Similar Documents at Maine Yankee |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20196K4821999-07-0606 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Because of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Status of Myaps Facility,Confirmatory Orders No Longer Necessary for Safe Operation or Maint of Plant ML20206H1611999-05-0505 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-36 ML20206G5731999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-36 ML20205D5261999-03-26026 March 1999 SER Accepting Util Rev 1 to CFH Training & Retraining Program for Maine Yankee.Rev 1 to CFH Training & Retraining Program Consistent with Current Licensing Practice for Facilities Undergoing Decommissioning ML20204C4631999-03-16016 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-36 ML20197C8231998-09-0303 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q),10CFR50.47(b) & (C) & App E to 10CFR50 Re Emergency Planning ML20236U8451998-07-24024 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Rev 14 to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co Operational QA Program ML20217H5241998-03-30030 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License DPR-36 ML20202D3181997-11-26026 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-36 ML20216F1511997-08-0808 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-36 ML20141G6511997-05-19019 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 158 to License DPR-36 ML20138G3541997-05-0202 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-36 ML20058E2641993-11-0505 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 143 to License DPR-36 ML20056F7831993-08-23023 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 142 to License DPR-36 ML20127D5061993-01-11011 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 136 to License DPR-36 ML20126H6211992-12-29029 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 135 to License DPR-36 ML20059K9991990-09-20020 September 1990 SER Accepting Methodology Re Statistical Combination of Uncertainties for RPS Setpoints ML20059H5901990-09-12012 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Facility Response to Station Blackout Rule.Issue of Conformance to Station Blackout Rule Will Remain Open at Facility Until Identified Nonconformances Resolved ML20059D0501990-08-30030 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License DPR-36 ML20055C2911990-02-20020 February 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Assessment of Asymmetric LOCA Loads Problem ML20246F6281989-07-10010 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-36 ML20245J0571989-04-25025 April 1989 SER Re Accepting Facility Emergency Response Capability in Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 3,w/exception of Instrumentation Re Variables Accumulator Tank Level & Pressure & Containment Sump Water Temp ML20245D4481989-04-24024 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 111 to License DPR-36 ML20245D4351989-04-24024 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-36 ML20155B4631988-09-27027 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 107 to License DPR-36 ML20154A1411988-09-0707 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-36 ML20150D7681988-07-0707 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Approving Util Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation Sys Contingent on Completion of Emergency Procedures & Operator Training & Submittal of Applicable Tech Specs ML20153A9641988-06-28028 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed Reflood Steam Cooling Model ML20196G6871988-06-23023 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-36 ML20151W5861988-04-26026 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-36 ML20153B3381988-03-16016 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831110,840216,0412,1214, 850618 & 0820 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.2, Based on Stated Util Commitments,Insp Rept 50-309/86-07 & Actions Described in Procedure for Vendor Interface ML20149H2831988-02-17017 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-36 ML20196C4301988-02-0909 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 102 to License DPR-36 ML20235M4661987-09-29029 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-36 ML20236F6441987-07-29029 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Item 2.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 ML20234B1781987-06-25025 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-36 ML20216J0371987-06-25025 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License DPR-36 ML20215E9301987-06-15015 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License DPR-36 ML20214W3841987-06-0404 June 1987 SER Supporting Util 831110 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 2.2 (Part 1) Re Requirement for Program Description to Ensure All Components of safety-related Sys Identified as safety-related on Informational Matls ML20214M1491987-05-21021 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Re Established Interface W/Nsss or Vendors of Each Component of Reactor Trip Sys ML20214J6001987-05-20020 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-36 ML20210C6631987-04-23023 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Adequacy of Offsite Power Sys.Further Evaluation Cannot Continue Until All Requested Info Received.Surowiec Line Not Acceptable Substitute for Mason Line During Startup or Normal Operations ML20206U9231987-04-0909 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 96 to License DPR-36 ML20197D4421987-04-0707 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting 850807 Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section XI Inservice Testing Requirements for Pump & Valves ML20205M6391987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Upgraded Seismic Design Program Contingent on Licensee Commitment to Upgrade Items in Table 3 ML20197D4241987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 94 to License DPR-36 ML20212N7091987-03-0404 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 