ML20235V351
| ML20235V351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1989 |
| From: | Dignan T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8223 OL, NUDOCS 8903100148 | |
| Download: ML20235V351 (113) | |
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February 28, 1989 UNITED STATES ERI'CA' '
l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i
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In the Matter of )
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, pt al. ) 50-444-OL
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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Offsite Emergency and 2) ) Planning Issues)
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APPLICANTS' TRIAL BRIEF AS TO FIRST FILING PHASE OF LITIGATION AS TO SPMC AND EXERCISE CONTENTIONS I
8903100148 890228 3 ADOCK 050 gDR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 I. APPLICANTS' OVERALL POSITION WITH RESPECT I TO THE LITIGATION AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS IN EFFECT AS THE RESULT OF THE FEMA FINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . 6 A. Description and Scope of the Rebuttable Presumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 B. The Effect of the Rebuttable Presumption Under 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) . . . . . . . . 7 II. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS . . . . . . . 10 A. EVACUATION PROCESS - TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5 JI Contention No. 4 . . . . . . . . 10 JI Contention No. 5 18 I
B. EVACUATION PROCESS - TRANSIT DEPENDENT . . 21 JI Contention No. 7 . . . . . . . . 21 C. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . 35 JI Contention No. 9 . . . . . . . . 35 JI Contentions Nos. 11 and 12 . . . 36 JI Contention No. 15 . . . . . . . . 41 D. PAR GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 I JI Contention No. 17 JI Contention No. 18 JI Contention No. 19 42 43 46 JI Contention No. 24 . . . . . . . . 50 E. COMMUNICATION - NOTIFICATION . . . . . . . 52 I JI Contention No. 30 JI Contention No. 34 52 54 JI Contention No. 39 . . . . . . . . 56 I
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F. SPECIAL NEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 JI Contention No. 45 . . . . . . . . 59 JI Contention No. 46 . . . . . . . . 64 JI Contention No. 47 . . . . . . . . 70 JI Contention No. 48 . . . . . . . . 72 I JI JI Contention Contention No.
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G. EVACUATION EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES . . . 88 JI Contention No. 51 . . . . . . . . 88 JI Contention No. 53 . . . . . . . . 93 i JI Contention No. 54 . . . . . . . . 94 JI Contention No. 55 . . . . . . . . 96 JI Contention No. 56(C) . . . . . . 102 JI Contention No. 57 . . . . . . . . 103 JI Contention No. 58 . . . . . . . . 104 JI Contention No. 59 . . . . . . . . 106 JI Contention No. 60 . . . . . . . . 106 I
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E I February 28, 1989
' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the Matter of )
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
'I OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, e_t al. ) 50-444-OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Offsite Emergency and 2) ) Planning Issues)
APPLICANTS' TRIAL BRIEF AS TO FIRST ;
FILING PHASE OF LITIGATION AS TO SPMC AND EXERCISE CONTENTIONS INTRODUCTION This trial brief addresses the contentions which, by i
virtue of prior orders of this Board and stipulations of the i
parties,1 have been set for hearing commencing March 21, 1989. It is the Applicants' present intention to file at the 1
Memorandum and Order (Settina Schedule for Hearina (Jan. 24, 1989) at 2-3; Joint Stimulation Recardina i
Stat'2s of Admitted Contentions (Feb. 7, 1989) at 10; Stimulation Recardina Filina Date for Testimony on Evacuation Bed Buses (Feb. 9, 1989) at 1-2; l Order Grantina Motion for Acoroval of Stimulation (Feb. 10, 1989).
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time the filings on the remaining contentions are due, a second Trial Brief which will incorporate the contents of this document as well as the material related to the later- l to-be-heard contentions. This will, for the convenience of the Board and the Parties, serve the purpose of putting the entire trial position of the Applicants in a single document.
This trial brief is broken into two major sections. The first section sets forth the Applicants' overall perception of the case and, in particular, the effect of the rebuttable presumptions accorded the Applicants in this proceeding by virtue of the provisions of 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) . The second section addresses the contentions at bar within certain categories, describing, in summary form, the Applicants' I testimony as to each. The discussion of each contention will also set out, where applicable, references to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings set out in the Review and Evaluation of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities ("SPMC Report") which are cf relevance to the contention under discussion, the Applicants' understanding of the prefiled testiniony of the opposition, and the " legal principles" applicable (including law of the case established I
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I I l in the Partial Initial Decision issued in the NHRERP portion of this proceeding).2 I. APPLICANTS' OVERALL POSITION WITH PISPECT I TO THE LITIGATION AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS IN EFFECT AS THE RESULT OF THE FEMA FINDINGS.
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A. Description and Scope of the Rebuttable Presumptions. l Under NRC regulations, emergency plans for nuclear facilities are to be reviewed for adequacy and capability of implementation by FEMA, and, "[i]n any NRC licensing proceeding a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presunction on questions of adequacy and implementation 1 capability." 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) . In the case at bar, the emergency plan of interest, known as the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) , has, subject to the installation of the vehicular alert and notification system (VANS), been found to be adequate and implementable by FEMA.
This general finding is set forth in a letter under date of December 14, 1988,, to The NRC Executive Director of Operations from FEMA's Associate Director for State and Local Programs and Support.3 It constitutes a rebuttable I 2 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-32, 28 NRC (Dec. 30, 1988) (hereafter referred to as "PID" and cited to the Slip Opinion).
3 Letter Peterson to Stello (Dec.14, 1988) at 2.
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presumption that SPMC is adequate and capable of implementation.
This overall finding, in turn, is based upon the SPMC Report which sets forth FEMA's detailed review of SPMC. !
The SPMC Report contains a number of detailed findings of adequacy by FEMA with respect to various aspects of SPMC.
These findings too, of course, operate as rebuttable presumptions under 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) . In addition, the fact that FEMA was able to reach its overall finding on the basis of that report, constitutes a rebuttable presumption that the matters addressed in the SPMC Report are the only matters which require review in order to reach the overall general conclusion. In other words, the interveners are precluded from arguing that some matter not reviewed by FEMA demonstrates the SPMC to be inadequate or not capable of implementation unless they first overcome the presumption that the matter they rely upon is irrelevant or unnecessary to an appropriate review of SPMC.
I B. The Effect of the Rebuttable I Presumption Under 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) .
In a comprehensive analysis of the then new 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2), a Licensing Board ruled that the rebuttable presumption created by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(2) should be viewed as having the same status as presumptions were accorded under I ;
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Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.4 The Licensing Board further held that:
"a rule 302 presumption dissolves in the face of contradictory evidence, provided
.g of course that such evidence meets the
- g. always apolicable tests that it is reliablq."D While there is at least one subsequent Licensing Board decision that suggests that any evidence, no matter how ephemeral, can rebut the 10 CFR 5 50.47(a) (2) presumption,6 I the better reasoned decisions have adhered to the doctrine 4
Metropolitan Edison Comoany 'Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1463 (1981).
5 Id. at 1465 (emphasis supplied).
6 Carolina Power & Licht Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), 23 NRC 294, 365 (1986)
(holding that 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) "means that a FEMA position may be accepted by a Licensing Board if that issue is uncontested. But if an intervenor I contests such an issue, the rebuttable presumption
' dissolves' and the FEMA testimony is given no special weight 'beyond that to which [it] would be I entitled by virtue of the expertise of the witnesses and the bases presented for their views'"). As authority for this proposition, the Licensing Board cited the Appeal Board decision which affirmed the 2211 Licensing Board decision discussed above. Suora, n. 4 and accompanying text. However, the Appeal Board decision cited, I noted that the Licensing Board ruling under discussion was not appealed to it, and what the Shearon Harris Licensing Board was relying upon was I a truncated recitation by the Appeal Board of what the Licensing Board had, in fact, held. S_e_e Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island e
Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1298 (1982).
I that the evidence necessary to " dissolve" the presumption must be " reliable and probative"7 or " persuasive."8 The I Commission has recently stated that at least as applied in the setting of exercise litigation, under 10 CFR 5
- 50. 4 7 (a) (2) FEMA " findings are entitled to presumptive l J
validity"9 and that despite an earlier Appeal Board decision !
which suggested that rebuttal could be accomplished entirely by cross-examination,10 the failure of an intervenor to prefile testimony in support of a contention would result in the contention being considered in default by virtue of the 10 CFR 5 50.47(a) (2) presumption.11 In short, then, in the setting of this case, the opponents of the facility are under an obligation to come forward with reliable, probative, and persuasive evidence on all contentions, and absent such an effort on their behalf, the contention must, by virtue of the 7
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Comoany (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-68, 16 NRC 741, 746 (1982).
8 Southern California Edison Comoany (San Onofre I Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1213 (1982).
9 Lonc Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) , CLI-88-9, 28 NRC (Dec. 1, 1988), Slip Op. at 4.
I 10 See Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAE-864, 25 NRC 417, 428 (1987).
11 CLI- 8 8 -9 , p_qp_r_q , at 5.
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I 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (2) presumption be resolved in favor of the Applicants.
II. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS I A.
EVACUATION PROCESS - TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN JI Contention No. 4 I The Contention: "The evacuation plan contained in the SPMC is so poorly designed and so inadequately staffed that, even I if state and local officials are assumed to make a best efforts response, there is no reasonable assurance that either the permanent I residents or the transients can or will be evacuated as efficiently as possible, therefore, the SPMC does iE not provide reasonable assurance
!E that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, and it fails to comply with 10 CFR SS
'I 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) ,
- 50. 4 7 (c) (1) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J.
B Basis A. The number of traffic control personnel relied upon by the SPMC is inadequate.
B. Insufficient capacity-enhancing measures and other poorly conceived traffic control strategies are utilized by i
the SPMC's traffic management plan. The SPMC has not i
I adequately addressed the problems that will occur during an evacuation in the event that the Gillis Bridge is closed to traffic in order to facilitate the passage of boats.
Il C. The traffic control diagrams contained in the SPMC i3 are not sufficiently clear to allow the SPMC's traffic management plan to be implemented.
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References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion A.4 at p. 13; Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; Criterion J.10.j at pp. 66-67.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: The Attorney General for The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MAG) has filed the testimony of Dr. Thomas J. Adler.
Dr. Adler criticizes the design and planned operation of certain of the traffic control posts (TCPs) and access control posts (ACPs) in the traffic management plan of the SPMC. These criticisms allegedly are made against the requirements of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control (MUTCD) which Dr. Adler asserts to be the proper standard by which to judge such posts in a radiological emergency plan. In addition, Dr. Adler recommends the use of barricades, as opposed to traffic cones at certain " key" TCPs and ACPs. He criticizes certain procedures and instructions for ambiguity, and argues that ununiformed traffic control guides will not command the respect necessary to control traffic. MAG has also filed the testimony of Frank Beevers, the acting Chief of Police of the Town of Salisbury Massachusetts. Basically, Chief Beevers sets out a rerun of the alleged problems and difficulties that will occur in the Town of Salisbury and its environs l
that were testified to by his predecessor in office during the NHRERP phase of the hearings. He concludes that the situation in Salisbury on a busy Sunday summer day would 1
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require the use of fifty trained police officers to handle the situation and opines that the small number of ununiformed traffic guides assigned the task in SPMC cannot do the job adequately.
The Town of Amesbury (TOA) has filed the testimony of Police Chief Michael A. Cronin. His testimony relevant to JI 4
appears at pages 3-12 of that testimony wherein he makes the following allegations:
he and his officers did not cooperate in the drafting of the SPMC as it affects TOA; the drafters of SPMC did not properly take into account the heavy influx of transients that occurs during certain summer and I
holiday periods in TOA; the diagrams of certain specific TOA TCPs contain errors; the designs of TCPs in SPMC, in general, are not good; there is a need for traffic guides (and presumably TCP diagrams) at an additional 20 intersections in TOA; it is wrong to use traffic cones, I as opposed to repositioned concrete barriers (which he says would also be useless without repositioned trained public safety officers to put them in place with a good deal of warning of an imminent radiological emergency) and, finally, the Seabrook Offsite Response Organization (ORO) does not have sufficient staffing to properly manage traffic.
The Town of West Newbury (TOWN) has filed a document entitled " Town of West Newbury's Direct Testimorly" which purports to set out what TOWN's Superintendent of Streets, I .,_
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Chairman of the Board of Selectmen and a Member of the Board of Selectmen "will testifv" to.12 The points made relevant to JI 4 appear at pages 3-12 of the document and are:
l l certain specified TCP diagrams are confusing or inadequate; certain TCPs are poorly designed for the purpose intended;
[ TCPs are needed at an additional eight intersections and at 1
three facility entrances; 35-40 additional traffic guides are needed; a lack of parking spaces for emergency personnel is i decried; the blocking of traffic by disabled or improperly parked vehicles is surmised; the existence of certain narrow j
roads is noted; and finally it is stated that if TOWN itself were to attempt to implement SPMC, it would not have the personnel necessary to do so.
i The Town of Newbury (TON) has filed direct testimony by the Chairman of its Board of Selectmen, Angelo Machiros, and its Chief of Police, Roger Merry. The points made with respect to JI 4 appear at pages 4-13 of the prefiled testimony and are the following: there are large traffic jams on sunny summer days on Plum Island and 6-10 traffic guides would be necessary to control the situation on the Plum Island Turnpike in the event of an evacuation, as 12 We leave to another filing what should be done inasmuch as in its present form the document is not prefiled testimony, but rather a lawyer's description as to what presumably will be late filed in the future without prior leave sought.
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't opposed to the one traffic guide called for in SPMC, therefore, SPMC would result in an evacuation of Plum Island that was no more rapid or efficient than an uncontrolled evacuation; there are errors in the diagrams of certain specified TCPs; and there are an additional 13 TCPs needed in addition to those now called in TON by SPMC.
The City of Newburyport (CON) has submitted a piece of prefiled testimony bearing upon JI 4. The testimony is by City Marshalll3 Francis E. O'Connor.
Mr. O'Connor makes the following allegations: CON's police department did not participate in the drafting of SPMC; he opines that the use of wooden barriers repositioned in the field would be a preferable traffic control device to cones; he criticizes various TCP diagrams and designs; he opines that there should be a traffic guide at all intersections involving a major thoroughfare in CON; he points to a certain conglomeration of schools and a hospital which would be extremely difficult to I, reach in congested traffic; he states that CON does not have the police resources itself to execute SPMC and concludes that an evacuation carried out pursuant to SPMC would be the equivalent of, and no better than, an uncontrolled evacuation.
i 13 This position is the equivalent of the more familiar term " Police Chief."
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Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: The Applicants have
) prefiled testimony addressing JI 4 which is contained in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 9.14 The testimony begins by describing the process that was utilized in selecting and designing the TCPs and ACPs. Next, it is explained that while it would be possible to have additional TCPs which would, in fact, expedite local traffic flows slightly, this would be of little benefit because downstream choke points which are manned are the controlling factors with respect to evacuation times. The testimony points out, with respect to TOA ', that all help sought in the selection and design of TCPs was refused by TOA and its officials. It is pointed out that, despite the prefiled testimony of TOA, TOA does have an emergency plan for the town; this plan has only two TCPs and both of them are, in fact, included in SPMC. It is noted that, while traffic guides are shown in specific locations on 14
, The testimony prefiled by the Applicants in this phase of the proceeding is all labelled " rebuttal" testimony and its numbering sequence begins with the number 6. This is because Applicants' Rebuttal i Testimony Nos. 1-5 were filed and received in the NHRERP phase of the case and we wish to avoid g confusion in the record by having two pieces of
" rebuttal" with the same number. Also, it should 5 be understood that the filing of any testimony by the Applicants in this phase of the hearing is not a pledge actually to offer the testimony. If the I Opponents have not rebutted the presumptions applicable at the close of their cross-examination g of FEMA and their own direct cases, the Applicants 3
may testimony.
elect not to offer all or any of their prefiled I 5
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the diagrams, these locations are not static and the Traffic Guides are free to move around the TCP as conditions may necessitate.
It is also acknowledged that the Applicants stand ready to make any changes shown to be necessary to the diagrams if the opposition will simply point the need out instead of continuing their "gotcha" attitude.
The Applicants' testimony goes on to explain why the choice of cones was made over barricades and why the Applicants believe the choice to be a correct one in light of the portability, size and reflectorization of the cones.
Next, the crocess of mobilizing the Traffic Guides is explained, in particular pointing out that the manning sequence assures the manning of the critical TCPs before evacuation commences except in the extremely unlikely event of a very early release. The Traffic Guides' procedures a.e next explained and the reasons given for why the Applicants believe they are appropriate, and it is pointed out that the exercise objectives relevant to these procedures were met during the June 1988 exercise.
Finally, the testimony addresses a desirable change to be made in a specific TCP in TOA.
Applicable Legal Principles:
- 1. This Board has previously found:
" Traffic control posts are designed to perform a number of rather obvious functions: (1) facilitate evacuating I
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I traffic movements which serve to expedite travel out of the EPZ along the planned evacuation routes; (2) discourage traffic movements which permit evacuating vehicles to travel in a direction which takes them significantly closer to the power station; and (3) resolve potential ;
i conflicts between traffic streams at intersections by assigning right-of-way so as to promote safe operations and to keep traffic moving." EID at i 9.65.
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This Board has also previously concluded that 3
" Unstable or aberrant driver benavior is not expected to be a significant factor in the event of an emergency at Seabrook" l and "there is no aspect of human behavior in the population
) of the Seabrook EPZ which will prevent an adequate emergency response in the event of a radiological emergency at i Seabrook,"
EID 11 7.89, 7.96 (subparagraph 9 at p. 174).
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"There are accidents that could progress to the
) j general emergency stage before the EOC or staging areas could be activated, and that would allow inadequate time to go through LILCO's planned mobilization process before !
) evacuation began.
The Board can find no defect in planning, however, since complete and timely mobilization under those I
conditions is simply impossible. The consequences of a failure to mobilize LERO before evacuation begins are relatively small because an evacuation unaided by LILCO
) traffic guides could still be accomplished although it would l
take more time than the controlled evacuation." Lona Island )
Liohtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
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) 85-12, 21 NRC 644, 724 (1985). Additionally, as this Board has concluded on this same issue: "the staffing problem i arises from a postulated rapidly developing accident at the very end of the spectrum of accidents within the UUREG-0654 planning basis" and "[t] hat particular accident sequence need not be isolated from all others for emergency traffic management purposes." EID 1 9.87. Further, this Board has recognized that " evacuation would be implemented on a municipality-by-municipality basis" and "an evacuation of l i
only a portion of the EPZ, even in a fast-breaking accident,
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will ameliorate or eliminate the problem of limited police I mobilization". Id.
