ML20202E218
| ML20202E218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-10, 50-364-94-10, NUDOCS 9802180101 | |
| Download: ML20202E218 (35) | |
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g' Dave Mor;y l S:uthern Nuclear Vice President Operating Company Farley PrWect P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham. Alabama 35201 Tel 205 992.5131 February 6, 1998 COMPANY
%ergyIo ServehurWorid" Docket Nos.: 50-348 iv CFR 50.12(a) 50-364 -
U, S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC ' 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 10CFR50. Aooendix R Exemotion Reauest Ladies and Gentlemen:
In response to NRC Violation A of Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection report 50-348/97-10 and 50-364/94-10, Southem Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) denied the violation in our letter dated November 5,1997. After consideration of the basis of SNC's denial of the siolation, the NRC concluded that the violation occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation (reference NRC letter dated December 18,1997). ' In the December 18,1997 letter, the NRC stated that "If SNC perceives that errors were made in their May 31,1985 submittal, they should submit a resised exemption request for NRC approval that includes appropriatejustification and addresses the
'special circumstances' of 10CFR50.12(a),". Consistent with our response to the December 18, 1997 letter (SNC letter of January 23,1998) it is the purpose of this letter to submit a revised exemption request.
This enclosed revision clarifies that a 3-sided, single 1-inch layer Kaowool wrap exists on specific Charging Pump train B raceways. These installations were made to satisfy the commitments of the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation (FPPR) Amendment 3, and were approved in the FSAR SER Supplement No. 5. As stated in th NRC " Request for Additional Information Related to Knowool Fire Barriers" dated December 24,1997, our licensing basis for these raceways is based, in part, on Section 4.3.5.1 of the FPPR. This configuration was included as a "special-case exception"in the Fire Area Hazard Analysis of the FPPR as follo:ts (paragraph 4.3.5.1, sub-paragraph 5.b, as cited in the NRC letter):
I Fire area 4 Room 160. Two train B trays are located approximately 17 feet from the nearest train A cable. Sprinklers are proposed for the area. ,
Wrapping the train B centrol cable tray with a half-hour barrier (Tray BHF-24) and the bottom and sides only of the power cable trays (BDE-9 V, fW '
1 and 15)is proposed. 7
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 Justification: The open-top barrier for the power cable assumes that the cable will not overheat. It is approximately 12 feet above the floor and 5
. feet below the ceiling. Hus the power tray is isolated from an exposure
_._. fire.
After issuance of Appendix R, Exemption Request 1-39 was submitted. This exemption request for Fire Area 1-004, which includes room 160, requested an exemption from the Ill.G.2 requirement to enclose one train of redundant safe shutdown cables in a one hour fire bamer, thus continuing to maintain the configuration described in the FPPR. For the charging pump power cable in BDE-9 and 15 the exemption request states " Fire area 1--004 contains redundant charging pump train A and B power cables. One train of redundant power cables is not pro 5ided with a firo-rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area ..." This exemption request contained an error in that it also stated in the Evaluation section that _"He redundant charging pump power cables are provided with a barrier (two 1-inch thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) ..." llowever, this was a documentation error as our intent was to maintain these raceways per the original design and the original approved licensing basis as approved by FSAR SER Supplement 5.
Enclosure ! " Charging Pump Appendix R Considerations"is provided to assist in understanding the nature of this specific configuration at Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) and to provide tecimical basis to support the original exemption request.
As requested, the enclosed revised exemption request 1-39 is hereby submitted, pursuant to 10CFR50.12(a), for NRC approval. Specifically, this revised exemption is being requested pursuant to the special circumstance of 10CFR50.12(a)(2)(ii) in that application of the Appendix R III.G.2 requirement to enclose one train of redundant safe shutdown cables in a one hour fire barrier is not ne ..sary in this case to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule, i.e., safe plant she*.down in the event of a fire in area 1-004.
Should you have any questions, please advise.
Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY Dave Morey LLB:maf3 side _er. doc Enclosure 1: " Charge.g Pump Appendix R Considerations" Enclosure 2: Revised Exemption Request 1-39 cc: Mr. L. A. Reyes, Region 11 Administrator Mr. J.1. Zimmerman, NRR Project Manager Mr. T. M. Ross, Plant Sr. Resident inspector
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. . n ENCLOSUREI
" Charging Pump Appendix R Considerations" ,
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Chaming Pumn Appendix R Considerations Farley Nuclear Plant has three 100% capacity charging pumps (A, B, and swing). One charging pump is required to maintain sealinjection and RCS makeup (safe shutdown functions). Fire area 1-004, which comprises a major portion of the Auxiliary building, contains (on the 100-R. elevation) control and power citcuits for all three pumps. The A and B train power is fed to the associated A and B train pumps. The swing pump is fed from either A cr B train power, independent of the other two pumpi 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, section Ill.O.2.c, requires that the circuits for one train of safe shutdown components be protected where the circuits are less than 20 fl. Irom redundant circuits. The A and B tram charging pump and associated room cooler circuits are separated by greater than 20 n. Although separated from redundant A-Train circuits by greater than 20 A., the B-Train circuits are protected with two one inch layers of Knowool to address any intervening combustible concerns, with one exception. One B train raceway (designated BDE-12, BDE-15, and BDE-09)is wrapped on the bottom and both sides with a single one inch layer of Knowool raceway wrap and fully wrapped with one layer of Zetex fire resistant insulating fab b. This raceway, which contains B train power supply circuits for the B Train and swing charging pumps is separated, at its nearest edge, approximately 35 R. froni the redundant A Train room cooler power and control raceways AFD-36 and AllDB18, respectively (see figure 1). It was originally designed without a Knowool barrier on the top in order to permit eflicient heat dissipation (note: it was later determined that cable de-rating for this raceway was unnecessary). This tray, approximately 12 R. above the floor and 5 n.
below the ceiling, is the top tray in a stack of three trays, one of which is protected with a single one inch layer of Knowool wrap. It is within the spray pattern for unobstructed sprinkler system coverage.
As additional conservative measures:
- The A-Train charging pump raceways are fidly protected with two one inch layers of Kaowool;
- The A-Train and B Train power supply circuits to the swing pump are partially wrapped svith two one inch layers of Kaowool;
- The B-Train power circuits for 'he swing pomp room cooler are wrapped with two one inch layers of Kaowool; and The B-Train control circuits for the swing pump room cooler are wrapped with a single one inch layer of Knowool.
