ML20006B188
| ML20006B188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1990 |
| From: | Hillwhilton R LAGOULIS, HILL-WHILTON & ROTONDI (FORMERLY LAGOULIS, NEWBURY, MA |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#190-9729 LBP-89-32, OL, NUDOCS 9002010069 | |
| Download: ML20006B188 (67) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'00CKETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSION USHRC ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 90 JE 25 P3 :38 Before Administrative Judges:
OFFICE CF SECRETARY 00CKEllNG & SliiVICb Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman BRANC5i Thomas S. Moore Howard A. Wilber
)
In the Matter of
) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
)
50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
(Off-Site EP)
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
) January 24, 1990
)
TOWN OF NEWBURY'S BRIEF ON APPEAL OF THE PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION OF THE SEABROOK PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES LBP-89-32 Town of Newbury R. Scott Hill-Whilton Lagoulis, Hill-whilton & Rotondi 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 (508) 462-9393
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9002010069 900124 DR ADOCK 0000 3
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L TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..
ii
' 7 ARGUMENT I.
THE LICENSING BOARD-ERRED IN REJECTING TON CONTENTION 9 (SHELTERING) AND THOSE PORTIONS OF~ TON CONTENTION 1 FHICH ADDRESSED SNOW 3
REMOVAL..
A.
The-Licensing Board Erred in Rejecting TON JL Contention 9.
3 B.
The Licensing Board Erred in Rejecting those
- Portions of TON Contention 1 to the Extent it Addressed Snow Removal..
12 II.
THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SPMC PROVIDED A REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF ADEQUATE.
PROTECTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SPMC TRAFFIC s
MANAGEMENT PLAN (J1-4) AND THE EVACUATION OF TRANSIT DEPENDENT PERSONS (J1-7) BUS ROUTES).
.13 A.
.The Licensing Board Erred in Approving the Traffic Management Plan.
. 13 B.-
The= Board Erred in Finding that the Means of Evacuating Transit. Dependent Persons is Adequate
.13 1.
The Licensing Board Erred'in Failing to Adequately Consider the Impassability.of Evacuation Routes.
. 14 2.
If Bus Re-Routing is Implemented, the SPMC is Deficient in Failing to Provide a Means of Notifying the Transit Dependent
.16 Population of the Route Change..'. -..
CONCLUSION
. 17 i
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e b
b TABLE OF AUTHORITIES NRC Adjudicatory Decisions Page(s)
Houston-Power and Lighting co.
(A'. lens Creek Nuclear Generating Station)
ALAB-590,_11 NRC 542 (1980) 5 Mississioni Power and Light Co.
(Grand Gulf Nuclear. Station, Unit 12)
ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423 (1976)
Philadelphia Elsctric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)
ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681 (1985) rev. declined CLI-86-5, 23 NRC 12S (1986) 12 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
ALAB-924 (slip opinion) 11,12,16
-Regulaticns 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) 3, 6
Miscellaneous NUREG-0654 7,13 11 M
'f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING: APPEAL BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman-Thomas S.' Moore-Howard A. Wilber
)
In--the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
INTRODUCTION
- This brief is submitted by the Town of Newbury (" TON") in support of its appeal of the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision [Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities ("SPMC")3, LBP-89-32 (November 9, 1989)-("PID").
This brief is divided into two parts.
In Part I, TON will demonstrate that the Licensing Board erroneously-rejected as inadmissible contentions which TON asserts should have been admitted into this proceeding for litigation.
In Part II, TON.
will show that the Licensing-Board a) made erroneous findings with respect to such-an affect and b) erroneously failed to take f
into account -- indeed, ignored or summarily glossed over -- many serious impediments to an effective evacuation of Newbury.
TON has attempted in its brief to limit its arguments to issues unique or specific to it.
It is TON's belief that other Interveners in this proceeding will do likewise in their briefs.
2 1
a.
(
But to the extent that any other Intervener includes-in a brief an argument or position which is relevant to any issue discussed in TON's brief,' TON incorporates the argument of that Intervener o
by reference.
PART I - THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN REJECTING TON CONTENTION 9 (SHELTERING) AND THOSE PORTIONS OF TON CONTENTION 1 WHICH ADDRESSED SNOW REMOVAL A.-
The Licensing Board erred in re3ectinz TON Contention 9.
~ TON submitted twelve numbered contentions which contained 1
numerous subparts and bases.
TON Contention 9 asserted that:
The SPMC fails to provide a reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event-of an emergency in that it does not provide reasonable assurance that sheltering is an adequate i
protective measure for Seabrook or provide adequate criteria for the choice between sheltering, evacuation or other protective measures, as required by C.F.R.
50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, Rev.
1, Supp.
1, J.10.b.
Nor does the SPMC include expected total protection afforded.in residences or other shelters as required by NUREG-0654, Rev.
1, Supp.
1, J.10.m.
i Basis The SPMC relies on two protective actions for the public, sheltering and evacuation, but fails to provide anything other than the vaguest of criteria for i
determining which protective ~ action should be undertaken in a given emergency.
It provides no-evaluation of the sheltering capacity of Newbury or the number of public buildings available for such use, 1
Particularly with regard to Plum Island, where thousands of transient people may be situated at the time of an emergency, the SPMC is devoid of any data which provides a reasonable assurance that sheltering is realistic.
Moreover, the SPMC provides no means of
-dealing with the realistic possibility that the owners of buildings normally open to the public will not allow their buildings to be used as shelters or that such i
1.
Sam TOWN OF NEWBURY'S CONTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO APPLICANTS' PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES, April 13, 1988, t
3
C
]
potential shelters.are constructed of materials which provide a sufficient level of protection.
The Licensing Board initially rejected the contention in its entirety, stating " matters identified in the basis are part conclusional and in part have been covered in prior 2'
litigation.
The Licensing Board heard arguments concerning the rejection of this contention at its August 3 and 4,
1988 prehearing conference.
It became clear during a portion of that hearing that the only conceivable aspect of the contention which had previously been litigated was that portion which asserted that owners of buildings might not open them for use as shelters, i.e. the " human behavior" aspect of the contention contained in the last sentence of the contention basis.
Tr. 14606-14611.
It was never asserted by anyone that the previous litigation addressed in any respect what the sheltering capacity of TON is, whether the structures available to be used as shelters in TON could be found to provide a reasonable assurance of adequate protection or how sheltering would be implemented.
Id.
Indeed, Applicants' counsel candidly stated ~that the SPMC drafters boldly made an " assumption" that the level of' protection afforded by shelters in TON is the same as exists in New Hampshire.
Tr. 14609.
The Licensing Board reconsidered its disallowance of the entire contention after the prehearing conference and allowed for
.i.
2.
S.g.a MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PART II (Ruling on Contentions p
on the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities), 7/29/88, p.
36-37.
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9 I
k" litigation the first sentence of the basis.. striking the main 3
contention itself and_the remaining basis in their entirety.
This was error.
Moreover, since the Licensing Board clearly-found that sheltering is an available protective action - but the record is wholly inadequate to support a finding of its availability, suitability or implementability -
the Board's findings in that regard lack evidentiary support.
TON Contention 9 simply and plainly asserted that the SPMC was deficient in that it failed to show that sheltering is an adequate protective measure, in failing to provide criteria for the choice between sheltering or evacuation and in failing to include expected total protection afforded in shelters.
A portion of the rejected basis asserted that the SPMC provided no evaluation of-the sheltering capacity of TON, the number of buildings available for such use or that of Plum Island in particular had sufficient sheltering capacity for the thousands of transients who visit the-island.
It is well established that an acceptable contention and the reasonable specificity for a basis of a contention do not require detailing evidence in support of the contention either in the contention or the basis at the initial pleading stage.
- See,
'e.g.,-Houston Power and Lightinn Co.,
(Allens Creek Nuclear
-Generating Station, Unit 12), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 551 (1980);
Mississiooi Power and Light Co., (Grand Gulf Nuclear 3.
Estet MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Following Prehearing Conference),
8/19/88, p.
7.
i 5
Station, Unit 12), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 426 (1976).
Rather, at
-the initial pleading stage, a party need only allege the reason (s) for its concern that a particular emergency planning standard is not met; it need not, at that initial pleading stage, demonstrate " factual support for the particular assertions which-they have advanced as the basis for their contentions."
ALAB-590, supra 11 NRC at 551.
It is plain that the Licensing Board misapplied these standards in rejecting TON Contention 9 and that the contention in its entirety should have been admitted with the possible U
4 exception of the last sentence of the basis.
First, it is plainly evident that the availability, suitability and implementability of sheltering was being challenged as inadequate in the proferred contention.
Second, it-asserted that the SPMC provided no adequate criteria to be used in deciding whether to evacuate or shelter or, if sheltering were to take place, the buildings that would be used or the amount of protection that could be afforded thereby.
Offsite emergency response plans must provide for a range of protective actions and guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with federal guidance, must be developed.
The planning standards contained in the Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 4.
TON was not a party to the New Hampshire phase of this litigation and has never claimed to be aware of precisely what was, in fact, litigated in that proceeding.
6 c
w
I, e
r-Preparedness in Support-of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654_
]
FEMA-REP-1,-Supp. 1,.further provides that evacuation routes and i
alternatives for inclement' weather must be provided, that shelter areas must be shown, that the bases for the choice of protective actions shall be included as well as the' expected local protection afforded in residential units or other shelters.
NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Supp.
1, II.J.
TON Contention 9 squarely put these requirements in issue.
It directly challenged whether the SPMC complied with these standards.
It is inconceivable that any party, at the contention filing stage of this proceeding, was not put on notice of the concern of TON so that it could assert and prepare-a defense to the contention.
Moreover, the scant testimony the Applicants presented on this point and the findings of the Licensing Board make it abundantly clear that the SPMC'provides for no basis for finding that the protective actions or the bases for choosing between them is adequate.
A review of the evidence plainly shows these facts.-
For example, the only means of access to and egress from Plum Island is via the Plum Island Turnpike, a typical two land road..The road is established in a floodplain, crosses
_t approximately two miles of tidal marsh and also a drawbridge which is approximately one-quarter mile in length which spans the 7
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Plum Island ~ River.
TON DIR., ff. Tr. 17801 at 3, Tr. 17407.
i
~ That road becomes impassable due to flood waters as many as
' fifteen-times per year and, in addition, ice cakes and other debris float onto' portions of that road and other roads on Plum Island, rendering them impassable for that reason as well.
TON DIR., ff.-Tr. 17801 at 3, Tr. 17892.
Although the impassability of these roads occurs normally in the winter, spring and fall, P
this has also occurred in the summer when as many as fifteen
. thousand people have been present on the island.
Tr. 17884, 17894.
Flood waters alone at times render Plum Island Tornpike
(
impassable for up to seven hours.
Tr. 17895.
Large amounts of debris, such as tree trunks, huge ice cakes, even furniture and
-i appliances, are also deposited on'the roads and remain after 1
flood or tide water recedes.
This debris must then be removed and the' roads remain impassable for as many as ten additional hours while this work is being done.
Tr. 17899.
j The Applicants and the Licensing-Board recognized the obvious fact that it may accordingly be impossible to evacuate i
. Plum. Island.
Applicants' answer to that problem is that they will, in that eventuality, "make the appropriate protective action recommendation" which "most likely" would be to shelter.
5.
TON files herewith Exhibit 1 (TOWN OF NEWBURY'S AMENDED DIRECT. TESTIMONY, February 19, 1989) and Exhibit 2 (TOWN OF NEWBURY'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE SPMC, August 14, 1989).
