ML20248B664
| ML20248B664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1989 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#289-8720 LBP-88-32, OL, NUDOCS 8906090139 | |
| Download: ML20248B664 (78) | |
Text
-_ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . _ - -_ ___ __ _
gf
} -' ,
tirn m,j .n,p UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'89 JUN -6 P 3 :51 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAF$TY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD i ! i) . I 3
- f. In the Matter of
<D Docket Nos. 50-443 OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL
.NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.- Off-site Emergency Planning f )
.(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) i
! NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO INTERVENERS' l APPEALS FROM THE LICENSING BOARD'S PARTIAL I INITIAL DECISION ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (LBP-88-32)
I r
y'
'jk .
Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney June 5, 1989 HP Inu 8?Mjjp 4 G gD ,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
- g. Docket Nos. 50-443 OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) Off-site Emergency Planning o )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO INTERVENERS' APPEALS FROM THE LICENSING BOARD'S PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (LBP-88-32) u-Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney June 5, 1989 m______________._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ._ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ __________.___________;
n _ - - __ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ .
l 1
-l i
i TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE q TAB LE OF AUTHORIT I ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i v STATEMENT OF THs CASE .......................................... 1 Introduction .............................................. 1 4
i B a c k g ro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 '
' STATEM ENT O F I S SU ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ARGUMENT ....................................................... 6 I. The Licensing Board Correctly Found That the State of New Hampshire has Ent;ered into Sufficient and Necessary Letters of Agreement With Those Persons and Organizations Who Are Relied Upon to Provide Services in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook ............................... 6 II. 'The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance of Sufficient Personnel to Carry Out an Emergency Response for the State and Towns Located in the EPZ in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook Station ................................................... 10 A. The Board's Reliance on Applicants' Personnel Resource Survey ...................................... 11 B. Testimony Concerning Local Staffing Inadequacies ......................................... 16 C. Other Alleged Deficiencies in the State's
!'
- Personnel Res ou rces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 III. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Transportation and Support Services i Will Be Available to Evacuate the Transport Dependent Population in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook Station ............................. 21 I
- ~
- ii -
PAGE IV. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Reception Centers Will Be Available in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook Station . .. . .. .. . .... 24 V. The Licensing Board Correctly. Concluded That There Is Reasonable Assurance That the Behavior of Emergency Workers and the Public in the Seabrook EPZ Will Not Prevent an Adequate 4 Emergency Response From Being Conducted in the Event of a Radiological Emergency at Seabrook S t a ti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 VI. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded, Both as a Matter of Fact and as a Matter of Law, That the NHRERP Contains Adequate Provisions for Sheltering Persons Located in Beach Areas Near the Pla'nt in the Event of a Radiological Emergency at Seabrook .......... 37 A. The " Reasonable Assurance" Standard ................... 39 B. Exclusion of the Sholly/Be p Testimony ............... 45 C. The Requirement of a Range of Protective Actions ...... 48 l
D. The Adequacy of the NHRERP's Protective Action !
Strategy .............................................. 51
- 1. The FEMA Analysis ................................ 53 i l 2. Maximization of Dose Savings ..................... 53 l
l
- 3. The Need for Implementing Detail ................. 55 E. FEMA'S Change in Position ............................. 58 I * .
VII. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded (Subject to Certsin Conditions and the Future Resolution of A l
- Limited Issue Over Which the Boc,rd Retain Jurisdiction) l That the Applicants Have provided Accurate Evacuation Time Estimates As Required By 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E ........................................ ........ 59 i
A. The Delayed Staffing of Traffic Control Posts ......... 60 i
B. The Peak Summer Beach Population .......................63 ,j C. The Imposition of Conditions on Applicants .. . . . . . . .... 65
- ' " ' ~
~ ~ ~ ~ '
- iii -
PAGE VIII. The Licensing Board Correctly Disposed of Two
! . Contentions Proffered by SAPL, Concerning the l- Adequacy of NHRERP Provisions For Treating Contaminated Injured Individuals and for the Timely Performance of Radiological Monitoring ............. 65 h*
! CONCLUSION ...................................................... 67
-s l
9
.9 t
t
^ " - ~
L.1"""_*'_"'_"1___..
- iv - i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE JUDICIAL DECISIONS Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .................................. 44 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Commission Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986) ........................ 40, 42, 49, 50 Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528 (1983) ....... 44, 49, 61-62 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200 '1986) ......................... 58 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983) ..... 15, 43 Long Island Lishting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAE.-905, 28 NRC 515 (1988) ........................ 25, 26, 27, 29 Long Island Lishting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Uni t 1) , ALAE -855, 24 NRC 792 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49, 51 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),ALAB-832,23NRC135(1986)........................ 7, 56, 57 I
l
- Philade_lphia Flectric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, UnWs I u.rM E.A5 BT9, 22 NRC 681 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . .< . . . . 28 Public Suvice Co. of New Hampshire fSeabrook Station. ?inf ts 1 and 2E ALAB-884, 27 NRC 56 ( 19M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Tennesse Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units IA, 2A, IB, and 28) ALAB-463, 7 RRC 341 (1973) ................. 29 f Atemic Safety and Licergig Coard Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899 (1985) .................. 58
-_2. '
~^'_'_"l~_~
N
- v-PAGE Kansas' Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station.
[' Unit 1). LBP-84-26, 20 NRC 53.-(1984) ........................ 7 l
Long Island Lighting' Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Station, L Unit 1),LBP-85-12,21NRC644'(1985)-....................... 7
,* Philadelphia Electric Co.-(Limerick Generating) Station.
Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-14, 21 WRC 1219 (1985 ............... 7=
- Public Service Co. 'of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station,-
Units 1 and 2)..LBP-88-32,-28 NRC 667 (1988) ................ ' passim l Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Summary Disposition Motions of Applicants and State of New Hampshire and Establishing a Date for Filing of. Late-Filed Contentions Arising Out .
. of Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological .
Emergency Response' Plan)," dated November 4, 1986 ........... 66 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), " Memorandum and Order (Providing Basis for and Revision to Board's Rulings on
' Contentions on Revision 2 of NHRERP)," dated May 21 -1986 ................................ ............... 7
, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units.1 &-2), " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on
- Contentions and Establishing Date and Location for Hearing),"datedApril 29, 1986 ............................ 7, 65 Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-15, 7 NRC 642 (1978) ........ 28 STATUTES' f., 5 U.S.C. I 553 ................................................. 45 42 u.S.C. i 2232(a) ............................................ 4e R_EGULATIONS 10 C,F.R. I 2.715(c) .......................................... 1, 3 10 C.F.R. I 2.762(c) ......................-,.................... 2 10 C,F.R. i 50.47(a) .......................................... 39 .
10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(2) ....................................... 14 I_ __ _1_______~_E___________.______________
'l l
- vi -
PAGE F
10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(1) ....................................... 8, 11, 13, 20
'10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(3) ....................................... 8
.10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(10) ...................................... 48, 50 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(12) ...................................... 66 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c) .......................................... 10, 17 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E ................................. 5, 65 MISCELLANEOUS
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980)............................................. passim
" Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning," Statement of Consideration, 52 Fed. Reg. 42078 (Nov. 3, 1987) ......... 41
" Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning," Proposed Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 6980 (March 6, 1987) ............................................. 42, 50
" Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents ," EPA-520/1-75-001 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
" Memorandum of Understanding Between Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Comission,"
50 Fed. Ry . 15485 (April 18, 1985) ......................... 3, 14 J*
^
" Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in
- Support of Lf ght Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016 (December 1978) ............. .. 49
" Statement Standard laofCFR Police on Emerg)ency 6 50.47 (b (12)." Planning 50 Fe d. Peg. 20892 (May 21, 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
" Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning ,
Standard 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(12) "
51 Fed. Reg. 32904 (Sept. 17, 1986) ......................... 66 I
cur _:-- ~
4 t
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAD REGULATORY COMMISSION I BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD -!
In the Matter of .)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL /
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, e_t_ al. Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO INTERVENERS' APPEALS FROM THE LICENSING BOARD'S PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (LBP-88-32)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction This case arises as an appeal by three interveners and the Comon-wealth of Massachusetts, participating as an interested State under D C.F.R. 9 2.715(c), from the Partial Initial Decision ("PID") on the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("NHRERP"), issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on December 30, 1988. M In its PID, the Licensing Board resolved all outstanding offsite New Hampshire
< emergency planning issues in the Applicants' favor, except for a limited f.
~
issue related to the effect on the evacuation time estimates (ETEs) of trips home by certain returning comuters. In sum, the Licensing Board determined that subject to certain conditions,. the NHRERP provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective sensures can and will be
~
~
1/ Public Service Co. of New Hasushire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 ar.d
taken within the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
< Briefs on appeal from the PID were filed by the Town of Hampton
~
(T0H), 2/ the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL), S/ the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), SI and the Massachusetts Attorney l General (Mass AG). El A brief in response to Interveners' appeals was filed by the Applicants on April 24, 1989. 5/ Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
l 5 2.762(c), the NRC Staff hereby files its brief in response to the Interveners' briefs on appeal. For the reasons set forth herein, the l
Staff submits that the Licensing Board correctly resolved all of the l issues raised on appeal, and that the PID should be affirmed. I 2_/ " Town of Hampton's Brief in Support of Appeal of Partial Initial Decision on the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan" l
("T0H Br."), dated Tebruary 10, 1989. 1 3/ " Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Brief on Appeal of the Partial )
Initial Decision on the NHRERP[,] LBP-88-32", dated March 21, 1989 i
("SAPL Br."). This brief superseded an earlier brief filed by SAPL i on February 24, 1989, which had addressed the limited issue of the j planning basis for New Hampshire reception centers. 1 4/ "New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Brief in Support cf Interveners' Appeal of LBP-88-32" <("NECNP Br."), dated March 24, i
~
1989. j i
5/ " Massachusetts Attorney General's Brief on Appeal of the Partial l initial ' Decision on the NHRERP[,] LBP-88-32" (^' MAG Br. ") , dated
~
1 Merch 24, 1989.
{/ "Brief of Appilcants-Appellees on Appeal From a Partial Inittel Decision of the Atorric Safety and Licensing Board Issued Dec. 30, .
1988 (LBP-88-32)" ("Apps. Br."), dated April 24, 1989. i
________-_____:_~__~____J
g p
Background
i The emergency plan that is the subject of the PID is Revision 2 of the NHRERP, published in August 1986 (App. Exh. 5). As summarized by the Licensing Board, some 122 contentions were admitted for litigation in the a proceeding, challenging the adequacy of the NHRERP; these were reduced by
~
l various Board rulings to a total of 26 conteritions prior to the commence-ment of evidentiary hearings (PID at 669). The persons advancing these contentions included, in addition to the Appellants, numerous towns and cities located in the EPZ who were participating as interested governments under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.715(c). In addition to testimony proffered by the Applicants and the various interveners and interested State and local governments, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") offered '
testimony and participated in the hearings as contemplated by a Memorandum )
I of Understanding between FEMA and the NRC. 50 Fed. Reg. 15485, 15487 (April 18, 1985). Approximately 50 days of hearings were conducted during )
the period of October 1987 - June 1988, and the record was formally. closed on June 16, 1988 (Tr. 14264).
The parties agreed to a classification of the matters to be litigated into the following eight categories -- which categorization also formed the organizational framework of the PID: I j v Letters of Agreement
. Response Personnel A:Jequacy 1
Transportation Availabili ty and Emergency Support Services j Reception Cer.ters t' notification and Cemunications 0
l
\
. p Human Behavior in Emergencies l Sheltering Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs)
As indicated by the above listing, the evidentiary hearings began with consideration of such general issues as the level of personnel staffing available to New Hampshire state and local governments in the event of a radiological emergency, and the adequecy of New Hampshire's arrangements via letters of agreement to secure the services of private and other organizations to assist the State's emergency response. The focus- of the hearings, however, soon shifted to the protective measures available for the substantial transient population present during summer months along the New Hampshire seacoast. Specifically, the Interveners challenged the accuracy of the evacuation time estimates included in Volume 6 of the NHRERP -- with particular emphasis on the transient beach population, and the adequacy of the State's provisions for sheltering that pop'ulation. These two issues, ETEs and beach sheltering, are similarly focused upon by the Interveners in their briefs on appeal. As more fully set forth below, the Interveners' challenges to the PID are without merit, and they fail to demonstrate that t.ny error has been committed by the Licensing Board.
ST/TEVlNT OF ISSUES The Interveners have not provided a precise listing of the issues they seek to raise on appeal, and it is not altogether clear which of the Board's findings and conclusions are claimed to be erroneous. However, as far as the Staff can ascertain, their briefs raite the following general l Issues for resolution by the Appeal Board:
1
$ 'l
- .______?_-.__.______ ____ _ -
l
- 1. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding that the State I of New Hampshire had entered into sufficient and necessary letters of agreement with those persons and organizations upon whom the State will rely to provide various services in the event of a radiological emergency i at Seabrook Station.
- 2. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding that the NHRERP {
provides reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient personnel to l carry out an emergency response for the State and towns located in the j EPZ, in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station, l l
- 3. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding that the NHRERP i provides reasonable assurance that adequate transportation and support services will be available to evacuate the. transport-dependent population in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
- 4. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding (subject to certain conditions) there is reasonable assurance that adequate reception centers will be available in the event of an emergency at Seabrook i Station, 'wherein the Board accepted the NHRERP's reliance on FEMA's. 20%
evacuation population planning basis which was addressed in ALAB-905.
- 5. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding, with respect to Interveners' " human bevavior" concerns, that there is reasonable assurance that the behavior of emergency workers and the public in the Seabrook EPZ will not prevent an adequate emergency response from being conducted in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
- 6. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, that the NHRERP contains adequate provisions for sheltering persons within beach areas near the plant in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. l
- 7. Whether the Licensing Board erred in concluding (subject to certain conditions and the future resolution of the limited returning commuter issue as to which the Board retained jurisdiction) that the Applicants have provided accurate evacuation time estimates as required by J 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E. !