The combustible loading in all of fire area 1-004 consists of primarily IEEE rated cable insulation. Room 160 also contains r step-ofTpad with small containers of clothing and trash that are emptied regularly.
Latching metal lockers are also situated in room 160 for storage of protective clothing. The FNP combustible loading calculation maintains an inventory of combustible Icading for all the rooms in fire area 1-004. The Fire Area Hazards Analysis (FSAR Appendix 9B, Attachment A) documents the consequences of a worst case fire in the area. The analysis includes consideration of transient corsustible loads that may be introduced as allowed by FNP administrative control procedures.
Automatic detection and suppression coverage is provided in the 100 R. elevation of fire area 1-004 where redundant trains of shutdown components are located. The Fire Area llazards Analysis also evaluates and documents that the detection and suppression coverage is suflicient for the hazards present. Sprinsler nozzles are located above the 3 sided B train cable tray to provide unobstructed coverage of the subject tray.
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. 4 ENCLOSURE 2 Revised Exemption Request 139 2
4 J. M. FARLEY NUCEEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
'EXEM'PTION REQUEST: 1-11 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-004 LOCATI,0N:
UN!1.' AUXILI ARY _ BUILDING. JLL 100 FT - 0 IN.. 121 FT -
Q_ _ I N . . 130 FT - 0 IN.. 139 FT - 0 IN.. 155 FT - 0 IN..
175 FT - 0 IN.. AND 184 FT - 0 IN.
Fire area 1-004 consists of the following rooms:
El 100 Ft - 0 In.
Room 151 Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms Room 152 Valve Compartment Roon Room 153 Waste Gas Compressor Room Room 154 Wawte Evaporator Steam Generator Room Room 155 Passageway to Unit 2 Room 156 Holdup Tank Room Room 157 Holdup Tank Room Room 158 Holdup Tank Room Room 159 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 160 Hatch Area Room 161 Corridor Room 162 Hallway Room 163 WDS Control Panel Room Room 164 Storage Room / Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Room Room 165 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Roc 3 166 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 168 Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Room Room 170 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Room 175 Hallway Room 176 Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 177 Pump Room Room 178 Filter Room Room 179 Valve Room / Combustible Storage Room 180 Recycle Evaporator Steam Generator Roolo Room 180 Boric Acid Area Room 187 Hydro Test Pump Room Room 188 Boric Acid Tank Area El 121 Ft - 0 In.
Room 203 Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room Room 204 Waste Evaporator Package Room Room 205 Passage to Unit 2 Room 206- P. eat Exchanger Room Room 207 Hatch Area Room 208 Corridor Room 209 Hallway Roil 215 Duct and Pipe Chase
, Roola 216 Valve Compartments Area 1-39-1 Rev. 1
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. J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 217 Volume Control Tank Room Room 218 Chiller Unit Room Room 219 Pipe Chase Room 220 Valve Compartment Roon Room 221 Primar* Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 222 Corridor Room 230 Recycle Evaporator Package Roon Room 231 Sluice Pump Room Room 232 Cluice Filter Room Room 236 HVAC Duct Chase Room 237 Corridor Room 238 Cask Storage Area Room 239 Transfer Canal Hoom 240 Spent Fuel Pool Room Room 253 Valve Compartment g1 130 Ft -0 In.
Room 601 Drumming Area Room 602 Passageway Room 603 Drum Storage Area - Combustible Storage Area Room 604 Passage Room 605 Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room Room 606 Filter Room Room 607 Filter Room Room 608 Blowdown Heat Exchanger Roon Room 609 Storage Room Room 610 Valve Compartment Room El 139 Ft - 0 in.
Room 301 Seal Water Filter Room Room 302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room Room 303 Reactor Coolant Filter Room Room 304 Waste Monitor Tank Filter Room Room 305 Seal Injection Filter Room Room 306 Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Room Room 307 Valve Compartment Room Room 308 Room 309 Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Domineralizer Room Hatch Area Room 310 Valve Compartment Room Room 311 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room Room 312 Corridor Room 313 Ploor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room Room 314 Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room Rooh 315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room Room 316 Passage to Unit 2 Room 322 Hallway Room 323 Sample Room Room 324 High Activity Radioactive Lab Room 325 Counting Room Room 326 Gas Analyzer Room i
1-39-2 Rev. 1
. J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 327 Valve Access Area Room 328 BTR Domineraliter R0oa Room 329 Pipe Tunnel Room 330. Chiller surge Tank Pump Roon Room 331 Valve Access Area Room 332 MCC 1A Area Room 340 Domineraliter Compartment Room 341 Pipe Chase Room 342 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Roon Room 348 Cask Wash Area El 155 Ft -0 In.
-Room 402 Passage to Unit 2 Room 403 New Resin Storage Room 404 Filter Hatches Room / Combustible Storage Room 405 Hatch Room Room 406 Decon Room Room 407 Hot Machine Shop Room 408 Hallway Room 409 Hallway Room 410A Room 410B 600-V Load Center (Station Service Transformer Room) 600-V Lood Center c
Room 415 Corridor Room 417 Corridor Room 418 Auxiliary Building and Containment Purge Vent Equipment Roon Room 419 Domineraliter Hatch Area Room 420 . Drum Storage Roon Room 421 Drumming Station Room Room 422 Corridor Room 423 Valve Compartment Room 424 Domineraliter Compartment Room 425 Demineralizer-Compartment Room 426 Domineraliter Compartment Room 427 -Demineraliter Compartment Room 419 Containment Purge Air Eguipment Room Room 430* Disrobe Area Room 43. Health Physicist Room Room 432 Corridor Room 433 Corridor Roou-434 Passage Room 435 Hot Shower-Room 436 Hot Toilet Room 437 Hot Janitor
- -Room 43R Hot-Water Heater Room l Room 439 Drying Area Room 440 Laundry Area l Room 441 Drying Area
-Room 442 First Aid Room Room 44? Locker Roon l
1-39-3 Rev. 1
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a J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 3 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 444 Clean Linen storage Room 445 Speat Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Roon l Room 446 Hallway
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Room.447 Cask Wash Storage Roon Room 448 SFPC Pump Room Room 449 Domineraliser Room Room 450 Valve Compartment Room 451 Filter Room 4
Room 452 Clean Shower Room-453 Clean Janitor Room Room 454 Lobby i Room 455 Clean. Toilet Room '
Room 456 Drying Area \
Room 461 Environmental Low Activity Lab '
Room 462 Non-Radioactive Vent Equipment Roon Room 463 Nitrogen Storage Room .