JI Contention No. 5 The Contention: "The method utilized by the SPMC for surveillance end removal of road blockages is not adequate to ensure that road blockages will be identified and removed promptly enough and the communications procedures for dispatching tow vehicles once blockages have been spotted are too cunbersome and ineffective."
Basis A. [ MAG 73D]
The method utilized by the SPMC for surveillance for road blockages is not adequate to ensure that road blockages will be identified promptly enough to dispatch tow trucks to remove them in a timely fashion. Route Guides assigned to
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buses are to " report any obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments by radio." Pro. 2.10, Attachment 3. Route Guides for the hearing impaired are to report " obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments to traffic flow." Pro.
I 2.11, Attachments 3. Also, Traffic Guides are to report "if traffic is blocked or if there is no evacuating traffic."
I App. J, p. J-3. Route Guides in buses, however, will not arrive for many hours into an evacuation, and when they do arrive their routes do not take them along all the key evacuation links. Indeed, bus routes seek to avoid the most I heavily traveled evacuation routes. So Route Guides in buses will not provide an effective means of surveillance for road blockages. Route Guides for the hearing impaired, similarly, I will likely avoid travel along major evacuation links, and they are not out in sufficient numbers nor throughout the full duration of an emergency. Stationary Traffic Guides are even less effective. Most of the many miles of key I evacuation roads will not be visible to them, especially at night.
B. [ MAG 73E]
The communications procedures for dispatching tow vehicles from the " transfer points" once road blockages have I been spotted by Route Guides or Traffic Guides is too cumbersome response.
to provide reasonable assurance of a timely Route Guides for the hearing impaired report I' blockages to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. Pro. 2.11, Attachment 3. Route Guides in buses going to schools and special facilities report blockages to the Staging Area I Leader, but Route Guides in buses assigned to " transfer points" report blockages to the Transfer Point Dispatcher.
Pro. 2.10, Attachment 3. Traffic Guides report blockages to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. App. J, p. J-3. Thus, I three separate ORO personnel receive reports of road blockages. Only the Transfer Point Dispatcher, however, is authorized to dispatch tow trucks to an impediment. Pro.
I 2.10, Attachment 8. Thus, unnecessary communication is generated which impairs an efficient dispatch of tow trucks.
C. [ TOWN 8,2]
The plan fails to identify an adequate means of dealing I
I with disabled vehicles or those which are inoperable due to fuel exhaustion or accidents. It simply provides for tow facilities at some unidentified site in Groveland with access to Route 113.
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The SPMC fails to adequately identify how impediments to i
the use of evacuation routes will realistically be corrected or addressed.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion J.10.k at p. 67.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: In his trial brief MAG says that the interveners have no witnesses on this contention except the hearsay testimony of two MAG investigators as to a survey they did of the availability of tow trucks.15 This testimony states that there is in place a l
letter of agreement (LOA) for 15 tow trucks and 22 drivers with Coady Towing Service. MAG says that he will try to make his case on this contention through the cross-examination of FEMA's and Applicants' witnesses.16 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: The Applicants' prefiled testiraony with respect to JI 5 appears in Applicants' Rebuttal No. 9. Therein the following topics are addrcssed. Two tow trucks are assigned to each community in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ. Travel time studies have been made to learn the likely travel time between the various transfer points since they represent most likely 15 Testimony of Maureen Mangan and John Paolillo (M&P) at 38-39.
16 MAG Trial Brief at 7.
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distances to impediments to be traveled by the tow trucks.
Statistics indicate that only four or five accidents can be expected to occur during an evacuation in the Massachusetts {
,I portion of the EPZ, and not all of those would be disabling in nature. Sensitivity runs have been made with the IDYNEV traffic model which show that the evacuation time is relatively insensitive to a total of as many as ten random accidents. The tentimony describes how impediments will be located and information concerning them transmitted. The June Exercise demonstrated the ability of the ORO to deal with accidents. Finally, there is a discussion of the topics of the Gillis and B&M Bridges as possible impediments.
Applicable Legal Principles:
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" Members of the public, without specific direction, would remove impediments to evacuation and other such tasks."
PlD 1 7.96 (subparagraph 7 at p. 173).
B.
EVACUATION PROCESS - TRANSIT DEPENDENT E
JI Contention No. 7 i The Contention: "No adequate planning has been done g for the transit dependent population W because the bus routes proposed for Newbury, Newburyport, [and] West Newbury will not expedite the evacuation of this population.
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The SPMC, Appendix D-5, relies on the Seabrook Station Evacuation Time of evacuation routes. Estimate Study in projecting the capability at critical intersections,The to time a studyextent, large recognizes that control determines the )
capacity of a roadway (Time Study, 3-1). 'The SPMC provides l for the control of one intersection on Plum Island, i.e.,
Plum Island Turnpike and Sunset Drive. A second major )l I
intersection, is uncontrolled.Plum Island Boulevard and Northern Boulevard, Plum Island would converge at the second intersection andApproximate ;
would timely result in a.significant bottleneck and impediment to evacuation.
i The SPMC accordingly does not provide a reasonable assurance that' adequate protective measures regarding relocating and traffic capabilities exist.
! D. [ TON 1.d]
- 1. Appendix J, p. N-6 depicts Newbury Bus Route #1.
That route provides for buses to travel onto Plum Island via the Plum Island Turnpike and then turn left . s. orth) on Old Point Road. Following that road to its end, the bus is then to turn 360 degrees and return via Old Point Road,
- a. Old Point Road is narrow. It actually is approximately shoulders. 1-1/2 lanes in width with narrow or no The SPMC unrealistically assumes that outflowing traffic will not impede the ingress of vehicles into the evacuation zone.
At the terminus of Old Point Road there is insufficient in the route map.room for the bus to turn around as is provided 3.
The SPMC calls for the bus to turn right (east) from Northern Boulevard onto 58th Street, follow that street to its end, turn left (north) follow that road to its end.onto There, Reservation Terrace the bus and is to turn around and follow these same roads back to Northern Boulevard.
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The SPMC provides that the bus, upon returning to Northern Blvd. Will turn right (north) and follow that road to its end, turn around and reverse its course back to Plum i
Island Turnpike / Boulevard and off Plum Island.
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The SPMC fails to provide for bus evacuation of any portion of Plum Island south of Plum Island Turnpike and / Boulevard dwellings south despite of that the location of numerous streets street. The SPMC wholly fails to provide for the evacuation of those residents or transients i I
without transportation on that portion of Plum Island.
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that roadOnce the bus to Rolfe's Laneis on Plum Island Turnpike, it follows (aka Ocean Ave.) where it turns left (southeasterly).
one has traveled about 3/4 mile.Rolfe's Lane intersects Route 1A when b.
j the option of turning leftWhile traffic on Rolfe's Lane apparently has (south) onto Route 1A or of proceeding straight to Hanover Street, the SPMC fails to provide most any information drivers as to which route will be chosen by or what criteria, consider in making that choice. if any, the drivers should Drivers familiar with the area will probably proceed straight to Hanover Street as that
) road provides brings relatively one closer to I-95.straight access to Route 1 and c.
Parker Street and Green StreetAt the three-way intersection of Route 1A, Newburyport), traffic is discour(providing aged fromegress turning from right onto Parker Street from Route 1A. One traffic guide is located in that area but is sited at Route 1A and Green Street, apparently to encourage drivers to turn onto Green Street instead of continuing south on Route 1A. Thus, no guide will l
discourage Parker Street. drivers from turning right from Route 1A onto d.
At the intersection of Rolfe's Lane, Green Street and Hanover Street (Appendix J., p. N-4), traffic from ,
three directions will merge and flow onto Hanover Street. {
One traffic guide is located at that intersection. As this
)
intersection will be handling evacuation traffic from Plum Island and Newburyport, guide will be able to adequatelyit is unrealistic directto assume the traffic flowthat andone j
ensure that opposite travel for emergency vehicles will be possible.
Moreover, the merging of these traffic flows will create a significant cessation of travel speed. bottleneck and vast reductions in or the
)
6.
cross Route 1, Once on Hanover Street, the evacuation bus is to travel onto Middle Street, turn right onto
) Highfield point. Road and end the route at the Newbury transfer I
i I
- a. At the intersection of Hanover Street and Route I 1, cones are placed so as to discourage travel in any direction except south on Route 1. The SPMC, if followed, would require the cones to be temporarily moved or for the bus to drive over them. The bus also will have to cross I sotthbound traffic on Route 1. Route 1 is a major southbound evacuation route and the SPMC fails to address the problem I the Route 1 southbound drivers who will not permit the bus to cross, an eventuality patently possible in the event of an emergency evacuation. If the bus does somehow cross Route 1, it is likely that automobiles will follow it as their drivers I may realistically conclude that the bus is following a preferred or less congested route.
I visible.
- b. Highfield Road is unmarked and not readily
- c. It is likely that vehicles exiting Newburyport I on Scotland Road will, due to traffic congestion, turn onto Highfield Road in the opposite direction to that taken by the evacuation buses in order to gain access to Route 1 south.
I Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width and drivers attempting to gain access to Route 1 will render opposing travel impossible.
- d. The transfer point is a narrow (approximately 15' wide) driveway which leads from Highfield Road to a Massachusetts Electric transformer which is in a fenced !
i enclosure at the end of the approximately 100' drive. No I area is provided for buses to be able to turn around or for vehicles to park. The area around the transfer point is I heavily wooded and overgrown with brush. No area is available for use of those evacuees who are dropped off at the transfer point.
E. [ TON 1.e]
- 1. Newbury Bus Route #2 (Appendix J, p. N-7) commences I at the Highfield Road transfer point and follows that road to Middle Road where the driver turns left (north). The bus then follows Middle Road to Route 1 where it turns right (south). The bus follows Route 1 to Elm Street where the driver is to turn righ,t (westerly).
- a. The SPMC is defective in that the intersection I of Route 1 and Elm Street is marked by no sign indicating the name of latter street. A driver unfamiliar with the area will be unable to identify the road he/she is expected to
!I follow when exiting Route 1.
l
.I i
2.
The bus continues on Elm Street until it reaches School Street where it turns right (northwest). School Street is followed to what is depicted on the SPMC as Orchard Street where the bus turns left (south). The route follows ',
Orchard Elm. StreetStreet to Elm intersects Street again withwhere Schoolit Street turns left (east) where until the bus turns left (northwesterly). The route again follows School Street to what appears on the SPMC to be Orchard Street where the bus turns right (northerly).
- a. The intersection of School Street and Elm Street is unmarked by any signs identifying either road for i
drivers traveling in any direction. The SPMC thus fails to provide a reasonable assurance that the bus driver will be able to correctly follow Route #2.
- b. No signs identify Orchard Street where the bus is to turn left (south) from School Street. Indeed, what i
appears to be Orchard Street at that intersection in fact is Central Street. The SPMC fails to demonstrate that the driver will correctly follow Route #2.
- c. Central Street is narrow, approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. The SPMC fails to provide an adequate assurance that this portion of Route #2 will remain passable in the event of opposing traffic.
3.
After the bus turns from School Street onto what is correctly Central Street, it follows that latter road north
' to Orchard Street where it turns right (northeast). Orchard '
Street is taken to Boston Road where the route turns right (east). The route follows Boston Road across Route 1 to Green Street where it turns left (northerly).
- b. Boston Road intersects with Route 1, a major '
southbound evacuation route from the entire EPZ south of l
) Seabrook Station. Route 1 will thus be heavily congested.
The SPMC calls for no traffic control points at that intersection and it is unlikely that the bus will be able to
) cross Route 1, particularly in light of the fact that two lanes of southbound traffic will be encouraged only one mile, more or less, north of that intersection.
- c. The map of Route #2 (Appendix 7, p. N-7) indicates that Boston Road intersects at a right angle an j unidentified road about 1/4 mile east of Route 1 but that the !
route continues straight on Boston Road. In actuality, that intersection is a "Y" intersection, or fork in the road, with
} I o
Boston Road bearing to the left and the other road bearing to the right.
Road.
No sign identifies which of the roads is Boston The SPMC lacks reasonable assurance that the bus drivers will be able to accurately follow Route #2 at this intersection.
- d. Boston Road, particularly after the fork, is about 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. Persons familiar with Newbury can be expected to evacuate the EPZ to the south via Boston Road to Route 1, especially if travel on Hanover Street (see Newbury Bus Route #1, App. J, p. N-6) becomes congested. This portion of Route #2 will accordingly become impassable for northeast bound traffic.
e.
The intersection of Boston Road and Green Street is unmarked. Bus drivers thus will be unable to follow Route #2 in the absence of route guides and/or directional signs.
4.
The bus is to follow Green Street to Hanover Street where evacuation Route #2 merges with traffic evacuating Newburyport and Plum Island via Hanover Street to Route 1 (see Traffic Control Post No. E-NB-02, Appendix J, p. N-4).
a.
Green Street (southbound) will in all i likelihood be recognized by drivers as an alternative route to Route 1 or Route 1A, both of which are major southbound routes. As Green Street is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width, southbound traffic will render travel to the north on that street impossible.
- b. Green Street, as well as other roads on all Newbury impassable.
bus routes, is subject to flooding and becoming The SPMC makes no provision for such an eventuality.
)
- 5. After merging with Hanover Street evacuation traffic, point.
the bus follows Newbury Bus Route 1 to the transfer j The bases for the preceding contention regarding the adequacy of this portion of the route are incorporated herein by reference.
F. [ TON 1.f]
- 1. Newbury Bus Route #3 (Appendix J, p. N-8) commences h at the Highfield Road transfer point where the bus turns right (southeast) from the transfer point driveway onto Highfield Road. The inadequacies of the transfer point set forth suora are incorporated herein by reference. The bus
)
l I
follows Highfield Road to Middle Road which it follows south until turning left (east) onto Boston Road. Bus Route #3 indicates that the bus (southeasterly) onto Hay then makes a 90 degree turn right Street.
- a. The inadequacy of Boston Road for eastbound traffic noted suora is incorporated herein by reference, b.
is not a right angle as RouteThe intersection of Boston Road and Hay Street
- 3 depicts.
"Y" Rather, it is a I intersection or fork which will cause the driver, if unfamiliar with the area, to become disoriented or lost.
I c.
traveling northeast Hay on Street is inadequately Boston Road. marked for vehicles d.
I has no shoulders. Hay Street is about 1-1/2 lanes in width and Opposing traffic to Route 1 via Boston Road, which is called for in Newbury Bus Route #3, will render travel in both directions impossible.
e.
Portions of Hay Street are within a flood plain and are subject to flooding, but the SPMC identifies no means I of dealing with the impassability of Hay Street due to flood waters.
t 2.
onto Newman From Hay Road. Street, the route turns right (easterly)
The route follows that road to Route 1A where the bus is to merge with southbound evacuees, cross Parker River and turn right (southeasterly) onto Old Rowley Road.
a.
Newman Road is not identified by any sign.
b.
Newman Road is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width, has no shoulders and crosses about 1/2 mile of marsh.
Opposing traffic will render southeasterly travel impossible.
c.
Newman Road is extremely low and, for approximately 1/2 mile, is within a flood plain area. The road is subject to flooding and becoming impassable.
d.
< g No intersection control is provided by the SPMC to enable the bus to merge onto Route 1A southbound. As that g
road is one of few southerly evacuation routes, it will be necessary to provide some form of control if the bus will realistically be able to join the Route 1A traffic.
I E
1 1
\
e.
no shoulders. Old Rowley Road is 1-1/2 lanes in width and has It is unpaved, crosses a flood plain area and is subject to flooding and becoming impassable due to flood waters.
3.
The bus continues on old Rowley Road to its I intersection with Route 1A. There the bus is to turn left (north) left and follow Route 1A to Hay Street where it is to turn (west). I I a.
To travel north on Route 1A from Old Rowley Road will require southbound evacuees on Route 1A to permit the bus to gain access to a northbound lane. Yet no traffic I control or route guide is provided at that intersection.
is thus unlikely that access to a northbound lane will be achieved.
It
- d. Hay Street is inadequately marked.
4.
The bus, after turning onto Hay Street, travels I southerly past the intersection with Newman Road. Hay Street then curves to the right (easterly then northeasterly) until it(southeasterly).
intersects Boston Road where the route turns left
- a. Before arriving at its intersection with Newman Road, i area. Hay Street is very low and, indeed, is in a flood plain impassable. Hay Street is subject to flooding and becoming b.
I After passing Newman Road, evacuation buses on Hay Street will be traveling in opposite directions. The road is of insufficient width to readily permit two-way bus traffic.
5.
After turning onto Boston Road, Newbury Bus Route 73 I crosses to turn right Highfield Route(north),
1 and continues to Middle following Roadroad that latter where Road and, from there, gaining access to the tothe bus is transfer point.
- a. The impracticability of crossing Route 1, noted suora, as is incorporated herein by reference.
b.
Highfield Road is marked by no sign and drivers will likely miss the turn onto this portion of the route.
I I
l G. [ TON 1.g]
- 1. Newbury Bus Route #4 (Appendix J, p. N-9) commences at the Highfield transfer point and turns left onto Highfield Road. The bus then turns left (southwesterly) onto Scotland Road and follows that road for approximately four miles to Moody Street where the route turns left (southeast). >
Scotland Road, before reaching Moody Street is renamed South Street after passing I95 and again renamed Spring Hill Road about one mile further on. i
- a. In the likely event that traffic is congested on Scotland Road, drivers will realistically attempt to use Highfield Road to gain access to alternate southbound evacuation routes. As Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width with no shoulders, cars traveling to those alternate routes via Highfield Road will render travel from the
, transfer point to Scotland Road difficult or impossible.
- b. Moreover, vehicles on I95 will likely exit onto South Street if the former is congested while the latter is lightly traveled.
Yet no traffic control at the intersection ;
(I95 and Scotland Road / South Street) exists.
- c. The turn the bus driver is to make from Spring Hill to the left (southeast) onto Moody Street is poorly ,
marked and would easily be missed. Indeed, South Street {
intersects Main Street before intersecting Moody Street and it is likely that incorrect turns onto Main Street will be made as the roads are inadequately marked.
- 2. From Moody Street, the route turns left (east) onto i what appears on the Route #4 map to be Lunt Street which l
' takes the bus to the left (east) to Church Street. There, the route turns right (southeasterly) and crosses I95 where {
it is renamed Central Street. The route turns left (northeast) onto Orchard Street approximately one mile after crossing 195.
