ML20238F262
| ML20238F262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1987 |
| From: | Cole S, Jerrica Johnson, Zeigler D MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238F181 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8709160047 | |
| Download: ML20238F262 (194) | |
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, , UNITED. STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges:
uf
' Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson
!lfl:i Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
, ;g Dr.' Jerry Harbour y
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)
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos. HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units ~1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP):
) September 14, 1987
)
TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. ZEIGLER, JAMES H. JOHNSON JR., ! AND STEPHEN COLE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ' FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON SAPL CONTENTION 7, SAPL CONTENTION 8A, SAPL CONTENTION 15, SAPL CONTENTION 25, SAPL CONTENTION;31, TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION III AND TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION IV
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i Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 t 8709160047 970911 PDR ADOCK 05000443 l' T PDR
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l Before Administrate'ive Judges: ; y Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson l Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. j Dr. Jerry Harbour ! h. 2
)
')
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos, j HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443-444-OL ! (Seabrook Station, Units 'I and 2) ) (Off-site EP)
) September 14, 1987
) > >
TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. ZEIGLER, JAMES H. JOHNSON JR., AND STEPHEN COLE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL , FOR'THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON 3APL 1 CONTENTION 7, SAPL CONTENTION BA, SAPL CONTENTION 15, SAPL' CONTENTION 25, SAPL CONTENTION 31, TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION III AND TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION IV r Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA. 02108-1698 , (617) 727-2265 l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ; Before Administrative Judges: Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Gustave A. Lincaberger, Jr. Dr. Jerry Harbour
. ~
i
)
i In'the Matter of )-
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
-HAMPSHIRE, ET AT,. ) 50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP)
) September 14,1987 .
)
l TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. ZEIGLER, JAMSS H. JOHNSON JR., AND STEPHEN COLE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL l FOR'THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON SAPL l CONTENTION 7, SAPL CONTENTION 8A, SAPL' CONTENTION
'15, SAPL CONTENTION 25, SAPL CONTENTION 31, TOWN OF ;
HAMPTON CONTENTION III AND TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION IV ! I. IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q. Please state your names and affiliations. A. (Zeigler) My name is Donald J. Zeigler and I am a tenured associate professor of geography at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, where I have taught for the ; past eight years. My area of specialization is social and behavioral geography with particalar reference to technological ,- hazards. i (Johnson) My name is James H. Johnson, Jr., and I am a tenured associate professor of geography and Program Director L for Population and Environmental Policy Studies at UCLA, where
)
1 I.have also taught for the past eight years. My area of specialization is social and behavioral geography with particular reference to technological hazards. (Cole) My name is Stephen Cole. I am a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. I I am also President of Social Data Analysts, Inc., a consulting ! firm engaged in conducting applied sociological surveys and polls. Q. Briefly summarize your experience and professional qualifications. A. (Zeigler) My professional qualifications are detailed in the curriculum vitae which is attached as Attachment 1. Briefly, I received my ph.D. in geography from Michigan State University, and my M.A. in geography from the University of i Rhode Island. I have pubitsbed several articles and reports on l 1 evacuation from nuclear power plant accidents, on the social impact of rising energy costs, and in the general field of technological hazards. I have also taught seminars on natural and technological hazards. I am a member of the Association of American Geographers and the Society for Risk Analysis. ; (Johnson) My professional qualifications are detailed in the curriculum vitae which is attached as Attachment 2. Briefly, I hold degrees.in geography from North Carolina Central University (B.S., 1975), University of Wisconsin at > Madison (M.S., 1977), and Michigan State University (Ph.D., 1980). My current research concerns human responses to hazards of technological origin, especially nuclear power plant l 4
l accidents, and I have authored or co-authored several papers on
]
.i actual and intended evacuation behavior in radiological j emergency. ,
(Cole) I graduated from Columbia College with majors
'in both sociology and history in 1962. I received a Ph.D. in i sociology from Columbia University in 1967.
Since 1962 I have been professionally involved in conducting social surveys. For the last 15 years, first under the name of Opinion Research Associates and starting in 1977 as Social Data Analysts, Inc., I have conducted more than 150 social surveys for various clients, including Newsday, The Boston Globe, The Baltimore Sun, Columbia University, the University of California at Irvine, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookhaven National Laboratories, and the Long Island Lighting Company, among others. Since 1979 I have conducted more than 10 surveys on public attitudes towards j nuclear power. I am the author of more that 30 articles appearing in such journals as Scientific American, Science, Public Opinion Quarterly, American Sociological Review, and American Journal of Sociology. In addition, I am the author of seven books, including a textbook on research methods, The Sociological Method, third edition (1ew York: Harper and Row, , 1980). My work in sociology has been recognized by the receipt I f l of a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship, appointment as Fellow to ] the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science, and 1 receipt of a Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship. For I a more complete description of qualifications and publications,
)
see my vita, which is attached as Attachment 3. l j 1 ! 4
i l 1 II. OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY ; I Q. What is the purpose of your testimony? A. (All) Our testimony concerns two major issues involved in'the assessment of the adequacy of the State of New Hampshire ) Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 2 ("NHRERP, Rev i 2" or the " Plan"): 1) the shadow evacuation phenomenon; and ]
- 2) role conflict and role a'andonment o among emergency 1
personnel. ]! Q. To what contentions and bases does your testimony relate? A. (All) Our testimony concerns the following contentions and bases: SAPL 7, 8A, 15, 25, 31/ Bases 5,6,7,12,13 and 19; l-TOH III/ Bases C,D and F; TOH IV/ Bases A,B,D and E. Q. Before discussing your findings and opinions in detail would you please briefly summarize your conclusions concerning the two issue areas you have mentioned. A. (All) Yes. Our testimony will be presented in two major sections each dealing with one of the major issue areas. In section A, we will discuss the shadow evacuation phenomenon. The assumptions made in the Plan with regard to the scope and extent of a shadow evacuation in the Seabrook EPZ L will be critically assessed. The assumption that only 25% of 1 l the population outside any area ordered to be evacuated but within the Seabrook EPZ will spontaneously evacuate without official instruction to do so has no basis whatsoever in fact 4 i 1
-- ._ _ -_ _ _______________________a
I or theory _and seriously underestimates the number of people who j l will be part of any evacuation shadow. Not only is the 25% shadow evacuation assumption unsupported by the actual record ) of public responses to actual radiological emergencies, but it understates by more ths.n half the number of.Seabrook EPZ residents who have indicated their intention to evacuate the i EPZ without official instruction to do so. In Section B, we will address the issue of role conflict and role abandonment. The Plan relies upon a whole host of individuals to perform emergency roles and to meet their emergency responsibilities. The integrity of the Plan is dependent upon adequate and timely response by these individuals, some of whom are professionals and some volunteers. The Plan assumes that any role conflict experienced by these individuals will not be severe or widespread enough to cause role abandonment. In light of our knowledge of human behavior during radiological and non-radiological emergencies, this assumption is totally false ; and inappropriate. In fact, significant numbers of individuals inside and outside the EPZ, professionals and volunteers, will either totally abandon their emergency role to protect themselves or their families or will so delay the performance of their planned emergency duties as to seriously affect the adequacy of the Plan as it is now drafted. III. TESTIMONY A. The Shadow Evacuation Phenomenon O. Would you please define " shadow evacuation"? J
A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) Yes. The term describes the i propensity for people to evacuate from an area threatened by or
. perceived to be threatened by a hazard, although they are.not ordered or advised to do so. In cases where the disaster agent is radiation, the magnitude of the evacuation shadow phenomenon ;
is likely to be much greater than for other disasters and thus is like.ly to pose a serious problem for emergency planning and preparedness. ; Q. What effects on emergency planning can a shadow evacuation have? A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) A significant shadow evacuation will affect the adequacy and availability of both planned protective measures designed to achieve radiological dose reductions--sheltering and evacuation. If the propensity of households both from within and outside the EPZ to evacuate 4 voluntarily or spontaneously is not taken into account in the i planning process, then the traffic conditions that are likely , I to exist during a radiological emergency can not be adequately ; assessed and the evacuation time estimates ("ETEs",) which the regulations require licensees to devise for the 10-mile plume f exposure pathway zone, will be grossly inadequate, j Q. Explain how the field of social geography is relevant to the study of the evacuation shadow phenomenon and its effect on emergency planning and preparedness. A. (Zeigler, Johnson) Geography has often been defined I as a study of the relationships between human beings and their j
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environments. Social geographers specialize in human spatial ' behavior--that is, the way individuals and groups behave in geographic space. Social geographers examine flows of people over space, the processes which set those flows in motion, and the distributional patterns which result. Since behavior is linked to perception, social geographers also examine the ways people perceive their environment and react to it. The scientific study of hazard perception is a particular subspecialty of social geography. We have both studied actual and intended human behavioral responses to I' radiological emergencies. We were both members of a Michigan State University team which conducted a survey of the TMI area i residents one month after the TMI accident in 1979. More i recently, we participated in the construction, design and analysis of social surveys which were conducted on Long Island and in the Seabrook EPZ to study intended behavior in the event of a radiological emergency, b Q. Please explain in more detail the meaning of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) In crisis situations, the public is confronted with the problem of how to protect itself from the disaster agent. Emergency response officials may order or recommend that the population they perceive to be at risk should take certain protective actions. In a radiological emergency, for instance, some or all of the residents within a 10 mile radius of a malfunctioning reactor may be advised to i l l l l
evacuate. -Oftentimes in crisis situations, however, people other than those. targeted by emergency response officials will perceive themselves to be in danger and thus voluntarily take protective action (s). The evacuation shadow phenomenon is the tendency in an emergency for people who believe themselves to be at risk to evacuate even though not ordered to do so. In a radiological emergency, the evacuation shadow phenomenon takes on far greater significance than in other la types of crises. Our studies indicate that in emergencies [ involving radiation, a large proportion of the population outside the officially designated zone of danger (as well as persons within the designated zone of danger who_are not advised to evacuate) will voluntarily move away from the perceived source of danger. The " evacuation shadow" will only begin'to diminish significantly at about 25 miles from the plant. The details of our views on the evacuation shadow phenomenon are set forth below, beginning with a discussion of i the important data from TMI which documents the need for emergency planners to consider this issue carefully when devising a preparedness scheme. Q. On what do you base your opinion that there will be a large evacuation shadow phenomenon in and around the Seabrook EPZ? l A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) Our opinion is based on the j actual response of residents of south central Pennsylvania to 1 1 l t-the TMI accident in March, 1979, and on the results of surveys-conducted on Long Island and in the Seabrook EPZ to elicit an expression from the relevant populations as to how they would likely respond to a radiological emergency. In collaboration with our colleague, Dr. Stanley D. Brunn of the University of Kentucky, we (Zeigler, Johnson) conducted one of the first social surveys investigating the actual behavior of the south central Pennsylvania area residents during the TMI accident of March, 1979.1/ Our TMI survey focused on 1) attitudes toward nuclear power before and after the accident, 2) behavioral responses to the accident, and 3) perceived social and environmental impacts of the accident. The most significant finding of our TMI study was the high degree of overreaction E! to the accident. Specifically, during the emergency the state of Pennsylvania advised evacuation of all pregnant women and pre-school age children within a five-mile radius of the plant. If only those 1/ In September 1979, we published, in collaboration with Dr. Brunn, the results of our survey of Three Mile Island area i l residents in a monograph entitled Final Report On A Social l Survey of Three Mile Island Residents. In January 1981, we published an excerpt from that monograph entitled " Evacuation l From A Nuclear Technological Disaster", in the Geographical Review. A copy of the latter article appears with this i testimony as Attachment 4. 2/ In this testimony, the term " overreaction" is used to decribe conduct which goes beyond that suggested by emergency officials. This should not be construed to imply that the person's conduct was wrong or irrational. 1
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people who'were. advised to evacuate had done so, about 2,500 1 people would.have evacuated. Instead, approximately 144,000 people.or approximately 39 percent of the population within 15 , miles of the plant, and 9 percent of the population in three ! communities approximately 15 miles from the site actually evacuated. (See, Figure 1). This fact led us to coin the term
" evacuation shadow phenomenon" to describe the tendency of people to evacuate from a widespread area, although they have not been advised or ordered to do so.
TMI was not the first time that the evacuation shadow phenomenon had been identified. Previous studies of human response to non-ra'diological disasters have noted a tendency for some people to overreact in crisis situations. However, the proportion of the population who tend to overreact during natural disasters and non-radiological technological disasters has generally been relatively small. The significar,t finding of our TMI study was that a substantially larger proportion of ; the population tended to overreact to the nuclear accident at TMI than had been observed in other kinds of emergencies. In addition to the high rate of voluntary evacuation, we noted in our TMI survey that the TMI evacuees tended to travel distances much greater than had been observed in previous studies of evacuation behavior. (See, Figure 2). At TMI the median distance traveled by evacueas was 85 miles. The implication of these findings is that any prudent radiological emergency response plan that seeks realistically to minimize dose consequences must take such behavior into account, especially in estimating evacuation times.
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Q.. Were the results of your studies of the TMI accident corroborated by any other studies of the accident? A. (Zeigler, Johnson) Yes, they were corroborated by at least two other. studies: one conducted'by Mountain West Research, and one conducted by a tea n of geographers' at Rutgers University.2/ Essentially, their results were very similar to our findings, particularly with respect to the estimates of the number of people who evacuated and the factors contributing to their decision to evacuate. Both of these other studies also observed the tendency of people from beyond the designated zone of danger to overreact, although neither study referred to this type of behavior as the evacuation shadow phenomenon. More recently, there has been further confirmation of the existence of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Lindell and Perry recently wrote about the evacuation shadow phenomenon at TMI in Transactions, published by the American Nuclear Society. Noting the large number of voluntary evacuees during the TMI incident, they stated: even if one assumes that all families with any pregnant women or preschool children evacuated as a unit, and that therefore as many as 10,000 persons evacuated 3/ K. Barnes, J. Brosius, S. Cutter, and J.K. Mitchell. Responses of Impacted Population to the Three Mile Island and Nuclear Reactor Accident. Discussion Paper No. 13. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, October 1979. C.B. Flynn, Three Mile Island Telephone Surver. Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG/CR-01093). Tempe, A'Z: Mountain West Research, October, 1979. 4 11 -
" appropriately," this is still an overresponse of more than an order of magnitude.1/
Elsewhere, Perry and Lindell, whose previous research has been in the area of natural disaster studies, conclude that the evacuation shadow phenomenon should be taken into account in planning for a radiological emergency.E! The TMI experience is undeniably important to emergency planning. It demonstrates that if a radiological emergency occurs, planners must anticipate dealing with a much larger number of people evacuating than might otherwise be expected. This TMI experience is particularly important for emergency planning for Seabrook because the Seabrook evacuation curvey documents that a shadow evacuation can be. expected to be a major factor in the event of an accident. O. Please-describe the purpose of the survey conducted in the Seabrook EPZ. A. (Cole, Zeigler, Johnson) In connection with this litigation, the Massachusetts Attorney General's office retained as consultants a group of social and behavioral scientists with expertise in technological hazards planning to analyze the adequacy of NHRERP, Rev. 2. In order to aid the Massachusetts Attorney General's office and its consultants in assessing the adequacy of the Plan, Social Data Analysts, Inc., l l 4/ M.K. Lindell, and R.W. Perry. " Protective Action Recommendations: How Would the Public Respond?" 41 Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 423-424 (1982). 5/ M.K. Lindell and R.W. Perry. " Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Warning: How Would the Public Respond?," 26 Nuclear News 49-53 (February 1983). 12 -
=:onducted.a' survey of' households within the Seabrook EPZ. A
. primary aim of-this survey was to provide the Attorney
- General'sl office and its consultants with some of the data necessary to assess the adequacy of the current 1 Plan' submitted for'the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ. In particular'we 9 wanted.to collect data which would allow us to' assess the accuracy of'certain key assumptions about. behavior utilized by-those who' generated the evacuation time estimates set forth in the.NHRERP, Rev. 2,. Volume 6. .
Q. 1Was the survey conducted in accordance with generally accepted social survey techniques? A. (All) Yes,-it was. Q. Describe how the survey was conducted? A. (Cole, Zeigler, Johnson) The survey was conducted by telephone amongLa stratified random sample of 1404 households within the EPZ surrounding the Seabrook Station. Q. Are telephone surveys accurate and accepted ways to collect. data on a population? A. (Cole, Zeigler, Johnson) Yes. There are three i frequently used techniques to conduct surveys. The first is by mail. Mail surveys of the general population are usually inadequate as the response rate (the number of people returning questionnaires divided by the total sent out) is frequently too low to make any. valid generalizations from the returned surveys. The second is by in-person interview. The costs and length of time it takes to utilize this method made it impractical for this study. The third and most frequently used method of conducting surveys is by telephone. Much research 13 - l I
;has shown that telc4none surveys are. generally as accurate as in-person surveys for collecting the type of data we sought in this study.5/ Data obtained from the local telephone companies indicate that more than 95% of the residents of thw L
L EPZ have telephones in their homes. We cannot generalize to-the.few families who do not-have residential telephones, but-the telephone survey is an accurate way to collect data and generalize about those families who do have residential telephones. Q. How did you' select the households to be included in the telephone survey. A. (Cole) The actual work of selecting the sample wac done.by Survey Sampling Inc. of Fairfield, Connecticut, under instructions from Social Data Analysts. We wanted to interview 1400 residents of the EPZ, distributed by town in the same proportion as is the population of the EPZ. (For a list of.the towns-in both the New Hampshire and the Massachusetts sections of the EPZ, see the Report, Attachment 5, Table A-1 pp. 54-55.) Since telephone numbers do not correspond exactly with the geographical boundaries of the towns, we.had to use zip codes to generate the list of telephone numbers to be called. Survey Sampling calculated the number of residential phones in each of the exchanges included in the sample. Telephone numbers were selected in such a way so that the proportion of the entire sample from a particular exchange would be the same as the proportion of the entire population from that exchange. 6/ Groves, R.M. And Kahn, R.L., Surveys by Telephone: A National Comparison (New York 1979).
, 1 i
The sample utilized is a random digit sample in which the last I i two digits in the telephone number are selected at random by a computer from among all those working blocks in a particular exchange. Since the exchanges do not exactly overlap with the boundaries of the towns, it was impossible to know whether a respondent actually lived in the EPZ until we began the interview. At the beginning of the questionnaire, the 1 respondent was asked what city or town he or uhe lived in. If the respondent did not mention one of the 17 towns in the New Hampshire section or one of the 6 towns in the Massachusetts section of the EPZ, that respondent was not included in the survey. As interviews were completed with respondents in each of the towns, we kept track of the number of completed interviews until we reached the designated quota for that particular town. Q. Did the procedure utilized to select the phone numbers allow you to include unlisted numbers in the sample? A. (Cole) Yes. Since the last two digits of the phone number were selected at random by the computer, the sampling ! frame included all telephone numbers in the exchange, both listed and unlisted residential numbers and business numbers in ] i the exchange. I l Q. How did you determine which person in the household to j i interview? A. (Cole) The sample was designed to be a random sample l of households with residential phones living in the EPZ. The I
sample'was not designed to be a random sample of individuals. Within the household we utilized either the male or female adult head of household as an informant on what the household would do in case of an accident at the Seabrook power station. A sex quota was utilized to make sure that the final sample
.would represent the population in terms of sex. It was important to make sure that women were not overrepresented because in past surveys on nuclear power women have usually had different attitudes than men. The survey ended up with 54%
female respondents and 46% male respondents which closely corresponds to the sex distribution of the population. (For the exact procedure the interviewer used in selecting the ; respondent to be interviewed, see the screening questionnaire, and instructions to interviewer, Attachment 5, pp. 58 and 46.) Q. Can the results of such a random sample survey be used to generalize to all the households in the EPZ? A. (Cole) With the exception of the few households who do not have residential telephones, this sample is an accurate way to generalize to all the households living in the EPZ. For this survey the sampling error is plus or minus three percentage points. This means that in theory if this survey were to be repeated 100 times using the same techniques, in 95 out of the 100 times the results obtained for a particular question would be within 3 percentage points of the results which would have been obtained by interviewing members of every household with telephones living in the EPZ. 16 - l 1
t-Q. You'say you interviewed 1404 people. Is this a large sample? A. (Cole) This is a relatively large sample. Generally, nationwide political _ surveys s'uch as those conducted by Time magazine are about the size of this survey. Of the more than 150 surveys I have conducted, only about 10 have had samples
-larger than that used for this survey.
Q. Does the size of the sample have an impact upon the accuracy of survey findings? A. (Cole) Yes. What's called " sampling error" for j l surveys is highly dependent upon the size of the sample. In a survey that is based upon a random sample, you interview a randomly selected group of people. You then look at what those people say in order to make generalizations from the sample to the population. In this case, the population would be households living in the EPZ. The sample was the 1404 heads of households whom we interviewed. The larger the sample size, } the smaller the possibility that the actual percentage of j people having a certain attitude in the population will vary l j significantly from what is indicated in the survey sample. 0 What did the interviewers do if they dialed a phone [ I l number in the sample and found that no one answered or no head I of household was at home? A. (Cole) The interviewers followed a set of " call-back" procedures. For every phone number included in the sample, we i made at least three call-backs or a total of four attempts. 1
The call back procedure required interviewers to make telephone calls to' initial "no answers" at different times of day. Thus, for example, if we first called a number at 5 P.M. and received a no answer or no head of household at home, we tried that number later on in the same evening. If we still received a no answer, we would make the call back on a later day. For numbers we could not reach in the evening we would attempt to reach those numbers on Saturday during the day.
.Q . What was the response rate on this survey?
A. (Cole) Normally, in surveys such as this one, response rates are computed by dividing the number of completed interviews by the number of eligible people contacted (the completes plus the refusals). When we did this, we found a completion rate of 64%, This means that we were unable to complete interviews with 36% of the households we contacted. Q. Does the response rate influence the a n ,ucy of the survey results? A. (Cole) Yes. There is no way to be certain that the people who refused to participate in the survey would have answered the questions in the same way as those who did participate. But, given past surveys we have conducted utilizing the same methods, we can be confident that the results we obtained are roughly representative of what the EPZ population would do in an accident at the Seabrook Station. , The lower the response rate the less confidence we could have in the survey results. Also important in assessing the , 18 - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ ~
adequacy of the survey results are the number of no answers, busy signals, or.no_ eligible respondent.at home. There can be: no way.of knowing'whether these people'would have answered differently.than those_ interviewed. As I pointed out above, the procedures utilized in this survey were aimed at minimizing the: number of these responses. When the number of no answers, etc. is higher, we 7an have less confidence in the adequacy of the results-for the purpose.of generalizing to the population.- Q. How did_you know that the interviews had actually been conducted with the. correct respondent and the information-accurately recorded by the interviewer? A. -(Cole) We utilized two methods to validate the ' surveys. First, during the interviewing we listened in on some of the actual telephone calls in order to make sure that the interviewer was following the instructions properly and accurately recording the information given by the respondent. Second, we conducted independent verification of the interviews by calling _back the respondents to make sure they had actually been interviewed,-that they were indeed eligible, and that the information had been accurately recorded. In addition to the 3 i verification conducted.by MKTG Inc., the fieldwork house who { did th , actual interviewing, Social Data Analysts, conducted 4 _its owr? independent. verification on approximatley 200 I s
. interviews selected at random. All of this verification showed i
*that the interviewers had conducted the survey with the proper 1J
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - _ _ - - . - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _. a
respondent, followed the instructions they had been given, and had reported the correct information. An occasional error by an interviewer was detected and corrected. In all surveys it is inevitable that some interviewing errors are made, but the verification procedures utilized here lead to the conclusion that there were very few errors on this survey. Q. How was the questionnaire utilized in this survey constructed? A. (Cole) Since this survey was designed to collect information needed by other consultants to the Massachusetts Attorney General, the questionnaire was designed after several meetings of the consultants and a representative of Social Data Analysts. The first meeting took place in New Hampshire on March 25th, 1987. At this meeting each consultant outlined the nature of the data that he or she would require in order to con 6uct their analyses. A draft of the questionnaire was then constructed by Social Data Analysts and distributed to all the i consultants. A second meeting was held in Boston on April 1st, 1987, to review the initial draft. Following this meeting we prepared a second draft and mailed it to all the consultants. We conducted a small pre-test on April 3rd to discover any ) I problems which might come up in the administration of the ] 1 questionnaire and difficulty in the questionnaire's wording. A two hour long teleconference was held on the evening of April i 7th. Based upon the suggestions of the other consultants and j the results of the pre-test, Social Data Analysts drew up a l l J
I third draft of the questionnaire. Given the complexity of the I l survey instrument, it was decided that we should conduct a pre-test with 100 random cases. This pre-test was conducted by MKTG cn April 8th. This pre-test was utilized to time the questionnaire and to assess clarity of wording and interviewer ease in following skip and coding. questions. Based upon the results of this pre-test and an extensive telephone contact with the Massachusetts Attorney General's office, the final somewhat shorter version of the questionnaire was prepared. Q. What did you do with the survey data after the interviews were completed? A. (Cole) After the interviews were completed, the data were entered directly onto the computer and then verified for entry errors. Since the sample was designed so that it would be representative of the population distribution among all towns in the EPZ, it was not necessary to use any weights in conducting the analysis. Since the original plan called for some of the data collected in the survey to be coded by Resource Systems Group (another consultant to the Attorney General's office), the completed questionnaires were delivered to them in their office in Norwich, Vermont. Q. What were the results of the survey relative to the evacuation shadow phenomenon? A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) One of the primary aims of the survey was to find out what residents of the EPZ would do
'I l
in case of an accident at the Seabrook station. Therefore the survey contained several scenarios which we read to the respondents and then we asked them what they would do under such circumstances. The scenarios were based as closely as possible on the actual Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages contained in the Plan. The first scenario asks the respondents to assume that they and their families were at home on a hot sunny Sunday afternoon in July at 2 p.m. The aim of this scenario is to find out what people might do in case an accident occurred at Seabrook while the beaches located near the plant were heavily in use. The EBS message announces that the beaches have been closed and advises all people on the beaches.and in the state park areas of Seabrook, Hampton and Salisbury to leave the area immediately, but it does not advise any residents of the EPZ to take any protective action. For the exact wording of the question in the New Hampshire version of the questionnaire, see at pp. 60-1. If we examine the responses given to this scenario, we find that 52% of all families living in the EPZ (50% of the New Hampshire residents of the EPZ and 56% of the Massachusetts residents of the EPZ) would begin the attempt l to evacuate as soon as they heard the EBS message advising the beach population to leave the area. These data suggest that , the estimate of a maximum 25% evacuation shadow made by consultants to the Applicant in computing evacuation time 1 estimates is incorrect and grossly underestimates the number of
)
) permanent residents of the EPZ who will attempt to evacuate as soon as they hear the MBS message advising the beach population to leave the area. The second scenario included in the questionnaire attempted to find out what EPZ residents would do if the first scenario were to evolve into a situation in which a General Emergency was declared, residents of Hampton Falls and Seabrook were advised to evacuate, and all other EPZ residents were advised to shelter in place. (For the exact wording of this , question, see Question 31 in Attachment 5, p. 62). The only respondents who were asked this question were those who did not say they would eva'cuate after hearing the first scenario. in order to assess the behavioral intentions of all families in the EPZ, we combined the results of Questior.s 20 and 31. (The results are presented in Attachment 5, Table 2, p. 32). We found that by 4 p.m. in the afternoon, after both EBS messages had been broadcast, 66% of the families in the EPZ would have i already begun preparing for or would be actually engaging in a i voluntary evacuation. Only 34% of the families in the EPZ ! would have followed the recommendations of both EBS messages. l If we consider only New Hampshire EPZ residents we find that 64% would have been involved in a voluntary evacuation and 36% would have listened to the protective action recommendations contained in the EBS messages. The survey contained other questions asking what respondents would do in the event of radiological emergency i l j 23 - l L_________.._..
n- - - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ - - 1 I 1
.(Q. 274 and Q. 312); but the responses to these questions are j not relevant to the issue of voluntary evacuation because in i
these scenarios all residents of the EPZ were advised to J evacuate, thus eliminating the possibility of spontaneous evacuation for EPZ residents. Q. Did the survey questions measuring behavioral intentions during an emergency at Seabrook utilize the exact wording of the EBS messages contained in the Plan? (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) No, we did not use the l A.. 1 exact EBS messages for several reasons. First, it is difficult for respondents to follow exceptionally long questions on the telephone. In constructing the questions, it was therefore necessary to delete part of the EBS message. However, we deleted only parts we regarded as either repetitious or non-essential. Telephone surveys are most successful when the total length of the interview does not exceed twenty minutes. In order to keep the length of the survey less than twenty minutes, it was impossible to read or in some cases re-read complete EBS messages. Also, some EBS messages contained sections which were irrelevant to our scenarios Thus, information about school closings was not relevant for a scenario taking place on a summer Sunday in l July. Such irrelevant information was deleted in order to avoid respondent confusion. Q. Does your survey indicate any other incorrect assumptions in the Plan?
l A. (Cole) Yes. As set forth in SAPL Contention 31/ Basis i 13, the Plan assumes that 2.5% of the residents of the New 4 Hampshire portion of the EPZ will require public transportation l l during a radiological emergency. Question 341 of the survey j l asked respondents:
"How many individuals in your household I would need public transportation'in order to i evacuate?"
Thirteen percent of the households in the New Hampshire section of the EPZ would require public transportation to evacuate one or more individuals. Seven percent of households would require public transportation for the evacuation of one individual, 4% for the evacuation of two individuals, 1% for the evacuation of three individuals, and 1% for the evacuation of four individuals. There are a total of approximately 91,600 people 31ving in the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ. If we H l estimate the average family size as 3 we obtain an estimate of 30,533 households. Using this figure we can calculate the I number of individuals requiring public transportation to , 1 \ evacuate during a radiological emergency: 7% X 30,533 = 2137 X 1 = 2137 4% X 30,533 = 1221 X 2 e 2442 1% X 30,533 = 305 X 3= 915 1% X 30,533 = 305 X 4 = 1220 TOTAL: 3968 6714 Thus, there are about 4,000 separate households requiring public transportation in the event of an emergency and a total of approximately 6,700 individuals or 7.3% of the population
requiring"public~ transport'ation. This is about three times the
' estimate made'by KLD. <
Q.' Have'you.seen an affidavit cigned by Dr. Dennis.Mileti in which he claims that the maximum size.of an evacuation-shadow at Seabrook would be 25%?
~
.A. (Zeigler,' Johnson, Cole) 'Yes.
Q. Do you agree with Dr. Mileti? A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) No. Dr. Mileti has no empirical basis on which:to make this estimate. Dr. Mileti makes the assumption that TMI represents the worst evacuation shadow which could occur. There is'no basis for this assumption. F i r s t', the assumption ignores one of the-key variables determining the size of an evacuation shadow--the seriousness of the accident. If an accident were to occur which the public believed to be more serious than that which occurred at TMI, the evacuation shadow could be much larger than the one at TMI. Second, Dr. Mileti ignores the fact that the size of an evacuation shadow at TMI among those living close to the plant was much larger than the size of the shadow of those living at a distance. Third, Dr. Mileti assumes
.without any evidence that the distribution of "better" information can overcome the pre-existing fear of radiation.