Room 464 Nitrogen Storage Room Room 467 SFP Heat Exchanger Room i Room 478 Motor Control Center Roon Plant modification in progress is deleting fire area 1-043.
3 Rooms 438, 440, 443, 444, 452, 453, 455 and 456 are now in fire area'l-004. The analysis for Appendix "R" shows this modification will-have no effect upon area 1 004 as the same safe !
l shutdown cabling exists in 1-004 ad revicJed.
- El 175 Ft - 0 In.
Roon 506 Component _ Cooling Surge Tank Roon
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El 1W4 Ft - 0 In.
Room 504 Stair No. 6 Room 505 Spent Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room 6 4 All of the fire area boundary walls are rated as a 3-hour fire barrier with all electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a 3-hour ra' ting. All doors that are part of the fire area boundary are UL Class A doors except for Class B doors to stairwells used for access-and egress and for doors in the fire area boundary leading toothe outside which are not rated. The floors and ceilings of fire area 1-004 which bound other fire areas are j
rated'for 3-hours with the excertion of two non-rated steel hatch covars. A non-rated steel hatch cover in the floor-of room 163 (area 1-004) communicates with room 103 (area 1-001) and a non rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 454 (area 1-004) communicates-with room 345 (area 1-042) and steel bolted access plates to HVAC duct chases rooms 215 and 236 (area 1-004) on elevation 139'-0" from room 317 (area 1-034) and room 346 (area 1-041)Lrespectively. All internal _ floors of fire area 1-004 are-
- reinforced concrete, and exposed structural steel has been Credit has been taken for the
- .. Protected by fire proofing.
1-39-4 Rev. 1
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J. M. FARLEY hUCLEAR PLANT L 10CFR50 APPENDIX *R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION separ' a tion afforded by several non fire-rated walls and floor slabs internal to the subject fire area, and are defined in the i
exemption justifications. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, those sealed penetrations for which i j credit has been taken shall be placed in the surveillance program.
EXEMPTION
! An exemption to section !!!.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it-requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and full
- coverage fixed suppression system. (Conditions A through !) 1 An exemption to section !!!.G.2.a is requested to the extent that' it-requares separation.of redundant cables ari equipment by a-4 fire barrier having a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating (Condition K). ,
The above exemptions are based upon implementation of the four modifications. .
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTlQE ,
A. REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
- A.1 Motor Control Center lA and 18 Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety related McCs, (1A) i ~ Q1R178001A-A and (1B) Q1R17B0018-B. These motor control centers provide power for various train-A and train-B safe-shutdown 4
components.respectively. Power supply: cabling and subject motor control centers are not protected by fire barriers and full coverage automatic suppression is not provided.
i Justification An enalysis was performed ta demonstrate that a fire would be
- limited to one'MCC and/or its associated power feed and.would not
- effect the redundant MCC and/or its associated power feed.
Therefore,-only vne train of redundant electrical distribution '
could be lost due to a credible fire in area 1-004. MCC 1A is located in room 332, el 139 ft - 0 in. having its power feed continue through room-312 thence up to el 155 ft in. MCC 1B is located in room 209 el 121 ft - 0 in. having its-power feed exit this room into an adjacent fire area.
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The redundant McCs are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el-139 ft -'0 in. Unsealed-penetrations located in the subject floor
- have been reviewed and will not effect the. separation afforded by the concrete. floor. The minimum horizontal separation between components is approximately 60 ft between MCC 18 (el 121 ft - 0 in.) and MCC 1A power feed (el 155 ft - 0 in.).
This 60 ft horizontal separation and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft - 0 in.
1-39-5 Rev. 1
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Jo R FARLEY NUCLEAR Pl. ANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
' A.2' DC Distribution Panels 1C and IF Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety-related de distribution panels (1C) Q1R41 LOO 1C-A and (1F) OlR41 LOO 1F-B. These 125 V-dc l distribution panels provide power for various train-A and train-B safe-shutdown components respectively. Power supply cabling and distribution panels are not protected by barriers.
Lustification, An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one de distribution panel and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant panel and or its associated power feed. Therefore, only one train of redundant de distribution panels could be lost.
DC distribution panel IC is located in room 312, el 139 ft -
0 in.. and de distribution panel 1F is located in room 209 el 121 ft - 0 in. The redundant de distribution panels are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 139 ft - 0 in. Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor. The minimum horizontal separation between these redundant panels is approximately 40 ft and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft -
0 in, and 139 ft - 0 in. A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject equipment. The detection
' system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hose stations portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on the subject elevations.
B. STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION Fire area 1-004 rooms 462 and 464 contain redundant steam generator pressure transmitters and cabling. The redundant steam generator pressure instruments provide the following signals:
EOUIPMEMI FUNCTION Q1N11PT3371A-A S/G-A Press. Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication Q1N11P10474-P2 S/G-A Press Protection Signal.
Indication 01N11PT0475-P3 S/G-A Press. Protection Signal.
Indication 01N11PT0476-P4 S/G-A Press. Protection signal.
Indication 01N11PT3371B-A S/G-B Precs. Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication.
1-39-6 Rev. 1
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Je M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX 'R" FIRE MAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i > -
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION i
Q1N11PT0484-P2 5/G-B Press, Protection signal.
Indication 4
01N11PT0485-P3 S/G-B Press, Protection signal.
Indication
- Q1N11PT0486-P4 5/G-B Press, Protection signal, !
i Indication Q1N11PT3371C-A 5/G-B Press Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and-Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication.
01N11PT0494-P2 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication 01N11PT0495-P3 s/G-C Press, Protection signal, Indication Q1N11PT0496-P4 S/G-C Press, Protection signal, Indication The redundant pressure transmitters and their cabling are not protected by fire barriers and full coverage automatic
', suppression is not provided.
