the most appropriate SARs. As such, the order fails to provide reasonable assurance that adaquate. protective measures can and will be'taken.in the event of a radiological caergency. 10 1
'C.F.R. 5 0. 4'1 (a) .
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; ' CONCLUSION- <
q .. . .' , P. ' ForLthe foregoingfreasons',the PID should b ' reversed and' n-L kn(f f i . . . . , . . ><. pL ', ; remanded ~to,the,Licensincj Board forJ turther:l hearings. T , 1 .
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.l' , s pectfully submittcd' ,
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7 HARMON, CURRAN-&;TOUSLEY> ' 1 L 1' - 2001."S" Street N.W. Suite 430 ' s Wpp x- , t
, . Wa'shington, D.C. . 20009:
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,;. . March 24,-15189 '
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .;
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.I certify that on/ March 24,. 1989, ccpies of the foregoi,ng.
l pleadingiwere served bythand,! overnight. mail,-or first-class ma11~ '
-on all~ parties.to this proceeding, ets designated on the) attached service list., g o . ,
h Diane Currah .] k j - ~, i- ,
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r , I t1 F L SEABROOK SERVICE LIST Offsite Appeal Board
*Ihomat J. Dignan, Esq. Phillip Ahrens, Esq. Richard Donovan Alan S. Rcretthal, Chairman R.K. Gad II, Esq. Assistant Attorney General FEMA Atomic safety and Licensing Ropus & Gray State IIouse, Station #6 442 J.W, McC mack (POCil)
Appea] Dwid Ore International P' ace Augsta, ME Oi333 Boston, MA 02109
' U.S. NRC Roston, MA C21104524 Wasir; spon, D.C 20555 Allen Lampert J.P. Nadou Carol S. Sneide r, Esquire Civil Defense Direesor Townd an Llov.ard A. Wilber Assistant Attorney General Town of Drenwwtxt 155 WasMr.pon Road Atomic S-fety and Ucensing 1 Ashburton Place,19th ihr Exeter, Nil 0F Rye,New flampshire (Gd70 Appeal Ikwrd Boston, MA 02108 U.S. NRC Paul Met:achern, Esq. AsaeJ N. Amirian. Esq-Washington, D C 20555 otanley W. Knowles Shaines & McEachern 145 South Main Street Board of Selectrriaa P.O. N 360
- v. Box 38 Thomas S. Moore P.O. Box 710 Maplescx>a Avenue Dradford, MA 01835 i Atomb Safety and Licensing North flampton, NIX 03826 Pommor , nil 03801 l Appeal Board U.S. NRC Judah II. MWr, Esq. Andra Gavutis Washingo i. D.C 201,5 Silvergiate, Gertner, e' al. IW t, Dox 1154 88 Droad Street Uast Kensington, Nll 03827 f
1 Ivan W. Smith, Cheroun Doston, MA 02110 Atomic Safety and Li.ensing Doard Robert A.Backus, Esq U S. Nuchar Regulato.y Commission Washington. O C. 20555 Dnator Unrdon J. liumphrey U.S. Sen.,te Dackus Hever & Soaon % c.f O Hl te,a Strect M- h Washington, D.C 20510 Maachate., Nll 03105 9
'AicharJ F. Ccie Atomic Safety and Liceprmg Doard
- (rtn. Tom BurscL)
Sherwin E.Tak, Esq.
,f Q
4 1 l U.S. Nuclear Repalmory Commitrior, Sene Gord ,. J 14m. ' < Office of Ceneral Counsel IV
^~3 Washington, D.C 2M55 1 Eagle Square, Ste 507 U.S. Nuclear Raulatorr Commission '
Concord, Nil 03301 Washington, D.C 20555 . .y , Kenneth A. McColum- < c, 1 Atomic Safety and Licensin;; Eaard U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Gary W. llolmes, Esq. IMmes & Ellis II. Josepr Flpia, Esq. Of0cc of General Counsel t 3 y Washington, D.C. 20535 47 Winnacunnent Road FEMA llampton, Nil Ont2 500 C Street S.W. Robert R. Pierce, Esq. Washmgton, D.C 2W2 : Atomic Very and Licen,singiloard Williarn Armurong ) U.S. EcleTr Regulatory Cornmissior. Civil Defense Director Geo<ge Dana B%ee, Esq. f Washington, D.C #555 10 Front Street Geoffrey M iluntington, Esq Exeter, Nil 03833 Office of the /.rtomey Ocneral Atontic Safety and Licensir.g State flouse Annet ] Appeal Boaru Panel cam.1 A.Qincy Concord, Nil 03'31 U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Wnager Washington, D.C 20555 Lity IIall Richard A. llampe, Esq. h
'126 Daniel Street flampe and McNicholas 3 Atomic Safety and licensing Portsmouth, Nll 03801 35 Plenant Street Board Panel Concord, Nil 03M1 U.S. Noch:ar Regulatory Commission Edward A. Thomas h Washington D.C 20555 FEMA Mrs. Anne E. Gomiman
]
442 J.W. McCormack (POClI) Board of Selecttm:n Docketing el Service Branch Ikaston, MA 02109 1315 New Market bid I U.S. Nuclea; Regulatory Commission Durham,Ull 03842 l Wash.'ngton, D C 20555 Charles P. Urnbam, Esq. McKay, Muiphy aLd Graham Williaro S. l.ord, Sekctman J Jane Doughty 100 Main Qreet Town llall - Fr2nd Street sal'L Amesbury, MA '01913 Amesbury, MA 01943
$ Market Street Portsmouth, Nil 03801 A', fred V. Sargent, Chairman R Scott flill-Whilton Board of Selectmen I agouhs. Clark. I till-Whilton Yu hm:I S.Mosuosso, Churman Town of Sads',ury, MA 01950 and McGuire Daard of Selectmen 79 State St reet Jawcil Street. RfD # 2 R:p. Roberta C Pevear Newburyport,MA 01950 Sout!, limpton, Nll 03642 Drinkwater Road llamptors Falls, Nil 0A44 Diana Sidebotham RFD # 2 Dox .I260 Putney, VT 05W J
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