In proceedings regarding the Shoreham nuclear plant on Long Island, Dr. Mileti argued that the EBS messages utilized in a February 1986 exercise of the Shoreham evacuation plan represented clear and " good" information. Yet research Dr.
=___-_____-_-_-_-____a---_ _ :_ ___
/ j; Cole conducted on Long Island revealed that citizens living near the Shoreham plant found those EBS messages, which Dr.
Mileti helped draft, to be confusing and frightening. Most of these citizens said that they would not listen to the advice contained in the EBS messages. Without empirical evidence to back up his claim that it is possible for " good" information to prevent a large evacuation shadow in radiological emergencies, Dr. Mileti's claim is wishful thinking. Fourth, Dr. Mileti has ignored the impact of the disaster at Chernobyl on the attitudes of Americans towards nuclear power plant accidents. ; Research which Dr. Cole has conducted on Long Island has shown that Chernobyl has resulted in a substantial increase in the public's fear of being exposed to radiation during an accident at a nuclear plant. The survey conducted among residents of the Seabrook EPZ asked the respondents whether they thought that an accident as serious as Chernobyl could occur. Seventy-two percent of the people we interviewed (70% of those in New Hampshire and 76% of those in Massachusetts) said that ; I such an accident could occur. (See Question 347 and results in j i Attachment 5, Table 1, p. 29). In summary, our survey contains data on how residents of the EPZ are likely to behave in the event of an accident at i Seabrook requiring the evacuation of the beach population. We i found that more than 50% of the population would engage in a i voluntary or shadow evacuation. Dr. Mileti's figure of 25% is i speculation not supported by any hard empirical evidence and i
i L ' would seem to. greatly underestimate the size of'a voluntary evacuation were a' radiological accident to occur at.the Seabrook Station. Q. In other proceedings concerning emergency planning for nuclear' power plants, witnesses for the owners have argued that surveys are not a reliable means to predict what people would
' do during a real: radiological emergency. Why should the Board accept as valid the survey results you have described?-
1 A. (Zeigler, Johnson,-Cole) While'it is certainly true that surveys are not perfect tools for predicting exactly how individual people will respond to a future event, they do provide very useful evidence, particularly with respect to the issue raised here. The point here is not that a particular number of individuals would voluntarily evacuate but rather that the planning assumption of a maximum of 25% voluntary evacuation in computing evacuation time estimates for the population is false. No one suggests that the survey is a precise instrument which accurately predicts exactly how many, or which, people would actually attempt to evacuate were a real accident to occur at Seabrook. But, the survey is the best tool we have; it gives us a rough idea of'the size of the evacuation shadow in a scenario similar to that utilized in the questionnaire. In a real accident, depending upon the seriousness of the accident and other variables, the evacuation shadow might be somewhat larger or smaller than that found in the survey. But we are sure that in any accident similar to
1 l that depicted in.the questionnaire, there would be a large
)
' voluntary evacuation of the permanent residents of the EPZ.
{ Q. Have you reviewed the deposition testimony of Dr. ! Mileti in this proceeding in which he states that he does not "put much credence" in a behavioral intentions poll? i (Deposition of Dennis S. Mileti, June 11, 1987, at page 148) 1 A. (Cole, Zeigler, Johnson) Yes. Again, there is no i reasoned basis for ignoring the expression of behavioral intention on the part of a population when attempting to predict what that population will do in-the event of an emergency. In fact, the. Plan itself is based on a survey which purports to gather just this type of data. "This survey [by First Market Research of Boston ("FMR"] also obtained data on the public's projected responses to an emergency at Seabrook Station." NHRERP, Rev. 2, Vol.6 at 1-2, (emphasis added). l l l Q. Have you had the opportunity to review the survey ' f l conducted by FMR? l { A. (Cole) Yes. l Q.. Could you tell us whether the results obtained from ! that survey are reliable enough to be utilized for the purposes of emergency planning? l A. (Cole) Based upon the information available to me, I believe that the survey conducted by FMR for KLD Associates has t serious methodological flaws wh.ich make it unwise for emergency I i l planners to utilize the information obtained in this survey for planning purposes. There are several serious problems with the l
r survey. Th'e most serious is the failure of FMR to utilize a call-back procedure. In order to complete 1320 utilizable
. interviews'(the 1300 in.the final sample and 20 in a pre-test)
FMR made:10,567 telephone-calls. This means that FMR made
- about 8 telephone calls for each completion. In the survey
,conductedeamong the same Seabrook resident population by Social Data Analysts, we completed 1404 interviews utilizing a total of 6,611. phone numbers. Thus, Social Data Analysts utilized 4.7Lnumbers for.each completed interview. The failure of FMR to utilize a call back procedure could have seriously biased the obtained results. For example, people who had long commutes to return home from work would have been less likely to be at home when the FMR interviewers called. Since no call back procedure was utilized these people may have been systematically excluded from the sample. This would result in an inaccurate estimate of the time it takes EPZ residents to return home during normal work days. Not utilizing a call back procedure could also bias the survey by excluding people who
-workflate, who work at night, who are frequently out of the house in the evening, etc. In order for random sample surveys to be adequate tools for generalization to the population, it is necessary for the researcher to make every effort to complete interviews with each member of the sample. The procedure utilized by FMR makes their survey more of a quota sample than a random sample. In my opinion it is dangerous to generalice from this type of sample to a population. Another i
i flaw which might have created bias is the failure of FMR to use a systematic procedure for selecting the member of'the household to be interviewed. Not surprisingly, the FMR sample ended up overrepresenting women, with 58% being women and 42% being men. Because the FMR survey was not conducted in accordance with generally accepted survey techniques, I support the claim made in SAPL Contention 31/ Basis 6 that the data obtained from it and utilized in making evacuation time estimates is not reasonably reliable. I also support the claim in SAPL Contention 31/ Basis 7 that the " Time to Travel Home" data obtained from the FMR survey could be seriously biased. As I pointed out above, the failure to utilize a call back procedure probably resulted in the FMR survey overrepresenting people with shorter commute times and underrepresenting people with longer commute times. Q. Did the survey conducted by Social Data Analysts l l provide more reliable data on how long it takes commuters to travel home under normal circumstances? A. (Cole) No. We did not include a question on how long ( it took respondents to travel home from work under normal circumstances. Q. In the absence of other data, does the data obtained 3
)
from the FMR survey provide some idea of the time-to-travel-home distribution that can be utilized? 3 l A. (Cole) Given the failure to use a call back procedure, it would not be prudent to utilize these data. The study should be repeated utilizing the proper methodology. l l l , 1 i
s de . a , 4', ib T
?E '
;;. .Q. JT o-your' knowledge, are there other problems in the way in which the..FMR. survey data have been utilized?
. A '. (Cole) Yes.: lThe FMR survey was utilized by KLD
, Associates.to compute how many people would require public
-tr,ansportation duringLa radiological emergency at Seabrook. In !
$ddition, KLD' utilized data obtained from the survey to
. .c
. calculate how many people would evacuate in each vehicle.
Because the PMR survey was not conducted in accordance with generally accepted survey; techniques, I consider the data not.
! adequately reliable for making these types of calculations.
The' data obtained from the Social Data Analysts survey.in questions 29, 30, 40,'41, 309, 310, 338, and 339, however, are 1 valid for such calculations. These data have in fact been utilized by other consultants to the Massachusetts Attorney General and the results presented in their testimony. (See Testimony of Adler). Finally', KLD utilized data from the FMR survey to estimate how many evacuees would travel to their assigned host community. The data collected by Social Data Analysts on where evacuees would go'under different scenarios would in our opinion much more accurately. reflect what the EPZ population would do in a real Snergency. These data have been utilized by other consultants to the Massachusetts Attorney
. General and the results reported in their testimony. (See Testimony of Adler).
Q. Have the results obtained from the Social Data Analysts survey conducted in the Seabrook EPZ been corroborated
. by other studies?
- A. (Zeigler, Johnson,~ Cole) Yes. A series of surveys of q,
the'Long Island population surrounding the Shoreham neclear
~
. power-plant corroborate the findings in the Seabrook survey.
Q.- Will you summarize the Long Island findings? A. . (Zeigler,. Johnson, Cole) Yes. In 1982, before it had taken any position on licensing, Suffolk County, New. York, sponsored a social survey of Long Island. households to determine ~how the public~was likely to respond to a potential accident at the Shoreham nuclear-power plant. We participated. in that survey:and published'several articles based on its results. Sample households in Nassau and Suffolk counties were asked to respond t'o three increasingly' serious accident scenarios: Scenario I asked what they would do if everyone within 5 miles of the' plant were advised to stay indoors in 1 response to an accident; Scenario II asked what they would do if'the evacuation / sheltering advisory were identical to that issued at Three Mile. Island; Scenario III asked what they would do if a 10-mile evacuation were ordered. In Scenario I, no one was advised to evacuate, but 25% of all households said they would leave. In Scenario II (the TMI case), 34 percent said they would leave. In Scenario III, only 3.6 percent of Long Island's population should have indicated'their intentions to evacuate, but half the total population of the island said
'they would leave. While the proportion of households decreased with increasing distance from the plant, the evacuation shadow covered the entire island, and the actual number of intended 1
j i
)
evacuees' increased with each additional mile. Intended evacuation rates were highest within 10 miles of the plant. In none of.the three scenarios did they fall below 40 percent of the population in that zone. Q. You testified earlier that in your opinion a radiological emergency is likely to evoke a much greater evacuation shadow response than other types of disasters. Please explain why. A. (Zeigler, Johnson, Cole) The reason stems largely from the nature of the disaster agent and the way in which the public perceives it. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Liechtenstein (1979)1/ have found that radiation is the disaster agent most dreaded by the public except for terrorism and warfare. In a recent study, Lindell and Barnes have concluded that the fear people have of exposure to radiation during a radiological emergency is far greater than their risk as measured by the Reactor Accidents Consequence Analyses model.0/ Radiation is imperceptible to the human senses except in extremely large doses. One is therefore unable to determine when one is in its presence. Fear of radiation is enhanced by the uncertainty of i I the consequences of exposure. Exposure may eventually be fatal, but the consequences may be latent--not appearing for many years after exposure. 7/ P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff, and S. Liechtenstein, " Rating the Risks", 21 Environment, 14-39 (April 1979), 8/ Michael K. Lindell and Valerie E. Barnes, " Protective Response to Technological Emergency: " Risk Perception and Behavioral Intention", Nuclear Safety, 464 (Oct. - Dec. 1986). 34 -
p 4, a N' In most disasters,' direct sensory evidence of the L hazard is available to the public and the information media. The? residents of a flood plain can corroborate the reports of. authorities and thefnews media through personal observation of. !
. rising waters and the information network of family and friends. 'Thus, at each stage in the flow of informat' ion,.
reported events can be directly compared with events as-they C 'are. occurring,'which means that inconsistencies'can'be resolved as they occur. In contrast, in the event of a nuclear F ' disaster, the news' media and the public have access only to
. secondary sources of information, and even government officials must depend in large part on secondary data made available by the utility companies. Sensory data are not available for the identification and evaluation of a nuclear accident; almost all-
~
information is acquired through remote inspection with instruments.that monitor the internal behavior of the reactor vessel or with dosimeters that measure the level of invisible radiation. Another factor which further explains the public's heightened fear of nuclear power arises from its controversial history.- Studies have shown that a large proportion of the public relates the fear of nuclear power to the use of nuclear weapons. Looming large in the social memory of the public are the deaths and human suffering caused by the bombing of Japan during World War II.A/ 9/' E. Cook, "The Role of History in the Acceptance of Nuclear power", 63 Social Science Quarterly 3-15 (1982); R.J. Lifton l Death and Life: Survivors of Hiroshima, New York: Random House, 1968. 35 -
\ +
h Also part of this " affective history" is the experience of TMI and Chernoby1'as' actual instances of radiological emergencies. As noted, in'the aftermath of Chernobyl, research indicates that.the public's inherent-fear of nuclear power has measurably increased. 1 B. Role Conflict and Abandonment Q. .What is the purpose of this testimony? A. (Zeigler, Johnson) The purpose of this testimony is
- to address matters raised'in SAPL Contentions 1EI 7, 8A, 15, 25, 31/ Basis 12, and Town of Hampton Revised Contention IV/ Bases A, B, D and E. Each of these contentions raised concerns about the' ability of State of New Hampshire officials to mobilize adequate personnel to perform a range of emergency duties in the event of an accident at Seabrook. In this testimony, we will-contend that the Plan assumes-unrealistically that designated emergency personnel from both inside and outside of the Seabrook EPZ will report promptly to perform their assigned tasks. The Plan fails to take into account the likelihood that emergency workers, particularly those who live in the EPZ and who have tasks to perform inside the EPZ, will experience role conflict and, as a consequence, 10/ The Massachusetts Attorney General does not intend to participate in litigation concerning SAPL Contentions 7, 15 and
- 25. To the extent that this testimony is relevant to these contentions, it is being offered on behalf of the Seacoast
' Anti-Pollution League.
l 1 l -- _____ ____ i
many will. fail tofreport, Lor will fail to report promptly, to
.their emergency-work. stations.1 It is our belief that role conflict among emergency personnel will seriously' jeopardize
'the workability of the Plan should a major accident occur at
'Seabrook.
Q. What is meant by the term' role conflict? A. (Zeigler,: Johnson) The term " role confict" is often. used to describe situations in which individuals are confronted I with dilemmas of multiple group membership loyalties. ' Humans L often find themselves in situations where'two obligations about which they feel strongly appear to be in conflict and draw them in opposing direct' ions. This kind of dilemma'is most apparent where the sense of duty one feels as a member of a family and the sense of duty one feels as a member of an emergency team suggest'different courses of action. In sociology this. dilemma is generally referred to as " role conflict," which means that the individual involved must find some way to resolve the conflict if he or she is to act effectively. Q. How does the concept'of role conflict relate to radiological emergency preparedness? A. (Zeigler, Johnson) In any emergency plan, it is essential that most if not all of the people who have been designated to assist in emergency response--be they
' professional emergency workers or volunteers--resolve their role conflict by reporting promptly to the emergency station assigned to them. There are very sound reasons to presume, however, that many of the individuals who are being relied upon 37 -
1 i i l to assume emergency duties will not be available in the crucial l early stages of an emergency--if, indeed, they become available at all. This is because they will turn first to the welfare of their families and will be reluctant to report for emergency duty until they have been assured of the safety of their loved . ones or have seen to their safety themselves. Q. Does the Plan rely upon persons resolving their role
. conflict by reporting to perform emergency duties?
A. (Zeigler, Johnson) Yes. First, as the Town of
'Hampton Contention IV and SAPL Contentions 8A and 37 point out, the Plan relies on several bus companies to provide buses and to supply drivers, and on the Teamsters Union (Local No. 633) to provide back-up drivers, to evacuate the special needs population, schools and other institutions, and transients from the Town of Hampton in the event of a Seabrook emergency.
Second, as noted in Town of Hampton Contention IV, the State of New Hampshire Compensatory Plan assumes the full participation of Hampton school officials, State Police Troop A, and other local law enforcement and traffic control officials, although it does not specify where the " additional" i law enforcement personnel will be obtained to make up for those local police who will not participate in implementation of the I Plan. Third, as stated in SAPL Contention 8A, in both the regular and compensatory plans the State of New Hampshire relies on Sheriff's deputies and local liaisons to perform certain tasks at staging areas. 1 _J
Fourth, as SAPL Contentions 15 and 25 indicate, the Plan also relies on the Coast Guard, the New Hampshire Towing Association, the USAF, the Civil Air Patrol, the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Telephone Company, OMNE Partners II, and a number of reception and host mass care facilities to provide a range of services should an accident occur at Seabrook. Finally, as noted in SAPL Contention 7, the Plan relies on host community personnel (under the supervision of the Department of Health Services) to monitor, and if necessary to decontaminate, incoming evacuees from the Seabrook EPZ. Q. Was it prudent for the NHRERP's drafters to have assumed that these emergency workers can be relied upon to report to duty promptly? A. (Zeigler, Johnson) No. In making this assumption, the State of New Hampshire has failed to consider the impact of role conflict on the behavior of emergency workers in crisis situations. Studies of natural and non-radiological technological disasters, research conducted in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island, and surveys of persons likely to be called upon to perform various duties should a radiological emergency occur at several U.S. reactor sites, suggest strongly that, in the event of an accident at Seabrook, a significant proportion of the workers relied upon in the Plan
i 1 will discover that their emergency work role and their family obligations conflict, and they will resolve this dilemma in favor of assuring first the health, safety, and welfare of their own families. Accordingly, a substantial number of the workers necessary for implementation of the Plan'will, in fact, not be available to perform their assigned duties, or will not be available promptly. Q. What is the basis for your opinion that the workers relied upon in the Plan will not be available? Q. (Zeigler, Johnson) The assumption that workers will be available is contrary to two well established facts about human behavior in crisis situations. First, one of the most firmly established findings in disaster research is that families generally evacuate as a unit in emergency situations requiring such protective action. Ronald Perry, who is a highly regarded disaster researcher and is familiar with the outcomes of hundreds of disasters and crises, puts the matter as follows: With respect to evacuation, it is known that families tend to evacuate as units, and that separation of family members often involves anxiety and attempts by evacuees to reunite families, sometimes by returning to the previously evacuated area.11/ 11/ Ronald W. Perry, " Incentives for Evacuation in Natural Disaster: Research Based Community planning" American Planning Association Journal (1979). i i
- L]=c
' ik l
.y similar conclusions have been drawn by other' disaster i researchers.11! In: light of this overwhelming body of I scientific evidence, prudent emergency: planners must assume i that a' substantial number of emergency 1 workers will return to-1 I
their homes as soon as an emergency is declared.so they can join'their families in1 evacuating or taking-other protective actions. Second, it isJalso well established in the disaster
= literature that:the. majority of those who experience role conflict resolve the tet4sion by turning to their families even at the' cost of abandoning their emergency' responsibilities. In
- study after study'of specific emergencies, the same findings
~
are reported:- 1 Prince,11/ speaking of a ship explosion and fire in Nova l Scotia:
-[T]he> earliest leadership...was that on the part of'those who had no family ties....
The others~as a rule ran first to their homes to discover if their own families were in danger. L 12/ Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analvsis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday, 1969; Thomas E. Drabek and Keith S. Boggs, " Families in Disaster: Reactions and Relatives' Journal of Marriage and the Family. 30: 443-451 (1978);. Thomas E. Drabek, "The Social Process in Disaster: Family Evacuation," Social Problems 16: 336-349.(1969); J. Hans and T. Sell, Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation Las Vegas, NV: U.S. Environmental Protection C , ' Agency,.1974; Donald J. Zeigler, Stanley D. Brunn, and James H. Johnson, Jr., " Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster" Geographi_ gal Review 71: 1-16 (1981). l}/ Sam Henry Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change. New York: Columbia University Press, 1920. 1 N E ' L U l
6 Y l N , s' a
- )
H E11emers,1A!*speakingfof a flood in Holland: q
' ~
[T]he nature of.thefdisasterJwas' such that L. people dropped alliother-tasks in order to assist their=own familias, or just to~be. with them. Killian,.15/ speaking of;four Southwest U.S.. communities stricken by disasters (tornadoes-and explosions): In all the communities there were. individuals'such,as policemen, firemen, and
.public utilities workers, whose loved ones were threatened by the same disaster that s
demanded their services asi l
" troubleshooters." Even persons who had no 'l such definite roles to play in times of catastrophe were confronted with:the alternatives'of~seeing after theirLown primaryLgroups or of assisting in the rescue and relief of any of the large number of injured persons regardless of' identify.
Indeed, only the unattached person in the community was likely to be free'of such
+
conflict. .(1952, p. 311) Killian notes furthes that this dilemma, in most instances, was resolved:in favor of the health, safety, and welfare of the family.
'.14/ H.L. El'1mers, Studies in Holland Flood Disaster 1953, Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences National'Resecreh Council, Washington, D.C., 1955, Volume IV, p.122.
15/ Lewis M. Killian, "The: Significance of Multiple-Group l
^
Membership inuDisaster" American Journal of Sociological 57: 311:(1952). tI.',
-l
.t
._______.__i. ._.________l_..
Most l general surveys of disaster behavior'also conclude
'that'roletconflicts-are likely to be. resolved in favor of U
attending to familyt rather-than emergency' obligations.16_/ I j
~
'Q. What1is the. result of workers experiencing. role conflict and resolving it in favor of their family obligations?-
A. (Zeigler, Johnson) Role conflict'can result in two a Edifferent responses, both'of which would seriously affect the implementation-of any. emergency plan. The first is-non-response, in which the: individuals become so active in relocation ~ efforts:on behalf of their families,'and/or remain s with their families during'the crisie, that they are not available for emergency-duty until the'immediate crisis has. passed.. Thefsecond is delayed-response, in which individuals report for duty only after the-needs of their families-have beenimet to-their satisfaction. The resultaof either of these
-two responses is that the emergency' worker's1 job is not performed as expected--because the worker either fails to report altogether or. arrives late.
Q. . Is.the likelihood of emergency workers resolving role conflict in favor of family obligations affected by the type of emergency involved? 16/ See, for example, Charles E. Fritz, " Disaster" in Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet, eds., Contemporary Social Problems New York:. Harcourt Bruce, 1961, p. 677; and James D. Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, " Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process," in George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman, eds., Man and Society in Disaster, New York: Basic Books, 1962, pp. .283-284.
] 1 y,
- i. . !
~
l A.. .'(Zeigler,. Johnson) . Role conflict is a'potentially serious' problem in any kind of emergency.- However,' such conflict isLfar more likely to be resolved in favor of family
. obligation when the event in question involves possible exposure,to radiation, rather than some other disaster agent.
Q. Why is that? A. (Zeigler, Johnson) As'already. discussed, apart.from terrorism and war, people are more fearful of radiation ~than
'they are of: any.other potential source of danger in the world around them. Ionizing radiationHis imperceptible to the senses--that is,.it cannot be seen, smelled, tasted, heard, or otherwise sensed i'n any. direct way--and thus people'have no way of knowing whether or not they are being exposed to it.
Moreover, people who suspect that.they may have been exposed
.will not'know for years--perhaps even generations--whether any damage has been done, and, if so, to whom. Because of its unique characteristics and its potentially lethal, carcinogenic and mutagenic effects, people are more apt to react with concern and alarm when they think members of their families may be-in. danger of exposure to radiation. For these reasons, the likelihood of role conflict resolution in favot of family rather than work obligation is even greater in a radiological emergency than in emergencies involving other disaster agents.
Moreover, the TMI experience provides strong evidence of the relationship between fear of radiation and role conflict resulting in worker unavailability. Several recent studies i indicate that role conflict was a serious problem during the j l
\
crisis at TMI.12! Describing the situation at area hospitals l during the TMI accident, for example, Smith and Fisher noted ; that "during the [ hospital emergency response] planning process, a new problem arose--the exodus of people included physicians, nurses, and technicians required to staff both the short term and long term medical facilities."18/ Maxwell, in 17/ D.L. Breo, Nuclear scare tests hospital's disaster plan, Hospitals, J.A.H.A., May 1: 33 (1979); W.E. Demuth, and J.J. Trautlein, The luck of Three Mlle Island, Journal of Trauma 19: 792-794 (1979); W.E. Demuth, and K.L. Miller, A perspective on Three Mile Island, Continuing Education, December: 18-24 (1982); K. Haglund, At Hershey: medical system near " failure" during Three Mile Island, New Physician 28: 24-25 (1979); S. Kasl, R.F. Chisholm, and B. Eskenazi, The gg impact of the accident at Three Mile Island on the behavior and well-being of nuclear workers -- part II: job tensions, psychological symptoms, and indices of distress, American Journal of Public Health 71: 472-483 (1981); E. Kuntz, Hospitals prepared radiation plans in wake of nuclear plant , accident, Modern Healthcare 9: 16 (1979); G.K. Macleod, Some ! public heelth lessons from Three Mile Island: a case study in chaos, Ambio 10: 18-23 (1981); C. Maxwell, Hospital organizational response to the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island: implications for futurs-oriented disaster planning. American Journal of Public Health 72: 275-279 (1982); Pennsylvania National Guard, Three Mile Island nuclear accident 28 March - 4 April 1979, after action reoort. Annville, Pa.: Department of Military Affairs, June 7 (1979); J.S. Smith, and J.H. Fisher, Three Mile Island: the silent disaster, JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 245 (April 24): 1656-1659 (1981); G. Strohl, Nuclear threat: hospitals need to know, Osteopathic Hospitals 23: 6, 8-9 (1479); W.%. Weidner, et al., The impact of nuclear crisis on a radiology department, i Radiology 135: 717-723 (1985). 18/ Smith and Fisher, footnote 17 above, p. 1656. { 1 l
.c 8 i
another_. analysis and. evaluation of hospital emergency planning. during the TMI' accident, stated that "the conflicting responsibility to family and work resulted in escalating staffing problems asfthe crisis continued."1E/ Some of the I local hospitals' personnel moved their families outside of the danger zone and-only'then returned to work resulting in extended periods of' delayed response. Others left the areas n and stayed away until the immediate crisis was over (non-response).- At one local hospital, for example, only 6-of-
'the 70 physicians who were scheduled for weekend emergency duty -l reportedly showed up for work.2q/ It'should be noted that.
noneoof these' hospitals were within the 5 -mile evacuation zone and that even 25. miles away from the accident site, at the Lebanon Valley General Hospital, there was reported to be a shortage of physicians and nursesuas a result of evacuation. On the basis of such observed behaviors, Maxwell concluded that, sin the event of another radiological emergency,
" administrators can expect significant absences from staff members who have family responsibilities and should anticipate a shortage of physicians as well".21/
. Hospital personnel were not the only group who experienced role conflict during the TMI crisis. Problems of multiple !
. group membership loyalty, espec ai lly between work and family 19/ Maxwell, footnote 17 above, p. 276.
20/ Maxwell, footnote 17 above, p. 278. 21/ Maxwell, footnote 17 above, p. 276.
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f
.o'b'iigations,' reportedly also occurred.among the Pennsylvania
- National Guard and TMI nuclear power plant' workers.12/- In a comparative study of.the behavioral responses of supervisory.
and non-supervisory' personnel at TMI and nearby Peach Bottom Nuclear' Power: Plant'(40 miles away), Kas1'and colleagues noted "the greater conflict experienced'and recalled by TMI workers; [ . their felt need to be in different' places at the same time, the
~
intrusion.of work demands on their overall planning of how to
, react to the accident, and. specific conflict with spouse over arriving at an' agreed upon decision regarding-the, family's
. response to the accident."13/ They estimated that'4 percent-andL11 percent of:TMI supervisory and non-supervisory personnel, respectively, evacuated during the crisis. Most of those who'left lived within 5 miles of the plant, the designated zone of selective evacuation during the. reactor crisis.
Q. Do you base your conclusion that role conflict will result in unavailability and delayed availability of emergency workers during a Seabrook emergency on any data other than what you have discussed above? Q. (Zeigler, Johnson) Yes. Social surveys of school bus drivers and volunteer firefighters within the vicinity of the Shoreham nuclear power plant in New York (Social Data Analysts, I 1982),'and of public school teachers in the San Luis Coastal l l 22/ .Kasl, Chisholm, and Eskenazi; and Pennsylvania National Guard, footnote 17 above. 23/ Kas1, Chisholm, and Eskenazi, footnote 17 above, p. 478. j
L Unified School District near the Diablo Canyon Plant in California provide further evidence of the extent to which role conflict is likely to be a problem in a Seabrook emergency.21/ In each of the three surveys, the respondents were asked: "What do you think you would do first if an accident requiring a full scale evacuation af the population within 10 miles of the plant were to occur?" Consistent with the role conflict theory, the behavioral options were: (a) perform your emergency work role, (b) make sure your family was safely out of the evacuation zone, (c) leave the evacuation zone immediately to make sure you were in a safe place, or (d) do something else. The results of these three surveys are summarized in Table 1. Sixty eight percent of the volunteer firefighters and 73 percent of the school bus drivers in Suffolk County indicated that, if a major reactor accident were to occur at the Shoreham plant, family obligations would take precedence over their duties as emergency workers.21/ By contrast, one-third of the teachers in San Luis Obispo County, CA, indicated that, under the conditions outlined in 2i/ Social Data Analysts, Inc., Responses of Emergency Personnel to a Possible accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Setauket, New York t 1982; James H. Johnson, Jr., - Reactions of Public School Teachers to a Possible Accident at ! the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, A report Prepared for the California Teachers Association, San Luis Obispo Chapter, j l 1983; James H. Johnson, Jr., Role Conflict in a Radiological Emergency: The Car:e of Public School Teachers, Journal of Environmental Systems 15: 77-91 (1985-86). 1 25/ Social Data Analysts, footnote 24 above. )
)
)
i
[ TABLE"1: Initial Reactions of Designated Emergency-Personnel to an Evacuation Advircry-Behavioral School" Bus a Volunteer" ' Selected b
' Intentions Teachers Drivers Firemen Personnel (n=232) (n=246) (n=291) (Seabrook;n=31)
(percent) Perform Emergency Work 67 24 21 52 Check on Family 21 73 68 39 Leave the Area 1 3 1 3 Do something Else 8 -- 11 3 Don't know 8 -- -- 3 Source: 8 Zeigler, Johnson, Brunn (1983, 81) bSeabrook Evacuation Survey, April, 1987)
7 the nuclear reactor accident scenario, other loyalties or responsibilities would take precedence over assisting in a full scale evacuation of schools. A strong sense of obligation to family in crisis situations and concern for personal safety were the most important factors distinguishing these teachers from the 61 percent who said that they would be inclined to remain at the schools and carry out assigned emergency respo.isibilities.21/ 1 The strongest and most direct evidence of the extent i to which role conflict is likely to be a problem in the event of a Seabrook emergency comes from the Seabrook evacuation
~
survey already discussed. Among other questions, the survey respondents in the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPE were asked (a) whether or not they had an assigned role in the Plan; (b) if so, what specific role were they expected to perform; and, (c) what would they do first if a general emergency requiring full sc. ale evacuation of the ten mile plume exposure pathway Zone was declared at Seabrook. (For the , i precise wording of the questions, see Attachment 5, pp. 68-69). , i of the 915 households surveyed in the New Hampshire f portion of the Seabrook EPZ, two percent contain individuals who reported that they had an assigned emergency work role in the Plan.. As Table 2 shows, the range of services these individuals are expected to perform is fairly extensive, including police and fire protection, traffic control, 1 26/ Johnson, 1985-86, footnote 24 above, pp. 83-87. __________ _ A
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? TABLE 2: Assigned' Emergency Work--Roles of-Seabrook Evacuation Survey Respondents (n=31) .
1 Emergency. Absolute Relative Cumulative'
- Assignment- Frequency . Frequency Frequency i'
.; Police- 6 19.4 19.4 Fire ..