- 8. Whether the Board erred in its disposition of two contentions proffered by SAPL, concerning the adequacy of NHRERP provisions for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals and the timely performance ;
of radiological monitoring. l These issues, together with the numerous subissues raised by 1
appellants with regard thereto, are addressed seriatim in the discussion j below.
'l
{
1 e
1 ARGUMENT .
I. The Licensing Board Correctly Found That the State of New Hampshire has Entered into Sufficient and .
Necessary Letters of Agreement With Those Persons -
and Organizations Who Are Relied Upon to Provide i Services in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook.
In the PID, the Licensing Board reviewed the Interveners' assertions that the State of New Hampshire had failed to secure sufficient letters of ,
agreement (LOAs) with various persons and organizations upon whom the State will rely to provide services or supplies in support of an emergency response in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
PID 11 2.1 - 2.30. The Board examined the evidence proffered by the Interveners, Applicants and FEMA in this regard, and concluded "that sufficient and necessary Letters of Agreement have been obtained and that they provide reasonable assurance that they are adequate for their intended purposes." PID 1 2.31.
This conclusion is challenged on appeal by the Town of Hampton and SAPL. For its part, the Town of Hampton contends that the Board erred in failing to require letters of agreement for EPZ school teachers, whom the Town asserts are unlikely to assist in the evacuation of schoolchildren as contemplated by the NHRERP (T0H Br. at 36-42). SAPL raises a broader but less well defined challenge to the PID, contending that the Board erred in -
its treatrent of LOAs for (1) schools, teacherr., day care centers, and r.Jrifng homes; (2) Teamsters Local No. 633; and (3) two named bus l
companier. SAPL further contends that the Bard erred in not requiring l
~
LOAs for host connunities and EPZ communities; and it contends that all of the LOAs secured by the State are deficient in the amount of detail they i
contain (SAPL Br. at 26-28). *l l
i____l.___. __ _ _ . . . _ _ _
The Licensing Board's conclusions in this respect are correct. While it is true, as the Board found, that the teachers are expected to accompany their schoolchildren on the buses and are thus, in a sense,
" service providers" (PID at i 7.10), there was no need for the State to secure LOAs with the teachers. First, as the Board noted, it had previously ruled that the teat.hers are essentially the recipients of services rather than providers of services, and thus LOAs securing their assistance were not required. U Second, the NHRERP does not expect the teachers to do anything other than what they normally do -- continue to supervise and assist the children who have been entrusted to their care, which, the evidence showed, is a duty teachers have historically performed in both normal and emergency situations (including the Three Mile Island accident), and were likely to perform also in the event of an emergency at Seabrook. PID 17.14; App. Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622, at 126-27, 130; Tr. 3967, 3969, 6625-26; FEMA Dir. ff. Tr. 4051 at 48. 8_/ The Board, as 7/
PID 12.3, citinc ASLB " Memorandum and Order (Providing Basis for and Revision to Boarc 's Rulings on Contentions on Revision 2 of NHRERP)",
dated May 21, 1986, at 7-8. See also, " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Date and Location for Hearing " dated April 29, 1986, at 19 (rejecting "any need that teachers, governmental organizations or officials execute letters of agreement to perform their statutory required duties").
-8/ It is interesting to note that the Board's finding is consistent with the findings of adjudicatory boards in other NRC proceedings where
~
similar evidence of teachers' pre-emergency intent c,r role conflict wu intrcduced. See, Long Island Lighting Co. ('5horeh'am Nu". lear Statior , Un1Tl), _e.g_. .ALAB-832, 23 NRC 175, 151-52 (1986); Id.,
LBP-85-1E, 21 NRC. 644, 677-79 (1985); Philadelphia Electric C6. .
): (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 12E
)
1292-93 (1985). See also, Kansas Gas &~ Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit"TJ, GP-84-25, 20 NRC 53, 96-99 (1984) (the record did not indicate a need for LOAs for the use of teachers' cars ,
in evacual.ing schoolchildren).
e..... .- - . . . -
the trier of fact, was _ entitled to credit this empirically based and expert . testimony rather than the testimony and teacher polls proffered by the Interveners, and to find in favor of the NHRERP on this issue.
SAPL offers no reason to believe (SAPL Br. at 25) that the Board erred its Memorandum and Order of May 21, 1986, in determinining that day care centers and nursing homes are essentially service recipients for which LOAs were unnecessary under NUREG-0654. 9/ SAPL's assertion should i
be rejected as unfounded. Similarly, SAPL offers no reason to believe that letters of agreement are required for either EPZ communities or host communities; and no suggestion that such LOAs should be provided is evident in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(1), (b)(3), or NUREG-0654.
With respect to Teamsters Local No. 633, New Hampshire relies upon some 48 of these drivers to participate in an emergency response as part of its Emergency Driver Pool, in the event that any deficit occurs in the number of drivers actually available at the time of an emergency. App.
Di sa. No. 2, ff. Tr. 4228 at 14; App. Dir. No.1, ff. Tr. 2795 at 7; PID at 692. The availability of this number of Teamsters drivers is supported by LOAs with tair employers. App. Dir. No.1, ff.Tr. 2795 at 7 and Attachment 6. While SAPL cites the deposition of a Teamsters Union official concerning the State's earlier assumption that as many as 1500 Teamsters members might be available to drive, SAPL acknowledges that the I
State now relies only upon the number of Teamsters drivers actually
-9/ " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", ,
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980).
1
( _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.g.
covered by LOAs (SAPL Br. at 27). See Tr. 2997. The Board was cognizant of this issue (e.g., PID at'673, 692), and committed no error.
With respect to the two bus companies referred to by SAPL (SAPL Br.
at 77-28), the Board's PID is likewise correct. While the Jan-Car Bus Company has gone out of business, its successor company has executed a separate LbA providing the same number of buses and 50 less drivers.
Tr. 3034-37; App. Exh. 7, ff. Tr. 3035. As to National School Bus Service, Inc., while the number of available drivers may have been overstated, any driver deficits can readily be made up from the State's Emergency Driver Pool, as the Board found. PID 114.9, 4.15-4.18; App Dir. No. 2, ff. Tr. 4228 at 14; App. Dir. No. 1, ff. Tr. 2795 at 7.
Finally, as to the level of detail contained in the LOAs, the Board found that many of the LOAs refer specifically to the potential for a radiological emergency, and the other LOAs can reasonably be assumed to cover such a potential. PID 1 2.28. SAPL does not appear to contest this finding, asserting instead that the LOAs do not " properly specify who is responsible for which actions, precisely what is to be done, and how it is to be done" (SAPL Br. at 26). The evidence showed that the LOAs point out what is expected of the signatories, Tr. 2801, and that the State officials pursuing LOAs (SAPL Br. at 26) were candid in their response to questions by potential signatories and did not attempt to mislead anyone.
Tr. 2800-02, 2841, 2865. In general, SAPL fails to point to any specific LOAs which it contends is deficient; moreover, SAPL offers no evidence to support its apparent belief that the persons who signed the LOAs failed to understand sufficiently the function they would be relied upon to perform 9
in an emergency. No error was committed by the Board with respect to any of the issues raised on appeal concerning the LOAs.
II. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance of Sufficient Personnel to Carry Out an Emergency Response for the State and Towns Located in the EPZ in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook Station. .
- Several of the Interveners' contentions challenged the adequacy of State and local staffing of emergency response personnel. Four of these contentions questioned the ability of various EPZ towns to carry out a 24-hour response, while the others questioned State and local staffing levels and the ability of the State to compensate for local inadequacies and for the six towns in New Hampshire which had indicated they would not
. respond to an emergency at Seabrook. PID i 3.1 The Board carefully considered the evidence offered by FEMA, the Interveners and Applicants, and concluded that " Applicants have made a strong showing that adequate response personnel resources exist to man the positions assigned by the NHRERP." PID 1 3.68. With respect to the "non-participating" towns, the Board found that a survey proffered by the Applicants demonstrated that .
the number of available personnel exceeded the number of personnel required to man the local emergency response positions; and the Board
~
applied the presumption in 10 C.F.R. 950.47(c) in finding that town officials will provide a "best efforts" response in the event of an emergency. PID 1 3.69. The Board concluded (PID 1 3.72):
We fir. , hat the Applicants have demonstrated that there is reasonable assurance that there are sufficient response persor.nel to carry out the protective action responses as required for each of the New Hampshire towns locatea in the Seabrook EPZ and for the State, ,
both as to its direct and compensatory responsibilities 1
in the event of a radiological emergency arising at .
Seabrook Station.
Numerous challenges are raised by SAPL and NECNP to the Board's findings on these issues (SAPL Br. at 28-35 and 45-47; NECNP Br. at 1-24),
contending that the Board erred in finding the NHRERP is adequate under 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(1). E These assertions are without merit.
1 A. The Board's Reliance on Applicants' Personnel Resource Survey First, SAPL and NECNP challenge the reliability of the " Personnel Resources Assessment Survey" conducted by the Applicants (App. Exh. 1, as corrected by App. Exh.1A, ff. Tr. 4685), contending that the Board failed to give proper weight to the testimony of Interveners' witness, Clifford Earl. In his testimony, Mr. Earl criticized (a) the survey's methodology; (b) a walk-through conducted by Applicants to determine personnel needs; and (c) the survey's asserted failures to define the tenn "available", to ascertain the actual number of "available" persons, to define the workload for each position, and to consider such variables as the time required to implement actions (SAPL Br. at 28-29, NECNP Br.
at 5-11, 19-22).
The Licensing Board began its consideration of these issues by discussing the Applicants' survey and its role in determining the number .
of necessary emergency positions and of personnel available to fill those 10/ 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(1) requires, in pertinent part, that "each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis." NUREG-0654 66 II.A.1.e.
and II.A.4 provide guidance as to the staffing requirements for ,
emergency response organizations.
- i
positions. P.ID 11 3.5 - ?.15. E The Board then gave extensive
. consideration to the testimony of Mr. Earl concerning the alleged defects in the' survey.- PID 11 3.16 - 3.36. Based on the evidence before it, the Board determined that the survey. was designed and managed properly, that .
_it was accurate, that data were verified, and that there was supervision of data gathering. PID 1 3.35 (citations omitted). The Board cor'rectly characterized Mr. Earl's exceptions to the survey as merely a statement of how he would have conducted the survey. M. The Board further found adequate support in the record that " workloads", as the term is commonly defined by emergency planners, were considered in the walk-throughs conducted to detemine the number of personnel required in an emergency
-(PID 13.30); and that the term "available personnel" as used in the survey means "the pool of resources that will be relie'd upon to carry out the responsibilities assigned under the NHRERP." PID 1 3.21. Upon a review of the record, the Board quite simply came to a different 11/ As the Board noted, with ample citations to the re. cord, the survey identified, by position and functional responsibility, all tasks to be performed in fulfilling emergency response functions, and the staffing requirements to implement the plan, including staffing needs for 24-hour operatia , the survey' did not, however, attempt to address the availability of people at any specific point in time.
PID 113.6 - 3.7. The survey identified response positions and staffing requirements, and identified available personnel resources to fill them, based on an analysis of a variety of data sources including personnel records and interviews with knowledgeable local officials. PID 1 3.10. The survey also assessed personnel needs and availability in the six New Hampshire towns that are not participating in emergency planning for Seabrook; addressed the availability of State resources to carry out the tasks assigned to the State and the State's ability to provide assistance to local municipalities; and canvassed State staffing needs and availability under the NHRERP, using procedures similar to those for the '
municipalities. PID 1 3.11 - 3.15.
conclusion than that reached by Mr. Earl. Having heard and considered the testimony of both Mr. Earl and the Applicants' witnesses, the Board was entitled to determine which testimony should be afforded greater weight.
The Board's findings in this regard are supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence, and should be affirmed.
The Interveners further assert that the Board erred, as a matter of law, in failing to require a demonstration that an adequate number of emergency workers will actually be "available" in a " temporal" sense, at the time of any given emergency (SAPL Br. at 28-29 and 32-33, NECNP Br.
at 15-19). In this regard, NECNP asserts that an applicant should be required "to provide some reasonable assurance that emergency response personnel are actually capable of reaching their posts and performing their duties", and that " temporal" considerations as to the ability of emergency response personnel to reach their posts are necessary in determining their " capability" to respond to an emergency (NECNP Br.
at 16-17). No case law or regulatory pronouncement is provided in support of this assertion.
The Board correctly rejected Interveners' assertions in this regard.
First, 10 C.F.R. 950.47(b)(1) requires that each principal response
. organizations "has staff to respond and to augment its initial reshonse on a continuous basis." The regulation does not establish any requirement as
~
to how promptly an emergency response organization must be able to come to a full staffing complement in an actual emergency. The Board correctly determined that the Applicants had demonstrated the existence of sufficient emergency response personnel, thus satisfying the regulation, and rejected Interveners' assertions as unrealistic. PID 13.22 - 3.24.
_. .________.__._ _ __ _ ________ _ 2 _ m
. Second, the Board correctly ruled that "the issue of wnether and when people will be there is an issue of planning and implementation, not personnel resources." PID 1 3.25, citing Tr. 3283-87. E The Interveners next assert that the Board erred in rendering its findings as to the adequacy of personnel resources before FEMA completed its review of the Applicants' survey and befoEe the State had submitted certain call lists and rosters requested by FEMA (NECNP Br. at 13-14 and 22-24; SAPL Br. at 33-34). These assertions are incorrect as a matter of law. Contrary to NECNP's assertion, there is no legal requirement that a finding must have been reached by FEMA with respect to every issue raised by an intervenor before a hearing may proceed, or that such a finding is required before the Board can reach its own conclusions. Further, the
" Memorandum of Understanding" between the NRC and FEMA contemplates that FEMA will present its " interim findings" for use in any NRC licensing proceeding. I3/ -
NECNP's argument that hearings must await the submission of a sufficiently developed emergency plan (NECNP Br. at22-23) is misplaced; such a plan existed here, and FEMA indeed came forward and 12/ This conclusion is generally consistent with FEMA's view, despite
' NECNP's suggestion to the contrary (NECNP Br. at13-14). For example, FEMA considers that an organization's ability to alert and mobilize emergency workers is a matter that may be demonstrated by an exercise, and that the availability of emergency workers does not necessarily depend upon their living and working in the community.
