ML20245J208
| ML20245J208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1989 |
| From: | Dignan T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#289-8545 LBP-88-32, OL, NUDOCS 8905040047 | |
| Download: ML20245J208 (75) | |
Text
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1989 j
Bb;, April 24, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD l
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, at al..
)
50-444-OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1
)
(Offsite Emergency and 2)
)
Planning Issues)
)
on Appea'l From a Partial Initial Decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Issued Doc. 30, 1988 (LBP-88-32)
BRIEF OF APPLICANTS-APPELLEES Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
George H. Lewald Kathryn A. Selleck Jeffrey P. Trout Jay Bradford Smith Geoffrey C.
Cook Ropes & Gray One International Place Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000 counsel for Applicants 8905040047 890424 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O
PDR 51
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii i
I STATEMENT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 3-1 ARGUMENT 5
I.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 5
II.
THE " BEACH SHELTER" CONTROVERSY WAS PROPERLY RESOLVED.
6 A.
The Correct Standard was Applied.
6 B.
The Standard was Met 12 C.
The "Sholly" Testimony was Properly Excluded.
15 l
D.
There is no Violation of the Requirement That There be a " Range" of Protective Actions.
17 E.
The FEMA Change of Position was Correct as a Matter of Law and in no way Tainted The Proceedings.
18 F.
The Licensing Board Committed no Error in Accepting the "Keller" Testimony.
20 III. THE CONTROVERSY AS TO ETEs WAS CORRECTLY RESOLVED.
22 IV.
THE HUMAN BEHAVIOR ISSUES WERE PROPERLY RESOLVED.
28 A.
The Licensing Board Correctly Determined That Disorderly Drivers Would Have no Major Effect on an Evacuation.
28 B.
The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That Emergency Workers Would Not Abandon Their Posts Because of " Role Conflict" or " Role Strain."
30
hs V.
THE LICENSING BOARD CORRECTLY RESOLVED THE ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 33 A.
Letters of' Agreement 33 B.
Personnel Resources..
34 C.
Special Needs.
39 VI.
THE LICENSING BOARD CORRECTLY PERMITTED RELIANCE UPON THE "20% STANDARD" AS THE PIANNING BASIS IN THIS CASE 43 A.
The Case at Bar is DistinguishableFrom AIAB-905 and was Correctly Decided on
'that Basis 43 B.
ALAB-905 Should be Reconsidered and Overruled.
57 VII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 62 A.
No Error Wan Committed in the Rejection of SAPL Contention No. 4 62 B.
No Error was Committed in Granting Summary Disposition of SAPL Contention No. 5 62 C.
No Error was Committed in the Disposition of MAG's Late-Filed Testimony.
63 CONCLUSION.
64 I
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4 l
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Coro. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519 (1978) 61 Carolina Power & Licht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532 (1986) 5 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983) 36 General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1),
ALAB-881, 26 NRC 465, 473 (1987) 5 Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986) 9, 19 Lona Island Liahtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515 (1988) 43, 44, 57-59, 61 Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), DIRECTORS' FINDINGS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS (April 17, 1989) 61, 62 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003 (1973),
affirmed, Citizens for Safe Power v. HEg, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 9 Niacara Mohawk Power Coro. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347 (1975) 6 Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858 (1975) 6 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220 (1986) 23 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479 (1986) 23
- iii -
1 l
r Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 1219 (1985) 33 Public Service Company of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1 (1978) 6 Public Service Comnany of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-32, 28 NRC 667 (1988) 1 Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528 (1983) 9, 12, 36 Regulations:
10 CFR 5 50.47 (b) (10) 18 50 Fed. Reg. 20891 (May 21, 1985) 62 51 Fed. Reg. 32904 (Sept. 17, 1986) 62 52 Fed. Reg. 6980 (March 6, 1987) 7, 10 52 Fed. Reg. 42078 (Nov.
3, 1987) 7, 11, 14 l
1
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i 6
April 24, 1989 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
before the l
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, at al.
)
50-444-OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1
)
(Offsite Emergency and 2)
)
Planning Issues)
)
on Appeal From a Partial Initial Decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Issued Dec. 30, 1988 (LBP-88-32)
BRIEF OF APPLICANTS-APPELLEES S_TATEMENT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS This is an appeal from a Partial Initial Decision (PID) issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board" or " Board") in the above-entitled proceeding on December 30, 1988.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-32, 28 NRC 667 (1988) (hereafter referred to as PID and by paragraph (1) number in order to maintain uniformity among the briefs).
The PID was the culmination of a proceeding which encompassed over 50 trial days in Concord, New Hampshire, and
l I
I
~
i Boston, Massachusetts, and which resolved all contentions made with respect to the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP), App. Ex.
5.
This is the radiological l
emergency response plan which covers that portion of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (Seabrook) located in the State of New Hampshire.
The PID, with a single exception (over which jurisdiction was retained), resolved all litigated issues favorably to the Applicants.
PID, passim.
In particular, the Licensing Board found and ruled that the NHRERP contained appropriate Letters of Agreement (LOAs), PID 5 2, that there were appropriate personnel and resources to execute the NHRERP in a radiological emergency, PID SS 3-4, that appropriate provisions had been made for registration, monitoring, and decontamination, PID 5 5, that appropriate provisions had been made for notification and communication, PID E 6, that human behavioral characteristics would not operate to defeat the execution of the NHRERP in a radiological emergency, PID 5 7, that appropriate arrangements and procedures were in place to provide protection for the " beach population" in the event of a radiological emergency, PID $
8, and that NHRERP Would, after the inclusion of certain modifications thereto and accounting i
for the so-called " commuter phenomenon", contain appropriate evacuation time estimates (ETEs), PID $ 9. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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Appeals from the PID challenging various of the above-i referenced findings and rulings have been taken by The Attorney General of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MAG),
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL), New England Coalition' j
on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) and the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire (TOH).
It is in the foregoing posture that this matter comes before this Appeal. Board.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES The Appellants' Briefs contain no statement of issues.
And it is not always clear exactly which particular rulings or findings are being challenged.
Our reading of the briefs, however, leads us to believe that the following issues are being raised before this Appeal Board:
1.
Was the so-called " beach sheltering" controversy correctly resolved by the Licensing Board?
This l
issue, in turn, subsumes within it the following sub-issues:
a.
Did the Licensing Board apply the correct legal standard in resolving the controversy?
b.
Assuming the correct legal standard was applied, was that standard met?
c.
Did the Licensing Board err in excluding the so-called "$ holly" testimony?
d.
Does NHRERP meet the requirement of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (b) (10) that there be a range of protective actions as that requirement app 1 des 4
to the " beach population?"
e.
Does NHRERP lack required " implementing detail" for the " beach population?" --___l-__-___.
O
[.
f.
Did the change of position of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) somehow taint'the resolution of the beach shelter controversy?
g.
Did the Licensing Board err in its treatment of, and reliance upon, the testimony of witness Keller?
2.
Did the Licensing Board err in its resolution of the ETE issues?
3.
Did the Licensing Board err in its treatment of the so-called " human behavior" issues?
4.
Did the Licensing Board err in its findings with respect to matters concerning resources and personnel?
5.
Did the Licensing Board err in its holding with respect to the planning basis for decontamination in the NHRERP?
6.
Was there reversible error committed with respect to certain pre-trial and at-trial rulings?
In particular:
a.
Did'the Licensing Board err in excluding SAPL Contention 4 concerning medical treatment for the contaminated lujured?
ASLB MEM. & ORD.
(April 29, 1986) at 82-83.
b.
Did the Licensing Board err in granting summary disposition of SAPL Contention 5 concerning the adequacy of the number of personnel and timeliness of arrival to conduct radiation monitoring?
ASLB MEM. & ORD. (Nov.
4, 1986) at 17-21.
c.
Did the Licensing Board err in refusing to permit certain rebuttal testimony proffered by MAG because offered too late?
Tr. 13963; ASLB MEM. & ORD. (Sept. 9, 1988).
'o l
l ARGUMENT I.
THE STANDARD OF-REVIEW The Appellants' Briefs seek reversal of numerous factual
. findings of the. Licensing Board.
None of the Briefs discuss the standards to be applied by this Appeal Board in reviewing.
findings of fact.
However, these standards are well known:
"[The Appeal Board) clearly [has] the power in reviewing factual findings of a licensing board to substitute.
[its) judgment for that of the fact finder if the record fairly sustains a different result.
That is not to say, however, that in conducting [its) appellate review [an Appeal Board) may ignore the [ licensing board's] findings and simply find the facts anew for 'we are not free to disregard'the fact-that the. Licensing Boards.
. are the-Commission's primary fact find [ers).'
Rather when [an Appeal Board) review [s]
findings of fact [it] will ' reject or modify findings of the [ licensing board) if, after giving [its] decision the probative force it intrinsically-commands, [the Appeal Board is) convinced that the record compels a different result.'
Thus, [the Appeal Board] must be persuaded that the record evidence as a whole compels a different conclusion and [the Appeal Board] will not overturn (the licensing board's) findings simply because [the Appeal Board] might have reached a different result had [it] been the initial fact finder."
General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (Three Mile
-Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-881, 26 NRC 465, 473 (1987).
Accord, Carolina Power & Licht Co. (Shearon
! -u_.-___.____-_.m._.___.._._-
__-m__:-
Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 537 (1986); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 867 (1975);
Niacara' Mohawk Power coro. (Nine Mile ~ Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 357 (1975).
In addition, an Appeal Board should be extremely loathe to disturb Licensing Board findings with respect to credibility, especially when witness demeanor underlies the finding, in whole, or in part.
Egg Public Service Company of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 29 (1978).
II.
THE " BEACH SHELTER" CONTROVERSY WAS PROPERLY RESOLVED A.
The Correct Standard was Applied.
TOH and MAG make the argument that the Licensing Board applied a wrong "best efforts" standard in resolving the beach sheltering issue.
MAG Br. at 33-45; TQH Hr. at 9-16.
As we understand the argument, it is to the effect that the emergency planning regulations of the Commission can be read as being " site excluding" or " license blocking" for a site which is in full compliance with the NRC siting criteria spelled out in 10 CFR 100.
Any doubt that the Commission intended its emergency planning regulations to be " site I
excluding" or " license blocking" was removed in the various 1
statements of consideration accompanying the proposal and final promulgation of the so-called " realism" rule.
In both those statements, the Commission made clear that emergency planning was not to be viewed as on a par with the safety and siting regulations, but rather was an additional protection, the application of which was subject to more flexibility than the core safety regulations.
Licensing of Nuclear towar F2 ants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline Tc Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning (Proposed Rule), 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6982 (March 6, 1987);
Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning (Final Rule) 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42081-82 (Nov.
3, 1987).
MAG and TOH claim that in this case the Licensing Board applied a "best efforts" standard which the Applicants had been promoting for some time before various tribunals.
A colorful exchange between one of the writers of this brief and Judge Edles concerning "show biz" is dwelled upon at length in MAG's brief.
MAG Br. at 33-35.1 1
TOH makes much of the language in Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act 42 U.S.C. 62232(a) "will provide adequate protection" by taking it out of context and juxtaposing it against the word
" operation."
IQH Br. at 10.
But the full context of Section 182(a) is that Applicants will provide - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
To begin with, it is necessary fully to understand what the Applicants were urging as a standard in this case.