1 Modification
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A dire rated bar~rier has been provided in Reon 4f2 for redundant '
i instrument cabling racewap 21E047, 2IE048, 315017, 4IE019, and '
i 3 415017. Th9 barrier extends from-pull box to wall penetection or i to pressure instrument. The barrier consists of two 1-in. layers i
of8Kaowool and an overall layer of Zetex fabric. A fire rated barrier inside the following conduits is-provided where they
' attach to pull boxes located in room 462. This barrier is the same as- thone: Provided inside conduit which penetrates 'a fire rated barrier penetration. The coneaits a~re 21E045, 21E047, ,
i 31E018, 3!E020, 4IE017, and 4!E039. An automatic fire partial i
suppression system presently covers the area of. modification in the eastern portion of room 462.
Justification
. 1
-Room 464 of fire area 1-004 contains cabling and pressure j ' instruments for steam generator A. Based upon a review of unsealed penetrations in the subject wall and the approximate 32-ft horizontal separation between redundant steam generator pressure instruments and cabling, a credible fire in room 464 would not propagate into room 462. Early warning provided by the smoke detection system in room 464 would provide adequate time
-for-fire brigade personnel to extinguish the fire in room 464.
In addition, initiation of the automatic fixed suppression system and the barriers provided for redundant cabling in room 462 would protect the redundant F/G B and C instrumentation. For a fire in room 462 a portable et .nguisher and manual hose station are available for use-in room 464.
l' 1-39-7 Rev. 1 1 .
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
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10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
' Room'462 of fire area 1-004 contains S/G A, B, and C pretsure instruments and associated cabling for the pressure instruments.
Based upon the modification, the existing raceway barriers, smoke detection, and fixed suppression in the area, a credible fire in room 46.2 would not effect the ability to monitor S/G A Pressure.
One functional steam generator is sufficient for safe shutdown at plant Farley. Due to fire induced signals from S/G B and C pressure transmitters in room 462, a false SI CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system may result. Plant procedures exist or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, or CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.
C. INSTRUMENT AIR Fire area 1-004 contains redundant instrument air system de power and control cabling which serve N1P19SV3825-A (instrument air Penetration room isolation valve), 01P195V3611-A (instrument air containment isolation valve) train A and OlB13SV2228-B (power relief valve backup air supply) train B. The de power and control cabling are not protected by barriers, and full automatic fixed suppression coverage is not provided.
Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one train of redundant PORV instrument air header isolation valve cabling.
Train A cabling is located in rooms 168, 163, and 162, el 100 ft - 0 in., and rooms 322, and 323, el 139 ft - 0 in.
Train B cabling is located in rooms 203 and 209, el 121 ft -
0 in. The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 121 ft - 0 in. and 139 ft -
0 in. Unsealed penetrations in the subject floors have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by these concrett floors. The train A cables have full suppression coverage on el 100 ft - 0 in, and el.139 ft - 0 in. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, heat collectors will be installed on all sidewall sprinkler heads of the system in room 161 to increase their responsiveness to a fire condition. Train B cables have full suppression coverage on el 121 ft - 0 in. A smoke detection system is installed in all roomo containing the subject cabling. The detection system would Provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are available for use on the subject elevations.
D. BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION Fire area 1-004 contains redundant power and control cabling of battery charging room coolers QlE16M006A-A and 01E16M006B-B.
1-39-8 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY KUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION traine A and B respectively, and battery room exhaust _ fans and exhaust dampers 01V47C012A-A, Q1V47C0128-B and Q1V47MOV3644-A, Q1V47MOV3(43-B, trains A and B respectively. The subject power and control cabling is not protected by barriers and full coverage automatic-fixed suppression is not provided.
Justification Fire induced failures in control and power cables could potentially result in the loss of ventilation in both the redundant train A and B battery and battery charger rooms. A failure of the ventilation system will not result in a failure of J the redundant train-A or -B 125 V-dc battery systems. Therefore, the potential fire induced failure of the power and control cable for the redundant battery and battery charger room ventilation fans and dampers will not result in the loss of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The safe shutdown requirement f or battery and battery charger ro' :a ventilation is a long term requirement. If ventilation is lost due to a fire in area 1-004, either portable ventilation equipment will be installed in the effected room (s) or the damaged ventilation system will be repaired within 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> of post-fire hot shutdown initiation to insure that battery room hydrogen concentrations do not exceed acceptable limits. Plant procedures covering these actions will be developed for a fire in area 1-004.
E. BORATION/ MAKEUP, DEPRESSURIZATION, AND RCP SEAL INTEGRITY Flow from the charging pumps is required for reactor coolant boration and makeup, reactor coolant system depressurization, and reactor coolant pump seal integrity. The following independent conditions concern cables related to the charging pumps and charging pump room coolers:
(a) Fire area 1 004 contains redundant charging Pump train-A and
-B power cables. One train of redundant power cables is not provided with a fire rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression coverage provided for 4
_both redundant trains throughout their_ entire route in the fire area.
(b) Fire area 1-004 contains redundant charging pump room cooler Power and control cables. One train of redundant power and control cable is not provided with a fire rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout the entire route in the fire area.
1-39-9 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS RF. EVALUATION Eqdification (a) A fire rated barrier has been Provided for train-A power chble raceway ADDA21, ADDA18, ADDA15, and ADDA09. The subject barrier will extend the complete route of the train-A changing pump power cable in fire area 1-004.
(b) The eF*eting fire rated barrier on raceva BFD803 has been exterf1J and a fire rated barrior for raceway BNFA03 is belt a provided along its entire length on el 100 ft - 0 in.
In addition, an open penetration approximately 2 ft - 6 in, north 121 ft -of 0 in. floor slab column has been 18 and 15 ftsealed.
- 8 in, west of column g, W,!
Justification (4ty f but / .
(a) An analysis was performed based upon the subject modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be -- }
limited to only one train of redundant charging pump power cabling.