FEMA Dir. ff. Tr. 4051 at 52 and 64. See also Tr. 4088-89, 4096-97.
13/ Further, even if FEMA had reached a conclusive finding of inadequacy
--~
with respect to an issue before the Licensing Board, the Board would be entitled to reach a contrary finding -- for instance, where the FEMA finding was rebutted, or where (as here) information became available subsequent to FEMA's review and was presented to the Board ,
for its consideration. 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(2).
- i
_ _ _ . _ _ _ . .-_______-_.-______-___L
j l
)
)
presented evidence as to the adequacy of that plan. See, e.g.,
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 775 (1983). E Further, the Board gave proper consideration to FEMA's views in i reaching its conclusion. See PID 11 3.62 - 71. The Board noted that l FEMA's testimony was based on its December 1986 review of the NHRERP, conducted before the Applicants had submitted their personnel rescurce summary, and that FEMA accordingly was unable to comment in depth on that sumary. PID 3.65, citing Tr. 4053. Even so, the FEMA witnesses stated that the personnel resource summary was a significant document, and that it represented significant progress by the State in addressing FEMA's earlier concerns. PID 13.67, citing Tr. 4098, 4109, 4165-66. The Board correctly proceeded to reach a finding on these metters without awaiting a final FEMA determination, E and found, based on the evidence submitted subsequent to FEMA's review, that the Applicants had demonstrated reasonable assurance that sufficient personnel are available to perform !
\
14/ In any event, as noted by the Applicants (App. Br. at 37), FEMA has now determined, subsequent to the close of hearings on the NHRERP, that the personnel resources identified in the plan are adequate.
See FEMA, " Review and Evaluation of the State of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station," (December 1988) (App. Exh. 43D), at 14-15.
. 15/ SAPL disparages the Board's observation that FEMA anticipated the State would submit the rosters and that the Board " expect [s] the State has provided the information" (SAPL Br. at 34, citing PID
. Y 3.66). However, this stated " expectation" is of no importance.
The Board had already found that the Applicants had successfully demonstrated the requisite " reasonable assurance" without the prior submission by the State of personnel rosters, and the Board's observation was not necessary for the Board's conclusion as to the ,
adequacy of the State's personnel resources.
the emergency response functions assigned to the State and to assis't non-participating towns and towns with inadequate resources. PID 11 3.70, 3371. No error was committed in this regard.
B. Testimony Concerning Local Staffing Inadequacies SAPL contends that the Board erred in crediting Applicants' survey over the testimony of several local policemen and town. officials who testified as to local personnel shortages and anticipated delays in mobilization and implementation times, due to such factors as the distance of various State Police barracks from the site, traffic congestion, the existence of other personnel commitments, and the potential unwillingness of emergency workers to respond to an emergency at Seabrook (SAPL Br.
at30-32). This testimony was reviewed at length by the Board (PID at 11 3.38, 3.40 - 3.46, 3.56) E and was found to be outweighed by other substantial evidence of record which supported the conclusion that adequate police and other personnel are available to meet the needs of the EPZ communities. PID 11 3.47 - 3.51, 3.68 - 3.71.
The Board's treatment of this testimony was based on a sound evaluation of t'he record. For example, the evidence indicated that when local personnel resources are not sufficient to fulfill a required function, State police or other personnel have been assigned to perform that task; and the State Police have sufficient personnel to carry out these assignments even in the nonparticipating towns. PID 1 3.47, c_iting 16/ The issue of emergency workers' potential unwillingness to perform their duties in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook was treated below as a human behavior issue, and is discussed infra at 30-32.
'l l
-J
App. Dir. No. 3., ff. Tr. 3228 at 6-7; Sullivan ff. Tr. 4687-88; Tr. 4721-23, 4696-99. Similarly, the evidence showed that adequate response personnel resources exist to man the positions assigned by the NHRERP; that virtually all of the positions in the towns that are participating in emergency planning have now been filled; and that the
~
Applicants' survey had identified more than enough personnel to man the emergency worker positions in the six non-participating towns. See PID 11 3.68 -3.69 and testimony cited therein. No error was committed by the Board in concluding that the available emergency personnel equalled or exceeded the number required to carry out the functions assigned to the State, and that there was reasonable assurance that the State would be able to fulfill its own role as well as its role in assisting both non-participating towns and towns having inadequate resources. PID 11 3.70, 3.71. b C. Other Alleged Deficiencies in the State's Personnel Resources SAPL asserts that the Board erred in finding the NHRERP to be adequate, because there may be insufficient back-up personnel to replace State and local emergency workers who would be withdrawn upo'n reaching the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) radiological exposure protective action guidelines (SAPL Br. at 33). SAPL further contends that the Board failed to give proper consideration to the stated unwillingness of many employees in the Division of Public Health Services to participate in the 17/ This finding is buttressed by the presumptions contained in 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(1), that local officials will respond with their best efforts in an emergency, and will follow the NHRERP in absence of a ,~
plan of their own. See PID 11 3.69 and 7.1 - 7.6.
l 9-
NHRERP on a voluntary basis, which is asserted to have the potential to affect the State's " marginal" level of reception center staffing (SAPL Br.
at 34, 45). In addition, SAPL contends that there is an insufficient i number of local firemen who are relied upon to perform radiological monitoring at the reception centers (SAPL Br. at 47). Finally, SAPL and NECNF assert that the Board erred as a matter of law in not requiring that reception centers will be staffed on a conteluous basis rather than for a single 12-hour shift (SAPL Br. at 45; NECNP Br. at 24-26). These concerns i
were properly resolved by the Board.
First, contrary to SAPL's apparent belief (SAPL Br. at 33), the EPA's Protective Action Guides (PAGs) establish an exposure value of 25 R for emergency workers. E The 5 R limit referred to by SAPL is actually a i lower value that has been established by the NHRERP for local emergency workers. See PID 1 3.57 - 3.59 and testimony cited therein. As the Board 1
noted, New Hampshire intends to rotate its emergency workers and will replace those approaching their established limit. PID 13.59. Once protective actions have been completed in an area, local emergency workers will be withdrawn from the area, consistent with the State's goal of limiting their exposure to the same level incurred by the ;.ublic. Id.
, 1 3.60. The remaining tasks, such as access control, field monitoring, I
plume tracking and the collection of environmental samples would be 1 performed by gate emergency workers, whose exposure limits correspond to the 25 R value established by the EPA for emergency workers. App. Dir.
~
18/ EPA, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for ,
Nuclear Incidents," EPA-520/1-75-001 (1975).
t I
- . - _ . _ _ __-.___________.___________________________________________J
(
. No. 3. ff Tr. 3228 at 14-15. In any event, however, responsible State officials testified that the State does not intend to allow emergency.
~ respo'ise needs .to go unmet. Id. at 15. The Board did not err in finding reasonable assurance that local ano state response personnel exist to meet the demands of a radiological emergency. PID 1 3.60.
As to the indications that many employees in the Division of. Public Health Services are unwilling to participate in the NHRERP on a voluntary .
basis, the Board referred to its discussion concerning human behavior in an emergency (where, inter alia, it found that pre-emergency expressions of intent are unreliable predictors of emergency behavior). Further, the l
Board determined to treat the State employees' letters "in the context of an emotionally charged licensing proceeding where such statements of predicted behavior .can be used in an effort to defeat such licensing or for the purposes of pressuring one's peers." PID 1 3.61. Accordingly, the Board determined "to give them little weight". Id. The Board's treatment of this matter does not constitute error; nor has SAPL demon-strated that staffing levels will be insufficient if these workers fail to
^
take part in the State's response to an emergency at Seabrook.
With respect to the number of local firemen available to perform radiological monitoring at the reception centers, there was substantial testimony as to the number of available firemen for each reception center and a demonstration that this number was sufficient to meet the staffing requirements for both the primary and secondary reception centers. PID 11 5.34 -5.38; App. Dir. No. 4, ff. Tr. 4740 at 19-20. SAPL's only
remaining complaint is that there are insufficient numbers of firemen to provide a full-scale second 12-hour shift capability (SAPL Br. at 47). El SAPL and NECNP alternatively cite 10 C.F.R. 650.47(b)(1) or
.NUREG-0654, 6 II.A.4, in support of their assertion that the reception centers must provide a second-shift (i.e., 24-hour) capability (SAPL Br.
at 45; NECNP Br. at 24-26). These assertions are incorrect. 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(1) does not address reception centers per se_, but only requires that each " principal response organization has staff to respond and augment its initial response on a continuous basis." In contrast, NUREG-0654 provides specific criteria for the staffing of reception centers, specifying that "[t]he personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and '
transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving ar relocation centers. &,
6 II.J.12. Simply stated, a reception center is a facility; it is not a
" response organization". El Nor has FEMA faulted the NHRERP for its 19/ NECNP also asserts that long evacuation times on a summer weekend could necessitate that the reception center staff remain on duty for upwards of 15 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> (NECNP Br. at 26). It is highly unlikely that an ETE as long as the extreme case postulated by NECNP would occur; and there is no reason to believe that emergency workers would
- abandon their posts en masse upon the conclusion of their shift in the face of evacuees Taiting to be monitored; and, in any event, the evidei.ce demonstrated the availability of substantially more workers than are needed to fill a single 12-hour shift. See, e.g., App. Dir.
Finally, there is simply no regulatory No. 4, ff. Tr. 4740 at 19-20.
requirement. or guidance provisien that would necessitate the full-scale staffing of reception centers beyond the guidance of NUREG-0654, 6 II.J.12. -
20/ NUREG-0654 defines " principal" organizations as " Federal, State, agencies or departments or executive offices
~~
Local and utilities (licensees) having major or lead roles in emergency planning and .
preparedness." Id., Appendix 5, at 5-1.
1; 21 l
provision of' a single 12-hour shift. See PID 15.96; FEMA Dir. ff.
Tr.5091 at (79)-(80); Tr. 5093-94. The Board's finding that reception centers are .not " principal response organizations" and its analysis of i NUREG-0654 (PID 15.67) are not incorrect as a matter of law.
III. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Transportation and Support Services Will Be Available to Evacuate the Transport-Dependent Population in the Event .of an Emergency at Seabrook Station.
Numerous contentions were admitted for litigation concerning the adequacy of the NHRERP's provisions for assisting persons with special needs, such as persons in nursing homes and hospitals and other persons requiring transportation assistance. The Board considered the evidence presented by all parties on this issue, including the testimony of several Intervenor witnesses with local experience in caring for such institution--
alized patients. In addition, the Board considered evidence as to the reasonableness of the State's reliance on a certain number of vehicles and drivers for an emergency response. Upon reviewing the record, the Board found that the Applicants had provided reasonable assurance that adequate transportation and support services will be available to evacuate the transport-dependent population of the EPZ in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. PID 1 4.42.
SAPL appeals from certain aspects of the Board's decision on this issue (SAPL Br. at 35-42). Specifically, SAPL complains (1) that an earlier ruling on summary disposition precluded it from challenging the adequacy of the State's special needs survey, which was utilized to estimate the number of buses and other vehicles that would be needed in an
~~~
l____________1_.______________.___.______ _ _ _ _ _
i emergency (Id. at 35-37); . (2) that the Board erred in crediting the State's estimate as to the number of drivers available to respond to an emergency (Id. at 37-39); and (3) that the Board failed to give proper consideration to the testimony of several Intervenor witnesses who challenged the adequacy of the State's planning for institutionalized patients (Id. at 39-42). No error was committed in this regard.
First, even assuming that the Board's ruling on summary disposition eliminated a "special needs" contention (which is not altogther certain).
SAPL fails to explain how the Board's resulted in any prejudicial harm.
Litigation on other special needs contentions continued following the Board's ruling, and the Special Needs Survey was addressed at length in the Applicants' testimony. See PID 14.4 - 4.7; App. Dir No. 2, ff.
Tr. 4228 at 8-15. SAPL had a full opportunity to cross-examine and challenge Applicants' witnesses as to the survey's reliability (see Tr.4282-4331); and SAPL was similarly not precluded from presenting rebuttal testimony on this matter. SAPL has incurred no harm.
In support of its claim that the number of available drivers has been grossly overstated by the State, SAPL relies on the testimony of witnesses Gaudagna, Laughton and Hutchison (concerning National Bus Service, Inc.
- the Teamsters Union, and National's Berry Division) (SAPL Br. at 37-38).
As discussed supra, the State has now substantially downgraded its
~
reliance on the Teamsters, in light of information it received which rendered its previous assumption of greater driver availability unwarranted. In light of this and other demonstrated responsiveness on the part of the State, the Board was entitled to recognize, in discussing Mr. Gaudagna's testimony, that the State has demonstrated its willingness
to revise its. reliance on its sources of drivers as circumstances warrant (PID 14.16 and testimony cited therein). E In any event, the Board properly found that any shortfall in driver availability as to these companies could readi,1y be filled. through the State's- substantial (412-man) Emergency Driver Pool. PID 11 4.9, 4.16, 4.18. The Board
' further correctly observed that emergency planning is an ongoing process involving constant revisions (PID 1 4.17). SAPL has only shown that such an ongoing process is occurring in New Hampshire; more significantly, it has failed to show that the number of drivers available to participate in the State's emergency response is now, or is likely to become,
. insufficient.
SAPL complains that the Board disregarded the testimony of witnesses Pilot, Trahan and Barrows concerning alleged inadequacies.in the number of-ambulances, buses, bus bed conversion kits and personnel to be provided to support the evacuation of nursing home and hospital patients (SAPL Br. l l
at.39-41). .The Licensing Board discussed this testimony at length '(PID j i
11.4.35-4.41), but decided to give greater weight to other testimony 1 before it. E In their brief on appeal, the Applicants provide a detailed discussion of the Pilot, Trahan and Barrows testimony, stating 21/ As to the number of drivers available at National's Berry Division, that number has recently been increased from 9 to 65, according to a new LOA signed by Mr. Gaudagna and actually moved into evidence by SAPL following the close of the . record. See SAPL's " Motion for Extension of Record of Litigation in re: the NHRERP Notice of Appeal", dated March 21, 1989, and Attachment thereto. The Appeal .