The words "best efforts" connote a bit of a "so what" attitude.
This is never what the Applicants urged.
What the Applicanto urged as a standard was basically the best plan which the hand of man could devise that would achieve the maximum dose savings reasonably achievable in any given event, without taking extraordinary measures such as major construction of roads, shelters, or other structures.
We submit that this standard is fully in accord with NRC precedent.
As long ago as 1983, the Commission made clear that under the then extant emergency planning rule, there was no requirement that extraordinary measures, such as major new construction, be undertaken just to deal with potential such information in license application "as the Commission may, by rule or reaulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to find that utilization.
. will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."
In short, the Congress left to the Commission the decision as to "how safe is safe?"
The basic position the Commission initially adopted, and has adhered to through the years, has been the " reasonable assurance" standard, not a perfect safety standard.
Similarly, MAG's argument that the word
" protection" should be substituted for the words
" protective measures" as the object of the modifier l
" adequate" in 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (1) MAG Br. at 36-39 ignores history and the fact that the commission i
has never equated compliance with its regulations with perfect safety.
This concept has constantly been ignored or denied by the interveners in the Seabrook litigation. L-____________
nuclear power plant accidents.
Southern California Edison C2x (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3),
CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).
Thus, so much of the "best efforts" standard as precludes extraordinary measures is well grounded in precedent.
TOH and MAG claim that the standard violates a supposed l
rule that there be an objective safety standard applicable.
Again Commission precedent precludes such an argument.
Back in 1986, the Commission flatly rejected the concept of there being an objective standard which emergency plans for nuclear power plants must meet.
"Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident.
Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reduction under'the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one olant site may not be for another."
Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986). (Emphasis added).
There is nothing new or different about such a standard.
The Commission's regulations have never been viewed as providing perfect safety.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1010 (1973),
affirmed, Citizens for Safe Power v. HBC, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
Any further doubt as to the standard properly s u___________
I 1
applied in emergency planning was removed by the Commission's statement of considerations which accompanied the proposal of the so-called " realism" rule.
"The existing emergency planning
[ regulation] does not require that plans achieve any preestablished minimum dose savings in the event of an accident.
For example, approved emergency plans with full State and local governmental cooperation have highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours and the projected dose savings for such plans would vary widely.
Thus the regulation is inherently variable in effect and there are no bright line mandatory minimum projected dose savings or evacuation time limits which could be viewed as performance standards for emergency plans in the existing regulations.
Moreover the dose savings achieved by implementation of an emergency plan under adverse conditions, e.a.,
during or following heavy snow, could be substantially less than under perfect conditions.
This variability is consistent with a concept or approach to emergency planning and preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid."
Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline To Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning (Proposed Rule), 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6982 (March 6, 1987).
And again when the " realism' rule was actually promulgated, the Commission made clear that comparison of sites, plans and plants real or hypothetical was not to be engaged in when judging emergency planning.
"[T]he acceptability of a plan for one i
, i I
I j
plant is not measured against plans for other nuclear plants."
Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Stage Where 1
State and/or Incal Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning (Final Rule) 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42084 (Nov.
3, 1987).
"Such an interpretation would be contrary to NRC practice, under which emergency plans are evaluated for adequacy without reference to numerical dose reductions which might be accomplished, and without comoarina them to other emeroency olans real or hvoothetical.
The final rule makes clear that every emergency plan is to be evaluated for adequacy on its own merits, without reference to specific dose reductions which might be accomplished under the plan or the capabilities of any other olan.
Id. at 42085.
The lack of logic in a position that there must be shown to be a certain set amount of " dose savings" is illustrated by the following:
If that were the law, then a site in a well-populated area would be more acceptable than one in a sparsely populated area.
This is so because dose is measured in terms of what is received by the receptor, and if there are no people, then there can be no doses and therefore no dose savings.
This is the logic of the MAG and TOH position. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
i B.
The Standard was Met TOH argues that, even assuming that the correct standard is what the opposition calls the!"best efforts" standard,.it was not met by NHRERP in this case.
IQH BI. at 30-42.
The first basis for this position is the fact that the State of New Hampshire has not undertaken to build supplemental entrance ramps to.a major interstate highway in the region, construct shelters or require seasonable operation of the plant.
All of these matters come under the category of
" extraordinary measures" held by the Commission not to be required in Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983) discussed earlier.
The second basis for TOH's argument is the lack of
" implementing detail" in NHRERP for the sheltering of the that portion of the beach population which is not transportation dependent.
IQH BI. at 33-36.
TOH states in its brief: " FEMA testified that where NHRERP contemplates sheltering for this population, ' implementing detail will be I
necessary'."
IQH BI. at 33.
What TOH does not point out is that FEMA recanted on that testimony, Tr. 14252, and gag Tr.
13294, 14075.
As the Licensing Board noted, it is not totally clear fror the record what FEMA's position is.
PID 1 8.73.
After reviewing the record as a whole, including the l - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
I consistent position taken by FEMA and New Hampshire that a shelter option for the beach population would almost never be used, the Board concluded that to clutter up the plan with implementing detail for such an option would be counterproductive and might even lead a decision maker to believe that the option was more viable than it really is.
PID 11 8.75-8.76.
This is a sound and well-reasoned conclusion, well supported by the record, and should not be disturbed.
The third argument which TOH makes is to the effect that
.the NHRERP relies upon teachers to account for all students boarding a bus, accompany them on the bus, and supervise them in the reception center.
But, says TOH, a number of teachers testified that they would abandon the children in their charge and go to their families in the event of a radiological emergency, and, therefore, the NHRERp does not represent a "best effort" by the State.
In another context, SAPL joins in this argument, arguing also that the Licensing Board erred in its findings with respect to the teachers.
EAEL DI. at 58-59.
To begin with, there is little doubt that the findings of the Licensing Board with respect to the teachers were heavily influenced by the demeanor of the witness panel.
As the Board noted, the teachers were uncomfortable with parts of their testimony, PID 1 7.11, and perhaps motivated in part
by a desire to contribute to the effort to stop Seabrook, PID 1 7.17.
-But, more importantly, despite TOH's arguments to the contrary, the testimony of the thirteen teachers cannot be viewed as representative of all the teachers in the region or even a substantial number of them.
As the Board pointed out, in the major survey relied upon by the opposition, i
l teachers pointedly were not asked if they would abandon the children entrusted to their-care.
PID 1 7.12; Tr. 3986-88.
Furthermore, there is no reason to apply the Commission's directive to reject any claim that state and local officials will refuse to act to safeguard the health and safety of the public any less forcefully to testimony by teachers than to other public officials.
Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning (Final Rule) 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42085 (Nov.
3, 1987) 2 There has been no failure on the part of the State of New Hampshire to meet the standard which interveners refer to as "best efforts."
l 2
SAPL complains that such a holding sweeps within it teachers who work for private schools such as Phillips Exeter Academy.
SAPL Dr. at 58.
The short answer to this is that no Phillips Exeter teachers testified they would " bail out." l
b C.
The "Sholly" Testimony was Properly Excluded.
Both MAG, MAG Br. at 51-52, 76-83, and TOH, TQH Er. at 16-29, argue that the so-called "Sholly" testimony should not have been excluded.
A review of the arguments reveals that the claim of error depends upon a rejection of the Licensing Board's decision as to the standard to be applied; therefore, absent such a rejection, the argument for the admission of the "Sholly" tastimony also fails.
As is described in summary form therein, MAG Br. Ex. 12 at 12 - 15, the Testimony was in four distinct parts.
The first part was a piece sponsored by Witness Sholly, MAG RI.
Ex. 12 at 15 - 28, wherein he " describes the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules."
MAG Br. Ex.
12 at 12.
The second part was sponsored by Witness Beyea, MAG Br. Ex. 12 at 29 - 75, who described his testimony as follows:
"In order to determine the extent of protection afforded the summer beach population by current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity from the Seabrook plant."
MAG Hr. Ex. 12 at 13.
The third member of the panel, Witness Thompson, gave testimony, MAG Br. Ex. 12 at 75
- 77, which he described as addressing:
"(1)
The potential for an atmospheric release similar to that designated PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur i
_A______
from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.
"(2) The range of variation of two parameters which effect plume rise during a 'PWR1-type' release, specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.
"(3)
The potential for 'PWR1-type' releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as those of ruthenium, than other categories of releases."
MAG Hr. Ex. at 15.
The final piece by Witness Leaning, MAG gr. Ex. at 77 - 107, is described by her as a discussion:
"of what is known about the acute and long-term health consequences that can be expected to befall human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in the range of dose levels that might eventuate from a nuclear power plant accident such as described in the testimony of Mr. Sholly, Dr. Beyea and Dr. Thompson.
I describe the kinds of injuries that would be received by the population in both the short and long term."
MAQ Hr. Ex. at 15.
A review of the entire testimony reveals that the foregoing descriptions, by the witnesses themselves, constitute an accurate summary of the testimony.
In short, the testimony begins with Mr. Sholly's exposition as to what the contents of various documents are, leading to the conclusion that core melt accidents are within the spectrum of accidents to be considered in emergency planning, and that the accidents Dr. Beyea testifies about are within that spectrum.
This is followed by Dr. Beyea's piece which purports to model certain accidents at Seabrook and show that _ _ _ _ _ _ _
f there is a potential for large doses to be received by the public if nuch events occur at certain times, a piece by Dr.
Thompson purporting to show the contents of the source term j
causing these doses, and finally Dr. Leaning's conclusion that given the circumstances posited by the Beyea and Thompson eqalyses, a large number of persons would be sick and more difficult to evacuate.
Thf.s obviously was a piece of testimony designed to quantify dose savings or lack thereof.
As such it was properJy excluded under the authorities cited in 5 II.A.,
i supra.
D.
There is no violation of the Requirement That There be a " Range" of Protective Actions.
MAG, MAG Br. at 72-75, and SAPL, SAPL Br. at 14, argue that NHRERP is inadequate because it does not provide a
" range" of protective actions for the beach population in light of the fact that the Board has found that evacuation will essentially always be the protective action of choice.
In the first place, the possibility that this population will be sheltered has not been eliminated entirely; there are very limited circumstances where a sheltering alternative would be utilized.
PID 1 8.84; PID 1 8.96.2, see also PID 11 8.6.
Second, even if one eliminates shelter entirely, there exist protective actions for these persons in addition to evacuation, including early beach closing.. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
Prescinding from the foregoing factual responses, however, the position of SAPL and MAG have no basis in law.
MAG attempts to read into the pertinent regulation 10 CFR 5 50.47(b) (10) a requirement that each individual in the EPZ have a range of protective actions provided for him or her personally.
This is not what the regulation says.
It requires that:
"A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure oathway EEI for emeraency workers and the public."
The use of collective terms throughout certainly does not readily connote the concept that every individual, or even every discernible group of individuals within each of the collective denominations, have available a " range" of protective measures.
ASLB Memorandum & Order (April 29, 1986) at 43-45.
E.
The FEMA Change of Position was Correct as a Matter of Law and in no way Tainted The Proceedings SAPL spends a good portion of its brief dwelling upon FEMA's change of position on the beach sheltering issue.
SAPL Hr at 9-12, 18-22.