Train-A power cabling is located in rooms 161, 162. 163, and 168. Train-B cabling is located in rooms 175, 160, 159. k
, 158, 157, 156, 155, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and A66. The '
t redundant power cables are provided with a bar21er (two 1-in.-thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire in the following rooms in fire area 1-004: train A in rooms 161. 162._163, and 168, train B in rooms 175. 160 and 1594 rull fixe suppression coverage is provided in rooms 163, 162, 161 160, 175, and 186. As previously noted, heat collectors ,
will be added to the sidewall sprinkler heads in room 161 to increase their responsiveness to-fire conditions. In addition, the redundant power cables are separated minimally by a 2-f t-thick reinforced concrete wall bounding roomi 159, 158, 157, 156, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and 166, with the exception of room 155 where there is approximately 32 ft of L separation. Unsealed penetrations in the subject walls have been reviewed and the walls are considered to afford ,
adequate separation.
A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the-subject cabling. Tha detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hose stations, portable extinguishers. and portable smoke removal equipment are
~-~
available for use on this elevation.
(b) 'An analysis was performed bssed upon the subject modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be limited to onlytone train of redundant charging pump cooler power:and control cabling.
l 1-39-10 Rev. 1
IEXT FOR INSERT ON PAGE 1-39-10
, with the exception of raceways BDE-09, BDE-12, and BDE-15 in room 160 that are provided with a single layer of 1-inch thick Knowool on two sides and bottom only. These installations were made to satisfy the commitment of FPPR Amendment 3, and were approved in FSAR SER Supple-(ment No. 5. j i
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION El 100 ft - 0 in contains redundant charging pump room cooler puwer and control cables. Train-B cables are protected by a fire rated barrier which extends to a point of 40-ft horizontal separation from the redundant train-A cables. Automatic fired suppression and smoke detection systems provide coverage for the subject cables.
El 121 ft - 0 in. contains the same redundant charging pump room cooler cables which have a minimum horizontal separation of approximately 40 ft. The train-B power and control cables are provided with automatic suppression and smoke detection coverage for their entire route on this elevation.
In addition, redundant train-A and -B charging Pump room cooler power and control cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick 0 reinforced in. Unsealed concrete slab floor at el 121 ft -
penetrations in t.he floor slab have been reviewed and are considered to afford adequate separation.
In conclusion, a credible fire in fire area 1-004 could not effect both trains of redundant charging pump room cooler power and control cables.
P. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION
(
Fire area 1-004 contains power and control cables for S/G-1C steam supply to TDAFW pump valve 01N12EV3235B-AB and TDAPW pump steam admission valve 01N12SV3226-AB. The subject cables are not
,'provided.
protect ed by barriers nor is full coverage automatic suppression Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the subject cables could cause the e.1bject valves to open, causing auto start of the TDAFW pump and t he dragging of steam f rom S/G-1C. In the unlikely event of wultiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be aitigated by manually tripping the TDAPW pump throttle valve 01N12MOV3406-A.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for a fire in area 1-004.
(s .
STEAM RELEASE (COOLDOWN)
'Pire area 1-004 contains de distributi0n panel (1C) 01R41 LOO 1C-A whict supplies solenoid power for atmospheric relief valves.
Q1N11PV3371A 01N11PV3371B, and 01N11PV3371C. The subject panel and cables ire not protected by barriers.
1-39-11 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CrR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE NAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
- i Justification Loss of de distribution panel 1C would render the main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable. One of the three.sain steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required te be operable to achieve steam release
- for cooldown. -The atmospheric relief-valves are.provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies. The subject valves are not located in fire area 1-004. The capabu ity to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a- fire in area 1-004 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
H. NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING Fire area 1-004 contains red 3ndant instrumentation cabling and equipment 01C55NN0048-A of neutron flux monitoring Q1C55NE0048A-A (post accident neutron flux monitor) and N1C55NE0031-Pl. and N1055NE0032-P2 (source range neutron flux monitors). The subject cabling and-equipment is not protected by barriers and automatic fixed suppression is not providad.
Justification
-Instrumentation cables for the tource range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 traverse fire area-1-004 through sonduit embedded in the floor slab at el 155 ft - 0 in..
and are accessible through embedded-pull boxes on-this elevation.
The instrumentation cables for the-neutret flux monitors Q1C55NE0048A-A are routed through-fire area 1-004 on el 100 ft -
0 in. . -121 f t - 0 in. and 139 f t - 0. in. The amplifier.
'Q1C55NM0048-A for- the neutron flut monitor is located on elevation 139-ft - 0 in.
The" re6undant cables- are separated by a 2-f t-thick reinforced concrete _ floor slab at el 155 ft -'O in. -Unsealed penetrations in- the 1 subject floor slab have been reviewed and are considered not to effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.
I.-
REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Fire area 1-004 contains cable for redundant RCS and pressuriser
=
sample- line boundary valves. ~ The RCS valves are Q1P16HV3101 B.
01P15HV3102-B. a nd: 01P15HV37 6 5-A. The pressurizer valves are Q1P15HV3103-A and Q1P15HV3881-B. The subject cables are not provided with barriers and full coverage automatic fixed suppression;is not provided.
1-39-12 Rev.-1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Justification An analysis of the effects of fire upon subject redundant line isolation valves shows that it would take multiple hot shorts to energize the solenoids to open all valves. In the unlikely event of multiple hot shorts (induced from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, the condition can be mitigated for the train-A powered valves 01P15KV3765-A and 02P15HV3103-A by -
removing power from all cables in the shared raceway. This can be accomplished by opening the supply breaker on 125 V-dc switchgear 1A (01R428001A-A) for 125 V-dc distribution panel IC '
(Q1R41 LOO 1C-A). Distribution panel 1A is located in fire area 1-018 room 0224.
Control cables of the train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q1831PCV0445A-A and Q1813MOV8000A-A and the reactor head vent valves 01B13SV2213A-A and 01B13SV2214A-A are located in fire area 1-004. The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel 01H21NBAPP260$G-A. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet 01H22 LOO 2-A are in this area. A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.
Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet 01H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway of the control cables for Q1B31PCV0445A-A.
Pressurizer power o)perated relief valve, and Q1B13SV2213A-A and Q1Bi3SV2214A-A. reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually aligning the affected relay a
(handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board. To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 17 on de distribution panel 1B (01R41 LOO 1BA) in fire area 1-043 room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 in fire area 1-035 room 0347 and manually Whift transfer relays TR1 (01B13SV2213A-A). TR2 (01B13SV2214A-A). TR3 (01B13PCV0445A-A),
and_TAS_(01B13MOV8000A-A) placing control back to main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
1-39-13 Rev. 1
4
, =J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i
1C'FR50 APPENDIX *R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
. .- )
Plant procedures will be developed to include the above action for a fire in area 1 004.