The facts set forth in this brief are set out in complete detail in the exhibits.
In addition, many of the factual assertions in this brief are based on
. Applicants' testimony.
L 8
i
4 Tt. 17382-17383.
But as to the availability of shelters in the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge portion of Plum Island, for example, the amount of sheltering actually available
. wasestablished as' being nothing more than a "six foot by six foot shack," Tr. 17383, for an area of the island six to seven miles in length.- Tr. 17383-17384.
It is painfully clear that the Applicants know full well that sheltering is simply not available l
and that it will not provide any reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
In any event, the SPMC provides for no true range of protective actions for those on Plum Island as is evident in the fact that sheltering is plainly not a protective action that ever would or could be considered given its lack of availability.
Moreover, the testimony of the Applicants cited above makes it l
certain that no criteria are set forth in the SPMC as to when and under what circumstances sheltering would be chosen over
- evacuation.
To compound matters, it is readily apparent that the Licensing Board fully recognized the existence of these problems and the absence of a real solution.
In PID Finding 3.123, the Board states that the impassability of Plum Island Turnpike due to flooding "would be identified and considered in the early stages of an emergency.and responses would be formulated, coordinated, and implemented with the appropriate governing l
-bodies.
If the roadway remained impassable at the declaration of a General Emergency, that fact would be considered in the PAR development process."
TON is unaware of any other party to this proceeding alleging, as TON does, with respect to Plum Island, 9
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that the impassability of one road would mean that a significant portion of a municipality could therefore not be evacuated.
The Board thus ruled for the EPZ in general that localized flooding would simply require a rerouting of evacuation traffic.
PID Finding 3.121.-
But the Board could plainly not adopt Applicants'
. generic solution to the impassability of roads when it came to Plum Island, so instead it simply accepted the Applicants' vague
, s and illusory promise to consider that fact in making the PAR.-
The Board then failed to consider the lack of any record support for Applicants' claim that the most likely alternate protective action, sheltering, would result in a reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
Thus, the Licensing Board not only erroneously precluded TON from fully developing the failure of the SpMC to provide for an effective means of identifying shelters and implementing sheltering as a protective action, it compounded that error by glossing over that serious and very real problem by finding in conclusory terms without adequate factual support that the l'
entrapment of hundreds or thousands of people on Plum Island would be somehow -- and we never learn how -- solved when a response is " formulated, coordinated and implemented" or when it i
o 6
is " considered in the PAR development process.
6.
The Board's findings with regard to Shelterinn Ootion for PARS, PID 6.23-6.30, clearly do not solve these shortcomings.
First, Finding 6.23 notes that the SPMC merely includes i
sheltering as a protective action available for the permanent i
population despite the Applicants' testimony that it also is an option for everyone on Plum Island.
See supra.
- Second, the findings simply do not address many of the issues TON asserted in Contention 9.
10 i
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4 9
.t It is especially clear that the Licensing Board's decision a) to reject TON Contention 9 and b) finding of adequacy as to sheltering constitutes reversible error in light of this Board's decision in Public Service Company of New Hampshire _, ALAB-924, November 7, 1989 (slip opinion).
There. this Board reversed the Licensing Board's finding of adequacy with regard to the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan's ("NHRERp") means for providing sheltering as a protective measure.
The record in this case makes it certain that the Licensing Board's finding here regarding the adequacy of sheltering are even less adequate than those rejected by this Board in.ALAB-924.
In ALAB-924 this Board found that sheltering as a protective action was an option of " limited utility. "
Id. at 56.
And in making.that conclusion, this-Board noted that an actual shelter stddy in New Hampshire had been conducted by the Applicant as to the number of shelters on the beach area'there and the level of protection they typically afforded.
Id..at 59-60.
In contrast, the Applicants here merely " assume" that available shelters on' I
Plum Island afforded the same level of protection as in New Hampshire.
Tr. 14609.
This Board accordingly upheld that
-portion of-the Licensing Board's determination in the NHRERP proceeding that sheltering could be considered as a limited protective action but, importantly,-this Board noted that such a finding depends "upon site-specific circumstances."
Id. at 58 n.164 (emphasis add).
TON maintains-that no site-specific i-circumstances are present in the record in this case which would j
lead to the conclusion that sheltering may be considered even as 11
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a limited protective action with respect to Plum Island in u
particular and the entire Massachusetts EPZ in general.
The SPMC doesinot even identify where the shelters are to be located.
~
Moreover, the Licensing Board committed clear reversible i
error in failing to require that the SPMC provide implementation details for the sheltering option if it is to be employed.
ALAB-924 at 58-59.
The fact that the SPMC includes sheltering
" speaks volumes about the need for appropriate implementing details."
Id. at 63.
Even a protective action which is extremely unlikely to be implemented must nonetheless be 7
adequately planned for.
Id..at 65.
B.
The Licensing Board Erred in Re3ecting those portions of TON Contention 1 to the Extent it Addressed Snow Removal.
TON contended, as did many Massachusetts EpZ municipalities, that the SPMC was deficient in 1) failing to adequately' set forth the means by which the seasonal impassability roads due to snow would be addressed and 2) in failing to identify a contingency measure to deal with such 7.
The fact is apparent that the Licensing Board regarded the likelihood of flooding resulting in road impassability as so remote as to not warrant true consideration.
- Sam, e.g. pID Finding 4.23.
That finding ignores the record which established that Plum Island Turnpike becomes impassable due to flooding as often as fifteen times per year, Tr. 17884, as well as settled law on this point that "a possible deficiency in an emergency plan cannot properly be disregarded because of the low probability that action pursuant to the plan will ever be necessary."
ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 155-156 (quoting philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 713 (1985) rev. declined, LLI-86-5, 23 NRC 125 (1986)).
12 i
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-impediments.
TON Contention 1. Basis b.
The Licensing Board.
rejected that contention basis.
Egg MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - PART.
m II, p.
32; tr. 14590-14595.
TON asserts that the-Board's rejection of-that basis constitutes reversible error for the reasons set forth in the appeal brief of the Town of West Newbury filed herewith.
PART II - THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SPMC PROVIDED A REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF ADEQUATE
.t PROTECTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SPMC TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN (J1-4) AND THE EVACUATION OF TRANSIT DEPENDENT PERSONS (J1-7 BUS ROUTES)
A..
The Licensing Board Erred in Accroving the Traffic Management Plan.
TON maintained before the Licensing Board that the SPMC's traffic management plan failed to provide a reasonable assurance that evacuation would result in a reasonable assurance of-adequate protection.
322 Exhibit 1, pp. 3-13; Exhibit 2, pp.
2-12. -
As to TON's claim'that additional TCP's should be required in the SPMC, TON incorporates herein the argument of TOWN.
B.
The Board Erred in Finding that the Means of Evacuating Transit Dependent persons is Adecuate.
NUREG 0654 requires the SPMC to provide a means for relocating transit dependent-persons with the EPZ.
Id., II, J.10.g.
TON asserted in its Contention 1 that the bus routes developed in the SPMC to meet this requirement were fatally flawed.- The Licensing Board's consideration and rejection of TON's contention,_some of which is generic to other EPZ communities, is likewise fatally flawed in 1) failing to adequately consider the effect the impassability of bus routes would have on an evacuation of the transit dependent and 2) 1, 13 I
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'failing to-Provide an effective means of informing the tranelt dependent of any change in transit routes because of the impassability of roads to be utilized in the planned routes.
1.
The Licensing Board' Erred in Failing to Adecuately Consider the Imoassability of Evacuation Routes.
' lum Island roads become As noted in Part I, supra, P
impassable due to flooding and other causes as often as fifteen-to twenty times per year.
Tr. 17892.
The Board incorrectly summarized TON's testimony to be that such impassability simply i
occurs during storms.
PID Finding 4.6.
Indeed, TON's testimony made it. clear that such-impassability, while frequently i
associated with storms, last-for hours, long after storms may have ended and occurs in the spring and fall and'even in.the summer.
Tr. 17884, 17894.
The' town has in fact been attempting-
'for years to rebuild the plum Island Turnpike because of that flooding. problem. - Tr. 17895.
The height of the flood waters have reached such heights that it has been impossible for buses 4
8 L
to traverse the road.
Tr. 17905-17906.
8.
The Licensing Board minimizes the concerns in part by claiming that the bus routes, and TON bus Route 1, utilizing Plum Island Turnpike in traveling to and from the island, were initially developed "under the direction of MCDA and local municipalities."
PID p.
182'n. 37.
This is plainly an overbroad conclusion.
No-testimony was presented that TON " directed" the Applicants to prepare the bus routes that.
appear'in the SPMC although one past official may have had some input into their drafting.
Similarly, the rejection by the Board of the Interveners' assertion that the plans were rejected as. inadequate since emergency planners had not a
rejected them does not withstand scrutiny.
With respect to I
TON, one of its panel members,~Angelo Machiros, chaired the t
town's evacuation committee.
Lest there be any mistake or
(
confusion, a brief review of his testimony makes its plain F
that he rejected the plan as inadequate.
I 14 l
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f e
The Licensing _ Board's rejection of these concerns is
' patently based in large'~part on its Finding 4.23 that the probability of flooding is highly unlikely.
The Board unfortunately, throughout its findings dealing with bus routes,_
conveniently _ fails to mention the uncontradicted facts and realities concerning Plum Island, its roads and their flooding problems and, instead, merely refers to the probability of flooding as established by ficod plain maps and statistical 9
expectations.
Moreover, the Licensing Board's reliance on the flood plain maps used in this proceeding was erroneous for the reasons set forth in the appeal brief of TOWN -- the maps do not, as the Board found, show anything but where the 100 and 500 year flood plains are located.
The Licensing Board 's additional finding that_the rerouting of bus routes will eliminate any such problem, PID Finding 4.24, likewise ignores those hundreds or thousands of people on Plum Island.
No conceivable amount of rerouting will create an alternative route where no road exists.
As was set forth above with regard to sheltering, a deficiency in an emergency plan cannot properly be disregarded because of the-low probability that action will ever be required.
I 9.
The Interveners acknowledge the " realism" doctrine.
But realism works both ways.
The Licensing Board should have dealt with this problem in its real setting and not simply by resorting to hoped-for statistical expectations.
The same is true with respect to TON's claim that evacuation buses will not be able to gain access to the island since both lanes of one access road will be blocked by evacuating traffic.
People fleeing Plum Island because of a catastrophic radioactive accident will not merely use their normal travel lane in the real world as the board found.
PID Finding 4.19.
15 4
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i ALAB-924 at 65.-
A serious accident may occur, evacuation may be required and flooding may prevent the bus routes, and TON Bus Route 1 in particular, from being driven.
The SPMC does not address much less attempt to solve this real eventuality.. Nor t
could it possibly achieve a solution.
The Board's findings that the bus routes are adequate and implementable accordingly 10 constitutes reversible error.
2.
If Bus Re-Routing is Implemented. the SpMC is Deficient in Failing to provide a g
Means of Notifying the Transit Dependent o
iU population of the Route Change.
The SPMC calls for transit dependent persons to wait along designated routes for an evacuation bus to arrive.
If a route must be altered due to its impassability resulting from flooding or other obstacle, an alternative route will be determined.
PID Finding 4.24.
While this could indeed occur during.an s-evacuation, there exists no means of notifying people who have already gone to the route that no bus will arrive if that route s
has been redetermined.
Thus, the mandate of NUREG-0654 that there be a means of relocation for those people will not be met.
It is manifestly unreasonable to assume that such people will i
have portable radios with them so that possible EBS notifications to this effect will be made known to those waiting outdoors.
\\
12.