The first cited group of pages consist of a diatribe designed to accomplish by rhetoric what SAPL could not accomplish in the hearing room, which is to demonstrate that FEMA's change of position was motivated by - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _
improper pressures brought to bear upon it.3 Indeed, the Board found, after listening to extensive evidence on the subject, that no such improper influence was exerted or perceived.
PID 11 8.90-8.94.
More importantly, the issue on this appeal is not how FEMA got to the position it did, but, rather, is its position, which the Licensing Board, in large part, concurred in, right or wrong on its own merit.
- Indeed, in the argument portion of its brief, SAPL essentially acknowledges this truism by confining itself to an argument that the "Keller" testimony should not have been given weight, SAPL Br. at 19-21, (Egg infra 5 II.F for discussion of this point), and a request to this Appeal Board to declare whether the legal basis for the FEMA change in position was correct, SAPL Br. at 21-22.
Interestingly enough, SAPL, having made the request, does nothing to advance its cause on this point by argument, beyond adopting MAG's argument as to why the "Sholly" testimony should have not have been excluded.
The fact is, that the FEMA legal position finally taken was totally in accord with the Commission's decision in Lona Island Lichtina Co (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 x
(1986).
It also is in full accord with the Commission's statements discussed above in the realism rulemaking 3
TOH has a brief reference to this point in its brief.
IQH Hr. at 43 & n.29. l
proceeding.
The initial FEMA testimony which was filed, but never actually offered'in evidence, on the other hand, was at total variance with Commission precedent, and, indeed, at variance with the legal position taken by FEMA in other i
proceedings.
Tr. 14130, 14178.
There was no error.
F.
The Licensing Board Committed no Error in Accepting the "Keller" Testimony.
As noted earlier, SAPL, SAPL Br. at 21-22, as well as MAG, MAG Br. at 61-71, and TOH, TQH Br. at 43-49 all decried the reliance placed by the Licensing Board on the testimony of FEMA witness Joseph K.
Keller, PID 11 8.58-8.72.
It is apparent that the main difficulty that the Appellants have.
with the Keller testimony is that it is based on what they term a generic analysis equally applicable at any site and.
leads to evacuation as always being the choice over sheltering.4 In addition MAG, as he did at the hearing, conjures up various hypotheses where, as Keller himself admitted could be the case if certain assumptions are made, the better choice would be shelter.
MAG Br. at 64-69.
Dr. Keller readily admitted that there were hypothetical situations where his thesis that evacuation was always the preferred choice would be shown in retrospect to have been 4
Insofar as the "Baldwin" aspect of this analysis is concerned, FEMA did not rely upon it because it represented an incorrect interpretation of evacuation time estimates.
Tr. 14169..
r_
the wrong decision.
Tr. 14240-44; Tr. 14255-56.
- However, one of the realities of life is that the decision makers on the scene are nct going to be able to predict the future.
Egg Tr. 10720-21; Tr. 11481-82.
With respect to the argument that the Keller testimony must be ignored because it was based upon data which was not site specific to Seabrook, it must first be remembered that when the Commission called for case-by-case analysis, it did not call coincidentally for a repeal of the laws of physics.
The " generic" data which Dr. Keller used was as applicable at Seabrook as at any other point on the earth.
Indeed, the strategy is even more applicable at Seabrook where everyone is agreed there is little good shelter, the drf for most of the shelter being 0.9.
PID 1 8.61.
In short, the Seabrook site is a better candidate for the Keller approach than is any average site because of the low value of its surrounding shelter.
There has been a Seabrook site-specific analysis.
That is what has been going on.
It is not necessary that there be a Seabrook specific site analysis of every conceivable fact relevant to emergency planning.
The Commission's call for a case-by-case analysis with respect to emergency planning has been fully adhered to in this case.
l.
_A__._..-. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
III. THE CONTROVERSY AS TO ETEs WAS CORRECTLY RESOLVED.
MAG, MAG Hr. 46-48, and NECNP, NECNP Hr. at 27-41 take issue with the Licensing Board's handling of the controversy concerning the evacuation time estimates (ETEs) in the I
NHRERP.
MAG seems to be arguing that the Board should have accepted the argument made by MAG, that, whatever the ETEs are, they are too long at Seabrook and therefore the license l
should be denied.
This is simply another version of the argument that the emergency planning regulations are to be read as being site excluders or license blockers; that argument has been dealt with in S II.A above.
In addition, it is to be remembered that ETEs are not an end unto themselves, which is the way MAG treated them throughout the proceeding.
They are merely a tool to help decision makers.
PID 1 9.127.
NECNP spends a good deal of time disparaging what it understands to be the Licensing Board's decision that 31,000 cars be assumed to be in the beach area for purposes of calculating ETEs.
HECHE Br. at 27-36.
What the Doard in fact did was state that on July 18, 1987, the evidence indicated that 32,800 vehicles were likely present in the beach area.
PID 1 9.120.
It also found that a reasonable number for the " peak of peaks" would be 35,000-36,000.
PID 1 9.121.
In addition, the Board made a simple confirmatory _ _ _ _ _ - - _ -.
\\
i l a 1
calculation to show that whichever figure was picked the results were within an hour of each other.5 Finally, the Board made clear that the entire issue of precision with respect to ETEs was somewhat academic in light of the fact that evacuation would be the action of choice in all cases except when factors other than ETEs would be controlling the decision-making process.
PID 1 9.128.
Thic entire pursuit of the " maximum" capa, of the beach area was of questionable usefulness anyway, given the admonition long followed with respect to ETEs that they should not reflect worse case scenarios, but rather should reflect realistic conditions.
Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 246 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 491 (1986).
NECNP next excoriates the Board for its findings with respect to the effect of delayed staffing of traffic control
)
points (TCPs).
NECNP Br. 36-40.
First, NECNP comes up with 5
It is true that the Board's stated exit rates used in 1 9.122 were wrong by an order of magnitude.
)
However, it is clear that the Board used the correct number in the calculations as is illustrated by the following:
The Board obtained a figure of 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for " maximum peak occupancy" which it set at 35,000.
The calculation is 35000/68.6 = 510/60 = 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Thus, NECNP's somewhat snide remarks with respect to this matter, NECNP Br. at 30-31, are unavailing. _ - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l l
a straw man and claims that a finding made in its human behavior portion of the PID by the Board was designed to deal with delayed staffing.
This was the finding in 1 7.88 that aberrant driver behavior, which the Board did not find to be likely, if it occurred, would be accounted for by the 15%
l reduction in capacity factor for all roads which was built l
into IDYNEV, the model utilized to calculate ETEs.
Only NECNP could view that finding in that location as being directed at the issue of delayed staffing of TCPs.
- Moreover, NECNP's argument in this respect is basically that the views of MAG witness Ceder should be adopted as to capacity factors.
Although MAG does utilize certain of Dr. Ceder's testimony on this appeal, see infra 6 V, MAG did not seek to have Dr. Ceder's views adopted by way of any proposed finding before the Licensing Board.
PID 1 9.22, T 9.29.
MAG's decision before the Licensing Board to leave Ceder in the forest was astute, and should have been followed before this Appeal Board also.
We invite the Appeal Board's attention to the proposed findings to which the Licensing Board alluded, and thereby adopted, in its decision.
PID 1 9.22.
The performance of Dr. Ceder can best be illustrated by a couple of examples:
Dr. Ceder criticized the use of a discharge headway in IDYNEV of 2.4 sec/veh and suggested the substitution of a figure of 2.7 sec/veh.
Ceder Dir., Post Tr. 5169 at 19.
Dr. Ceder's sole citation of authority for l
l I
his opinion was a book entitled Traffic Analysis and Desian by R. J.
Salter.
Ceder Dir., Post Tr. 5169 at 19.
He claimed that Salter had found saturation discharge headways "for an observed 80 vehicles.
to be 2.63 sec/veh."
Id.
When first asked, on November 5, 1987, on cross-examination, where he got that figure from the Salter text, he could not find or calculate it even after having a certain chapter of the book pointed out to him and three times denying that it was the relevant portion, Tr. 5334-37, 5348.
The next day he l
returned to the witness stand, admitted that the portion of the book he had been directed to, Aco. Ex. 24, Post Tr. 5467, was the correct one, Tr. 5444, 5447, admitted the 2.63 figure was wrong, Tr. 5444-45, and changed it to 2.56, Tr. 5445, 5447.
On further cross-examination, he stated that the "80" vehicles should be "226," Tr. 5453, admitted he had again done the calculation wrongly, stated that the headway figure should be 2.53, Tr. 5456, and, finally, admitted that when one put the Salter figures into passenger car equivalents, the correct number was 2.16, Tr. 5465.
On another occasion, Dr. Ceder criticized the ETE study on the basis that the study as set forth in Aon. Ex.
5, Vol.
6, does not contain an nnalysis of the effect of a single accident, that the probability of a serious multivehicle accident in one particular 2.65 mile segment was close to 100%
(i.e, almost assured) during an evacuation and that travel in the EPZ l 1
a I
f should be equated to travel in a construction zene where accidents are more likely.
Ceder Dir;., Post Tr. 5169 at 22-29.
The work zone analogy is strained to say the least.
Tr.
5338-45; Aco. Ex. 21, Post Tr. 5347.
Acceptance of the 100%
I probability of a multivehicle accident described above requires one to accept the concept that there is a 100%
chance of a serious multivehicle accident (i.e. death or personal injury involved), on a particular 2.65 mile stretch of four-lane road when a flow of traffic is 2000 vehicles per hour for five'and one half hours at 10 M.P.H.
Dr. Ceder's attempt to explain why such an intuitively unlikely concept represents reality was wholly unconvincing, involved use of data of questionable relevance to the road at issue, and questionable use of that data, even assuming its relevancy to the situation at Seabrook, and, finally, seemed not to be borne out by certain of the data used even accepting it as accurate and properly used.
Tr. 5350-87; Tr. 5514-21; App.
EKs. 22, 23, Post Tr. 5391.
This is the witness NECNP would have carry the day, even after he was abandoned at trial by his sponsor, MAG.
Prescinding from the straw man, NECNP next takes issue with the Board's acceptance of the evidence that sensitivity runs, which had been done with IDYNEV, revealed that the effect of late staffing of TCPs simply was not all that great.
PID 11 9.74-9.78.
It is not clear what fault NECNP l _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
r is finding with this aspect of the decision as such.
- Rather, it appears that NECNP, having learned that one of the runs shows that a failure to man a TCP, which would discourage traffic in a certain direction, speeds up the ETE, wants that' change imposed on the State.
NECNP Br. at 38.
However, what NECNP ignores is tnat the discouragement is dictated by the principle that evacuation routes are to be designed to take persons away from the plant, not towards it.
Egg PID 1 9.83.
Finally, NECNP claims error from the fact that the Board found the ETEs adequate provided that the ministerial task of making certain changes desired by the Board was accomplished, and subject to the resolution of the so-called " commuter" issue.
The Board's decision in this regard was perfectly proper.
Especially is this so when the facts at Seabrook are that the ETEs will almost certainly never dictate a choice of protective action.6 The fact is that ETEs in the Seabrook situation are of vanishingly small use in emergency planning.
They have probably been worked to a precision unheard of anywhere else in the nation, and the Board gave more than enough attention to them and correctly analyzed the controversy.
There was no error.
6 Indeed, protective actions in the first instance are based on plant status and in-plant conditions, even in the absence of a release.