Board granted SAPL's motion to supplement the record on April 13, 1989, absent objection by any other party.
22/ See, e.
, PID 11 4.39 - 4.40 and testimony cited therein; App. Dir. ,
E2 . Tr. 4228 at 14-21; Tr. 4398-99.
L:ll: r ? --
that the Board was fully justified in disregarding the views of these
- l. witnesses. App. Br. at 40-43. The Staff concurs in that statement, for the reasons indicated in Applicants' brief. E IV. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That the NHRERP Provides Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Reception Centers Will Be Available in the Event of an Emergency at Seabrook Station.
Two contentions were litigated before the Licensing Board with respect to the adequacy of reception centers for evacuees, generally challenging the NHRERP's compliance with NUREG-0654, 5 II.J.12. That-provision states:
Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitoring of svacuees at relocation centers in host areas. The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume.
exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
Numerous issues were raised in this area, including the plan's provisions for waste water and solid waste disposal, the number of showers available, and the number of emergency workers and monitoring devices. With respect to all of the issues raised in this area, the Board concluded, subject to 23/ For example, notwithstanding the witnesses' testimony as to the difficulties they anticipate in evacuating the nursing homes with which they were associated, on cross-examination it became apparent that these facilities have emergency plans and personnel of their own upon which they would rely upon in the event of fire or other emergencies requiring evacuation -- and that such evacuations have been initiated or conducted in the past. See PID i 4.38 and the
- evidence cited therein.
- ~~
- ___ _ -_______ - __ ._J..
the satisfaction of certain conditions, E that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate reception centers for the purpose of registration, monitoring, decontamination, and waste handling can and will be made avpilable in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station" (PID 1 5.103).
Only two issues 'are presented on appeal from the Board's decision on these matters. First, as discussed above, NECNP and SAPL challenge the Board's determination that a second 12-hour shift need not be provided for evacuees other than emergency workers; this assertion is without merit, for the reasons discussed supra at 20-21. Second, SAPL challenges the Board's acceptance of the NHRERP's planning basis, which assumed that 20%
of the EPZ population may be expected to arrive at the reception centers (SAPL Br. at 42-57). E SAPL argues that the Board's acceptance of the 20% planning basis was l improper, in that (1) this planning basis was premised on the same FEMA memorandum which the Appeal Board criticized in ALAB-905 in the Shoreham
-24/ These conditions addressed the need for (1) the development of emergency worker call-list rosters (2) the provision of additional monitoring personnel at two of the four primary reception centers, and (3) delayed staffing or second shift capability for the one
. reception center designated for use by emergency workers. See PID 115.68, 5.78, 5.82, and 9.972.
25/ The NHRERP utilized a planning basis for all four of its primary reception centers based on a 20% evacuee load at the Manchester reception center; inasmuch as the other three centers are expected to handle a smaller population than the Manchester reception center, the planning basis for those facilities exceeds 20%. Similarly, the planning basis utilized EPZ population estimates for summer months, which are significantly larger than winter population estimates. PID 1 5.9. While SAPL challenges the extent of " conservatism" afforded by these considerations (SAPL Br. at 44 and n.7), it does not contend .
that the State fails to satisfy the 20% standard.
L_________
proceeding (SAPL Br. at 43); E (2) a SAPL witness, Dr. Donald Herzberg, challenged the adequacy of the planning basis here, when he offered his opinion that "the vast majority" of EPZ evacuees will arrive at the reception centers for monitoring (Id. at49); and (3) 86% of the respondents to a " beach blanket survey" conducted at Hampton Beach stated they would go to a reception center (if instructed to do so) (Id. at 50).
The Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-905 does not warrant a finding of error by the Licensing Board in this proceeding. In ALAB-905, the Appeal Board did not find the FEMA memorandum to be deficient as a matter of law.
Rather, the Appeal Board found, based on the extensive record before it --
including considerable Intervenor testimony and an in-depth cross-examination of FEMA witnesses -- that FEMA failed, in that proceedino, to defend its p*anning basis sufficiently. ALAB-905, 28 NRC at 525. Indeed, the Appeal Board remanded the issue for further consideration by the Licensing Board, affording FEMA and the NRC Staff an opportunity to present further evidence providing firm and sound support for the 20%
planning basis. See id., 28 NRC at 530-31. E 26/ Lont Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
ALAE-905, 28 NRC 515 (Nov. 29, 1988).
-27/ The Appeal Board's dissatisfaction with FEMA's testimony in Shoreham appears to have stemmed from the inability of FEMA's witnesses in that proceeding to adequately explain the underlying rationale for the planning basis, not having been involved in its formulation and having no personal knowledge of the considerations that went into its
. formulation by FEMA. See 28 NRC at 525. The fact that those witnesses may have lacked personal knowledge as to the underlying reasons for the 20% planning basis does not render the planning basis invalid. Further, SAPL has provided no reason to believe that the testimony of the FEMA witnesses appearing in this proceeding would ,
have suffered the same infirmities, if the issue had been raised.
No such demonstration in support of FEMA's 20% planning basis was required in this proceeding, given the state of the evidentiary record before the Board. As the Licensing Board noted, in Shoreham there had been a direct and specific challenge both to the underlying basis for FEMA's generic 20% planning guidance and to the applicability of that -
generic guidance to the Shoreham EPZ. PID 11 1.11, 5.65 - 5.67. Here, as in Shoreham, FEMA witnesses testified that planning is required for "at least 20%" of the evacuees. FEMA Dir. ff. Tr. 5091 at 80, Tr. 5093-94.
However, the similarity between the two proceedings ends there. Unlike the situation in Shoreham, the interveners here made no attempt at all to cross-examine FEMA as to the rationale for the planning basis (see Tr. 5092-99). Further, the Interveners here failed to present any expert testimony supporting the need to plan for more than 20% of the evacuees to arrive at the reception centers. The sole testimony by Interveners on this issue consisted of the unsupported opinion of Dr. Herzberg -- a medical doctor with a background in nuclear medicine and no experience or expertise in radiological emeroency planning -- who stated only that he believed the " vast majority" of EPZ evacuees wm > come to the reception centers, and that he would be interested in learning the basis for FEMA's planning assumption. 2_8/ The Board properly applied the Comission's rule 28/ Dr. Herzberg stated that "[i]t would interst me greatly to find out what is alleged to form the empirical basis of the 20% estimate of evacuees reporting for services." Herzberg Supp. , ff. Tr. 5010, at 2. While Dr.Herzberg expressed interest in learning the bais for FEMA's assumption, he never challenged the empirical bases for that assumption nor did he offer any empirical or theoretical basis in ,i support of his own opinion as to what the " vast majority" will do.
,I
1 l
affording a rebuttable presumption to FEMA's findings, and was entirely justified in finding that FEMA's views had not been rebutted here.
SAPL claims that the Board erred and demonstrated bias in treating Dr. Herzberg as a non-expert. The Board's findings in this regard were correct. E Dr. Herzberg is the Director of Nuclear Medicine at a hospital in Hanover, New Hampshire. Herzberg Dir. ff. Tr. 5011 at 1. His only experience with radiation planning issues involved observations of hospital workers going through limited mock radiation accident scenarios (typically involving two patients), and with patients anticipating radiation treatment for illness. Id. ; Tr. 5020, 5057-58, 5060. He had never published any articles dealing with human behavior in an emergency; had no experience with large-scale radiological or non-radiological emergency planning; had never reviewed the emergency plans of other States; was not familiar with the reception center planning bases of other emergency plans; and admitted he was not a " perfect expert witness" in the ,
field. Tr. 5065-5066, 5057-58, 5063, 5065. E The Licensing Board was
-29/ See, e.g. , Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, i U6Tts 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 735 (1985) (no weight should be afforded to an asserted expert who can supply no scientific basis for his statements (other than his " belief") and who disparages his own
~
testimony); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-15, 7 NRC 642, 647 n.8 (1978) (less weight is to be afforded to the testimony of a witness with limited expertise).
30/ Despite SAPL's suggestion to the contrary (SAPL Br. at53), a challenge was made to Dr. Herzberg's qualifications to testify as an l expert on human behavior in an emergency (Tr. 5055) and the Board I accepted his testimony limited to his narrow area of expertise dealing with medical patients. Tr. 5056-5057. Proposed finoings challenging Dr. Herzberg's qualifications were later filed by both
- the Applicants and the NRC Staff.
i tl
fully justified in treating Dr. Herzberg's opinion as unsupported, speculative and that of a non-expert.
As to SAPL's reference to the " beach blanket" survey, it should be noted that SAPL never raised this matter in its proposed findings filed before the Licensing Board, E and should not be allowed to raise it for the first time now, on appeal. See , e.g. , Tennesse Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units IA, 2A, 18, and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 348 (1978). Further, that survey is inapposite, in that it asked the respondents to assume they would be instructed to proceed to reception centers; in fact, upon a precautionary decision to close New Hampshire beaches, beachgoers will only be directed to leave the beach. Finally, as the Board found, the beach blanket survey was flawed and, in any event, pre-emergency statements of intent do not afford reliable predictions of actual emergency behavior (PID 1 7.87).
In sum, the Board's findings with respect to the NHRERP's reception center planning basis were correct, based on the evidentiary record before the Board. The Licensing Board's decision should be affirmed, notwithstanding the Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-905 that the evidence presented in Shoreham warranted a different outcome in that proceeding.
-31/ See " Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Proposed Findings of Fact, '
TuTings of Law and Conclusions of Fact", dated May 9,1988, at 54-72.
_-_--.:. "~~
V. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That There Is . Reasonable Assurance -That the Behavior of Emergency Workers and the Public in the Seabrook EPZ Will Not Provent an Adequate Emergency _ Response From Being' Conducted in the Event: ' of . a Radiological Emergency at Seabrook Station.
'In the prNeeding below, the Interveners raised numerous issues concerning the potential human - behavior of emergency workers and the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook. Foremost among these concerns were Interveners' assertions that there would be role abandonment and role conflict on the part of teachers, police officers and emergency workers; and panic and disorderly behavior by the public at large, raising the prospect of aberrant driver behavior that would interfere with a safe, orderly and efficient evacuation. The Licensing Board carefully considered all of the testimony sponsored by the Interveners, Applicants and NRC Staff with respect to these issues and concluded that Interveners' concerns were unfounded (PID 1 7.96).
On appeal, SAPL and the Mass AG challenge this portion of the Board's decision, particularly.with respect to the issues of role abandonment by -l teachers (SAPL Br. at 58-59); whether a " therapeutic community" will develop among the general public (Id. at 59-62); and the potential for aberrant driver behavior (Id. at 62-65; MAG Br. at 20-29).
With respect to the potential for role abandonment by teachers, SAPL
~
asserts (1)that the Board erroneously treated teachers as government officials in applying the the "best efforts" realism doctrine and (2) that the Board improperly disregarded the testimony presented by a panel of 13 teachers, who stated that in the event of an emergency at Seabrook, teachers would abandon their students in order to be with and assist their i e
^
- * ~ ' ~ ' ' ' ' ^ ~
.______A_._-.-_A
own children (SAPL Br. at 58-59). First, contrary to SAPL's assertion, the Board's decision with respect to the teachers does not rest on the realism doctrine. True, the Board stated that the realism doctrine "should" apply to teachers, and it rejected "the implication . . . that teachers will fail to perform their natural and traditional duties in the
. event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook in accordance with the presumption of the emergency planning rule." PID 17.17. However, the Board then proceeded, at length, to examine the merits and reliability of the teachers' testimony -- and its decision rests not on the realism rule but on its perception that the testimony was not a reliable predictor of how teachers would respond in an actual emergency (PID 11 7.17 - 7.22),
and on the testimony of Dr. Mileti concerning human behavior in an emergency, including teacher behavior. See PID 11 7.14, 7.59; App. Dir.
No. 7 ff. 5622 at 126-27, 130; Tr. 6624-26; see also Tr. 3967, 3969.
Indeed, if the Board had intended to base its decision on the realism rule, it would have had no need to consider (much less admit) the teachers' testimony.
The Board's detennination not to rely upon the teachers' testimony is well founded. For example, as the Board noted, the teachers were
- uncomfortable saying they would " abandon" their students to go care for their own children, Tr. 3947-49; there are many more teachers in the EPZ than those who came forward to testify, many of whom may not feel the role conflict voiced by these witnesses or who might resolve any such conflict differently, PID 11 7.20, 7.22; and while many other teachers signed a petition saying they do "NOT accept the conflict of duty" assigned to them by the NHRERP, they were not asked if they would leave or abandon their
students and no effort was made to determine if they would do so.
- Tr. 3986-87. .Further, the evidence showed that despite these expressions of intent, the NHRERP did not assign any role to teachers beyond that which they have historically performed in emergencies, including the Three Mile Island accident. PID 17.14; App. Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622, at
. 126-27,130; Tr. 3967, 3969, 6625-26; FEMA Dir. ff. Tr. 4051 at 48. See discussion supra at 7-8.
With respect to the question of general human behavior in an emergency and whether a " therapeutic community" will develop within the public (SAPL Br. at 59-62), no error has been committed. While SAPL may disagree with the Board's determination to rely upon testimony by Dr. Mileti rather than Intervenor witnesses, the Board cannot be said to' have disregarded the testimony cited by SAPL. See PID 11 7.34- 7.40, 7.54-7.58, and 7.65. In effect, the Board heard the witesses' opposing ,
views and was persuaded by Dr. Mileti's testimony. That testimony was based on empirical research accumulated over the last three decades regarding public emergency behavior in the United States in reference to geological, climatological, and technological emergencies. App. Dir.