The FEMA finding as to the adequacy of the means of relocation does not alter this inexorable conclusion.
(
merely found that the procedures for the evacuation of the transit dependent to be adequate.
Exhibit 2 at par. 4 1.2; PID Finding 4.3.
Nowhere did FEMA evaluate or find the r
roads constituting bus routes themselves to be adequate.
Nor did FEMA find that the number of buses the SPMC will
[1 utilize is adequate.
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-Lacking a means of notification, no reasonable assurance that those. transit dependent persons will be relocated can be made.
t CONCLUSION' For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Licensing. Board should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted, s
\\
/ }7lltlk
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R. Scott ITilM Qhilton Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton & Rotondi 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 (508) 462-9393' Counsel-for Town-of Newbury t
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~ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Thomas S.-Moore
-Howard A. Wilber v
)
In the. Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
50-444-OL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
January 24, 1990
)
EXHIBITS TO BRIEF OF TOWN OF NEWBURY IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL OF LBP-89-32 l
3-
i 00CKEILD i'
USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 JW 25 P3:38 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD OfflCE OF SECRElARY Before Administrative Judges:-
00CKEilHG A SCHVICI:
l BRANCH
~
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman s
Thomas S. Moore l
Howard A. Wilber
)
In the Matter of
) Docket No.
50-443-OL
)
50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
(Off-Site-EP)
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
TON'S STATEMENT OF~ ISSUES PRESENTED REGARDING APPEAL OF LBP-89-32 f
1.
Did the Licensing Board err in rejecting TON Contentions 9 and 1 (in part) in its MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
.PART II (Ruling on Contentions on the Seabrook Plan'for Massachuset-.s Communities).-July 29, 1988, pp. 36-37, a
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Following Prehearing Conference),
j August 19, 1988, p.
7)?
1 i
2.
'Did'the Licensing Board err in finding that'the SPMC
=l provides a reasonable assurance of adequate protection with
. respect to the traffic management plan (J1-4)-and'the evacuation of transit dependent persons (J1-7-) in LBL-89-32, Findings 3.123-3.131, 6.23-6.30;.page 182 n.37, Findings 4.3-4.307 Town of Newbury a
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EXHIBIT 1 i
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UNITED STATES OF At4Elt1CA NUCLEAR REGULATORY (JOMiilSSION before the AToti1C SAFUTY AND LICENSING IlOARD February 19, 1909
)
In the 14atter'of:
)
)
PUBLIC SETIVICE cot 1PANY OF
)
Docket Hon. 50-443-OL-1 NEu IIAMPSillRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL-1
)
Offsite Emergency (Scabrook Station, Unito 1 and 2
)
Planning Issues
)
TOWN OF NEWBURY'S ATTENDED DIRECT TEST 1HONY Panol Memberst. Angelo tiochiros, Chairman Board of Seleckmen Roger lierry, Chief of Police I n t. rod uc t ioJ Tnin tes'.imony addreseen the [n11owing contentionst J1 4 (Traffic Management Plan)
J1 7' (Trnnsit Dependent - Bus llouten)
J1 63 (Local Government Equipment)
Summary of Testimony
-J1 4 The traffic management plan fails to provide a reasonabin.
nsourance that ovacuating traffic will be able to leave tha Town
.of Newbury (TON) in a timely and effective manner.
The traffic control posts (TCP) identified in the SPMC are inadequately staffed and are equipped insufficiently.
Other critical arcan requiring traffic direction and control are uncontrolled, liajor rout.cs are too narrow to provido for simultaneous ingress and 1
M s
3 inbound traffic will be blocked by outbound vehicles.
4 egresar The TCP's will not be able to be manned after evacuation commences -- contiol of the evacuation, once lost, cannot be obtained.
Vehicle occupants will abandon their vehicles and attempt to evacuate on foot.
Seasonal irnpedlinents periodically impede evacuation.
I JI 7 The tot 1 bus routes fail to provide a reasonable assurance that transit dependent persons will be evacuated in a timely fashion.
The routes proposed utilir.c roads which are inadequate and which will be unavailable due to evacuating traffic.
The routes will be driven an insufficient number of tines.
The routes' terminus, i.e. the transfer station is inadequate for its intended purpose.
The routes are periodically unnseilable due to uensonal impediments.
U 51 Tott lacks aufficient personnel and rosnurces to implonnent the plan in the event that Ono in unable to do so.
EXPEltIE!!CE OF PA11Eb 11E!4BERS
'l.
Angelo tinchiros has been a tiewbury selectman for nine lie has lived at the intersection of Plum Island Turnpike years.
and Old Point Itoad on Plum Island for approximately fif teen As a selectmen, he knows the number of emergency yeare.
personnel and the types of emergency equipment TOli has.
As a long-term resident of Plum Island at its most congested intersection, he has for years observed traffic patterns of vehicles leaving the island under all types of weather 2
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s conditions.
lic known from his personal experience and observations how various typen of weather conditions affect onu's ability to trave,1 on all roads in TOti, and particularly the one rond leading to Plum Island.
2.
Roger florry has been the chief of the 11ewbury Police Department since llovember, 1906.
lie became a full-time police officer in 1976.
Before that, he was an auxiliary officer for one year and a reserve officer for three years, lie graduated f rom the 11assachusetta Police Academy in 1976.
lic roccived a
' degree in criminal justice.in 1906.
lie is familiar with the road
- conditionn in TOli under all types of weather, the types of
- woathnr patterns which arino on Plum Island and throughout Toll, tho effect advene weather has on traf fic and road pausability, and the conduct of drivers under normal'and ndverso weather conditions.
Jl 4 - TRAPl'1C 11A14 AGE!1E11T PLAN 1.
Plum Island - Plum Island Turnpike is the sole road leading to the island.
It is a typical two lane rond ruoning cast atid west, one lane leading to t.he island and the other from the island, it is located in a floodplair, crossou approximately two miles of tidal marsh and crossen a bridge about one-cluarter mile in length which spans the Plum Island River.
Plum Island Turnpike and portions of other roads on the island are shown in t.he attached photographs -- au can be seen, portions of t.he roads become impassable at times of high water levels and ice cakes and other debris float onto them during high tides and remain after the tide recedon.
A map of TOli is also attached.
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-The panel members have seen the traffic leaving the.ioland j
-utider a-variety of weather conditions during all times of the year.
During the summer,.when the beaches are crowded, traffic jams f
+nt1y occur during aItornoon wookonds when people-wr visiting th aches on the inland leave.
It frequently takes s
l
. hours before traffic is flowing normally once those traffic jnne l
begin to occur.
Plum Island Turnpiko typically contains a very congested'line of extremely olow moving cars during normal summer, Inte-afternnon conditions.
The panel members have aluo soon what happens when, for' example, a sudden rain storm counon j
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many' beach visitors to leave at approximately the name timo ---at.
S tlicoe'timos, cars are backed up all over.the island.
13o t t leneel; e
- traffAc jama occur at the following internoctions
Plum Isinnd 1
d
. Turnpike und Old Polut Road, Plum Island 13oulevnzd, Sunset-Drive qy and..i!or thern - 13oulevard.
At
- 1. hose interacictions, veh bloc atLompt
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- to mergo into the one westbound lano of, Plum Islatul'Turp sihe.
During 1.or.oal conditions, thic traffic bocumes very snarled; si during sudden rain storms,. tho tra f fic becomeo ' extremely ja,nned and gridlock results at timas.
Durlug. weekends, two patrol officers are normally on-duty in TON during the day.
During summer woohondo, one additional 1
ofIleerLis on duty on the.loland.
TON does not even atLonpt to I
control t.<affic leaving the 1aland since to do so would requiro aix_to? ton ofIteers under normal nummor condiLiono and-TON doco not have that number.on duty.
In paragraph two of the testimony v.
on'this contention TON han described what, in the panel's L
. opinion, would have to be provided.
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., -.The panel has reviewed the SPllC traffic manngement plan for 3
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}l Plum Island.
That plan calls for one traffic guide to control F.
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traffic. attempting 1to leave the island.
If an emorgency occurs
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lat Seabrook Station, which requires ovacuation of the island, l
is the opinion of the panol that the traffic control provided in
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'the' SPilC would do nothing noro to f acilitato evacuation of the 2,
That is, tisland th'an would an uncontrolled.ovacuation.;
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evacuation will occur no more quickly or orderly under the SPl1C W
that control.
In forming that opinion, l
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,,than would happen without
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the panel has relied on its observations and experience, and has.
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takencinto account the fact that overyono on the island, i
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' including those who live there, would be Icaving at once instead'
'f t-i t
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'of simply-t.he.beachgoers.
'Iti addltion, t.he loani has taken - into i.
-t y,
that the uvricucon would tio utfdor stroon cor sidorMion the irct
,f In addition,-the i
- due to their fear of radiation from the plant.
the one traffic control post celled for q
l panel has considered that
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1 woul3 prcLably 'not ' oven be renned until af t.cr the evacuatior I
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s t n+ od.
Angelo itachiros lives at the intersection of Plum' Island j
Northern Doulevard and Sunset.Drivo,.whero all traffic l
Doulevard, stbound lano, on summer
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- 1eaving the island morgos into the one we weekend afternoons, he watches the traffic trying to leave the.
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anditions The traffic barely moven at all under normal island.
11 0 has often concluded when people are leaving at various timos.
while watching that traffic that, under an omergency evacuation,
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the traffic would becomo hopelonnly jammed.
!!c worked with the f
in attempting to arrive at a workable. plan Applicant in the past I
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I for evacuation until it became npparent. t.hnt evacuating the i
inland quickly enough to provido nomo lovel of protection for the 3
people there is impossible.
i For.those reasons, the opluton of the panel is that ovacueou j
i would be unable to leave the inland.
Trnffic ntlempting to morge onto Plum Island Turnpiko from florthern Itoulovnrd, Old Point Rond and Sunset Drive would becomo jammed nnd would move very slowly, and probably not at all.
Even nnnuming that the drivers of those f
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- vehicles would not-panic, frunttalion nt. not being able to 1 cave using the one westbound lano woutil naturally result in drivers l
b using both lanos of Plum Island Turnpiko in order to leave.
.This would begin quickly, before tho 'idl' were malmoil.
Control of the evacuation would accordingly bo tont bqfore the TCP could be pinced into operat. inn and it. wonid be impooniht o to gain cont.rol-s
.once it is' lost.
L 1.
. Traffic Control Pontn - The panel han formed the
- cpinion,. based on its observations of traf fic 1:l' TON and experience regarding traf fic cont rol, thnt the following are errors and. ambiguities which ent i ently oxint in the SPl1C traffic control diagrams:
A.
Traffic control Pont thi. I1-11P-01:
The dingram l
orroneously concluden that onn-traffic guide will bo able to control trafflo nttempting ourons from Plum Island in an orderly manner and nimultaneously permit
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ingress.to Plum Island.
Even assuming diligent effort by that guide, one inillvidual is not sufficient to maintain traffic flow at thin major intersection of Plum.
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Island.
The dingram leient reet ly nnnumen tiin t traffic I
converging at the int os au+et noti wili bo u t.1 I I r.ing noranni t
travol lanes only.
Tho dinyinm Inlin to acknowledge s
s that all tra f fic att.cinpt long to lonvo Plum Island will converge at thin intesnoetion or the controls which will
'l accordingly be noconnnay, les otilor to maintain control
.at the interacct. ion nnd pot in t t irnvol to the inland, an j
L emergency vehicle with Ilonhinq llyhtn nhould be pinced i
in.the middle of tho inlotnection and at lennt two-f traffic guidea should lin pr o nolit at the p
intersection,.one dithetIny untn untering Plum-1sined
-Turnpiko from Sunuot 14Ivo niel t*u other directing
-f traffic on the two remainimi nt t ects phown.