4 12.9 32.3<
.t Traffic-Control 1 3.2 35.5
.Schoolbus. Driver 5~ 16.1 51.6 Special. Emergency busdrivers 1 3.2 54.8-
^
' Ambulance /AssignedLdoctor or nurse 3 9.7 64.5
- Official radio or TV position' 2 6.5. 71.0
' Role not specified 9 29.0 100.0
. Source: .Seabrook Evacuation Survey, April, 1987.
I
emergency. transportation (schoolbus and ambulance drivers), emergency medicine,(nurse and' doctors), and emergency
, communications (official radio or TV position).
When asked'what they would.do first if a general emergency were declared at Seabrook, only half indicated that they would report'immediately'to their assigned emergency post. The other half gave responses suggesting that they either would not report or would.not report promptly to perform their assigned emergency roles. Among this latter group,'a small. percentage indicated that.they would'either leave
-immediately (1%), do something else (1%), or were. unsure what they would.do (1%)'. Not surprisingly,.the majority indicated that :they would first inake sure that their f amily was safely out of the evacuation zone. In response to the question "How
'would you make sure your family was safely out of the y evacuation zone", 8% indicated that they would "go home and
~ drive [their) family to a safe place out of the evacuation zone" (non-response), but the majority (67%) indicated that
-they would " call home and tell (the] family to leave without
[them]." Implicit in the latter response is the notion that the individual would then report to his/her assigned emergency i post (a delayed response). It is highly unlikely, however, that'these designated emergency workers would be able to contact family members by telephone during an accident at the Seabrook plant. Telephone exchanges are likely to be overloaded, as was the case during the TMI crisis in 1979 when 52 -
1 F. Emore than~2 millionscalls were' attempted on a system designed
.tojhandle.only half as many.22/ Under such conditions, the only-reasonable assumption is that these people would leave immediately'tofcheck on their. loved-ones, since rarely,.if
. eve r', have: emergency personnel' reported'for duty without.first O
Viewed in this context, tne survey Leontacting1 family members.
]
data supports our. contention that, if a major accident'were to-occur at Seabrook, problems of conflicting group' loyalties
)
among designated emergency personne1'who~ reside within the H I ten-mileEplume exposure pathway. zones would significantly-Lhinder efforts.to implement the emergency response plan promptly.
]
The plan also. relies on a very large number of ' emergency' personnel who. live.outside the Seabrook EPZ, e.g., State Police, Department of Transportation workers, Teamsters, l bus company drivers, National Guardsmen, and others. Evidence l l from TMI suggests that. concerns about personal safety and long-term health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation will discourage a substantial percentage of these workers from leaving a relatively safe zone and entering one currently or at risk to be contaminated with radioactive materials.21/ For example, in the early stages of the TMI accident,'the telephone communications system had to be greatly expanded at the site. L l 27/ W.W. Chenault, G.D. Hilbert, and S.D. Reichlin, Evacuation Planning in the TMI Accident. Washington, D.U.: Federal
. Emergency Management Agency, 1979. '
28/ pennsylvania National Guard, footnote 17 above. 53 -
l
.The local telephone company, however, had difficulty finding personnel willing to expose themselves to the hazards'of venturing near the plant in order to install additional phone equipment. Reluctance of this sort should be expected of ;
designated emergency workers who live outside of the Seabrook i EPZ, and a significant amount of role abandonment should be l anticipated and planned for. In our view, prudent planners can not rely on a simple strength-through-numbers strategy to deal with role abandonment. For example, the Plan has on paper 1228 potential bus drivers to operate the projected 515 buses. This is not a meaningful' planning response. First, the Plan relies on letter-l agreements signed not by the actual individuals who are being relied upon but by their employers or superiors. Individual consent forms evidencing a 1-to-1 communication between the planners and the individuals relied on is an essential first step in adequate planning. Second, the plan makes no attempt to identify and locate those individuals who are less likely to abandon their emergency roles - i.e., those with less role conflict arising from familial relationships. Third, there is no evidence that the numerical relationship between potential and required drivers is a strength-through-numbers strategy in light of the actual effects of role abandonment during radiological emergencies. i h i UNITED STATES'OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges: .l
- Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson j Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. <
- Dr. Jerry Harbour
)' f
) l In the Matter of )
)
'PUBLIC SERVICE. COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP) ,
) September 14, 1987 l'
)
ATTACHMENTS TO TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. ZEIGLER, JAMES H.. JOHNSON, JR., AND STEPHEN COLE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE-COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON SAPL J CONTENTION 7, SAPL CONTENTION BA, SAPL CONTENTION 15,'SAPL CONTENTION 25, SAPL CONTENTION 31, TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION III AND TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION IV I Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 l 4 l
i f 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative: Judges:
' Helen'F. Hoyt',. Chairperson Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
K .Dr. Jerry Harbour
).-
I' :n the-Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANYLOF'NEW ). Docket Nos. HAMPSHIRE, ET'AL. ) 50-443-444-OL (Off-site EP) (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
) September 14, 1987 1 )
ATTACHMENTS'
-TO TEST 7 MONY OF' DONALD J. ZEIGLER,' JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR.,
AND; STEPHEN COLE ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'
-FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON SAPL'
-CONTENTION 7, SAPL CONTENTION 8A,-SAPL CONTENTION
~
15, SAPL CONTENTION 25, SAPL~ CONTENTION 31,1 TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION III AND TOWN OF HAMPTON CONTENTION IV l Department of.the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place 1 Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 O
, = . _.
_ _ _ _ . _ _ ~ . ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 Professional Qualifications of Donald J. Zeigler i : Attachment 2 Professional Qualifications of-James H. Johnson, Jr. Attachment 3 Professional Qualifications of Stephen Cole Attachment 4 Zeigler, D.J., Brunn, S.D. and Johnson, Jr., J.H., " Evacuation From A Nuclear Technological Disaster," 71 Geographical Review, No. 1, 1-16 (January 1981) Attachment 5 " Behavior During a Radiological Emergency: Reactions of EPZ Residents to a Possible Accident At . the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station,"
]
Social Data Analysts, Inc. (September 1987) l a 8
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Resume DONALD J. ZEIGLER Department of Political' Science and Geography Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508 Tel. (804) 440-3845 Home Address: 705 Barrison Way, Virginia Beach, VA 23462 Tel. (804) 490-1060 Specializations Technological Hazards Evacuation Planning Nuclear Power Urban and Social Geography Energy & Settlement Systems Cultural Landscapes Education Ph.D. 1980 Michigan State University East Lansing, Michigan 48824 M.A. 1976 Univerity of Rhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 B.S. 1972 Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania Shippensburg, Pennsylvania 17257 Present Position ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR (since 1986) Assistant Professor (1980-1986) DIRECTOR OF THE GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM (since 1983) Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508 SELECTED COURSES TAUGHT
' Geography of the City Geography of Energy Economic Geography Hazards: Natural and Technological (Team Taught)
Cartography and Cartography Practicum Seminar in Geography: Applied Geography in the 1980s SELECTED COMMITTEE SERVICE l Ph.D. in Urban Services Policy Committee, 1980-present Steering Committee for the Center for Regional Studies, 1986-present Steering Committee for the Institute for the Study of Minority Issues, 1985-present i I Chairman, Arts and Letters Scholarships s Awarda Committee, 1984-1985 Chairman, Arts and Letters Instruction Committee, 1986 present
2 Other Experience CONSULTANT (1982-1984), Office of the Chief Executive County of Suffolk, Hauppauge, New York 11788 l Worked closely with the County attorneys in a research capacity to evaluate likely behavioral responses to an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. SENIOR LECTURER (1984), Department of Political Science, Public Administration, and Geography, Christopher Newport College Newport. News, Virginia 23606 Taught an upper-level elective, Geography of Cities. RESEARCH ASSISTANT (1980), Center for Environmental Quality Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 Assisted in organzing a series of community and state level energy workshops, including preparation of the final reports for the Michigan Energy Administration. TEACHING ASSISTANT (1377-1F/9), Department of Geography Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 i Taught economic geography, assisted in field techniques in geography and in geography of environmental quality. ARCHIVES ASSISTANT (1978 and 1979), State of Michigan Archives Department of State, Lansing, Michigan 48918 Organized newly acquired archival record groups and manuscript collections; wrote finding aids to facilitiate public access l to primary source materials GEOGRAPEER (1976-1977), Geographical Statistical Areas Branch Geography Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington, D.C. 20233 Analyzed statistical and cartographic data in order to prepare and revise census tract plans and other statistical areas in the South, in cooperation with local planning agencies. INSTRUCTOR (1976), Department of Geography University of Rhode Island,~ Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 3 1 Taught economic geography; directed a tutorial in geographic ! education, and served as University College advisor. j Selected Publications BOOK ' l Technological 5azards. Resource Publications in Geography. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1983. (Principal author; with J. H. Johnson, Jr., and S. D. Brunn) l I
ARTICLES
" Evacuation Decision-Making at Three Mile Island." In A. Blowers and i
D. Pepper, editors, Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State. ' London: Croom Helm, 1987. Forthcoming. (With J. B. Johnson, Jr.)
"Modelling Evacuation Behavior during the Three Mile Island Reactor '
Crisis," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 20 (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.) (1986): 165-171. I
" Evacuation Planning for Technological Hazards: An Emerging Imperative." Cities 3 (1986): 148-156. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Evacuation from Nuclear Attack: Prespects for Population Protection in Hampton Roads." Virginia Social Science Journal 21 (Winter 1986): 22-31. (Reprinted in The Virginia Gazette, October 11, 1986, p. 4) !
"The Geography of Civil Defence." In A. Jenkins and D. Pepper, eds.,
The Geography of Peace and War. London: Blackwell, 148-162. 1985. pp.
" Evacuation Behavior in Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents."
Professional Geographer 36 (May 1984): 207-215. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
"A Spatial Analysis of Evacuation Intentions at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station." In M. J. Parqualetti and K. D. Pijawka, eds. ,
Nuclear Power: Assessing ar.d Managing Hazardous Technology. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. pp. 279-301. Johnson, Jr.) (With J. B.
" Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emergencies."
Economic Geography 59 (October 1983): 386-402. Johnson, Jr.) (With J. H.
" Energy Change and Evolvi.ng Nonmetropolitan Land Use Patterns. " In G.
Macinko and R. H. Platt, eds. Beyond the Urban Fringe Land Use Issues in Nonmetropolitan America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. pp. 305-312. (With L. M. Sommers)
" Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster." Geographical l Review 71 (January 1981): 1-16. (Principal author; with S. D.
Brunn and J. H. Johnson, testimony and accepted by Jr.) This article was entered into the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 4, 1981. l
" Changing Regional Patterns of Central City Credit Ratings: 1960- l 1980." Urban Geography 2 (July-September 1981): 269-283. l
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" Human Settlements in Sparsely Populated Areas : A Conceptual Overview." In R. E. Lonsdale and J. W. Holmes, eds, Human i Settlements in Sparsely Populated Regions. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 14-52. (With S. D. Brunn)
I
REVIEWS Review of D. Clark, Post-Industrial America: A Geographical Perspective (New York and London: Methuen, 1984) in the Professional Geographer 38 (November 1986): 434. 3 Review I of M. R. Greenberg and R. F. Anderson, Hazardous Waste Sites: The Credibility Gap (New Brunswick, N. J.:
~
Center for Urba Policy Research, 1984) in the Professional Geographer 38 (May 1986): 206-207 Review of R. W. Perry, M. K. Lindell, and M. R. Greene, Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management (Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Beath, 1981) in the Geographical Review 72 (July 1983): 425-427. Review of D. L. Sills, C. P. Wolf, and V. B. Shelanski, Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982) in the Professional Geographer 34 (November 1982): 485-486. REPORTS
" Lafayette Shores Survey, Norfolk, Virginia." Institute for the Study of Minority Issues, Old Dominion University. Punded by the Urban League. 1986. (With J. Carr'and C. Jones)
"Purther Analysis and Interpretation of the Shoreham Evacuation Survey." In volume 3 of the suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (Draft). 1982. (With J. B. Johnson, Jr.)
Energy and the Adaptation of Human Settlements. Edited by H. E. Koenig and L. M. Sommers. East Lansing, Michigan: Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State University. 1980. (Contributor: pp. 6-19, 22-25, 28-40, 43, 123-129) Final Report on a Social Survey of the Three Mile Island Area Residents. East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Geography, Michigan State University. 1979. 281 pp. (With S. D. Brunn and ; J. B. Johnson, Jr.) Selected Professional Prese.ntations Public Perceptions and Intended Evacuation Behavior Around i Virginia's Surry Nuclear Power Station." Annual meeting, Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers, Lexington, Kentucky, November 24, 1986. (With J. C. Friberg and students) The Sizewell B Inquiry: A Geographer's Participation in the United Kingdom's Nuclear Power Debate." Annual meeting, Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers, Chapel Hill, N.C., November 25, 1985. 0 a--_______--_-__ _ - - ---
5
" Evacuation from Nuclear Attack: Prospects for Population Protec-tion in Hampton Roads." Annual meeting, Association of American G*ographers, Detroit, Mich., April 24, 1985.
" Beaches in the City: Coastal Urbanization in Tidewater Virginia."
Conference on the Management of Developed Coastal Barriers, Virginia Beach, Va., January 15, 1985. (With J. C. Friberg)
"A Model ,!
of Evacuation Decision-Making in the Three Mile Island i Nuclear Reactor Crisis." Annual meeting, Institute of British Geographers, Leeds, j England, January 10, 1985. (With J. H. ! Johnson, Jr.)
" Preparing for Place Annihilation: Civil Defense Evacuation Planning in the United States." Annual meeting, Middle States Division, Association of American Geographers, West Chester, Pa., September 29, 1984.
" Human Responses to Radiological Emergencies." Annual meeting, Association of American Geographers, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1984. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
"The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon: Comparing Behavioral Responses to Nuclear Accidents." Annual meeting, Southeastern Division, Association of .American Geographers, Orlando, Fla., November 21, 1983. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Energy-Efficient Metropolitan Regions: A Conceptual Model of Adaptations to a High-Cost Energy Puture." Annual meeting, Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers, Atlanta, Ga., November 23, 1981.
" Energy and the Transformation of a Metropolitan Landscape: Con-trasting Contemporary and Future Settlement Geographies." Annual meeting, National Council for Geographic Education, Pittsburgh, Pa., October 29, 1981. (Available on microfiche as part of the ERIC document collection: ED 214815)
"From Three Mile Island to Worlds End: Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster." Annual meeting, Pennsylvania Council for Geography Education, Harrisburg, Pa., October 11, 1980.
Testimony Testimony before the United Kingdom's Sizewell B Inquiry, Snape, Suffolk County, England, November 1984. Testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Matter of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Licensing Hearings. Riverhead, New York, January 1984. __..___._---__-._w
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5 i Testimony before the Governor's Advisory Cnemission on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. New York, New York, June 1983.
.)
l Testimony before the Suffolk County Legislat:re in the Matter of the ! Shoreham Nucler Power Station Emergency Planning Proceedings. l Hauppauge, New York, January 1983. l Thesis and Dissertation i
" Central City Credit Ratings : Regional Patterns and Spatial Cor- '
relates." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of j Geography, Michigan State University, 1980. ( Advisor: S. D. Brunn. Committee Memberst J. T. Darden and I. M. Matley)
" Selected Quality of Life Indicators and Demographic characteristics of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States."
Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Geography, University of Rhode Island, 1976. (Advisor: G. H. Erausse. Second Reader: ' H. J. Warman) Media Interviews Radio: WNIS, Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, 1986. < ODU Dialogue, on Evacuation from Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, 1985. (Syndicated) NBC-Radio, New York, N.Y., on the Shoreham Evacuation Survey, 1983. (Nationally syndicated) WKAR, East Lansing, Michigan, on the Three Mile Island Survey, 1979. Television: WAVY, Portsmouth, Virginia, on emergency preparations at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant, 1986. 1 WTAR, Norfolk, Virginia, on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, 1986. . BBC-East Anglia, England, on the Sizewell B Inquiry, 1984. WELM, East Lansing, Michigan, en the Three Mile Island ' Survey, 1979. Professional organizatiers Association of American Geographers (since 1966) Conference Participant, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983-1986. Session Chairman, Annual Meeting,1983. Member, Energy Specialty Group. Member, Urban Geography Specialty Grorp. Member, Coastal and Marine Geography Specialty Group. - - - -__ __-_____________ __ _ b
7 i Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers ! (since 1980). Conference Participant, 1980, 1981, 1983-1986. Discussant, Annual Meeting 1981, 1986 Virginia State. Representative, 1986-1988 Member, Program Committee Chairman, Audit Committee, 1984. National Council for Geographic Education (since 1967) Conference Participant, 1981, 1984, 1986. Session organizer, 1986 Chairman,1990 Annual Meeting Committee,1985-present. Member, Awards Committee, Region VIII, 1982-1984. Chairman, Awards Committee, Region VIII, 1983-1984. Virginia Geographical Society (since 1982) President, 1985 present. Editor, VGS Today, 1985-present. i Contest Coordinator, Annual Statewide Student Contest, 1984. Member, Executive Board,1984 present. Virginia Social Science Association'(since 1984) Conference Participant, 1983-1986. Member, Executive Committee, 1986-1987. North American Cartographic Information Society (since 1986) Conference Participant, 1986. Gamma Theta Upsilon, omicron Chapter (inducted 1970) President, Omicron Chapter, 1971. Kappa Delta Pi (inducted 1971) Personal Birthdate: November 26, 1951 Birthplace: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Married Two Children Travel: United States, Canada, Western Europe a
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CURRICULUM VITAE
' James H. Johnson,.Jr.,
Mailing' Address-Home' Address Department.of Geography 15325 Magnolia Bl'd. v #305 r ,, University of. california Sherman' Oaks, CA 91403 mLos Angeles,LCA;90024 (818).'789-5506 (213)L 825-1415/825-1071 EDUCATION: B.S., Geography, North Carolina Central. University, 1975. M.S. , . . Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madisen,' 1977. Ph.D., Geography, Michigan State. University,L1980.
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FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION Teaching'and Research systematic: . energy' policy and planning,. urban, social geography of the inner city.
' Methods: - research design, theory and methodology in
- geography.
SPECIAL BONORS:" -
-Recipient of the Theodore;R. Speigner Award for the highest
. academic average, Department of Geography, North Carolina Central University, 1975.
Summa Cum Laude Graduate, Department of Geography, North. Carolina Central-University, 1975. Selected as an Outstanding Young Man in America by the l Jaycees'in.1976. Graduate Fellow, Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975-77. Reciphant of the first place award ($100) for the best l graduate student paper presented at the East Lakes Division of. the Association of American Geographers Annual Meetings, Michigan Stats University, September 15-16,-1978. {
. Recipient of a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship for '
the 1986-87 academic year. ACADEMIC' EXPERIENCE: l J Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of Southern California, 1986-87. Senior Faculty Research Associate, Institute for Social Science Research, Head of Environmental and Population Policy Studies Program. 1986-1988. l
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Jam 30 H. Johnson, Jr. i Page 2 l Associate Professor of Geography, University of California, ! Los Angeles. 1985-present, j i Assistant Professor of Geography, University of California, I Los Angeles. 1980-1985. PROFESSIONAL AND CIVIC AFFILIATIONS: Church: Member, St. John Missionary Baptist Church Falkland, North Carolina Other Organizations: Gamma Pi Chapter, Gamma Theta Upsilon Association of American Geographers Triangle. Geographers Association Association of Pacific Coast Geographers i Western Social Science Association American Association for the Advancement of Science IN PREPARATION:
"A Prospective Analysis of Evacuation Behavior in a Radio-logical Emergency," (submitted in revised form for publication consideration in a scholarly journal) (with Donald J. Zeigler).
Review of Alley Life in Washington, by J.R. Borchert, Historical Geography Newletter. Composite Review of Protest Is Not Enough, by R.P. Browning, D.R. Marshall, and D.H. Tabbr and The Suburban Squeeze, by D.E. Dowall, Environment and Plannine A. i Planning for Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (a research monograph l to be completed in early 1988). { l Review of Nuclear Power: Siting and Safety, by Stan Openshaw, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. PUBLICATIONS: 1977 " Black Migration as a Response to Social Psychological ' Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," Proceedings, New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographi- j cal Society, Vol. 6, pp. 42-46 (with Walter C. Farrell, ! Jr.). l l 1978 " Black Migration as a Response to Social-Psychological Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," The Geographical Survey, Vol. 7, pp. 22-27 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr. ) ; a revised version. I l
James H. Johnson, Jr. l Paga 3 i PUBLICATIONS (Continued) : 1 1978 " Black Philadelphians:'. A Factorial Ecology," 1 R Proceedings, Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, Vol. 52, pp. 91-95 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr., and John D. Oliver). i 1979 "The Quality'of. Afro-American Life in Houston, Texas: A Geographical. Perspective," in J. Pinder.and R. 'roctor, P Perspectives on the Urban South: Selected Papers from the Tourth Annual Conference,;pp. 207-221. -Norfolk, Virginia: Norfolk State College, and Old Dominion University, 1979, (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr., and Patricia Johnson). - 1979 "Recent Methodological Developments and the Geography of
. Black America," The Pennsylvania' Geographer, Vol. 17, pp. 19-30 (uith Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). I 1979 "Phenomenology.in Geography,." The Geographical Survey, Vol. 8, pp. 3-9 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.).
.1979' " Educational Concern of Inner City B1ack Parents,"
ERIC Document (June 1979) , #106-297 (with Walter C.
. Farrell, Jr.).
.197? " Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." Department of Geography, Michigan. State University,.May 1979 (with Stanley D.
Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). 1979 _" Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Areat Residents." Department of Geography, Michigan
. State-University, August 1979, 220 pp. (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler).
1979 " Preliminary Review and Analysis of Electric Utility ! Rate. Reform: . Implications for Oakland and Livingston { Counties, Michigan."_ Repor.t for Michigan Community Action Agency Association and Oakland-Livingston Human Services Agency, under contract #71-3698. Departments of Geography and Agricultural Economics and Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State. University, September 24, 1979 (with Bradley T. Cullen). 1979 " Spatial Patterns of Alcohol Outlets in the Washington, D.C. Black Community," Proceedings, Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, Vol. 53, pp. 589-97 (with Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1980 " Residential Preference Patterns of Afro-American College Students in Three Different States." The Professional Geocrapher, Vol. 32, pp. 37-42 (with Stanley D. Brunn). 4 1 ..
I 1 Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. Paga 4 PUBLICATIONS (Continued): ) j
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, 1980 " Spatial and Behavioral Aspects'of the Counterstream:
Migration of Blacks to the South," in Brunn, Stanley D. and James 0. Wheeler, eds., The American Metropolitan System: Present and Future. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Scripta Series in Geography,. Victor Winston Pub-lisher, 1980, pp. 59-75 (with Stanley D. Brunn). 11980 "Locational Conflict.and Public Attitudes Regarding the. {
-Burial of. Nuclear Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experi-ence." East Lakes Geographer, Vol. 15, pp. 24-40 (with Stanley D. Brunn and Brian McGirr).
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1981
" Evacuation from the Nuclear Technological Disaster at
.Three Mile. Island," The Geographical Review, Vol. 17, pp. 1-16 (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler).
1 1981 " Household Energy Consumption in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan: Some Patterns, Alternatives and o Policy Implications." A Report for the Michigan Commun-ity' Action Agency Association and the Oakland-Livingston ) Human Service Agency. East Lansing:' Michigan State University, 65 pp. (with L.M. Sommers, G.A. Woods, and T.C. Miller). q 1981 " Gentrification and Incumbent Upgrading: Benefits and Costs," CAAS Newsletter, Vol. 6, November, pp. 10, 16. i 1982 " Implications of the Black Move to the South," Black Enterprise, Vol. 12, January, p. 21 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1982 " Impact of Electricity Utility Rate Reform in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Journal of Environ-mental Systems, Vol. 12, pp. 27-36 (with Bradley T. 4 Cullen and Lawrence M. Sommers). 1982 "A Note on Black Migration to the South," Geographical Perspectives, Number 49, pp. 38-43. 1982 "Further Analysis and Interpretation of the Shoreham Evacuation Survey," in Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Vol. 3, November, 1982, 71 pp., 17 tables, 2 figs. (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1983 "The Role of Community Action in Neighborhood Revitali-zation," Urban Geography, Vol. 4, pp. 16-39. 1 l I L.,.xx----__ - - - - _ . , - - - -
7 Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. Paga 5 L ' PUBLICATIONS (Continued):
- 1983 " Implications of. Electric Utility Rate Reform Legisla-tion for Low IncomeLHouseholds in Oakland and Living-ston Counties, Michigan," The Social Science-Journal,
.Vol.1 20,fpp. 87-97 (with Bradley T. Cullen and Lawrence M. Sommers).
1983 Review of Not on My Street, by M.J. Dear and S.M. Taylor, Environment-and Planning A, Vol.15, pp. 861-863. 1983 " Distinguishing Human' Responses to Radiological Emer-gencies," Economic Geography, Vol. 59, pp. 386-402. (with D.J. Zeigler). 1983 " Reactions'of Pub'lic.-School Teachers to a Possible
. Accident at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant," a research report prepared for the. California Teachers Association San Luis Obispo County Chapter, July.
'1983 Technological Hazards, Resource Publications in Geog-
-raphy, Washington, DC:- Association of American Geog-raphers. (with Donald J. Zeigler and Stanley D. Brunn).
1984 "A Spatial Analysis of Evacuation Intentions at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," pp. 279-301 in Nuclear Power: Assessing and Managing Hazardous Technolocy, edited by M.J. Pasqualetti and K.D. Pijawka, Boulc er, CO: Westview Press.. (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1984 Review of Revitalizing Cities, by H. Braviel Holcomb and Robert.Beauregard, The Professional Geographer, Vol. 36, p. 387. 1984 " Planning for Spontaneous. Evacuation During a Radiologi-cal Emergency," Nuclear Safety, Vol. 25, pp. 186-194. L1984 " Inter-ethnic Conflict in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles," pp. 57-94 in Vol. 6 of Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press. (with M.L. Oliver). 1984 " Energy Assistance and the Poor: An Evalgation and Alternative Allocation Procedure," Energy, Vol. 9, pp. 571-581. (with B.T. Cullen). 1984 " Evacuation Behavior in Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents," The Professional Geographer, Vol. 36, pp. 207-215. (with D.J. Zeigler). O
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Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. 4 Pcgo 6 PUBLICATIONS (Continued): , 3 1984 "Towards a Regional Approach to Radiological Emergency Response Planning," Papers and Proceedings of Applied Geography Conferences, 7:114-122. 1985 " Planning for Nuclear Power Plant Accidents: Some Neglected Spatial and Behavioral Considerations," in Geographical Dimensions of Energy, edited by F.J. Calzonetti and B.D. Solomon, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., pp. 123-354. 1985 " Role Conflict in a Radiological Emergency: The Case of Public School Teachers," Journal of Environmental Systems, vol. 15: 77-91. 1985 "A Model of Nuclear Reactor Emergency Evacuation Decision-Making," Geographical Review, Vol. 75: 405-418. 1985 Review of Solar and Wind Energy, by M.T. Katzman, Geographical Review, Vol. 75: 495-497. 1985 " Black-Brown Conflict in the City of' Angels," Urban Resources, Vol. 2: LAl-LAS. (with M.L. Oliver). 1985 " Summary Report on a Social Survey of Century Freeway Displacee Households in the City of Hawthorne," a report prepared for the Center for Law in the Public Interest, Los Angeles, July, 1986 " Evacuation Planning for Technological Hazards: An Emerging Imperative," Cities, Vol. 3, 148-156 (with D.J. Zeigler). 1986 " Evacuation Decision-Making at Three Mile Island," chapter 12 in Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State, edited by David Pepper and Andrew Blowers, London, i Croom Helm Ldt, pp. 267-289. (with D.J. Zeigler). 1986 "Modelling Evacuation Behavior During the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Crisis," Socio-economic Plannina Sciences, Vol. 20, 165-171 (with D.J. Zeigler). 1986 Review of Back to the City: Issues in Neighborhood l Renovation, by S.B. Laska and D. Spain, Geography Research j l Forum, Vol. 8, forthcoming. ] 1986 " Evaluating Nuclear Reactor Emergency Information Maps," { Technical Papers, 1986 ACSM-ACPRS Annual Conference, Vol. 1 ) pp. 67-75. (with R.B. McMaster and S. Friedman). . I
Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. ' Paga 7 PUBLICATIONS (Continued): 1986 Review of Comprehensive Emergency Management: ' Evacuating Threatened Population, by R.W. Perry, Environment and i Planning A, Vol. 18: 840-842. 1986 " Predicting Nuclear Reactor Emergency Evacuation Behavior," Energy, The International Journal, forthcoming.
-1987 Review of Social and Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal, by Panel on Social and Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Management, Professional Geographer, forthcoming.
1987 " Blacks'and the Toxics Crisis," The Urban League Review, forthcoming.(with M.L.. Oliver). PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS: 1976 ' Annual. Meeting,.New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geogra-phical Society, " Black Migration as a Response to Psycho-Social Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters,"
' Salem, Massachusetts. '
1976 Annual Meeting, Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, Commentator for session
" Considerations in Culture," Chicago, Illinois.
1977 Annual Meeting, Popular Culture Association, " Folk Reasons for Early 20th Century Black Migration," Baltimore, Maryland (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr., and Phillip Kitchart). 1978 Annual Meeting, Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Conference on the Urban South, "The Quality of Afro-American Life in Houston, Texas: A Geographi-i cal Perspective," Norfolk, Virginia (with Walter C. l Farrell, Jr.). l 1978 Annual Meeting, Michigan Academy of Sciences, " Factors Influencing the Decline of White and~Non-White Operated Farms in the Central Coastal Plains of North Carolina, 1945-1969," Ypsilanti, Michigan (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1978 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science, " Black Philadelphians: A Factorial Ecology," Champion, Penn-sylvania (with Falter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1978 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Division, Association of American Geogrphers. " Spatial variations in Attitudes Toward Nuclear Waste Disposal in Alpene, Michigan," East Lansing, Michigan (with Brian J. McGirr). 4 l
Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. Paga 8 PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS (Continued) : [ l 1979 Annual Meeting, Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Conference on the Urban South, " Black Migra-tion to the South: A Focus on Durham, North Carolina," Norfolk, Virginia (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1979 Sixth Annual National Conference on the Black Family,
" Searching for Elbow Room: A Perspective on Southern Black Migration," Louisville, Kentucky (with Walter C.