App. Dir. No.
6, Post Tr. 10022 at 7; Tr. 10187-89. i i
u____________________.______._____________.________
+
l i,
d l
1 IV.
THE HUMAN BEHAVIOR ISSUES WERE PROPERLY RESOLVED.
A.
The Licensing Board Correctly Determined That Disorderly Drivers Would Have no Major Effect on an Evacuation.
One of the main grievances of MAG and SAPL on appeal is that the Board rejected its thesis that any evacuation would be extremely disorderly, and, therefore, planning based upon any different assumption was flawed for that reason alone.
HAQ Br. at 20-29; SApL Br. at 61-65.
Basically it is their belief that the Board should have accepted the views of various local police officers and citizens who' testified that' traffic would be disorderly in an evacuation, MAG Br. at 21-24, SAPL Er. at 62-63, and also should have accepted the views expressed by a minority of the persons interviewed in the so-called Luloff " beach-blanket survey"7 who stated they 7
It is questionable whether the " beach blanket survey" sponsored by MAG witness Dr. Luloff is of any value.
To begin with, the final selection of the questions was by a consensus including attorneys from The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Tr. 8220, who have an obvious interest in the direction the survey takes; one of the emergency messages used in the survey was incomplete; Tr. 8223; Dr. Luloff admits that the survey was not designed to test what the reaction of people would be to the actual emergency messages to be used; Tr. 8224; no data was kept as to refusals to be interviewed; Tr. 8225; the sheltering scenario was described to the interviewee, no actual or hypothetical message was used, Tr. 8226, and Dr. Luloff admits that a change in phraseology would affect the responses, Tr. 8226-29; the l
\\.
might not, or would not, follow directions, and the apparent view of Dr. Adler that the inexperience of the drivers with the delays they would be experiencing would lead to disruptive behavior.
MAG Hr. at 20-25.
MAG also argues that Dr. Ceder had determined that one major accident on a certain evacuation route was a near certainty.
We have already discussed the credibility of that testimony, supra 5 III, which was properly rejected by the Licensing Board.
I What the Board did accept was the uncontroverted testimony of the Staff witness Urbanik that there exists no evidence that aberrant driver behavior has ever been a factor in any evacuation in the history of the United States.
EID 1 7.83 and citing Tr. 7485-86; Urbanik Dir., post Tr. 7372 at 17.
Sag also Tr. 7774-75.
Further, contrary to MAG's suggestion to the contrary, Egg MAG Br at 27-28, the question as to following police instructions was phrased so neutrally as perhaps to invite a rebellious response; Tr. 8230-36; no written instructions were given to interviewers; Tr. 8236-37; controlling for age and sex in the interview process was apparently important, Tr. 8243-45, but age of interviewees was not asked, Tr. 8262, and admittedly age classification in many cases would thus be one of guessing, id.; and only drivers were interviewed on the assumption that the driver would make the decision to shelter or leave for the group, Tr. 8253, a questionable assumption, it would seem, Tr. 8254-61; ado. Reb. No.
4, Post Tr. 9155 at 13-15.
As Dr. Luloff himself stated:
"Given even the small size of this survey, if you torture the data long enough, it will confess to virtually anything.
Tr. 8265.
No wonder the Board found it " flawed."
EID 1 7.87. I
e Licensing Board did not adopt the views of an " unqualified" Dr. Mileti in this area.
Rather, what the Board did is i
acknowledge that Dr. Mileti did not claim expertise on driver behavior par gg, but that he did opine that civil behavior by drivers could be expected, consistent with the theory of
" collective identification" in an emergency, which he testified to at length; as the Board stated, Dr. Mileti is qualified to testify to this limited aspect of driver behavior.
EID 1 7.84.
There was no error in the resolution of the driver behavior issue.
B.
The Licensing Board Correctly Concluded That Emergency Workers Would Not Abandon Their Posts Because of " Role Conflict" or " Role Strain."
SAPL devotes a portion of its brief to an argument that the Board erred in its resolution of the human behavior issues.
SAPL Hr. at 58-65.
A portion of this argument is devoted to a challenge to the Licensing Board's findings with respect to teachers.
SAPL HI. at 58-59.
And another portion of the argument addresses panic among drivers.
EAEL Dr. at 61-65.
Both of these arguments have already been dealt with above.
Supra SS II.B, IV.A.
SAPL also devotes a number of pages to an argument that the Board erred in not adopting the views of MAG witnesses Ziegler and Johnson, and SAPL witness Herzberg to the effect _ _
)
l l
I that people are more fearful of radiation than other potential sources of danger except war and terrorism.
SAPL Br. at 59-61.
SAPL does not actually go to any conclusion from this argument, but presumably what is intended is to argue that the Ziegler - Herzberg theory, if adopted, would lead to the conclusion that emergency workers would abandon their posts because of fear of radiation.
In the first place, the Board did not simply ignore the l
Ziegler panel.
No doubt, it approached it with some l
wariness, because, as the Board correctly found, some of the testimony was just plain misleading.
EID 11 7.55 - 7.56, citing Tr. 8012-16.
As to Dr. Herzberg, his experience was confined to seeing patients in hospitals undergoing radiation treatment for serious illness, Tr. 5058, 5060, who were, understandably, under great personal strain at the time given their situation.
However, the Board did discuss the Ziegler
" unique fear of radiation" theory in some detail.
EID 11 7.36, 7.54, 7.63, 7.64.
The Board accepted the views of Dr. Mileti to the effect that people perceive all hazards in a unique way but that there are basic principles of human behavior which come into play with respect to dealing with' all hazards, which basic principles will operate in radiological, as well as other, emergencies.
EID Y 7.64 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
d citing hER. Dir. No. 7, post Tr. 5622 at 137-40.8 As reason for rejecting the Ziegler view, the Licensing Board, in addition to the credibility problem cited earlier, pointed out that the survey Ziegler, at al. relied upon supported the view that the workers would, in fact, do their duty, especially when one considered the actual numbers involved, EID 11 7.36 - 7.40, that their TMI analysis was wholly insensitive as to whether the individuals involved had, and
- perceived they had, an assigned emergency role, EIR 1 7.58, and even if one agreed, which the Board did not, that TMI showed evidence of widespread role abandonment, the fact is that Ziegler was unable to provide a nexus between the actions taken at TMI and fear of radiation, EIQ 1 7.65.
The decision of the Board on this point was well-reasoned and complete; there was no error.
8 We admit to a total inability to understand the statement at page 60 of SAPL's Brief:
"Dr. Mileti did acknowledge at II. 6425 that the published literature in the United States indicates a higher level of fear of radiation than of other hazards."
l What Dr. Mileti said was that the fear of radiation was greater, according to the published literature, than fear of natural disasters, not all other hazards.
Indeed, in the following pages, Dr.
Mileti indicated quite clearly that this was not his view of the literature taken as a whole.
Tr.
6426-30. I l
V.
THE LICENSING BOARD CORRECTLY RESOLVED THE ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES A.
Letters of Agreement Both SAPL, SAPL Br. at 25-28, and TOH, IQH Br. at 40-42, raise the issue of whether Letters of Agreement (LOAs) should be required from individual teachers in light of the Board's finding that the teachers were providers of services as opposed to recipients.
EID 1 7.10.
TOH and SAPL read too much in to the finding.
The Licensing Board was commenting upon the planning basis which considered the teachers recipients of service because they were not doing anything that they did not do every day.
The Board could hardly have been turning over its earlier decisions which it had just previously acknowledged.
ELD 11 2.2 - 2.4.
In any event, the teachers are employees of a political subdivision of the State, and the State is not required to have an LOA with its political subdivisions.
SAPL also has other complaints concerning the Board's resolution of the LOA contentions.
SAPL Br. at 26-27.
First, there is concern that two LOAs with host facilities do not spell out such things as monitoring responsibilities.
Prescinding from the fact that an LOA does not have to have I
the specificity of a contract, Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-14, 21 I b C_________m__.-
a NRC 1219, 1367 (1985), the plan does not require any such monitoring activities by those two host facilities.
Egg EID 11 5.76 - 5.78.
The monitoring will be done by persons assigned out from the reception centers.
As to the Teamsters, SAEL Br. at 27, only 48 drivers, whose employers had signed LOAs, were being relied upon in any event, App.
l l
Dir. No.
1, Dost Tr. 2795 at 7 and Attach.
6.
As to Jan-Car, SAPL Br. at 28, an LOA was obtained from its successor which had purchased the bulk of Jan-Car's buses.
Tr. 3034-37; App.
Ex.
7, post Tr. 3035.
As to the shortage of drivers from National School Bus Service, SAPL Er. at 27-28, there is a sufficient pool of bus drivers to overcome any shortage arising from that problem.
App. Dir. No.
1, post Tr. 2795 at 7; App. Dir. No. 2, post Tr. 4228 at 14.9 There was no error in the resolution of the LOA contentions.
B.
Personnel Resources SAPL, SAPL Br. at 28-34, and NECNP, NECNP Br. at 1-24, take issue with the Licensing Board's resolution of the issues surrounding personnel adequacy.
9 3Apne s apparent quarrel with the Board's finding that it need not find a right and wrong way to conduct a survey, SAPL Br. at 26, is a mystery.
The finding SAPL refers to had nothing to do with LOAs and appears in that portion of the PID which deals with response personnel adequacy.
l,
NECNP first argues that error was committed because the Board did not require a demonstration that all of the various personnel being counted on to respond would be "available" l
I when needed.
The Board correctly rejected this argument.
j EID 11 3.22 - 3.25.
The fact is that there are sufficient personnel identified to execute NHRERP, even assuming the nonparticipation of the six New Hampshire towns who have refused to plan.
App. Ex. 1 at Table 3.1-4.
It is true that one cannot be sure that on the day of an accident all of these people will be available.
However, for most positions there is a significant overage of people available.
In addition, the plan provides for drawing on such things as the New England State Police Compact which would make available a pool of over 3,000 trained officers.
Tr. 4731.
This entire argument is a rerun of what has become the "what if" argument.
There is no doubt that the NHRERP can be "what iffed" to death.
It is true that one can dream up an accident where the need for personnel is essentially instantaneous.
If that occurs, the plan (or any other plan) would prove to be of little, if any, assistance before the fact of release.
By the same token, very little can be done until after the fact in any other instantaneous disaster.
The fact that State Police have to come from across the state for a radiological emergency is no different than if the had to come across the state, as they would, in the event of a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ -
flood, major fire, chlorine spill, or any other event.
This does not mean that the personnel resources are inadequate.
And it is clear that the State is not under any duty to hire an additional 3,000 State Police Officers and' station them on the New Hampshire Seacoast for nuclear accidents only.
Southern California Edison Co. gSan Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983).
Next, NECNP argues that the survey of the Applicants did not properly account for the workload of the. responders.
NECNP Br. at 19-20.
The "walkthroughs" performed to ascertain the personnel needed to perform the various tasks took account of the " workloads."
Tr. 3271-75, 3283, 3287.
Next, the Licensing Board is criticized for not crediting the testimony of NECNP witness Earl.
NECNP. Hr. at 21-22.
The Board did not " discredit" Mr. Earl.
Indeed, the Applicants did not attempt to discredit Mr. Earl; Applicants did not even cross-examine him.
What the Board correctly perceived, EID 1 3.35, was that all the Earl testimony established is that Mr. Earl would have done the survey differently.