In l
s c,ddition, cach guldo nienild bn wonritig highly.
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reflective clothing niet bn nquipped with high-power flashlights.- in addlllon, LMt.,voden shou!.d be orected
^l to reduce the possib!Iit y of out flowlng traf Lie travolliig i
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on inbound lance, D.
Tra f fic Control Pon t th).J.-14P-07 :
Thin TCP in located within the City of 11ewlint yport but will handle all
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traffic exiting Plum I n l.inil.
Uno trniric guide will l
not, despite. boat, offosIn, bn nhlo.to iaorgo traffic irom
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Plum Island and Water Dteoct liito ono nouthbound inne.of Ocean Avenue /itolfe'n 1.rinn.
Thn TCP nhows one traffic guide who appears'to dlecel ttaffIc on Plum lainnd i
Turnpike.
At least uno additionni gulilo will be required.- The dingtnm nieown thnt lityt ons t o Plus !alnut!
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f t
y.
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will bo -blocked witi conne.
s hi.innun a y */, l 'Hl 7,
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p approximately onn niilin i-4 l' lion Imland Turnpihn betwoon t his intersect. ion natil l't o= lainant wan nandor l
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approximately t.wo foot of f inis t eel tl lilo wnloin; during i
i tlant time a missimum of 4v'. of I leos n uot o etaployed 1
'to control peopt o at t ne e i 6aul i o il<ilii neconn i o the
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1niand and worn bnrely i 4n in elo seu.
TrnIflO conca wonid-be incffoct.1vo to. Inooinsnope t.rtivoI.
Thu annio t
ronources identiflod wi*s. eo.insel to tho procoding l
trnific control pont. af. + lit tio oc.ployeel n t Ihin i
internoction.
lin r r i toi.l e. nio.ul.1 tio amploynel Instead of eeptuyod, thntr number uhould
,e, era: ate, if conen nao to **
i bo doubled for t.ltin niet rvosy ofher inLcrro*ution whore j
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they are used.
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C, Traffic Control l'o n t tio. I'-lH6 ti? :
Two t enI f le guition y
niid an er.crqoney volil"l = wi t ti f i noh inet lightn nhould bo located at thn intormoision of Ilo t i n ' n 1.tuio and Rou t.c 1A.
The guidon nlionld im enpii ppoil nn tioted nbove.
Traf fic conon ni o loerit o I on liont o.l A in a ~ mariner which l
will prohibit accenn nl 6unon nuit rot.urninel commuters to i
Plum Island.
Trnffle isom liolfo'n Innn anil nort.hbound e
t t.raffic on Routo lA ce"non nr thn int.ornoct.lon, leading to increased coingent loti.
The allnegram noither depicto nor takes into necoino on tior at a not.n toented within tho l
i nron shown in t.ho dison aim ( c.eg. itorgan Avenuo which intersects Route 1 A Imi u on town lin11 nei niiown and Rolfe's Lane),
llo t a nt f lo cont a ut exinto f or t.he polico i
t i
gasm
- (, s y,,
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], - g c I
s x y3 til a Lion / town hn ! !, n e*Ii" uheeo e lipal f Ient:L notivity would be expoeted.
loe
- i i c a.la n aloiulit lio unod where-
"lnleun. ennon silunilil bc
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i ennos are shown on, oi,
doubled.
A litinluann :
++6ni lol pormltn tinvol froiu h
7 Itoute 1A to Pnthen fu i - ** lin i la not nhown on the
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dlagram nor'arn conteii-ceeanni t o pl ovolit vehicles t.o A
D Honi a IA t.hr onyh t hat parking
. ntitor - Parker Str ont fit
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lot.
One t.rn t f le <pil>t. o.pii ppo l nn not.<nt nbove, would l>o necessery to pi ovoie. ieaval f 5 om Itou t.o IA to Parl;nr j
h,
. fit r ee t.
A necond t i n i 4 6.
epilda octus pimet an rioted t
La above, rahould im pine.a when a tbo t ra f fle spilde in e
_,a I
ill m 6 4 is l y cipsi ppml guides ht depleted nont town hai4 r
te b
nhould be pinuent ni e0 ion o e aeo e ion isf tilcon and linnover-fit. root e and at i ho leo. +.p t t on o f Ilot ipni, Avnnuo niid t i.o out evil ni). uneiterly t rnvol v-liout.o 1.
1nentlon of
.~n on Parl;or Stroot s'ou f l.
- n t< t t h flouhue y thni Itouto 4.
- 1 D. Traffic Coitrol,Pont 11-a 'hp p li lit ock lini in f, t.rnvol nerona Itout.o 1 ison n ni tu a e u t 4 o' fililill o Itoad g
conflicts with flowtuu,. < = enut e n I niel 7.-
The tiumber of cosios - aliould bo ib
+- 1 4 ul e von Iliott woutd prohnbly I,.
tiot. s top trnvol I n si e.
i4, 64si1.;olnn ninsold be unod.
At
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l i li flanhltel l ights niid 3
n, least two omorgoney 3.-
' i s g+1 * *. Init ont niinvo, nhould lui i:
four traf flo spildon, i
located at t.hin int os e - ilon,
't o maintnin traffic flow p
nt this intornout.lon, o--lthininsul trnvol on Itoute 1
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tihould be climluntoil ei lin en ev o s fitront nluinld be uned
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only for outbounit t:-i j.(
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. Traffic Control pont flo, thilli. Ole A Coll TCP, i t.
13.
conflicts with flowinia y non lomto 4 in that ovacuation c,
buses on'thnt routc. tie a u p p o n nel to psoceed on Parher Street through itn liit ve =oct ton wi t.li SLnto Street and 1
Itoute 1 but traffic lii stint ruinnor. in not permitted as i
e "i n t o a l l'on t o I on parker Street.
depicted.
Itor eove r, ce in impossible dun to i s oa -len'ntlon of i mmovnlil e 6
barricades whicli proliii li voit e s i nq llout.o 1 Irom Parher j
Street and additiount i is e lenilon whicli sinparnto the
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northbound and nontlit -
i thi is o 4 l a no ri.
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- 3.., Addi t ional-a r.on n-r er}o l i i sbj tinffle_eyitrol - The panel
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'nn a formed th'e opinion, baned em Itn ournelonee nin1 hoowledge of Toti and traffic ~within Toll, tlois oitotninisiel tenific flow and
- l f wo-way.trnffic will be linponoll*lo unionn all controin are in j
t place prior to tiie commencement of nn ovneuntion.
It is the opinion of the panel thnt t.b n f> l l o w lie s n i o n n t oittil r_o additional traffic. control personnel:
A.
Old Point llond, flor tlic a n 'ltou l evn t d,_i'_l ism I n i nnd Turnpike, Rolfe'n 1.nno, llanover Street,.Routo LA nuel i
,itoute 1:- In ordor to *iliitalis Iwo-waytrnifIc on theno-roads, traffic qulilon usetwl hl'thly viniblo clothing and ecpiippo.1 nit h i I. nh t t ellit n nhoilld bo loen ted niong-the entiro len sin of e wh s omt at a slintalico clonn t
- + 4 liei neliell n tIl-I VoI pnf1000 cito
. Hliough to ono allot. lion ynido another guido utii lie a moll i y v InIblo t.o the
. il r i ve r.
D.
Central Stroot ngl lumie iAi una i e o f I le spitelo a
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- u equipped as notod above, and one emergency vehicle with finshing lights _should be located at this intersection as I
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. residential traffic and trniIic from the Governor Dummer j
r.
Academy and Trit.on Regional liigh School will atteinpt to gain access to Route 1 at. this location.
Triton Regional liigh Schools A minjmum of two traffic L
C.
yl guides, equipped as noted above, nhould bo located ut this-c b
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' site, one at the front eintrnuco nnd ono nL t.ho rent f
-ontrance.
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D.
Route 1 A Bridge Simun f irJ, t hrt Parker itiver :
Three traffic guides, equipped on noted alsovo, 'nud two flanhing 11 hta should bc located emergency vehicles with 9
.at the bridge, one vehielo and t.rnffic guido at this acothbound entrance to the bridge, rat.a t.raf f)c guide in the middle of the bridge and one traffic guido and emergency vehicle at the southbound exit from the bridge.
. E.
Ilighfield Road and Scotland-Roadt-One-traffic
.. guide, equipped as noted above, is needed to permit evacuation buses to gain'necess to Scotland Road fron the liighfield Road trann f or point.
F.:
Scotland Road:
Traffic guides, equipped no noted above, should be localeel nlong Scotland Rond closo enough to one another. em ihnt whnn n driver passen ono traffic guido another tinffic guido will bo immediately visible t.o the driver.
til thout nuch controls, two-way traific will not be pons:iblo.
G.
llanover Street at 11ewbury Element.nry School At least L
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4 tuo traffic gulden, oqui t i o.1 n ei sint ed abovo, and one emergency vehicle with f l iain t ma l iqht n, will l>e needed to permit ingrenn t o l lo- + ' io n il amt ovneunt ion t.hore f ron.
11.
Itoute 95 and contral fit i e.t i At Ionnt. thren t.ra f fic guides, equipped as not o.1 nisovo, nhould be preocut.
One traffic quido and toi new qotiey vehicle with finshing lights should be located at the entrance ramp from Route 95 to Central Street, disoctinq nil Itoute 95 nor t.hbound traIfic to Contral Street.
A second tralIic guido uhould r
T be at the trp of the romp direct.ing traf fic from Interatnt.o 95 to crono linute 95.
A third traffic guide should direct such t.ro s I le to the nout.hbounid Route 95 rai'ip.
This turnaround should not, be attempted at Rout.c 95 niid Scotland Rond as pinunrol for the rennon that.
nignificantly higher o'-
, *ilon 4:affle will bo present on Scotland Rond t.hnu i "ni e n I Ill.t not.
I, e sino t.t n [ fic tiuido,
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Woodbridge School niul 1
,i o tonald I.o locnted at this equipped no noted abov*.
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41tjeparture of location to Coint.rol lho *stIVnl n1:
parents and evacuat.lon t...non.
J.
flor thorn Boulovard niid I' lum I n I n ot! T,u r,np if.,o At loanL one traffic guide, espol i..o l nn mitt 91 nhovo, and an emergency vehicle wit.h flanhing lighto is needed to traf fic onto I' lum Island Turnpike.
morge K.
Boston Rond and Rout.o 1:
One traffic guido, equipped as not.ed abovo, nhould bn located at thin intersection in order t o onnble bunos t.ruveling Newbury 12
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c Bus Routes 1 and 2 to cronn Route 1.
b.-
Route 1A and bow Stroots A t.
lennt. One traffic guido, O
equipped as not.od abovo, nlu)uld bo located nt t.his sito to enable northbound ovnennt ton hunon (flowbury Bus Itoute
- 3) to cross Route 1 and tinin accous to llay Stroot.
M.
Byflold Elementary School:
One traffic guido,
.n; oculpped as noted abovo, nhould ho located'at thio location to control'the nrrival and departuro'of.
parento and ovacuation bunen.
b JI 7 - TRANSIT Dl?t'l?tlDUtlT, 110H ROUTES i
There are four bus routes not up in t.ho SP!4C for TO!!- Two
' buses are nenigned to.each route.
I?ach rout.o is to be driven g
twice.
The panoi has foriaod tho opinion t. hat the buses will be p
unable t6 travel t.ho routes for t.ho rennone not fort.h belows g
Li
- A.