Farell, Jr.). 1979 Annual Meeting, Michigan Academy of Sciences, " Urban Homesteading and Historic Preservation: Problems and Prospects," Mt. Pleasant, Michigan (with Walter C. ' i Farrell, Jr.). 1979 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science,
" Spatial Patterns of Alcohol Outlets ir the Washington, D.C. Black Community," Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania (with)
Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). I 1979 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Df. vision,' Association of , American Geographers, "Elec'ricity Utility Rate Reform ! or Maintenance of the Status Quo?", Akron, Ohio (with ( Bradley T. Cullen). ! 1979 Quarterly Meeting, Michigan Community Action Agency Association, " Preliminary Review and Analysis of Elec-tric Utility Rate Reform: Implications for Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Lansing, Michigan. 1979 Monthly Meeting, Oakland-Livingston Human Service Agency, " Benefits and Costs of Lifeline Electric Utility Rate Reform," Pontiac, Michigan. 1979 Annual Meeting, Southeast Division, Association of American Geographers, "Locational Conflict and Public Attitudes Regarding the Burial of Nuclear Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experience," Nashville, Tennessee (with Stanley D. Brunn and Brian J. McGirr). 1981 Annual Meeting, Western Social Science Association, !
" Electric Utility Rate Reform: The Significance of the Spatial Factor," San Diego, California.
1981 Annual Meeting, Southwestern Economics Association, "Combinatorial Programming Solution to a Park and Ride Mass Transit Problem," Dallas, Texas (with Bradley T. Cullen).
l Jam 3s H. Johnson, Jr. Pcga 9 - PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS (Continued): J 1981 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers,
" Location-Allocation Model of Vanpool Park and Ride Sites: The Lansing, Michigan Example," Los Angeles, California (with Bradley T. Cullen and Lawrence M. {
1 Sommers). a 1982 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, "Regionalization as a Step Toward Developing a National Energy Policy," San Antonio, Texas. 1983 Annual Meeting, Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geographers, "The Evacuatioin Shadow Phenom-enon: Comparing' Behavioral Response to Nuclear Acci-dents," Orlando, Florida, November 20-22 (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1984 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers,
" Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emer-gencies," Washington, D.C., April (with Donald J.
Zeigler). 1984 Seventh Annual Applied Geography Conference, "Towards a Regional Approach to Radiological Emergency Response Planning," Tallahasse, FL, November 1-3. 1984 Annual Meeting, Southwest Division of the Association of American Geographers, "An Analysis of a Household Energy Use Survey," Lubbock, TX, September 20-21 (with B.T. Cullen). 1985 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers,
" Attitudes Toward the U.S. Energy Problem: The Case of Michigan," Detroit, MI, April.
1985 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers,
" Attitudes Toward the U.S. Energy Problem," Detroit, l Michigan, April (with B. T. Cullen and Lawrence Sommers).
1985 Eighth Annual Applied Geography Conference,
" Role Conflict in a Radiological Emergency: The Case of Public School Teachers," Denton, Texas, November.
INVITED LECTURES AND TESTIMONY: 1976 Prairie View A&M University, Department of Economics, Geography, and Social Science and the School of Agri-culture, "The Effects of Mechanization on the Produc-tion of Flue-Cured Tobacco in the Coastl Plains of North Carolina," Prairie View, Texas. m.______ _ . _ _ _
Jam 3s H. Johnson, Jr. Pego 10 INVITEL LECTURES AND TESTIMONY (Continued): 1977 Cheyney State College, Urban Studies Department, " Data Gathering Techniques in the Social Sciences," Cheyney, Pennsylvania. 1978 Monthly Meeting, Woodbridge Neighborhood Citizens Coun-cil, " Benefits and Costs of Neighborhood Revitaliza-tion," Detroit, Michigan. 1980 Comments on the Revision of Chapter 90 (Liquor and Tavern Regulation) of the Milwaukee Code and Related Concerns. Presented to the Utilities and Licenses Committee of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Common Council, November 3 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1981 Special Faculty Lecture Series, UCLA, Bi-CentenniaIl Symposium on the Human and Physical Ecology of the City, "The Ghettoization of Blacks in Los Angeles." University of California at Los Angeles. 1981 Faculty Seminar Series, Center for Afro-American Stud-ies, " Spatial Perspectives on Counter-stream Black Migration to the South," University of California at Los Angeles. 1982 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) (Emergency Planning Proceedings) January 19, 1982. 1983 " Evacuation Planning for Radiological Emergencies," Department of Geography, University of California at Davis, Davis, California, January. 1983 Testimony Before the Suffolk County (NY) Legislature Regarding Emergency Planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, January 24, (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1983 Testimony Before Governor Cuomo's Commission Investi-l gating Emergency Planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, July (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1983 Testimony Before the San Luis Obispo County School Board of Education. In the Matter of the San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan, Augus't.
4 Jaman H.. Johnson, Jr. Pega 11 INVITED LECTURES AND TESTIMONY (Continued) : 1983 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, ! United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the ; Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear j Power Station, Unit 1) , Docket No. 50-322-OL-03 (Emer- ! gency Planning) (with Kai T. Erikson on contention 25 - role conflict). December.
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l 1983 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) , Docket No. 50-322-OL-03) (with j Donald J. Zeigler on contentioin 23 - the evacuation 1 shadow phenomenon). December. 1984 " Planning for Nuclear Power Plant Accidents: Some Neglected Spatial and Behavioral Considerations," Environmental Psychology Program, City University of New York, April, 1984 "A Critical Appraisal of Radiological Emergency Prepar-edness and Response Regulations," Energy Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, August. 1984 "A Causal Model of Nuclear Reactor Emergency Evacuation Decision-making," Department of Geography, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, November. 1985 " Testing A Model of Radiological Emergency Evacuation Decision-making," Energy Division, Oak Ridge National ; Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, January. / 1985 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ; In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham ' Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322 (OL) (Emergency Planning Proceedings), January. 1985 Institute of British Geographers Annual Conference, "A Causal Model of Evacuation Decision-making in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Accident," Leeds, England. 1985 " Evacuation Decision-Making at TMI", Department of i Geography, University of Colorado, Boulder, September. 1985 Testimony before the United States District Court, Central District of California. In the matter of the Displacement of Households for the Construction of the Century Freeway, July. 4
James H. Johnson, Jr. Page 12 l INVITED LECTURES AND TESTIMONY (Continued) : 1 1986 " Black-Brown Conflict in the City of Angeles," Department I of Geography, University of Southern California, January. , 1986 " Inter-ethnic Conflict in the Los Angeles Black Ghetto," Department of Geography, San Diego State University, j February. l MEDIA INTERVIEWS AND PUBLICATIONS: 1977 " Incentive to Poor?" response to editorial "No Free ! Abortion," Tulsa World (August 26, 1977), p. 5. > 1978 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Nuclear Waste ) Disposal in Northeastern Michigan." 1979 " Lifeline Bill Will Not Aid Poor," The State News i (October 9, 1979) with Bradley T. Cullen. { I 1979 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Social Survey I of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald Zeigler). . l 1979 WELM, Channel 11, East Lansing,' Michigan. " Preliminary J Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). ARTICLES WRITTEN BY OTHERS REGARDING MY WORK: 1978 Fran Murray, "Alpena Residents Still Oppose Nuclear Waste Site," press release, Department of 2aformation Services, Michigan State Universicy, East lansing, Michigan, September 21, 1978. 1978 United Press International. "Alpena County Still Against a Waste Dump Site," Detroit News (September 24, 1978). A number of other Michigan cities' newspapers carried accounts from the original news release. 1979 Fran Murray, " Residents of Three Mile Island Area Fear Impact of Disaster," press release, Department of Infor-mation Services, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Micchigan, May 18, 1979. 1979 Fran Murray, "U Survey of Three Mile Island Area Issue," MSU News Bulletin (October 31, 1979), p. 2. 1979 Ellis Cose, "In the Aftermath of Three Mile Island," Detroit Free Press (October 31, 1979), p. 10A.
Jamas H. Johnson, Jr. Paga 13 ARTICLES WRITTEN BY OTHERS REGARDING MY WORK (Continued): 1979 Karen Zurawski, "Eastown Community Association Study Movements of People," Photo Reporter (October 1, 1979),
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1982 . Frances Cerra, " Evacuation Plan Stirs Old Doubts," New York Times (May 16, 1982), Section 21, p. 1. 1983 S.E. Seager, " Disaster Plan Debate Grows," Telegraph Tribune, August 3, p. 1. 1983 Cheryle Johnson, "Would Teachers Abandon Children in an Emergency," Five Cities Times Press Recorder, August 5,
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1983 S.E. Seager, " Evacuation Survey May Show' Flaws in Plan," l Telegraph Tribune, March 19, p. A-3. 1983 Carl Hall, " Coming Home: More Blacks Moving Back to South," Arkansas Democrat, July 31, 1F-8F. I t l
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[ s VITA Stephen Cole Birth Date: Ju ne 1, 19 41. Home-Address:. 23 Mt. Grey Road Setauket, New York'11733 Pho ne : 516-689-9793 Of fice Address: State. University of New York at Stony. Brook' Department of Sociology Stony Brook, New York 11794 Phone: 516-632-7732 Education: B.A., Columbia College, 1962 Ph.D., Columbia University, 1967 Academic Appointments: 1964 Lecturer., Barnard College 1965- Le c tu re r, Columbia University 1966-67 Instructor of Sociology, Columbia University 1966 76 Research Associate, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University 1967-68 Assistant Professor, Departme nt of Sociology, Columbia University 1968-70 Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 1970-73 Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 1973-Present Professor, Depardnent .of Sociology, State University of New York at' Stony Brook ; 1977-Present Research Associate, Center for the Social Sciences,- Columbia University 1987 Visiting Profesor, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Poland Honorary Societies and Awards: l i 1962 Phi' Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Columbia College j 1962 Honorary Woodrow Wilson Fellow 1962-63 National Science Foundation Fellow 1963-66 National Institutes of Health, Public Health j Service Fellow a 1963 Bobbs-Merrill Award 1965-66 John W. Burgess Honorary Fellow of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University 1971 Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow 197 6-P rese nt Sociological- Research Association 1978-79 Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship , 1978-79 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California J 1980 Presented a,nnual paper at Sociological Research Association Dinner 1984-P rese nt SUNY Faculty Exchange Scholar
Page 2 f Professional' Activities: Fromil966 to the ~ p' resent I have ' served as a consultant to the
'following organizations- on various applied sociological research projects.
1966-68 Social Welfare Research Council, CUNY l1970-71 Center for Research on the Acts of ' Man, University of Pennsylvania l' 97 3-p rese nt Newsday 1973-79 Committee on Science? and Public Policy (COSPUP), National Academy of Sciences 1977 Brookhaven National Laboratories 1978 The ' Baltimore- Sun 1979 National' Bureau of Economic Research 'i 1981 Long Island Lighting Company 1982 The Boston Globe 1982-83 University of California at Irvine 1984 State of California
~1982-present Suf folk County (New York) 1987 Commonwealth of Massachusetts I have also served on= the editorial boards of the - following journals Sociology of Education, Sociological Quarterly, American Journal of Sociology, The American Sociologist.
I have -served. as a referee for more than a dozen other jour-nals, for. the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the National Institute of Education, as well as other public and private granting agencies. Over the last fif teen years I have presented more than 40 invited lectures at professional conferences and educational-institutions all over North knerica and in' Europe. 1 l l l
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'Page 3 Publications:
BOOKS 1969 The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UPT. New York: Praeger Press. (Reprinted by Arno j Press, 1980).
'1972 The Sociological Method, 1980, 3rd enlarged edition. Bos to n: Houghton Mif flin Company.
1973 Social Stratification in Science (with Jonathan R. Cole). Chicago: The University of l Chicago Press. (Paperback edition published
]
i n 1981 ) . a Translated into Chinese by Guxin Light Daily Press,f
.1988 (with a new introduction) . '
3 1975 The Sociological Orientation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979, 2 nd enlarged edition. 1978 Peer Review in the National Science Foundation: Phase I (with Jonathan R. Cole and Leonard Rubin) . l Washington, D.C. : National Academy of Sciences. 1981 Peer Review in the National Science Foundation: Phase II (with Jonathan R. Cole). Was h i ng to n, - D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.- 1988 Social Influences on the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (with Jonathan R. Cole). Camb ridge: Harvard University Press. ( f orthcomi ng) i PAPERS (an asterisk indicates a refereed journal) 1961 "The Charitable Impulse in Victorian England," > King's Crown Essays 9 3-28. 1 1964 " Inventory of Empirical . and Theoretical Studies i of Anomie" (with Harriet A. Zucke rma n) . In j Marshall Clinard (Ed. ) , Anomie and Deviant Behavior. New York: Free Press, pp. 243-313.
- 1967 " Scientific' Output and Recognition: A Study in i the Operation of the Reward System in Science" j (with Jonathan R. Cole), American Sociological '
Review 32, 377-390. Reprinted as a Bobbs-Merrill Reprint and as an XIP Publication. l l l l
Page'41 ' PAPERS Conti nued. . . .
- 1968 " Visibility and the Structural Bases of' Awareness _
in Scientific Research" (with Jonathan R. ' Cole) , l Ame rica n Sociolo,gical Review ~ 33, 397-413. ] ,
- 1968' "The Unionization of Teachers: Determinants of l Ra nk-and-File Support," Sociology of Education 41, }
66-87. ( Reprinted in Donald A. Erickson (Ed. ) , j Educational Organization and Administration. 1 Be rkeley : McCutcha n Publishing . Corporation, 1977. ) !
- 1969 " Teacher's Strike: A Study of the Conversion of Predisposition into Action," American Journal of q Sociology,74, 506-520.- Repri nted as . Warner !
Modular Publication R809. Reprinted in Donald - 1 Ge rwi n ( Ed . ) , ' The Dmployme nt of Teachers , ' Some i Analytical _ Views. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974. j i
- 1969 " Determinants of Faculty Support of Student .f Demonstrations" (with Hannelore Adamsons),
Sociology of Education 42, 315-329. l
- 1970 " Professional Status .and Faculty Support of Student Demonstrations" (with Hannelore Adamsons),
, Public Opinion Quarterly 34, 389-394.
- 1970 " Professional Standing and the Reception of Scientific Papers," American Journal of Sociology 76, 286-306. Repri nted as Bobbs-Merrill _ Reprint ;
S-678. Reprinted in B.T. Eiduson a nd L. Beckman ' (Eds.), Science as a Career Choice. New York: I Russell Sage Foundation, 1973, pp. 499-512. , Reprinted in P. Wei ngart (Ed.), Wissenschaf tsso-ziologie I,. Athenaeum Verlag, 1973. I
*-1971 " Measuring the Quality of Sociological Papers" (with Jonathan R. Cole) , Ame rican Sociologist 6, 23-29. i 1972 " Continuity and Institutionalization in Science: A Case Study of Failure." In Anthony Obserschall (Ed.), The Establishment of Empirical Socioloqg. j New York: Ha rpe r a nd Row , pp. 7 3-129. Reprinted i n Wolf Lepennies ( Ed. ) , Geschichte der Soziologie Suhrkamp Verlag (Frankfurt am Main) , vol. 4, 31-110, 1981.
l 1 1 i
Page 5 PAPERS Continued. . . .
- 1972 " Illness and the Legitimation of Failure" (with 1 Robert Lejeune) , American Sociological Review 37, 347-356. Reprinted in Leo G. Reeder (Ed.), H a nd-book of Scales and Indices of Health Behavior,1977 Reprinted i n Ca ry S . Kart (Ed.), Domi na nt Issues in Medical Sociology. ( First edition) Reading, Mass )
Addison Wesley Publishing Co. , 1977. (Second Editio) 1986. Reprinted in Howard Robboy and Candice Clark j (Eds.), Soul _I nte rac t io n, St. Martin's Press, New York , 198 6.
- 1972 "The Ortega Hypothesis" (with Jonathan R. Cole),
S.cie nce 17 3 ( oc tobe r) , 368-375. Reprinted in i Eire Gebhardt, Sociology of Science. New York: Seabury Press, 1980. l 1975 "The Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Theories of Deviance as a Case Study. " In Lewis Coser (Ed.), The Idea of Social Str,ucture: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jova novich , pp. 175-220. 1976 "The Reward System of the Social Sciences" (with Jonathan R. Cole). In Charles Frankel (Ed.), Controversies and Decisions: The Social Sciences a_nd Public Policy. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 55-88. 1977 " Peer Review in the huerican Scientific Community" (with Jonathan R. Cole and Leonard Rubin) , Scientific American 237, No. 4 ( Oc tobe r) , 34-41. 1978 " Measuring the Cognitive State of Scientific Disciplines" (with Jonathan R. Cole and Lorraine Dietrich). In Yehuda Elkana, Robert K. Merton, Arnold Thackray, and Harriet A. Zucke rman (Eds. ) , Toward a Metric of Science: The Advent of Science ~ Indicators.
~
New York: John Wiley. 1978 " Scientific Reward Systems : A Comparative Analysis." In Robert Alun Jones ( Ed. ) Research in the Sociology of Knowledge _, Scie nce , and Art. G ree nwic h , Conn.: Johnson Associates, Inc. pp. 167-190. i . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ l
Page 6-
- PAPERS Conti nued. . . .
- 1979- "Which Researcher Will Get the Grant?" (with J. R. Cole), Nature 279, 575-576.
1979 " Comment on a paper by Michael Overington," The jynerican Sociologist 14 ( Feb rua ry) , 17-19.
- 1979 " Age and Scientific Performance," kmerican Journal of Sociologg 84, 958-977.
1980 " Comme nts on ' Indicators of Scie ntific Ma npower' ," ! Scie ntometrics , Vol. 2 No. 5-6, pp. 405-409. Translated into Russian, 1987. 1981 "The Functions of Classical Theory in Contemporary Sociological Research" (with K. Adatto).. In F. Kuklick (Ed.), Research in the Sociology of Knowledge, Sc ie nce , and Art III. Greenwich l Conn. : Johnson Associates, Inc. i
- 1981 " Chance and Consensus in Peer Review," (with J. R. Cole and G. Simo n) , Scie nce 214,
( 20 Novembe r 1981) , 881-886.
- 1982 "NSF Peer Review (continued)" (with J.R. Cole and Gary Simon) Scie nce ,215 ( 22 Ja nua ry , 1982) 344-8. <
i
- 1983 "The Hierarchy of the Sciences?", American Journal l ~~"~
of Sociology 89, 111-139. American Journal of
~5'ociology a rticle: Translated into Polish in J. Niznika, ed. Rozwoj nauki a spoleczny kontekst l poznania Warsaw Panstowowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1987
- 1984 "Little Science Big Science Revisited,"
Scientometrics, (with G.S. Meye r) 7, 443-458 J 1984 " Experts' Consensus and Decision Making at the National Science Foundation," (with J. R. Cole) ] i in Kenneth Warren, Selectivity and Information 1 Systems: Survival of the Fittest, (New York: Praeger Science Publishers)
- 1986 " Sex Discrimination and Admission to Medical School: 1929-1984,"
American Journal of Sociology, 92 (549-567).
Page 7
' PAPERS Continued. . . . / 4 .
f 1987 " Formation of Public opinion on Complex Issues: j The H. ' O'Case Go rmaofn,Nuclear ed. Power" (with R..Fiorentine) in. ] t
. Surveying Social Life: Essays in Honor of Herbert H. Hwnan (Middletown, Conn. : Wesleyan University Press)in press.
'*L1987 " Testing the Ortega Hypothesis: Milestone or Mills to ne? " Scientometrics ' (with J.R Cole) 12, 327-335 ( Entire issue devoted to examination
- of 197 2 ' paper "The Ortega Hypothesis. ")
R
- 1987 " Comme nt on Hargens' " Scholarly Conse nsus and-Journal' Rejection Rates,"' Anerican Sociological 1 Review (with G. Simon and J.R. Cole) f orthcomi ng .-
1987 "Discrimi nation Against Wome n InL Science: ' The Conf usion of Outcome .with Process " 11' n J . R. Cole and H. A. Zuckenman, eds. i 3[ omen in' Science (New York: Norto n) ,. in -
- press.
- - _- _ _ _ _ . __A
l l i 1 ATTACHMENT 4
.i
( i. - The Geographical Review-vauut n January,1981 suusen EVACUATION FROM A NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER
- DONALD J. ZEIGLER, STANLEY D. BRUNN, and JAMES H. JOHNSON JR.
unique peacetime technological. disaster occurred in northeastern United g States in the spring of 1979: an accident in a nuclear-generating plant. Because of the proliferation of nuclear power plants throughout the world, the possibility of comparable disasters elsewhere increases. We chose to examine one aspect of the .1979 American disaster: evacuation of the affected popute. tion. The nuclear acciuent at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, dramatically emphasized the need to broaden the range of evacuation studies to include technological dis-asters, particularly ones of nuclear origin. The crisis at Three Mile Island pro-vided the first opportunity for an empirical examination of the evacuation pro-cess in the aftermath of an unexpected and unprecedented nuclear disaster. We ) used it as a case study in order to seek a foundation for geographical research in the nascent field of evacuation behavior and planning in response to tech-nological disasters. Our objectives are to identify the spatial and temporal di-mensions of evacuation behavior among TMI residents, to offer a conceptual model of evacuation-decision making in response to a nuclear disaster, and to suggest the role for geographers in evacuation planning. Because of the unique-ness of the case study, we offer generalizations and models to explain the decision-making process for nuclear evacuation not as definitive conclusions but rather as hypotheses for future studies. Joseph Hans and Thomas Sell compiled a list of more than 500 natural and technological disasters that required evacuation during the period 1%0 to 1973.' Their figures indicated that an average of almost 90,000 persons per year were forced to evacuate their homes because of hurricanes, floods, train derailments
- We thank Gyula Pauer, director of the Cartography Laboratory, University of Kentucky, for con-structing the graphics.
' Joseph M. Hans Jr. and Thomas C. Sell, Evacuation RirAa--An Evaluation (Las Vegas, Nev.: U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency,1974), pp.101-153. 9 DR. ZEIGLER is an A$sistant professor of geography at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508. Dn. BRUNN is a professor of geography at the Un'.versity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506. Dn. JOHNSON is an assistant professor of geog-raphy at the University of Califomia, Los Angeles, California 90024. Copyright @ 1981 by the Amencan Geographical Soctery of New York
2 Tut crocRAPHICAL REVIEW involving toxic chemicals, and other types of disaster, Evacuations from tech- , nological disasters accounted for only one-fourth of the incidents listed by Hans and Sell. In terms of affected area and population each technological incident lacked the large-scale effect that characterized natural disasters.' Part-ly because of this limited scope of impact, study of evacuation from techno-logical disaster has been neglected. Such evacuation has traditionally been viewed as a mechanistic problem, merely a question of logistics. In this article we hope to advance understanding of individual behavioral patterns during evacuation from a technological accident. This understanding will allow public officials and planners to base emergency-evacuation designs on documented behavioral responses rather than on assumptions derived from the experience of evacuations from natural disasters. The data for this study, hereafter referred to as the Michigan State Univer-sity (MSU) study, were obtained from a survey questionnaire mailed to a strat-ified random sample of 300 households in south central Pennsylvania approx-imately one month after the accident at TMI. The sample included- 178 households within fifteen miles of the plant and 122 households in Carlisle, Duncannon, and Lancaster, three communities beyond the fiftecn-mile radius that we chose to include in the sample. Of the 267 questionnaires that reached j their destinations,150 were completed and returned, a response rate of 56 percent. A detailed description of the survey design and a copy of the ques-tionnaire appear in the final report on the TMI incident that we published elsewhere.8 In this article we make reference to two other surveys of TM1 area l residents, although the final results of each survey are yet to be published. I One survey was conducted by Mountain West Research for the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission (NRC), and the second was done by a group of geogra-phers at Rutgers University.' These three TMI studies provide the basis foi examining the emergency-planning process in general and evacuation planning in particular. Methods of
- Harry Estill Moore and others, Before the Wind: A Study of the Response to Hurricane Carla.
Disaster Study No.19 (Washington, D. C.: Nanonal Academy of Sciences' National Research Coun-cil,1%3); Thomas E. Drabek, Social Processes m Disaster: Family Evacuation, Soc al Problems, Vol. 16,1%9, pp. 336-349; E. M. Beck, Communication in Crisis: Explainin5Evacuation Symbohcally, , i Communications Research, Vol. 2,1975, pp. 24-49; Earl J. Baker, Predictmg Response to Hurrienne Warnings: A Reanalysis of Data from Four Studies, Mass Emergenacs, Vol. 4,1979, pp. 9-24; and Ronald W. Perry, Evacuation Decision-Making in Natural Disasters. Mass Emergennes Vol. 4,1979, pp. 25-38.
- Stanley D. Brunn, James H. Johnson Jr., and Donald J. Zeigler, Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile island Area Residents (East Lansmg, Mich.: Michigan State University, Department of Geography,1979), pp.19-25.
' Mountain West Research, Inc., Three Mile Island Telephone Survey: Preliminary Report on Pro-cedures and Fmdmgs by Cynthia B. Flynn, prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Govemment Printmg Office,1979); Mountain West Research, ine., with Social Impact Research, Inc., The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident at Three Mile Island by Cynthia B. Flynn and James A. Chalmers. prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Govemment Prmhng Office,1980); and Kent Bames, James Brosius, Susan Cutter, and James Mitchell, Responses of Impacted Populations to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Accident: An Initial Assessment, Discussion Paper No.13 (New Brunswick, N. J.:
Rutgers University, Department of Geography.1979). The NRC study was conducted by telephone in July and August of 1979, and the Rutgers study was based on a questionnaire mailed in April of 1979. In general the results of the MSU, NRC, and Rutgers studies are mutually supportive; ma;or differences are m the conceptuahzation and the spatial analysis of evacuation behavior and decision making, topics that are most fully developed in the MSU report.
EVACUAT!oN FRoM NUCLEAR DisAsTEM 3 coping with the consequences of nuclear disasters are certain to attract consid-erably more interest than they have to date for several reasons. The TMl acci-dent demonstrated that " societies using nuclear power today must accept major accidents not only as a theoretical possibility of no practical consequence, but as a risk to include in actual planning."5 The results of state and nationwide opinion polls conducted since the accident at TMI indicate that supporters of nuclear power, though now insisting on higher safety standards, still outnum-ber persons who oppose it." Nuclear-generating facilities in the short run, at least, will probably continue to operate and to proliferate. Of the existing and planned reactors in the United itates,85 percent are sited within sixty miles of a metropolitan core and thus cast a nuclear threat over a large proportion *of the population in the country.' , EVACUATION-DEC!stoN MAKING l j Our study of the Three Mile Island evacuation was one of the first attempts to document the process of evacuation under the threat of a severe technological I disaster. We designed the questionnaire to ascertain whether the respondent evacuated and to identify the factors that influenced the decision. The results of the survey indicate that 53 percent of the population within twelve miles of TMI evacuated, while only 9 percent beyond this limit left their homes. We propose a tentative model of the evacuation decision making process and the spatial outcome of those decisions (Fig.1). The first question posed was whether even to consider evacuation; 21 percent of the sample never considered this question. The remainder considered evacuation, but only 31 percent of the sample decided to evacuate. Several external constraints on the flow of deci-sions existed. Some potential evacuees were undoubtedly dissuaded from leav-ing by temporal (when), spatial (where), and operational (how) constraints. The relationships in the diagram should thus be interpreted to present a system of interlocking decisions rather than a series of unrelated options. Further re-search on evacuations from nuclear and other technological disasters may sug-gest revision and refinement of the decision-making model and, perhaps even more importantly, may help to identify the critical factors that influence the decision making process. Two spatially distinct population groups were identified on the basis of their reaction to the TMI incident. One group, composed of individuals who remained in their usual place of residence during the crisis, may be called the residual population; the other group, comprising the individuals who di.- parted, is the redistributed population or evacuees. The MSU study found no statistically significant differences between these two groups in terms of oc-cupation, income, age of household head, length of residence in south central L Pennsylvania, and political ideology. Similarly the NRC study found that dif-l ferences in income, education, and occupation had no significant bearing on an individual's decision to evacuate.'
' Bent Sorenson, Nuclear Power: The Answer That Became a Question, AmWo. Vc.!. 8,1979, p.17.
# Robert C. Mitchell, Public Opinion and Nuclear Power Before and After Three Mile Island, Resources, Resources for the Future, January-Apn!,1980, pp. 5-7.
' Policy Research Associates. Socioeconomic Impacts: Nuclear Power Siting (State College, Pa.:
Policy Research Associates for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1977), p. 43.
- Mountain West Research. Inc., with Social impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 24.
4 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW EVACUATION DECISION MAKING Decisions to be Made SpatialOutcome of the Decision Making Process c onsider no E vacua tsOni " i Remam Should We at Home Evacuate? (Reudval ar T9 , Population) v Should - What Part ,_,,,, E ntire F amdy Evacuater
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Fic.1-Evacuation decision making. Beginning with the study of the population affected by Hurricane Carla, studies of natural disasters have repeatedly confirmed the hypothesis that a family is the unit making the decision about evacuation.' Evacuees from sud-den natural catastrophes typically leave the hazard zone in family groups and remain together during the crisis. The results of our survey suggest that while the majority of evacuees left in complete family units, the proportion of partial
- Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p. 7.
>f, 4
EvACUAT!oN FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 5 families fleeing the disaster was larger than would be expected from the con-clusions of natural-hazard research. In charting the basic patterns of evacuation behavior and in planning many phases of the evacuation process, the concept of an evacuation unit, as opposed to the individual or the family, may best serve as the fundamental analytical entity. We define an evacuation unit as a single individual acting alone or a group of individuals acting in unison during the evacuation process. Because the members of a household may be unable to agree on a. decision or on procedures, a single household may generate several evacuation units. In the MSU survey, partial families composed one-third of all' evacuation units, but in the sample communities beyond fifteen miles from the plant, evacuation units were more likely to be partial families than complete families. Within six miles of the plant, complete families out-numbered partial families by more than three to one. The high percentage of partial families evacuating the TMI area may be accounted for by the high ) degree of uncertainty surrounding the accident itself and by the inability of either individuals or public officials to gauge accurately the magnitude of the malfunction at the plant. In his study of the sudden and unexpected impact of the Denver flood of 1965, Thomas E. Drabek demonstrated that evacuation is not always the result of a simple scenario in which families receive a warning, seek to confirm the danger, and decide to evacuate."Instead he proposed four separate evacuation processes: evacuation by default, evacuation by invitation, evacuation by com-promise, and evacuation by decision. Although Drabek's classification scheme was specific to forced evacuation in response to a natural disaster, we propose a similar, but somewhat modified classification system specific to voluntary evacuation in response to a technological disaster. In terms of the response of families in the Three Mile Island area, evacuation seemingly resulted from three different processes: evacuation by division, in which some members of a family decided to leave while other members decided to remain; evacuation by con-serisus, in which the whole family decided that evacuation was the best course of protective action to followiand evacuation by compromise, in which a dead-lock was resolved by a dominant family member in favor of evacuation. Dra-bek's model of evacuation by default would be applicable only in the event of a forced evacuation. The principal factor motivating TMI residents to evacuate was concern about personal safety: 94 percent of the evacuees gave this reason (Table I). Conflict-ing reports from governmental and utility-company officials were another crit-ical factor. One-fifth of the evacuees indicated that the news media played a role in their decision. The NRC study also cited the perception of danger and the volume of confusing information as the major reasons for evacuation." The reasons given by members of the residual population for not evacuating were varied (Table II). The most frequently given explanation was that no order to evacuate was issued. The NRC study also found this response to be the most frequent argument for staying." The existence of many conflicting reports was
"' Drabek, footnote 2 above, pp. 345-346.