No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622 at 105. The Board's decision is supported by
- substantial, reliable and probative evidence (e.g. , App. Dir. No. 7, ff.
Tr. 5622 at 94 g seq.; App. Reb. No. 5, ff. Tr. 9408), and should be
~
affirmed. E l 32/ While SAPL contends'that the Board disregarded evidence as to a 1972
" riot" of youths in Hampton Beach, Dr. Mileti did not suggest that such riots cannot occur. Rather, his testimony indicated that in the (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
- . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _____i
With respect to the potential for aberrant driver behavior, various '
witnesses sponsored by the Interveners advanced the theory that in the congested summer traffic conditions which may be anticipated in Seabrook beach areas, there will be a widespread abandonment of vehicles, numerous i traffic accidents, and a general disregard for traffic management control ,
devices and traffic guides. PID 11 7.82, 7.85. Opposing testimony was !
sponsored by .the Applicants and NRC Staff. Upon a review of all the evidence, the Board found that significant aberrant driver behavior as postulated by the Interveners was unlikely to occur. In particular, the Board was persuaded by the testimony of the Staff's expert, Dr. Urbanik, who has had a long involvement in Seabrook ETE issues and with ETE prep-aration around the country. PID 17.83; see Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 7372 at 2-3 and curriculum vitae attached thereto. Based on his knowledge of the literature concerning past evacuations, Dr. Urbanik testified that there is no evidence that aberrant driver behavior was a factor in any
~
evacuation in United States history, including an evacuation of 200,000 people along the Texas seacoast during Hurricane Carla, where traffic congestion lasted for hours. Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 7372, at 17; (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE face of a disaster affecting a population at large, persons within that population will tend to fonn what he described as a " therapeutic community" with resulting altruistic public behavior. Dr. Mileti's testimony is unaffected by the occurrence of the youth riot referred ,
to by SAPL.
Tr. 7485-86, 7489-90. E Signf"icantly, as noted. by the Board (PID 1 7.83), none of the Interveners' expert witnesses disputed this evidence.
See, e A , Tr. 7237, 8216-18. Dr. Mileti agreed . that civil driver behavior should be expected, based on a phenomenon which sociologists have observed during actual emergencies. App. Reb. No. 2, ff. Tr. 9407. 34/
Based on the evidence, the Board correctly concluded that unstable or aberrant driver behavior was not expected to be a' significant factor in
' the event of a Seabrook emergency. PID 1 7.89.
33/ The Interveners assert that the Seabrook area is " unique" and that Dr. Urbanik agreed with this position (MAG Br. at 28; cf. SAPL Br.
at 65). In fact, however, Dr. Urbanik stated (Tr. 7486):
"Certainly Seabrook is unique, but there have been extensive periods of congestion where people have been stuck in their cars for hours and hours before they have arrived at their destination. So, it is not black and white. I mean it is not' that we have got one just like Seabrook. But on the other hand, it is not like there is not anything that .is not like it at all."
Dr. Urbanik went on to discuss other evacuations involving hundreds of thousands of people, with extended periods- of traffic congestion, in which no aberrant driver behavior was experienced. Tr. 7489-90.
While the Mass AG asserts that Dr. Urbanik's testimony " offers no insight" on how drivers may be - expected to behave in a Seabrook evacuation and is otherwise inapplicable to Seabrook (MAG Br. at 29),
- there was an ample demonstration of the applicability of Dr. Urbanik's testimony to Seabrook. See, n Tr. 7485-86, 7774-75, 7801-03.
34/ While Dr. Mileti declined to hold himself out as an expert in the narrow field of driver behavior in traffic jams (SAPL Br. at 63-64; MAG Br. at 28), he demonstrated that he had sufficient expertise in human behavior and knowledge of the evacuation literature to address this issue. Tr. 6316, 9431-33. The Board properly found that he was ,
sufficiently qualified to testify in this area.
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J
r
(
The Interveners incorrectly assert that the Board ignored the testimony of local policemen and area residents who stated that area drivers often disregard traffic officers and devices in " normal" (non-emergency) conditions (SAPL Br. at 62-63, 65; MAG Br. at 21-24).
That testimony dealt only with normal conditions -- and no showing was
- p. ,
made by Interveners that area drivers would behave the same way in an emergency evacuation. Further, while Interveners contend that driver behavior in other evacuations is inapplicable to Seabrook due to the area's high population density and limited road network (SAPL Br.
at 64-65), they made no showing that local drivers 'are significantly different than drivers in other areas, or that driver behavior in a Seabrook evacuation is 'likely to be significantly different than driver behavior in the heavily populated Texas seacoast vacation area which was evacuated. during Hurricane Carla and discussed by Dr. Urbanik. See Tr. 7489-90. The Board considered the local residents' testimony as to non-emergency driving behavior, but declined to give it greater weight ,
than the undisputed expert testimony of Drs. Urbanik and Milet1. This determination was not erroneous.
The Mass AG next asserts that the Board failed to consider the results of a " beach blanket survey" conducted by Dr. Luloff, in which respondents indicated how they believed they would behave during an evacuation (MAG Br. at 24, 27). El The Board considered this evidence 35/ The Mass AG also claims that the Board erred in not permitting him to file rebuttal survey (MAGtestimony).to Br. at 27 support He fails the statistical to note, however, validity thatofthis the (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
J O
9
and decided that it could not serve as a reliable predictor of how people would actually behave in an emergency. As the Board noted, the survey was seriously flawed (see Apps. Br. .at n.7); and, in any event, emergency behavior is largey (,rected by factors present at the time of an actual emergency, which could not be simulated by surveys of pre-emergency intent (PID 17.87). El No error was committed by the Board in its consideration of this matter.
Finally, the Mass AG asserts that the Board failed to recognize the
" key point" of Dr. Ceder's testimony, that accidents are more likely in congested-flow traffic conditions than in free-flow conditions (MAG Br. at 25-26). Interestingly, aside from the flaws in this tastimony (see Apps.
Br. at 25-26), this " key point" was never presented to the Bcard in the Mass AG's proposed findings. E/ daving failed to raise the issue in his (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE testiEony would have been a surrebuttal to rebuttal testimony filed by the Applicants; that he could have defended the survey's validity in his direct testimony or through cross-examination of Applicants' rebuttal witnesses; and that the Board is not obliged to afford parties the unlimited right to file surrebuttal testimony whenever they perceive some damage has been done to their direct case. See Tr. 9159, 9167-68. In any event, however, the Board's decision rests !
on the lack of reliability inherent in pre-emergency surveys of intent, regardless of whether the survey is statistically valid.
Accordingly, the admission of this surrebuttal testimony would not have affected the outcome of the Board's PID, and its exclusion
~
cannot constitute prejudicial error.
\
36/ Dr. Luloff, the Mass AG witness who sponsored the survey, agreed that it would be important for survey respondents to fully understand the emergency scenario, and that his survey did not inform them of many conditions which might exist. See, e_.g., Tr. 8277-81.
37/ See " Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon's Proposed
~~~
Tiiidings of Fact and Rulings of Law", dated May 19, 1988.
- 37.-
proposed findings, he 'should not be permitted to raise it for the first .;
time,on appeal. .See discussion , supra at 29.
VI. The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded. Both as a i Matter of Fact and as a Matter of Law, That the .
.: NHRERP .Contains Adequate Provisions for Sheltering Persons Located in Beach Areas Near the Plant in the Event of a Radiological Emergency at Seabrook.
One of the principal issues in contention throughout the course of the Seabrook operating license proceeding has been whether the existence of certain Seabrook site-specific conditions preclude a finding of rea-sonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of'a radiological emergency. These conditions include a high
' population density duritia lummer mot.ths when many visitors frequent nearby beaches and recreational areas; a limited road network available for use in the evacuation of beach areas; and the absence of adequate physical structures which could serve to shelter the population from a radiological release. The Interveners assert that this combination of circumstances, under certain fast-breaking accident scenarios, ' could result in significant radiological exposures to large numbers of persons. Simply put, it is the Interveners' contention that Seabrook operation will result in too many people being placed at too great a risk -- and that this violates Coinnission reguistfor.s (MAG Br. at 83; Tr. 5546-50). All of
' Interveners' many and diverse; arguments concerning this " beach shelter" issue revolve around and depend upon this central -- and flawed --
premise.
The Licensing Board's analysis of this matter included consideration of the evidence sponsored by Interveners and Applicants as to the limited ,
road network in the beach area, the extent to which there are buildings
- - - - - _ - _ - _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ ~
t l
l ( suitable for use as , shelters, the minimal level of dose reduction which would be afforded by many buildings in the area, and the nature of the NHRERP's protective action strategy for Sach area populations. In l
I addition, the Board received evidence of FEMA's favorable position with respect to the adequacy of NHRERP provisions for protecting the beach
. population, and it conducted a full inquiry into the reasons why FEMA changea its position from one which it had announced earlier. Upon careful consideration of all of these matters, the Board reached a detailed set of conclusions in which it held, inter alia, that:
(1)the preferred protective action for seasonal beach populations in the Seabrook EPZ is almost always early beach closure or evacuation; (2)the State of New Hampshire is prepared to recomend sheltering for the beach population in the very limited circumstances when that protective action would efford maximum dose savings to that population; (3) neither the emergency planning regulations nor NUREG-0654 require sheltering per g; (4) there is no legal requirement that the Applicants demonstrate the ability to achieve a preset minimum dose savings with respect to the sheltering or evacuation of the beach population; (5) FEMA has concluded that the NHRERP satisfies the require-ments of NUREG-0654 even though the State of New Hampshire intends to shelter the beach population only in very limited circumstances, that there is a technically appropriate basis for New Hampshire's choice;
- (6) FEMA's finding is supported by the preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence; (7) adequate consideration has been given by the State of New Hampshire in the NHRERP to the protective action of sheltering for the Seabrook area beach population; and (8) subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions unrelated to the beach shelter issue, there is reasonable .
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken within the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ in
the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, and the Commission's emergency planning regulations have been satisfied.
PID 118.96,10.2 and 10.3. As discussed below, the Licensing Board's resolution of the beach shelter issue and its many subelements was correct as a matter of law, is supported by a preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence, and should be affirmed.
A. The " Reason: ie Assurance" Standard The Mass AG and TOH launch their challenge to the Board's decision with the assertion that its finding of " reasonable assurance" under 10 C.F.R. 950.47(a) rests upon an erroneous view of what that standard requires. In this regard, they contend that the regulation requires
" adequate protection" of the public; that the Board failed to find that any particular level of protection would be afforded by the NHRERP to beach populations; and that the Board improperly focused on planning efforts rather than results. (MAG Br. at 33-72; T0H Br. at 9-30). These assertions are without legal merit.
10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(a), in terms, requires a finding that "there is reasonable assurance that acequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Nowhere in this (or any
. other) regulation has the Commission established a minimum level of protection which must be afforded by an onsite or offsite emergency plan l
-- nor has the Commission ever required that an emergency plan provide
" adequate protection" or an " adequate level of protection" in the sense of requiring assurance that some level of radiation exposure will not i
,,,y
- _ = - _
i i
r occur. EI To the contrary, the Comission has explicitly stated that no such requirements exist:
i -
Our emergency planning regulations . . . . differ in character from most of our siting and engineering design requirements which are directed at achieving or
. maintaining a minimum level of public safety protection.-
See, eA, 10 C.F.R. 6 100.11. Our emergency planning-requirements do not' require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum ' evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in_ the event of a serious accident. ' Rather they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reductions under the circumstances; what may be' reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be.for another.
Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
CLI-86-13, 24 N,RC 22, 30 (1986). 3_9/
The' Commission recently reiter'ated this view, upon its adoption of an amended rule providing criteria for use in the evaluation of offsite emergency plans where state and/or local governments decline to partici-38/ Indeed, it is possible to postulate for any nuclear plant, some severe accident which, regardless of its extremely low likelihood, may result in unavoidable severe health consequences. - This
- potential does not contravene the Commission's emergency planning-regulations.
39/ The Comission's explanation of the place occupied by the emergency planning regulations vis-a-vis other health and safety its regulations demonstrates the invalidity of TOH's argument that emergency plans, themselves, must provide " adequate protection" of the public under the Atomic Energy Act (TOH Br. at 8-9). Further, it should be noted that the Atomic Energy Act confers broad discretion upon the Comission to determine "by rule or regulation" just what is required in order to find that a nuclear plant "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. ,
i2232(a).
pate iri emergency planning. #0/ - There, the Commission recited with approval its decision in Shoreham, supra, and further clarified that offsite emergency plans are not to be evaluated in terms of the level of dose protection they may afford:
That decision [CLI-86-13] also included language which could be interpreted as envisioning that the NRC must estimate the radiological dose reductions which a utility plan would achieve, compare them with the radiological dose reductions which would be achieved if there were a state or local plan with full state ar.d local participation in emergency planning, and permit licensing only if the dose reduction are " generally comparable."
Such an interpretation would be contrary to NRC practice, under which emergency plans are evaluated for adequacy without reference to numerical dose reductions which might be accomplished, and without comparing them to other emergency plans, real or hypothetical. The final rule makes clear that every emergency plan is to be evaluated for adequacy on its own merits without reference to the specific dose reductions which might be accomplished under the plan or to the capabilities of any other plan. It further makes clear that a finding of adequacy for any plan is to be considered generally comparable to a finding of adequacy for any other plan.
52 Fed. Reg. at 42,084-85.
Similarly, in its notice of the proposed rule, the Commission noted that there is no minimum level of dose protection or minimum acceptable ETE, and that dose savings may be substantially less under adverse conditions than under perfect conditions -- with no resultant adverse impact upon a finding of " reasonable assurance":
The existing emergency planning regulations [ sic) does not require that plans achieve any pre-established minimum dose savings in the event of an accident. For 40/ Statement of Consideration, " Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning," 52 Fed. Reg. 42078 ,:
(Nov. 3, 1987).
example, approved emergency plans with full State and local cooperation have highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours and the projected dose savings for such plans would vary widely. Thus the regulation is' inherently variable in effect and there are no bright-line mandatory minimum projected dose savings or evacuatia time limites [ sic]
. which could be viewed as performance standards for emergency plans in the existing regulation. Moreover, the dose savings achieved by implementation of an emergency plan under adverse conditions, e.s_., during or following heavy snow, could be substantiaTTy less than under perfect conditions. This variability is consistent with a concept or approach to emergency planning d preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid.