This is true.
It is also true, as the Board found, that the Applicants' survey was sufficient unto the day.
E1Q 1 3.35.
NECNP next argues that the resolution of this issue should have awaited the FEMA review of the survey and other evidence adduced at the hearing.
NECNP Br. at 22-24.
This simply is not the law.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co._ (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
j
Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 774 ff. (1983).
Finally, on this point it should be noted that since the hearings closed on the NHRERP phase of the hearings, FEMA.has reviewed this whole situation and, in a document now in evidence before the Licensing Board, has found that personnel resources are adequate.
FEMA, Review and Evaluation of the State of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station (Dec. 1988) at 14-15 (App. Ex. 43D at 30-31).
Next, NECNP argues that the Board erred in not requiring 24-hour staffing for monitoring and decontamination centers.
They argue that the specific provisions of NUREG-0654 5 II.J.12 should be read in conjunction with the general provisions of 5 II.A.4 and a 24-hour staffing requirement imposed.
Such a reading certainly transgresses.the basic principal that the specific should control the general in construing a document.
More to the point, reading the monitoring and decontamination provision the way the Licensing Board did makes very real sense in the real world because, within twelve hours, all kinds of assistance of this nature will be available from other state and federal I
sources.
Egg Tr. 4892-93.
SAPL makes the same arguments, albeit somewhat more acidly, as NECNP.
In addition, it dwells at length on the testimony of local officials in the nonparticipating towns to - ___-_____--_
the effect that they cannot staff NHRERP for their town.
Prescinding from credibility questions (which were real and numerous), the short answer is that the State has demonstrated adequate compensatory capabilities.
SAPL also
argues that the Board erroneously resolved its contention that radiation levels would force emergency workers to abandon their posts and therefore more staffing was required to address this possibility.
SAPL Br. at 33.
As the Board found, there are in place procedures to rotate workers to keep exposures below SR, which is the level utilized by the State, and which level is the same as that deemed the highest level to be used as a " trigger level" for protective actions for the general population.
However, that same guidance sets the PAG for emergency workers at 25R.
EID 11 1.3.57 - 3.60.
The SR limit is a goal; there is no intention to allow emergency needs to go unmet.
App. Dir. No.
3, Dost Tr. 3228 at 15.
Finally, SAPL resurrects its argument that twenty-five letters from various state employees declining service on the Seabrook Emergency Response Team is evidence that the personnel for manning NHRERP is inadequate.
SAPL Br. at 34.
Suffice it to say that adequate staffing has been achieved' without these individuals. - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
C.
Special Needs j
SAPL challenges the Licensing Board's resolution of the issue of the adequacy of transportation and support services.
)
l SAPL Hr. at 35-42.
SAPL begins by complaining of the summary
{
disposition granted by the Licensing Board which, in essence, foreclosed litigation over the special needs survey used by New Hampshire to identify those with special needs in the event of an evacuation.
SAPL Hr. at 36-37.
However, SAPL gives no reason for why that decision should be reversed beyond a conclusory statement that there did exist general issues of material fact.
SAPL Br. at 36.
We confess an inability to address intelligently such a conclusory argument.
SAPL then goes on to argue, in essence, that since the numbers changed from time to time with respect to buses and drivers, and that certain sources were shown to be less numerous in number, or less reliable, than first thought, the finding that the number of vehicles and drivers were adequate should be disregarded.
As found by the Board this kind of argument ignores (a) that Applicants have been constantly addressing the accuracy of the numbers and taking steps whenever over-estimations are found and (b) the fact that emergency planning is a dynamic process.
EID 5 4.17. _______1____
l l
l SAPL next objects to the Board's refusal to adopt the views of Intervenor witnesses Pilot, Trahan and Barrows.
Elp 11 4.35 - 4.39.
First, with respect to Witness Pilot:
On cross-examination, she admitted that she was unaware that'the planners had worked with the hospitals and nursing homes to come up with the numbers, Tr. 7678, admitted, albeit reluctantly, that hospitals and nursing homes are qualified to decide what sort of transport their. patients required, Tr. 7679, and admitted that she was unaware that at the time of an actual emergency a doctor or nurse would decide what type of transport should be used for each patient, the plan containing " default values" only, Tr. 7678-80.
Turning next to witness Trahan:
Mr. Trahan testified that in his view his facility, Seacoast Health Center, could not be safely evacuated or sheltered, Trahan Hir., post Tr. 7806 at 3-8, and that the transportation allocated to his facility was inadequate, Trahan Dir., post Tr. 7806 at 8-9.
Mr. Trahan testified under cross-examination, however, that the j
transportation allocated for his facility was based on information he, himself, provided to the New Hempshire Civil Defense Agency.
Tr.7824-25.
Under cross-examination it also turned out that Mr. Trahan's facility has a complete disaster plan, Tr. 7810; App. Ex. 25, which he authored, Tr. 7822, and the facility complies with each and every provision in the 1
disaster plan, Tr. 7821.
The disaster plan includes detailed 1
l 1 l
i provisions for the orderly evacuation of patients, App. Ex.
25 at 3, 14, 23-36, outlines emergency duties for administrative, pharmacy, housekeeping, kitchen, and maintenance personnel, as well as nursing staff, App. Ex. 25 i
at 14, 39, includes shelter provisions for tornados, App.
Ex. 25 at 48-50, repeatedly stresses the responsibility of staff to assume their positions in time of disaster, App. Ex.
25 at 38, 24-26, and provides for off-duty personnel "to be called to assist in any emergency or evacuation," App. Ex. 25 at 23.
Mr. Trahan testified that his facility is not adequately staffed to carry out an evacuation in a radiological emergency.
Trahan Dir., natt Tr. 7806 at 5-6.
Under cross-examination, however, he testified that the facility's staff are trained in all aspects of preparedness for any disaster and that they participate in ongoing training and drills so that they each promptly and correctly carry out a specific role in case of a disaster.
Tr. 7816.
Mr. Trahan also testified that his facility was not adequately staffed, Tr. 7822, but then opined that it was sufficiently staffed for the number of patients they took on, Tr. 7823.
Later, under Board questioning, Mr. Trahan testified that "there are many types of crises that [his j
l facility] may have difficulty responding to.
in a manner that includes proper handling of [his) patients."
Tr. 7840.
Nevertheless, he admitted that, during a hurricane emergency f
i 4 1
two years ago, his facility followed the evacuation plan checklist, including arranging for emergency food supply and bringing in the required staff to the facility.
Tr. 7843-44.
As to Witness Barrows:
Barrows challenged the alleged assertion in NHRERP that only 15 seconds need be allowed for evacuation of a wheelchair resident from the room to a place where buses would pick the patient up, Barrows Dir., Post Tr.
4405 at 2-3.
This was not an assertion made at the referenced page of NHRERP Volume 6 (p. 11-21).
Rather, the assertion there is that assuming that elderly or disabled persons are at the loading point when the bus arrives, they may be loaded at the average rate of 15 seconds per person.
In fact, Ms. Barrows testimony as t) the timed trial for evacuation of a resident specifically did not include a sequence of loading a patient onto a bus. Tr. 4435-36.
Ms.
Barrows original testimony stated flatly that she did not believe that the Rockingham County Nursing Home could be evacuated in a safe or timely manner.
Barrows Dir., Post Tr.
4405 at 2, 4.
However, on cross-examination it was revealed that the Nursing Home has a complete evacuation and disaster plan.
App. Ex. 11, Tr. 4426-31, 4434.
The plan includes a reference for procedures in dealing with food and water exposed to radioactive fallout.
Tr. 4432. In addition, it appears that the Home has in fact been evacuated in a safe i
I i
)
and timely manner.
App. Ex. 12.
The board was more than justified in disregarding the views of these witnesses.
VI.
THE LICENSING BOARD CORRECTLY PERMITTED RELIANCE UPON THE "20% STANDARD" AS THE PLANNING BASIS IN THIS CASE SAPL devotes a good portion of its brief to an argument that the PID should be reversed on the ground that the Board found the planning basis for monitoring and decontamination adequate despite the Appeal Board's decision in Lona Island Liahtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515 (1988).
SAPL Br. at 42-57.
Herein we argue that the case at bar is distinguishable from ALAB-905 and therefore correctly decided on that basis.
Thereafter, we urge the Appeal Board to reconsider and overrule the doctrine of ALAB-905 if the cases are not distinguishable.
A.
The Case at Bar is DistinguishableFrom ALAB-905 and was Correctly Decided on that Basis As the Applicants made clear at the outset of their direct case on the issue of decontamination and monitoring, the planning basis used in NHRERP for the staffing of monitoring and decontamination facilities was grounded in the FEMA 20% rule which was set out in the so-called "Krimm Memorandum" which was the subject of the Appeal Board's review in ALAB-905.
Ann. Dir. No.
4, post Tr. 4740 at 3-4 and Attach 1.
It is at that point that the similarity l I A_____-_____-_-____
)
between the two cases begins and ends.
Even a cursory review of ALAB-905 reveals a concerted, effective and relentless attack by the interveners on the bases and rationale of the j
twenty percent rule.
The FEMA witnesses (contractor and agency) were cross-examined as to the genesis and basis of the rule, 28 NRC at 525; cases in defense of the rule were put on by the Staff and the Applicant in that case, they obviously having been put on notice that the standard itself was being challenged, id. at 529-30.
This is to be contrasted with what took place in the case at bar.
As noted above, the Applicants' panel made clear at the 1
outset that the basic planning document relied on was the Krimm memorandum.
On the day the Applicants' direct case was introduced, the following cross-examination with respect to the 20% figure took place:
"BY MR. BACKUS:
Q Now, at page 4 of the testimony you adopt an estimated planning figure of 20 percent of the estimated population to be evacuated is going to show up at the reception and decontamination centers; is that correct?
A (Callendrello)
That's correct.
Page 4 says, "This guidance suggests the use of 20 percent of the total evacuees as planning basis for estimating the number of persons arriving at reception centers."
Q And I take it that that 20 percent is based upon what has been marked as Attached 1 to this testimony, which is a FEMA memorandum, the date on which is illegible here, but December 24, from Mr. Richard Krimm; is that correct?
A (Callendrello)
That's correct.
Q And the reference in question would be on page 2 of that attachment under " Guidance" which states, "For highly improbable radiological releases involving high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large area, it may be
i 1
necessary to monitor a greater number of evacuees" -- I'm sorry, I'm sorry, strike that ont.
I got the wrong thing.
It's crossed out here.
It's number one I wanted to read.
"The state and local radiological emergency preparedness plan should include provisions at relocation centers in the form of trained personnel and equipment to monitor a minimum of 20 percent of the estimated population j
to be evacuated."
l Is that correct?
I A
(Callendrello)
That's correct.
Q Now the reference there is to a minimum of 20 percent, and yet the New Hampshire appears to use that figure j
without ever allowing for some greater number.
Was there some reason -- well, was there some reason why a more conservative number than 20 percent was not used?
Perhaps I could ask Dr. Wallace that question.
A (Callendrello)
Maybe if I can just take one cut at the answer first.
The guidance memo was used as it was written.
The minimum of 20 percent was used as a planning basis.