- a. These series of turns are poorly marked and it is likely that drivers will become disoriented or lost in this area.
- b. Vehicles traveling south on I95 will likely
) exit to Church Street / Central Street in the likely event of congestion on I95 snd travel west, thereby impeding eastbound travel.
l l
1 c.
The turn onto Orchard Street is unmarked. 4 3.
Orchard Street is renamed Middle Road approximately two miles northeast of Central Street. The route follows Middle Road past Highfield Road and across Route 1 where it becomes Hanover Street. Hanover Street is followed to Green Street where the route turns left (north).
- b. Buses will likely not be able to cross Route 1 without route.
control of evacuees utilizing that major southbound 4.
Evacuation Poute #4 follows Green Street to Parker Street where it turns left (westerly), crosses State Street in the City of Newburyport and continues east to cross Route l
- 1. After crossing Route 1 in Newburyport, the bus route turns left (southerly) at the intersection of Graf Road. The !
route follows that road to Highfield Street and the Newbury transfer point.
i b. Left (easterly) turns from Green Street to Parker Street are discouraged (see Traffic Control Post No.
E-NB-02, Appendix J, p. N-4). The bus driver would thus be required to disregard traffic cones located at the turn or be obstructed by inbound traffic on Parker Street.
- c. It is unrealistic to expect that evacuation buses will be permitted by traffic flows to cross State Street and Route 1 in Newburyport as provided by the bus route. State Street will be congested and Route 1 will j i
contain heavy numbers of southbound evacuees. To cross Route 1,
the bus will need to cross two northbound and two southbound lanes. Inadequate traffic control exists at these I l crossings.
- d. Congestion of Route 1 will result in evacuees turning from that road onto Parker Street and the eventual
- congestion of traffic there. The bus route will thus likely be impassable.
e.
) Graf Road / Scotland Road will in all likelihood be jammed with evacuees attempting to gain access to 195.
Timely unlikely.
travel on this portion of the bus route is accordingly
- f. Entry onto Highfield Road from Scotland Road will be impeded or blocked by evacuees and buses attempting to reach 195 via Scotland Road from Plum Island, Newbury and Newburyport.
1 l
l l
H. [ TON 1.h] I Appendix J.,
- p. N-10, route.
a proposed bus evacuation of the SPMC includes a map showing !
The route depicted in that map includes Downfall Road as one of the streets the !
evacuation bus is to travel upon. Downfall Road is a " paper" !
> street only and, in actuality, is nonexistent and impassable.
I. [ TON 1.i]
Many of the roads, e.g. Boston Road, Hay Street, Old Rowley Road, constituting bus routes and potential evacuation routes lie in whole or in part within flood plain areas and i' are subject to periodic flooding. The SPMC fails to provide a reasonable assurance that these routes will be passable during flooding periods. The SPMC fails to identify alternate bus routes in identified become impassablethe event duethat those which have been to flooding, seasonable impediments. other
- J. [ TOWN 7.2A, B, D)
Appendix J, Amendment 2, the prior version now replaced by the applicant, did contain the town map, sketch maps and bus evacuation routes described above. That version was also inadequate to comply with the planning standards or to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event evacuation is necessary for the following reasons:
- 1. Appendix J, Amendment 2, p.WN 9-11 consisted of evacuation bus routes in West Newbury. There are no street signs at a number of the intersections at which bus drivers were required to turn in order to follow the routes. Parts of River Road (Route #1) are subject to flooding, rendering segments A of the part of Ash road impassable at certain times of the year.
Street (Route #2) is a dirt road which is regularly underwater during portions of the year and is closed to traffic during portions of the year.
2.
The transfer site for the bus routes, located at Stewart Street, is inadequate. It consists of a 26 foot by 29 foot paved area which is inadequate for a bus turn around.
)
Nor is there any area for people to congregate in the area j while parking.
awaiting transfer or for emergency personnel vehicle There are no sidewalks in that area of Stewart !
Street, and the sides of the road fall off inco gullies which !
l
I I are often wet.
There was no provision.for traffic guidos to assist and facilitate bus movement at the transfer site.
- 3. Appendix J, Amendment 2, I p.WN-3-8 consisted of sketch maps of traffic control points in West Newbury. The control point at Crane Neck Street and Georgetown Road provided for traffic cones blocking the turn north on to I Georgetown Road -- a turn used on prior bus route #2. The control point at Church Street and Main Street provided for ,
cones blocking a turn used the turn on prior busfrom routeMain
- 1. Street to Church Street --
l< .
[ TOWN 8.1)
Parts of various streets in West Newbury are subject to flooding and may be closed during part of the year. The plan I does not adequately address the seasonable impassability of the roads as required by NUREG-0654 J.10.k or provide a reasonable assurance that adequate means exist to deal with seasonal impassability of roads due to flooding. Nor does it I identify contingency measures to deal with such impediments.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-GS.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: TOWN has indicated that its Superintendent of Streets "will testify"17 that there are no street signs at certain intersections on the bus routes; others are not easily read; certain streets on the bus routes I
are subject to flooding and/or blockage during a snowstorm; that the bus transfer point is in a bad location, is too small, and is subject to being inaccessible in a snowstorm; certain streets are subject to blockage during snowstorms; and, finally, he states that delays in the bus runs may result from the inadequacies previously detailed in the 17 See n. 12, suora, and accompanying text.
I I
B B
TCPc.18 I TON has filed direct testimony which sets out various difficulties alleged to infect the four bus routes in the SPMC for TON. These include alleged congestion, l misplacement of traffic cones, a lack of an alternative route '
if there is the reoccurrence of a washout on one route which t
apparently has occurred some time in the past, an alleged inability of buses to cross Route 1, and the requiring of difficult maneuvers. It is also alleged that the transfer point is inadequate in size and lacks shelter. Finally, it is stated that one of the evacuation routes includes a nonextant road.19 TON has submitted a piece of direct l
testimony on JI 7 by CON's Director of Planning and Development, E. James Gaines.
Mr Gaines' testimony criticizes the selection of the Water Street transfer Point l in CON because it is located in a flood plain, too small in area; and certain contemplated construction projects will result in traffic congestion in the area through at least 1991. In addition, CON witness O'Connor has submitted profiled testimony which makes the following alleged criticisms of the bus plans: the routes only " skirt" the l large centers of the city's population, and the routes do not 18 TOWN Direct Testimony at 12-14.
19 All of the foregoing appears in TON's Direct Testimony at pp. 13-16. It is interesting that the entire testimony is some four double-spaced pages; the original contention was 12 sincle-spaced pages.
I I
"I i I
have sufficient TCPs. Like witness Gaines, witness O'Connor criticizes the transfer point. He says that it is too small, I end requires difficult turns by the buses.20 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: The Applicants address JI 7 in Applicants' Rebuttal No. 9. Therein, the following points are made:
the bus routes used were originally developed by the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (the criteria used are described); maps are being updated to assure uniformity. Transfer point operations are described.
In addition, the testimony sets forth how the number of runs was determined; the functions of the route guides; the Applicants rationale for assuming that the buses can I successfully cross evacuation traffic; the fact that the i
flood plain allegations involve areas which are in the 100 or 500 year flood plain; the manner for coping with local flooding; and, finally, a detailed response to the myriad of i bases for the contention.
Applicable Legal Principles:
- 1. "Any evacuation -- tornado, earthquake, hurricane or chemical hazard related -- may require evacuees to brave adverse weather conditions." P_ID 1 4.22.
2.
" Unstable or aberrant driver behavior is not expected to be a significant factor in the event of an 20 This testimony appears at pages 12-14 of the O'Connor testimony. j I
I
I I
emergency at Seabrook" and "there is no aspect of human behavior in the population of the Seabrook EPZ which will prevent an adequate emergency response in the event of a radiological emergency at 3eabrook," PJD 11 7.89, 7.96 (subparagraph 9 at p. 174).
C. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING JI Contention No. 9 The Contention: "No provision is made in the SPMC I for procedures to be employed in the event of a strike or other form of job action affecting the availability of the emergency I personnel relied on to adequately staff and maintain the NHY ORO. In the absence of such procedures, this I utility plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be I taken. See Lona Island Lichtina Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 21 NRC 644, 888 )
(1985). !
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion A.4 at p. 13.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: No direct testimony has been filed. MAG states that the case will be made by cross-examination of FEMA.21 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants have I addressed this contention in Applicants' Rebuttal No. 14.
21 MAG Trial Brief at 8.
, I I
Therein, an analysis is made showing that the percentage of ORO members who are unionized is only 11%; loss of all these persons due to job action would require the coincidental striking of three separate companies by 12 unions; strikes by separate companies are analyzed; the conclusion is that there are sufficient personnel to sustain the ORO in each case. In addition, it is pointed out that the ORO commitment by each ORO member is a commitment made separate and apart from his ;
or her employment as such. Thus, there is no basis for assuming that a striker would not honor his or her ORO commitment in the event of an emergency. 1 Applicable Legal Principles: At least as of this juncture union contracts governing employment do not govern the relationship of individuals with ORO. l I
q 4
JI Contentions Nos. 11 and 12 i
(These contentions are treated together because they overlap and are treated in a single piece of testimony by MAG)
Contention JI 11: "The SPMC fails to provide for the adequate or continuous staffing of ORO personnel to maintain or sustain an emergency response. For these
! reasons, the SPMC fails to meet the l standards set forth at 50.47(b) (1) ,
(2), and (5), and the regulatory
)
guidance established by NUREG 0654 II. A.1.e.4., B, and E.2.
I l
[. '
LI I Basis A. [ MAG 77A]
The SPMC does not provide for the capability of I continuous operations for a protracted period of time.
Personnel are required to report to staging areas at a Site
{
l Area Emergency; however, the SPMC fails to specify the number of personnel in each response category who are required to report on first shift, fails to identify adequate mechanisms i
l for providing second shifts and backup personnel, fails to I identify mechanisms for instructing contract personnel as to I which shift they should report for, and fails to provide assurance of continuity of personnel from the contracted companies.
k
{
B. [ MAG 77B]
The NHY Offsite Emergency Response organization fails to I provide adequate staffing for evacuation specific positions.
The SPMC states " evacuation specific positions will have one compliment only with additional personnel I available as backup as noted on Figure 2.1-1."(at least Plan 2.1.1.
20%)
Plan 2.2.1.
The justification for only providing a single shift for these positions is stated as "If an evacuation is I required, the functions will be performed over a relatively short period of time as opposed to the entire emergency situation which may last for a protracted period." The j
l I justification is flawed in that implementing procedures require these positions to be staffed at the Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations.
The time between call out of
{
)
}
j personnel and deployment to execute evacuation support duties I may be many hours or even days. Since these positions must be available to execute protective actions at any time from l
I declaration of an Alert to termination of the emergency I situation, alternate shifts must be available to provide evacuation support capability during an " emergency situation which may last for a protracted period."
{
)
D. (MAG 77D)
The ORO staffing lists in Appendix H indicate that there I are fewer staff available for some positions than will be reasonably necessary on a 24-hour basis during protracted emergency, especially for such positions as Route Guides, I Traffic Guides, Dosimetry Record Keeping, Reception Center Staff and Reception Center Monitoring / Decontamination.
I I
I g ,
Contention JI 12:
"There is no reasonable assurance that there will be adequate second shift manpower capability for I certain evacuation-specific positions. Therefore, the SPMC fails to comply with 10 CFR I 50.47(a), 50. 47 (b) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (15) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.4. and II.O.
Basis A. [ MAG 78A)
Given the length of time that it could reasonably take to evacuate the general population, special facilities, I hospitals, schools, day care / nurseries, and the transit-depend / mobility-impaired population, there is no reasonable assurance that an evacuation can be completed within one shift.
The SPMC, App. H provides the names of no second I' shift personnel for the NHY ORO for the evacuation-specific positions of Traffic Guides, Monitoring / Decontamination j Personnel and Reception Center Staff. Instead the plans I asserts that NHY ORO will request second-shift manpower assistance from Yankee mutual assistance plan. Atomic Electric Company pursuant to a I
Plan, 5 3.2.2, p. 3.2-9. There is I no reasonable assurance, however, that durina a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station which is serious enough to warrant a second shift for these evacuation-specific I positions, enough volunteers can be recruited by Yankee Atomic to fill all such positions. This is not to be confused with role abandonment, because these workers did not previously have assigned emergency roles to fulfill.
I- simply will not volunteer in sufficient numbers or in aThey timely fashion during a radiological emergency.
B. (MAG 78B) who There do is no show up assurance for that the second-shift Yankee duty will Atomic have volunteers received I adequate training.
There is no indication in the SPMC that these workers will have received job-specific pre-emergency training.
The SPMC merely instructs the first-shift I evacuation-specific workers to give the second-shift volunteers e.g.,
a " thorough briefing" upon their arrival. See, App. J, p. J-3 (Traffic Guide Procedures). Such on- !
I the-job training during an emergency, offered by first-shift workers who want to minimize dose consequences by getting out j l
i I 1 l
)
I I
I' of the EPZ as quickly as possible, is very likely to be inadequate. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that these second-shift workers will have the capability of performing their assigned tasks in the proper manner.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion A.2.a at pp. 10-11 and Criterion A.4 at p. 13.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG has prefiled the testimony of Geary W. Sikich ("Sikich-3")22 with respect to these contentions. Therein, Mr. Sikich devotes himself exclusively to the concept of having only one shift of evacuation specific personnel. It is his position that the concept itself is bad, and that, in particular, what he calls "on-the-job" training for replacement personnel is not workable.
He criticizes the use of Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) personnel as a back-up in the unlikely event that the evacuation specific positions do have to be staffed with a replacement shift. In particular, he addresses perceived difficulties with respect to back-up personnel for the positions of traffic guide, monitoring and decontami-nation personnel, and dosimetry readers.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: The Applicants' prefiled testimony which addresses JI 11 and JI 12 is I 22 Testimony of Geary W. Sikich on Behalf of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding the I Adequacy of Second-Shift Staffing for certain Evacuation Specific Positions (JI 11 and JI 12).
I I
I I
Applicants' Rebuttal No. 10. Herein, it is pointed out that in the event of an extended emergency situation, there will be substantial resources beyond the ORO available, including the resources of The Commonwealth. The testimony goes on to describe personnel categories, the concepts of shift and complement, the fact that primary response personnel positions are staffed with enough persons to cover two full shifts plus backup personnel beyond that number. Next, the five " evacuation specific" positions are described and it is pointed out that each of these positions is staffed at 120%
of need. The testimony next addresses the situation where there is a substantial period of time between the declaration of a site area emergency (when most evacuation specific personnel are called out) and the order to evacuate. This discussion includes descriptions of how the YAEC personnel are mobilized and the fact that YAEC personnel who will engage in dosimetry reading and monitoring / decontamination are already technically qualified. Next, it is pointed out that the reserve personnel are placed on standby when five hours have passed since the initial response. The procedures for each position are explained. It is pointed out that it is expected that personnel will stand by their posts until properly relieved by a person who has been trained. Finally, the point is made that a shift turnover was exercised successfully in the June exercise.
I I _
1 I i I i Applicable Legal Principles: " Emergency workers, as a group will not abandon their roles in a radiological emergency." ELQ 1 7. 96 (subparagraph 3).
JI Contention No. 15 l
The Contention: "ORO emergency workers will be
' 3E liable for damages resulting from their actions and the SPMC does not l
discuss at all what if any, provisions or agreem,ents for indemnification exist. As a result, the emergency response by ORO I workers is unpredictable.
although state emergency workers are indemnified by the Commonwealth Moreover, I pursaant to statute, the SPMC is silent on the relationship, if any, between authorization of police powers and indemnification for ORO workers."
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion A.2.a at pp. 10-11; Criterion A.2.b at p. 11.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG has stated in his trial brief that he will rely on cross-examination of FEMA personnel to establish his case.
It is to be noted that under prior rulings of this Board MAG had the burden of going forward with evidence separate and apart from the order entered scheduling the filing of testimony.23 I
23 Memorandum and Order (Admitting SPMC Contentions)--
I at 107.
I j
i
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Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants' prefiled testimony with respect to this contention appears in Applicants' Rebuttal No. 15. This is testimony by Dr. Dennis S. Mileti.
Dr. Mileti describes the results of a study he and others conducted for DOE concerning, inter alia, how liability questions have influenced evacuation decisions in the past.
Dr. Mileti indicates that while there are i I documented cases where liability concerns influenced emergency response at the organizational level, there are no 1
known cases where such matters influenced the activities of i
individuals actually engaged in a response.
Applicable Legal Principles: Emergency workers as a I group stand by their posts and do not abandon a well-defined role in emergency situations. Elp at i 7.96 (subparagraph 3 at p. 172).
II l
D. PAR GENERATION The MAG Contentions
' (Contentions 17-19 in this subject matter category are treated together because they are so treated by MAG)
JI Contention No. 17 The Contention: "The SPMC fails to provide a range of protective actions for the public I within the Seabrook plume exposure EPZ. No choice of protective actions is set forth in the SPMC for large numbers of people. Thus, the SPMC does not meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654 II.J.9, 10.m. and does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate p protective measures can and will be
(
taken. 50. 47 (a) (1) .
Basis I A.
The SPMC does not provide an alternative to evacuation of the EPZ.
for the beach areas in the Massachusetts portions Evacuation alone does not constitute a range of protective measures.
Secondary mitigating measures including decontamination, are not protective "measu,res" or
" actions" under 50.47 (b) (10) . In fact, the Commission itself has identified " appropriate protective measures" as evacuation or sheltering . 10 C.F.R. 5 100.3(b).
B.
In the absence of sheltering for the transient beach populations, the SPMC does not provide adequate protective measures under 50.47(a) (1) because for all fast-paced serious accidents that produce offsite consequences in less time than the transient beach populations can effect an evacuation, those populations have no adequate protection from severe radiological deses. Substantial portions of the beach population are entrapped by the traffic congestion generated by an order to evacuate and cannot remove themselves from areas close-in to the plant for many hours.
JI Contention No. 18 The contention: "The SPMC does not establish or describe coherent decision criteria to be used by emergency decision-makers in formulating an appropriate PAR and otherwise fails to provide guidelines for the choice of protective actions consistent with federal policy. The SPMC's !
decision-making criteria for selecting a sheltering as opposed to ,
an evacuation PAR is inadequate and jnaccurate, and, therefore, fails to !
meet the planning standards set j forth at 50.47(b) (10) and NUREG 0654 II.J.10.m. and Appendix E, IV, A.4.