"" Mountain west Research. inc., with Social Irnpact Research, Inc.. footnote 4 above, p.18 Mountain West Research, Inc.. with Social Irnpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 21.
6 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW taste l-reasons Poa EvACUAr NC PERCENTAGE or SVACUATION REA$3Ns t/ NITS Concerned about Safety 91 Conflicting reports from government and utility company officials 48 Conflicting reports from utihty company officials Conflicting reports from government officials 26 News media 24 Everyone was evacuating 20 Ordered to evacuate 7 4 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3. TABLE II-reasons FoR Nor EVACUATING
)
man i PERCENTAGE oF RAASONs NONEVACUEEs ( j No order to evacuate was issued 62 Too many conflicting reports i 42 No apparent reason to evacuate l 36 Home was a safe distance from plant 31 Fear of looting 24 No children involved Could not leave job or business 23 21 No one else in area evacuated 16 Needed to take care of farm hvestock 6 No place to go Too old to evacuate -5 Handicapped 3 2 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3. the secon6-most frequently cited reason for not evacuating. Paradoxically this was also the second most widely cited reason among the persons who. chose to evacue. Conflicting information was thus used by some residents to justify a decision to leave and by others to justify a decision to stay. THE GEocRAPHY oF EVACUATION FRoM TMI On the basis of the redistribution of population in the immediate aftermath - of the Three Mile Island disaster, we were able to delineate two distinct but l overlapping regions: the zone of evacuation and the evacuation field. The first i zone comprises the areas left by the evacuees, and the second was the area to j which the evacuees fled. - zone OF IVACUAT1oN The pattern of voluntary evacuation from Three Mile Island clearly reveals a distance-decay relationship that illustrates both the effect of governmental , directives and the evacuation shadow phenomenon. The distance-decay func-tion shows a sharp discontinuity approximately twelve miles from the plant (Table III). Within a twelve-mile radius of the disabled reactor,53 percent of the sample reported that at least part of the household evacuated. Beyond twelve miles, only 9 percent of the sample reported evacuation. The sharp
., EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 7 TABLE IU-DISTANCS AND EvAcvAnoN REseONSE PERCENTACE OF REsrONDING DISTANCE 20NE HOUSEHOLDS FROM wHICH FROM TMI sOME MEMBERS EVACUATED 1 to 3 miles 55 4 to 6 miles 56 7 to 9 miles 53 10 to 12 miles 47 13 to 15 miles 13 More than 15 miles 9 Total sample 31 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3.
discontinuity in the vicinity of twelve miles reveals the impact of two directives issued by the office of the governor of Pennsylvania on Friday, March 30. In the first, everyone within a ten-mile radius was advised to remain indoors, an action known as sheltering. In the second, all pregnant women and preschool children within a five mile radius of the plant were advised to evacuate. The first directive seemed to establish the critical evacuation boundary in the minds of area residents. Beyond the ten-mile limit the proportion of respondents who evacuated declined sharply. 1 The evacuation-shadow phenomenon is the term used to describe the ten- i dency of an official evacuation advisory to cause departure from a much larger area than was originally intended. The evacuation shadow cast by the public announcement of a very limited evamation order extended well beyond the zone to which the order applied. If only the persons advised to evacuate had left the area, the number of evacuees would have been limited to approximately 2,500 preschool children and pregnant women. Instead an estimated 144,000 j persons, or 39 percent of the population, evacuated their homes in the area as ! far as fifteen miles from the plant.'8 Although the evacuation shadow phenom-enon may be a minor consideration in evacuation planning for natural hazards,
)
I the impact of the phenomenon needs to be emphasized in planning for future l nuclear accidents precisely because delineation of the geographical scope of an i , invisible danger such as ionizing radiation is difficult for public officials and i private citizens to determine. In planning for an evacuation from a nuclear disaster, it can therefore be projected that any order to evacuate will cause the departure of residents not only from a designated zone but also from its periph-eries. The planning process should accommodate responses from the two areas. FVACUAftoN FITLF' , in order to analyze the spatial patterns o' evacuation behavior, we asked l each evacuation unit to indicate its destinati n. Taken together, these desti- I nations constitute the evacuation field of the survey respondents (Fig. 2). The I spatial pattern, as inferred from the locations of these sites, suggests a calm I and orderly movement rather than a hysterical flight. Evacuees fled a median distance of eighty-five miles from Three Mile Island. In the NRC study the median distance was found to be one hundred miles from the plant."In ecm-
" Mountain West Research, Inc.. with Social impact Research. Inc., footnote 4 above. p. 22.
" Mountam West Research. Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17.
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i % bc. 2-Destmations of TMI evacuees. parison with the list of evacuations compiled by Hans and Sell, the median flight of evacuation from Three Mile Island is thelongest on record. The longest median distance given in that study was eighty miles in response to Hurricane Carla in 1%1." Half of the evacuation units in the MSU survey chose destinations between forty five and ninety miles from the plant. We define the area in these limits as the zone of perceived safety far from the nuclear site. The inner boundary of this zone, shown on Fig. 2 by a dashed line, suggests that the evacuees sought destinations far enough from the plant to put a territorial buffer between themselves and the source of possible danger. The outer limit of the zone seems to imply a reluctance on the part of most evacuees to venture any f arther than necessary from home. The zone of perceived safety represents the spatial out. come of the tension between centrifugal forces generated by the perception of danger and centripetal forces generated by the attachment to home. A strong directional bias, similar to that identified in studies of the intra-urban mobility process, appears to have influenced the configuration of the
" Hans and Sell. footnote I above, pp. 83-M
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3 . EVACUAT1oN FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 9 - evacuetion field. Although only one of every ten evacuation units chose des. " tinations in the quadrant southeast of TMI, almost half chose destinations in the quadrant northwest of the crippled reactor. The directional bias was the - consequence of several interrelated factors. The most important considerations seem to have been a preference for a site upwind from the plant, a psychological r attraction to the mountains in time of danger, and a reluctance to select a ' - - destination in the more densely populated metropolitan areas to the east. These '* - factors, and possibly others, require further investigation before behavioral . models of the evacuation site-selection process can be constructed. % = In addition to sketching the configuration of the actual evacuation field, we .' ettempted to delineate a potential evacuation field for all respondents. Everyone ' was asked to supply a choice of destination, if a presidential order had required a full evacuation of the area. The map of potential sites displays a galaxy of - destinations to the north and the west of Three Mile Island and an evacuation hollow, an area shunned by evacuees, around the reactor (Fig. 3). The maps of actual and potential fields are similar in many respects, although the map of potential destinations has a less clearly defined zone of perceived safety. The potential destinations were also more widely dispersed, and some were not ' ' shown on the map because they were as far away as California, Arizona, and Florida. EVACUATION QUARTERS , The homes of relatives and friends proved to be the preferred evacuation quarters among both the actual and the potential evacuees. The MSU survey L
~
found that 81 percent of the evacuees stayed with relatives and friends. The comparab!c figures were 78 percent in the NRC study and 74 percent in the ~ Rutgers study.'" These proportions exceed those characteristic of evacuations ' from natural disasters.Despite the ubiquity of hotels and motels in the evac- .' ' uation field, their use by evacuees from Three Mile Island was limited, in all likelihood, by the financial strain that such accommodations would have im- -' posed on family budgets. The use of the designated evacuation shelter in Her. - shey, ten miles from the plan., might have been limited by the perceived social ' stress of life in mass quarters and by the perceived locational stress that evac. ; uees would have experienced in a site so close to the threatening reactor No respondent in either the MSU or the Rutgers survey reported utilization of the - public shelter in Hershny, and only one of the 1,500 households surveyed in the NR tudy used the evacuation shelter.'"The maximum number of persons , who usid the shelter in one day was esti.nated at only 180, a situation that seems to confirm the finding that " shelter centers are used only if nothing else is available or if one cannot financially care for himself."88 A wasonable con. ' clusion is that the low utilization of the shelter at Hershey %s partially the p O
" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above. p. In and i Barnes and othe s, footnote 4 above, p.17.
j
" Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p. 43, and Thomas E. Drabek and Keith S. Doggs, Famthes l in Di aster: Reactious and Relatives, foumal of Mamaer and the fam@, Vol. 30,1%8, pp. 443-451.
" Barnes and others, footnote 4 above, p.17; and Mouritain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 25.
" Hans and Sell, footnote 1 atiove. p. 52, and Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc, footnote 4 above, p. 25, 1
1 10 tur crocRAPHICAL REVIEW POTENTIAL DESTINATIONS IN THE EVENT
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Fic. 3-Potential destmations of TMI area residents m event of an ordered evacuation. result of its location in the ten-mile zone from the reactor. Within ten to twelve miles of TMI,47 percent of the survey respondents evacuated. The pattern of evacuation was influenced by both spatial and temporal processes (Fig. 4). In this diagram each prism of the cube represents the average behavior of evacuees originating in each of the six distance zones used in this analysis. The distance of the home from Three Mile Island was found to be directly related to the destination chosen by an evacuee. In general, persons living farther from the plant fled to more distant locations than did individuals living close to the plant. The same tendency was observed in the NRC study.:" This finding adds a new dimension to evacuation behavior that has not been previously observed or predicted, and several explanations may tentatively be offered. First, persons living closest to the plant were likely to be the most concerned about the safety of their homes and property. They were therefore inclined to remain as close as possible to home. Second, only in the closest distance zones were residents with high personal evacuation thresholds suf. ficiently motivated to abandon their homes. If these evacuees lived a few miles
- Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., foomote 4 at>ove. p.17.
1
.9 -f f EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 11 i
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS OF EVACUATION oce, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, q I of m o-p st i o f6 (l'((lll l lli ( { ((l{ is - - Jo - . . T l 34s . t w w . _ 8 c 7s = f . I c 2 go . , 7 2 109 - m - - Mar Apr 135 20:10:11t1 i ? i ) i4 e 9 s 617i8i# #1 0:11:12ill:14:19116i'7:18 Dates of Departure and Return Fic. 4-Spatial and temporal dimensions of evacuation. further from TMI, they probably would not have evacuated at all. Third, resi-dents who live far from the disabled reactor would be expected to shun evac-uation sites in the closest zones because they would offer little or no improve-ment over the conditions of the home site. It can be hypothesized that evacuees originating at great distances from Three Mile Island would include the seg. ment of the population with low personal evacuation thresholds that would consequently be likely to seek more distant destinations. Fourth, because evac-uation units residing more than fif teen miles away were predominantly women and children, many constraints on evacuation might have lessened.
12 int GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW The temporal dimension of evacuation is along the third axis of the evac-uation cube and represents the date and the duration of evacuation (Fig. 4), The length of the hinges on which the prisms hang denotes the average du.
- 7. tion of evacuation, while the position of the hinges denotes the average date of departure and return. The length of stay away from home among respon- i dents ranged from one to sixteen days, but 54 percent of all evacuation units returned home two to four days after departure. In the three-mile zone closest to the reactor,58 percent (none of whom had preschool children) stayed away IMee to six days, and 42 percent (all of whom had preschool children) were absent nine to thirteen days. As distance between home and plant increased up to the fifteen-mile radius, the duration of stay away from home decreased.
An increase in the duration of evacuation was observed in respondents from the three sample communities that were outside the fifteen-mile limit. The majority of evacuation units (54 percent)left on Friday, March 30, two days after the accident and the beginning of what was termed the crisis-re-sponse period.2' An identical percentage was cited by the Rutgers study, and the NRC study reported 55 percent." The departure of so many persons that day can probably be attributed to a combination of factors. First, the governor's sheltering and evacuation directives were issued on Friday when serious con-sideration of a full evacuation first became public. Second, two major con-straints on evacuation were lifted because Friday is the end of both the work-week and the school week. Evacuees living close to the plant were likely to leave earlier than those living in the outlying communities. Whereas 77 percent of the evacuation units living within six miles cf the plant left on or before l Friday, only one-third of the evacuation units living ten or more miles away
]
evacuated on Friday. All of the evacuees who reported leaving on Monday ' lived ten or more miles from the plant. A CONCEPTUAL MooEt or STRESS-INDUcEn EvACUATJON l The decision to evacuate from the Three Mile Island area may be concep-tualized as a behavioral adjustment to the stressful environmental conditions caused by the sudden nuclear accident. Evacuation in anticipation of disaster therefore becomes a stress-management technique whereby an evacuee moves from one location to another in an effort to reduce the strain imposed by the perception cf danger.;' The stress-inducing factors during the TMI crisis were the knowlt dge that radioactivity had leaked into the environment and, more importantly, the fear of an even larger catastrophe, that is, a core meltdown, Russell R. Dynes and others. Report of the Emergency preparedriess and Response Task Force. Staff Report to the President s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Washington. D. Co U.S. Govemment pnnhng Office,1979), p 45. Dynes divided the time af ter the accident in the emergency-response penod from Wednesday, March 28 to Fnday mornmg, March 30. and the ensis-response penod, beginning on Fnday mormng, March 30.
; Bames and others, footnote 4 above, p.17. and Mountain West Research, Inc., with Socialimpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 abos e. p 24 12 5tanley D. Brunn. Spatia! Causes and Consequences of psychosocial Stress. in The Geography of Health and Disease (edited by John M Hunter; Chapel Hill, N C.: Univeruty of North Carolina.
Department of Geography.1974) pp 138-153; W. A. V Clark and Mart 9 Cadwallader, Lo. cational Stress and Residential Motiihty. Entirenenent and Beharre*, Vol. 5.19'3. pp 29-41. Harold D. Foster.The Geography of Stress. Arra. Vol. 11,1979. pp.107-10R and Juhan Wolpert. Migration as an Adjustment to Environmental Stress, fournal of Socialiswes. Vol. 22,19e 6. pp 92-102
L2 - . l f EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR D!sAsTER 13 GENERALIZED PERSON AL STRESS CURVES Doecudibrium
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3 wanewn' raunac ' inne ' 9 man ' haan ' man tonae 'nwanon'inance ' ence ' kwon ' - Fic. 5-Generahzed personal stress curves. at the plant. Only permanent relocation is a more radical adjustment to per- h ceived risk than evacuation. Less radical adaptations surfaced among TMI area residents, for example, modifications of the daily personal routine such as remaining indoors and constant tuning to local and regional news. EVACUATION-RESPONSE THRESHOLDS I At any given distance from Three Mile Island, the propensity of a household to evacuate depends on the evacuation-response thresholds of individual fam- i ily members and on the availability and the desirability of evacuation quarters ! at varying distances from the source of danger. The evacuation-response threshold is that point along an individual's personal-stress continuum when the decision to evacuate is made. Individuals with low thresholds will tend to evacuate even if they live far from the source of danger, while persons with high thresholds will evacuate only if they live very near that source. As distance ' from the plant increases, the proportion of the evacuating population decreases, I and the evacuating population includes an increased number of individuals , with low evacuation-response thresholds. The tendency of persons with low , thresholds to move farther from the stricken plant than persons with high t thresholds helps to explain the pattern of evacuation-site selection with respect l , to the two distance variables presented in the evacuation cube (Fig. 4). ' l Generalized postaccident personal stress curves offer another temporal mea- ! sure of responses to the disaster (Fig. 5). The increased perception of stress on l I Friday is apparent on both stress curves, but only the curve for the evacuees rises above the evacuation-respon.se threshold. The precipitous drop in the l evacuees' level of perceived stress on Saturday was the result of departing for
l i 14 THE CEoCRAPHICAL REVIEW SELECTION OF EVACUATioit QUARTERS I
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sueuuuk Motel shelter grEnd Nonvocational PotentionalEvacuation Quarters stress continuum Fic. 6-Selection of evacuation quarters. a destination that was considered a safe distance from the plant. Consequently equilibrium was reestablished. Evacuation may also be motivated by reasons other than the need to alle-viate stress. Some evacuees' stress curves may peak below individual evacua-tion-response thresholds, an indication that the persons may have acquiesced in the decision by their family to evacuate, even though individually they would not have taken the action. Forced evacuation by governmental author-ities and previously arranged plans to be absent would be other examples of such a phenomenon. The stress curve of an individual may also rise above the evacuation-response threshold, but evacuation is not an automatic result. For example, some individuals may have had no place to go, may have been con-fined to an institution, or may have had constraints imposed on their mobility by a job or other commitment. The possible evacuation sites that a hypothetical evacuee might consider can be entered in a matrix of the search for evacuation quarters, which iden-tifies available options (Fig. 6). Personalized stress curves may be projected along each axis of the matrix. On the basis of the map of actual evacuation destinations, the most desirable locations were between forty-five and ninety miles from the disabled reactor. The locational stress curve therefore ap-pears to dip in this range and to demarcate a zone of perceived safety. A personal or nonvocational stress curve, representing the total social and finan-
EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 15 cial strain perceived to be associated with various types of evacuation quarters, was drawn to conform to the preferences expressed by survey respondents. The curve peaks at public shelters and diminishes through motels, friends, and relatives. Although the use of second homes and campgrounds would be lim-ited by personal circumstances, they are included as potential destinations. EVACUATloN SPACE-SEARCH MATRIX In the space-search matrix the most desirable evacuation sites can be iden-tified by projecting the " lowest" segment of each stress curve into the matrix. The area, delineated in Fig. 6 by a shaded border, has three' potential sites that would be open to this particular evacuation unit. The final choice under such circumstances would be made on the basis of nonvocational factors that er ter the selection process. While locational factors would prevail to discourage the selection of evacuation sites either very near or very far from the nuclear plant, nonvocational factors would influence the selection of a specific site in the geographical zone of perceived safety. Each individual would perceive the stress associated with location and types of evacuation quarters differently. This personalized decision-making schema is only a first attempt to analyze the thinking and the planning by which individuals and families search in the surrounding territory for an acceptable evacuation destination. THE GEoCRAPHER's ROLE IN EMERGENCY-RESPONSE PLANNING Until the accident at Three Mile Island, emergency-response and evacuation planning received surprisingly little attention from either the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission or government officials. Prior to the TMI accident, NRC had required nuclear plant operators to develop emergency plans only for the fa-cility itself and the surrounding low-population zone. The zone around TMI extended only 2.2 miles from the facility. At the time of the accident, no evac-uation plans existed for the local jurisdictions in the area. Although the three closest counties had five-mile emergency response plans on file, only one plan incorporated a fully developed course of action. Two emergency plans were developed for the state at the time of the accident, but neither one had been approved by NRC.24 After noting the low priority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had accorded emergency-response planning, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island recommended that emergency plans, including evacuation, be designed for existing and proposed nuclear power plants on the basis of alternative disaster scenarios for any given plant. Scenarios would specify appropriate responses from state and utility-company officials on the bases of both the magnitude of the disaster and the distance of residents from the generating station. The commission considered a single evacuation plan based on a fixed set of distances and a fixed set of responses to be inadequate. 5
" A thorough entique of the plans in effect on March 28, 1979 and of the ad hoc plannity) docu-ments that evolved in response to the nuclear emergency is in Dynes .nd others. footnote 21 above, pp.101-169.
" The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, D. C.; U.S. Covernment Pnnung Office,1979), pp. 76-77.
s . g , , J. . . , . . . .. -. ~-- e- e= N 16 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW l In view of the minimal attention to emergency-response planning and the I recommendation of the presidential commission to identify appropriate re-sponses for a range of conditions, there seems to be ample opportunity for geographers to contribute to the design and the implementation of emergency-response plans for nuclear emergencies. The role of the geographer in emer-
, gency preparedness is considered most essential in the design of plans for evacuation and for delivery of emergency services. Expertise in spatial and locational matters is especially critical in response to nuclear accidents and other technological disasters. Specific contributions of the geographer include the identification of the areas to be evacuated on the bases of distance and direction from the disaster site, the description of the population and settle-ment geographies of the potentially affected areas as a basis for intelligent decision making, the determination of the transportation routes that would be most suitable for an evacuation, and the establishment of the locations for evacuation shelters. Additionalimportant contributions that geographers may make are the prediction of the movement patterns of evacuees in order to
. . .' regulate the mass evacuation of an area and to plan for the delivery of emer-gency services and supplies in the evacuation field, the creation of the networks for the communication of disaster information and for the delivery of emer-gency services in the zone of evacuation, and the identification of the locations that would be most difficult to evacuate because of physical constraints, per-sonal immobility, or attitudinal resistances.
In addition to the magnitude of the accident, other factors may require the formulation of contingency plans to cope with the invisible danger and de-struction associated with a nuclear emergency. Evacuation, particularly if it
., begins as a voluntary process, will vary according to the season of the year, the day of the week, the specific weather conditions, and the availability of gasoline supplies. Factors unique to the affected area will also need to be con-sidered in anticipating the public response to an evacuation order, particularly rural-urban population mix, automobile ownership, ownership of campers, vans, and second homes, available public transportation, proportion of the population confined to institutions, location of friends and relatives, obstruc-
, tions in the transportation network, and extent of cooperation among local governments. A clear understanding of responsibilities and prior planning of appropriate emergency responses will help to facilitate evacuation from nuclear and other technological disasters.
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ATTACHMENT 5 i o
BEHAVIOR DURING A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY: REACTIONS OF EPZ RESIDENTS TO A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT AT THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION September, 1987 l I Prepared for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by Social Data Analysts, Inc.
i !' o I b' l TABLE OF CONTENTS m lL L About Social - Data Analysts, Inc........................... 2
! E x e c u' t i v e S umm a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-
' De s c rip t io n of Se ab rook ' Su rv ey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
' Some L Importa nt Results of the Seab rook; Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
' At t i tudes Towa rd Nucle a r Powe r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Vo l u n t a ry E v a c u a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Correlates ~ of Evacuation I nte ntions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ;
A Failure to Comply with Protective Action R e c omm e nd a t i o ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Tab le 1* Re s po ns e s b'y S t a t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
' Table 2: Response of EPZ Reside nts 'to a Ge neral Dn e rg e ncy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Table 3 At t i tude s towa rd Nuclear Powe r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Table 4: Failure to follow Protective Action Re comme nda t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. 36 Table'5: Failure to Comply with an Evacuation Advisory ...................................... 37
. Te c h n i c a l A p p e nd i x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 i
Sample............................................... 40 i Selection of Respondents. . . . ........................ 43 I n t e rv i e w i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 I n t e rv i ewe r I ns t ruc t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 'I Ve ri fi c a t io n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-......................... 47 Outcome s a nd Re spo nse Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 De sig n of Que s t io nna i re. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 Da t a E nt ry a nd S amp l i ng E r ro r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table A-1: Tow ns i ncluded i n the S ample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Table A-2: Zip Codes includes in the Sample. . . . . . . . . 56 Table A-3: Failure to Complete: Number of Telephone Numbe rs Dialed and Outcome by State. . . . . . . . . 57 .l Questionnaire: New Hanpshi re ve rs ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 j Questionnaire: Massachusetts ve rsion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 _.s
7 ABOUT SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS. INC Social Data Analysts, Inc. is a Long Island based research and polling company that has conducted more than 150 social surveys in the last fif teen years. Clients have included Newsday, The Boston Globe, The Baltimore Sun, Brookhaven National Laboratories, Columbia University, the University of California at Irvine, the_ National Bureau of Economic Research Suf folk Cou nty - ( New York) , the State of California, and the Long Island Lighting Company. Social Data Analysts adheres to the code of ethics of the American ! Association of Public Opinion Researchers. Dr. Stephen Cole is President of Social Data Analysts. Dr. Cole, who received his Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University in 1967, is also a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is the author of seven books, including a popular research methods text and more than 30 articles published in journals such 1as Science, Scientific kmerican, American l Sociological Review, American Journal _ of Sociology, and Public Opinion Ouarterly. ;
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' Executive Summary
(" f At' the L request' of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Social-L
' Data Analysts, Inc. conducted a survey among a sample of 1,404 residents of the Dmergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the
'Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The survey is based upon a stratified - random sample .of households inJboth the New Hampshire and' Massachusetts portions of the EPZ. The sample Was selected by Survey Sampling Inc. : of Fairfield, Connecticut, unde r instructions from Social Data Analysts, Inc. The survey was conducted on the telephone. The telephone. interviewi ng . was conducted by MKTG. Inc. of Isl-ip, New York. Either the male or female : head of household was interviewed and asked what1 the f amily.
would do in case of various accidents which could occur at Seabrook Station. In addition, other information which -was needed by consultants. to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was collected. Some of this information had- the purpose of making accurate evacuation tine estimates for the EPZ. ' The results of the survey were generalizable to all households with telephones within the EPZ. The sampling error for the survey is plus or ~minus three percentage points. The survey found that the New Hampshire reside nts ' of the Seabrook EPZ are Hin general, opposed to nuclear power and are highly fearful of being exposed to dangerous levels of radiation during . a potential' accident at the station. Sixty-two percent of the New Hampshire respondents interviewed said that they were opposed to the operation of Seabrook.
- The survey found that in case of an accident in which people on the beaches and the tstate parks were advised to evacuate; but residents of the EPZ were not given any advice as to protective actions, more than 50% would attempt to evacuate.
Thus, the assumptions about voluntary evacuation made in the New Hampshire plans seem to be unrealistic. The data indicated that- the propensity of people to voluntarily evacuate was influenced by their pre-existing fear of exposure to radiation frea nuclear power plants. Thirteen percent of New Hampshire households in the EPZ would require public transportation for the evacuation of one or more household members. The transit dependent population is about 7,000; a figure significantly higher then that utilized in the New Hampshire emergency plan. Finally, the survey found a surprisingly large minority of respondents who said that they would not evacuate even in the case of a General Emergency in which all residents of the EPZ were advised to evacuate.
l Description of the Survey I In connection with litigation currently being conducted l before the Atomic Safety Licensing Board, the Massachusetts j l Attorney General's of fice retained a group of consultants to i analyze the adequacy of the evacuation plan submitted for the
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Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. In order to aid the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its consultants in assessing the adequacy of 'the Seabrook Evacuation Plan, Social Data Analysts, Inc. con-ducted a random sample survey _ anong 1 404 residents of the Evacuation Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. A primary aim of this survey was to provide the Commonwealth and its consultants with the data necessary to assess the adequacy of the current plan submitted for the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ. In particular we wanted to collect data which would allow us to assess the accuracy of certain key assumptions about behavior utilized by those who generated the eva-cuation time estimates utilized in the Seabrook evacuation plan. The survey was conducted only among residents living within the EPZ. In order to make sure that the proportion of people in the survey in each town in the EPZ matched the proportion of people in the population, a stratified random sampling procedure was utilized. The number of interviews completed in each town was determined by the proportion of the total EPZ population residi ng in that town. (For details on how the sample was selected and the survey administered, see the Technical Appe ndix (beginning on p.40) . We completed a total of 915 interviews with residents living in the New Hampshire portion of i
f u l ' the EPZ and a' total' of: 489' interviews with residents liv'ing in; the Massachusetts portion of.the EPZ.
. Answers 1 given to 'most of ' the questions contai ned in it'he l L
' questionnaire, ' broke n down by whether the : responde nt lived in
- the ' state :of Massachusetts or New Hampshire, :are presented in Table l (beginning on p. 15). Some of the data collected in the survey were' to beLutilizedL in a traf fic simulation computer model which calculates evacuation time estimates. Some of these' data are i
difficult to provide in tabular-form but are ' availab'le on - a { l a computer tape by request from Social Data Analysts,~Inc. Since not all questions were relevant for both Massachusetts and New Hampshire residents, two similar but. slightly ; dif ferent '
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. versions of' the questionnaire were utilized.
Both forms of the questionnaire appear in the Technical Appendix. (See-pages 58 to 84). Although the role of So.cial Data Analysts, Inc. in this study was primarily one of data collection, in this report we will point out 'come of the significant results of the survey.- The data will be analyzed in detail by other consultants to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the substantive conclusions f rom their. analysis will be presented in their own j reports. Some Important Results of the Seabrook burvey Attitudes toward Nuclear Power Prior research by social scientists has indicated that people in the United states are highly afraid of exposure to radiation released from a nuclear power plant. Research conducted
1 1
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.g ~by Slovic, etJ alf has found that people fear a nuclear power plant accident' more. than anyf other disaster agent except warf are and 30 terrorism.1 - 'In a recent study, Lindell and Barnes have concluded that the ' fear. people have of exposure to radiation during a radiological emergency is f ar greater than the risk as assessed by nuclear e ngineers and < scie ntists. 2 The current . survey found the residents of the Seabrook' EPZ to have strong fears of, nuclear. power and. found .the majority of people -
were opposed to nuclear power (See Table 1) . Sixty-Five percent are opposed to the operation of the Seabrook plant (O. 16) and 58%
' define themselves as' " opponents" of nuclear power plants (O.15).
Only 20%' believe that it would not be dangerous at all to live near a nuclear . power plant (O. 14). When asked how likely it . was. that they and their f amilies would be exposed . to a dangerous level of ra'd iation af ter hearing an accident scenario that recommended no protective actions' for any residents of the EPZ although it did-announce that the beaches had been closed and that the people on the beaches and in the state parks had been directed 'to leave the area immediately (O. 20) , 50% said that it was "ve ry likely" (O. 42) th'at they and their f amilies would be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. And 72% believe that it is possible for an accident as serious as that at Chernobyl to take place at Seabrook (O. 347). 1 P. Slovic, P. Liechtenstein and B. Fischoff, " Images of Disaster: Perception and Acceptance of Risks f rom Nuclear Powe r , " in G.T. Goodman and W. D. Rowe, ed. Energy Risk Management (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 2 Michael K. Lindell and Valerie E. Barnes, " Protective Response to Technological Emergency: Risk Perception and Behavioral I nte nt io n, " Nuclear Safety, Oct-Dec., 1986, p. 464.
Voluntary Evacuation - Onerof the. primary aims of the survey lwas to find out .what l residents of the EPZ would do in case of an' accident' at the I Seabrook Nucl' ear Power ' Station. Therefore the survey contained j 1 several scenarios which we read to the . respondents and then we asked them what they would do under such a circumstance. The i scenarios 'were based as closely as 'possible on the actual Emerge ncy. Broadcast System (EBS) messages contained in the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP), Rev. 2 (Aug.~1986)
.The1first scenario asks the respondents to assume - that they and their whole f amily -were at home on a hot sunny Sunday-af ternoon in July at c2 p.m. The aim of this scenario is to find out what people might do in case an accident occurred at Seabrook =
while the beaches-located near the plant were heavily in use. The EBS message announces that the beaches have been closed and advises' all people on the beaches and in the state park areas of Seabrook, Hampton and Salisbury to leave 'the area immediately but it does not advise any residents of the EP2 to take any protective action. (For the exact wording of the question on this scenario, see Question 20 in both the Massachusetts and the New Hampshire versions of the questionnaire. ) One of the main purposes of this question was to estimate the size of the group of residents who would evacuate under these circumstances without being instructed
- to do so. This phenomenon is sometimes called " voluntary evacuation. "
In emergency situations, whether they be caused by natural i
V U or.unnaturallcauses, the public is conf ronted with the problem of how to protect itself from harm caused by ' the disaster agent. Emergency ' resp,.nse of ficials may recommend that the population which'they believe to be at risk should take certain specified protective actions. In the scenario we are discussing here, I_ none of the residents' of the EPZ were advised to evacuate or ~ to ( L take any other protective action although people on the beaches and in the state parks were advised to leave the area immediately.