If you read further in the testimony, the process for determining the evacuee load at each reception center was done by I
calculating, in fact, it's on page 5, determining the peak population, subtracting out the 1pecial facility population, subtracting out the transient-dependent population, multiplying that by 20 percent, and then adding back in the transient-dependent population, because they would be l
arriving at the reception centers.
]
Those numbers vary for a reception center.
The 1
largest number of evacuee (sic) would be arriving at the Manchester reception center.
Therefore, that number was used as the planning basis to determining the staffing and equipment needs for all four of the reception centers.
While that equates to 20 percent for the Manchester reception center, it equates to some larger percentages for the other reception centers.
And in fact, the percentages worked out to about 25 percent of the total evacuee population can be monitored.
So the intent of that guidance memo was followed.
The planning basis was a minimum of 20 percent.
In actuality, that worked out to somewhat more, and it's about 25 percent.
Q I would like to get an answer to that from Dr.
Wallace.
I understand your claim that it's conservatism for the non-Manchester reception centers, Mr. Callendrello.
A (Wallace)
What was your question again on that?
Q The testimony says that you are assuming that 20 percent of the evacuees will be going to the reception centers, and for that 20 percent refers to Attachment 1, !
--____-___x_
i 1
which is the FEMA memorandum for Mr. Krimm, which refers to using a minimum 20 percent figure.
And I guess I'm asking you, Dr. Wallace, as the professional in charge of the Division of Public Health Services, are you comfortable with going with a 20 percent figure-and not a more conservative figure, a higher figure?
A (Wallace)
I think as Mr. Callendrello was indicating, we actually have -- on the basis of the calculation, we actually have a higher percentage of evacuees that are being taken care of in these centers.
In addition, where we're basing our calculations on the peak summer population, and in fact in wintertimes you would handling 50 percent or even greater of the population.
Q Isn't it true, Dr. Wallace, that in regard to the Manchester reception center where you have expected that --
where you have the most communities I guess assigned, or the most people assigned, including Hampton Beach, you don't have
(
that conservatism.
A (Wallace)
Let me confer just a moment, please.
Q Sure.
JUDGE SMITH:
As I understand your question, it's an arithmetical question and not a -- I mean, it's a mathematical question, isn't it?
MR. BACKUS:
If I've got everything correct in my assumption, which I would like him to confirm, that's true.
(Witnesses confer.)
THE WITNESS:
(Wallace)
I guess the additional load, possible load could be handled by opening the secondary center as well which is an additional number of peoples (sic) that could be handled.
So I think we have an adequate, an adequate number.
BY MR. BACKUS:
Q So you are referring to the secondary centers as providing a degree of conservatism here; is that what you are saying?
A (Wallace)
Yes, that adds an additional load that can be handled.
Q The secondary center in Manchester as I understand it, Dr. Wallace, is to be Hillside Junior High School which is also to act as the -- if this is the correct word --
primary center for the local emergency workers that will be going to a decontamination center; is that right?
A (Wallace)
That's correct.
MR. BISBEE:
Your Honor, at this interlude could I ask if counsel could refer specifically to whether he's questioning on reception centers or decontamination centers?
I think there may be some confusion here in the record as to which one is being responded to or referred to. _-
MR. BACKUS:
I understand they are both to be colocated in the same facilities.
THE WITNESS:
(Bonds)
The primary reception center, or the primary decontamination center and the reception center in the host community are colocated.
The secondary decontamination center does not carry with it a separate registration reception area.
There is still just one registration area per host community.
BY MR. BACKUS:
Q So there is no secondary reception center.
There is only a secondary decontamination center; is that right, Mr. Bonds?
A (Bonds)
That's correct.
Q All right.
In any event, I take it on page 4 that after you used this 20 percent figure from the FEMA memorandum as you have outlined, you then go to determine the populations of the communities involved, and there is a reference on page 4 to the peak population estimates are Rye, Hampton, North Hampton, Hampton Beach and Seabrook.
I take it as it states there that this peak population is based on information contained in Volume 6 which is the evacuation time estimate; is that correct, Mr.
Callendrello?
A (Callendrello)
That is one piece of it, and the analysis of the aerial photographs taken on July 18, 1987.
Q Do you know whether or not those estimates of population exceed those to be found in Tables 1 of the local community plans, Volume 16 through 32?
A (Callendrello)
I believe for all the communities they do exceed them for the summer weekend condition.
There are three columns of numbers there.
One is resident, one is summer weekend, the other is summer weekday.
So my answer addresses only the summer weekend."
Tr. 4767 72.
The questioning then moved on to a statement on page 6 of the l
direct examination concerning the decontamination center for emergency workers.
On the next day, November 3, 1987, the following additional cross-examination appears in the record:
l DY MR. BACKUS:
l Q
Okay, let me turn, then, on this same subject to the planning basis for the number of evacuees to arrive at these centers.
We have established, or your testimony states, does it not a(sic) we pointed out yesterday, that the planning basis is 9,667 people assumed to arrived at these decontamination centers; is that correct?
A (Bonds)
That's correct, sir.
Q And that, of course, is based upon the FEMA assumption that we -- the FEMA figure we gave yesterday, at least in part, that 20 percent, a minimum of 20 percent of the evacuees may be going to the reception centers, and may need decontamination; correct?
A (Callendrello)
That's correct, and the calculation is as indicated on page 5 where it's -- it's not just a straight 20 percent of evacaees.
There are -- some people subtracted out of that population, some people added back in with it, and that 20 percent is not applied across the board to evacuees.
Q Right.
Now, if all of these 9,667 people arriving at the Manchester decontamination reception center required decontamination, and you assume the length of time you do for showers for these people, is it correct that given the number of shows(sic) there that it would take in excess of 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> to decontaminate all of the evacuees?
A (Bonds)
I'd have to do the mathematics.
If your assumption is that they would all need a shower, and they would all need 10 minutes in the shower, I would have to take a look at the mathematics on that and multiply the thing through."
Tr. 4883-84.
Thereafter, the cross-examination continued on the issue of whether there were enough showers to handle the twenty per-cent (9,667 people).
That was the last we heard on cross-examination by SAPL's counsel with respect to the twenty percent.
)
The next thing of interest that appears in the record is I
the cross-examination plan of SAPL.
Paragraph 2 thereof reads as follows:
"2.
Is it not true that the FEMA Memorandum from Richard W.
- Krimm, referred to at p. 4 of Applicants' direct testimony states that provisions should be made for personnel and equipment to monitor a minimum of 20% of the estimated population to be evacuated? (See (2 of 2) at page 2).
Why is the State of New Hampshire not basing its. _ _ _ _ _
(
planning more conservatively and planning for more than 20%?"
This is the only reference in the entire cross-examination plan to the 20% rule.
There is nothing in there that would indicate an attempt to attack the rule itself or the basis for it.
The next time the twenty percent rule was mentioned was when FEMA counsel cross examined the Applicants, see Tr. 4930 gt gag.
Naturally, FEMA counsel made no effort to challenge the FEMA planning basis.
The next matter of possible relevance is the direct testimony of Dr. Herzberg which appears post Tr. 5010.
There are two pieces; the direct, and the supplemental direct.
In the direct the closest thing to a questioning of the planning basis one can find is in an answer which appears on pp.
1-2.
The relevant portion of the answer reads as follows:
"Most individuals in the area of potential radiation exposure will have no way of knowing whether or not they have been contaminated.10 As a result in addition those people actually contaminated reporting to the decontamination facility, it is likely, depending on the magnitude of the radiation accident involved, that an even larger number of noncontaminated people will be present at the facility.
The accident-response program in the NHRERP is deficient in its ability to accommodate the number of people that i
10 This statement is questionable as seen in more detail below.
Public information will make reasonably clear the zones where contamination is possible. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
munt be expected at the decontamination centers."
The best case for SAPL appears in the supplemental direct of Dr. Herzberg where he states at page 2:
Based upon my experience with small decontamination exercises it is my opinion that the vast majority of evacuees will come to be checked.
I have for many years observed the reaction of human beings to information about radioactivity and it is my opinion that more people would report for services after potential exposure to radioactivity than would report for services following other natural or technological emergencies. It would interest me areatly to find out what is alleced to forn the empirical basis of the 20% estimate of evacuees reportina for services.
(emphasis added).
As the Board pointed out, E1D 1 5.65, the testimony set forth above with emphasis constitutes only an expression of interest in a question, not substantive comment on the subject.
Moreover, as we have pointed out above, suora 5 IV.B, the experience from which the doctor draws to give his surmises as to fear is experience with those who are so unfortunate as to have contracted a disease which requires treatment by radiation.
The only subsequent cross ext.mination of Dr. Herzberg which might be said to bear upon the issue at bar is the following:
BY MR. LEWALD:
Q And now, could I refer you to paragraph three of your testimony, your direct testimony?
A (Herzberg)
Yes, sir. L__ __ _
4 Q
And could I ask you as to what you are trying to do in that paragraph?
A (Herzberg)
Yes.
You refer to number three, of the first paragraph, and there is -- I think I will address the second sentence here.
"I think at the basis of any decontamination program must be the identification of those persons who are and are not contaminated."
There is no way, short of actually having developed the physical signs and symptoms of radiation exposure, to know whether a patient has been exposed to radiation, particularly contaminated is what we are looking for.
Unless you survey that patient with the appropriate survey meter.
Q And ir it your position that the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, does not address this subject?
A (Herzberg)
It does not address the number of people who will be potentially exposed, is my understanding of it.
In view of the goal, as I understand it, of the program to check and potentially decontaminate 20% of the population.
Q You think that the plan ought to be fashioned or drawn by, in some fashion so that it would reach 100% of the population in am (sic) emergency protection zone?
A (Herzberg)
I am only saying that if you want to find out if somebody is contaminated, you have to check them.
I don't think that I can go beyond that.
Q Then you are saying that the only right way to do it, is to look at everybody within the zone, is that so?
A (Herzberg)
Well, if it were me and my family, I would want us all checked, right.
1 Q
And you put the responsibility for this on the utility or on the Applicant, or the State of New Hampshire?
A (Herzberg)
Well, I think that --
Q Whoever sponsored the plan?
A (Herzberg)
I think that somebody, I think that whoever is responsible for the plan, owes it to the public to see that they are checked, whether or not they have been contaminated when there has been a release of radioactivity, that is large enough to raise that suspicion that people are contaminated.
Q And this is one deficiency of the plans, that it does not make it mandatory for everybody within the EPZ to be examined.
A (Herzberg)
I did not say that it should be mandatory.
I don't know how you would do that kind of thing. '
l
! =
l But I think the public certainly should have vigorous -- a vigorous attempt should be made to convince the public that they need to arrive at a detection and decontamination center in the event of serious radioactivity release.
Q And is it the lack of a publicity campaign that you are complaining of?
A (Herzberg)
No.
Q No.
A (Herzberg)
Simply reading through the proposals, it seems to me as if the numbers that are being prepared for are inadequate."
Tr. 5024-26.
And during cross-examination by Staff counsel, the following appears:
"Q All right.
So as I understand your testimony it's based upon your own belief as to what a reasonable plan should contain, am I correct?
A (Herzberg)
I would -- belief I think is not -- it is my opinion; yes, that's true.
Q On Page 2 of your testimony you express the view that a larger number of persons that will present themselves to a reception center than the plan anticipates.
Are you aware of whether the New Hampshire plan --
well, first, are you aware of what percentage of persons from the EPZ are anticipated or planned for to arrive at the reception centers?