A reading of these statements by the Comission compels the conclusion that the Licensing Board properly interpreted the " reasonable assurance" standard. In essence, the Board was not. charged with the task of determining whether any particular minimum level of dose savings, minimum level of public protection, or acceptable level of risk was afforded by the NHRERP; instead, the Board was required to determine whether the NHRERP provided " reasonable and feasible dose reduction under the circumstances." Shoreham, supra, 24 NRC at 30. As the Commission noted, "what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for another" (Id.) -- and therefore, even if Seabrook site characteristics are such that the level of available public protection may be less than what is available at other sites, that would not require a finding that
, the requisite " reasonable assurance" is lacking. In light of these clear pronouncements, there is simply no . apparent basis for Interveners' 41/ Proposed Rule. " Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Governments Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Local .
Planning," 52 Fed. Reg. 6080, 6982 (March 6, 1987).
assertion that the Board erred in interpreting the " reasonable assurance" requirement.
Similarly, .there is no merit to Interveners' elaborate argument that the Board improperly established a "best efforts" standard (e.g., MAG Br.
at 33-45, 51-53; TOH Br. at 21-23). This argument consists of nothing more than an attempt to reconstruct the Board's decision to fit a definition of their own making. 42/ - For, as the Mass AG concedes, "the Board at no point stated that the standard it was applying was a 'best efforts' standard" (MAG Br. at 51-52). Instead, the Board's PID reflects careful adherence to the Commission's instruction in Shoreham, supra _, that the standard for assessing an emergency plan's adequacy is whether it achieves " reasonable and feasible dose reduction's under the circumstances. " Thus, the Board sought to determine whether the NHRERP
~
had considered available options so as to maximize the dose savings available under the circumstances, and concluded that it had done so.
See , e.g. , PID 11 8.49, 8.79-8.84, 8.96. This is consistent with the Commission's Shoreham decision and its later regulatory pronouncements (discussed supra), and with the Appeal Board's earlier guidance that the objective of emergency planning is "the achievement of maximum dose
. savings." Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power l
Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983). Cf. NUREG-0654, at 6 ("[t]he overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide 1
42/ The Mass AG candidly states, "the task on appeal is to reconstruct the Board's analysis so that its reliance on the 'best efforts' standard becomes clear." MAG. Br. at 52 n.40. No strawman argument ,.
has ever had so clear a genesis.
ei
dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the Protective Action Guides"; accord, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).
SAPL complains that the Board has issued a "standardless decision" that " rests on nothing more than the personal predilections of the Board members" (SAPL Br. at 18); the Mass AG similarly asserts that " reasonable assurance", if it is to mean anything, must require a finding as to the actual level of protection afforded by an emergency plan (MAG Br. at 79-80 I
and passim). With these arguments, the appellants seek to persuade the Appeal Board that the Licensing Board has overlooked an existino regulatory requirement and is therefore wrong as a matter of law.
However, they fail to note that they previously argued the rule, itself, contains no standards. Thus, SAPL previously contended before the U.S.
Court of Appeals that "the regulations adopted by the Commission provide no standard by which to guage the adequacy of emergency plans because they do not set out specific radiation dose limits and release times." $ The appellants' assertion here, that the Board has failed to apply a standard embodied in the emergency planning regulations, flies in the face of their
. prior complaint that the regulations lack standards.
Finally, it is worthwhile to recall that in arguing for the admission of the Sholly/Beyea testimony, the Mass AG conceded that there is no
-43/ Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire v. NRC, 690 F. 2d 1025, 1029 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (appealing from the Commission's decision to allow plant construction to proceed prior to a hearing on emergency plans). The Court rejected SAPL's complaint about the lack
- of standards, as an untimely challenge to the regulations. Id.
l l
e
existing standard as to how great a risk is acceptable under the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and he asked the Licensing Board.to establish that standard:
[W]e believe it [the NHRERP] is inadequate because too
-. . many people are put at too great a level of risk.
That's the point. . . . We believe that too many people are put [at] too great a level of risk.
If you press us' as to what constitutes too many people, and what constitutes too much risk, we're going to, unfortunately, kick it right back at you. We view that as your obligation to determine what is too .many people and what is too great a risk. But we believe that if reasonable assurance of adequate protection means. anything, . . . if there is a standard there at all, obviously there is because we are all here testing it, there has to be a line that could be drawn.
Tr. 5546. The problem with this argument, as the Staff noted below (Tr.5578-79), is that it sought to have the Licensing Board (and now, the
. Appeal Board) establish, in an individual licensing adjudication, what should only be established by the Commission -- and even then, only in a generic rule-making proceeding with opportunity for notice and comment, in. .
accordance wit' the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 9 553. The Mass AG's efforts to avoid the self-evident truth of this proposition (MAG Br. at 77-79,83-84) are to no avail.
For all of the above reasons, the Interveners' assertions that the Licensing Board has erred in failing to apply a standard of " adequate protection", which they assert is somewhere embodied in the Connission's emergency planning regulations, should be rejected.
B. Exclusion of the Sholly/Beyea Testimony The Interveners next assert that the Board improperly rejected certain testimony proffered by the Mass AG (the "Sholly/Beyea Testimony") ,
in an evidentiary ruling issued on November 16,1987 (MAG Br. at 76-83; 9
T0H Br. at 21). E l That testimony had sought to demonstrate that there could be significant health consequences upon the occurrence of certain accidents at Seabrook. $/ The Applicants filed an objection, in the form of a motion in limine, seeking to exclude this evidence. Oral argument on the motion was held on November 6, 1987 (Tr. 5531-82); and on November 16, 1989, the Board indicated it would grant the Applicants' motion (Tr. 5608-09), finding that the testimony was irrelevant and may not properly be considered under the Commission's emergency planning regulations (Tr. 5608; see also Tr. 5594-5616). On November 18, 1987, the 44/ " Commonwealth of Massachusetts Corrected Testimony of Steven C.
Sholly on the Technical Basis for the NRC Emergency Planning Rul.es, Dr. Jan Beyea on Potential Radiation Dosage Consequences of the Accidents that Form the Basis for the NRC Emergency Planning Rules, Dr. Gordon Thompson on Potential Radiation Release Sequences, and Dr. Jennifer Leaning on the Health Effects of Those Doses", filed on September 14, 1987, and refiled as corrected on November 17, 1987.
45/ The testimony consisted of four parts:
(1) a description of "the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules" (Sholly), Sholly/Beyea Testimony at 12; (2) an attempt to model "the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity" from the plant, based upon " accident sequences that are similar to the NRC's generic
- versions, but which take into account reactor specific differences at Seabrook" (Beyea), Id. at 13-14; (3) an analysis of "the potential for an atmospheric release, similar to that designated as PWR1 ... to occur from a steam explosion or high pressure melt ejection event." coupled with an analysis of certain variables believed to have the potential to affect plume rise, and potential variations in the source code (Thompson), Id. at 15; and (4) a discussion of the health consequences that might result from radiation doses associated with the foregoing events and ,:
conditions postulated in the testimony (Leaning), Id. at 15.
Board rejected the testimony upon its being offered, on grounds of relevance (Tr. 5961, 5979). 5/
The Board's exclusion of this testimony was entirely correct. The proffered testimony sought to introduce into litigation a quantitative analysis of the probabilities and consequences of various postulated accident sequences and conditions. As the Mass AG acknowledged in his motion for directed certification, the purpose of the testimony was to demonstrate that the level of protection afforded by the NHRERP to seasonal beach populations near the plant is inadequate -- i.e., that "too many people would be put at too great a risk by operation of the Seabrook plant" (Sholly Motion at 10-12,16). This assertion is repeated here (MAG Br. at 83). El However, no matter how often repeated, there is no foundation for the view that the emergency planning regulations embody a
" risk" determination. As discussed supra at 38-41, the Commission has 46/ The exclusion of this testimony was challenged by the Mass AG in a motion for directed certification filed on January 7,1988 ("Sholly Motion"), which was denied by the Appeal Board as untimely.
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-884, 27 NRC 56 (1988).
47/ Indeed, notwithstanding the Mass AG's assertion here that a finding of reasonable assurance requires a finding of " adequate protection",
. in arguing for the admission of this testimony he recognized that no minimum dose or public protection standards exist in the emergency planning rules. See Sholly Motion, at 14, 16-18. Similarly, the Mass AG has previouiTy conceded that the emergency planning rules do ,
not incorporate any standard of risk against which an emergency plan is to be evaluated. In oral argument before the Licensing Board on the admissibility of this testimony, he stated (Tr. 5558):
It is equally clear the Commission hasn't announced, and here is the standard against which that objective evidence is to be measured. You must have no fewer than these people at no greater than this risk. That's also '
equally clear that's not been required.
_._____._._______l
stated clearly that these regulations do not establish any minimum level of dose savings, any minimum level of protection, or any acceptable level of risk to be afforded by an emergency plan. For this reason, the Sholly/Beyea Testimony was not probative as to any issue properly before
~
the Board -- i.e., it was irrelevant -- in the absence of any rule estab-lishing the appropriate dose consequence or risk standard to be met.
C. The Requirement of a Range of Protective Actions The Interveners next challenge the Licensing Board's determination that sheltering is not required by the Commission's emergency planning regulations (PID 18.80), and its approval of FEMA's finding that "the requirements for a range of protective actions . . . have been satisfied even though the State of New Hampshire has chosen not to shelter the beach population except in very limited circumstances" (PID 1 8.96). In essence, the Interveners assert that the PID rests upon an incorrect interpretation ,of the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(10). That regulation requires, in pertinent part, that:
A range of protective actions have been developed for .
the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place . . . .
. According to Interveners, the relatively long ETEs for the Seabrook EPZ in summer months could result (in certain fast-breaking accident scenarios) in significant radiation doses during an evacuation -- and, they assert, the lack of sufficient effective shelters in the beach areas deprives the State of the " range of protective actions" required by regulation (e.g.,
MAG Br. at 72-75; TOH Br. at 25-28,36).
. _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ . ~ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
No error was committed by the Licensing Board in its resolution of these issues. The Board correctly concluded that the Commission's emergency planning rules do not require sheltering per se. No such 1
requirement appears in the regulations, nor has the Comission ever interpreted the regulations in this way. To the contrary, the Commission has indicated that its emergency planning rules do not contemplate that substantial offsite construction efforts (as would be necessary to provide
" adequate" shelters for area beachgoers) should be undertaken before a plan may be found to be adequate. San Onofre, supra,17 NRC at 533. E Further, as the Appeal Board has recognized, although the rule requires a
" range" of protective actions, it does not "specif[y] what that range must include." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792, 798 (1986).
Moreover, the Commission has clarified that the goal of emergency planning is to achieve " reasonable and feasible dose reductions under the circumstances," and "what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be for another." Shoreham, supra, 24 NRC at 30. In other words, if a plant is located in an area with predominantly wooden, or poorly constructed, or relatively few buildings -- such that only minimal
. dose savings are feasible by sheltering in the event of an accident --
that circumstance does not render an emergency plan inadequate. Nor would
"'-48/
Cf. NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (December 1978), at 13-14. As indicated in NUREG-0654 (at 6), FEMA has determined that the guidance in NUREG-0396 should be used as the planning basis for ,
radiological emergency plans.
I
. _ _ _ _ ___________a
this result be affected by the fact that relatively long ETEs may pertain to a particular site. The Commission has indicated that there is no minimum 'ETE that must be achieved and that approved emergency plans may have " highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours," with the result that "the projected dose savings for .
such plans would vary widely." 52 Fed. Reg. at 6982. Nor does a combination of these circumstances require a finding of plan inadequacy, since the regulations do not require that an emergency plan achieve any
" preset minimum radiation dose saving." Shoreham, supra.
It should also be noted that 9 50.47(b)(10) requires a range of protective actions for " emergency workers and the public." Nowhere does the regulation require that a range of protective actions exist that would include shelter and evacuation for every person, in every conceivable accident scenario, in all weather conditions -- such as the fast-breaking accident on a hot sumer weekend postulated by Interveners. For example, severe winter storms or hurricanes at many nuclear plants may preclude an evacuation of some or all of the population, leaving only sheltering as an available protective action for those persons; the Comission has indicated that this is not inconsistent with the emergency planning
- regulations. E Similarly, many nuclear plants are located near beaches 4_9/ As the Commission noted (52 Fed. Reg. at 6982):
[T]he dose savings achieved by implementation of an emergency plan under adverse conditions, e. ., during or following heavy such could be substant a y less than under perfect conditions. This variability is consistent with a concept or approach to emergency (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
. _ . _ _ . __.m___ _ _ _ _ ________2_ew -
and other recreational areas where shelter is not available for portions of the population; that does not cause an emergency plan to be inadequate under Comission regulations. See Tr. 14120, 14130.
Finally, a " range" of protective actions exists for the summer beach population at S' eabrook. First, as the Board found, the State has not altogether discarded the shelter option for beach areas, having retained it for use in those extremely limited circumstances when it might afford greater dose savings than evacuation (see discussion infra). Second, the NHRERP also includes provisions for monitoring and decontamination, which are within the " range of protective actions" contemplated by the rule.