Newbury Bus Route 1:
Tho bun cannot cross Bout.o 1 in
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L oIt.her direction no eniIe'l Ion io t.ho routo because traffic conos put in pl.o o neenrding to TCPC-lin-03 doen n
not permit any vehicio' tis cronn Itoute 1 as the plan calls ior.
Ilanover Sti ont, flot f n' n 1,nno and plum 1sinnd E
'Turnpiko, the three rondn the hun in nupposed to uno t.o y
got to the island,.wi.11 bo blocked by evacuating traffic for.the reasons discunnod nbove.._Once on the inland, t.ho bus will be unablo to tinvol t. o the end of the
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island on olthor Old Point. Road or 11orthern Doulovnrd an s
the route calls for because ovacunt.ing tra f fic will i
block travel in t. hose directions on thonc roadn.
B.
. Newbury Dus Rout.u 2 :
A port.lon of Orchard Stroot hua 1
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-- yg become_ impassable when the road washed out when a strenm.
overflowed-its. banks.
The bus route does not provide nn.
alternative route should a similar occurrence take place..The bus is to cross Routo 1 at its intersect. ion l
t with>Doston Road but thn plan providos for.no traffic control at that int.ersection ond the bus will be
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-seriously delayed because of t.he utilizat. ion of Route 1.
as a major evacuation route.
Tho' bus will not be abic to re-cross Route 1 at linnover !1t r out, for t.ho reason Litat.
h TCPE-Illl-03 provides for cones whIch b1och travol in thal
. direction.
In addition, ovacunt.lon traf fic on Rout.c 1 1
will make it extremely:dIffluult. Ior the bus to crous Routo.1 at thin locat. ion.
C.
llewbury Dus Routo 3:
This bus route has boori recent.ly revised and no. longer utilizes llay Street or flowman Road, roads which had crnnt.ed problems duo.to, amona other things, periodic flooding.
Dut the bus is st.111 supposed to cross Route 1 at its intersect.lon with Doston Rond and tho namo problem results with this route as resulted with.the previous routo at t.hiu location.
Tho. bus is also supposed to t.rnvnt north on Route 1 A across the' Parker River.
A two-lano bridge spans the river at that point.
Itei'nuno no trnf fic colit. role o):ist at that bridge, the panol, based on it.s exportance and knowledge of driver bohnvlor, hno formed the opinion-y that both lanos of the bridge will be used by southbound-traffic and that the bridgo will not be accessibio to p
14 I
'_.._m L
northbound traffic as tho toutn plniin.
In fact, the t
pntici believes that the cuttro wlilth of Itouto-1A will be 1
jammed with ovacuees heading south sinco Itout.o 1 A.is = a major road leading away from Seabrook for llewburyport us-l well no 110wbury.
FinalIy. tho einito no recontly revloed u
enlis for the bus to innto a ll-t ut u on liny St root nonr f]
tlio intersection of Ilom=i-lio i.t.
Witilo it uoitId not be L
imponsible for a bus to eventuntly reverso Ato direction h
ott 'llay Stroot by goints f oi 6 a n.1 foitil n tiumbor of. tiinen l(
or - using flewman Road t o i.i n a s omed oli, thin annuuver would be extremoly til r i 4
.It I( ti ny (1Lrout io bn i nct uncel liy ovncuees.
D.
!!owbury Bus Routo 4:
't 16 6 =
out a nino hno aot'ontly buon revised.
The route now enfin for the bun to travel on Scotland Road toward tiowbitryport.
That rond util be jammed with Newburyport evacueen and travol t.oua rd flowburyport will be innpon =lblo, in addit. ion, the revised route calls for thu hun to crons itoute 1 at Parker Street.
Immovnble barricados have boon built at that-location which make cronnint Itoute 1 tliero innpos s ible.. Finally, the e nut o pl n eus for the buo t.o travel east on Parker rit t ent t o lileih Itond -- Parkor
~
Street will be jammed by Hnwburyport nnd Plum lolancl ovncucco who are t.rnvol'
, i ei e i n' oppnni to ilI rect. ion no enstbound bus traffic we i ha imponnible.
E. lTtanofor' Point:
The 11'
'y Ieai*for point In located on liighfield llo+'.
'Ihnt iond in extremely 15
\\.
I'>
m-t
' o.
4
,j narrow and winding.
Any degroo of traffic on that road 1
I will make bus travel impossible, particularly from the
~
.a.
transfer point to Scot. land Itond.
The transfer point
)
itself is really nothing more than a driveway leading t.o
}
a Hassachusetts' Electric Company substation.
Ho shelter exists there.
Very littin room exists to enahic the bun t
to turn into or turn around within'the tronofer point'.
j i
P.
Evacuation Route 2, noveis ly itecept. ion Center:
The SPl1C diagram which shows the route from the tiewbery transfer point to the B<sverly recept. inn centor inclules written
.j
. instructions.
Those laint a uct f oun, which pronumably j
would be referred.to by llic bun driver or his or her -
assistant or guide, tells the driver to make a left t.u r n D
on Downfall Road.
Downinil Itond does not exist at that
' location.
)
JI ' G3
. LOCAL GOVI:111111ENT EQUI PilENT As.noted with regard to JI 4, dealing with the traffic.
.t
.i mtanagement plan, the panel believen that traffic controlo must be r
in. place:before the evacuation begins.
TON does not have enough i
personnel or. equipment to provido t. hose controls, cvon assuming
' tliat all of its ofI-duty personnel could be cont. acted and reaponded promptly, an eventuallty highly unlikely to occur.
l
. TON'.s police department consistn eif onn chief, one deputy chief, two lieutenants, one sergeant and three patrol officers and p
. sixteen reserve patrol officorn, nuo pntrol officer / dispatcher and a' dispatcher.
Its fire-fightlug pornonnel consists of two
- full-time individuals and approxi st.oly fifty volunteers.
Thin i
k 16
.):
', [
pm
=
lh
,w V.
~
total number of'individualoJis itinuf ficient to provide the i'
traf fic controls previously ident i flod which Toll believoc would -
li L
be;necessary. 'Also, it is doubtful that enore than hnif of theno
- workers will be able to be contacted and will roupond.
In. addition, TON's vehiclon conslut tuoroly of three marked L
. police cruisers and two all-terinin vehielon, twelve fire truckn i.
of varioun si=os, four dutop t ruck a, onn pickup truck, ono personnel carrier, two tractorn, unto back hoe'and one sidewalk plow.- Toli also has one boat.
Thono vehicion are not sufficient to establish the type of traffic control Toli believes in necoscary as is set forth above.
flor is this equiprient n'ufficient to enable TOli to retuovo impediments to travel on Toll's y
y roadways'in a timely fannion, auch an ice caken which becmne n
deposited on plum Island Turnpil.o.
Dated: 11 arch./7 1909 Dy
'ft
[ts. --
11. ficott llil1-nthilton Cou viel for. Town of 11cwbury 1.ntiou l i n, - ll1 I l-Uhil ton t. Rotondi p'
79 tit. ate Street flout o r ypor t., 11A 01950 (5011) 462-9393 i
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6.
/
e UN11ED GTA1E OF At1CRICA 17UCLEAR REGULATORY COMitISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSI!JG BOARD August 14, 1909
)
In the Matter of:
)
)
pUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Doc)tet Nos. 50-443-OL-1 11EW llAMpSilIRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL-1
)
Offsite Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2
)
Planning Issues l
TOWN OF NEWBURY'S PROPOSED Fl!IDlHGS OF FACT WITil RESPECT TO Tile SpMC The Town of 11ewbury (Toli) files the following proposed findings concerning the SpMC.
These address sections 3 (Traffic Management Plans), 4 (Evacuation of Transit Dependent Persons) and 10.1.13 (Coordination of Government Resources and Response) of Applicants' proposed Findings (Applicants' P.F.),
pursuant to the Board's instructions. TON will follow the order of the Applicants' proposed finding.
A proposed finding adding letter designations, e.g.
3.1.1B(a)., etc. to Applicants' numbering system is a separate proposed finding which TON believes is related to the topio in Applicants' proposed finding of that i
number.
Where no express agreement is set forth in connection with any finding, ruling or conclusion proposed by Applicants, and there is no finding, ruling or conclusion substituted or bearing TON's additional designation, TON disagrees with Applicants' proposal.
To the extent that any other Intervenor has submitted a substitute or additional proposed finding (s) TON d
e e
p V
?* ;
' adopts the proposed finding (s). submitted by othtr Int;rvanors.
3.1.17.
Toll'provided detailed testimony relating to issues i
presented in J1-4.
The testimony was presented by its police
~ chief. Roser-Merry, and the chairman of its Doord of Selectmen, AngeJ o Machiros.
TO!1 Dir., ff. Tr. 17001, pagJtim..The TOM panel
. explained 'in detail in their direct examinati6n and during the cross-examination of them why they justifiably have concluded y
F that-implementation of the SpMC would result in an evacuation of p
the Town of Newbury which would be no more rapid or efficient F
i;
'than an uncontrolled evacuation.
3.1.10.
The Applicants have attempted to minimize the
" negative impact of the TON panel's testimony during this i
proceeding (Applicants' pF 3.1.10).
The efforts of the A'pplicants.to minimize Chief Merry's testimony, for example, is i;
not based on a full 1and complete review of the TON panol's i
b
. testimony as a-whole but, rather, on isolated segments of testimony taken:out of context.
The. TON panel's testimony as a whole,is-logical, persuasive and-compelling.
The Board makes L
this findina based upon the detailed review of their testimony as L
oppears in the.following subparagraphs.
3.1'.10(a).
The Doord finds that both members of TON's. panel-4 4
.are competent to testify on the subjects they addressed.
Chief t;
Merry has been a full-time polico officer since 1976 and was a Cparty-time officer bofore then, lin has graduated from the
' Massachusetts police. Academy and holds a degree in criminal E
3ustice.
lie is familiar with the road conditions in TOH under n
all types of weather. the types of weather patterns which arino 2
- i,.
I
Yn' V
4 t
c:
.on. plum Island end through TOII, the effect adverse weather has on l"
traffic.ond road passability in Totl, and the conduct of drivern under normal and.adverso weather conditions in TOti.
Chief j
s 7
-llerry's personal knowledge and observations of these events and j
I factors is vastly superior to that posttensed by any wituces or i
E panel of witnenses presented by the Applicants or the staff.
I -
Indeed. no evidence was. presented to this Board that any witness b
b>
presented by the Applicants or the staff had ever observed lorne-
}
numbers of people leaving plum Island or llewbury at approximately r'
o the same time or that any of those witnesses had visited the l
I Ii island or:the town during periods of inclement weather.
{
F Observations of these conditions, on tbo other hand, are common t;
L
~
L if not daily experiencos of Chief Morry.
tot 1 Dir., ff. Tr. 17001
[
p
.at:2-6.
perhaps. oven inore compelling testimon) of the conditions i
relating to plum Island were. presented by. Chairman Machiros.
The
(-
q
< chairman has been' a, selectman for nine years and lives at the p
I intersection where all traffic evacuating Plum Island-will r
convorge in order to gain access to-the one westbound lano of-e roadway J onding from the. island.
Ld., Tr. 17340-41.
'3.1.10(b).
Access to and from Plum Island is via the Plum
~ Island Turnpike, a typical two lano road.
The road is established in a floodplain, crosses approximately two miles of title marsh and crossos a drawbridge which spans the plum Island Iliver and which is approximately ono-quartor milo in longth.
TON
-e Dir., ff. Tr. 17001 at 3 Tr. 17407.