93 to License DPR-36 ML20211G4361987-02-14014 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831110 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing for Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20210V1831987-02-0909 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 92 to License DPR-36 ML20207N2181987-01-12012 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to NRC 860721 Request for Addl Info Re Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Integrity,Per IE Info Notice 86-019 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20211M4841999-08-31031 August 1999 Replacement Pages 2-48,2-49 & 2-50 to Rev 14 of Defueled Sar ML20211D7111999-08-0909 August 1999 Rev 17 to Maine Yankee Defueled Safety Analysis Rept (Dsar) ML20196K4821999-07-0606 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Because of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Status of Myaps Facility,Confirmatory Orders No Longer Necessary for Safe Operation or Maint of Plant ML20206H1611999-05-0505 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-36 ML20206G5731999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-36 ML20205D5261999-03-26026 March 1999 SER Accepting Util Rev 1 to CFH Training & Retraining Program for Maine Yankee.Rev 1 to CFH Training & Retraining Program Consistent with Current Licensing Practice for Facilities Undergoing Decommissioning ML20204C4631999-03-16016 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-36 ML20206D7491998-12-31031 December 1998 Co Annual Financial Rept for 1998. with ML20155G9591998-11-0303 November 1998 Rev 1 to Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20155D8651998-10-28028 October 1998 Public Version of, Maine Yankee Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML20197C8231998-09-0303 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(q),10CFR50.47(b) & (C) & App E to 10CFR50 Re Emergency Planning ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20236X1751998-08-0303 August 1998 Rev 16 to Defueled Sar ML20236U8451998-07-24024 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Rev 14 to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co Operational QA Program ML20248D3011998-05-26026 May 1998 Rev 14,page 16 of 17,Section II of QA Program ML20247J0211998-05-11011 May 1998 Revised Page 16 of 17 of Section II of QA Program,Rev 14 ML20247D3451998-05-0606 May 1998 Rev 15 to Defueled SAR, Replacing List of Effective Pages ML20217J9811998-04-28028 April 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Description of Drift Specification for Model 1154,gauge Pressure Transmitters,Range Code 0 in Manual Man 4514,Dec 1992.Cause Indeterminate.Will Issue & Include Errata Sheets in All Future Shipments to Users ML20217H5241998-03-30030 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License DPR-36 ML20217D9691998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Maine Yankee.W/ ML20216D7681998-02-25025 February 1998 Rept to Duke Engineering & Services,Inc,On Allegations of Willfulness Related to Us NRC 971219 Demand for Info ML20203A3011998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Maine Yankee ML20202F3771998-01-31031 January 1998 Annual Rept of Facility Changes & Relief & Safety Valve Failures & Challenges ML20202E0541998-01-30030 January 1998 Rev 14 to Myaps Defueled Safety Analysis Rept ML20199K3211998-01-27027 January 1998 Rev 13 to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co,Qa Program ML20199K3471998-01-22022 January 1998 Rev 14 to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co QA Program ML20199C2281997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20217R2301997-12-31031 December 1997 Myap Annual Financial Rept for 1997 ML20203F8551997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20202D3181997-11-26026 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-36 ML20198R6371997-11-0606 November 1997 Yankee Mutual Assistance Agreement ML20155G9511997-10-31031 October 1997 Rev 1 to M01-1258-002, Decommissioning Cost Analysis for Myaps ML20198P9431997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20217K5191997-10-24024 October 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Five Valves That May Have Defect Related to Possible Crack within Forging Wall at Die Flash Line.Caused by Less than Optimal Forging Temperatures.Newer Temperature Monitoring Devices at Forging Area Heating Ovens Procured ML20211N0571997-10-0707 October 1997 Revised Pages to Jul/Aug 1994 SG Insp Summary Rept ML20198K0201997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20199H1861997-09-25025 September 1997 Rev 12 to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co,Qa Program ML20217A9251997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20217R1051997-08-27027 August 1997 Myaps Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20216F1511997-08-0808 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-36 ML20210M4451997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1997 for Myaps ML20151M1351997-07-21021 July 1997 Rev 0 to Technical Evaluation 172-97, Cable Separation Safety Assessment Rept ML20141H2691997-06-30030 June 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20141B9951997-05-31031 May 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1997 for Maine Yankee.W/ ML20141G6511997-05-19019 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 158 to License DPR-36 ML20138G3541997-05-0202 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-36 ML20141G2871997-04-30030 April 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1997 for Maine Yankee ML20137Z1971997-04-14014 April 1997 Forwards to Commission Results of Staff Evaluation of Performance of Licensees W/Ownership Structure Similar to Plant ML20137N7541997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 11 to Operational Quality Assurance Program ML20138B1491997-03-31031 March 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1997 for Maine Yankee 1999-08-09
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j,.= aeog y pg UNITED STATES y c( p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 .'.