Shoreham, supra, ALAB-855, ?d NRC at 800. Thus, even if the requirement that there be a " range of protective actions" is interpreted to mean that seasonal beach populations must be provided with more than the s4gle protective action of evacuation, the NHRERP satisfies that requirement, D. The Adequacy of the NHRERP's Protective Action Strategy The NHRERP's protective action strategy for Seabrook area beach populations begins with a precautionary measure, whereby New Hampshire may order an early closing of area beaches at the " Alert" stage of an emergency, when no offsite action would ordinarily be warranted, thereby
. affording additional time for the beach populations to remove themselves from the area at greatest risk and preventing additional public access to the beaches. This is to be accomplished, inter alia, through the (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE planning and preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid. ,,
broadcast of voice messages on loudspeakers which have been installed in beach areas. PID 11 8.16-8.29. New Hampshire has also included the provisions necessary for a full-scale evacuation of beach and other areas; it has considered both the availability and quality of shelters in beach areas; and it has considered the dose saving benefits which might be afforded by sheltering, and under what circumstances those benefits would be present. For a variety of reasons, New Hampshire has concluded that evacuation, rather than sheltering, would be the protective action of choice for Seabrook area beach populations except in three extremely limited circumstances. FEMA witnesses concurred in New Hampshire's protective action strategy. PID 11 8.30, 8.36-8.42, 8.44-8.45, 8.48, 8.58-8.72. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Board accepted FEMA's views, approved the NHRERP's protective action strategy, and determined that New Hampshire had given adequate consideration to the protective action of sheltering for Seabrook area beach populations. PID 1 8.96.
The Interveners raise several challenges to the Board's decision in this regard, primarily on three. theories: (1) that FEMA's determination as to the adequacy of New Hampshire's strategy was improperly based on a J
generic rather than a site-specific analysis; (2)that the NHRERP's
. protective action strategy somehow fails to provide maximum dose savings l for the public; and (3) that the Board failed to require the inclusion of I
" implementing detail" in the NHRERP as recommended by FEMA (TOH Br.
at 30-36, 44-49; MAG Br. at 61-74; SAPL Br. at 19-25). These assertions are without merit.
l e
-m,,
- 1. The FEMA Analysis First, the Board appropriately considered and rejected Interveners' argument that the technical analysis performed by FEMA's witness (Keller) was improperly generic. As noted by the Board, that testimony "is no less relevant to Seabrook simply because his reasoning and the physical laws of nature relied upon may also be relevant to other nuclear power plants."
PID 1 8.72. As Mr. Keller noted, his analysis, while generic, is also applicable specifically to Seabrook. Tr. 14244. Further, Mr. Keller went j beyond a generic analysis, indicating that his views took into consid-eration such Seabrook-specific characteristics as the very minimal (10%)
' dose sayings available in Seabrook beach area structures and the fact that the dose protection afforded by such unwinterized structures degrades rapidly. FEMA Dir. ff. Tr.13968 at 9-10; Tr. 14164. As stated by K.. Keller, there is no need for further examination of the State's
-selection of evacuation as the protective action of choice, because "this 10 percent reduction is so -- is so down in the dirt in the error band, it's trivial. . . . [W]e don't have much in the way of shelter." -
Tr. 14243-44. Despite the interveners' assertions to the contrary, FEMA has considered a highly critical Seabrook site-specific characteristic in
.' reaching its position. See PID 1 8.71.
- 2. Maximization of Dose Savings Second, the Interveners have failed to demonstrate that the NHRERP's protective action strategy fails to provide the maximum reasonable and feasible dose savings available under the circumstances. Indeed, the Interveners' leading witness on this subject, Dr. Goble, agreed that structures in the beach area provide an average dose reduction factor of
__..___________._.________m_______.___U
l l~ 1 -
only 0.9 which "is not very good." Tr. 11457, 11477. Further, he stated that the existence of adequate shelter space with good dose shielding factors (in the range of 40-50%) is critical to any decision to recommend l
shelter. Tr. 11505-06. And, Dr. Goble generally agreed that, for various reasons, evacuation would usually be preferable to sheltering for the ;
beach population, and that sheltering would be more effective than evacuation only in limited circumstances. Tr. 11461-70, 11479-85, 11681.
While the Mass AG attempts to fashion the issue into one requiring close technical analysis (MAG Br. at 54-69), the simple fact that Seabrook beach areas lack sufficient shelters with good dose protection values renders this analysis meaningless, whatever its value may be with respect to protective action decision-making at other sites. See PID 11 8.56-8.57; Tr. 14243. E
---50/ The Mass AG complains that the Board precluded him from introducing testimony that a strategy of sheltering, or of sheltering followed by evacuation, would be preferable to the strategy of evacuation alone (MAG Br. at 53, 60, 69, 69, 85). There is no basis for this accusation. This subject was addressed in Dr. Goble's testimony and was duly considered by the Board; the only evidence excluded by the Board during the hearings was the initial Sholly-Beyea testimony (focusing on accident sequences and dose consequences), which the Mass AG offered repeatedly in substantially the s::me form, without
. excising the inadmissible portions.
As to the Mass AG's offer of additional Sholly/Beyea testimony in June 1988 subsequent to the close of the record (MAG Br. at 86-87),
he has failed to explain why that testimony was offered so late --
particularly since he was on notice of FEMA's revised position since at least March 1988 when FEMA filed its revised testimony, and he conducted a full inquiry of the bases for Mr. Keller's views in a deposition lasting several days in April 1988. See Tr.14156. The Board's determination not to accept the Mass AG's extremely untimely offer of -testimony does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, inasmuch as the Board accepted Dr. Goble's protective
- strategy testimony, no harm has resulted to the Mass AG. !
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ ___ur
I V._
L , 3. The Need for Implementing Detail l- Finally, FEMA -- upon whose testimony rests the entire concept of
" implementing: detail" -- has clearly. indicated that further implementing detail is not necessary to a finding- that the NHRERP is adequate. First, as indicated . by FEMA witness Cumming, FEMA believes that sufficient
- implementing detail is, already in the plan with respect-to the transit-dependent population (estimated to be two percent of the total. beach population). Tr. 14252. Second, because FEMA recognizes that sheltering for the remaining 98 percent of the beach population is an " extremely, extremely limited option", the NHRERP's "ad hoc" approach to sheltering this' group is sufficient without the inclusion of any implementing detail.
Tr. 13294, 14075', 14253-54. Thus, FEMA has concluded that "the requirement for a range of protective measures has been satisfied even though the State of New Hampshire has chosen not to shelter the summer beach population except in very limited' circumstances", and the NHRERP satisfies NUREG-0654, il II.J.4 and - II.J.10 with respect to the summer beach population. FEMA Dir. ff. Tr. 13968 at 3 and 11..
~
While the Board expressed confusion in understanding FEMA's views as to the 'need for " implementing detail" (PID 18.73-8.74), the testimony
. discussed above demonstrates that the Board reached exactly the same conclusion as was reached by FEMA. This conclusion is correct. There simply is no reason to require that an emergency plan include needless details pertaining to an option of extremely limited value, and which the State and FEMA have indicated is almost certainly never to be utilized --
especially when one considers, as did the Board, that the inclusion of such additional provisions will only " clutter" the plan with unnecessary
detail, will not improve the olan, and could actually have an adverse effect on the State's. response to an emergency. PID 1 8.75. The Board's conclusion is- consistent with the position reached by FEMA and the majority of the RAC, that the NHRERP's provisions for Seabrook area beach
. populations are adequate. Tr. 8686-90, 8695-98, 8701-03, 11922-57.
.- Nor is the soundness of this conclusion altered by the Appeal Board's decision in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit
-1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC' 135 (1986) -- which SAPL asserts requires that the details of a beach shelter plan be included in the NHRERP without regard
' to thel low probability that evacuation would ever be selected as the
. appropriate protective action (SAPL Br. at 25). In ALAB-832, the Appeal Board was concerned that pre-planning had not been conducted for the evacuation of certain hospitals near the perimeter of the EPZ. While it was highly improbable that such an evacuation would be conducted, the Appeal Board in essence found that it could not- be conducted without
. pre-planning as to the number of vehicles required to transport the patients. Further, the Appeal Board found that guidance in NUREG-0654 with respect to the preparation of ETEs required that an analysis be conducted as to the time needed to evacuate special neteds populations such C as area hospitals. As the Appeal Board noted, this required "an awareness of the extent of the transportation that might be required to remove the patients from the EPZ, as well as an understanding of how and when the evacuation would be accomplished" -- and "the proposal to deal with transportation requirements only after the need arises supplies no insight on either score." Id. at 156-57.
fl
_=.._._.m._ _ _ . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . __..___________i
In contrast to the "ad hoc" approach to hospital evacuation planning considered in ALAB-832, New Hampshire's planning efforts with respect to beach sheltering are far advanced. The NHRERP already provides the physical means for notifying the beach population of a recommendation to ,
shelter, and it includes appropriate mechanisms for determining when that protective action recommendation should be issued. See, e.g., PID 1 8.38.
Further, New Hampshire has already fully considered the size of the beach population, the number and kind of structures available to shelter those persons, the location cf. these structures, and the circumstances in which beach sheltering would be recommended. PID 11 8.39-8.41, 8.43-8.45.
While the State has decided not to incorporate the Stone and Webster shelter survey into the NHRERP or to use it as a planning basis, that
~
study remains available for use by decision-makers at the time of an emergency. PID 1 8.45. i In addition, unlike the need to pre-plan for the transportation of hospital patients, for which scarce transportation resources must be identified and made available, no such limitations are associated with the sheltering of beachgoers. As the Board found, more than enough buidings are present in beach areas for this purpose (PID 1 8.83). Such sheltering a can be accomplished merely by directing beachgoers to go inside the nearest available building and close the doors and windows. See &
Further, while the need to pre-plan for the transportation of special needs populations is specifically addressed in NUREG-0654 (see ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 156-57), that guidance is inapplicable to the asserted need for
" implementing detail" for beach sheltering. In sum, the Appeal Board's P
t 58 -
I decision in ALAB-832Tdoes not mandate the inclusion of implementing detail for beach sheltering in-the NHRERP. E E. . FEMA's Change in Position 1
Two ' Interveners point at. FEMA's well-publicized shift in position concerning the adequacy of the NHRERP's provisions for Seabrook area beach
. populations, claiming that this _ change resulted from external and corrupt influences and that the Board therefore erred in relying upon it (SAPL Br. !
at 9-12, 19-22; TOH Br. at 42-44). E The Licensing Board gave careful consideration to all of Interveners' allegations concerning this shift in testimony.. granting them the right to conduct substantial additional i
document and- deposition discovery and permitting unlimited examination of these- matters .at hearing. The. Board reviewed the record with respect to these allegations. -and concluded that FEMA's shift in position resulted not from corrupt external pressures but from a thorough evaluation of the
~
technical,. regulatory and legal issues involved. PID 11 8.86-8.95, l
51/ Cf. Carolina Power & Light Co.- (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant),
X[KB-843, 24 NRC 200, 206-07 (1986) (affirming the Licensing Board's i finding in LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899 (1985), that the applicants had i satisfied NUREG-0654, i II.J.10.m. by -conducting a survey of area shelters to determine the " expected local protection" afforded by
- .- . those structures, and citing the Licensing Board's conclusion that "what the decisionmakers need is a manageable set of reasonable estimates, not'a finely tuned and detailed mass of data").
~
52/ Interestingly. -the Mass AG chose not to join other Interveners in this attack on FEMA -- notwithstanding the fact that it was the Mass AG who led the parties and Licensing Board through months of investigation into the reasons for FEMA's shift in position, including the subpoenaed deposition and trial testimony of FEMA's originally named witness and numerous FEMA officials from Washington, as well as several days of testimony by NRC Staff members who had participated in FEMA's Regional Assistance Committee (RAC)
deliberations on the subject of Seabrook beach sheltering.
~
i 2
especially 18.93. This' conclusion is supported by the testimony of officials from FEMA's- Washington headquarters, and by the testimony of FEMA's witnesses Cumming and Keller. See Tr.12,645-13.298 and FEMA Dir.
.ff. Tr. 13968 g seq.; Tr. 8541-43, 14039, 14127; App.,Exh. 38. Further, the Board's conclusion is supported by the testimony of two NRC Staff i
.. members who participated in FEMA RAC discussions on the subject of beach sheltering and who provided helpful insight into FEMA's initial and subsequent deliberations on this matter. See Tr.11727-12641; . and Staff Exhs. 2 - 6. There is simply no reliable basis upon which the Board could have found . that FEMA's shift in position was the result of any improper.
influence or consideration.
For all the above reasons, the Licensing Board correctly concluded, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, that the NHRERP contains adequate provisions for sheltering the seasonal beach populations located within the Seabrook EPZ.
VII. The' Licensing Board Correctly Concluded (Subject to Certain Conditions and the Future Resolution of a Limited Issue Over Which the Board Retained Jurisdiction) That the Applicants Have Provided Accurate Evacuation Time Estimates as Required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E. .
- The Interveners, and in particular, the Mass AG, focused much of their efforts to litigation over the accuracy of the evacuation time )
estimate (ETE) analysis presented in Volume 6 of the NHRERP. j3/ The i
l l
I 53/ This ETE analysis was initially conducted by KLD Associates, Inc., on
~~
I behalf of both the State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of f Massachusetts, before the Commonwealth withdrew from emergency ,
planning for Seabrook.
9
_ _ - _ _ - - - - . .- 1
i; .
l Applicants submitted certain revisions to those estimates as part of their case-in-chief, which were noted in the Licensing Board's decision. In r
addition,. the Board determined' that the ETEs should -be modified somewhat further, to - account for additional information of record. The Board imposed'. certain' conditions requiring modification of the ETEs in this' regard, and retained . jurisdiction over a limited subissue concerning certain returning commuters. Subject to those conditions and the single issue retained ~ for further consideration, the- Board concluded that the 4 l
Applicants' had provided an accurate analysis of the time required to evacuate the Seabrook EPZ, and "in. particular with respect to evacuating ,
the New Hampshire beaches during summer weekends." PID 1 9.130.
.On appeal, NECNP and the Mass AG contend that the Board erred (1)' in failing to recognize the deleterious effects which delayed staffing of traffic control posts (TCPs) will assertedly have upon the ETEs (MAG Br.
at 15-20; NECNP Br. at 36-42); (2) in determining the size of the peak a
summer beach population (NECNP Br. .at 27-36); and (3) in conditioning its approval ~ of the ETEs on actions to be taken by the Applicants rather than by the State of New Hampshire (NECNP Br. at 40-42). These assertions should be rejected.