As a result, the SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and l
a j
wf11 be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. !
- 50. 47 (a) (1) .
A. [ MAG 27A]
There is no study presented in the SPMC setting forth I the time required for effecting a sheltering PAR for various sectors of the plume exposure EPZ and for various populations in the EPZ as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Part IV. The effectiveness of sheltering as a dose reduction I strategy is significantly influenced by the time required to implement a sheltering response. (S._ea e D. Aldrich, D.
Ericson, Jr. and J. Johnson, Public Protection Stratecies for I P_otential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Shelterina Conceots with Existina Public and Private Structures, SAND 77-1725, Feb. 1978, at 13). Therefore, decision criteria must include I the time required for the various segments of the population to implement a sheltering PAR.
B. [ MAG 27B]
The SPMC's decision-making criteria calculates a wholebody of shelter dose based on a shelter protection factor
.9. According to the 1970 U.S. Housing Census, approximately 93% of the year-round housing units in Massachusetts have basements (SAND 77-1725, App. C, Table C1), which would afford shielding factors of .6 for I cloudshine and .05 for groundshine. Therefore, the SPMC's decision criteria are inaccurate and could result in decisions to evacuate the population when a sheltering PAR would afford greater reduction.
C. [ MAG 27C]
The SPMC's decision criteria do not adequately consider dose from groundshine in determining whether to evacuate or I shelter the population. The decision criteria do not adequately consider the shielding factor for groundshine afforded by shelters in the Massachusetts EPZ, and do not adequately consider the skin and car deposition doses that I persons sitting in cars whiJe waiting to evacuate could receive if, due to traffic congestion, they are unable to evacuate the area prior to plume arrival.
1 I
D. [ MAG 27D)
The formula used in the SPMC's decision criteria for calculating thyroid shelter assumes an air exchange rate that is too high for the predominantly winterized structures that would serve as shelters in the Massachusetts EPZ, and, therefore, inaccurately calculates projected thyroid dose.
E. [ MAG 27E]
The decision criteria fails to account for exposures from inhalation other than thyroid exposure.
F. [ TON 9, Basis 1)
The SPMC relies on two protective actions for the public, sheltering and evacuation, but fails to provide anyt.hing other than the vaguest of criteria for determining whit.h protective action should be undertaken in a given emergency.
G. [ MAG 56B]
The SPMC ignores the entrapment phenomenon described by NUREG 1210, V.4 at 19-20, which will occur at the Seabrook site during times of high beach population and also fails to adequately consider and plan for the possibility of entrapment due to bad weather, such as blizzards or flooding conditions.
H. [ MAG 56C)
The SPMC does not project doses correctly because it under-estimates doses from iodine and other ground deposited material, including failing to recognize in its doso (
calculations the increased risk from ground deposition as individuals await evacuation and the possibility of further increased dose from skin deposition and deposition on automobiles.
l I. [ MAG 56D)
The SPMC totally ignores the protective action that i
combines sheltering with rapid identification after plume passage of " hot spots" and relocation although this strategy is recommended by NUREG 1210 as appropriate for certain situations. {
i
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JI Contention No. 19 I The Contention: "The SPMC, in conjunction with the NHRERP, allows and encourages -
!E decision-makers to call for an lg evacuation of EPZ by sectors (S, SW, NE, SE, N), even within 5 miles, depending on which way the wind is llM blowing. This is a deficiency in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50. 47 (a) (1) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Rev.
1, Supp. 1,Section II.J.
Basis A. [ MAG 31, Basis 1)
Because frequent, wind-shifts in the area of the plant are so I and because the phenomena of seabreezes at this site makes actual direction of plume travel difficult to predict, if an evacuation is required for any segment, there should always be a 360' evacuation out to the distance I necessary.
The sudden 180' wind shift during the course of a serious hazardous materials fire at Seabrook, New Hampshire in March rather than 1988 demonstrates by 360' increments. the folly of evacuating by sectors I procedures direct decision-makers first to determine the wind direction and, if conditions warrant an evacuation, to Instead, the SPMC's evacuate (beyond two miles) only the downwind sectors. See I IP 2.5, Attachments 1, 2, 3 and 6. For this plant site, the normal potential results of high and low wind speeds as shown on Attachment 6 to IP 2.5 simply are not reliable.
B. (MAG 56F)
I There is insufficient and untimely incor meteorological data into PAR decision-making.poration meteorological assumptions made are not appropriate for the Further,of Seabrook site and will result in inaccurate dose projections I because they do not adequately reflect or account for features of shoreline meteorology, including the frequent change sea breezes of wind direction along the coastline. and the phenomena associated with I
I
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Reference to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; J.10 at pp. 69-70.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: According to MAG's Trial Brief, his proof on the three contentions consists entirely of a piece of testimony filed by Dr. Thompson gt. d.24 and a separate piece filed by Dr. Adler.25 This latter piece which appears as part of the Adler testimony discucsed above in connection with JI 4, is simply a statement that Dr. Adler made certain described IDYNEV runs, the results of which vere provided to Dr. Goble, a member of the Thompson et al. panel of witnesses, to assist him in the preparation of his testimony.26 The Thompson 31 d. panel's testimony is reminiscent of the so-called "Sholly" testimony offered by MAG in the NHRERP phase of the proceeding and there rejected by the Board.
It is the intention of the Applicants to object to the admission of this testimony for the same reasons that the Sholly piece was objected to. While the testimony duly recites that it is not the same thing as 24 Testimony of Dr. Gordon Thompson, Dr. Robert L.
Goble, and Dr. Jan Beyea on Behalf of the Attorney General for The Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Contentions Regarding the Adequacy of the SPMC.
25 MAG Trial Brief at 18.
26 Adler at 12.
I I
l i
I Sholly,27 the fact is it is.
Without going into detail, it is clear that it purports to analyze the effect that part.icular hypothetical accidents may have, compares Seabrook results of such events with generic cases, and goes into the expected deaths and injuries to be expected in each case.28 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address i these contentions in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 11.
Therein is spelled out the purpose of protective actions, the basis for the decision criteria used, the concept of shelter in place, the ux made of radiological data, the keyhole evacuation concept, the emergency classification levels and protective actions that will be taken at each, and the radiation data that will be used. It is explained that the initial PAR's will be based upon in-containment data, but that these may be refined by utilization of dose projections I accomplished through the use of a PAR work sheet.
of doses considered and how they are calculated are The kinds described. Finally, the testimony describes how SPMC deals with the " Entrapment Phenomenon."
l _
27 Thomoson et al. at 10-11.
I 28 The giveaway is the tact that Tables 4-6 refer to "NHRERP Evacuation" instead of "SPMC Evacuation" which is the4,term used in the text. .Q..gmpa re p. 3 3 I with Tables 5 and 6.
I I
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Applicable Legal Principles:
1.
"our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident. Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and
\
feasible dose reduction under the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one olant site may not be._for another."
Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986). (Emphasis added).
2.
"The existing emergency planning (regulation) does not require that plans achieve any preestablished minimum dose savings in the event of an accident. For example, approved emergency plans with full State and local governmental cooperation have highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours and the projected dose savings for such plans would vary widely.
Thus, the regulation is inherently variable in effect and there are no bright line mandatory minimum projected dose savings or evacuation time limits which could be viewed as performance standards for emergency plans in the existing regulations.
Moreover, the dose savings achieved by implementation of an emergency plan under adverse conditions,
I e . c ._ , during or following heavy snow, could be substantially less than under perfect conditions. This variability is I
consistent with a concept or approach to emergency planning and preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid."
Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline To Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning (Proposed Rule), 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6982 (March 6, 1987).
- 3. "The Commission presumes as does FEMA that offsite individuals in the EPZ may, as a result of a nuclear plant accident, either become externally contaminated with radioactive materials or become exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, or both."
Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 534-35 (1983).
JI Contention No. 24 g The Contention: " Assuming the Commonwealth and EPZ 5 municipalities would delegate authority to NHY to perform governmental emergency response I functions, see, SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2, an assumption the Town of Amesbury denies, the anticipated protracted I delay in obtaining this authority under emergency conditions would preclude prompt public notification I or a timely public emergency response. See, NUREG-0654 II.E.6 and NUREG-0654 Appendix 3 (b) (2) (a) .
For example, following NHY I' notification to the Commonwealth of an emergency, NHY must explain its I I _
F I'
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d I own capabilities, and brief the commonwealth.on the emergency.
PROCEDURES 2.14,- p. 5. The Commonwealth, under the SPMC, then-is required to
. action response. (PAR) assess-its protective capabilities 1 and, if. inadequate, purportedly may !
authorize NHY to implement police- ~l powers.to provide assistance. Id; d I SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2. The cumulative effect of these. delays, briefings, ,
multiple notifications, and 1 communications through-numerous .
h.. lines of authority, will result in~ .'
substantial-delay in public notification and in timely. PARS.by the public,.-even if it is assumed
' that. police power authority
. ultimately may be delegated by:the j
Commonwealth and EPZ towns.
b References to FEMA Findinge of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
i SPMC Report - Criterion A.2.a at pp. 10-
- 11. -
) Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: The only testimony filed by-the opponents on this contention 1s filed by TOA. At the
-)
outset there is a problem because'TOA actually addressed such 1
-testimony as it did file mainly to JI 2329 which is not a ,
i contention to be litigated as part of the first filing. The testimony that they apparently rely upon according to their 29 "The decision criteria described in the SPMC are not coordinated with those set forth in the NHRERP.
Thus, the possibility exists for delayed and conflicting PARS being formulated, transmitted and
[ recommended to the relevant state governments. The SPMC has no adequate procedures to prevent this and therefore does not meet the planning standards set l forth at 50.47 (b) (1) and (10) and the guidance of NUREG 0654 II.A. and J." ;
I trial brief30 is testimony by Chief Cronin that he is unfamiliar with NHRERP or any emergency plan for other Massachusetts communities, that the Board of Selectmen members are sometimes hard to contact, and that he has only assigned police duties to duly sworn officers or auxiliary officers.
We admit to being unclear as to how any of this is relevant to JI 24.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: The subject of the notification of and coordination of PARS is addressed in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 11. The methods of obtaining permission from the Commonwealth to notify the public of, and implement, a PAR are described as are the methods and routes of the transmittal of PARS prior to, and after, ORO activation. In addition, the methods of performing public notification are described.
I Applicable Legal Principles: None.
E.
Communication - Notification I
JI Contention No. 30 The Contention: "The SPMC relies too heavily on commercial telephone links for critical and essential emergency communications. Because commercial telephone lines will be and should I be assumed to be overloaded shortly after the onset of an accident at Seabrook, no essential emergency 30 TOA Trial Brief at 7-10.
I I
communications should be based in the first instance on commercial I telephone communications. As such !
the SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (6) and planning guidance of NUREG 0654' II F.
Basis r
A. [ TOWN 3, Basis 1]
Moreover, communications with local governments rely z essentially on the use of commercial telephone service and do not provide for adequate backup in the event of the failure of commercial telephone service. Accordingly there is no 1
reasonable assurance that timcly notification and local response can be made in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station.
} References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion F.1.a-o at pp.
29-34.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: CON has prefiled the
)
testimony of Mr. O'Connor in which he states his opinion that i reliance on commercial telephones for communication is inappropriate because there are no public telephones available at four TCPs in CON. MAG has filed some testimony
> on this issue.
There is an unvarnished conclusory opinion by Mr. Sikich that there is " foreseeable line overload,"31 and b also a statement that phones at special facilities may not be r?nned.32 l MAG witness Barnicle indicates that at a number of I 31 Sikich 1 at 2.
32 yg, 41, 1
E I
special facilities and schools there are a limited number of telephone lines and in her hearsay testimony she reports alleged statements by officials at such institutions that 1 e these lines may become overloaded 5
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony:
Applicants' prefiled testimony as to this contention is set forth in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 12. Therein, it is explained that the I
commercial telephone system is not relied upon for initial notification of offsite authorities. The backup -.
communication methodology in all cases where ORO rely on the telephone system are described. The steps which have been taken to mitigate the use of the telephone by the general public are described.
Also set out is a description of the central office switching systems that are, or will be, in effect in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ and how those systems prioritize in an emergency. Finally, it is pointed out that the primary method of communication for the Traffic
{
Guides is not the telephone, but, rather, portable, multi-channel radios.
I Applicable Legal Principles: None.
I JI Contention No. 34 g' The Contention:
g "The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (5) and the guidance provided in NUREG I 0654, II. E. 1., E.2 and F.1 because the notification and mobilization of I
I
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response organizations and personnel is not adequate.
Basis !
I C. The SPMC provides no adequate means of alerting, notifying and mobilizing key emergency personnel such as bus drivers, ambulance drivers and others. The SPMC simply leaves this function to the contracting employers, but provides no detail on who, how and when such notification i will take place.
This at NUREG 0654, II.E.2.
fails to meet the standard set forth y E. The SPMC provides no assurance that state and local government employees and those providing contract services to the state and local governments (such as snow removal companies, private ambulances, and the like) will be adequately notified of an accident at Seabrook.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion F.1.a-e at pp.
29-34; Criterion E.2, at p.23.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: The only testimony
) prefiled on the subject of this contention is contained in the Mangan et al. testimony. It consists of a paragraph which says in effect that if the emergency occurs during late
)
afternoon or early evening or on weekends, the drivers may not be home to get a phone call.33 Beyond this, MAG apparently intends to rely on cross-examination.34 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants' prefiled I
testimony on this contention appears in Applicants' Rebuttal l Testimony No. 8. Therein, it is stated that the bus k
33 Mancan at 37.
34 MAG Trial brief at 62.
companies will be notified by the Melita Emergency Telenotification System (METS) and the companies will, in turn, notify and ascertain the availability of their drivers by means of a procedure distributed to them.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 39 The Contention: "The information to be made
{ available to the public pursuant to the SPMC prior to an emergency does not meet the regulatory standards as set forth at 50.47 (b) (7) , NUREG 0654 II. G. and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV. D.2.
Basis A. [ MAG 24AJ Plans and information procedures for disseminating pre-emergency is inadequate. There is no assurance that the many thousands of transients who frequent the Massachusetts portions of the Seabrook EPZ will have available to them either prior to or at the time of an emergency any information concerning the methods and times required for notification, the protective actions planned, the nature and effects of radiation or a list of sources of additional information.
B. [ MAG 24C)
Inadequate provisions have been made to insure that the special needs population receive necessary pre-emergency information.
C. [ MAG 24D.1, 2, 6 - 9]
The content of the pre-emergency information made available to regulatory the public is not adequate and does not meet the requirements.
1.
The information is not adequately presented to the
)
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E reader as important emeroency information that should be retained.
2.
i inadequate Theand discussion will confuseof the the health reader risks as t of radiation is 1
l proper circumstances of emergency response.o The the need for and information I fails to state or and life-threatening indicate that athat radiation release can be would of radiation harmful beand and should be considered an emergency.
3.
The public is not informed about the lack of participation in emergency planning by the state and local (
governments and the basis for that non-participation. No I adequate discussion is presented concerning the ORO and the nature of the SPMC as a utility plan, and the relationship (s) during an emergency between the ORO and state and local governments.
l 4.
Inadequate information is provided to parents regarding procedures to be employed in the event of an evacuation of school children.
5.
"How To Take Inadequate Shelter."information is provided with respect to l people to The information fails to instruct seek shelter in basements or the lowest level possible, windows. and in roomsand Inadequate withinappropriate the fewest number of doors information is and provided with respect to respiratory protection.
6.
to pets. Inappropriate information is provided with respect I Most pet owners would be unwilling to leave their pets at home in the event of a radiological emergency and g therefore might be discouraged from reporting to reception y centers if accompanied by a pet, even when they are instructed to do so for monitoring and decontamination. The information also fails to inform pet owners that they could I be gone from their homes for at least several days or weeks, or even indefinitely.
D. [ MAG 53A) 1 I {
With respect to public education materials, the types of materials to be utilized will not be effective in reaching many special needs persons. !
E. [ MAG 53C)
The public information materials which have been provided contain too little and inadequate information to ;
(
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i
establish adequate preparedness for those who have disabilities.
F. [ MAG 53D]
The materials have not been designed using channels or-methodologies types. which are appropriate to specific handicap-The information is all in the form of printed words.
G. [ MAG 53E)
To adequately prepare for addressing t who have special needs during an emergency,he needs of those specific information about the needs of those individuals must be targeted to the general public and emergency workers. The SPMC does not do this.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion G.1 at pp. 36-38; Criterion G.2 at p. 38 & App. A at pp. A-1 -- A-29, App. B at pp. B1 -- B23.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: As to this contention, I
MAG offers the prefiled testimony of Lynne D. Filderman. Ms. ..
Felderman criticizes the failure to use public media and the lack of any statement in the materials used to the effect that SPMC is not endorsed by The Commonwealth. She then engages in criticism of various aspects of the calendar and
{
other print materials being used by the Applicants. Finally, she expresses concern that transients may not, in fact, I
receive pre-emergency information.
i
) Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this contention in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 7. Therein are described the FEMA guidance on the issue and the point is
\_ l
) i
E l t
made that some of the materials have been distributed and others are in draft form. It is pointed out that, in fact, multi-media efforts are made. The point is also made that instructions for pets are not required and that, in fact, The Commonwealth has a phone message that instructs owners to leave their pets at home in time of emergency. The methods l
of getting information to transients are described as are the distribution and content of special needs public information.
Finally, there is a section of the testimony that directly confronts some of Ms. Filderman's theories of the purpose of preemergency public information, j
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
F. SPECIAL NEEDS I JI Contention No. 45 (Note that on1y bases A, F, G, J, K, L, P, and Q are in contention in the initial filing of this phase E of the hearing)
The Contention: "The SPMC fails to offer reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a timely fashion for schools and day I care centers. Thus, it fails to comply with 10 CFR 50. 47 (a) (1) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (b) (14 ) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (15) , 50. 47 (c) (1) ; NUREG
-I 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J, II.N and II.0; and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Appendix 4.