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It is possible in emergency situations that people who are eventually asked to take -some kind of protective action, in this case those -living within the EPZ, would decide by themselves or
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" voluntarily" that they should take that protective action before they.are advised to do so. It is also possible that people who are aever asked by energency response officials to take a protective action will decide by themselves or " voluntarily" th' t athey are at risk and will take some protective action. Voluncary evacuation is the evacuation by people who have not, at the time, been advised to evacuate by emergency -response of ficials.
In regard to radiological emergencies this phenomenon has been- labeled by Professors James H. Johnson and Donald J. l Zeigler as the " evacuation shadow" ef fect. Their studies of the actual response of people to the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) and the potential responses of Long . Island residents to an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear power plant suggested that in emergencies involving radiation "a large portion of the population outside the of ficially designated zone of danger (as well as persons within the designated zone of danger who were not i 1
_9_
.o advised to evacuate) will voluntarily move away from the perceived
( source of danger. d 3 In Ltheir' study of what. actually happened at . TMI, Zeigler and Johnson found that' although only ._ about 2,500 people were advised to evacuate, approximately 144,000 or about~ 39% of f the populat' ion' within a 15 mile radius of the plant actually evacuated. Since the initial work conducted by Zeigler a nd. Joh nson, there' have been several other surveys conducted by social scientists attempting to predict the response of the public to potential radiological emergencies. Virtually all of these surveys suggest that there- will be significant evacuation shadow effects in a radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant. According to a March :25, 1987 affidavit of Dr. De nnis Mileti, Profest.or of Sociology at Colorado State University, the maximum size of the evacuation-shadow in a radiological emergency at Seabrook would be 25% (p. 14). This ' estimate is not based upon any evidence other than an ad-hoc extrapolation' from what happened at TMI. Dr. .Mileti's estimate did not take into account the seriousness of the theoretical accident or other important I variables. Based upon the data collected in the current survey it appears as if Dr. Mileti has grossly underestimated the size of the potential evacuation shadow in the event of a radiological eme rge ncy at Seabrook Station. If we examine the responses given 3 Testimony of 2eigler and Johnson on contention 23 1982 hearings on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station evacuation plan I
to the first scenario, that in which only people on the beach and [ state park areas were advised to leave those areas; but no one l L residing in the EPZ was advised to take any protective action, we find that 52% of the f amilies in the EPZ would evacuate when they ! heard the EBS message. Fif ty percent of New Hampshire EPZ residents and 56% of Massachusetts residents of the EPZ said that they would evacuate. These data suggest then that even a minor accident at Seabrook could result in a substantial evacuation shadow exceeding 50% of the EPZ population. In this research we have not attempted to estimate the size of any evacuation shadow for residents living i outside the EPZ. But other research, including that done on TMI and on Shoreham suggest that there would .be a large voluntary evacuation of residents living outside the EPZ. Such an evacuation would 'make it harder for people living within the EPZ to evacuate and further increase the evacuation time estimates. The second scenario attempted to find out what EPZ reside nts would do if the first scenario (O. 20) were to evolve into a situation in which a General Emergency would be declared, residents of Hampton Falls and Seabrook were advised to evacuate, and all other EPZ residents were advised to shelter in place. The only respondents who were asked this question were those who did not say they would evacuate af ter hearing the first scenario. I n orde r to assess the behavioral intentions of all f amilies in the EPZ we combined the results to questions 20 and 31. The data are ]
}
presented in Table 2 (beginning on p.32) . In this table we have classified the respondents into three groups: those who would have I
~11-voluntarily evacuated af ter hearing the first EBS message, those who would have voluntarily evacuated af ter hearing the second EBS message (this does not include the residents of Hampton and Seabrook who were advised to evacuate), and those who would have f ollowed the recomme ndations mado in both messages. Included in the last group were residents of Hampton and Seabrook who did not say they would evacuate af ter hearing the first EBS message but did say they would evacuate af ter hearing the second, and residents of all other towns who did not say they would evacuate af ter hearing both EBS messages. In Table 2 we can see that by 4 p.m. in the afternoon, two hours af ter the first EBS message had been b roadcas t, 66% of the f amilies in the EP2 would have already begun preparing for or actually engaging in a voluntary evacuation. Only 3,4 % of the f amilies in the EPZ would have followed the recommendations of both EBS messages.
Although the questionnaire contained two other accident scenarios (O. 27 4 a nd O. 312) the responses to these questions are not relevant to the issue of evacuation shadow because in these scenarios all residents of the EPZ were advised to evacuate, thus eliminating the possibility of voluntary evacuation for EPZ residents but not eliminating this possibility for residents out-side the EPZ which were not included in this survey. Correlates of Evacuation Intentions Most soci al scientists studying the response of the public to radiological emergencies agree ,that whether or not the public complies with protective action recommendations depends primarily l upon two f actors: pre-existing fear of exposure to radiation and
the information the public receives during the accident (includi ng the official EBS messages).4 The data collected in this survey support the results of prior research conducted by Social Data Analysts that intention to evacuate is significantly correlated with the attitude of the respondent toward nuclear power and radiation. Those people who have high levels of fear of exposure to radiation will be the most likely to be opposed to nuclear power and will be the most likely to say that they would voluntarily evacuate i n a radiological eme rgency. Above we showed ti.at the permanent resident population of the Seabrook EPZ was opposed to nuclear power and had high levels of f ear of exposure to radiation during a nuclear power plant accident. In Table 3 we show responses to the first scenario broken down by the respondent's attitudes toward nuclear power and fear of radiation. Those people with the most negative attitudes towards nuclear power and with the highest level of fear of nuclear power were the most likely to say they would voluntarily evacuate. For example, 68% of those who believe that livi ng near a nuclear 4 See M.K. Li ndell a nd B . E . Barnes, op c_it. Dennis Mileti and John Sorenson, testimony provided before ASLB concerning Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant in Suf folk County, New York. James Johnson, Donald J. Zeigler and Stanley D. Bru nn ,
" Evacuation from the Nuclear Technological Disaster at Three Mile Island," The Geographical Review, Vol. 17, pp.1-16 1981.
J. Joh nso n, D.J. Zeigler, " Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emerge ncies," Economic Geograp_h,y, Vol. 59, pp.386-402. 1983 James Joh nson, "Pla nni ng for Spontaneous Evacuation During a Radiological Eme rge ncy ," Nuclear Sa fe t,y, Vol. 25, pp. 186-194. 1964.
powe r. plant is - very dangerous: as compared with 26% of those. who
~
'said living L near a nuclear power plant is L not dangerous. at all said
( they would~ voluntarily evacuate. af ter hearing' the first EBS
~
L message. These results lead to the conclusion 1 that voluntary ,
~
f evacuation is heavily influenced by pre-existing fear of nuclear-power; and exposure to radiation. Failure _to Comply with ' Protective Action Recomme ndations - The extent to which the public.will follow the advice given in the EBS messages is one of the critical f actors 'which is not-generally known. .The data collected in this survey suggests'that j in all tim scenarios significant portions of the public would not follow the recommendations of the ' EBS messages. In Table 4 we show the proportions of the population in the EPZ who would not follow the recommendations in each of the scenarios included in the survey. 5-We have already pointed out above that there would be significant voluntary evac 0ations for the first two scenarios. , 1 The data in Table 4 bring to light another significant problem with the _ Seabrook evacuation plan. In the case of a General . 1 Emergency in which a]UL residents of the EPZ are advised to evacuate, .one' quarter of the respondents said that they would not i' evacuate and would remain in the zone. Although this study does not allow us to determine why so many f amilies would not follow -the 5 This calculaton was not possible at this time for the last scenario (0 312) since whether or not the respondent was inside or outside of the EPZ at the time of the accident had not yet been calculated.
'l
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _m___m W
R i j protective action. recommendation ' to evacuate, L it is possible that-this results f rom - a lack of' clarity in' the EBS messages. It is also possible that'the. people who said that.they would not. evacuate did not perceive themselves at risk either because of 4 where they lived or because. of their pre-exisiting attitudes toward
, nuclear' powerfand radiation. Data on this hypothesis are presented in Table 5' .
It turns out - that1 the respor. dent's' perception of how Lf ar they live from the Seabrook plant -is .not substantially related ' -) to whether .they would evacuate when advised. Attitudes:towards nuclear. power are moderately correlated with whether or not the respondent would evacuate when advised. Thus 38% of those who said ' that livi ng near a nuclear power plant was "not. dangerous: ac all"- said that they would not evacuate when advised as compared with only 20% of those who said that living near a. nuclear power plant . is very dangerous. i i l
)
i i
- J:
Table 1 i .
.. Responses by[ State New
-Hampshire- _ Mas s achuse t ts '
E '6.*isex, Total malo . 46% 48% 47% female 54 52 '53
. TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (1404)
- 14. In -ge neral,. how da ngerous do1 you think it would be to live near a nuclear.
. power plant?
.l very dangerous :!
39% 54% 44%
- d a nge rous I
' 33 29 32 not dangerous at all !
23- 14 20' don' t know 4 3 4 l TOTAL 99% 100% 100% (1402)
- 15. Would you describe yourself'as:
a supporter of nuclear power' plants' as a means of providing electricty 24% 17% ;21% an. opponent of nuclear
' power plants, or 55 65 1 58 you haven' t made up
. your mind yet on this issue 20 17 19 don' t know 1 1 1 TOTAL 100% 100% 99% (1404) !
- 16. Do you think that the Seabrook nuclear power plant should be allowed to operate to generate >
electricity? I yes 32% 24% 29% no 62 70 65 do n' t k now 6 7 6 4 TOTAL ) 100% 101% 100% (1404) l
Ouestion numbers correspond to those on questionnaire, 4 j
The number of cases for each question is in parentheses.
]
l i I I l
'!N % .g : Table 1 continued...... New Hampshire Massachusetts Total 17.. ' Give n where . you live, do you think : you would tx3 af fected. by a release of radiationJif-a seriou's problem developed at the Soabrook nuclear- power . station af ter it started a ope rati ng? ; yes 86% 92% 88%- rus - 10 5- 8 don' t know 3 4 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% -(1401)
- -18..'In a direct line, about' how'many miles is your home f rom . the Seab rook nuclear power station?
O to 2 miles 14% 8% 12% 3 to 5. miles 14 34 21
- 6 to 10 miles 40 52 44 more than 10 miles 32 6 23 TOTAL 100% 100% '100% (1349)
[For the wording of the scenario, see the quest-ionnaire in the Technical Appe ndix. ]
- 30. When you . heard this message on the radio, would you and members '
of your f amily: go about your normal busi ness 6% 5% 6% stay inside your home 38 32 '36 leave your home and go somewhere else 50 56 52 don' t know 5 7 6 TOTAL 99% 100% 100% (1403.1
+ . ; a us , c
/
N 'I .. ; , st .
'i / ' ' ' ~ ~
,[yj:
'~'
- y. LTable" 1) 'conti nued. . . . . . .
J.gs New M ', > Hampshire. Massachusetts . Total u ;21. Where would_youigo?- l o (That is,the place ~you^ would-expect toispend'. , !.; . .the night) 'l i 7". Ementionsia specific town 52% 44%
. does n' t . me ntion a . specific 49%'
srr . town' 48- 56 51
. TOTAL ,
100%- 100% 100%' -(734)
- 24. Where-would'you go?1*
1 mentions; a specific state 60%. 48% 55% doesn' t, mention a specific stateJ .40 '52 45
-TOTAL 100%
1 100% 100% (734)! i ' In a' direct line, .about
'2 6. ; how ma ny. miles. is your final' destination-from g
.your home?. I 10 miles or less ' 2% '2% 2%
11'~ to 25 miles 7' 10' 8 26 to,50 miles' 18 :19 19 51 to'100 miles 23 18 21 more than 100 miles 19' 14' -17 don' t know 31 -38 33 TOTAL '100% 101% 100%~ (734)
- 29. Counting yourself, how manyl people in ;
your household will
' be evacuating? I
)
one 12% 11% 11% ! two 29 23 29 three 22 22 four' 22 24 23 24 five 9 12-six 10 i 3 3 3 1
.seven 0 0 eight 0 0 0 0 don' t know 1 O O
. TOTAL 100% 99% 99% (734) 1 Only those who answered # 3 for Question 20.
Continuation of O. 21, pertaining to name of a state.
Table 1 conti nued. . . . . . New Hampshire Massachusetts Total
- 30. How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily use to evacuate? 1 o ne 80% 79% 80%
two 14 17 15 three 2 2 2 four 1 0 1 five 0 0 0 six or more 0 0 0 no vehicles 2 1 1 do n' t k now 2 1 1 TOTAL 101% 100% 100% (733) [For the wording of the scenario (0 31) see the quest-ionnaire in the Technical Appe ndix)
- 31. When you heard this message on the radio would you and members of your f amily: 2 go about your normal business 4% 2% 3%
stay inside your home 66 68 67 leave your home and go somewhere else 22 18 21 do n' t know 8 12 9 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (666)
- 32. Where would you go?
(That is the place you would expect to spe nd the night)3 mentions a specific town 47% 40% 45% doesn' t me ntion a specific town 53 60 55 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (138) 1 Only those who answered # 3 . for Question 20. 2 Only those who did not a nswer # 3 for Question 20. 3 Only those who answered # 3 for Ouestion 31.
1 Table 1 conti nued. . . . . . New Hampshire Massachusetts Total
- 35. Where would you go73
- mentions a specific state 52% 58% 54%
doesn' t mention a specific state- 48 (2 46 TOTAL- 100% 100% < 100% (138)
- 37. In a direct line, about how many miles is. your final destination f rom your home? 3 10 miles or less 8% 5% 7%
11' to 25 miles 8 13 9 26 to 50 miles 22 13 20 51 to 100 miles 17 16 17 more than 100 miles 13 10 12 don' t know 32 42 35 TOTAL 100% 99% 100% (138)
- 40. Cou nti ng you rsel.~ ,
how many people in your household will be evacuating? 3 o ne 5% 8% 6% two 44 37 42 three 32 26 30 four 11 18 13 five 5 10 6 six 1 0 1 seven 1 0 1 eight 0 0 0 don' t know 1 0' 1 TOTAL 100% 99% 100% (138) 3 Only those who answered # 3 f or Question 31.
- Continuation of O. 3 2, p'ertaining to naning a specific state.
l
,g , ,;,,g , Table 1 continued. . . . . .
- ' New
[/ l Hampshire, Massachusetts ' Total l'
'41. :: How ma ny of your --
; vehicles would .-you and
?'. ' your.' f amily ' use to:
evacuate?'3
, g' one. 83% '8 4 % 83%
'two- 11 13 12
- th ree - 1 .0 1-four, 0- 0 0 five. 0 .0 0 six or more 0 0 0
-no vehicles 3 0 2 don' t know - 2 .' 3 2
. TOTAL- 100% 100% 100% (138)'-
.4 2. : When you: heard t'his -
messagelon the radio how -likely do you 'think it.would be that you-and your. f amily would be exposed to a dangerous level of radiation? very likely 46% 59%. 50%- somewhat likely 28 17 24 very unlikely 13 8 11 depends upon conditions 7 A1 8 don' t ' know 6 5 6 TOTAL 100% 100% 99% -(1403) 269. L And ' now . could you tell me the name of your assigned host community [ and reception center in. the event an evacuation was- ordered for your town.
. knows host community 11% 13% 12% .i doesn' t know host -{
community 89 67 88 I TOTAL. 100% 100% 100% (1404) 3 Only those who answered i 3 f or Question 31. =__-__-_-__-_-_-
l l l Table 1 conti nued. . . . . . New
~ Hampshire Massachusetts Total
[For the wording of the ! scenario (0 274) see the question-naire in the Technical Appendix] l 274. When you heard this message on the radio, q would you and members i of your f amily: go about your normal busi ness 3% 3% 3% l a l stay inside your home 22 19 21 leave your home and go somewhere else 71 71 71 don' t know 5 7 6 : TOTAL 101% 100% 101% (1401) 375.. Where would you go? (That is the place you would expect to spe nd the night) 4 mentions a specific town 69% 70% 70% doesn' t mention a specific town 31 30 30 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (993) 278. Where would you go? 4* mentions a specific state 73% 73% 73% doesn' t me ntion a specific ; state 27 27 27 l TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (993) 306. In a direct line, about how many miles is your final destination from your home? 4 10 miles or less 5% 4% 4% 11 to 25 miles 21 34 25 26 to 50 miles 23 16 21 51 to 100 miles 16 11 14 more than 100 miles 13 12 13 do n' t k now 2'2 24 23 TOTAL 100% 101% 100% (993) 4 Only those who answered # 3 on Question 274. Continuation of O. 275, pertaining to naning a specific state.
^
pi .
/:;iH -
p0 ' < w j
- y. ,
h , L -j gv4 ;, .
~ Table 1 Leonti nued. . . . . ..
]
% ^
New- i Hampshire M ssachusetts- Total. l
}
l
, 309. - Counting yourself, '!
1 ' how many: people: in
.your household.will be evacuat'ing? 4
- o ne.- 12% 11% 11%.
two~ 31 28 30 three 26 23 25 B four 20 24 22 five 8 '10 9 six- 2 2 2 seven- 1 1 1
! e igh t' .
0 0 0-d o n' t: k now '-
. 0 1 0 TOTAL. 100% 100% 100% -(993).
310. How many of your
. vehicles would you and your f amily use to evacuate? 4 one 82% 79% 81%
two 12 17 14 three 2 2 2 four 1 0 1 five 0 0 0 six or more 0 0 0 no vehicles. 2' 2 2 don' t know 1 0 1 TOTAL 100% 100% 101% (993) 4, Only those who answered # 3 for Question 274.
Table l ' conti nued. . . . . . New Hampsh ire _ Massachusetts Total _ 311. Suppose there was an accident at the Seabrook Station and the State Civil Defense officials said that everybody living within 10 miles of the plant should evacuate but everybody who lived more than 10 miles from the plant was safe. Would you believe the State Civil Defense of ficials that people living more than 10 miles away were safe? yes 22% no 15% 20% 68 75, don' t know 9 71 10 10 TOTAL 99% 100% 101% (1403: 312. Now suppose it was 10:30 a.m. on a Tuesday in April and you and each of your f amily members were at the place each of you normally are on such a day when you heard on the radio the last message ordering a general evacuation. In addition, the message said, "All schools within the towns advised to evacuate are being evacuated to the predesignated Reception Centers for the town in which they are located. Parents should not drive to school to meet their children since the children are being bused directly to Reception Centers. " Would you: go about your normal business 4% 8% stay inside where you are 25 18 6% leave the place you are 23 a nd go somewhere else 65 don' t know 66 66 5 7 l 6 I TOTAL 99% k 99% 101% (1393) I
/
6 i
- Tab'le t i?~conti nued. . . . . ..
J New , d (Hampshire' Massachusetts Total
.313."Where wouldayou.go?
;(That is the place where you would expect
<tolspend the night).5
- mentionsLa specific' town 70% 68%
doesn' t mention a specific 69%- stownL '30 32 31-TOTAL. 100% 100% 100% '(913)' 1316. Where'.would you go? 5
- mentions! a spec ific'siate - 73% 72%
doesn' t - mention a ' specific 72% state 27 28 28 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (913) 318. Would you stop. anywhere along the way to pick up f amily membe rs , ~ f rie nds and/or personal belongings at home? 5 yes 40% no 44% 41% 57 51 55 don' t know 3 4 3 TOTAL 100% 99% 99% (908) 334.; Would these stops, in total, take you at all out of the way - you f i'nte ndid to go? 6 no 45% 39% 43% yes, less than one mile 10 8 yes, one to five miles 9 15 22 18 yes, .six to ten miles 15 15 15 eleven or more- miles 13 15 14 don' t know 2 1 2 TOTAL 100% 100% 101% (376) 5 6 only those who answered # 3 for Question 312.
-* Only those who answered # 1 for Question 318.
Continuation of O. 313. pertaining to naning a specific state.
- Table 1 conti nued. . . . . .
New i Hampshire Massachusetts Total 335. In a direct li ne , about ; l-how many miles is your final destination from the place you normally are at 10. 30 a.m. on a weekday in April? 5 10 miles or less 10% 10% 10% 11 to 25 miles 19 25 21 26 to 50 miles 22 20 51 to 100 miles 22 14 8 12 more than 100 miles 13 10 12 don' t know 22 26 23 TOTAL 100% 99% 100% (913) 338. Counting yourself, how many people in your house-hold will be evacuating? 5 { i one 14% 11% 13% two 30 28 30 three 24 24 24 four 20 25 22 five 9 10 9 six 2 1 2
.s eve n 0 0 0 eight 0 0 0 do n' t k now 1 0 0 TOTAL 100% 99% 100% (913) 339. How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily j use to evacuate? 5 'I one 78% 75% 77%
two 15 j 20 17 three 2 l 2 2 four 1 l 0 0 five 0 1 0 0 six or more 0 0 0 i no vehicles 2 1 2
)
don' t know 2 1 2 j TOTAL 100% 99% 100% (912) l l 5 Only those who answered # 3 on Questions 312. l
m, m
. X- Table 1' continued......
,y New L
' Hampshire Total.
3 4 0.
- Is the re ' a nyo ne i n you r.
f amily who is bedridden,. handicapped or who. . needs special evacuation assistance?! no . 95% 95%- yes' and ~ have already registered-with.N.H. Civil Defense ~ 2 :2
- yes but have not yet registered' with N.H.
Civil Defense' 3- 3
. TOTAL 100%- 100% (914) 341. ' How many ' individuals in your household would need'
.public transportation. in order to evacuate?.
o ne - 7% -7% two 4 4 three' 1 1 four 1 1 five- 0 .0 six or more 0 0 no one 87 87
' don' t know 0 0
' TOTAL 100% 100% (912)
'342 . Do you play any . assigned role in the evacuation
_ plan? no 96% 96% yes 3- 3
. do n' t know 0 0
. TOTAL- 99% 99% (915) t
*' Ouestions 340 thru 346 pertain only to the New Hampshire Questionnaire.
l l
- l 0
( ., LTable,.1 continued' 4 i New. i
-Hampshire -Total 1 I' .
.)
- 343.1 What 'assignme nt do you s
;havez in: the event of an evacuation?;7 policei 27% 27%
f i re - 18- 18 traffic control 5 5
' ~ school bus . driver 23. 23 j special' emergency bus - j
,._ d rive r 5
.5
' ambula nce/assig ned - 1 doctor or nurse 14 14 offi'cial radio or 'i television position: ~!
9 9- l TOTAL .Li 101% 101% (22) -j "
.i l344.~ -Supposef that. the Seabrook -1 nuclear power station is licensed and- begins i
' to operate. . If there were 1 a problem at the plant and
, you baard that a 10 mile j zone had to evacuate, what !
would.you'do<first? 7
. report to my assigned !
i
-place to help the '
evacuation 53% 53% make sure my f amily was i safely out'of the. E L evacuation zone 40 40 leave the evacuation I zone to.make sure I . was in a safe place 3 3 something else 3 3 TOTAL 99% 99% (30) 7' Only those who answered # 2 to Question 342. 1 l l
'..j:; . ;
'28-n
- Table ? l conti nued. . . . . .
N , New l -f Hampshire. Total L. 345.. .How would ' you imake sure that your. f amily was safely out of thef evacuation zone? 8 go homeiand' drive' your. f amily to a safe place
-out of the evacuation
- zo ne 9% 9%-
call- home andi tell your
- f amily' to leave without you .. 73- 73 some other-.way 18 18
' TOTAL 100% 100% (11) q 346. IfL there was a nuclear 1 accident at Seabrook "
Station requiring 'the evacuation. of people
.within a 10 mile zone, how dangerous do you .
think it would be for i you to . spend several hours -in your emergency assig nme nt? 7 so dangerous - that ' it would.be. life th reate ning 26% 26% very dange rous. 16 16 , somewhat dangerous 23 23 l not dangerous 19 19 don' t know 16 16 TOTAL 100% 100% (31) 1 7 Only those who answered # 2 to Question 342. 8' Only those' who answered # 2 to Question 344. I
1 Table .1 conti nued. . . . . . Massachusetts- ' Total
.340.'* Is there anyone in your f amily ' who is. bedridden, \
. handicapped or who j needs.special evacuation assistance?
I no 93% 93% yes 7 7 TOTAL. 100% 100% .(489) 341.* How many individuals in
.your household would need public- transportation in order to evacuate?
one 9% 9% two 3 3 three 2 2 four 0 0 five. 0 0 six or more 0 0 no one 84 84
. don' t . k now 1 1 TOTAL-99% 99%- (488)
New Hampshire Massach'usetts Total 347. Last spring a major nuclear accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the. Soviet Union. Do you think that it is possible for as serious an accident to occur at the Seabrook nuclear power plant if the power. plant is put into i ope ration? yes 70% 76% 72% no. 25 19 23 do n' t k now 6 6 6 TOTAL 101% 101% 101% (1402) 0-Questions 340 and 341 pertain only to Massachusetts Questionnaire. l l l' u________ -- - - _ - - - - -
Table 1 conti nued. . . . . . New Hampshire Massachusetts Total 348. Currently plans are to have Civil Defense of ficials supervise an evacuation if this should become necessary. If as a result of an accident at Seabrook, you decided to leave the area and a Traf fic Control of ficial who was assigned to preve nt traf fic congestion told you not to drive on a road that you wanted to use, do you think you would: go where you wanted to go 31% 34% 32% go where you were told ; to go 56 48 53 don' t know 13 18 15 TOTAL 100% 100% 100% (1397)- 349. Does your f amily have a plan of what each member would do and where they would go in the event of an accident at seabrook Station? yes 18% 16% 18% no 81 83 82 don' t know 0 1 1 TOTAL 99% 100% 101% (1400)~ 360. How many vehicles are owned, leased and/or rented in total by members of your ' household? o ne 27 % 28% 27% - two 46 48 47 j three 17 15 16 q four 5 4 5 five 1 2 2 six or more 1 0 1 no vehicles 2 2 2 d o n' t k now 0 0 0 ) TOTAL 99% 99% 100% (1398) l
. ., Table 1 ' co nti nued. . . . . . .
1 l' New l Hampshire Massachusetts Total
'361. Wh'at is the last~
grade of-. school ~ that you completed?- some high' school or less- 6% 10%' .8% high school graduate .33 33 33
- some college .
'23 18 21 college graduate: 37- 39 38 TOTAL. 99% 100% 100% -(1387)'
.362. Do you or any members --
..l'
' of - your immediate _ f amily
- curre ntly work.' for -
Public Service of New Hampshire?
;yes 3% 1% 3%
no 97 99 97 TOTAL 100%' 100% 100% (1398)- 363.- Do you or any membe rs ' of your immediate family. curre ntly. . work at . the Seabrook Station, . either for Seabrook or. any sub-co ntrac to r? 9 yes' 54% 14% 46%
,no 46 86 54 TOTAL' 100% 100% 100% (.35)'
9 Only those who answered # 1 in Question 362. - L._2__________-______.:__-________. - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ __ - .b
- TABLE 2 *
~
Response of EPZ ~ Residents to a General Emergency
- . (Combined Responses To Questions 20 and 31)
New Hampshire Massachusetts Total
. Voluntary evacuation ' af ter hearing' first EBS message 53% 61% 56%-
Voluntary evacuation' af ter hearing second EBS message 11 8 '10
> Follow protective action j
- recomme ndations *
- 36 30 '34 TOTAL 100% 99% 100%
(862) (448) (1310)
- Responde nts who said " don' t know" or " refuse" to Question # 31 have been excluded from the analysis.- The percentages here~ dif fer slightly from those in Table 1 because of the exclusion of these people;from the analysis. The number of cases is in parenthesis.
** All those who did not evacuate af ter hearing the first EBS message and residents of Hampton Falls and Seabrook who did evacuate af ter hearing the second EBS message and for residents for all other towns who said that af ter hearing the second EBS message would either go about their normal business or stay 1 i nside . their home. We are assumirg that people who said "go q about their normal business" will do so indoors.
)
i i I L . t_: - _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ . -
ij I TABLE 3
' Attitudes toward Nuclvar Power l
l and Intention to Voluntarily Evacuate l
% saying they would evacuate after hearing first EBS
_ message-(0 20) Attitudes toward New nuclear power _ Hampshire Massachusetts Total
- 14. In general, how dangerous do you think it would be to live near a nuclear power plant?
very dangerous 68% 70% d a nge rous 68% 57 64 60 not dangerous at all 27 22 26
- 15. Would you describe yourself as:
a supporter of nuclear power plants as a means of providing electricity 31%' 24% 29% an opponent of nuclear powe r plants, or 67 68 67 you haven' t made ep your mind yet on this issue 46 63 51
- 16. Do you think that the Seabrook nuclear power plant should be allowed to operate to generate electricity?
yes 31% 33% 32% no 66 71 68
-..-----______J
1>: .
]
" 3 w , - 1 i
; Table 3 continued......- j
%E s ayi ng . they. .
I would evacuate after "
. hearing first EBS ;
. message-(0 20) j l
Y Attitudes toward- New nuclear _ power - -f Hampshire Massachusetts Total l
- 42. When1you heard this message on1the radio L
how llikely ~do , you thi nk - it~would be that;you. and your 'f amily would be exposed to a ' dangerous.- level of radiation? ve ry, likely . 64% .65% 65% somewhat likely 46 52 48' very'unlikely- . 33 38 34 depends upon conditions 50 67 '57
-311. Suppose there was an f
. accident at the Seabrook Station and the State .
Civil Defense of ficials said that everybody living within 10 miles of the: plant should evacuate but everybody who lived more than 10 miles from the plant was safe. Would you believe the State Civil Defense of ficials that people living more than 10 miles away: were - safe? l' yes 27% 34% 29% no 63 67 64 i o i
5
-3'5-
Tab 1'e].3 continued......
' t saying1they '
would evacuate after hearing /first EBS-messa,qe (O. 20) Attitudes toward: New. nuclearLpowe r? Hampshire Massachusetts -Total
- 347. Last spring - a major nuclear-accidentcoccurred at the' Chernobyli nuclear power station-in.the Soviet Union.'. Do you think ~ that itLis possible for as.
serious an accident ato-occu r "at the seabrook nuclear power ' plant' if the power plant is put into ope ra tio n?. '
.yes 62%
no 65% 63% 30 36 32 i 1
TABLE 4
- Failure to follow Protective Action Recomme ndatio n l
i New Hampshire Massachusetts Total ; i
% saying they would evacuate af ter hearing first EBS message (0 20) 53% 60% 56% (1321
% not complying with recommendations af ter hearing the second EBS message (Q. 20 and O. 31) 64 69 66 (1310! % saying that they , would not evacuate after l all residents of the EPZ were advised to evacuate (O. 274) 26% 24% 25% (1324l 1 l l l i l
- Responde nts who said " don' t know" or " refuse" have been
) '
excluded from the analysis. 1 1
s u . -
, TABLE 5
- Failure to Comply with an Evacuation Advisory by' Perceived Distance from ' the Plant and Attitudes L Toward Nuclear Power.