A (Herzberg)
I would assume that all the people from the EPZ.
Q I'm not sure if I made myself clear.
Do you know to what percentage of the population within the EPZ is planned for to arrive at the reception centers?
A (Herzberg)
Twenty-five percent.
I Q
So I take it when you said 100 percent, that --
A (Herzberg)
Is what?
Q I must not have made myself clear when you gave me that answer.
A (Herzberg)
I misunderstood what you said.
Q Okay.
Do you know for other nuclear plants and for l
radiological emergency response plans for other states, do you know what the planning basis is in terms of the percentage of persons who are planned for to arrive at reception centers?
A (Herzberg)
No, I do not."
Tr. 5064-65.
! I
The next event which bears upon the subject under discussion is the testimony of FEMA on this question which occurred on November 4, 1987, and appears Dost Tr. 5091.
Therein at the page numbered 59 in the top right-hand corner and having " global" number 80 in the bottom right-hand corner, FEMA states its position that 20% is the minimum number to be planned for.
We reproduce below SAPL's entire cross-exa'nination of this FEMA testimony.
" CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BACKUS:
Q Mr. Thomas, the testimony that is at global page 80, that has just been marked, does that reflect the position held by FEMA today, in regard to SAPL 7?
A (Thomas)
Yes, it does.
Q And SAPL 33, I should add?
A (Thomas)
In effect, it does, because on global page 97, we refer back, on global page 97, which deals with SAPL contention number 33, it refers back to the position that is taken no(sic) global page 80.
Q There is a reference on nace 80 to the memorandum from Mr. Krimm. that provisions for monitorina evacuees, must address at least 20% of the total EPZ oooulation.
Am I correct sir, that it is FEMA's position that that is a minimum number of evacuees that shg.uld be potentially considered to be needina monitorina?
A (Thomas)
No. I don't think that is exactiv correct.
It is our position that it is a minimum number of evacuees that should be planned for within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
It is very important to keen in mind that there is a time element in there, as well.
That is my response, sir.
Q When you say, you are addina the time element here, that is the minimum number that should be considered withiD 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />?
Is that your qualification?
A (Thomas)
That should be specifically planned for.
I orefer to use the word. olanned for, rather than, considered.
Q Is it then FEMA's position that if one is prepared to monitor and potentially decontaminate 20% of the evacuees,. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, that an ad hoc resoonse can be counted on to take care of hicher numbers than that?
A IThomas)
Acain, it is at least 20%, with that proviso, your statement is correct.
That is essentially FEMA's Dosition.
Q-And sir, we had, yesterday, testimony about the provisions for showering off evacuees that will be coming to these decontamination centers.
Are you aware, sir, if the plans provide for any method of monitoring or checking those individuals after they have been through the showering process?
A (Thomas)
I would like to check the plans.
My recollection is that, yes, the plans do provide for that and I would like to take a look at them if you like?
I believe that we could specifically refer you to that point.
Yes, I believe that they do say that.
Q Is that -- I would be happy to have you check, but first let me just ask, is that.something that is an important part of the plans, in your opinion, that there be provisions for monitoring of the individuals after they have been through a shower?
A (Thomas)
Yes, that is important.
Q And has FEMA had anything offered to it, since this testimony was prepared that is being reviewed, if not formally, under the technological review assistance provisions that you have, in regard to the decontamination and reception centers?
A (Thomas)
For the sake of the record, let me just point out that you indicated technological review, and we r.ormally refer to that as a technical review.
1 Q
Technical review, thank you.
A (Thomas)
The response to your question is, that we have nothing in front of us to review on this matter, with the exception of the resources assessment summary, which addresses, to some extent, or is the beginning of or a milestone on the way to addressing some of our concerns on personnel resources.
It is a partial response, the beginnings of a partial response in personnel resources, in that it deals with some of the State personnel that would be involved in 1
the monitoring of the decontamination centers.
And I have Mr. Tanzman would like to add to that, I believe.
A (Tanzman)
Just to answer your question fully, the witnesses have seen the Applicants' testimony which does add some information with respect to that issue, but I don't think that there is a formal -- I don't think that that testimony is formally in front of FEMA in the context, either _ _ _ _ _
o of the technical assistance review, or in the context of a RAC review.
Q Okay.
And Mr. Tanzman, when you said, the witnesses have seen the Applicants' testimony, you are referring to you, Mr.
Thomas, and Mr. Swiren, being here when the Applicants have testified, presented testimony and have had it cross-examined in the last couple of days, is that right?
A (Tanzman)
In addition to the prefiled testimony, yes.
Q okay.
And you are saying that that testimony, although you have read the prefiled and by and large heard the examination of that testimony, other than that, that is not before you for any technical review?
A (Thomas)
That is correct.
Q Okay.
A (Thomas)
May I point out that we have talked before about the collegial review process that we go through.
Our normal expectation is that if the state wants to send us plan changes or plan amendments, that they will send in the sufficient number of copics, and those changes will be distributed to the members of the regional assistance committee, and we will receive their advice in the course of determining if changes to the outstanding regional assistance committee, FEMA review, are necessary.
And that has not been done up to this point.
Yesterday was the first that we had heard that it was contemplated that there actually were -- what I understand --
planned changes incorporated in the testimony, beyond that which had been formally submitted by Director Strome to FEMA, in August and September.
Q Right.
And you previously described, on the record, I believe, the process that FEMA will go through, when those plan changes are made formal and presented to you, is that correct?
This would be the same as you described for other portions of plan review?
A (Thomas)
It would be the same as I have previously described for other portions of the plan review, that is correct.
Q And now, you previcusly also described, Mr. Thomas, the exercise that FEMA does on radiological plans, one of which we all know was held in regard to a prior revision of the New Hampshire Plan, in February of 1986.
When there is going to be an exercise of the New Hampshire Plan Rev.
2., with whatever amendments, will that !
f exercise include a review of the operation of a reception decontamination center?
A (Thomas)
Let me --- again, I don't mean to be picky, Mr. Backus, but you indicated that we are talking about an exercise that FEMA does.
Again, FEMA audits or observes exercises carried out by the state and the utility -
- joint exercises of the state, utility and local governments.
We observe them, we audit them, we critique them.
Q Yes, thank you for that, I appreciate you for clarifying my language here.
So, don't worry about it.
A (Thomas)
With that in mind, it may or may not be a provision -- I am sorry, please strike that.
Yes, it would.
According to our internal standards, our procedures, we negotiate objectives for the exercise with the state, which normally may or may not include taking a look at a reception center.
But where we have had a previous exercise that indicated a deficiency, we would always, in the next exercise, look at that particular matter.
And where there was a deficiency in the number of personnel available for monitoring and decontamination, we l
would certainly look at that in the next exercise.
Sorry to take so long with the answer, but the answer to your question is, yes.
Q And the answer is yes, I take it from what you have said, because among the deficiencies in the February 1096 exercise, were deficiencies related to the reception decontamination center review?
A (Thomas)
Again, I don't mean to be picky, there was one deficiency, it was not a plural.
Q Okay.
MR. BACEUS:
That is all, Your Honor."
Tr. 5092-98.
The portion of the above set out with emphasis is the entire attack made upon the planning basis when the FEMA witnesses were on the stand.11 The Board's characterization of the SAPL effort as "at best indirect," EID 1 5.66, is generous.
11 Also it should be remembered that Mr. Krimm himself testified, albeit on another subject matter, in this proceeding, but no effort was made to address the issue at bar with him. _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
SAPL aimply did not make a case on the planning basis, nor did it attempt to.
That being the case there remains the FEMA finding in j
j 1
its direct testimony at post Tr. 5091 that 20% is the number.'
As this Appeal Board has recently stated:
reaardless of the assumptions FEMA emoloved in reviewina the remeraency olan1 or the outcome of that review, the Commission's regulations provide that the FEMA finding 'will constitute a rebuttal i
(sic) presumption on questions of I
adequacy and implementation capability."
Public Service Company of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
Memorandum and Order (Unpublished) at 7 (April 11, 1989).
On the above-described record, the Licensing Board was absolutely correct in ruling that the presumption was not rebutted and holding as it did.12 B.
ALAB-905 Should be Reconsidered and Overruled In the event that the Appeal Board is unpersuaded by the argument above, with a full appreciation of its recent vintage, and with the greatest respect for the members of 12 SAPL's reliance on the answers to the Beach Blanket Survey SAPL HI. at 50 is misplaced.
Prescinding from the flaws in that survey which the author thought could be tortured to admit of anything n.7, supra, the fact is that the question assumed an EBS message that ordered everyone to report to a monitoring and decontamination center.
As seen below, that is not the kind of message that will go out in the real world. s
o, this identical Appeal Board, we respectfully urge that ALAB-l 905 be reconsidered.13 It does not appear that in ALAB-905, this Appeal Board l
addressed or decided the basic question of whether any NRC-adjudicatory board is permitted to overrule generic FEMA guidance in the emergency planning area.
It is true that the NRC Staff is considered only another party to NRC adjudicatory proceedings and that when its Reg Guides are called into question, Staff must defend them and Licensing and Appeal Boards may decide not to follow them.
But FEMA guidance is not guidance from a subordinate arm of this agency.
It is rather the position of a sister federal agency, an agency which the President of the United States empowered to take the lead in offsite emergency planing for nuclear power plants.
And its findings are accorded the only rebuttable presumption to be found in NRC regulations.
- Thus, FEMA generic policy is not in the same legal posit'on as a Staff Reg Guide.
Yet, this Appeal Board in ALAB-905 seems to have assumed that it could overrule that judgment of FEMA if, 13 We are also fully aware that the Commission did not see fit to review ALAB-905.
However, that decision, released on February 17, 1989, preceded by only two weeks the Commission's decision ending the Shoreham litigation proceedings.
The foreknowledge of that may well account for the Commission's decision not to review.
Also, we do not believe the Appeal Board addressed much of the argument made here.
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in the Appeal Board's opinion, the ju'dgment was not well enough articulated to withstand this Appeal Board's scrutiny.
The analogy that comes to mind is to hark back to the days when financial qualifications was an issue in NRC proceedings; would an Appeal Board feel free to disregard, as not well supported, an Internal Revenue Service Ruling if one was being relied upon in the financing scheme for a nuclear power plant; or to disregard a policy statement of the SEC in the area?
We think not.
And we respectfully suggest that FEMA's position is no less; indeed, in light of the Presidential directive by President Carter, FEMA's position is even stronger.
Prescinding from the forgoing legal argument, we respectfully suggest that certain of the factual assumptions that apparently shaped the reasoning of ALAB-905 were faulty.
The Appeal Board could find no basis for equating the number of persons seeking shelter with those that will need to be monitored.
At first glance, the assumption that there will be more people who will seek monitoring than both monitoring and sheltering seems logical and attractive.
However, it will not bear up under careful analysis of the realities of a nuclear event.
If there is no release, the public will be so informed and essentially no one will seek monitoring at all.
If there is a release and contamination in an area, the public information will inform people that if they were in a _
certain area, they are potentially contaminated.
It will also tell them that the smart thing to do would be to take a shower and put their clothing in a bag for checking at some later date.
Now who will go to the congregate care center?
~
The answer is:
those who cannot go home to shower or to their hotel room or anywhere else.