I I _
I -
1 I
Basis A. [ MAG 47A]
The SpMC does not contain separate emergency response plans for the staff and students at each of the schools, I including day care centers and nursery schools, in the six Massachusetts EPZ communities, and those outside the EPZ which receive students from inside the EPZ. Nor does the SPMC provide any reasonable assurance that each of these schools has an adequate school-specific plan for responding appropriately or in a coordinated or integrated manner with I the SPMC in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. Without adequate school-specific plans for each school, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school i children. Most schools have no such plans. Existing emergency plans, while adequate for responding to fires and snow storms, are wholly inadequate for responding to a I radiological emergency, especially one which is serious and fast-developing. While reference is made in Appendix F of the SPMC to a " Generic Massachusetts Public School Plan," the I schools have no knowledge of such plans and would not keep or use them if offered by NHY. Nor could any " generic" plan ever be adequate for the wide range of different types of schools, which have vastly different student populations, I student age groupings, student / teacher ratios, class sizes, layouts and construction (for sheltering), organizational capabilities, compositions of special needs children, I different methods of notifying parents, etc. Absent the existence of institution-specific radiological emergency response plans to address tne different preparedness needs of each school, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate I protective measures can and will be provided to school children.
F. [ MAG 47F]
The SPMC's reliance on the 16 bus companies listed in I Appendix M, pp. M-4, 5, to provide the drivers, vans and buses listed is unfounded. At least eight of the 16 companies have either confirmed that they will not I
participate or that they will offer only the buses, vans and l I drivers that might be available, if any, at the time of an l emergency. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a l single bus, van or driver will be available from at least eight of the 16 companies relied upon. The remaining companies do not have sufficient drivers and buses to I :
I
I I
transport fashion.
all school children out of the EPZ in a timely G. [ MAG 47G]
will beThe SPMC underestimates the number of school buses that needed. There are more students than have been I estimated, especially in day care and nurseries, but also in the schools. In addition, during an emergency additional '
adult supervision will be needed on each bus, and the average capacity of the buses has been overestimated.
J. [ MAG 47J]
The SPMC proposed to include school information in the EBS messages if the schools request that this be done. If I most will of the schools become extremely respond long andto this drawnoffer, out.the EBS messages K. (MAG 47K]
The SPMC's provisions offer no reasonable assurance that sheltering caninorthe willschools.
be implemented appropriately or in a I timely fashion The SPMC contains procedures for having the School Liaisons call the special facilities and read a prescripted School Protective Action Message.
Pro-2.7, Attachment 1.
If sheltering is recommended, I however, the Liaison provides no information whatsoever of how this is to be done. .C_ f . P r o - 2 . 7 , Attachment 3. It assunes without any basis for doing so that the school has its own sheltering procedures. For those facilities which have no sheltering plan, the message simply affords inadequate guidance on how to implement a timely, safe and effective sheltering response. There are no instructions, I for example, as to where in the school shelter should be sought (i.e., in basements or interior rooms),
no instructions regarding the closing of windows and doors, and I no instructions regarding what actions should be taken for respiratory protection (such as placing several layers of toilet paper over the mouth and nose). No specific TV or I radio stations are mentioned for receiving EBS information about sheltering instructions. There is, therefore, no reasonable assurance that adequate sheltering will be provided.
L. [ MAG 47L]
There are a significant number of schools throughout the Massachusetts EPZ that would be totally inappropriate for I
I - _ -
5 I
sheltering school children -- the population most sensitive to radiation exposure -- because the schools have no basements or interior rooms, and have exterior walls which I are almost entirely, or substantially, comprised of glass.
In addition, there are a number of newer schools with climate control systems that are totally reliant on outside air.
P. [ MAG 47S2]
I or drive The SPMC fails to ensure that school students who walk themselves to school will take appropriate action during an evacuation when they leave the schools on foot or in their own vehicles. There is no assurance that they will I go to Reception Centers or the Host School Facility. There is also no assurance that they will go home and meet up with their families.
Q. (TOWN 7.3)
Appendix M, Amendment 3 fails to accurately reflect the I number these providers of day care providers in West and children being cared for by Newbury. Appendix M, Amendment 3 also fails to accurately reflect the number of students and staff at the schools in West Newbury.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g, at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: Relying upon the hearsay testimony of Witness Barnicle as to a survey she took of schools and special needs facilities and Witnesses Mangan and Paolillo as to a survey of bus companies, MAG witness Sikich has prefiled testimony as to this contention in which he makes the following points: He says there are not enough liaisons for the schools and they will get so hung up answering questions during the initial phone calls that they I
I
I will not be able to complete all their calls in an appropriate amount of time; he claims there are not enough telephone lines into the schools and as a result they will be tied up by anxious parents; he believes ORO should supply staff at each school to explain things and thus avoid confusion which he surmises will otherwise occur; he claims there are not enough buses which will be available to evacuate the schools; and, finally, he argues that a site specific plan for each school is required Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: In Applicanto' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8 it is demonstrated that there are, despite problems of recent withdrawals of participation, more than enough buses to evacuate the entire Massachusetts portion of the EPZ, including the schools. The remaining matters relevant to this contention are addressed in Applicants' Rebuttal' Testimony No. 6. There the point is made that information provided by ORO and received from the schools at the time of the emergency is adequate to support the PAR. In the event the ORO is unable to get through to a school or other special facility, conservative " default values" will be assumed for purpose of dispatching buses and other forms of transportation.
In addition, the point is made that there is no requirement that an individual plan be developed for each
{
school and special facility. The efforts to do that are described.
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-Applicable Legal ~ Principles: None.
2 JI Contention No. 46-1
[
The Contention: "The SPMC fails to provide j
- reasonable assurance that adequate j protective measures can andLwill be- 1 implemented for all those persons j who are patients in the two hospitals within the Massachusetts 1 EPZ and for those who become injured j'
) during the emergency, from radiation contamination / exposure. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50. 4 7 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (10) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (12) and NUREG 0654, Rev.-1, Supp. 1,-II.J.10.d, 10.e, 10.g; and II.L.
- Basis s
A. [ MAG 48A]
In the event of an evacuation, the two hospitals located' L .within the EPZ have more patients than can be accommodated by the hespitals with which NHY has reached agreements. The Amesbury Hospital currently has approximately 44 beds in use.
They are atinfull capacity at this time and will be expanding ]
to 58 beds August, 1988. The Anna Jacques Hospital in l Newburyport has approximately 156 beds and is~ presently operating-at 58% capacity (or approximately 90 patients).
Thus,
! in the event of an evacuation, accommodations would be required for approximately 148 patients. i The hospitals with which NHY purports to have agreements i
> would patients.
not be able to provide the required beds for these A summary of the services offered by the hospitals designated in the SPMC are as follows: i 1
L Hospital A has eleven physicians to handle simple contamination cases. However, in regard to the relocation of L- patients from hospitals within the EPZ, or accommodating R radiologically injured persons, the hospital would be able to provide only five beds at best.
f Hospital B has signed a letter of agreement to care for patients located at the Anna Jaques Hospital in the event l
(
l of a radiological emergency. However, Hospital B has no I intention of treating radiologically contaminated individuals. ;
1 Hospital C has contracted with NHY officials to i provide emergency disaster services. They would be able to 5 1
activate these services within a twenty-four hour period.
Hospital C would only be able to accommodate approximately I ten very severely injured patients. The hospital has a capacity of 730 beds of which 85-90% are usually occupied.
I Hospital D has no agreements with NHY to care for relocated patients or to provide decontamination facilities.
i I Hospital E has agreed with NHY officials to accept transferred patients from other hospitals. Its capacity is 300 beds, of which 20 are usually available. It does not have the facilities to handle radiologically contaminated individuals.
Hospital F has agreed to provide only acute care I services to nursing home patients. They have declined to offer decontamination facilities after being approached by NHY.
filled.
It has a capacity of 108 beds of which 90 are usually I
Hospital G has agreed to assist in the relocation i
of patients from Anna Jacques Hospital. They have not agreed I to provide treatment for radiologically contaminated individuals. Hospital G could accommodate approximately forty patients in the event of an emergency.
Hospital H has not made any agreements with NHY regarding the relocation of patients within the EPZ, or for treatment of radiologically contaminated individuals, in the I event of an emergency. The hospital is equipped to treat up to three " chemically affected" patients. The hospital is licensed to accommodate 365 patients and might have approximately ten beds available in the event of an emergency.
I NHY.
Officer, It was Hospital I has reached no definite agreement with the understanding of the Chief Operating ago, from discussions with NHY conducted over one year I that Hospital I would act as a "back-up" to Anna Jaques Hospital. Hospital I can accommodate 311 patients and operates at about 64% of capacity. They do not have any decontamination facilities. In the event of an emergency, it could provide approximately thirty beds. j I
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In summary, the hospitals identified in the SPMC would be able to accommodate, at best, approximately 133 patients.
This total includes beds to be provided by Hospitals D and I which have not entered into any agreements with NHY. Even assuming that these hospitals would provide accommodations in I the event of an emergency, the total number of beds provided would fall short of the approximate 148 beds required just to relocate Amesbury Hospital and Anna Jaques Hospital.
The SPMC also fails to ensure that adequate accommodations will be available for the radiologically injured in the event of an emergency. It fails to take into I consideration that during a radiological emergency it is highly likely that hospitalization will be required for people suffering non-radiological injuries sustained during I an evacuation (as a result of auto accidents, heart attacks, etc.)
Reasonable estimates of the number of persons who may need to be hospitalized as a result of radiation from a I serious radiological accident at Seabrook Station greatly exceed the beds available.
size of the beach population on These busyestimates summer days, are based on the the lack of sheltering available to them, and the fact that severe I traffic congestion will entrap thousands of persons in the beach areas and prevent their evacuation for many hours. The arrangements in the SPMC for their care are grossly I inadequate.
Reasonable estimates of the number of people who may sustain non-radiological injuries during an evacuation also greatly exceed the beds avai.able.
Furthermore, decontamination facilities are inadequate at the hospitals identified in the NHY plan. Only Hospital A and Hospital C have stated they have the ability to treat I radiologically contaminated persons. Hospital C would only be able to treat ten cases, at most, of radiological contamination.
" chemically affected" Hospital H is equipped to treat up to three patients.
i It is reasonably estimated that a number of persons who will need hospital decontamination these hospitals toservices providewill thisgreatly service.exceed the capacity of B. [ MAG 48B) i i The SPMC makes inadequate preparations for the safe, efficient evacuation of patients located within the EPZ at Amesbury Hospital and Anna Jaques Hospital, Newburyport.
I Amesbury Hospital has been contacted by NHY officials but the role and/or hospital responsibilities of the hospital were unclear to administrators. It does not have any agreements I
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I with any other hospitals at this time regarding the relocation of patients during a radiological emergency.
the event that an evacuation was ordered, it would have toInbe I accomplished in an M hp_q fashion by the town ambulance service, private ambulance service, or by patient's families.
These sources However, of transportation would be unreliable.
a I assuming that transportation were available, an
[ evacuation of the hospital would take many hours. No institution-specific evacuation time estimate has been prepared.
At Anna Jaques Hospital, no evacuation plan has I been developed to provide for the evacuation and relocation of patients in the event of a radiological emergency. Any evacuation which would occur would be M hgs, accomplished through private ambulance services with which the hospital has " working relationships" but no written agreements. These sources would be unreliable, however, in the event of a I radiological emergency. Assuming that adequate hospital would take many hours.anNo transportation were available, M hgc evacuation of the evacuation time estimate has been prepared.
institution-specific C. [ MAG 48D]
I The SPMC has arrangements for an inadequate number of ambulances to evacuate all those who may reasonably need such transportation so there is no reasonable assurance that NHY ORO can implement the Massachusetts EPZ.a timely evacuation of the two hospitals in D. [ MAG 48E)
The SPMC provides no reasonable assurance that the Amesbury a radiological andemergency.
Ann Jaques hospitals are suitable as shelter in E. [ MAG 48F) l The sheltering instructions provided to hospitals by ORO are wholly inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that adequate sheltering measures can and will be taken by hospitals.
F. [ MAG 48G]
The Generic EPZ Hospital Plan mentioned in Appendix G is too vague to be of any real benefit to the hospitals.
Amesbury Hospital received such a plan but has not kept it.
There it of any is no indication benefit that Anna Jaques would keep it or find either. Only site-specific EPZ hospital 5
I
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I plans can provide reasonable assurance of adequate preparedness, and then only when backed up with a staff trained in appropriate emergency response actions.
H. [SAPL 5, Basis 1]
There are only 4 hospitals identified in the SPMC from l I which letters have been obtained having anything to do with a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. The letter from New England Deaconess Hospital, dated Sept. 10, 1987 states I that the hospital has agreed to work with New Hampshire I Yankee only to the extent "to assess feasibility and appropriateness" facility. of the hospital providing services as a host )
There is no agreement or even mention that New I England Deaconess Hospital might provide any monitoring or decontamination EPZ. services for evacuees from hospitals in the I The letter of agreement with The Hunt Hospital commits that facility only to the provision of acute care beds for nursing home patients and states specifically that The Hunt Hospital "would not be utilized for evaluation and treatment I of ' contaminated injured' members of the public."
of agreement with St. Joseph's Hospital in Lowell, The letter ;
Massachusetts, dated 8/31/87, requires only that the hospital have a minimum of one physician and one nurse on call within j 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> capable of supervising, evaluating and treating j radiologically public. contaminated injured members of the general 4 I John's No estimate could treat is provided.
Hospital has of hospital patients.
of the number of evacuees St. Joseph's only The letter of agreement with St.
to do with the hospital's acceptance No mention whatsoever is made of I monitoring or decontamination capability. The letter of agreement with Brigham and Women's does not specify the extent of services to be provided. Further, the arrangements I for transporting facilities victims of radiological accidents to medical are inadequate. The SPMC states at 2.4-3 that the NHY-ORO maintains letters of agreement and/or contracts with ambulance companies capable of transporting non-ambulatory I and Appendixcontaminated M. and/or injured individuals as listed in However, the Ambulance letters of Agreement in Appendix C only support a total of 42 ambulances, at least 4 I of which will not be available since Amoskeag Ambulance has gone out of business.
Furthermore, these same ambulances are to be drawn upon to transport special facilities populations I to host facilities. According to Appendix M, all 42 of the ambulances from Appendix C are needed for evacuation of the listed special facilities, leaving none for the functions stated at 2.4-3.
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References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; Criterion J.10.k at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: Again relying on the hearnay testimony of Ms. Barnicle, MAG witness Sikich sddresses this contention. He alleges that there are not enough telephone lines into the hospitals and they will become jammed as relatives of patients call in, thus preventing ORO from reaching the hospital, to ascertain transportation needs.
He decries the lack of individual plans for each hospital and claims that there is not enough host hospital bed capacity for those who will be evacuated.
MAG witness Leaning has prefiled testimony as to the need for an ability to care for the contaminated injured.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this contention in Appli its' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6. As in the case of the schools the point is made that an adequate l response will be implemented without existing facility specific plans. If there is an inability on the part of the liaison to get through to the hospital, transportation resources will be assigned out on the basis of conservative default values. As to facility specific plans, the point is made that all hospitals and nursing homes subject to Federal regulation are required to have, and regularly exercise, an emergency plan. The testimony further describes in detail 5
I I
the provisions and agreements made for care of the contaminated injured. As to the availability of host hospital beds, the testimony demonstrates that there are 350 beds under an LOA for an expected need of 259.
Applicable Legal Principles:
- 1. Hospitalization for most people who are contaminated (but not injured) would not be an emergency matter. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 136-38 (1982).
- 2. To be accredited by the joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation, a hospital must have the capability I to treat contaminated injured individuals. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
CLI-85-15, 2 NRC 184, 186 (1985).
I JI contention No. 47 The contention: "There is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event I of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station for institutionalized persons (e.g.,
I patients in medical facilities) who cannot be evacuated. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) and I NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II.J.10.d, and II.J.10.e.
II.J.9, I
I I I
I I
I Basis A. [ MAG 49A]
Although the SPMC at Plan 3.6-6 acknowledges that there I may be some institutionalized persons who cannot be evacuated, there in no reasonable assurance in the event of an emergency in which the general population is advised to I evacuate that there will be sufficient medical and other support staff available to care for the patients who are unable to evacuate.
hospitals under these circumstances.The SPMC makes no provision for staffing I C. [ MAG 49C)
I Although the SPMC at Plan 3.6-6, acknowledges that some institutionalized persons cannot be evacuated, there are no special decision-making criteria for the institutionalized I population that take into account the special factors associated with sheltering or evacuating that population such as the greater risk to that special population from I evacuation and the relatively better shielding protection as a would that hospital. be afforded by sheltering in a large building such Moreover, the message to be given to hospitals in the event of an emergency where the general I
population is instructed to evacuate, provides no '
instructions at all with respect to sheltering, and in fact, only speaks of the hospital's evacuation needs (see Pro-2.7 I at 15) thus implying that all hospital evacuated regardless of the situation. patients to provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures will Thus, thewill befails SPMC be taken for institutionalized persons who cannot evacuate.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion J.9 at pp.56-58; 1 l
Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG witness Sikich, again relying on the hearsay testimony of Ms. Barnicle, testifies that the SPMC does not contain enough information on the shelter potential of the hospitals; that there will not be sufficient hospital staff to care for those remaining
!I
I in the hospital, especially at night; that there are not enough ORO staff to assist in the cases of people who have to shelter in a hospital for lack of ability to move; and, the somewhat surprising assertion that no one at hospitals will know how to administer KI.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: In Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6 the point is made that the decision to require the sheltering in a hospital of a patient because movement would be unwise is an option always open to the administration of the hospital. Provision is made for that decision to be conveyed to the ORO so that permission can be sought from The Commonwealth to distribute KI to protect the well-being of the patient.
I .
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 48 The Contention: "The SPMC is deficient because it has not identified all or even most I of the special needs resident population, has not sufficiently assured the security of acquired I information about special needs individuals, has not adequately determined the specific assistance needed by identified individuals to I. cope with a radiological emergency, has not identified other individuals and organizations capable of I assisting and the type of assistance required, and nas no adequate procedures for assuring that this I data is periodically validated.
Thus, the SPMC does not comply with 10 CFR 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (7) ,
I I
I I 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (c) (1) , and NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Sections II.G and II.J.
Basis A. [ MAG SOA)
The plan proposes to conduct periodic special needs surveys by mail. Plan 3.7.
number of reasons. This method is unreliable for a All homebound persons in need of special assistance be ascistedwill therefore not in sheltering be known or themselves to evacuation NHY and thus cannot in the event of an emergency. The identification proposal is inadequate in the following respects:
1.
The survey already conducted to identify I persons with special needs produced unreliable results because of the wide-spread opposition to Seabrook. Future surveys will likely product similarly unreliable results.
I a) Some persons refused to complete forms in protest; I b) Some persons reported that members of their families had special needs when, in ;
fact, they did not; c) and Forms not sentwere collected by opposition groups in.