% of EPZ reside nts saying they would
' not evacuate when all
- EPZ residents where advised -
to evacuate (O 274)
~ Perceived 1 distance New f rom the ~ pla nt Hampshire. Massachusetts Total-
- 18. In a direct.line,Labout how ma ny m.iles ' is your home.from the Seabrook nuclear power station? -
0 'toL2 miles 27% 19% 25% 3 to 5 miles -24 23 23 6' to 10 miles 21 26 23 more than 10 miles. 31 19 30 Attitudes toward- , nucle,ar power
- 14. In ge neral, . hcw dangerous do you think it would be to live near a nuclear power plant?
very dangerous 20% 22% 21% d a nge rous 22 20 22 not dangerous at all 39 36 38
'15 . Would you' describe
.yourself ass a supporter of nuclear power plants as a means of providing electriety 35% 36% 36%
' an opponent of nuclear-power plants, or 20 21 20 you haven' t made up your mind yet on this issue 29 25 28
Table 5 continued. . . . . .
% of EPZ reside nts saying they would not evacuate' when all EPZ residents where advised
.t_o, e v a c u a t e (0.274)
Attitudes'toward .New i nuclear power Hampshire Massachusetts Total,
- 16. Do you think that the
, Seabrook nuclear power plant should be allowed to operate to. generate electricity?
yes. 33% 36% ~33%- no- 20 20 :20
' 4 2. When you heard this message on the_ radio
- i. ' how likely do you think it would be that you a nd your . f amily would be exposed to a: dangerous level ' of ' radiation?
very likely . 22% 24% 23% somewhat likely 24 17 22 ve ry unlikely . 32 35 32 depends upon conditions 32 22 28
)
1
-311.. Suppose there was an accident at the'Seabrook ] 4 Station and the State .l Civil Defense of ficials '
said that ' eve rybody living within 10 miles , 'i of the plant should evacuate but everybody ; whoz lived more than 10 miles if rom the plant was safe. Would you believe the State Civil Defense 'of ficials that people living more than 10 miles away were safe? I yes 32% 32% 32% no 24 21 23 l __.__m_..____ ..._______.__________m_.
r- , , :vw 3 --. 39-31-
- Tab le 5' co nti nued. . . . . . ,
n
, '% of EPZ reside nts s'aying.they would not evacuate when all EPZ residents where advised to'evacuaten-(0 274)
't hAttitudetoward' s :New nuclear power- Hampshire Massachusetts Total ,
. 347. i Last '. spri ng ' a- maj or. nuclear accident ' occurred at' the Chernobyl. nuclear power station in the' Soviet . .
, Union. Do.' you ,. think , that -
it'i's possible for as-serious an accident to-occur at 'the Seabrook
- nuclear power plant if -
' thes powe r pla nt is put into-.
- ope ration?
'yes 21%~ 22% 22%
no 35 33 34 1
'b
'O Responde nts ' who said " don' t know" or " refuse" have been .
excluded:from the analysis. t I i 1
)
l
TECHMICAL APPENDIX
.Sampl_e .
The sample was selected by Survey Sampling, Inc. of L Fairfield,. Connecticut under the direction' of Social Data l L L Analysts. The survey -is based upon a stratified random sample of
' households with residential telephones. Data obtained from local t elepho ne - comp a nies indicate that approximately 95% of the residents of _- the EPZ- have telephones in their homes. The variable upon which the sample was stratified was town. We vanted to interview a total of 1400 residents of the EPZ. The following towns in the state of New Hampshire were included in the sample:
Brentwood, - East Ki ngston, Exeter, Gree nla nd , Hamp to n, Hampto n Falls , Ke nsington, Kingston, ~ New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton,1Portsmouth, Rye , Seabrook, South Hampton and Stratham. The following towns in the state of Massachusetts were also i ncluded : Amesbury, Merrimac, Newbury, Newburyport, Salisbury and We s t ' Newbu ry . Population estimates for each of these towns were obtained in the following manner: for New Hampshire we utilized the population estimates contained in volume 7 of the Evacuation Plan filed ~.for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. For Massachusetts we used population estimates obtained from the 1985
, . Commo nwealth Ce nsus. In -Table . A-1 we list all the towns included in the EPZ , an estimate of the size of the population in that town, the proportion of the entire population of the EPZ living in that town, and the number of interviews actually completed.
Since ' telephone exchanges do not correspond exactly with the geographical boundaries of the towns in the EPZ, we had to use a
g moro s comple'x; procedure. to' draw tho sample of telephone numbers L \y . I usedEin?thelsurvey. From i the ' local telephone directories we obtained a -list of zip ' codes. for every town in the EPZ. In
' i in L
orderL to check 1that this' list of zip: codes was complete, we had l' Survey . Sampling utilize a' computer. program' wich listed all zip codes within 15 miles of Seabrook,1 New Hampshire. The EPZ1 arou nd the Seabrook ' nuclear' power station includes all . towns that have any-portion of - their boundaries ~within a ten mile radius of the' plant. By cross-checking ' the list of zip ' codes generated by Survey Sampling with ' that obtained from the telephone directories, we found allTof: the zip codes for all of the towns included in f the EPZ. lA list of the~ zip.codestin the EPZ are presented in Table A-2. For each zip code within the EPZ, Survey Sampling generated a list -of telephone exchanges. For most of the exchanges which appeared on the list, all' of the numbers were within the EPZ. Some, however, contained numbers for people living inside the EPZ ' and numbers for people living outside the EPZ (these are, of course, those exchanges which are in areas which straddle the boundaries of the EPZ.) In order to determine whether or not to incl 0de a particular exchange in the sample, we looked at the total proportion of phone numbers in that exchange which were inside the EPZ (determined by the zip code) . If 15% or more of
- the numbers in a particular exchange were inside the EPZ, that exchange was included in the sample of generated telephone num-b e rs .
Survey Sampling then calculated the total number of resi-dential phones in all of the exchanges included in the sample.
y, s Numbers wero : solected 'in such, a 'way so that the proportion of i numbers in .the sample in a .particular exchange would be the same as' the proportion of numbers in the population in that exchange. l The sample utilized . is. a random digit dial sample in which the l last two' digits in the telephone number are selected at . random by a computer f rom' among all those working blocks in a particular exchange. Using this type of. random digit dial sample we were insured o' f including unlisted phone numbers in the sample. The sample was i designed to be a random sample of households with telephones. Since we had no accurate data on the number of discreetL households
.within each of the towns in the EPZ, we utilized the raw population figures in order to make estimates of the. distribution of households within the towns included in the EPZ.
Even' utilizing this relatively complex procedure in generating the sample, it was impossible in some cases to know whether a particular phone number was for a household in a town included in the EPZ. Ultimately this information was obtained f rom the responde nt in a screening question at the beginning of-the survey. . At 'the beginning of the questionnaire, the re spo n-dent was asked what city or town he or she lived in. If the respondent did not mention one of the 17 towns in the New Hampshire section of the EPZ or one of the 6 towns in the Massachusetts section of the EPZ, that responde nt was not included i n the survey. As interviews were completed with respondents in each of- the towns, we kept track of the number of completed inter-views until we reached the designated quota for that particular town. l
Salect' ion df Ra'sponde nt c , The ' sample ' we utilized 'for this survey is a random sample of 1 households with : residential telephones, not a random sample- of i nd ividual s . - 'Within'the household we~ utilized either the male or female adult head of household- as an informant on what the
. household would do in' case of an accident at' the Seabrook Nuclear Powe r' Station. Interviewers were instructed to ask to speak to the male or female head of household '(see Instructions to "I nte rviewe rs ) . - A sex quota was used to insure that the final" sample 'wou2 3 represent. the population in terms of sex. It was important to make sure that women were not over represented as it is well known from prior surveys that .the attitudes of men ' i and women toward issues like nuclear power generally; dif fer. The survey ended. up with 54% female respondents and 46% male resondents which closely corresponds to the sex distribution of the population.
Inte rviewi ng The interviewing for this study was sub-contracted to MKTG. Inc. with of fices in Islip and Farmingdale, New York. MKTG is a large well-known company whose clients include most of the best known survey research companies in the country. MKTG has been used in the past by Social Data Analysts, Inc. All the inter-viewirn was done between April 10th and April 22nd ( no i nte r-views were conducted on April 12th and April 19th), on all days but Saturday. interviewing was conducted. between the hours of 5 p.m. a nd 10 p .m . On Saturday, interviewing was conducted only during the day.
- l l' ..
PriorT to tho ' start of L the . survey, Ann' Harriet - Cole , - who
- acted l as projectd ' irector for this study, conducted a one and a Jhalf hour ' training' session for MKTG -interviewers and project '
j supervisors.-
. MKTG 'is set up so that the client can' monitor the' i'nterviews by listening-.in on the telephone. lines. Extensive monitoring :was conducted? for this project . t'o make sure-that the i
'[
'i interviewers 'were following. instructions ' precisely. A written. 1 1
l set ofl interviewer ' instructions 'was prepared and is reproduced d
; b e low. . } l 3
t s J u
'l t
a I
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p- .
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' INTERVIEWER. INSTRUCTIONS Seabrook ~ Evacuation Survey April, 1987 i' . .
l-Social Data Analysts would like to. thank you for helping us with 1 this . important study. :We would appreciate.it if you would read
' theses brief1 interviewer ' instructions. If you have any que'stions at; all' about the way the survey should be administered your-supervisor will be pleased to assist you. ' Th a nk you.
. _Ge ne ral I ns,t_ruc t io ns 1)- The most important instruction for this survey is to read;the questionnaire exactly as it is writte n. You should read
- all words to all responde nts. If you have any -questions about how to pronounce a particular word please ask your supervisor.
- 2) .There are several places in this survey where there are
" Skip" instructions.-
cisely. 'It Be careful to follow these. directions pre-is important questions ' which apply to them. that we ask all respondents all relevant
- 3) This ' survey 'is a pre-coded closed 'end survey. For every question you ~ will indicate the . response given by the respondent by writing the appropriate number on the line at the f ar right of the; questionnaire which corresponds' to the question. You can l only write one responr,e on each answer line. The respondent must choose only one answer. If the respondent cannot choose, code.
with the corresponding number for " Don' t Know. " When you read a question.and give the respondent the dif ferent answer choices, there is a " DON'T READ" section to each question.- This section is for your use only.
- 4) .Sometimes respondents ask what a question means. We do not want responde nt.
interviewers to try to explain the question to the same question. It is important that every respondent be asked the should reread theIf question. a respondent asks what a question means, you If the respondent still has a question, call your supervisor. , L
- 5) Sometimes people ask who is sponsoring a research pro-ject.
Do not volunteer this information; but if a respondent l asks'you,'you can say that this survey is being done by Social Data-Analysts, Inc. at the request of the Commonwealth of i Massachusetts. If the respondent has any further questions, he or j she can phone (516) 689-9793. 1 i i
Specific' Instructions Colum ns ' l-5 : Identification Number In column 1-5 you should' writefthe five digit identification number for the respondent which appears on the sample sheet. .This number should not be l~ . written down until af ter the interview is. completed. Please check : the number caref ully. l
Introduction:
Read the introduction exactly as it is
- name.
written.LWhen you identify yourself please use a first and a last Re sponde nt . Selectio n:
' ra ndom sample ' of . households.
The sample . used in this survey is a Within each household we want to interview either the. male or female head of household. You. should make sure that the person you are talking with is in fact a head.of household. We do not want to interview teenagers, young people living at home with their parents, or old people living with their children. It is better to. lose an interview zather. than interview the wrong person. Verification: These surveys will be verified both by your supervisors and by Social Data Analysts In order for us to do this verification, it is necessary for you to ask the respondent for his or~her name. A full name is unnecessary if the respon-
. dent does not want to give it. A first name or a Mr. A, etc.
(anything that will enable the verifier to identify the responde nt) is all that is needed. Please write this nmue down on the questionnaire below the telephone number. Telephone number: In order to make sure that you have dialed the telephone number on the sample sheet correctly, please read it back to the respondent and ' write it down in columns 363-372. If by any chance you made an error and dialed the wrong number, write visor. down the number you actually dialed and notify your super-Thanks again for your help with this survey. l 1 f I
,s.-
- Va rif ic at io n '
it g 'In order to make'..sure that the interviews were conducted
. p rope rly , an' extensive set of verification procedures was uti -
lized.. First, as ' reported above, interviewers were monitored as. they actually made-the. calls both by a Social. Data Analysts representative .and by MKTG supervisors. 'Second, our agreement with MKTG called for them to verify at least 15% of all completed interviews by calling back the respondent and making sure . that the currect responde nt had been ' interviewed and that the correct information' had been recorded by the interviewer. I Finally. Social Data Analysts conducted its own independent - verification on approximately 200 interviews selected at random. All of this verification showed' that the interviewers had conducted the survey with the proper respondent, followed the instructions- they had been given, and had reported the correct
'i n' fo rma t io n. -
An occasional error by an interviewer was detected and corrected. . LIn all surveys it is inevitable that some inter-viewing errors are made; but the verification procedures uti-- lized here . lead to the conclusion that there were very few errors on this survey. Outcomes and Response Rate In Table A-3 we show the number of telephone numbers dialea f and the outcome for each state. Altogether the sample consisted I cf 6,611 telephone- numbers. { Since in this survey we only wanted
- to interview heads of household and most household heads work during.the day it was necessary to make a large portion of the calls in the evening, on about 16% of these numbers (1,055) we 1
_g_ ~ p . rocsived no answar af ter thras or more es11 back attempts. The l
! call back procedure . requires making telephone calls to- initial "no
- answers" - at dif ferent. times of day. .Thus, for example, if we first
- call a number at 5 p.m. and receive a no answer we will try that
. number later.on in the same evening. If we still received a no answer, we would make the call back on a later day. For numbers that we could not reach in the evening.we would attempt to reach that4 number'on Saturday during the day.
Sincef the random digit dialing technique is not able to dif-
- ferentiate between residential and business phone numbers with the same exchange, it' is possible that some of the '"no answers" were actually businesses. which were not open during evening hours in which the survey was conducted or on Saturday. For another 457 numbers e we found' either a continuous busy signal or were not able to find a male or female head of household . at home af ter three ' or more: call back attempts were.made. A significant portion of the numbers selected using the random digit dialing technique (2,270) turned out not to be working residential telephone numbers (these include business phones) . This is because not all numbers' in active blocks are actually assigned.
In 93 cases we found poople who either did not speak English
]
or were unable to communicate with the interviewers for some other l i reason. In order to be sure of obtaining a proper sex distribution in the sample, we employed a sex quota. In 249 cases we were ) l unable to complete an interview because the interviewer could not l obtain a respondent of the correct sex. Seven hundred and ninety-three people ref used to
participcto in'tho survey. No rmally , in surveys such as. this one,
-f c
. response; rates' areLeomputed by dividing the number of completed interviews by the. number.of eligible . people contacted (the a completes plus the refusals).
When we do this we find a completion rate of 64%. Normally on surveys such as this response rates between 50% and 75% are obtained. The response rate . depe nds , among! other f actors, on the topic of t a survey and who is identified as the organization conducting the survey. Although there is no way to be positive that those people who refused to participate in the survey do not differ significantly f rom those. whom we interviewed, given the procedures utilized in this research and the success we have had using similar procedures in other surveys, we can be reasonably confident that the obtained
. s ample is representative of the population of residential telephone subscribers within the EPZ.
One hundred people told us that their household was not in any
.of the seventeen New- Hampshire or six Massachusetts towns that comprise the EP2.
These interviews were terminated. An additional 190 possible respondents were terminated because we believed we had already completed the targeted number of inter- { views for their town. Because phone exchanges overlap town line i bou nda ries , l< in some cases we had to terminate individuals whose ; phone exchange was identical to households in a town where we still l 4 needed to complete' interviews. Des;(In of the Questionnaire 1 The research project was initiated when Assistant Attorney General Allan Fierce - of the Massachusetts Attorney General's l . ____m__._
of ficof anked Social Data Analysts to conduct a survey for use_by-
~ the Attorney General's = of fice and its consultants in litigation _
currently under way before the ASLB in regard to the evacuation - _ plan drawn up for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. -The survey was' also to be made available for use by the' other interveners, i ncludi ng_ the . Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) and .the Town of Hampton. Af ter telephone conversations between Allan Fierce and both Stephen Cole and Ann Harriet Cole in which the nature of
'the-research was explained and discussed, Social Data Analysts agreed' to take on this assignment. On March 25, Ann. Cole par-
.ticipated in a day long meeting in New Hampshire attended by Allan Pierce, Ms. Jane Doughty of SAPL, and the following con-
'sultants for the Attorney General's of fice: Mr. Colin High of Resource-Systems Groups Mr. Albert Luloff of the University of q New Hampshiret Mr. William Befort of the University of New Hampshire r a nd Mr. Donald Zeigler of the Old Dominion University -
in Norfolk, Virginia. At this' meeting each consultant outlined
' the nature of the data that he or she would require in order to conduct their analyses. The way in which the questionnaire was to be constructed was also extensively discussed. Af ter this meeting, Stephen Cole and Ann Cole drew up a draf t of the questionnaire which was distributed to the Attorney General's consultants and to Mr. Pierce.
There was a second day long meeting in Boston on April 1st, to review the initial draft. At that meeting, Allan Pierce, Jane Doughty of SAPL, and the following consultants were present: Ann Cole from Social Data Analysts.. Rob Goble of Clark University, - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - . l
.r c nd1Albe rt : Lulof f. . Mansrs. Tom Adler and. colin Figh of Resourc'e u Systems Group were .' consulted during that meeting by 2 teleconf e re nci ng. -
AL second. draf t Eof the questionnaire was pre-i pared 'byf Social' Data Analysts and was mailed. to all of the con-sultants,
. At this point a small pre-test of the . questionnaire was, conducted 'on April 3rd to discover. any problems which might come up in the administration-of the questionnaire and difficulty in the questionnaire's wording.' A two hour ' long teleconference' was held on the evening of April 7th. The conference call included Allan Fierce, Ann Cole , Tom Adler, Donald Zeigler, and
. Albert Luloff. Each consultant. participating on this call
. reviewed the questionnaire and then relayed suggestions and com-ments back to Social Data. Analysts. Based upon the ~ suggestions of the consultants and the result of the pre-test, Social Data Analysts drew up another draft of'the-questionnaire. 'Given the
. complexity of the survey instrument, it was decided that we
. should' conduct a pre-test with 100 random cases. This pre-test was conducted by MKTG on. April 8th. This pre-test was utilized to time 'the questionnaire and to assess clarity of wording and interviewer ease 'in following skip and coding. instructions.
Based upon the results of this pre-test and an extensive telephone contact with the Massachusetts Attorney General's of fice, . the final. somewhat shorter version of the questionnaire was prepared. One of the primary aims of the survey was to find out how people would behave in the event of various possible accidents at
. the Seabrook Station. In order 'to determine this, the respondents
o " i , ... '1 [ -N '
'I L/" '
ware iroad 'various ~ scenarios based upon the EBS messages contained j I' in the NewL Hampshire Ra'diological Emergency Response Plans, Rev. 2 (Aug.11986).- We 'did not use the- exact EBS messages - for I several reasons. First,'it is difficult for respondents to t L follow exceptionally long questions on the telephone. In 1 constructing the questions,. it was therefore necessary to delete j
.partiof'the.EBS message. We attempted to delete only parts which were: either. repetitious , or non-essential. Telephone surveys are most ' successful when the total length aof the interview does not exceed twentyfminutes. In' longer interviews you will have L respondents becoming tired and hanging up prior to completion.
In order to keep the length of the survey less than twenty , minutes it was impossible to read or in some cases re-rs sd complete EBS messages. . [In this survey all respondents who ref used to complete the entire interview were classified as refusals. ] Finally, some EBS messages have parts which were irre-
-levant to the scenario. Thus, information about school closings was not releva nt for a scenario taking place on a summer Sunday in July. Such irrelevant information was deleted in order to avoid respondent conf usion.
Da_t a E nt ry and Sampli_ng Error l l Af ter the interviews were completed, the data were entered j directly onto the computer and then verified for entry errors. Since the sample was designed in such a way so that the sample would be representative of the population distribution anong all towns in the EPZ, it was not necessary to use any weights in conducting the analysis. It was not possible to easily obtain
o > o information on the number of residential households' in each~ town
.which have more- than-oneL residential telephone listing. Therefore, it is possible tha' tthis sampleL slightly. over represents h'ouse-holds. with more than. one telephone listing., Prior research.by
, Social Data Analysts has indicated that households with more . than one telephone listings. do not dif fer in their attitudes toward nuclear power from households - with only one telephone listing.
. The re f o re , it is highly unlikely, that this problem had any substantive effect on the obtained 9esults.
The sanpling- error for the EPZ is plus or minus three pe rcen-tage points. This means that in theory if this survey were to be . repeated 100 times using the same techniques, that in 95 out of the 100 times the results obtained for a particular question- would
.be .within three percentage points of the results which would' have -
been obtained by: interviewing members of every household in the EPZ The sampling' error for that part of the survey among .New Hampshire residents is plus or minus three percentage points, and the sampling error for that part of the survey among Massachusetts residents is plus. or minus four percentage. points. These calculations assume that the survey was conducted under ideal ci rcums ta nces. Since there are a large number of practical problems in conducting surveys of this type, it is possible that there could be other sources of error in the survey.
- t;- . ,. ,
t i TABLE Al 1 Tow ns included in' the Sample
% of EPZ Completed % of' Population Population I nte rviews ' S ample g
New ; Hamp shire - Town Listings
' Bre'ntwood 2,039. .014 16 .011
,7 East' Kings ton ' 1,262 .009 14 .010-Exeter 11,744 .084 119 .085 Gree nla nd - 2,225. .016 22 .016 Hampto n 13,234 .09'4 131 .093 Hampton Falls 1,474 .010 15 .011.
Ke nsington 1 1,385 .010- 15 .011 1Ki ng s ton 5,085> .036- 51 .036 New. Castle 621 .004 6 .004 Newfields 868 .006 8 . 006
. Newton 3;744 .027 39 .028 No rth".n amp to n 3,638 .026 38 .027
.Portsmouth 26,881 .191 268 .191 Rye 5,099 .036 51 .036 Se ab rook- 8,158 058 82 .058 South Hampton 699 .005 6 .004 Stratham 3,455 .024 34 .024 1
TOTAL-. 91,601 .652 915 .652
-l
-5%-
Tcblo Al continusd.....
% of EP2 Completed
[ Population % of , Population Interviews
- Sample Massachusetts Town Listings Amesbury- 13,923 .099 138 .098 Merrimac 4,237 .030 43 .031 Newbury 5,423 .038 54 .038 Newburyport 15,635 .111 157 .112 Salisbury 6,588 .047 66 .047 West Newbury 3,175 .022 31 .022 TOTAL 48,981 .348 489 .348 i
_gg-TABLE A2 Zip Codes Included-in the ..ple zip codes 01860' 03842 01913- 03848 01922 03854 01950 03856 01951 03858 01952 03862 01985 03865 03801 03870 03827 03871 03833 03874 03840 03885 i a _m____.m____---- -- - - - -'-'-
' TABLE.A3-Failure.to Complete
, t' Number of' Telephone Numbers Dialed f x and: Outcome by State-
-New Hampshire. Massachusetts
. Ou tc_om_e - EPZ. ___
EPZ Total Completed Interviews 915 489- 1,404
- No Answer or? Business 786 269- 1,055-
- Busy, No Head'of' Household Available. 322 135 457 No.t . a worki ng ~ numbe r 1 719 '551 2,270-Langua'ge or Psychological PrCrlem 6 5 '. 28 93-
, could.notLobtain.' correct' sex -170 79 249
- Not , in Zo ne' 42- 58' 100 Over Ou'ota for- Town. :123 67 190-
, Refusals, 542 251 793
.. TOTALS -4,684 1,927 6,611-i 1
( l
= = - - - ~
l
-s 8 -- ' .: . 'g : START? -TI'ME :_
1END TIMES: INTERVIEWER.NAME:_ 1 x SEA' BROOK. EVACUATION SURVEY 2 ; APRIL 1987 ' ( . SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE 3 4 i #' INTRODUCTION 5-c A.1 Hello myf name is Social; Data Analysts. We ~ are doi ng aI study am . calli ng for T' . of the attitudes Power of ' area residents toward the Seabrook Nuclear Station. '
;B. .May I-speakLto-the Male or' Female head of household.
[ Skip lto 0.: 6 L ]' <------Re s po nde nt i s o n li ne ----------- .a. [Sk ip ' to O. C' ] <------Swi tch i ng to re spo nde nt' --------- b 4 [MAKE CALLBACK APPOINTMENT <----Responde nt/ not available--------- c.
- OF DESIGNATED RESPONDENT.
[ASK FOR FIRST NAME.] c - [Te rminate] <-------- No household head of needed sex -- d
. Respondent's - Phone Numbers (Area-Code); (Phone Number) j i
CALLBACK APPOINTMENT NAME OF' DESIGNATED RESPONDENT:
= ATTEMPT DATE ~ TIME l RESULT l INTERVIEWER 1 a p
2 a P
- 3. a
'~ D 4 a p
l lC. Hello my name is _ ._
. I am calling for Social Data Analysts. We are _doing a study of the attitudes of j area., residents toward the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. i i
4
s SEABROOK-.EVACUTION SURNEV' , l MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE
***** NEW HAMPSHIRE ***** ]l; 1
i
- 6. Interviewer; Record ' Sex . '[ Don' t Read]
I
'l = male
,2j= female 6
-l
= 7 '- 8 . What. town do you ilive in? i New Hampshire Towns Massachusetts Towns
, -Brentwood ------------- 01 Amesbury -------------- 18 Ea s t . K i ng s to n---------- 0 2 Me rr im ac -------------- 19
' E x e t e r-------- --------- 0 3 Newbury'--------------- 20 G ree nla nd-------------- 04' Newburyport ----------- 21 ,
, H am p t o n-- - - -- ------ ---- 0 5 Salisbury ------------- 22 ;
Hamp to n Fa lls----------: 0 6 We s t Newb u ry ---------- 23
' Ke ns i ng to n------------- 07 K i ng s to n--------------- 0 8 New Castle------------ '09 Newfields ------------ -10
' Ne w to n -------------- -
No rth H amp to n---------- 12 [Inteviewer please note: if Po rt sm ou t h------------- 13 ' respondent is f rom one of the Rye-------------------- 14 Massachusetts towns ' listed above, Se ab rook --------------- 15 please use a Massachusetts Sou th' H amp to n---------- 16 survey.]
'Stratham--------------- 17; 7 8 What is'your Zip' Code?
i 9 10 11 12 13 DON' T READ: [999 .99 = Don' t Know/ Refuse (I nterviewe r: Please repeat back the Zip Code to verify correctness] ! Terminate Instructions: [ Interviewer: If respondent does not live in any one of the 23 towns - TERMINATE interview and on screener put I.D. Number, phone numbe r, name of town respondent lives in and zip code. Code on Sample Sheet "WT" (wrong town) . ] i 1 _u_______ _ _ _ _
--s ,
._gg_-
In.' ganiral',/ how' dangarous' do you think it would be to J 14 3 flivatns'ar a nuclear power plant?-
+- $ .1= very. l dangerous 2= ; d a nge rous :
3= not dangerous: at all: DON'Tl READ [ 4 = Do n' t K now 9= Refuse' 14 ll i l5. IWould you describe: yourself 'as 1 =' a supporter of . nuclear power plants : as a means :of providing electricity. 2 = 'an opponent of nuclear power plants, or 3 = you haven' t- made up your mind yet on this issue? DON'T READ [4= don' t know [9= Refuse ~~ 15
. 16. 'tx> you think . that the Seabrook . nuclear power plant should
- be allowed to operate .to generate electricity?
1 = yes DON' T READ [3=Do n' t K now 2 ='no .[9= Refuse ~
.16
- 17. . Given where .youilive, do you think' you would be af fected by'a release of-radiationsif a serious problem developed
.at the Seabrook nuclear power station af ter it: started op . Tati ng?
1.= yes 12 = no DON' T ' READ { 3 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse 17 18 - 19. In a. direct- line, about how many miles is your home f rom the Seabrook nuclear ' power station? DON' T READ [ Code Directly: 00 to 98] [ Don' t Know/ Refuse = 99 ) _ 18 -19
. Assuming that the Seabrook nuclear power station is licensed -
and begins to operate, we would like to know what you would ! do -iff something happened at the plant. Suppose that you and L your whole f amily were at home on a hot sunny Sunday af ternoon L in ~ July at 2 p.m. and you turned on the radio and heard the
;following messaget "We interrupt our program at .this time to bring you the f ollowing message. This is not a test. "
,.e
'"A1 problem has occurred at' Socbrook Station. Asia pre-
' ccution',: thoLStato z of New HEmpshire> has ! closed beach 'and state park areas in. Seabrooki and Hampton. Persons on the f' beaches ; and lin state. park areas in Seabrook and Hampton should " leave the ' area immediately. - All other persons should-stay tuned to4this station for further information. "
h "I repeat, because of _ af problem at Seabrook Station, the beach and state park areas Jin Seabrook and Hampton have t
' been closed.: Persons on the- beaches and in state park l ' areas in .Soabrook and Hampton should leave the . area
.immediately."
"The following . message is directed to persons . in Brentwood,
' East Kingston, E Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Ke nsi ng ton, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, ' Rye, Seabrook , South - Hampton and Stratham:
" State of ;New Hampshire .of ficials are ~ currently _ reviewing the situation at Seabrook Station. At this time, there is no.
need to take any action.' Please stay tuned to this station for further information and instructions."
- 20. When you heard this message on the radio, would you and members of your' f amily:
1 =' go about your normal business, or - [ SKIP to 0 31] 2 = stay inside your home, or (SKIP to 0 31] 3 = leave your home and go somewhere else '[ASK 0 21] DON'T READ [4 = Do n' t K now [ SKIP to 0 31 ]- [9 = Refuse [ SKIP to 0 31 ] 20 21-25. Where would you go? ( That is the place you would expect'to spend the night) PLEASE SPECIFY: Town Name , State 21 22 23 24 25 [ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town Name and State] DON'T READ: [ 9 99 99 = Do n' t K now ]
- 26-28.LIn a direct li ne , about how many miles is your final destination f rom your home?
[ Code directly in miles] [ Don' t know = 999] . 26 27 28
i
- 29. Counting yourcoif, how many people in -your household will ]
be ovacuating? j [ Code directly l'thru 7] ) 8 = eight or more people l 9 = Do n' t know 29
- 30. How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily use to j evacuate? {
1 = 1 vehicle 4 = 4 vehicles 2 = 2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles DON'T READ [ 8 = Do n' t know [9 = Refuse 30
--------------[ SKIP to 0 42]--------------
- 31. Suppose that in order to find out what had happened at Seabrook, you kept your radio on and at 4 p.m. in the af ternoon you hear _ the following message:
" A general emergency condition 7as declared at 3:30 p.m. I today at Seabrook Station. A general emergency condition l i ndicates _h a t there has been a f ailure in plant safety systems.