J. NON-FIRE-RATED HATCH COVERS IN FIRE AREA BOUNDARY i
(a)_ Anon-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 163
_(area-1 004) communicates with room _103 (area 1-001).
(b) A non-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 454
- (area 1-004) consunicates with room 345 (area 1-042).
Justification ,
(a) Room 163 (area 1-004) contains an automatic fixed suppression uystem which provided suppression coverage in the area of the_ subject steel hatch cover. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, one !
sprinkler head of this system will be relocated to improve water coverage of the steel hatch cover. In addition, an l analysis of safe shutdown circuits in room 163 (area 1-004) and room 103 (area 1-001) was performed to determine if ;
there were any new redundancy problema identified if a fire j L
propagated between the adjacent fire area rooms.. The analysis showed that physical separation afforded redundant safe shutdown cabling in each fire area was adequate as applied tb one another. Therefore, with the detection system provided in rooms 163 and 103 and the suppression-provided in the area of the hatch in room 163, fire rating of the subject hatch cover is not required.
(b) The existing sprinkler systems in room 345 (1-042) and 454 (1-004) will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the-passage of-fire from fire area 1-004'to the adjacent; fire area via the non-rated steel hatch.
FIRE-AREA INFORMATION
-Fire Area: 1-004 r
MAXIMUM ROOM .. Nt'MBER S / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIItE
- TITLES- TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft81 SEVERITY 151 Waste A. B Gas Decay L Tank' Rooms L152. Valve A. B j
Compartment Cable (a) 1.122 lb(a)15,g77(a) <30 min (Al Room. insul.
Charcoal 810 lb filter. '
1-39-14 Rev. 1
- , . e e , , , - . . .... , ww 4.---.,-,m-.--r-...---- c-,-.m.-,-..,., + e . . , -4,,--,c-, ,,---,-w-,
~
J. M. FARLFY tiUCLEAR Pf, ANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAK! MUM ROOM NUMBERS / SMUTDOWN COMBUST!BLE FIRE LOAD TITLES FIRE TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 165 Gas A, 3 Decay Tank Room 166 Waste A. B Gas Decay Tank Room 4 153 Waste A. B Charcoal 570 lb 34.733 <30 min Gas Compressor filter Room Cable insul. 448 lb Lube oil 1 gal 159 Recycle Evaporator B Cable insul. 299 lb 26.783 <30 min Lube oil 0.5 gal Feed Pump Room 168 Chemical A. B Charcoal 200 lb 52.037 <1 h and Laundry filter Drain Tank Cable insul. 890 lb Room Lube oil 0.5 gal 175 Hallway A. B Cable insul. 972 lb 29.530 <30 min 154 Waste B Evaporator Steam Cen.
Room 4
155 Passageway B to Unit 2 160 Hatch A. B Ares 161 Corridor A. B. C Cable (b) 12.531 lb(b)27.995(b) <30 min (b) insul.
Lube oil 0.75 gal Panel 14 lb 162 Hallway A. B 163-WDS Panel A. B Room l
l 1-39-15 Rev. 1 l
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX 'P l' IRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAK! HUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUST!BLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES _TPAIN _ _ MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ftsy ggygggyy 164 L'aundry A and Hot Shower Tank Room 177 Pump -
Room 178 Filter -
Room 215 Duct and -
None 0 0 0 Pipe Chase 176 Secondary -
None 0 0 0 Spent Resin Storage Tank Room 179 Valve -
Cable insul. 56 lb 2,724 <30 min Room /
Combustible Storage (c) 180 Recycle -
Cable insul.
Evaporator Steam Gen.
Room 186 Boric A, B Cable insul, 2,437 lb(d)23,636(d)<30 min (d)
Acid Area Lube oil 3.75 gal 187-Hydre -
Cable insul.
Test Pum'y Lube oil >
Room 204 Waste Channel Cable insul. 183 lb 4,963 <30 min
(
Evaporator 1 Package Room 219 Pipe -
None 0 0 0 Chase 203 Wasto A Cable insul.
Condenser Tanks and Pump Room
- 1-39-16 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
, ,10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVA' 'kTION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES _ TRAIN MATERI&L_ OUANTITY (Btu /ft:1 SLVERITY 205 Passageway -
Cable insul.
to Unit 1 207 Hatch B Cable insul.
Area 208 Corridor A. B Cable insul. 20,365 lb(4)40.542(*)<1 h(*)
Channel Panels 71 lb 1
209 Hallway A, B Cable insul.
Channel Panels 1
218 Chiller -
Cable incul.
Unit Room Panels Lube oil 6 gal 222 Corridor A. B Cable insul.
(
237 Corridor -
Cable insul.