While the Applicants' a
11obuttal-Panel No. 9 prof essed to have visited Plum Island i
'a combined total of thirty or so timos, Tr. 17409, the Doard is i
k 3
1 9
i
+
4
p b
f; o
e fda troubled by the' lack of ineaningful knowledge they acquired o
thereby.. For e>: ample. Applicants' panoi had noticed, j
when driving over the bridge leading to the island. an enclocure com:nonly associ'ated with. drawbridges on the bridge Tr. 17 352-353,.but it did not register on any of=that panel's members until
[
they' testified that the bridge indeed was a drawbridge.
Tr.
17407.
3.1.10(o).
portions of. plum Island Turnpike and roads on k
t plum Island itself become impassable at times of high water.
L levels.
In addition, ice cohes nnd other debris float onto_those p
ronds during high tides:and remain after the-tide racedes.
TOH E
I Dir.. ff. Tr. 17001 ab 3.
plum Island Turnpike becomes Q
f'
' impossible due to flood waters as many as fifteen times per year, L
-Tr. 17092,-normally in the winter, fall and spring but this i.
't
}\\
condition has'also occurred in the summer with as many as 15,000 i
people on tho island.
Tr. 17004, 17094.
Flood waters alone at i
[
, times render' plum Island Turnpike irnpassable for up to seven
~
hours. Tr. 17895.
But the cause of the irupassability.of the plum p
Island evacuation routes is not limited solely to. flood or-tido
[
L L
waters.
Larne' amounts of debris-(tree trunks, huge ice cahos, J
h even furniture and appliances) are deposited on the roads and-remain after flood or tide water recodos.
This debris must then i
be removed and the roads remain impassable for as many as ton W
hours while-this work is being dono.
Tr. 17099.
14ero accidents l
on.tho sole road leading to the island cause it to be scaled off s
I.
to.. travel for up to five hours.
Tr. 17054-17055.
Simple festivals at an airport abutting Plum Island Turnpike cauces V
q i
P i
+
e
+
4' i;C.;'
Ib'
[
traffic to back up for miles down Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane as far as Route 1A and beyond.
Tr. 17823.
The flooding and tide problems of plum Island Turnpike are also present on Sunset h
Boulevard and Old point Road on the island itself, both of which I
would be used leaving in the event of an evacuation.
t-3.1.1B(d).
TON's panel members have seen traffic leaving in Plum Island under a variety of weather conditions during all times of the year.
During tha summer, when the popular beaches E
on the island are crowded, traffic 3ams frequently occur during L
summer afternoons when people visiting the beaches leave.
It frequently takes hours before traffic flows normally once these p
traffic 3ams begin to occur.
Plum Island Turnpike typically contains a very congested line of extremely slow moving cars during normal, late-afternoon conditions.
- 14. at 4.
Accidento L
which occur at the entrance to the island seal it off to traffic for up to five hours.
Tr. 17854-17855, 3.1.18(e).
TON's panel members have aleo personally observed what happens, for example, a sudden rainstorm causes many bea'ch visitors to leave at approximately the same time -- at I.
these times, cars are bached up'all over the island.- Bottleneck traffic jams occur at multiple intersections on the island where
' vehicles attempt to merge into the westbound lane of Plum Island Turnpike.
During normal conditions this traffic becomes very snarled; during rainstorms the traffic becomes extremely 3ammed and gridlock'results at times.
TON does not attempt to control such traffic'under normal conditions since it has insuffielent personnel on duty to do so.
Id.
x
g'm g?,
e 3.1.18(fl.
Despite these problems, the SPMC traffic monar.ement plan roerely calls for one traffic guide-to control all F
of the traffic leaving the island.
M at 5.
Dut even that eno r<
4 i
traffic centrol point will not be staf fed until almost three or
'four hours have passed from-the timo the ovacuation begins.
Tr.
i 17 m
i If an emergency occurs at Seabrook Station which requ3res L
17347.
g evacuation of tho island, it is plain that.the traffic contro) l h,..
[
provided in the SPMC would do nothing more to facilitato E
i evacuation of the' island than would occur in the event of anu
[
uncontrolled evacuation.
That is, ovacuation of the island will occur no more quickly or orderly under the SpMC than would occur l
- s I
without that control.- Tott Dir., ff. Tr. 17001 at 5.-
Under
[
r; normal conditions, traffic converging at the ono intersection where all traffic meets to leave the island barely moves; under j
an cmergency evacuation with all residents-and visitors on'the
'.^
island leaving at once, traffic from the island would become.
i liopelessly 3ammed.
M.
Frustration of-the-drivers at being r
I lunable to merge onto plum Island Turnpiho would naturally lead to i
frustration at not being able to evacuato using the one-bound lane and.this naturally would result in drivers using both lanes of plum Island Turnpike in order to evacuato.
This'would occur
-quickly, before any traffic control was in place.
Control'of evacuation from the island would accordingly be lost quickly and it would be 1:npossible to gnin control once it is lost.
El a t 6 -
-7.
'The Board accordingly rejects the assertion of staff witness Urbanik to the offect that he sece no difficulty in the concept of traffic guides establishing control after they arrive at an 6
f 4
r o
assigned-congested _ intersection.
-Tr.
26663.
The plain fact is i
L that the sole traffic guido provided in thu SPMC for Plum Island V
will not be able.to arrive at the assigned post at all during on evacuation..
3.1.18(g).
Moreover, even if vehicles could get to Plum
-Island Turnpike, the SPMC provides for no traffic control after-leaving, the island until vehicles arrive at the intersection of
[
Plum Island Turnpike and Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's. Lane.
It is unrealistic and~ unreasonable to assume, as the SPMC does, that
. drivers will merely utillso the one ogross lane of, Plum Island Turnpike or any other road leading to the inajor evacuation routes
. for this area, namely. Interstate 95, Houte 2 and Route 1A.
TON l
Dir.. ff._Tr.l17801 at 6-6, 10-13.
[
3.1.24.-
The primary ob.lective - of traf fic management is. to.
E
- f acilitate the ' movement of people away from the area of concern.
[
-The_ultimato~ goal is that of done reduction.
To meet that goal, a-traf fic management plan should seek to f acilitate the movement of people away from Seabrook Station and not merely to move b
people out of the ten milo radius-around the~ facility.
Thus, the Applicants' efforts here, which are simply directed on reducing overall' evacuation timo es timates, merely addressos nun of the
- Bools of evacuation traffic management.
The Applicant anrecs that: additional traffic control points in TON would assist to facilitate traffic movement.
Tr. 17355,-17357-17350.
- Indcod, i
the Applicant's panel belloves that additional traf fic control points' would assist in~ traf fic movement at nity intersection where i
7 l
(.
2 4
v Ji 3
D
..i i
j s
.there is significant competing traffic flow.
Id.
But while the Applicants' witnesses recognine that such control would j
h' faellitate movement further from Seabrook Station, the plan fails L
f; to pro' vide those additional controls and, instead, merely
]
'provides for-control at areas where tremendous volumes of traffic i'
would be expected which merely has as a goal the lowering of the overall evacuation time estimates.
In other words, the overall L
5 goal of traffic management'as provided in the SPMC is merely to.
l e,
reduce E.T.E.'s although, with additional controls, people could j
still be moved further from Seabrook Station even if E.T.E.'s are not reduced.
The Board rejects the Applicants' approach to j
evacuation planning as being fundamentally misguided in itn philosophy.
3.3,36.
TCP's should be des 3sned to facilitate evacuating traffic movement away from Seabrook Station in a safe and orderly manner.
When additional TCP's can accomplish these goals, and here the Applicants acknowledge that additional TCp's would assist in moving-traffic. Tr. 17357, they should be provided in order to mas:imize dose reductions.
Within TON, maintaining traffic flow will be virtually impossible unless all controls are in place before the evacuation commences..
TON Dir., ff. Tr.
17801 at 10.
This is particularly true with regard to the narrow a
two' lane roads leading to and on Plum Island.
The following controls.must be present within TON before the coal of a
facilitating and maximizing traffic movements and dose reduction are met (but the SPMC provides none of them).
3.1.26(a).
In order to maintain two-way traffic on Old 1
e L
i l
I
+
4 fF' '
J
. Point Road, llorthern Boulevard, Plum Island Turnpike. Rolfe's Lane and llanover Street. traf fic guides should be located a3'ong the length of each road at a distanco close enough to one'another P
f
'so that when a driver passes one guide another guide will be readily visible to the driver.- JA.
This is'the route which will be' driven by every vehicle leaving Plum Island.
TON Dir.,
ff, Tr. 17001 at attached Zoning Map.
By the applicant's testimony, more than 3,000 vehicles will utilise this route during an evacuation.
Tr. 17337.
The SPMC's goal of merely 4
providing one traffic guide ~for Plum Island, and then not until-three or four hours after the evacuation has commenced Tr.
t 17347, is inadequate.
The Board rejects the SPMC's method of facilitating traffic movement from the is3and as being wholly inadequate.
j 3.1.26(b).
At '
st one traffic guide should be present at
^
the intersection c.'
. tral Street and Route 1A to facilitate the evacuation of_res.
)s and the Governor Dummer Academy and Triton Regiona)
School which both are located near this intersection.
TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 10-11.
3.1.26(c).
A minimum of two : guides should be located at the two entrances ~ to Triton Regional liigh School in order to facilitate movement of traffic to the school by parents and
-buses.
13 o
3.1.26(d).
Traffic guides should also be located at the i
bridge which spans the Parker River on Route 1A.
Route 1A is a major evacuation route from Newbury as well as from Newburyport.
Tr. 17363-17364.
Route 1A is a relatively wide two-lane road 9
4 i
0-2J
m
+,
p i.
+
4 t
e wh3ch would easily accommodate two lanes of evacuating traffic while nevertheless permitting one lane'of roadway to be open for ingress by, for example returning commuters.
But the Parker River Bridge, which is approximately one-quarter mile long, consists merely of two lanes and has no shoulders.
Tr. 17394-17395.
Thus as it is probable that Route 1A will contain two I
lanen of' evacuating vehicles when approaching the bridge, no controls are present to-facilitate the merging of those Janes into one outbound lane and it is most improbable that drivers of evacuating vehicles will merge on their own.
Thus, as the plan provides for.no-control at this site, the bridge will likely be Lused entirely by evacuating vehicles thus completely blocking l
inbound travel by returning commuters, tow trucks, evacuation
' buses and any other inbound traffic.
S3milarly. Old Point Road on Plum Island is merely seventeen feet wide.
Tr. 17384.
It
' will not accommodate two outbound and one inbound lane.
It is natural that, given the fact that the residential portion of Plum
' Island is densely populated with many of the lots there being less than 500 square feet in size, Tr. 17386, drivers will
]
naturally utilize both lanes of old Point Road and render inbound
' traffic' impossible.
Moreover, none of the streets which comprise the evacuation' route from Plum Island, i.e., Plum Island Turnpike. Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane and Hanover Street, will accommodate two outbound and one inbound lane of traffic.
Yet it I
is probable that drivers will form two lanes of outbound traffic.
I Inbound traffic by returning commuters, evacuation buses and the t
like will accordingly be impossible.
Tr. 17387.
The SPMC is 10 i
l
3.
i j.
of in'failing to recognize and provide for a meant.
inadequate This is true even though facilitating travel along these routes.
the Applicants' panel acknowledges that additional traffic guides "will be able to assist traffic in many locations in Dewbury."
Tr. 17376.
For example, Applicants' panel acknowledges that additional guards would assist traffic movement if they would be
]
located along Route IA, AlcDa llanover Street. Alnng Route I and along Plum Island Turnpike.