I 2.
The deeply-felt and widespread opposition to Seabrook does not engender confidence on the part of special needs persons that the information they might submit I will such data.
be kept confidential, thereby discouraging submission of B. [ MAG 505)
It appears that each special needs resident will be listed by name in Appendix M. This listing will also show I each person's address, phone number, and an identification of those who are hearing-impaired, sight impaired, or mobility-impaired (in need of an ambulance, wheelchair van or curbside I pickup).
Section 7.2.3 of the SPMC states that because of the confidential nature of the contents, Appendix M will have
" limited distribution."
It willand also be " maintained to Federal at [all)
I emergency response facilities provided Regulatory agencies." Conceivably, there could be dozens of I _
I
I I
\ 1 copies of Appendix M which contain this private information.
=
The SPMC provides no procedures for assuring the effective security of this information.
Any ad hpog procedures that may be devised by NHY do not provide reasonable assurance of adequate security.
C. (MAG SOC)
Individualized determinations of functional t
characteristics of special needs persons necessary to cope with a radiological emergency are not sufficiently specific.
I Appendix categories.
M utilizes a "Needs Code" with only 5 general Much information on functional characteristics and needs could and should be obtained to enable appropriate and timely assistance to be provided.
\ D. [ MAG SOD)
With the exception of transporters during evacuation, individuals and organizations capable of assisting handicapped persons on an individual basis have not been identified. The plan also fails to identify people resources within the handicapped community who may be utilized in the development, review and exercise of plans for the homebound and other special needs residents.
E. [ MAG SOE)
I The proposal provides no reasonable assurance that the information collected will be validated, updated, or maintained, but merely asserts that periodic surveys will be I mailed method.
which, for the reasons stated above, is an unreliable I References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion G.2 at pp. 38-39;
\
1 Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG has prefiled the testimony of Dr. Don A. Dillman and Sharon Moriearty with respect to this contention. The basic thrust of this testimony is to criticize the methodology of the survey which I
I I
the Applicants performed to learn who the transportation dependent are. In addition, Ms. Moriearty questions the premise that what has to be learned is only the names of those transportation dependant. She argues that much more is needed. The testimony questions the use of utility Dilling lists and voter registration lists on the ground that not everyone is on such lists and especially because persons with disabilities are more inclined to not be on such lists for financial reasons. Finally, each of the witnesses by different methodologies comes up with a figure between 2,000 and 2,500 as the number of special needs persons who will need assistance. In addition, MAG witness Daines argues that I the card survey method utilized by Applicants is deficient {
because of the hesitancy of the population with disabilities to self-identify. It is his assertion that there are likely l to be many people who should be, but are not, on the list and they will come out in an emergency and there will be no facilities to cope with them.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants' testimony with respect to this contention is to be found in Applicants' l Rebuttal Testimony No. 6. Therein the survey used to locate the special needs homebound population is described and the Applicants' reasons for believing that it was adequate for the purpose are given. The methodology has been deemed adequate by FEMA. In addition, more recent efforts to update I
"~
I )
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the information are described including extensive advertising in the media. Further, the point is made that there are procedures for permitting those not reached by the survey to seek help in an actual emergency. It is also pointed out that history demonstrates that persons who have disabilities are usually helped in time of emergency by friends and neighbors.
Applicable Legal Principles:
1.
Card surveys have been held to be an adequate method for determining special needs populations in this and other NRC proceedings. See Public Service Company of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Summary Disposition Motions of Applicants and State of New Hampshire) (Unpublished) (Nov. 4, 1986) at 16-17; Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 487-88 (1986).
JI Contention No. 49 The Contention: "The SPMC's provisions for assisting I the special needs resident population in taking protective actions are grossly deficient and l
provide no reasonable assurance that I adequate protective measures'can and will be taken by this population.
i g The SPMC therefore fails to comply 5 with 10 CFR 50. 47 (a) (1) ,
5 0. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (c) (1) or NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Section J, I and FEMA Guidance Memorandum 24 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons).
l I
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Basis A. [ MAG 51, Basis 1 1]
The SPMC's protective action plan is a generic one for I all those in the resident population who have handicaps.
once contacted, Guide, by phone or (if hearing-impaired) by Route the individual is asked to verify his or her transportation is recommended.requirements in the event that an evacuation I time contact is made,If a PAR to shelter is in effect at the pre-written sheltering instructions.the individual is given some brief, in effect at that time, the person is offered If a PAR to evacuate is assistance, transportation pick-up routes or by dispatching a wheelchair van oreither by waiti ambulance to the person's home.
I Following transportation to a reception center, the person is registered and effered temporary shelter in a congregate care facility. This generic plan is inadequate to meet the different needs of I different categories of handicapped individuals for each step in the process needed to engage in adequate sheltering or evacuation.
Therefore, separate protective action plans need I to be developed for each of the main categories of handicapped individuals present in the EPZ in order to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Ege Memorandum 24 I (Radiological Persons), Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped the existing guidance" in NUREG 0654,which by its terms " supplements which states as a I formal " guideline" that "[p]rotective plans have been developed for all cateaories of handicapped individuals present in the EPZ and integrated into the general radiological emergency plan." Id. D.5 (emphasis supplied).
B. [ MAG SlB]
I There is one generic element, however, which does need to be included in each of the protective action plans for individuals with different categories of handicaps: for each I handicapped individual who needs assistance with preparing to shelter, sheltering, evacuation preparation, travel processing through a reception center, living in a relocation I (congregate care) facility, or recover /re-entry, there needs to be a responsible and knowledgeable contact person to provide communication and physical assistance. Such contact people need to be identified in advance for each individual I each activity which requires assistance. The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assistance that such contact people are I I -
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available for each assistant-requiring activity.
24, pp. 5-6. See G.M.
C. [ MAG 51C)
- 1. Evacuation. Once they are notified by phone to evacuate, some of those persons who are blind will need assistance with packing necessities, packing provisions for their guide dog, with egress from buildings, and with entering congregate care centers.
unfamiliar vehicles, reception centers, and I communicate the evacuation process. with them by Deaf persons will need someone to writing and/or by signing through The pre-written generic message these Pro. 2.7, individuals p. 15, Attachment receive does3. not offer this assistance.
2.
If sheltering is ordered, some individuals who are I blind will need a responsible contact to make sure windows and ventilators respiratory protection. are closed and a wet cloth is being used for Deaf persons will need a contact I person 7.
There is to perform to keep them informed of EBS messages.
this no function. assurance Sae G.M. 24 at that Route Guides will be available D. [ MAG 51D)
- 1. Evacuation.
The evacuation needs of the home-bound mobility-impaired population has not been adequately provided !
for in the SPMC because there are an inadequate number of {
ambulances fashion. At and wheelchair vans to transport them in a timely {
the reception centers and the host special I
i i
facility there appear to be accessibility problems, based on examination of the floor plans provided. Bathroom facilities are seriously deficient at the Reception Centers because I there are not enough toilet stalls and they are not wide stalls.
Necessary ramps appear to be lacking. The Decontamination impaired. Trailers are not accessible to the mobility- {
I 2. Shelter.
i impaired persons a choice if they prefer to be sheltered inThe SPMC do I their own homes or at work rather than undergo the strain of evacuation. See G.M. 24 at 7. Whenever they shelter, those with mobility impairments need a responsible contact to check I on closure of windows and ventilators and on respiratory protection.
be available. The SPMC does not ensure that such a person will Inadequate provision is made to have KI available for those whose immediate evacuation may be I
infeasible or very difficult. See NUREG 06545, Rev. 1 Supp.
1, II.J.10.e.
E. (MAG 51E, Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.)
- 1. Evacuation. The non-functional and emotionally disturbed will need the assistance of trained staff on a one-to-one or other appropriate ratio. At the Monitoring / Reception Center, a Special area should be set aside for registering, monitoring, and decontamination of the mentally and emotionally disturbed and for their maintenance, where staff can exercise appropriate supervision and control, and can administer medication. G.M. 24 at 8. The SPMC has not made such arrangements. Agreements to receive a specific number of individuals should be made with mental facilities outside the EPZ, to accommodate non-functional severe cases.
G.M. 24 at 8. This has not been done. Responsible staff should remain with each mentally or emotionally impaired homebound entry phases.
person throughout the reception and recovery /re-G.M. 24 at 8. This, too, has not been provided.
- 2. Shelter. A responsible contact is needed to perform or supervise the required protective actions. G.M. 24 at 8.
The SPMC is deficient in this respect.
F. [ TON 3, Basis 1)
The SPMC (I.P. 2.10, p. 19) identifies five schools within Newbury and five special facilities. The SPMC fails to identify what special transportation requirements these facilities may have or provide any reasonable assurance that such requirements can effectively be met. The SPMC fails to identify reasonable routes of access to and departure from the facilities.
j References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion J.9 at pp. 56-58; Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Profiled Testimony: MAG Witness Moriearty has filed testimony which describes various kinds of j
disabilities which she fecls should be considered in the {
planning process; asserts that a disproportionate portion of
/ l i
persons with disabilities are poor; and argues that SPMC is deficient because it concentrates only upon certain disabilities, i.e., those which give rise to a need for transportation and hearing impairment which would prevent a person from hearing warning sirens. MAG witness Sikich, while admitting to no expertise with respect to persons with disabilities nevertheless feels competent to, and does, agree wholeheartedly with Ms. Moriearty's criticisms of the plan and states that more detailed knowledge is needed and provisions must be made for persons with additional disabilities to those already addressed. MAG witness Daines also criticizes SPMC for lack of staff to load the elderly or disabled into vchicles and lack of extra vehicles to handle the overflow not n the list which he claims will surely materialize in a real emergency. He advocates a medically-trained person on every bus utilized to evacuate special needs persons.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this contention in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6. The procedures for implementing protective actions for homebound people with special needs are set out. Any such person requesting assistance will be visited by and assisted by ORO personnel. In addition, extensive reasoning is set forth as to why ORO believes that it can rely upon the concept that
I I
I disabled individuals will have available assistance from family and friends. i Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 50 The Contention: "The SPMC fails to identify all of I the special facilities which exist in the EPZ. Even for those 0 facilities which have been identified, there is not reasonable assurance that protective measures I can and will be implemented in a ,
timely and effective manner. Thus, the people in special facilities will not be adequately protected in I the event of an emergency, and the SPMC, therefore, fails to comply with 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) ,
5 0. 4 7 (b) (3 ) , 50.47(b)(8),
- 50. 47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654, Supp.
1, II.A.3, II.C.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.10.e and II.J.10.g. l i Basis $
A. [ MAG 54A]
listed in the SPMC.
Not all the special facilities have been identified or !
have been listed. In Specifically, not all the nursing homes addition, in the EPZ towns there are other unidentified special facilities in other categories besides nursing homes,projects.homes for the mentally retarded, and I elderly housing residences for the mentally ill,Thesetransition categorieshomes includefor community battered women, and local lock-ups.
B. [ MAG 54B] l I The SPMC neither contains separate emergency response plans for the staff and residents at each of the special facilities nor provides any reasonable assurance that each of E these facilities has an adequate facility-specific plan for 5 responding appropriately or in a coordinated or integrated manner at Seabrook with Station.
the SPMC in the event of a radiological emergency Without adequate facility-specific I
i 1
plans for each special facility, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for those in special facilities. While Appendix F refers to a " Generic Massachusetts Special Facilities Plan,"
no generic diverse plan for all special facilities, populations, given their each facility to respond appropriately.can provide the guidance Moreover, the necessary for special facilities have not seen such a plan, and many will not keep it or rely on it even if NHY sends it to them.
C. [ MAG 54C]
The only " support and assistance" (sgg NUREG 0654, Supp.
1, II, J.10.d when an evacua) tion has been ordered is transportationprovided by N assistance in the form of buses, vans and ambulances. For many persons in special facilities this transportation is not sufficient nor usable without further pre-boarding support and assistance from " helpers" in preparing the patients necessary/ residents belon,ings to leave; gathering their clothing,
)
allaying their . ears,, patient records, and medications; anxieties and bewilderment; treating those who suffer shock and " transfer trauma"; and simply helping vans, individuals and ambulances. with movement impairments onto the buses, Without adequate emergency response plans for each special facility, there is no assurance that
> special and facility functions.
assistance staff can and will perform all these support The implementing procedures for '
the drivers does not mention offering this assistance, nor is there any assurance that the drivers have the prior experience or training which would enable them to respond appropriately to a wide range of needs and difficulties which the residents the will have in preparing to board and boarding transport vehicles.
)
D. [ MAG 54D) 7 The implementing procedures for the special population liaisons are poorly drafted, vague, and confusing. For example, Pro-1.10 5 5.2.1 instructs the Special Population
(
> Liaisons upon arrival at the Staging Area to " proceed to your location as shown in Attachment 3, Layout of Staging area, of Implementing Procedure 3.2."
The Attachment referred to is the NHY ORO Message Form, not the staging area layout, which is Attachment 5 of Pro-3.2. Moreover, the procedures for the 1 special Population Liaisons are set forth in two separate i l
Implementing Procedures (1.10 and 2.7) which are neither
( identical nor sufficiently integrated with each other to ensure that confusion and mistakes will not occur.
l
' Dr 1
-)
f G.. (MAG;54G)
The Implementing Procedures do not make it clear what- i
^
the Special Population Coordinator will tell.the-Liaisons to do when the Coordinator is informed that NHY's ORO has
" recommended" awaiting a response. a PAR to state or local officials but is
. The procedures for Special Population Coordinators'and.Special. Population Liaisons do not differentiate clearly between a PAR which has been recommended by NHY's ORO but is not-yet authorized (or rejected) authorizedand:a PAR being recommended after having been j by state / local officials. If the SPMC {
e contemplates. sending buses to special facilities upon ORO's
' mere recommendation of.an evacuation PAR to state / local officials, this'would create a host of problems, especially if the state / local officials.were,to decide sometime later j when shelter.
the buses were loading to direct the population to If the SPMC does not contemplate that
, buses / ambulances would be sent upon the issuance by ORO of a mere PAR recommendation to state / local officials, it should clearly state'this in the Implementing Procedures and eliminate this confusion.
H. (MAG 54H) l '
i The SPMC's
-in Appendix M, reliance on the sixteen bus companies listed pp. M-4, 5, L buses listed is unfounded. toAtprovide the drivers, least eight of the sixteen vans and L companies have either confirmed that they will.not l participate or that they will offer only the buses, i drivers that might be available, if any, at the time vans of an and
]
emergency.
Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a- ;
single bus, van or driver will be available from at least- l
) eight of the sixteen companies relied upon. 1 companies do not have sufficient drivers and buses toThe remaining )
transport EPZ all those in a timely persons in special facilities out of the fashion.
)
I.
(MAG 54I)
I The SPMC significantly underestimates the number of ambulances and wheelchair vans needed. This stems, from a failure to correctly identify the number of thosein part, needing more specialized transportation than regular buses can. provide.
Appendix M, p. M-16, indicates that the SPMC t
will be relying on 48 buses, 21 ambulances (or 6 evacuation
{
bed buses) and 36 wheelchair vans to transport those in the special facilities identified.
To meet the needs of this 1
l I
I I special population, a much higher percentage of ambulances and wheelchair vans is needed. Buses, especially school buses but coaches as well, are unsuitable modes of I transportation for large numbers of those who are elderly or mentally retarded. l I
I J. [ MAG 54J) t' The SPMC states that evacuation bed buses "may be substituted for a.mbulances when patient care levels permit."
Appendix M, p. M-16. There are no standards or procedures i proviled anywhere in the SPMC for having an ORO staffer make this judgment, nor are the Special Population Coordinators i I
l and ,tatsons qualified to make it. If this judgment is left I to th.a administrator of the special facility by the SPMC, most administrators of nursing homes will not permit the frail elderly or others who may be bedridden to be transported in bed buses, viewing it as too crude a method to ensure the patient's health and well-being. Instead, '
l administrators will insist on evacuating these individuals in I ambulances. As a result, the evacuation of special facilities will not be completed in a timely fashion.
K. [ MAG 54K]
I {
1 The plans call for an insufficient number of ambulances l to relocate all those in special facilities (non-hospitals) 5 who need to be transported by ambulance in the event of an l evacuation. In Appendix M, p. M-16, the SPMC calls for 21 l ambulances to meet this need. Significantly more ambulances j will be needed for this population.
L. (MAG 54L]
The SPMC's reliance for a prompt response on the nine (9) ambulance companies listed in Appendix M, pp. M-138, 139, is unfounded. Six (6) of the companies cannot be relied upon I at the time of an emergency to provide all or some of the ambulances indicated. In many instances this stems from an intent by company owners to honor existing prior commitments
$ first before responding to a Seabrook evacuation. For some !
E companies, no drivers have agreed to participate. One !
j company has dropped out altogether, and another is out-of- ;
I business. Also, when it was enlisting the companies' participation, NHY appears to have: (1) stressed that it was extremely unlikely that the company would ever be called on !
to perform, and (2) glossed over the potential hazards the job entails, failing in some cases even to inform the owner that ambulances might be traveling into areas which were in I 1 I
I or had been in the path of a radiation plume. There is no reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency, the ORO will be able to produce sufficient responding ambulances to evacuate those in special facilities in a timely fashion.
M. [ MAG 54M)
The SPMC's provisions offer no reasonable assurance that sheltering can or will be implemented appropriately or in a timely fashion in the special facilities. The SPMC contains I procedures for having the Special Population Liaisons call the special facilities and read a prescripted "Special Population Protective Action Message." Pro-2.7, p. 14, I Attachment 3. If sheltering is recommended the Liaison is to call and say: " Sheltering is the recommended action for your area at this time. Please implement your facility's sheltering procedures. Please take the following actions:
- 1. Close all doors, windows, and vents.
- 2. Turn off all fans, heating, and air-l a conditioning which use air drawn from outside.
- 3. Extinguish unnecessary combustion.
I 4.
5.
Use telephones for emergencies only.
Remain indoors until advised otherwise.
Move to the basement or the room with fewest windows.
6.
Keep radio or TV on for Emergency Broadcast System information.
I Numerous problems exist with such a message.
without sheltering procedures.
It assumes any basis for doing so that the facility has its own 3 For those facilities lucky enough to g have such confusing:
procedures, the message is contradictory and the alid "take the following actions." facility is to implement its own procedures Some of these actions I (" Move to the basement or the room with the fewest windows")
may well be inconsistent with the facility's own plans. The message is also too rigid to encourage facility staff to use the appropriate judgment necessary about such critical matters as turning off all fans, heating, and air conditioning in light of the needs of the frail elderly and handicapped population to be protected. For those facilities t which have no sheltering plans, inadequate guidance on how to implement a timely, safe, and effective sheltering response. No specific TV or radio the message simply affords stations are mentioned for receiving EBS information.