253 Valve B Cable insul.
Compartment 156 Holdup B Cable insul. 274 lb 11.029 <30 min Tank Room 157 Holdup B Cable insul. 358 lb 13.879 <30 min Tank Room 158 Holdup B Cable insul. 278 lb 10,769 <30 min Tank Room 188 Boric -
Cable incul. 111 lb 619 <30 min Acid Tank Area 206 Heat B Cable insul. 143 lb 6.305 <30 min Exchanger Room
, 220 Valve -
Cable insul. 25 lb 3.200 <30 min Compartment Room 1-39-17 Rev. 1 I
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION ROOM NUMBERS / MAXIMUM SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES _ TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 18 SEVERITY 230 Re' cycle B Cable insul. 17,048 Evaporator 557 lb <30 min Package Room 231 Sluice B Cable insul. 134 lb 17,258 <30 min Pump Room 232 Sluice -
Cable insul. 296 lb 25,132 <30 min Filter Room 236 Duct B None 0 0 0 Chase 216 Valve A. B Cable insul. 40 lb 6.549 <30 min compartments Area-217 Volume -
None 0 0 0 Control Tank Room 221 Primary -
None 0 0 0 Spent Resin Storage Tank Room 238 Cask -
Storage Area 239 Transfer -
Canal l 240 Spent -
Cable insul.(f) 204 lb(f)1,243(f)<30 min (f)
Fuel Pool l Room l 348 Cask -
Wash Area l
447 Cask -
Cable insul. 8 lb 21.236 <30 min Wash Etorage Misc. material *00 lb Area /
ble Combust {C)
Storage 309 Hatch -
Area 1-39-18 Rev. 1 i
~.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR$0 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAK! MUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE ?!RE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 312 Corridor Channels 2 and 4 A. B 325 Counting -
Room 322 Hallway A. B 316 Passageway A to Unit 2 327 Valve -
Gas bottles (9) 34 lb(9)29.989(9)<30 min (9)
Access Area Cable insul. 6.366 lb Panel 22 lb
, 332 MCC 2A Channels Pipe insul. 24 lb 2 and 4 Flammable 5 lb A. C liquid
,% 307 Valve A Compartment Room 310' Valve A Compartment Room 330 Chiller Channels Surge Tanks 2 and 4 Pump Room A 301 Seal -
Water Filter Room ,
302 Recycle -
Evaporator Feed Filter Pump 303 Reactor A Coolant Filter Room 304 Waste A Cable insul.(h) 13 lb(h) 392(h)<30 win (h)
Monitor Tank Filter
' Room 9
1-39-19 Rev. 1 ,
Jo M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX *R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1
I MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERG/ SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TPLES _ TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft81 SEVERITY 311 Re~ cycle A Evaporator
)
Concentrates i Filter Room 313 Floor -
Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room 314 Waste -
Evaporator Feed Pilter Room 315 Recycle -
Waste Condenser Filter Room 305 Seal -
Injection Filter Room 306 Recycle -
None 0 0 0 Evaporator Feed Demin.
Room 308 Waste -
None 0 0 0 Condensate and Monitor Tank Domin.
Room 323 Sample A. B Cable insul. 515 lb 35.28C <30 min Room Pipe insul. 3 lb 324 High -
Cable insul. 998 lb 23.950 <30 min Activity Pipe insul. 11 lb Radioactive Flammable 200 ft3 Lab gas bottles 326 Gas -
Cable insul. 25 lb 1.889 <30 min-Analyzer -Pipe insul. 3 lb 2.083 Room 1-39-20 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX *R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUST!BLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft:1 ggyggg7y 329 Pipe -
None 0 0 0 Tunnel 331 Valve A Cable insul. 330 lb 10,936 <30 min Access Area 342 Spent Channels cable insul. 112 lb 5,247 <30 min Fuel Pool 2 and 4 Pump 340 Demin- -
None -
0 0 etalizer Compartment 328 BTR -
None 0 0 0 Demin.
. Room 601 Drumming -
Area 602 Passageway -
Cable (i) 627 ib(i) 2,141(i) <30 min (i) insv1.
Panel 7 lb 603 Drum -
Storage Area Combustible Storage Area 604 Passage -
Cable 128 lb 3.859 <30 min insul.
605 Blowdown B Cable 247 lb 8,885 <30 min Pumps and. insul.
Surge Tank Room 606 Filter -
Cable 55 lb 7.208 <30 min Room insul.
607 Filter - Cable 3 lb 563 <30 min Room insul.
~
608 Slowdown Channels cable 85 lb 1.720 <30 min Heat 2 and 4 insul.
Exchanger Roon 1-39-21 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE MAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANT!.TY (Btu /ftal SEVERITY 609 Storage Channels Cable 136 lb 3,891 <30 min Room 2 and 4 insul.
B 610 Valve - Cable 4 lb 616 <30 min Compartment insul.
Room 341 Pipe Channels None 0 0 0 Chase 2 and 4 B
445 Spent B Cable (3) 1.758 lb(3) 24.570(3)<30 min (3)
Fuel Pool i n s u '. .
Heat Exchanger Room 448 SFPC -
Pump Room 451 Filter - None 0 0 0 Room 449 Domin- -
None 0 0 0 eraliter Room 450 Valve -
None 0 0 0 Compartment 406 Decontam- -
Cable insul. 171 lb 5.702 <30 min inution 407 Hot * -
Cable insul. 424 lb 4,488 <30 min Machine Pipe insul. 7 lb Shop 409 Hallway Channels 1 2, 4 A. B 410A 600-V Channels Load Center 2 and 4 A
410B 600-V -
Load Center 1-39-22 Rev. 1
e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES _ TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft81 SEVERITY 405 Hatch B Room 419 Domin- A. B Cable (k) 22.752 lb(k) 35.737(k)<30 min (k) eralizer insul.
Hatch Area . Panel 36 lb Pipe insul. 16 lb 40s Hallway A 422 Corridor A 446 Hallway -
423 Valve -
Compartment 420 Drum -
Cable insul. 943 lb 12.212(1)<30 min (I)
Storage Room 421 Drumming -
Panel 14 lb Station Room Flammable 459 lb liquid 424 -
None 0 0 -
Domineralizer Compartment 425 -
None 0 0 -
Demineralizer Compartment 426 -
None 0 0 -
Domineralizer Compartment 427 -
None 0 0 -
Domineralizer Compartment 418 Auxiliary Building and Cable insul. 561 lb 58.754 <45 min Charcoal 7.400 lb Containment filter Purge Vent 5 -
Equipment Room 1-39-23 Rev. 1
e -
- 4, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 7
,10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA2ARDS ANALYSI8 REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 404 Fi?ter Channel Cable inLul. 30 lb 306 <30 min ll( Hatch Room /
Combustible 1
Storago (c) \
403 Hot -
Cable insul. 124 lb 3,852 <30 min r Instr. Shop Pipe insul. 33 lb 3 ,402 Passage A
- i to Unit 2 417 Corridor A d430 Disrobe -
Area J435 Hot - ss cable (m) 3,337 lb(mi 7,839(m)<45 S min (m)
Shower insul. .
443 Locker \
Cable 408 lb\> 3,376 <30 min
.. Room 453 Clean Channels Janitor Room 2, 3, 4 455 Clean Channels Toilet Room 2, 3, 4 4'
456 Drying -
> Miscellaneous 100 lb Area /
a 452 Clean -
Shower 444 Clean Channels Stored items Linen Storage 2, 3, 4j/
4dn Laundry -
Cable 522 lb 20,626 <30 min Arnt insulation 438 Hot Water -
Cable 27 tb 4. 7 'O <30 min Peater Room insulation 2439 Drying -
Arca 41 Drying -
rea 1-39-24 Rev. 1 L
Q *:- <
- _ _ _ - . . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ - _ _. __ . ..~.._ _ _
. o .
e .