Tr. 17377.
In addition, the Board finds that additional guards are necessary Al2DE Bush h
Eoulevard/Rolfe's Lane as that road necessarily must be taken to a
evacunte from the island.
Thus, Applicants' panel agrees with 3
l TON's assertion that traffic control must be provided along the Plum Island. evacuation route and' the Board so finds Id.
TON Dir., ff. Tr.'17801 at 10.
3.1.33. The Applicants assert that it is not necessary to provide for additional TCP's so long as those additional TCP's would not reduce the overall ETE.
That philosophy permeates the applicants traffic management plan.as~ set forth in the SPMC.
I This Board rejects that philosophy and the Applicants' I
approach.
The goal of emergency planning is to move people away This Board has consistently ruled that
=from the area of danger.
to maximise dose reduction.
Tr.
the goal of the SPMC should be 17538.
In the case of this plant, the Applicants should strive to move people away from Seabrook Station and not merely out of j
the ten mile radius around the facility.
Since Applicants acknowledge that additional TCPs could be added which would TR 17355-facilitate movement of traffic away from the facility.
11 B
3-
-4 v
t c.
17376, tho-5PMC is inadequate in that it falls to maximite dose reduction by failing to provide for additional TCp's which the
-Applicants concede would facilitate movement away from Seabrook Station.
Moreover, the record is devoid of any ev3dence that it would be unreasonable or impractical to provide the additional TCp's the Applicants acknowledge would assist in facilitating traffic movement.
3.1.30.
Applicants appear almost to assert that the SpMC is in reality the result of the combined input of the police chiefs in the affected municipalities.
The Board declines to find that the SpMC is adequate simply because five police officers at some point in the past providad input to the Applicants.
Indeed, in the case of TON, municipal officials as well as the former police chief cooperated for years with the Applicants in attempting to devise evacuation plans which would facilitate the timely and efficient evacuation of people.
In fact, witness Machiros was Ii the. chairman of TON's evacuation committee.
Tr. 17056.
It was only1after TON made a sincere effort to assist in developing a plan that it became apparent to its officials that one could not be devised.
TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17001, 5-6. that the former Newbury chief of police may have attempted to assist in in developing TCps is not taken by this board to mean that TON's panel is incorrect in concluding that the proposed TCps are
'i na'd e qu ate.
The Applicants provided no evidence whatsoever concerning that former Newbury official's bachground or experience and acknowledged that he had frequently brcought to the 12
I 4.
attention of the Applicante the is cource limitations that e>:let 3
in-TOH.
Tr. 17368.
3.1.42.
While TON will exert its best effort to respond to an emergency at Seabrook Station, its resources are inadequate to provide necessary traffic and access control.
T0li merely has eight full-time police officers and seventeen reserve patrol officers.
Its fire f3ghting personnel consists merely of two full-time individuals and approximately fifty volunteers.
It is unlikely that more than half of these workers will be able to be contacted and will respond in a emergency.
TON Dir. Cf. 18601 at 16-17.
It is plain that reserve of ficers and volunteer fire fighters normally hold regular jobs and that to simply contact each of those potential responders could require significant numbers of hours and the services of one or more persons who are on duty to contact them.
The actual number of people within TON who realistically would be available to respond in the event of an emergency probably total no more than twenty-five to thirty.
This number is inadequate ~to establish the-type of traffic i
control which this Board has found to be necessary.
This Board also rejects Applicants' assertion that other agencies or the state police would facilitate the response of local
. municipalities for the obvious reason that their numbers are lihewise limited and will likely be deployed at the maior i
evacuation routes of Interstate 95, Route 1 and Route 1A and not on local ronds such as plum Island Turnpike and roads on plum Island.
Finally, the equipment available to TON is insufficient in number and type to establish the traffic control which is 13
,,i
y
.a
- , e - i I
4 hac;sscry in ord;rito fccilitoto the ovacuation of the tovin or even to remove impediments, such as ice cakes and other debris which frequently become deposited on Plum Island Turnpiho, in E
order that the roads in TON can be used in a timely fashion.
14 at 17, 3.1.46.
The sole TCP on Plum Island will not be staffed until appr'o::imately three to four hours af ter the order to evacuate.
Tr. 17347.
Of course, this assumes that inbound travel on Plum Island Turnpike and Rolfe's Lane in TON is even possible at that t3me, Tr. 17351, a proposition which this Board I
^
rejects.
Even accepting the Applicants' assertion that merely 3,000 vehicles have been observed by it to be on Plum Island, Tr. 17337, that easily could translate into more than 10,000 evacuees-easily. Given this fact and the existence of.the single i
lanes of travel available to those evacuees, this TCP should be i
one of the first traffic posts manned and not one of the last.
Otherwise,-travel to the' island by, for example, evacuation buses and returning commuters would be impossible as evacuees will naturally use both outbound lanes and thereby bloch inbound i
traffic.
3.1.49.
Activating the sole TCP provided from Plum Island will be. impossible as planned.
While it may be common for police I
to establish control during congested conditions, such as at the scene of an accident, that is an isolated incident spatially and
' does not involve the mass exodus of vehicles using very limited i
roadways.
The Board finds that the Applicants will be unable to 14
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.._ctoff tha TCP'a plann:d'for Plum Is1cnd,' tho intersection of Plum l
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- Island Turnpike and Ocean Blvd./po]fe's Lano for the reason that l
h
_is
-- j Linbound travel to those locationn will be linpossible where, as 1
'the case here, the evacuation will already have been under way
[
for hours before the. attempt to establish those controls is made.
{
TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17680 at 4-10.
)
l 3.1.02.
As pointed out by the Applicants in their proposed-findings. TON indeed take the position that the SpMC is I
deficient.because, in the event of a flood, it would be L-L
. impossible to leave the inland.
TON's concern about that
-deficiency in the SpMC is justified in taking into account that plum Island Turnpike not only any become impassable but that it U in fact regularly does become impassable.
Typically, p
l
' impassability results at-times of high water icvels and when ico-cakes and debris float onto.that road.
TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17801 at 3, Tr. 17899.
For example, on January 2, 1987, approximately one mile of Plum Island Turnpike became impassable for hours when it
-was under about two feet of flowing tide waters.
Id. at 8.
This not an extremely isolated or unlikely event.
Indeed, that road
)
is. subject to flooding on a routine basis, as frequently as fifteen times per year.
Tr. 17892.
Applicants recognize that y
such an event at the time of an emergency at Seabrook Station
- make,the. evacuation of Plum Island impossible.
Tr. 17382-17383.
4 To deal with that insoluble problem, the Applicants simply stato
-that'such an impediment would be a fact which would be considered in making the appropriate protective action
'I 15 f,
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p 7
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' recommendation, l.d., Applicants'-PF 3.1.82.
Undoubtedly,-the Board can take the Applicents at their word when they say they will consider this problem if and when it arises in generating i
their PAR recommendation.
The promise to consider this problem, however, cannot lead the Board to conclude that a reasonablo assurance of adequate protection will result.
First, the s3mple fact is that there is no alternative method of evacuation or e.
route of evacuation proposed or possible for Plum Island.
Tr.
17382-17383.
Thus, the only alternative PAR would be sheltering.
The Applicants have provided no information to this Board of the P
shelterins capacity of plum Island from which a finding of l
adequacy could be made.
And a significant portion of Plum Island, six or seven miles of its length, is made up of the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge.
In that refuge, only one l
l shelter was identified by the Applicants as being available for j
sheltering but was characterized as being nothing more than "a l
six foot by six foot shack" Tr. 17383-1784.
Assuming that this Board should. accept the Applicant's testimony _that almost two i
thousand vehicles were observed on plum Island South, which i
-includes the refuge, Tr. 17337, that means that hundreds and potentially thousands of people could be trapped in the refuge with no means of shelter and no means of evacuation.
While f
Applicants argue that it is unlikely for large numbers of people
-to be in the refuge during storms and that such an event is j
accordingly unlikely, it is apparent that flooding does not i
always occur simultaneously With a storm.
Indeed, higher than normal tides are the chief cause of the flooding of Plum Island n
i 16 L
aj
n 3
- Turnpike and such tides could be caused many, many hours after a R
storm passes if the storm is $n fact the direct cause of the final result of flooding.
TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17001 at 3.
But even if the number of trapped people in the refuge were hundreds and not thousands,
.though they plainly could be thousands -
there is no assurance that the SpMC provides them with any protection in the least.
Nor does the SPMC provide for any method of dealing with ice cahes and other debris which float on to roads such as plum Island Turnpike and render them impassable.
TON Dir. ff.
Tr. 17801, at'3, Tr. 17899.
While flood waters recede, debris-which rondors roads impassable must be physically removed and the SpMC makes no provision for accomplishing this.
4.
EVACUATION OF TRANSIT DEPENDENT PERSONS 4.1.2.
While FEMA has found the procedurec for the evacuation of the transit dependent adequate, FEMA has nct evaluated the evacuation routes.whether the number of buses to be used on individual routes are adequate given the characteristics of the individual. routes and numbers of transit dependent persons to be picked up or whether the roads to be driven by the buses are adequate for the intended purpose.
i 4.1.5.
TON's panel of witnesses testified to serious i
difficulties which will be encountered in attempting to implement
-the bus evacuation plan.
TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 13-16.
4.1.5(af.
It is planned that Newbury bus route H1 will leave the transfer point, travel on the same roads being used by all Plum Island evacuees and, after picking up their riders, 17
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return to the transfer point.
liowever, the Board finds that this 4
bus will be unable to travel on llanover Street. Ocean i
Blvd./Rolfe's Lane, plum Island Turnpike, Old point Road and LSunset Boulevard since evacuees, who will have commenced evacuation prior =to the bus runs and before TCP's in Dewbury are manned, will be utili::ing all inbound travel lanes.
Isl.
The Boards findings with regard to these issues supra, are incorporated herein.
Once on Plum Island, the buses will be unable to travel to the northern portion of the island on Old Point Road or Northern Blvd. as planned because evacuating vehicles will block inbound travel on those roads.
Jf.
4.1.5(b).
A portion Newbury bus route #2 has become
)
i impassable when one of its roads, Ocean Street, has washed out when a stream overflowed its banks.
The SPMC provides no
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alternative route should a similar occurrence take place durinn an evacuation. -The buses which drive route #2 are to cross Route 3
1 at its intersection with Boston Road-but the SPMC fails to l
provide any traffic control at that intersection.and the bus will be seriously delayed in crossing Route 1, if it can at f
all, because of.the utilication of Route 1 as a major evacuation J
route.
Id. at'14.
The buses of route #2 are planned to again cross H
Route 1 in returning to'the transfer point (at the intersection d
of Route 1 and llanover Street) but evacuation traffic will
. seriously delay crossing Route 1 if the bus is able to cross that q
l evacuating traffic at all.
1
-4.1.5(c).
Newbury bus route 113 calls for the bus to travel 18 4
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y north on Route 1A across the Parker River.
A two-lane bridge spans the river at that point and, for the reasons set forth above (Route lh is a major evacuation route, two lanes of couth-bound traffic will undoubtedly occur at this bridge, no traffic controls exist at this location), the bridge will not be
- accessible to the bus which will be north bound at this location.
t.
4.1.5(d).
Newbury bus route #4 provides that the bus will travel-on Scotland Road for a significant distance.
Scotland
' Road is-a ma$or route which large numbers evacuees from the City of Newburyport~will use to gain access to Interstate 95.
Accordingly, it will likely be 3ammed with evacuees and it is unlikely that the buses will be able to drive on th.ts portion of the route as planned, ld at 15.-
4.'1.5(e).