A release of radiation into the air occurred and State Civil Defe nse and Public Health of ficials are currently reviewing the consequences of the release, local weather conditions and other f actors. Persons working or visiting beach areas in the towns of Hampton and Seabrook from North Shore Road and Ocean Boulevard, to the north, .and Route 286 and Ocean Boulevard to the south, are advised to evacuate the area. Evacuatioin is also recommended for people in Seabrook and Hampton Falls. "
" People living in the towns of Brentwood, East Kingston, Exeter, l G ree nla nd, Hampton, Kensigton, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Soeth Hampton and Stratham i are advised to SHELTER IN PLACE. Remai ning indoors will provide you protection f rom any radiation being released f rom the plant."
When you heard this message on the radio, would you and members of your f amily: , 4 1 = go about your normal business or [ SKIP to O. 42] 2 = stay inside your home, or [ SKIP to 0. 42] 1 3 = leave your home and go somewhere else [ASK Q. 32] DON' T READ [4 = Don' t know [ Skip to O. 42] [9 = Refuse [ Skip to 0 42] 31
32-36;lWhorafwould you go?.( Thct is the place you would expect to spond the night) PLEASE-SPECIFY: Town Name , State 32 33 34 35 36
-[ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town Name and State]
DON' T READ: [ 9 99 99 = Do n' t K now) 37-39. In a direct line, about how many miles is your final destination f rom your home? [C,,de directly in miles] [ Don' t know = 999] 37 ___38 39 __
- 40. Counting yourself, how many people in your household will be evacuating?
[ Code directly 1 thru 7 8 = eight or more people 9 = Don' t k now 40
- 41. How many of your vehicles would you and your family use to evacuate?
1 = 1 vehicle 4 = 4 vehicles 2 = 2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles DON' T READ [ 8 = Do n' t know [9 = Refuse 41
- 42. When you heard this message on the radio how likely do you think it would be that you and your f amily would De exposed to a dangerous level of radiation?
1 = very likely - 2 = somewhat likely 3 = very unlikely i DON' T READ: [4 = depends upon conditions 1 [ 5 = do n' t k now f [9 = refuse 1 42
~
Now I would like to ask you some questions Ebout the people who live with you in the household and where they normally are on a weekday morning. First yourself ) 1 i' DON'T READ [ See Chart on Next Page]
]1 269-273. And' now could you toll mo the name of your assigned I host community and rocoption conter in the event an evacuation was ordered for your town.
Town State j i (269T (270) (271) (272) (273) DON'T READ [ 9 9 9 9 9 = Do n' t know ] Now I would like you to listen carefully to a dif ferent message and tell me what you would do. Suppose that you 'and your whole f amily were at home on a hot sunny Sunday af ternoon in July at 2 p.m. and you turned on the radio and heard:
" A General Emergency condition was declared today at Seabrook Station. A General Emergency condition indicates that there has been a f ailure in plant safety systems."
" A release of radiation occurred . New Hampshire Civil Defense and Public Health Of ficials are currently reviewing the consequences of the release, local weather conditions and other f actors. "
" Persons residing, wo rk i ng , or visiting beach areas in the towns of Hampton and Seabrook from North Shore Road and Ocean Boulevard to the north, and Route 286 and Ocean Boulevard to the south are advised to evacuate the area. For persons f rom these areas who require assistance or temporary shelter, Reception Facilities have been opened in the City of Manchester."
" Evacuation is also recommended for people in Brentwood, East Ki ngs ton, Exete r, Gree nland, H amp to n, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook South Hampton, and St ratham. "
The reception center for people in the town of is ( Re spo nde nt's Town Name)
~ (liel2f f rom list)
" Services available at the Reception Centers include: mo nitori ng for contamination and decontamination, if necessary."
i ___m __
E . 2741iWhon you ha'ard : this message on the radio, would you' and members -
'offyour. family; 91 Nigo:aboutJyourinormal.. business,'or: -[ SKIP to 0 311]
2 fa stayt inside your home, or [ SKIP to O.311]- 13 E= leavefyour ' home and' go' somewhere" else [ASK.O.275] w -' DON' T READ ; ! [4. = Don' t : K now ' -[ SKIP to 0 311] [9'= kefuse- [ SKIP to 0 311] ~~
'274 l
'275-279 1Where would you go? (-That is.the place-you would expect to.
spend the, night)
, PLEASE SPECIFY:
i:L J Town Name > , State'
.(275) ~ (276) (277) (278) (279)
[ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town' Name and State] L . DON' T READ: - [ 9 9 9 - 9 9' = Do n' t K now] 306-308. In aidirect line, ~ about how many miles is your final
.destinationLfrom yourlhome? Key Punch
'up ID' l 3 01-305 '
[ Code directly, in miles] [ Don' t 'know = 999] 306 307 308-309. Counting Lyourself, 'about how many people in your household Lwill. be evacuating? ! r
- [ Code directly 1 thru 7 8 = eight or more . people 9 ' = . Don' t k now 309 310. How many of Lyour vehicles would you and your f amily use to evacuate?
l' = 1 vehicle '4 = 4 vehicles i
~
2 =L2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles ' 3 ='3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles ;
. DON' T READ' [ 8 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse 'j l
\
- l b". . .
i .311 1SupposoEthorof wast an accident at- ths SoabrookE Station and: tho' Stato u Civil Defe nse of ficials said that .everybody l'iving within1 ten miles of the. plant should evacuate, but
. that' everybody. who lived more ' tha n 10 miles away from the
' plant was_ safe. Would; you belie ~ve the State -Civil Defense-
;of ficials that~ people living .more than -10 miles away were
-safe?
L 1;=;yes 2 = no DON'T [3 = Do n' t K now READ [9 = Refuse 311
. 312..NowLsuppose'that it was 10:30-a.m. on a Tuesday. in April Land .
that you and' each . of your f amily : members were " at the place each of , you' normally are 'on such a -day when 'you heard on the radio the last message: ordering. a general evacuation.- In, addition' the message said," All. schools within the towns advised to' evacuate are'being evacuated to the predesignated Reception
. Centers .for the' town in which they are located. Parents should not drive to school to meet their children since children are
-being ~ bussed directly to Reception Ce nters. "
Would you: 1 =.go about your normal business [ Skip to 0 340] , 2 = stay inside where you are (Skip to 0.340] -{ 3 w leave the place you are and go somewhere a else [ Ask' O. 313] ,g DON'T. READ [4 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse [ Skip to 0 340] 312
].j 1
- 313-317,- Where.would you go? ( That is the place you would expect to
. spend the night) 1 1
PLEASE SPECIFY: d Town Name , State 313 314 _315 316 317 [ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town Name and State] DON'T READ: [9 99 99 = Do n' t K now]
. 318. Would you stop anywhere along the way to pick up f amily members, friends and/or personal belongings at home?
1 = yes 2 = no (SKIP to 0 335) DON'T READ [ 3 = Do n' t k now [9= Refuse [ SKIP to 0 335] __318 S 1 l
319'333 Whoro would you stop? DON' T READ: .[ Respondent can give up to three dif ferent stops. Please Print name of Town and State for each stop)
.Please specify:
Town State 1 a) (319) (320) (321) (322) 1323T b) T334) (325) (326) ~(327) (328) c) (329) (330) (331) (332) (333) DON' T READ [ 9 9 9 99 = Do n' t K now] 334. Would these stops, in total, take you at all out of the way. 1 you' inte nded to go? 1 = no 2 = yes, less than one mile 3 = yes, one to five miles 4 = yes, five to ten miles 5 = eleven or more' miles DON' T RFAD [ 6 = Do n' t know [9 = Refuse 334 335-337. In a direct line, about how many miles is your final destination from the place you normally are at 10:30 a.m. on a weekday in April? [ Code directly in miles] [Do n' t know o 999] 335 336 337 338. Counting yourself, how many people in your household will be evacuating? i (Code directly 1 thru 7 8 = eight or more people 9 = Do n' t know 338 l 1
-339. How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily use to ovacucto?
1 = 1 vehicle 4 = 4 vehicles 2 ='2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles DON' T READ [ 8 = Do n' t know [9 = Refuse 339 And now some more general questions. 340. Is there anyone . in your f amily who is bedridden, handicapped or who needs special evacuation assistance? 1 = no 2 = yes and have already registered with New Hampshire's Civil Defense 3 = yes but have not yet registered with New Hampshire's Civil Defense DON'T READ [9= Refuse 340 341. How many individuals in your household would need public transportation in order to evacuate? DON' T [ l = 1 person 5 = 5 people [ 2 = 2 people 6 = 6 or more people READ [ 3=3" 7 = no one [ 4=4" DON' T READ [ 8 = Do n' t K now [9 = Refuse ~ 341 342. Do you play any assigned role in the evacuation plan? 1 = no [ Skip to 0 347] 2 = yes [Ask 0 343] DON'T READ [3= don' t know [9= Refuse [ Skip to 0 347] q
)
_ _ _342 343. What assignment do you have in the event of an evacuation? 1 = police 5 = special emergency bus driver 2 = fire 6 = ambulance / assigned doctor or nurse 3 = traffic control 7 = official radio or television 4 = school bus driver position DON'T READ [9= Refuse _
- @ v-344. Suppoco that the Seabrook nuclear power station is licensed and begins to oporate. If there were a problem at the plant and you heard that a ten mile zone had to evacuate what would you do first?
1 = report to my assigned place to help the evacuation [ Skip to 0 346] 2 = make sure my f amily was safely out of the evacuation zone [Ask Q.345] 3 = leave the evacuation zone to make sure I was in a safe place (Skip to 0 346]
- 4 = something else [ Skip to 0 346]
(please specify) DON'T READ (9 = Refuse [ Skip to 0 346] 344 345. How would you make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone? 1 = go. home and drive your f amily to a safe place out of the evacuation zone? ! 2 = call home and tell .your f amily to leave without you. 3 = some other way l
~~
(please specify ) 1 DON' T READ [9 = Refuse j 345 ! 346. If there was a nuclear accident at Seabrook Station requiring the evacuation of people within a ten mile ] zone, how dangerous do you think it' would be for you to j spend several hours in your emergency assignment? j 1 = so dangerous that it would be life threatening 2 = ve ry da nge rous 3 = somewhat dangerous ; 4 = not dangerous ) DON' T READ (5= don' t know [9 = Refuse I I 346 l l l i
347; Lost- spring a major nuclear accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear powar station in the Soviet Union. Do you ' think that it is possible for as serious an accident to occur at the Seabrook nuclear power plant if the power plant is put into operation? 1 = yes 2 = no DON ' T [ 3 = Do n' t k now READ [9 = Refuse 347 348. Currently plans are to have Civil Defense of ficials supervise an evacuation if this should become necessa ry. If as a result of an accident at Seabrook, you decided to leave the area and a Traf fic Control of ficial who was assigned to prevent traf fic congestion told you not to drive on a road that you wanted to use, do you think you would: 1 = go where you wanted to go, or 2 = go where you were told to go DON'T READ [3 = don' t know [9= Refuse - 348 349. Does your f amily have a plan of what each member would do and where they would go in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station? 1 = yes 2 = no DON' T READ [ 3 = d o n' t . k now [9= Refuse 349 350-354. At what time does the male head of household leave his place of employment to return home for the evening? (Hours) (Mi nute s) 1 = am 2 = pm CODE DIRECTLY: : 350 351 352 353 354 DON'T READ: [0001 = does not work outside of home [0002 = never at a regular time [0003 = don' t know [9999 = no male head of household
)
t I l , c
1355-359 At what time dons'the female head of household leave her picco of employmont to return home for the evening?~ (Hours) ( Mi nu tes) 1 = am 2 = pm CODE DIRECTLY: 355 356 357 358 359 DON'T READ [0001 = does not work outside of home [0002 = never at a regular time [0003 = don' t know [9999 = no female head of household 360. How' ma ny vehicles ' are owned, leased and/or rented in total by members of your household? 1 = 1 vehicle 5 = 5 vehicles 2 = 2 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 7 = no vehicles ; 4 = 4 vehicles DON'T READ [ 8 = Do n' t k now [9= Refuse 360 361. What is the last grade of school that you completed? 1 = some high school or less 2 = high school graduate 3 = some college 4.= college graduate-DON'T READ [9 = Refuse] 361 362. Do you or any members of your immediate f amily currently work for Public Service of New Hampshire? 1 = yes [Ask 0 363) 2 = no [(Go to Please Read] > DON' T READ [9 = Ref use [Go to Please Read] 362 363. Do you or any members of your immediate f amily curre ntly work at the Seabrook Station, either for Seabrook or any s ub-co nt ractor? 1 = yes 2 = no DON'T READ [9 = Refuse 363 [I nte rviewe r t A supervisor might he calling within the nex t few PLEASE READ) days to verify that I completed this survey with you. I would appreciate it' if you would acknowledge ! that it was completed, j l i l
-yg.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION [ Interviewer: Please verify and record respondent's telephone number] -a, [ Area Code]
,_ 365__
363 _ 364 [ Phone Number] 366 367 368 369 370 371 371 l Responde nt's First Name . For Validation: ~ ( Firs t Naine ) l { i l
.y - - - - . - - - -------- _ _
.'t
.SEABROOK EVACUTION SURVEY-
.MAINLQUESTIONNAIRE
~*,* * * * * * *'
MASSACHUSETTS s
. I p
6.s ' Interviewer Record Sex
! [ Don' t Read]
U
-1 = male-2'=' female 6
L'" 7-82Whaticity or town do you. live in? ' _New Hamp_ shire Towns. Massachusetts City / Town
. B re ntwood ~ ----------- -- 01, Amesbury -------------- 18 o
- Ea s t K i ngs to n---------- ~ 0 2 E x e t e r----------------- 0 3 ' Me r rim a c ------------ G ree nla nd------------ Ne wb u ry --------------- 2 0
-04 Ne wb u rypo rt ----------- 21 H amp to n--- ------------- 0 5 Salisbury.------------ 1 Hampton Falls---------- 06 t
. K e ns i ng to n---- --------- 07 We s t Newb u ry ---------- 23 K i ng s to n--- --- -------- - 0 8 New Castle------------- 09 Newfields ------------ .10
' Newton -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - 11 1 No rth , Hamp to n---------- 12 Po rt sm ou t h------------- 13 [Intev_iewer please note: .if Rye------------------- 14 respondent is. f rom one of the Seabrook-------------- '15 New Hampshire towns listed above, South Hampton---------- 16 please use a New Hampshire su rvey. ]
S t ra t h am---------------' 17 7 8 What.is.your Zip' Code? 9 10 11 12- 13 DON'T READ: [999 99 = Don' t K now/Ref use ' [I nterviewe r Please repeat back the Zip Code to verify correctness] Te rmi na te . I ns t ruc tio ns: [ Interviewer: If respondent does not live in any one of the 23 towns - TERMINATE interview and on screener put I . D .' Number, phone number, name of town respondent lives in and zip code. Code on Sample Sheet "WT" (wrong town).] ll t. l. l l l ' L l L________ _ 1
- 14 . lIn ' ganaral., ' how' dangerous . do you think it would be~ to
. livo , near a ' nuclear: power plant? .. l= very ' dangerous N 2= dangerous :
3=l not dangerous at all DON' T 1 READ [ 4 = i Don' t K now 9= Refuse _ _ , 14
- 15. .Would you . describe yourself - as l' = ;a supporter of nuclear power plants as a means of providing- electricity.
2 = a:. opponent of nuclear power plants, or 3 = you haven' t made, up your mind. yet on this i ssue? DON'T READ [4= don' t know > [9=Ref use 15
'16.. Do you think .that the Seabrook nuclear power plant should be allowed . to operate to generate electricity? .
1 = yes DON'T READ [3= Do n' t K now 2 = no [9= Refuse 16
- 71' . . . Given where you live,' do -you think you would be af fected byx airelease of radiation if a serious problem developed at the Seabrook nuclear power station af ter it started
. ope ra t i ng? '
l'= yes. 2 ='no DON' T READ [ 3 = Do n' t know [9.= Refuse _ _ _ _ 17 18 - 19. In a direct line, about how many miles' is your home f rom the Seabrook. nuclear power station? DON' T READ [ Code Directly: 00 to 98] [ Don' t Know/Ref use= 99 ] 18 ~ 19 Assuning that~ the Seabrook nuclear power station is licensed and. begins to operate, we would like to know what you would do if something happened at the plant. Suppose that you and your whole f anily were at home on a hot sunny Sunday af ternoon i n ' July L at 2 p.m. and you turned on the radio and heard the following message r.
"We interrupt our program at this time to bring you the j f ollowing message. This is not a test."
1
i
)
" A problem hns occurred at Saabrook Station. As a pro- )
ccution, the Stato of Now Fampshire has closed beach and ) state park areas in Seabrook and Hampton. The Massachusetts beaches and state park areas have also been closed. Persons i on the beaches and in state park areas in Seabrook Hampton and l Salisbury should leave the area immediately. All other persons should stay tuned to this station for further information."
"I repeat, because of a problem at Seabrook Station, the j beach and state park areas in Seabrook,Hampton and Salisbury have been closed. Persons on the beaches and in state park areas in Seabrook, Hampton and Salisbury should leave the area immediately."
"The following message is directed to persons in Amesbury, Me rrimac , Newbury Newbu rypo rt, Salisbury and West Newbury-
" State of New Hampshire of ficials are currently reviewing the situation at Seabrook Station. At this time, there is no need to take any action. Please stay tuned to this station f or further information and instructions. "
'20. When you heard this message on the radio, would you and members of your family:
1 = no about your normal business, or (SKIP to 0 31] 2 = stay inside your home, or (SKIP to 0.311 3 = leave your home and go somewhere else [ASK 0 21] DON'T FCAD {4 = Don' t K now [ SKIP to 0 31 ] s [9 = Refuse [ SKIP to 0 31 ] __ _ 20 21-25. Where would you go? ( That is the place you would expect to spend the night) PLEASE SPECIFY: ' Town Name , State 21 22 23 24 25 [ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town Name and Statel DON' T READ: [999 99 = Don' t Know] 26-28. In a direct line, about how many miles is your final I destination f rom your home? [ Code directly in miles) i [ Do n' t k now = 999] 26 27 28 s
" 2 9. ' Counting. yourself how many people in your household will bo evacuating?
S [ Code directly 1 thru 7) . ! 8 = eight or more people-9 . = Do n' t know 29
- 30. . .How many of your --Sicles ' would ' you ' and your f amily use to ]
evacuate? 1 = 1 vehible 4 = 4 vehicles 2 =-2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicless 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles DON' T READ [8 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse 30 [ SKIP TO O. 42] ----------
- 31. Suppose that in. order to find out what had happened at Seabrook, you kept your radio on and at 4. p.m. in the af ternoon you heard the following message:
" A ge neral emerge ncy . condition was. declared at 3 30 p.m today.at Seabrook Station. A general emergency condition indicates that there has been a f ailure in plant safety systems.
A release of radiation into the air occurred and State Civil Defense and .Public Health of ficials are currently reviewing the consequences of the . release, local weather conditions and other f actors. Persons working or visiting beach areas in the' towns of Hampton and Seabrook are advised to evacuate the a re a. Evacuation is also recommended for people in Seabrook and Hampton Falls. " People living in the other New Hampshire towns around.Seabrook Station are advised' to SHELTER IN PLACE.
" People livi ng in the Massachusetts towns of Amesbury, Merrimac Newbury, Newburyport, Salisbury and West Newbury ar<r. also advised to SHELTER IN PLACE. Remaining indoors will provide you protection f rom any radiation being released f rom the plant."
When you heard this message on the radio, would you and members of your f amily: i 1 = go about 'your normal business or (SKIP to 0 42] l 2 = s t ay i nside you r '1ome , or [ SKIP to 0 42] I 3 = leave your home and go somewhere else (Ask 0.32] DON'T READ [ 4 = Don' t K now [ Skip to 0 42] ] [.9 = Refuse [ Skip to 0 42] I 31 ) 1 a l l
.32-36. W'sora would you go? -( That is the place you would expect'to spend the night) i- PLEASE SPECIFY: ,
Town' Name i_ , State 32-
- 33. 34 35 36
'[ Interviewer ' Instructions: ' Please print the Town Name' b
and State] I
. DON'T' READ: [ 999 99 = Do n' t K now)
'37-39.'In?a. direct li:~, about.how many miles is your final destination' from your < hane? .
[ Code directly in miles] [ Don' t know = 999) -37 38 39 4 0. :evacu Counting yourself, how many people in your household will be ati ng? - [ Code directly~1 thru 7 8 = eight or more people 9 = Don' t k now -
' 41 '. 40 How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily use to evacuate?
1 = 1 vehicle. 4 = 4 vehicles 2 = 2 vehicles" 5 = 5 vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 6- = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles DON'T READ [ 8 = Do n' t k now ' [ 9 = Re f use
- 42. 41
. When you heard this message on the radio how likely do you think it would be that you and your f amily would be exposed to a dangerous level of radiation?
1 = very likely 2 = somewhat likely
- 3. = very unlikely DON'T READ: [4 = depends upon conditions
[5 = don' t know [9 = refuse
~
42 Now I would like to ask you some %uestl~oiis about the people who live with you in the household and where they normally ' are on a weekday morning. First yourself: DON'T READ [ See Chart on Next Page] 1'
269-273. J And now1 could: you tell me the nrme of your . assigned. host community and Lraception center in the: event an Jevacuation;was ordered. for your town. 3 ? -Town State (269) (270) T271) (272) (275)
~ DON' T READ [ 9 9 9 9 9 = Do n' t k now ! ) .
l . Now I would l'ike you . to c listen 'caref ully. to a . dif fe rent . Lmessage(and tell me what you would do. Suppose that .you and your whole f amily were' at home on a hot
. sunny . Sunday af ternoon in . July at. 2 p.m. and you ' turned on the radio and heard:
" A ; Ge neral Eme rge ncy co ndit ion ; was declared today ' at .. Seab rook '
Station. . Al General Emergency condition indicates that there
.has been' a f ailure in plant safety systems."
"A release of radiation occurred. New Hampshire ~ and Massachusetts Civil Defense and' Public Health Of ficials are currently reviewing the consequences of the release, local
. weather. conditions and other f actors. All persons in beachf areas and in the 17 New Hampshire. towns 'within ten miles of Seabrook ~ Station' are .being advised to evacuate. "
" Persons residing, working, or visiting Massachusetts beach areas in Salisbury and Plum Island are advised to evacuate the a rea. For; persons from these areas who require assistance.
or temporary shelter, Reception Facilities have been opened in the town of Peabody, Massachusetts."
" Evacuation is also recommended for people in Amesbury, Merrimac,.
Newbury ,' Newburyport, Salisbury and West Newbury. " The . reception center for people in the town of __ is ( Responde nt' s City / Town Name)
~~l@~ad
( from11ist)
"Se rvices available at the Reception Centers include: monitori ng for contamination and decontamination, if neces sa ry. "
274.; When you heard- this message on the radio, would you and members of your family: 1- = go about' your normal businesn, or [ SKIP to 0 311] 2 = stay inside your home, or [ SKIP to 0 311] 3 = leave your home and go somewhero else [ASK Q.27 5] DON'T READ [4 = Do n' t K now [ SKIP to 0 3111 (9 = Refuse (SKIP to 0 3111 _ _ _ _ 274
)
l
= - - - - ~ - ~ - ~
s(. 27.5-27 9.fWhere would; you go? ( That'is.the place you would expect'.to a; spend the night) 1 PLEASE SPECIFY: u Town Name . .
, State (275T~ (276)
(277) (278) (279) v
-[Inte rviewer' Instructions: Please ' pri nt the , Town Name and State)
DON'T READ: [ 9 9 9 99 ' = Do n' t K now] 306-308.' In' a direct line, about how many miles . is your final destination from your home? Key. Punch] Dup ID-301-305 [ Code directly. in miles] _, m c y [Do n' t know . = 999] 306 307- 308 309. Counting yourself, about hoi ..any people in your household will be evacuating? [ Code directly 1 thru 7 8 = eight or more people 9e Do n' t k now 309 310 How many of your' vehicles would you and your f amily use to evacuate? 1 = 1' vehicle' 4 = 4 vehicles 2 = 2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 7 = no vehicles C DON' T READ ' [8 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse 310 311. Suppose there was an accident at the Seabrook Station and the State Civil Defense of ficials said that everybody
.living within ten miles of the plant should evacuate but that everybody who lived more than 10 miles away from the plant was safe. Would you believe the State Civil Defense of ficials that people living more than 10 miles away were safe?
1 = yes 2 = no DON'T [3 = Don' t K now READ [9 = Refuse 311 l \ - _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _
c-- ecu-312. Now supposo that it was 10:30 a.m. on a Tuesday in April and that you cnd each of your f amily members were at the place each of you normelly aro on such a day when you heard on the radio the last message ordering a general evacuation. In addition the message said,"All schools within the towns advised to evacuate are being evacuated to the predesignated Reception Centers for the town in which they are located. Parents should not drive being to school bussed directlytotomeet their children Reception Centers. since
" children are Would you:
1 = go about your normal business [ Skip to 0 340] 2 = stay inside where you cre [ Skip to 0 340] 3 = leave the place you are and go somewhere else [Ask 0 313] DON' T READ [4 = Don' t know [9 = P.efuse [ Skip to O.340] 312 313-317. Where would you go? ( That is the place you would expect to spend the night) ! PLEASE SPECIFY:
]
Town Name State i 313 314 315 316 ~317 [ Interviewer Instructions: Please print the Town Name and State] DON'T READ: [999 99 = Don' t Know] 318. Would you stop anywhere along the way to pick up f amily memb e rs , f riends and/or personal belongings at home? 1 = yes 2 = no [ SKIP to 0 335] DON'T READ [3 = Don' t know [9= Refuse [ SKIP to O. 335] 318
_ ,T- _g1_ 3192333 . Whero would'youLstop?:
- DON' T READ: [Responde nt can give up to three ' dif f erent stops. . .Please Print name of Town and State
- 1. for eachistop]
Please specify: I; ' p 1
, Town State a)- .
( 319)I T3207 ( 321) (322) T323) b)' . . . . (324)c(325) (326) (327) (328).
'c) _ _ __ '
(329) (330) (331) l(332) (333) DON' T ' READ - [ 99 9. 99 '= Don' t Know] 334. Would;these stops, in total, take you at.al_1 out~of the way you intended to go?-
-1 = no 2 = ' yes , . less th'an one mile 3.:= yes, one.to five' miles 4 = yes , five . to ten miles
- z 5 = eleven or more. miles DON'T READ [ 6 L = Do n' t k now [9 = Refuse 334
- 3 35-337. In _' a di rect li ne, about how many miles is your final destination from the place you normally are at 10:30' a.m.
on a weekday in April? [ Code directly in miles] _ [ Don' t know = 999] 335 336 337 338. ' Counting yourself , how ma ny people in your household will b e . evacuati ng? [ Code directly 1 thru 7 8 = eight or more people 9 = Don' t k now __ 338
339. How many of your vehicles would you and your f amily use to ovacuate? 1 = 1 vehicle 4 = 4' vehicles , 2 = 2 vehicles 5 = 5 vehicles ( 3 = 3 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles l 7 = no vehicles DON'T READ [8 = Don' t know [9 = Refuse 339 And now some more general questions. 340. Is there anyone. in your f amily who is bedridden, handicapped or who needs special evacuation assistance? 1 = no 4 = yes DON'T READ [9 = Refuse k 340 j 341. How many individuals in your household would need public transportation in order to evacuate? DON'T [ 1 = 1 person 5 = 5 people [ 2 = 2 people 6 = 6 or more people READ [ 3=3" 7 = no one [ 4=4" DON'T READ [ 8 = Do n' t K now [9 = Refuse 341 347. Last spring a major nuclear accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Union. Do you think that it is possible for as serious an accident to occur at the Seabrook nuclear power plant if the power plant is put into operation? 1 = yes 2 = no DON ' T [ 3 = Do n' t know READ [9 = Refuse 347 I 348. If as a result of an accident at Seabrook, you decided to leave the area and a Traffic Control of ficial who was assigned to prevent traf fic congestion told you not to drive on a road that you wanted to use, do you think you would: 1 = go where you wanted to go, or 2 = go where you were told to go DON'T READ [3 = don' t know [9= Refuse 348 l I J l 3
, _gg 349. Doss your fLmily have a plan of what each member would do and whera they would go in the event of an accident at' Seabrook Station? l = yes 2 = no DON'T READ [3= don' t know [9= Refuse 349 350-354. At what time does the male head of household leave his place of employment to riturn home for the evenind?
~
(Hours) (Mi nu tes) 1 = am 2 = pm CODE DIRECTLY: - 350 351 352 353 354 DON'T READ: [0001 = does not work outside of home - I [0002 = never at a regular time [0003 = don' t know ; [9999 = no male head of household 355-359 At what time does the female head of household leave her place of employment to return home for the eve ning? (Hours) ( Mi nu te s) 1 = am 2 = pm CODE DIRECTLY: 355 356 357 358 359 DON' T READ [0001 = does not work outside of home [0002 = never at a regular time [0003 = don' t know [9999 = no female head of household 360. How many vehicles are owned, leased and/or rented in total by members of your household? 1 = 1 vehicle 5 = 5 vehicles I 2 = 2 vehicles 6 = 6 or more vehicles 3 = 3 vehicles 7 = no vehicles 4 = 4 vehicles l DON'T READ [ 8 = Do n' t know [9= Refuse _ _ _ _ 360 I
}p o361;iWhat';is'.tho'.~1ast grade of school that you completed? A '1L. =' some ..liigh school- .or .less
' 2 = higheschool graduate 3 ='some college p 4.= college graduate 4
DON'T READL[9 = Refuse] 361
'362.. Do ,you; or any memberr of your immediate f amily currently work for"Public Serv.
- of New Hampshire? ;
}
1 = yes [Ask-Q.363] 21= no [(Go- to Please Read] l 1 DON'T.READL(9 = Refuse [Go to Please Read] -~ 362 l 363.- Do xyou or: any members of your immediate f amily currently i
. work at the Seabrock Station, ei ther for Seabrook or any J s ub-co nt rac to r?
1 = yes 2 =.no DON' T READ [9 = Refuse 363
.1 (I nte rviewe r: A supervisor might be calling within the next few -q
. PLEASE READ] . days to verify that I completed .this survey with you. j I would appreciateLit if you would acknowledge that it was' completed.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION H
.[ Interviewer: Please verify. and record respondent's telephone number]
[ Area Code] 363 364 -365 (Phone Number] 366 367 368 369 370 371 371 W il Respondent's First Name I For Validation: -1 (First Name) f i 1 1 I 1 1 i l a
)
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