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
, ,10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES _T. RAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ftaj, ggjggyyy
-434 Passage -
9433-Channels 2, 3, 4 v415 Corridor Channels 2, 3, . 4 A
, 432 Corridor A Cable insul. 4.337 lb 61,284 <45 min 454 Lobby A Hone 0 0 -
462_Non Channels Cable insul. 1.019 lb 7,673 <30 nin Radioactive 2, 3, 4 Pipa insul. 30 lb Vent _ Equip. A Room 1
4 463 Storage -
Cable insul. 100 lb 4,542- <30 min F.7 o m ~ Misc. items 100 lb 464 Storage Channels Cable insul. '115 lb 7,818 <30 min Room 2, 3. 4 Misc. items 100 lb A
467 SFP -
Cable insul. 65 lb 1,704 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room 429 Channel Cable insul. 6,015 lb 188.885 <2-1/2 h Containment. 2 Fanel */ l b Purge Air A, B Charec.1 23,000 lb Equipment filter Rons 431 Health Channels Cable insul. 381 lb 28,391 <30 min Physics Room 2, 3, 4 461 Channels Cable insul. 586 lb 10.077 <30 min Environmental 2, 3, 4 Low Activity Lab 436 Hot -
Cable insul. 9 lb 296 <30 min
. Toilet 1-39-25 Rev. 1
=r
- J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDb ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUM)TRS/ SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ftal SEVERITY 437 Hot -
Hone - - -
Janitor 442 First Channels Cable insul. 136 lb 9,933 <30 min Aid Room 2, 3, 4 478 Motor A, B Cable insul. 7,403 lb 39,085- <30 min Control Panel 7 lb Center Room 504 Stairvell -
Cable insul. 51 lb 925 <30 min No. 6 Floor.
El 184 ft -
0 in.
505 Spent -
Cable insul. 661 lb <30 min Fuel iool Charcoal 3,800 lb 27.117 i
Vent filter Equipment Panel 14 lb
, Room 506 Component Cooling Surge Cable insul.- 28 lb 947 <30 min Tank Room 170 Letdown A, B Cable insul. 61 lb 2,198 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room a .- Applies to rooms 151, 152, 165, and 166 collectively,
- b. Applies to rooms 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 177, and 178 collectively. .
c.- These rooms are occasionally utilized es combustible storage areas, particularly durin s outage periods. They will have 3-houcLatedboundaries,smokedetection,andsgrinkler systems that provide a density of 0.30 gal /m/ft upon completion of modifications.
- d. Appl'.es to rooms 180, 186, and 187 collectively.
- e. Applies to rooms 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 218. 222, 237, and 253.
- f. Applies to rooms 238, 239, 240, and 348.
1-39-26 Rev. 1 ,
v r ._
J. M. FARLEY tfUCLEAR PLANT
, , 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION t
- g. Applies to rooms 309, 312, 325, 322, 316, 327, 332 307, 310 and 330 collectivelyr
- h. Applies to rooms-301, 302, 303, 304 311 313, 314, 315, and 305 collectively.
- i. Applies to rooms 601, 602, and 603 collectively.
3 Applies to rooms 445 and 448 collectively.
- k. Applies to rooms 409, 410A, 410B, 405, 419 408 422, 446, and 423 collectively.
- 1. Applies to rooms 420 and 421 collectively.
- m. Applies to rooms 402, 417, 430, 435 439 441, 434 433, and 415 collectively.
pESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. Portions of the area boundary along the containment wall which'are also boundaries for other fire areas are self expanding cork.
Doors: Doors that are a part of the area boundary are UL Class A doits except for Class B doors to stairways and for. doors in the area boundary leading to the outside which are not. rated. ,
Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through the area boundary are sea 16d to a 3-hour fire resistance rating.
Ventilation: This area is served by both the radwaste and nonradwaste HVAC systems. Fire Jamper/ doors are installed in duct penetrations through the area boundary. The steel bolted
)- access pl,ates located in the HVAC duct etases rooms 215 and 236 on elevation 139'-O" are constructed to provide a heat barrier as specified on decign drawing F 176781.
Floor Drains: The 111 4-it. ,lameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity drain to either the waste holdup tank or the
, floor drain tank.
FIRE PROTECTION Smoke detection systems are installed in all rooms containing safe-shutdown equipment (except rooms 236 and 341) or where there is appreciable combustible material. Automatic suppression is provided in the following rooms 160 (partial), 161 162. 163 164, 168, 175, 205 (partial). 207 (partial). 208, 209, 222, 312 (Partial). 316 322, 402, 403. 404 415 (consealed space). 417 1-39-27 Rev. 1
r e
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
, ,10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZAPDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION (consealed space). 420, 421, and 447. As previc sly noted, heat co11ectc;1 will be added to the sidewall sprinkler heads in room 161 to increase their responsiveness to fire conditions. The 5-kV discornect switches in room '.61 and the load tanters in rooms'410A and 4103 have an autovatic heat-actuated CO2 suppressiorcsystem. Hose stations are installed to satisfy the requirements of NFPA 14.
Portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are provided on each elevation.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION Room 236 (duct chase), 341 (pipe chase), and 342 (spent fuel pool pump room) have safe shutdown control and instr nentation cabling which pass th ugh them and smoke detection is a provided.
Modification Smoke detection has been added in room-342.
Justification e
Room 236 (duct chase) contains safe shutdown cabling. All cabling in this chase is routed in conduit. The duct chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles . The duct chase runs vertically from el 121 ft -0 in, through 139 ft - 0 in, and 155 ft - 0 in. As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 233, there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced. the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.
Room 341 (Pipe chase) contains safe shutdown cabling. All
-cabling in this pipt chase is installed in conduit. The pipe chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles. The pip 6 chase exits the auxiliary building at el 139 ft - 0 in, which is below grade. As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 341: there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.
1-39-28 Rev. 1 l