The Newbury transfer point is located on liighfield Road, a road that is recognized by the Applicants' panel to be narrow and winding. Id. at 15 Tr. 17403.
Any degree of traffic on that road make bus traveling impossible, particularly north from the transfer point to Scotland Road.
Very111ttle room exists to enable the bus to turn into or around within the transfer point and, if liighfield Road is used by backing onto it by the bus will be extremely difficult
- evacuees, if not impossible.
The transfer point consists of nothing more 3
i than an electric substation area with a seventy-five foot drive-way which is no wider than fifteen feet leading to it.
Tr. 17399-17400.
No shelter is provided at the transfer point for transit dependent evacuees.
Moreover, liighfield Road is merely sixteen feet wide at its narrowest point.
Tr. 17397.
19
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c That point is located south of the tranofer point and three of-
~
.the four Newbury bus routes leave from and return to the transfer point'in'that direction.
Since at lease seventeen feet of road width is needed for two buses'to pass each other, Applicant's pF 4.1.12, it will be impossible for these three routes to be driven as planned.
4.1.5(f).
It is planned that full buses, once they complete their. routes, will drive straight to the reception center in Beverly.
Tr. 17401.
If the buses are not full when=they complete their routes, however, it is planned that the buses will i
return to the transfer point where they will discharge their l
The passengers will wait in a bus at the transfer Jpassengers.
point until that bus becomes full of evacuees.
That bus will j
i then transport.them to the reception center.
Tr. 17401-403.
l!
However, merely one bus is being=provided which will wait at the reception center for evacuees who will be dropped off there for i
transportation to the reception center.-
TR 17404.
In addition, only two buses are planned for each of the four routes (a total i
of eight buses) and it is estimated that each bus _will merely j
it drive its route once.
There is no reasonable insurance that the fl 1
the number of buses which are being provided for TON are adequate y
to meet the transportation needs of the transit dependent.
It is 1
i apparent that the Applicants do not know whether the number of e
-\\
buses to be utilized in TON are adequate: Applicants' panel
-testified that they will know whether to have the buses drive their routes more than once only if the buses are full after they complete a route.
Tr. 17404.
But since full buses will travel D
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.directly to'the reception center in Deverly, N'r. 37401. A t 10 plain that there simply will be no additional buses to drive routes more than once if that becomes necessary.
Moreover, the Applicants acknowledge that they have no way of knowing whether or how many transit dependent persons have gone to bus routes $n order to ride the evacuation bus after the bus has driven the route.
Tr. 17405.
The fact that buses will not start driving the routes until sometime after the evacuation commences does nothing to solve this problem; buses will be impeded as set forth above and transit dependents may simply miss the first bus or two because they are waiting in their homes and not outside where they have no protection.
Finally, nothing is provided in the SpMC for transit dependents in the Refuge.
4.1.5(g).
The SPMC leaves it to individual bus drivers to decide'how to travel from the Newbury transfer point to the Beverly reception center.
Tr. 17402-17403.
The Board finds this to be inadequate.
The drivers of the buses will be provided with no information concerning which of the possible routes to the reception center is the best at any particular time.
In addition, the bus drivers will be unable to acquire information on their own as to which route to choose.
Id.
4.1.10.
The Board finds that the Applicants' testimony concerning transit dependents are competent to serve as witnesses on the subjects they address.
The Board likewise finds that TON's panel was competent to testify on the subjects they addressed-with regard to transit dependents.
TON Dir., ff. Tr.
21 I
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l'7001'at 13-16.
With regard to the' Applicants' panel, however, p
the Board does not find that the information they provided was 1
persuasive.
Much of the testimony of the Applicants' panel, I
which also in addressed below in finding 4.1.12, was haced on information provided to the panel which the panel colored and interpreted in the light most favorable to the Applicants.
For
- example, the panel glossed over the fact that Boston Road, used in bus routes, in merely sixteen feet wide.
Tr. 17390.
In addition, the; pane) incorrectly claimed that a dump truch was observed to pass a bus on Boston Road.
Tr. 17390-17392.
It was developed in examination that the panol relied on page 120 of Attachment I to their testimony in making that claim and that j
they possessed no information of any truck passing any bus other-than the incident described in' Attachment 1.
But Attachment I plainly. states that a bus and dump truck passed one another on l
Orchard Street and is wholly silent of any description of a bus l l
i i
passing a dump truck on Boston Road, ld.
In fact, it was even developed in examination of Applicants' panel that the-school bus was stopped on the shoulder of the road (undoubtedly Orchard Street) when the dump truck passed it and the panel had j
absolutely no information concerning how far onto the shoulder
'i the bus was when the truck passed.
Moreover, Applicants' panel j
claimed that Old Rowley Road, which is utilized by 11ewbury Bus 3
l Route 3, is~ fifteen feet wide with " additional shoulders."
Tr.
17396.
It was developed through cross-examination that the 3
A additional shoulders, when combined, added merely eight inches to j
the portion of that road which can be driven upon.
- Finally, I
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'd while Applicants' panel testified that two busee were obeelved to pues on Hichfield Road, the panel did not know where that had occurred but, in any event,'one bus was pulled over and stopped at the side of the road at the time the incident was observed.
Tr. 17398.
Based on these factors, the Board puts little weight on the testimony of the Applicants' panel with regard to the bur routes in TON or how well those routes will accommodate
[
evacuation of transit dependent persons.
4.1.11.
While evacuation bus routes may initially have been 0
h developed undor'the direction of flessachusetts Civil Defense p
Agency or local municipalities, it is a simple truism that those agencies and municipalities, after attempting to devis'e a plan which would provide a reasonable assurance of protection, concluded that they were unable to accomplish that objective.
While Applicants argue that the fact of state or local municipal input equates with state or local municipal beliefs of adequacy, the. reverse is more likely:
the Commonwealth'of Massachusetts r
and municipalities within the emergency planning zone sincerely
[
L attempted to devise a plan which would provide protection for their inhabitants but, with ample justification, concluded that
~
local conditions made such planning. impossible.
4.1.38.
This Board does not find persuasive the contention
\\
t of the Applicants that, TON roadways within a floodplain are all' a 100-year floodplain,.and that there is thus only a probability of 0.10 that ma3er flooding would occur on these roadways in any given year or that it is highly unlikely that these roadways will be rendered impassable by flooding at the time of an emergenc:r at 23
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P,,-
<i. 02nbrook Stotion.
Firot, flooding with3n TON bza cimply occurr d ' -
To g.
3 in fact much more often than Applicants' predictions would indicate.
Second, Applicants plainly do not fully understand i
TON's concerns with regard to flooding:
it is not merely flood
-gaigr_a which renders roads impassable, debris which those waters
[
i
-deposit and-leave.on the roads continue to render the. roads-impassable after the water recedes.
TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 3.
Finally, the evidence Applicants rely on to make that l
assertion does not support that claim; the roads plainly could be
.in a 25, 50 or 75 year floodplain.
Thus, while it may not be pr,obable that these roadways will be rendered impassable due to flooding.during an emergency evacuation, neither can it be said s'.
that such an event is highly unlikely. Indeed, as noted Eupla, such floods occur as frequently as fif teen time s per year,
)
4.1.19.
When bus evacuation routes become impassable to 1
local flooding or other impediments, alternate routes to Plum Island do not exist.
Tr. 17382-17303.
.While the SPMC provides 4
no for procedures to be followed if rerouting is necessary, amount of rerouting will result in evacuees from Plum Island, conceivably numbering in the thousands, from being able to leave the island.
Id.
I;f COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE 10.
i 10.1.13.
TON plainly.does not have sufficient personnel.and i
equipment to.promptly implement the extensive traffic controls which TON officials believe would be necessary and which Applicants' witnesses concede would help to facilitate traffic TON Dir., ff.
4 movement along many critical evacuation routes.
24
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g.
gr F'.
[u. 9 c;,.;
t,,
i, R cf Tr. 17 8 01 a t' 3 0- 13. :16-17 3. Tr. 17355-17358; Tr. 17376-17377.
Nor f,
doen TON possess equipment sufficient to enable it to remove
. impediments to travel cuch as ice. cakes and other debris which I
h i,,
s become deposited on Plum Island Turnpike and other roads during flooding or. storms.- TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 17.
Thus, TOM could not implement the SPMC traffic management plan.
Respectfully submitted, kJ R. Scott Hill-Whilton Lasoulis, Hill-Whilton & Rotondi-l 79 State Street
}
Newburyport, MA 01950 (508) 462-9393 Counsel for Town of Newbury I
b 1
u 25
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DOC,
So jet 25 P3'3B CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I,
R.
Scott Hill-Whilton, Counsel for' the Town of Newb ggythe of the enclosed documents to be served upon the persSM@b(a above-entitled action, hereby certify that I have ca0W antL e
addresses listed below, by first class, postage prepaid, mail and by Federal Express, postage prepaid, mail to those names which have been marked with an asterisk.
Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman Dr. Richard F.
Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20014 Bethesda, MD 20814 Robert R.
Pierce, Esq.
- Docketing and Service Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street East West Towers Building Washington, D.C.
20555 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 g
~
- Thomas G. Dignan,.Esq.
A.S.L.A.B. Panel Ropas and Gray U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 225 Franklin Street-Washington, D.C.
20555 Boston, MA- 02110
-Diane Curran, Esq.
John P. Arnold, Attorney General Harron, Curran & Towsley Office of the Attorney General Suite'430 25 Capitol Street 2001 S: Street, N.W.
Concord, NH 03301 Washington, D.C.
20009 Mitzi A. Young, Esq.
Kenneth A. McCollom
'Edwin J.
Reis, Esq.
1107 W.
Knapp Street Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stillwater, OK 74075 office of the General Counsel 11555 Rockville Pike, 15th Floor Rockville, MD 20852 Jane Doughty Paul McEachern, Esq.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Shaines & McEachern Five Market Street 25 Maplewood Avenue Portsmouth, NH 03801 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Robert A.
Backus, Esq.
The Honorable Gordon J. Humphrey
'116 Lowell Street United States Senate P.O. Box 516 Washington, D.C.
20510 Manchester, NH 03105 1
n
?*
v
.11. Joseph Flynn, Esq.
Stephen Jonas, Esq.
Office of General Counsel Assistant Attorney General FEMA Office,of the Attorney General
-Washington, D.C.
20472 Boston, MA 02108' Barbara' Saint' Andre, Esq.
Mr. William Lord
.Kopelman-& Palge Selectman
- 77. Franklin Street Board of Selectmen
> Boston, MA 02110 Amesbury, MA 01913 Phillip Ahrens, Esq.
Judith H. Mizner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General 79 State Street
. Department of the Attorney General Newburyport, MA 01950 Augusta, ME 04333 Clioward' A. Wilber Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing 145 South Main Street Appeal--Board P.O. Box 38 '
O.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Comm.
Bradford,-MA 01835 i
Washington, D.C..
10555 Jack Dolan
- G.
Paul Dollwerk, Chairmen FEMA Atomic Safety & Licensing Region I Appeal Board J.W.'McCormack' Post Office &
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
C Courthouse Building, Room 442 Washington, D.C.
10555 Boston, MA 02109
- Alan:S. Rosenthal George Iverson, Director Atomic Safety &' Licensing-N. !!. Office of Emergency Mgmt.
3 Appen1. Board.
State llouse Office Park South n
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
107 Pleasant Street Washington, D.C.
10555 Concord, nil 03301 h.
Signed under seal this day of di w p t
- 1990, t
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R.
Scott Ilill-Whilton I
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