No rational person is going to stand in line at a congregate care center to be monitored and take a shower if found contaminated if, in the alternative, that person can go elsewhere and immediately get a shower.
Thus, there is a very definite connection between the number who seek shelter and the number who will need monitoring and decontamination.
The numbers for all practical purposes will be equal.
Prescinding from the foregoing, there is a basic question of equity involved here.
A utility follows the guidance of a Federal Agency with lead responsibility in an area; guidance which has been followed throughout the country so far as we are aware, plans accordingly, and then another federal agency says "gotcha."
This cannot be the type of National Government that is intended by our constitution and our laws.
If the civil rights of an individual were so l
1 treated, the Courts and Congress would be justifiably j
outraged.
It is to be remembered that this agency offered no guidance of any kind in this area.
A utility could go nowhere else for guidance than the Krimm Memorandum.
Indeed, - -
4 there are any number of plants cranking out power (and radiation) on the same planning basis.
The result of ALAB-905 " borders on the Kafkaesque."14 Finally, we cannot help but note the fact that FEMA has formally advised this agency of its intent to continue to use the 20% rule unless advised to the contrary by the Commission.
Appendix A to this Brief at 2.
No such advice has been forthcoming as of this writing.
We also note the fact that. the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),
speaking for the Commission, has stated the Agency's continued adherence to the FEMA 20% Rule.
Lona Island Licht.ina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), DIRECTORS' FINDINGS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS (April 17, 1989)
(hereafter cited as "LILCO FINDINGS" and to the slip opinion) at 12-13.
In that same decision, NRR points out that a j
rationale for the 20% rule is also found in the fact that the laws of meteorology preclude simultaneous contamination of the whole EPZ.
Id. at 12.
This was put forth as ona of the rationales for the use of the 20% rule at Seabrook also.
App. Dir. No.
4, cost Tr. 4740 at 2-3.
NRR also points out that the planning basis allows for expansion, if necessary, through use of other industry and government resources.
14 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 557 (1978). _
i LILCO FINDINGS at 13.
NHRERP makes provision for this same capability.
Tr. 4892-93.
J VII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES A.
No Error Was Committed in the Rejection of SAPL Contention No. 4 SAPL complains, SAPL Br. at 65-66, of the Licensing Board's rejection of their contention with respect to contaminated injured.
The ruling when made was totally sound and in accordance with then extant Commission guidance issued to the Adjudicatory Boards.
Statement of Poliev, 50 Fed.
Reg. 20891 (May 21, 1985).
See also Statement of Poligy, 51 Fed. Reg. 32904 (Sept. 17, 1986).
B.
No Error was Committed in Granting Summary Disposition of SAPL Contention No. 5 SAPL complains, SAPL Br. at 66-67, of the grant of summary disposition of SAPL Contention No.
5.
The decision, as set forth in the Memorandum and Order of November 4,
- 1986, is sound.
SAPL offers nothing on appeal except conclusory statements to the effect that its witnesses were better qualified than the State officials and that they believed that the monitoring efforts would be too late.
Monitoring efforts of the kind here involved are never "too late."
Initial PARS are made on the basis of data at the plant, not that from the field monitoring teams. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _
L C.
No Error was Committed in the Disposition of MAG 8s Late-Filed Testimony MAG complains, H&G Br. at 86-87, of the rejection of the third incarnation of "Sholly" testimony.
As the Board spelled out in its Memorandum and Order of September 9,
- 1988, MAG had good reason to know he would need the testimony at issue as early-as Feb. 11, 1988, Memo at 4-5, he had total notice as early as April 19, 1988, and so admitted in a filing made with the Board, 14 at 5.
On May 10, 1988, his first attempt at rebuttal was excluded.
Yet no request for leave to file another piece of rebuttal was forthcoming until June 14, 1988, two days before the scheduled close of hearings.
He did not file the motion to reconsider that ruling until July 6, 1988.
There was no abuse of discretion, and hence no error.
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l CONCLUSION The Partial Initial Decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, L/dWh f
W As n~
Thomas 6.JDignan, Jr.
George H. Lewald Kathryn A. Selleck Jeffrey P. Trout Jay Bradford Smith Geoffrey C. Cook Ropes & Gray One International Place Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000 counsel for Applicants
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Washington, D.C. 20472 l
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l Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.
l Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stello:
This is to provide comments of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the November 29,1988, (ALAB-905) ruling of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board on the issue of radiological monitoring of evacuees for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
This will also confirm recent conversations between our staffs about the commitment of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to provide any future testimony needed on the appropriate percentage of the population tc, use as a planning basis for monitoring capacity. Finally, it will confinn FEMA's position to use 20% as the appropriate figure, unless notified differently by NRC.
Among other things, the Appeal Board discussed the OL-3 Licensing Board's rationale for reaching a decision on the question of the number of individuals (expressed as a percentage of the total EPZ population) that must be used as a planning basis in deciding upon the necessary facilities and equipment for ronitoring evacuees. As indicated by ALAB-905, "in its decision, the Licensing Board determined that, as urged by LILC0 with NRC staff endorsement, the appropriate basis is twenty percent of the EPZ population. From all that appears, the Licensing Board's acceptance of the figure was founded almost exclusively upon an internal FEMA memorandum" [a December 24, 1985, memorandum f rom Richard W. Krimm]. The Appeal Board later states that the so-called "Krimm memorandum", and by extension, the FEMA testimony on that memorandum, does not provide a sufficient foundation for the Licensing Board finding in question.
One of the reasons underlying the Appeal Board's position is a matter of particular concern to us. The doard cites as a weakness, the " tacit assumption [in the memorandum] that the issue it addresses is generic in character." In fact, the ruling recommends the consideration, among other things, of the influence of the demographic and meteorological characteristics of a particular Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), on the percentage of people in an EPZ that would, in the event of an accident, seek monitoring either on the basis of instructions or their own initiative.
In fact, in support of this approach, the Appeal Board, in footnote 32 on page 526, cites the testimony of the NRC staff, which " recognizes (at least implicitly) that demographic and meteorological characteristics of the EPZ are relevant in the determination of the monitoring basis." In I
our view, a return to site-specific considerations to determine the A9PE N OlX R
2 parameters of offsite preparedness goes against the generic approach underlying basic radiological emergency planning documents such as NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I and NUREG-0396. Such a trend, based on site-specific risk assessment factors, brings into question planning assumptions in many other areas of the REP program. Further, to the extent that it seeks to establish site-specific criteria to be used in the evaluation of plans and exercises, it will result in a greater FEMA reliance upon the risk assessment responsibilities of the NRC, Under such conditions, NRC would have to identify all parameters upon which planning analyses would be based.
In the case of the justification for the use of 2,1 as a figure for monitoring capacity, the Appeal Board reacted favorably to the testimony of the NRC staf f witness, Lewis G. Hulman. As you may recall, the participation of Mr. Hulman occurred at the direction of NRC Executive Director for Operations, based on discussions with FEMA on whether to appeal ALAB-855, involving the same issue. However, while the Appeal Board saw the Hulman analysis as a good beginning for the establishment of a planning basis, it did not find the arguments sufficiently explored to totally justify the 20% figure. Based on the Appeal Board's judgment on both the FEMA and the NRC testimony, we believe that the NRC, rather than FEMA, is the appropriate organization to pursue the development of a monitoring capacity figure that will be defensible before NRC adjudicatory bodies.
While the original forum for the discussion of 20% as a monitoring capacity figure (the Shoreham licensing hearings) is now closed, the issue is now be fore the Seabrook ASLB on the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) and before the Appeal Board on the New Hampshire Emergency Response Plan. As you know, the hearings on the SPMC began on March 21, 1989. FEMA believes that it presented its best analysis of how to reach an appropriate monitoring figure in the Shoreham litigation.
Unfortunately, that analysis, upon appellate review, was found inadequate by the Appeal Board. Given no new data, we believe that it would be counterproductive to present it again in the Seabrook hearings. Thus, as confirmed in a recent conversation between Bill Travers of your staff and Craig Wingo of my staff, we will rely upon the NRC to present a rationale to support the 20% figure at Seabrook or any future hearings.
In light of the above discussion, and in the absence of any further guidance from NRC, we will continue to use 20% for plenning purposes as ah acceptable percentage of the EPZ population for radiological monitoring.
In addition, we wish to reemphasize our belief that a generic approach to the analysis of monitoring capacity requirements is more consistent with the established 2
4 Please concepts and principles upon which'offsite REP planning is based.
notify us if the Commission does not support that position or the 20%
figure.
.A SinpEy',
- /
/ /
eterson Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support W
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr., one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on April 24, 1989, I 1
made service of the within document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Thomas S. Moore Mr. Richard R. Donovan Atomic Safety and Licensing Federal Emergency Management Appeal Panel Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Federal Regional Center Commission 130 228th Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Bothell, Washington 98021-9796 Administrative Judge Ivan W.
H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Smith, Chairman Office of General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Federal Emergency Management U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Agency Commission 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20472 Administrative Judge Richard F.
John P. Arnold, Esquire Cole Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board George Dana Bisbee, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorney General Commission Office of the Attorney General Washington, DC 20555 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 Administrative Judge Kenneth A.
Judith H. Mizner, Esquire McCollom 79 State Street, 2nd Floor 1107 West Knapp Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Stillwater, OK 74075 Diane Curran, Esquire Robert R.
Pierce, Esquire Andrea C.
Ferster, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Harmon, Curran & Tousley U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Suite 430 Commission 2001 S Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20009
e.
'o t';si ;['
y l
Adjudicatory File Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Atomic-Safety and Licensing Offig.p g.tpepFg gutive Legal Board Panel Docket (2 copies)
DNeddr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ccamission Washington, DC 20555 Washingtont, DCv"20555 di Atomic. Safety and Licensing Robert A.
Backus, Esquire Appeal Board Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street l
Commission P.O.
Box 516 l
Washington, DC. 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 Philip Ahrens, Esquire Mr. J.
P. Nadeau Assistant Attorney General Selectmen's Office Department of the Attorney 10 Central Road General Rye, NH 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 Paul McEachern, Esquire John Traficonte, Esquire Shaines & McEachern Assistant Attorney General 25 Maplewood Avenue Department of the Attorney P.O.
Box 360 General Portsmouth, NH 03801 One Ashburton Place, 19th Fir.
Boston, MA 02108 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A.
Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1 - Box 1154 City Hall Kensington, NH 03827 126 Daniel Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire U.S.
Senate Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton &
Washington, DC 20510 Rotondi (Attn:
Tom Burack) 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Leonard Kopelman, Esquire One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Kopelman & Paige, P.C.
Concord, NH 03301 77 Franklin Street (Attn:
Herb Boynton)
Boston, MA 02110 Mr. Thomas F. Powers, III Mr. William S.
Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street 10 Front Street Amesbury, MA 01913 1
Exeter, NH 03833 l
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l,
1
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e.
Ashod N. Amirian, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Esquire 145 South Main Street Murphy and Graham P.O.
Box 38 33 Low Street Bradford, MA 01835 Newburyport, MA 01950 Gary W. Holmes, Esquire Richard A. Hampe, Esquire-Holmes & Ells Hampe and McNicholas 47 Winnacunnet Road 35 Pleasant Street Hampton, NH 03842 Concord, NH 03301
_A Thom(s 6. ' Dign, Jr.
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