I N.
[ MAG 54N, Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.]
The SPMC contains inadequate provisions for the distribution of dosimetry to those in special facilities whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult. See Plan, p. 3.6-6. Special population liaisons are 5.5.4, to provide "information" about dosimetry, Pro-2.7, 5 but there is no assurance as to what this information will be or that the liaisons are knowledgeable enough to present the information adequately.
O. [SAPL 7, Basis 1 1]
There are no plans of any description and no specifically nursing homes, designated host facilities for the hospitals, day care centers, schools or other special facilities listed in Appendix M of the plan, though there is now reference Amendment to " generic" 3 to Appendix F.
plans for these facilities in Appendix M's Index identifies Shriner's Auditorium as the sole listing under " Host School Facilities" and under " Host Special Facilities." The description of the facility in the letter of agreement is that approximately it consists125,000 of an auditorium and wings totalling sq. ft. This does not assure an adequate or clients. facility for receipt of special facility residents circuses, Further, Shriner's Auditorium is used for rodeos and the like and may not be available should such an event be in progress at the time of an emergency.
The Hunt Hospital is to take some nursing home residents, though there is no specification of the number that can be taken.
St. John's The andsame St. is true of the letters of agreements with Joseph's hospitals regarding the number of
' hospital patients that can be received and cared for. There is therefore no reasonable assurance of adequate host facility services being provided under the SPMC.
P. [SAPL 7, Basis 1 2]
Furthermore, there are no teachers or health care facility workers designated in the SPMC to provide services such as supervising children and assisting the elderly and infirm to board evacuation vehicles.
NHY-ORO personnel designated to provide such services.Neither are there any Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance of adequate personnel special facilities. to carry out the protective action responses for I
R. [ TON 10, Basis 1]
The SPMC (Appendix J, p.
- 1) identifies day care / nursery schools in each municipality within the EPZ but omits from !
that listing Newbury. the operating day care facilities in the Town of 1 facilities,The SPMC fails to identify the locations of such I enrolled, the number of infants and other children the number of staff personnel or how any special transportation requirements of the facilities will be met.
t S. [TOA 4D.2]
There is no plan in the SPMC as to how the PARS will be implemented.
(.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion J.9 at pp.56-58;
) Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: TOA has prefile'd the testimony of Chief O'Connor who states that certain-facilities are not included in SPMC that should be. ' MAG does not appear to have offered any evidence responsive to this 1 contention Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this
) contention in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6 and Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8. Basically, the TOA assertions are addressed by pointing out that the facilities named are either out of business, included, or never did exist.
In addition, all of the other cases alleged in contentions or answers to interrogatories are addressed.
Applicable Legal Principles: None. 1 l
I 1
)
. ..n-g -
1 1
-)
G.-
EVACUATION EQlTIPMENT AND FACILITIES JI Contention No. 51 '
i D" The Contention:
"The SPMC proposes.that individuals j
who have been evacuated from special
. facilities will be relocated to a 3 single " host special facility".
This special' host-facility contains ]j a large auditorium, an arena, and. '
miscellaneous space on.two floors.
I 'The SPMC's plans'for use of this facility do not provide-reasonable t assurance;that it will be available e in a_ timely fashion'in the event of
.an. emergency.or.that, even-if ,
available, it'will be. adequate for i j use as a_special needs' congregate - ] ;
care center, or that.the care ,
available will' be adequate for the -
number and kind-of special needs individuals to be-'sent there. The-SPMC therefore fails to comply with 101CFR ' 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (3 ) , _
L 50. 47 (b) (8) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II A.3, II C.4,- II .j J.10.d.,.and II J.10.g. !
Basis A. [ MAG 55A)
-This facility is frequently used for a variety of special events including a circus, a rodeo, and a wide variety of "shows".
)
during such an eventThere is no reasonable the facility assurance can be converted in athat c timely fashion into a facility capable of meeting the relocation needs of nursing home' residents, the mentally retarded,
[- those in other special facilities, and the transport dependent population.
B. [ MAG 55B]
1 In Appendix M, p. M-18, the facility is noted as showing a capacity to handle 2,000 special facility and mobility impaired individuals. )
Given that the second floor of the
)
i facility is not serviced by an elevator, that much of the first floor will be serving simultaneously as the sole host school facility for over 9,000 school aged children, that parts of the first floor would be unsuitable as relocation space for those who are less than completely ambulatory, and that a large number of staff must also be present to assist L
and care for these special needs individuals, the maximum ,
feasible number of special facility and mobility-impaired individuals who can be adequately cared for overnight in this !
I facility is significantly less than 2,000. At the same time, the total number of special facility and mobility-impaired individuals who reasonably may need a place of relocation significantly exceeds 2,000, there are a number of special
) facilities in the EPZ which have not been identified in the SPMC, and the size of the mobility-impaired population has
)
also been significantly underestimated. Furthermore, the t plan assumes that only 80% of those individuals who are in I special facilities or who are mobility-impaired will require overnight shelter. i Appendix M, p. M-16. No basis is I
)
presented to support this assumption, and it is imprudent. (
In the. event of an evacuation from the six Massachusetts '
communities, when all the nursing homes, elderly housing projects, group homes for the mentally retarded, etc. are evacuated and transported to this host special facility, there are no public announcements, as there are for schools, instructing family members to pick up the residents of these special facilities at the host facility. The SPMC therefore ought to provide the means to shelter, feed, and appropriately care for all these individuals, not 80% of them. This number alone, when all special facilities are counted, exceeds 2,000 individuals. To this number should be added the mobility-impaired individuals who have been either bused out of the EPZ or who have engaged in ride-sharing to
' evacuate but have no place to stay. A prudent estimate would be that at least 2,500 special needs individuals would need care at this special host facility. Add to this the space needed to accommodate adequate staff and care-providers for i
this population and there is a need to accommodate at least 2,750 persons on a 24-hour basis at the host special facility, far more than the " capacity" of the space available.
(
C. [ MAG 55C)
I There is no reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient, or indeed any, beds, blankets, food, or basic l
)
care available at the host special facility. The SPMC relies !
on the American Red Cross to establish and operate all congregate care centers, see Plan, 5 2.4.2A. While the SPMC 1
1
1 I
contains a mechanism to request a Red Cross response, Pro-1.6, there is no reasonable assurance that if contacted the Red Cross can respond in time with sufficient staff and i- I resources to turn this facility, possibly then housing a circus, rodeo, or other "show", into a special needs congregate care facility by the time evacuees arrive.
I Because it is the policy of the American Red Cross to engage in planning for nuclear power plant disasters only in concert with governmental planning efforts, the American Red Cross I has undertaken no planning for its response in Massachusetts to a disaster at Seabrook Station. Thus, in the event of an emergency, the Red Cross can only respond on an aA hpoj;; basis to provide emergency relief services in Massachusetts. In a I recent letter to NHY, a senior official of the American Red Cross commented on the lack of state and local participat. ton in the planning process in Massachusetts by stating:
There should be no doubt that without close coordination of Red Cross and government activities within the I framework of tested disaster response plan, Red Cross relief efforts will be negatively affected.
I The plan identifies 27 other congregate care centers for those without special needs, see Appendix M, I M-12. Given responsibility for all these congregate care centers at once, there is no reasonable assurance that the pp. M-9 through Red Cross can and will respond in a timely manner, or at all, to provide the beds, blankets, food, or any other assistance I needed at this special host facility.
D. [ MAG 55D)
There is no reasonable assurance that the thousands of special needs individuals who will end up at the host special I facility will be provided with the minimal level of medical care, special diets, and special personal attention (bathing, dressing, etc.) that they need to ensure their health and well being. There is no provision in the SPMC regarding who is to provide this special care. There is no assurance that nursing home owners will send sufficient staff to the host special facility to provide the special care needed by the I infirm and frail elderly or those on special diets or medications, nor is there any provision which assures that the for.
mentally retarded will be safely and appropriately cared The American Red Cross does not provide "special" care I of this kind even when they are participating in planning for nuclear power plant disasters. Thus, there can be no I
presumption that they will do so on an ad hgg basis here.
The SPMC is inferior to other plans which provide that those in nursing homes and other special facilities are relocated
! to other nursing homes and special facilities of the same kind where staff are trained and equipped to provide the kind of special care these evacuees would need.
E. [ MAG 55E)
Owners, operators, administrators, and staff of the special facilities have no assurance that the residents of their facilities can and will be adequately cared for at the special host facility upon relocation. They have not even been told the name of the special host facility to which I
their residents would be transported. If, at the time of an emergency, they are told that their residents are to be transported to this site, most responsible owners, operators, administrators, itself to be patently andinadequate.
staff will resist, viewing the facility For those who inquire what the plans are for caring for their residents at the facility upon relocation, those plans, if described accurately, will be viewed to be patently inadequate. Thus, regardless of the participation of state and local officials, most of those who operate and staff the special facilities will not permit those in their care to be relocated to this host facility.
Instead, operators and staff will respond in an ad hgg fashion.
F. [ MAG 55HJ The American Red Cross has not certified that this facility meets the criteria established by the ARC for mass care shelters plant disaster.to be used for evacuees from a nuclear power Absent certification by the American Red Cross, there is no reasonable assurance that the ARC will in fact establish this shelter during an emergency.
G. [ MAG 55I]
The facility does not meet the American Red Cross criteria for shelters for nuclear power plant disasters.
H. [ MAG 55J]
shelter Regardless standards,whether the facility meets the ARC generic the facility itself is not suitable for use as a host special facility for the population intended.
)
I. [ MAG 55K]
Use of this facility as a shelter for the elderly in nursing homes and elderly housing projects will be hazardous to the health and well-being of these individuals because it will substantially exacerbate the effects of the " transfer
)
trauma" they experience will already itself. be experiencing from the evacuation References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion J.10.h at pp. 65-66.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG witness Sikich criticizes the Shriner's Auditorium as a host center for the disabled because: the American Red Cross (ARC) will provide only minimum care and no medical care or staff to take care of the disabled who arrive their; in such a case, Mr. Sikich believes there could be trouble.- He also says that the Shriner's Auditorium is only partially handicapped accessible.
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: This contention is addressed in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6. Therein, the capacity of the Shriner's Auditorium is described; it is revealed that it can accommodate 1,484 persons and Applicants have committed to make it fully handicapped accessible. In I addition, Applicants have available a center in Westboro, Massachusetts, owned by New England Power Co. which can house 2,233 people.
l' 5
m i Holy Cross College in. Worcester is identified as the ,
School Host Facility with capacity for the entire. .l
{
Massachusetts EPZ school population andiaccompanying staff. 1
-Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 53-.
The Contention: "The facility identified as a i
staging area located in Haverhill at I 145-185 Water Street is not now available to the ORO for this L purpose and no other facility has been identified. The City of Haverhill on February 26, 1988 issued a cease and Desist Order as to'all uses of the premises as a Staging Area based.on violations of the City of Haverhill Zoning Code, I 255.13. In April,'1988, the Superior Court of-the Commonwealth entered a temporary' restraining order prohibiting any-further use of these premises for the purpose. In light of the function and' role of the Staging Area'in the SPMC, the absence of any identified lawful ,
location'for such-a facility makes I the effective implementation of the SPMC impossible and the SPMC fails I to meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (3) , (8), (10) and NUREG 0654 II J.10.g,'k and H.4.
Basis i
A. [SAPL 2, Basis 1] !
The SPMC states that the NHY offsite Response Staging
)
Area is located at 145 Water Street in Haverhill, Massachusetts (see 5.2.2.). The city of Haverhill issued a 1
L R cease and desist order to Public Service Company of New Hampshire and Mass Electric on February 26, 1988 to prevent e
the use of the facility for an emergency drill. The
{ Assistant City Solicitor for the City of Haverhill stated ]
p o
1I
)
that a restraining order was obtained from Superior court to stop a subsequent drill that was to go forward on March 31, 1988. That drill was called off. The City of Haverhf.ll has I no intention of allowing that area to be used as a staging area for implementation of the SPMC.
) Referencas to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion H.4 at pp. 44-45.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: No direct testimony has been prefiled.
\
MAG states that he will make his case on I cross-examination.35 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: None.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
I JI Contention No. 54 The Contention: "The SPMC relies upon the American I Red Cross to establish and operato all 27 congregate care centers and I the host special facility, yet it does not contain any kind of written agreement with the American Red I Cross which identifies the emergency measures to be provided in Massachusetts and the mutuall:
acceptable criteria for their implementation.
"Because it is the policy of :he American Red Cross to engage in
.I planning for nuclear power plant disasters only in concert with governmental planning efforts, the I American Red Cross has undertaken no planning for its response in Massachusetts to a disaster at I Seabrook Station. It has therefore not entered into any agreement of any kind with NHY or the Joint i 35 MAG Trial Brief at 54.
I I
1 I
Owners to provide any services. In the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, the American Red Cross response would be at best M ho_c. Such a response does not provide reasonable assurance that
,I any of the congregate care centers-or the host special facility will be operated by the American Red Cross or that, if the Red Cross does act to establish mass care centers in Massachusetts, it can be done in a timely fashion. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR
- 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (1) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (3 ) , 50. 47 (b) (8) ,
I 50. 4 7 (c) (1) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, supp. 1, II.A.3, II.C.5, and II.H.4."
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion A.1.a at pp. 5-6.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: MAG has prefiled the hearsay testimony of Arthur Lonergan, who did a survey of all designated congregate care centers to see what plans, if any, the personnel there had for clearing the necessary space. He states that only nine of twenty-five facilities had such a plan.
Based upon this testimony the ubiquitous Mr. Sikich opines that in his opinion the lack of such plans is a serious flaw. Nothing is offered by MAG to back up the contention that the ARC response in an emergency would be "M Applicants' Prefiled Testimonf: In Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6, the role of ARC is detailed, and the commitment spelled out.
I i
I '
I Applicable Legal Principles: ARC's Congressional Charter mandates its participation and assistance in a
{
radiological emergency at Seabrook.
JI Contention No. 55 I The Contention: "The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that an adequate number of buses, i
ambulances, wheelchair vans, vans, I tow trucks, drivers and road crews 3 j
can and will respond in a timely fashion. Therefore, the SPMC I violates 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (1) , 50.47 (b) (3) , I
- 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (c) (1) and NUREG I 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.3.,
II.C.4., II.C.S. and II.J.10. j Basis 4
I A. [ MAG 71A]
l I Appendix The M, SPMC's pp. 4,reliance is unfounded. At leasttoeight 5,
on the 16 bus companies listed in provide the drivers and buses listed of the 16 companies have either confirmed that they will not participate or that they will ,
I offer only available, the buses, vans and drivers that might be I if any, at the time of the emergency. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a single bus, van, or driver I will relied be upon.
available from at least eight of the 16 companies The remaining companies do not have sufficient drivers, buses and vans to evacuate the transport-I dependent / mobility-impaired population and all those in hospitals, special facilities, and schools, and daycare/ nurseries who need bus / van transportation. This number is larger than the SPMC estimates.
I B. (MAG 71B)
I The SPMC provides no reasonable assurances that the buses and drivers which will be participating can be mobilized quickly enough to ensure a timely response. First, many of the companies are located at substantial distances from the EPZ.
I Second, the SPMC's procedures in Pro. 2.10 for notifying bus companies, determining the availability of I
_ _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -
buses and drivers,
) bus needs, Dosimetry Record assigning keepersBus Dispatchers, Route Guides, and assigning particu to the assigned bus yar , and sending these ORO staffers off radiological emergency.ds is designed for a slow-breaking and time-consuming to ensure a timely response in a fast-These procedu breaking accident. Third assemble and brief the drivers, Dosimetry sRecord to keepers,,and Bus Driver Packets, to distribute dosimetry and company's
- 3. 6.1 ( B) , full contingent of responding buses,and see Plan, 5 to lead back in convoy as fast as either its last responding bus driver or the OROthe bus is anyard team, whomover extremely arrives at the bus yard last inefficient, This
" weak-link" system.
Moreover, buses do, and convoys will have a much more e difficult timco traveling buses into the EPZ against evacuating traffic than single would.
C.
[ MAG 72A]
The SPMC relies on nine 9 to provide all the ambulances (an)d wheelchair vans e to need dprivate ambulan by such vehicles during a radiological emergencyevacuate This all includes all facilities, persons in the two EPZ hospitals, the special.
and the mobility-impaired transport dependent population who need such vehicles in order to evacuate and relocate.
injured Alsothe during needing ambulances emergency by will be those who are radiation.
companies, Of these nine has dropped agree to participate.out after finding that its drivers would notindicates One company which had agreed in a letter of agreement to provide four ambulances can provid e Another which had a letter of agreement to provide threereas .
ambulances entered into a contract to provide only two One company actually vans believes it could provide 22 ambulances and 12 wheelchair state and the compa,ny,has received no assurances yet from itsbu drivers; so there is no reasonable assurance that it can and will provide any company fashion. vehicleswith
/ drivers in an emergency in a timely provide tenAnother ambulances, a letter of agreement to critical care units claims to have only 9 vehiclesfive wheelchair vans, and two not 17, available" thinks basis is unlikely. if its drivers will participate,and which it has agreed to The remaining three companies have
agreed three to providedriver ambulettes/ a totalteams, of six ambulances / driver teams and but the ambulettes are not licensed in Massachusetts and cannot be used there.
D. [ MAG 72B]
In seeking to enlist the participation of these ambulance companies and their drivers, NHY led at least some of the companies and drivers to believe that they would not be driving intocontaminated.
radiologically areas close to Seabrook Station which were This was done through a combination of active misrepresentation and critical omission of facts regarding what kinds of individuals might need 3
ambulance services and where they would be located. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that even those I will drive into radiologically contaminated areas or handleambula radiologically contaminated individuals. To the extent that contracts can be construed to require such services, these practices were contracts obtained in violation using unfair or deceptive trade of M.G.L. c. 93A, 92, and are unenforceable.
E. [ MAG 73A]
The NHY ORO does not rely on an adequate number of tow trucks to in removed enable a timely allfashion.
potential road obstructions to be In Appendix M, p. M-3, there are only four road crew (tow) companies listed. For these companies, Appendix M lists a total inventory of 31 tow vehicles.