A. The Delayed Staffing of Traffic Control Posts In its PID, the Licensing Board gave considerable attention to the issue of delayed staffing of TCPs and how that might be expected to affect the ETEs. PID 11 9.61-9.88. The Board received. testimony as to how many
' local policemen and State Police officers are assigned responsibility to man TCPs and access control posts (ACPs) in the event of an emergency at Seabrook, where those persons are located, and how long it would take for
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ i_
them to arrive at their posts. E.g., PID S1 9.68-9.73. The Board noted that both the Interveners' witness (Dr. Adler) and Applicants' witness (Mr.Lieberman) had performed sensitivity runs with the evacuation computer model to determine the effects of. delayed staffing, and that they
~
had found those effects to be relatively small. PID 11 9.74-9.78; Adler Dir. ff. Tr. 7181 at 45; App. Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622 at 44-48, 67-68.
The Board declined to find that any delayed staffing of TCPs would render ;
i the traffic management plan inadequate, stating as follows:
First, we note that New Hampshire has committed all its available State Police resources to traffic control in the event of an evacuation. There is no regulatory ,
requirement that the State recruit more ' troopers in i anticipation of a rare event. Second, the staffing problem arises from a postulated rapidly developing accident at the very end of the spectrum of accidents within the NUREG-0654 planning bases, but with the additional postulation that the accident occurs on a peak summer day. That particular accident sequence need not be isolated from all others for emergency traffic management purposes. Third, TCP staffing shortages revealed by this litigation would arise during a hypothetical evacuation of the entire EPZ. In an actual emergency, however, evacuation would be implemented on a municipality-by-municipality basis. ... There are
. in fact seven Emergency Response Planning Area (ERPAs) for Seabrook into which the municipalities are grouped.
... An evacuation of only a portion of the EPZ, even in a fast-breaking accident, will ameliorate or eliminate the problem of limited police mobilization.
. PID 1 9.87 (citations omitted).
These conclusions are appropriate and should be affirmed. First, the Comission has indicated that the emergency planning regulations do not require the recruitment of substantial additional personnel. Southern j California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 !
.l
- ____...________________________a
i i
1 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528 (1983). E Second, the Board correctly perceived that delayed staffing of TCPs is of concern only when three relatively rare events coincide -- a fast breaking accident, a crowded summer weekend, and a determination to evacuate the entire EPZ at once.
, . ~
The likelihood that all three of these conditions wil1 coincide in time is
- ' such that the Board could properly find reasonable assurance that delayed staffing of TCPs is unlikely to affect the ETEs. See PID 1 9.87.
Further, the fact that staffing of the TCPs may be delayed is a factor known to New Hampshire decision-makers, and may be considered by them in fashioning their protective action recommendations.. In this regard, the sensitivity runs perfomed by KLD Associates satisfy the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, which specifies that the relative significance of alternative assumptions should be provided. Id. at 4-7.
As was noted by Dr. Urbanik, the Applicants' ETE study "is likely to aid decision makers in the selection of appropriate protective actions in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station." Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 7372 at 18-19. Moreover, as Dr. Urbanik testified, the ETEs would be affected by delayed staffing of TCPs only with respect to a limited number of 4
54/ This aspect of the San Onofre decision was cited by the Mass AG in his proposed findings for the proposition that "the regulations do not require that extreme or unreasonable emergency planning measures be taken." " Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon's Proposed Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law", dated May 19, 1988, ,;
at 130.
e:
- - _ _ - - - _ .,__n
l i
critical TCPs (Id. at 8; Tr. 7721-24, 7781-82), for which a sufficient number of personnel appear to be readily available (PID 11 9.70-9.71). 5_5/
B. The Peak Summer Beach Population The Licensing Board appropriately considered the extensive evidence concerning the expected size of the " peak" summer vehicle population, in evaluating whether the Applicants had complied with the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. The Board ultimately selected the maximum number of parked cars observed in an aerial photographic session, which it adjusted to represent a peak crowd at 2:00 pm, and to which it added several thousand cars to account for vehicles in transit and vehicles hidden from the cameras' view; as a result, the Board found that a maximum of 32,800 cars may be assumed to have been present on the day in question.
PID 1 9.120. While the aerial photographs were all taken on hot summer weekend days, it was not possible to be certain that those days represented the " peak of the peaks". See Tr. 6080-116. Accordingly, the Board considered other evidence to determine the parking . capacity, which it then considered in estimating the " peak of the peaks." The Board found that while neither the Interveners nor the Applicants had ever observed more than approximately 27,000 vehicles in the area, a " reasonably 4
55/ NECNP also asserts that the Board should have required New Hampshire to ensure that traffic is not discouraged from traveling south over the Hampton Harbor Bridge. New Hampshire will undoubtedly have to address many competing considerations in the event of an actual emergency, including any impediments to evacuation over one or annther evacuation route which might exist at the time. The Board's decision to leave this determination to the State was entirely proper, especially given the uncertain benefits of imposing such a
- condition. See PID 11 9.85-9.86.
__-____-___~_~L
'(
expectable peak occupancy" is 31,000 vehicles and an " expectable maximum peak occupancy" is 35,000 vehicles. PID 1 9.121-9.122.
NECNP's various challenges to this aspect. of the PID are without merit. First, NECNP is incorrect in its assertion (NECNP Br. at 30-31) that the Board erred in performing certain mathematical calculations. See r Apps. Br. at 23 n.5. Second, its argument that the Board failed to consider overnight visitors (NECNP Br. at 32) is incomprehensible. The aerial photographs upon. which the Board (and Interveners) rely in
- estimating beach area populations already include all vehicles present in the area, including those of overnight gues.ts. Third, the anecdotal testimony of Ms. Fallon (NECNP Br. at 32) does not provide a basis for finding the Applicants' carefully calculated ETEs are inadequate.
Moreover,- Ms. Fa J o:s 's testimony concerned the traffic congestion experienced on a normal (non-emergency) day, when traffic flow is impeded by vehicles engaged in normal beach area activities such as " cruising",
lookirg for parking, and otherwise behavi% in a manner not expected to occur during an emergency evacuation. Tr. 7781 (Urbanik). Fcurth, there is no merit .to NECNP's assertion that more realisitic ETEs need to be developed, reflecting a wide range of summer conditions (NECNP Br.
at33-34). This assertion was properly considered and rejected by the Licensing Board, which found that the NHRERP is already sensitive to the i variations in summer populations. PID 11 9.904de NHRERP Vol. 6 1'
at 10-12. No further presentation of ETEs for the vh-19,s possible summer conditions is necessary. Tr. 7738-43, 7796-98 (Urbanik).
9 j C. The Imposition of Conditions on Applicants l
l NECNP further asserts that the Board erred in imposing upon the Applicants, rather than on the State, a requirement for revision of the ETEs consistent with the Board's decision (NECNP Br . at 40-42). This
- ~
assertion should be rejected. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG-0654, 5 II.J.10.1. impose upon ar. applicant the task of preparing evacuation time estimates. There is no reason to believe that the State of New Hampshire, whose fundamental interest is the protection of its citizens, would disregard the revised ETE information which is to be provided to it by the Applicants.
VIII. The Licensing Board Correctly Disposed of Two Contentions Proffered by SAPL, Concerning the Adequacy of NHRERP Provisions for Treating Contaminated Injured Individuals and for the Timely Performance of Radiological Monitoring.
SAPL asserts that the Licensing Board improperly rejected SAPL Contention 4, in an Order dated April 29, 1986. El That contention read as follows:
The New Hampshire State, local and host community plans fail to meet in adequate fashion the requirements that provisions be made for medical treatment of contaminated injured individuals as set forth at 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(12) and NUREG-0654 II.L.1 and L.3.
This contention generally alleged that local medical facilities listed in the NHRERP had an inadequate capacity to treat radiological accident patients (SAPL Br. at 65). On March 26, 1986, the Applicants provided the Board with a letter (inserted in the transcript ff. Tr. 2353) committing 56/ " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Date
- and Location for Hearing)", dated April 29, 1986, at 82-83.
'I i
them to full compliance with the Commission's interim guidance on emergency planning standard 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(12). On the basis of this commitment, SAPL Contention 4 was rejected. The Licensing Board's decision was fully consistent with the Comission's guidance to its adjudicatory Boards at the time. E/ Accordingly, the Board's rejection of SAPL Contention 4 should be affirmed.
In addition, SAPL asserts that the Board improperly granted summary disposition of SAPL Contention 5 in a ruling dated November 4,1986. E!
That contention had generally asserted that New Hampshire radiological'i monitoring personnel would not be able to arrive at monitoring and sampling locations in the EPZ on a timely basis, and that the number of such personnel was insufficient to permit 24-hour staffing. The Licensing Board considered all of SAPL's allegations in this regard, and correctly detemined that they were insufficient to meet the Applicants' and FEMA's affidavits filed in support of the motion for summary disposition (Order at 18-21). In addition, the Licensing Board later admitted a broad range of contentions (including other SAPL contentions) raising substantially simi_lar personnel assertions, which contentions were the subject of evidentiary' hearings and were resolved in the Board's PID. See, e.g., PID 57/ See " Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 CFR E 47(b)(12)," 50 Fed. Reg. 20892 (May 21, 1985); see also, I
" Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12)," 51 Fed. Reg. 32904 (Sept. 17, 1986).
g/ " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Summary Disposition Motions of Applicants and State of New Hampshire and Establishing a Date for Filing of Late-Filed Contentions Arising Out of Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency response Plan)," dated November 4,
- 1986, at 17-21.
t
.1 3.70.. Accordingly, the Licensing . Board's summary disposition of SAPL Contention 5 was not erroneous and, in any event, resulted in no harm to SAPL.
CONCLUSION
.- For the reasons set forth above, the NRC Staff submits that the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision of December 30, 1988, is
. supported by a preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence, and that it is correct as a matter. of law. Further, no sufficient reason has been provided 'for disturbing the Licensing Boa,rd's other determinations which have been raised on appeal. Accordingly, the Licensing Board's determination that the NHRERP provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,,
9JJtN $
Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 5th day of June, 1989 1
t -- _ - - _
i<.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, p3 $j BEFORE-THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of ) tty, A 1 DocketNos.502k43OLW
. PUBLIC SERVICE-COMPANY OF 50-444 OL re NEW HAMPSHIRE, e_t al,. Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 ) -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify ~ that copies of "NRC SThFF BRIEF IN RESPONSE- TO INTERVENERS' APPEALS FROM THE LICENSING BOARD'S PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE-RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPO W PLAN (LBP-88-32)" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in -the United . States mail, . first class or, as -indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's internal mail system, this 5th day of June 1989:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairman (2)* H. J. Flynn . Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Federal Emergency Management
'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agency Washington, DC 20555 500 C Street, SW Washington, DC 20472 Richard F. Cole
- Administrative Judge Calvin A. Canney Atomic-Safety and Licensing Board City Hall U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 126 Daniel Street Washington, DC 20555 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Kenneth A. McCollom John Traficonte, Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General 1107 West Knapp Street Office of the Attorney General Stillwater, OK 74075 One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Boston, MA 02108
- ' Diane Curran, Esq.
Harmon, Curran & Tousley Geoffrey Huntington, Esq.
2001.5 Street, NW Assistant Attorney General
. Suite 430 Office of the Attorney General '
Washington, DC 20009 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 Philip Ahrens, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General -
State House Station Augusta, ME 04333 O
J l
- 2_-
^
Robert A. Backus. Esq. Peter J. Matthews, Mayor
' Backus, Meyer & Solomon City Hall l ~ 116 Lowell Street Newburyport, MA 01950-Manchester, NH 03106 Mrs. f.nne E. Goodman, Chairman Paul McEachern, Esq. Board of Selectmen a' Shaines & McEachern- -
13-15 Newmarket Road 25 Maplewood Avenue l Durham, NH 03824' a P.O. Box:360 e Portsmouth, NH 03801 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey United States Senate Charles P. Graham, Esq. 531 Hart Senate Office Building McKay, Murphy & Graham Washington, DC 20510 .
100 Main Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Barbara J. Saint Andre, Esq.
Kopelman & Paige, P.C.
Sandra Gavutis, Chairman 77 Franklin Street
- Board of Selectmen Boston, MA 02110 RFD #1, Box-1154-Kensington, NH 03827- Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Board of Selectmen..
William S. Lord South Hampton, NH 03827 Board of Selectmen Town Hall.- Friend Street Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Amesbury, MA - 01913 - Town Counsel for Merrimac-145 South Main Street R.; Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq. P.O. Box 38 Lagoulis,-Clark, Hill-Whilton Bradford, MA 01835
& McGuire .
79 State Street Richard R. Donovan
- Newburyport, MA 01950 Federal Regional Center Federal Emergency Management Agency Allen'Lampert 130 228th Street, S.W.
Civil Defense Director Bothell, Washington 98021-9796-Town of Brentwood 20 Franklin Robert R. Pierce, Esq
- Exeter, NH 03833 Atomic Safety and Licensing
' Board Panel William Armstrong U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Civil Defense Director Washington, D.C. 20555
( Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
-Exeter,'NH 03833 Robert K. Gad, III, Esq.
Ropes & Gray Gary W. Holmes, Esq. One International Place Holmes ~& Ellis Boston, MA 02110
- 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH- 03842
J; P. Nadeau Ms. Suzanne Breiseth Board of Selectmen Board ref Selectmen 10 Central Street Town ret Hampton Falls -
Rye, NH 03870 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Judith H. Mizner, Esq.
79 State Street. Atomic Safety and Licensing
- 4. Newburyport, MA 01950 Board (1)* ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Robert Carrigg . Washington, DC 20555 c- Board of Selectmen Town Office Atomic Safety and Licensing Atlantic Avenue Appeal Panel (8)*
North Hampton, NH 03862 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Docketing and Service Section*
Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 8%
Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff
>0 9
. ~ . _