Even if all these vehicles could respond, there would not be sufficient tow vehicles to remove all the road impediments in a timely fashion that can reasonably be I expected during an evacuation of the entire EPZ in Massachusetts. Many more tow trucks are needed.
F. [ MAG 73B]
listed in Appendix M is unfounded.The SPMC's reliance on the four road crew c I dropped emergency. out of ORO altogether and Two of the companies have will not respond in an A third company will not renew its agreement to participate after the first year, and even now cannot provide reasonable assurance that its drivers will show up in the event of a radiological emergency. The final company (two tow trucks) can give no reasonable assurance that it would to do so. and feels that it is under no contractual obligation respond I
I I
I G. [ MAG 73C)
I Even assuming that tow trucks are available to respond, the SPMC deploys only two tow trucks per town, assigning them both to the " transfer point."{ Pro. 2.10, 5 5.4.7(B). Thus, I
at most, a total of only 12 tow vehicles will be deployed I throughout the six Massachusetts communities. This is far short of the number needed to clear the evacuation routes of all reasonably anticipated blockages in a timely fashion.
H. [SAPL 11, Basis 1)
I The numbers of buses set out in Amendment 3 of the SPMC for special facilities for the 6 Massachusetts communities have been drastically reduced with no apparent reason, rationale or compensating measures provided to explain these plan changes. (See Appendix M, p. M-16) For Amesbury j special facilities, for example, buses were reduced from 13 l down to 1 and wheel chair vans were reduced from 9 down to 1.
As another example, Newburyport's special facility buses were 5
reduced from 25 down to 2 and the wheel. chair vans were reduced from 18 down to 1. Absent a reasonable number of emergency vehicles for the special facilities for these and I the other Massachusetts EPZ communities, there is no reasonable assurance that residents of special facilities can be protected.
I The vehicle numbers are set forth in SPMC Amendment 4 are not all reasonable given the numbers of special facility residents in those communities.
I. [TOA 1B)
Even assuming these Letters of Agreement, on their face, I purported to create a binding commitment to provide emergency resources, the SPMC fails to demonstrate that those individuals deemed "available" to perform emergency services have in fact been asked, and agreed, to provide these I services in an actual emergency, or that these individuals, many employed far from the EPZ, could promptly be located, notified, and deployed to respond to a nuclear accident.
I Traffic accidents or additional delay will occur as emergency personnel, business operators, or commuters returning for family members, must maneuver through outgoing evacuation I traffic, or queue at the perimeter of the EPZ, awaiting identification checks. SPMC Plan, p. 3.6-14.
J. [TOA 4A)
Following declaration of an emergency, the SPMC provides that bus companies should be contacted to " determine the I
number of drivers and vehicles (buses and vans, if applicable) which would be available and their mobilization times . . . bus company managers will call back with the number of vehicles and drivers which can be provided . . .
PROCEDURES'2.10, p. 5. 'This underscores two'significant inadequacies in'the SPMC:
(1) On its face,.the SPMC' indicates that each. Letter of Agreement does n21 accurately = state the number of manned vehicles.which a particular company can provide in an actual .
emergency, and'that this determination will only be made at the time of'an actual. emergency.
L (2) Substantial delay in deploying emergency transportation will occur as each bus company attempts to 1
determine its availability of manned vehicles. For the SPMC indicates that bus companies will be assigned to a particular need only after each bus company has assessed its available resources, informed NHY, and the total resource pool lis known. Egg, PROCEDURES 2.10, p. 5 (B) and.(F).
K. (TOA 4H]
'There is no reasonable assurance that the bus drivers who purportedly have agreed to respond to an emergency at Seabrook in fact have sufficient experience or training to perform this function. Under the SPMC, bus drivers of emergency vehicles are not required to have any prior experience in emergency operations, no prior experience with special needs populations, and no prior experience busing small children, including school children. SPMC Plan, pp.
2.1-29, 30. Additionally, even assuming these individuals have adequate training and experience, the SPMC fails to
, demonstrate that the individual bus drivers, or other private i
citizens with apparent emergency roles such as teachers and health care sta U., have in fact agreed to be available to
- drive.in an actual emergency.
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L. [ TON 2a]
The SPMC provides that nine buses will be available to evacuate Newbury residents and transients. The SPMC fails to provide any empirical data to support the conclusion'that
[' this number of buses is sufficient to provide adequate L
evacuation of transportation dependent persons.
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i M. [ TOWN 9.1]
The plan provides for tow trucks to be located at a staging area somewhere in Groveland. The plan does not specify the number of tow trucks or provide any basis for a finding that disabled the number will be adequate to respond to vehicles.
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Nor is there any reasonable assurance that the trucks would be able to effectively reach disabled vehicles in West Newbury in a timely manner since they would 1 be enteringtraffic.
evacuating West Newbury against the flow of outgoing N. [ TOWN 9.3]
The plan fails to provide an adequate basis for a finding that the number of ambulances and other emergency vehicles for the transportation of persons with special J needs, or personnel to man those vehicles, are sufficient to ,
reasonablysuch requiring assure the' safety of persons in West Newbury transportation. Nor does the plan provide an adequate basis for a finding that such vehicles would be able to timely a reach persons manner. in West Newbnry requiring such assistance in i
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion C.4 at pp. 17-18; Criterion J.10.d at pp. 60-62; Criterion J.10.g at pp. 64-65; Criterion J.10.k at p. 67.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: As to this contention, MAG presents a piece of hearsay testimony by Ms. Mangan and Mr.
Paolillo which is a survey of all the vehicle supplying companies involved.
The claim is that there are in reality far fewer vehicles available (at least at certain times) than
) are necessary.
1 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this contention in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8. This
)
testimony shows that there are sufficient vehicles under LOA, and available, for execution of SPMC.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 56(C)
The Contention: "The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate procedures, personnel, equipment and facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of general public evacuees, emergency workers and special facility I
evacuees (e.g. nursing home residents) have been established.
Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 5 50. 4 7 (b) (8) ,
5 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 5 50. 47 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654, Rev. 1,'Supp. 1 II.H.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.12, II, K.5.a and K.5.b. have not been met.
C. [SAPL 3, Basis 1 3]
Finally, there is no specific provision in the letters of agreement with receiving hospitals -(Hunt Hospital, St.
i John's Hospital, St, Joseph's Hospital) and decontamination of special facility populations fromfor the monitoring nursing homec, hospitals and other facilities or for monitoring and decontaminating special needs residents who i are evacuated from out in the communities. It is likely that many of these individuals could not be handled in the trailers at the reception centers. There are no letters ,
}
(sic) of agreement of any description in the SPMC for l Lawrence General Hospital, Lowell General Hospital, Framingham Union Hospital or Newton-Wellesley Hospital and l the LOA's with New England Deaconess Hospital and Brigham and
} Women's Hospitalfacility treating special make evacuees.
no explicit mention of receiving and !
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion H.4 at pp. 44-45;
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I I l Criterion H.7 at p. 46; Criterion H.10 at pp. 46-47; Criterion J.12 at pp. 72-74.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: None Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: This contention is addressed in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6. The assertions in the contention and basis are directly refuted.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 57 The Contention: "The SPMC fails to provide adequate I means for the handling and disposal' of contaminated waste water and contaminated materials, contrary to i the requirements of 10 CFR I '
5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 550.47(b)(9) 9 50. 4 7 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654 II.I.8. and k.5.b. ,
Basis A. [SAPL 4, Basis i 1)
Implementing Procedure 2.9 states at 5.2.10 that a storage area outside the trailer for monitoring and I decontamination belonging is to and to evacuees guard the articles.
be identified one person foriscontaminated to be designatedarticles to i
L The waste is supposed to be double i bagged, labeled and set aside in this area. (1P 2.9 at I 5.8.4) Adequate personnel to perform this task are not designated.
described. What then happens to the waste material is not I Nuclear, provided in Appendix C,Awas radwaste disposal letter of agreement with only a 2 year contract which began on July 1, 1986 and will expire in July of this year.
No other waste disposal agreements exist in the SPMC.
I Therefore, identified for handling waste materials.there are no adequate procedures anl I
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B. [SAPL 4, Basis 1 2)
I The trailers used for decontamination at the reception centers and EWF trailer each only have 1200 gallon collection tanks for contaminated waste water. The average 10-minute shower uses 3-5 gallons per minute and results in 30-50 gallons of waste water. Therefore, the impoundment capability of the storage tanks will only be good for I approximately 40 showers at best. Unless procedures are made for pumping out or replacing storage tanks and (sic) adequate personnel are assigned to those duties, contaminated water will be released to the environment whether it is diluted to acceptable levels or not.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion C.4 at pp. 17-18; Criterion K.5.b at pp. 78-79.
Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: None Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: This contention is fully addressed in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 13.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
JI Contention No. 58 I The Contention: "The SPMC fails to demonstrate that each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment I its initial response on a continuous basis, fails to provide for an adequate number of available manned I emergency vehicles, in violation of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (1) ,
- 50. 47 (b) (3) , 50. 47 (b) (6) ,
i
- 50. 4 5 (b) (8) , NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, I REV. 1 (hereinafter "NUREG-0654")
II.A.1.e, II.A.3, II.A.4, II.C.4, and II.F.1.a. Contrary to I Applicants' assertions of
" formalized agreements" demonstrating a commitment to I ,
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provide certain emergency response resources, g_qs SPMC Plan, p. 1.1-2, l I many Letters of Agreement (LOAs) with service providers are specifically identified only as a j
" proposed contract," rather than a 3 binding agreement. Additional
' 3 Letters of Agreement are due to expire, by their express terms, on I or before September 1, 1988, or even before completion of litigation on the SPMC before the Licensing Board. l There is no reasonable assurance I that the Letters of Agreement proffered by New Hampshire Yankee
{
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(NHY) represent binding commitments I- by the purported service providers {
l or that the personnel relied upon in l the SPMC will in fact be available in the event of an actual emergency at Seabrook Station.
References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability I of Implementation: SPMC Report - Criterion A.4 at pp. 13, l Criterion C.4 at pp. 10-19; Criterion D.4 at pp.20-21.
Opponents' Profiled Testimony: As to this contention, MAG presents a piece of hearsay testimony by Ms. Mangan and Mr.
Paolillo which is a survey of all the vehicle supplying companies involved.
The claim is that there are in reality I far fewer vehicles available (at least at certain times) than are necessary to execute SPMC. l 1
Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants address this contention in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 8. This testimony shows that there are sufficient vehicles under LOA and available for execution of SPMC.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
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I I The Contention:
JI Contention No. 59 "The SPMC fails to meet the planning i I standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1) , i (8) and (9) and the guidance of i I
NUREG 0654 II.A.3. because there is {
no assurance that resources relied I on in the SPMC will be-ade the time of an emergency. quate at A.
All letters before January of agreement and contracts entered into 28, 1988, bankruptcy, are prima fmLq unreliable.the date on which PSNH filed for 1.
These contracts are executory under 11 U.S.C. 5 1 I 365(a) )
assume orandreject the debtor-in-possession, them. with Court approval, may Either these contracts run between private suppliers the Seabrook and NHY -- a division of the bankrupt -- or owners
{
i I agent"). (with NHY functioning as " managing In the latter case, the 35% Lead owner is a debtor-in-possession and its obligations under these j j
agreements is individual up to its proportionate ownership I share. To date, the Bankruptcy Court has not granted the bankrupt the necessary approval. l I References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation: None.
I i
.I Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: None Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: None - MAG has the burden of proof on this matter under prior Board Orders.
I Applicable Legal Principles: None.
1 JI Contention No. 60
'I The Contention: "The SPMC fails to adequately l
identify the emergency equipment I available for use in implementing the plan. The SPMC thus fails to provide a reasonable assurance that I
I -103-
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I adequate equipment is provided and maintained as required by NUREG-I 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.H. The SPMC fails to identify the equipment available for use in discouraging or ,
encouraging direction of traffic I- flows.
The number and location of cones, barricades and other control devices are not adequately set forth I in the SPMC. Their availability for timely use is not described. This contention is confined to the towns of Newbury, Newbury Port, Salisbury and West Newbury.
Basis A. [ TON 2b]
I use The SPMC fails to identify the equipment available for flows. discouraging or encouraging direction of traffic in The number and location of cones, barricades and I other SPMC. control devices are not adequately set forth in the Their availability for timely use is not described. ,
this will be difficult or impossible if an emergency isIn the e I rapidly controls traffic developinginand evacuation has commenced without place.
to control points will be unlikely.Thereafter, gaining timely access References to FEMA Findings of Adequacy and Capability of Implementation:
SPMC Report - Criterion H.11 at p. 47; Criterion J.10.k at p. 67.
. Opponents' Prefiled Testimony: None as such. CON claims that its testimony described under JI 4 above supports this contention.36 Applicants' Prefiled Testimony: Applicants' I 36 CON Trial Brief at 13.
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justification for the traffic control equipment it has selected is set out in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 9.
Applicable Legal Principles: None.
Respectfully submitted, WJ Thomas G. DisJersh, Jr.
George H. Lewald
.m Kathryn A. Selleck g Jeffrey P. Trout Jay Bradford Smith I Geoffrey C. Cook Roper & Gray one International Place Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000 Counsel for Applicants I
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0306EIE0 g0LKEiED UMLhi ggtid
- 89 IBR 3 NO .16 Fqre 328cy0i'tf89 UNITED uur p[STATESCCF
,.g AMERICA TJ ' 4 '.i. .
00Ch . ig.Q M' '
NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket-Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL
)
(Seabrook Station,-Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site' Emergency
) Planning Issues)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on February 28, 1989, I mad service of the documents listed below:
- 1. Applicants' Trial Brief as to First Filing Phase of Litigation as to SPMC and Exercise Contentions;
- 2. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 6 (Protective Actions for Particular Populations);
- 3. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 7-(Pre-Emergency Public Information);
- 4. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. G (Transportation Resources);
- 5. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 9 (Traffic Management and Evacuation of Special Populations);
- 6. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 10 (ORO Staffing);
- 7. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 11 (Protective Action Recommendation Generation);
1
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1
- 8. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 12 (Commercial l Telephone Systems) ;
1
- 9. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 13 (Radioactive l Waste Handling and Disposal);
- 10. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 14 (The Effects 'j of a Strike By Members Of the NHY Offsite Response !
Organization);
)
- 11. Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 15 (The Liability and Response of Members of the NHY Offsite Response Organization) ;
- 12. Applicants' Exhibit 40: Emergency Plan Information Calendar;
- 13. Applicants' Exhibit 41: Agreements; l
- 14. Applicants' Supplemental Answers to Interveners' Expert Witness Interrogatories;
- 15. Professional Qualifications of Stephen M. Baldacci;
- 16. Professional Qualifications of Joseph W. Bisson;
- 17. Professional Qualifications of Robert Boyd, Jr.;
- 18. Professional Qualifications of Anthony M.
Callendrello;
- 19. Professional Qualifications of Gary J. Catapano;
- 20. Professional Qualifications of S. Joseph Ellis;
- 21. Professional Qualifications of Catherine M. Frank;
- 22. Professional Qualifications of Thomas F. Grew;
- 23. Professional Qualifications of Edward B. Lieberman;
- 24. Professional Qualifications of Peter S.
Littlefield;
- 25. Professional Qualifications of Dennis S. Mileti;
- 26. Professional Qualifications of Robert O. Nelson;
- 27. Professional Qualifications of William F. Renz;
- 28. Professional Qualifications of Michael C. Sinclair; l and j l
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- 29. Applicants' Cross-Reference to Joint Intervenor Contentions and Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony by depositing copies thereof with an express mail service, prepaid, for delivery to (or, where indicated, by depositing in the United States mail, first class postage paid, addressed to): i Administrative Judge Ivan W. Smith Robert Carrigg, Chairman Chairman, Atomic Safety and Board of Selectmen Licensing Board Town Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlantic Avenue Commission North Hampton, NH 03862 East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Diane Curran, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harmon, Curran & Tousley East West Towers Building Suite 430 4350 East West Highway 2001 S Street, N.W.
Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20009 Administrative Judge Kenneth A. Stephen E. Merrill McCollom Attorney General 1107 West Knapp Street George Dana Bisbee Stillwater, OK 74075 Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Adjudicatory File Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of General Counsel Board Panel Docket (2 copies) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building One White Flint North, 15th Fl.
4350 East West Highway 11555 Rockville Pike Bethesda, MD 20814 Rockville, MD 20852 l
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esquire {
Appeal Board 116 Lowell Street i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P. C. Box 516 Commission Manchester, NH 03105 ]
Washington, DC 20555 l
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o_______----__---_-------------
4 4 Philip Ahrens, Esquire Mr. J. P. Nadeau Assistant Attorney General Selectmen's Office Department of the Attorney 10 Central Road General Rye, NH 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 Paul McEachern, Esquire Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Shaines & McEachern Department of the Attorney 25 Maplewood Avenue General P.O. Box 360 One Ashburton Place, 19th Fl.
Portsmouth, NH 03801 Boston, MA 02108 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1 - Box 1154 City Hall Route 107 126 Daniel Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801
- Senator Gordon J. Humphrey R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire U.S. Senate Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton &
Washington, DC 20510 Rotondi ,
(Attn: Tom Burack) 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950
- Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Leonard Kopelman, Esquire One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Kopelman & Paige, P.C.
Concord, NH 03301 77 Franklin Street (Attn: Herb Boynton) Boston, MA 02110 Mr. Thomas F. Powers, III Mr. William 9. Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street 10 Front Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Exeter, NH 03833 H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Esquire Office of General Counsel Murphy and Graham Federal Emergency Management 33 Low Street Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W. ,
Washington, DC 20472 I Gary W. Holmes, Esquire Richard A. Hampe, Esquire )
Holmes & Ells Hampe and McNicholas {
47 Winnacunnet Road 35 Pleasant Street j Hampton, NH 03842 Concord, NH 03301 '
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D ;,
.= s , ,.
- p. 0 ' 'e l Mr. Richard.R. Donovan- Judith H. Mizner, Esquire Federal Emergency Management' 79. State Street,.2nd. Floor Agency . Newburyport, MA 01950
' Federal Regional Center 130 228th Street,;S.W.
Bothell, Washington '98021-9796 l
. Ashod N. Amirian, Esquire l 145 South Main Street P.O. Box 38-Bradford, MA 01835
, Robert R. Pierce, Esquire.
L Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building _
4350 East West Highway Bethesda,.MD 20814 James H. Carpenter,. Alternate Technical Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory' Commission East West Towers' Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 W
Thomas A M gnan, Jr.
W
(*= Ordinary U.S. First Class Mail)
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