'l WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 9, - a SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO AMENDMENT N0 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-36 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY j MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET N0. 50-309 INTRODUCTION By letters dated April 23, 1985 and October 7, 1985, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.11.B that would: (1) add blowdown and body vent valves on instrumentation lines to the list of manual containment isolation valves that may be repositioned under administrative control without prior compensatory measures, and (2) add manual containment isolation valves to the remedial action statement for Containment integrity.
BACKGROU9 Blowdown and Body Vent Valves Technical Specification 3.11.C lists certain containment isolation valves which may be repositioned under administrative controls. The proposed change would add blowdown and body vent valves on instrumentation lines to this list as follows:
"3. Blowdown and body vent valves associated with instrumentation lines may be repositioned under administrative control without compensatory measures to isolate the penetration."
The purpose of this change is to allow the occasional manipulation of instrument vent and blowdown valves, for brief periods during surveillance testing and maintenance, which is necessary to meet the requirements of the Maine Yankee Technical Specifications in order to ensure the instruments are operable in accordance with assumptions made in the Final Safety Analysis Report. During normal calibration, when the calibration tester is attached to the blowdown valve and the valve is open, the isolation valve of the instrumentation line maintains the containment boundary conditions. The body vent or blowdown valve is opened for only brief periods of time with the associated instrument isolation valves open. Written procedures have been established that address the operation and manipulation of these valves during maintenance and calibration. Although one of two containment integrity barriers are being breached, the period of time that the valves are open is very short, the size of the opening is very small (0.25 - 0.5 inch l
diameter), and a technician in close proximity could quickly shut the valve, 8606040182 860527 PDR P ADOCK 05000309 pg
if required. Thus, in the unlikely event a design basis accidcrt occurs with the valves open and the technician were to fail to close the valves, the effects would be minimal because of the small size of the lines. Also, as noted previously, because the valves are normally only fully opened for very brief periods to blow down the associated lines, the probability of any impact on containment integrity is extremely small.
Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the proposed change has a negligible effect on plant safety and is, therefore, acceptable.
Manual Containment Isolation Valves 4
The proposed change would add manual containment isolation valves to the list of valves in the remedial action statement. This addition is a clerical change which makes the remedial action statement consistent with the technical specification and corrects the previous inadvertent omission of
- manual valves from the remedial action statement.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in a surveillance requirement or in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, basea on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by cperation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance i
of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
4 Date: May 27, 1986 Principal Contributors:
, Ken Ferlic, Region I Robert Ferguson, PEICSB t
i I
- . . . _ _ . . _ , _ . - _ _ _. . . . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . - _ - , - _..,m. _ _ _ , _ , - _ _ _ , - - _.
. . , , . - . .__,____.m.
Exception:
- 1. Manual containment isolation valves may be repositioned under administrative controls provided prior compensatory measures are taken to isolate the penetration. Compensatory measures which may be taken include closing other valves or installing blind flanges to isolate a penetration. Compensatory measures whica are in effect for longer than seventy-two hours must meet the same design criteria as the original containment isolation valve.
- 2. The following manual containment isolation valves may be reposi-tioned under administrative control without compensatory measures to isolate the penetration:
RH-4, 6, 7, 26 MS-48, 50, 68, 70, 88, 90, 239, 241, 243 PAP-1, 4, 23, 24, 25 HPD-4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15 I IA-212, 213, 218, 219, 220 l
- 3. Blowdown and body vent valves associated with instrumentation lines may be repositioned under administrative control without compensa-tory measures to isolate the penetration.
Remedial Action:
With one or more automatic, remotely operated, or manual containment isolation valves inoperable, maintain at least one automatic, remotely operated, or manual isolation valve operable in each affected penetra-tion that is open, and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either:
- 1. Restore the inoperable valve to operable status, or
- 2. Isolate the affected penetration by use of at least one manual, remotely operated or deactivated automatic isolation valve secured (tagged) in the closed position or by use of a blind flange.
Compensatory measures which are in effect for longer than seventy-two hours must meet the same design criteria as the original contain-ment integrity valve.
C. The reactor shall not be critical if the containment internal pressure exceeds 3 psig.
D. On-line containment purne.
On-Line purging of containment is not allowed under the conditions of Specification 3.ll.B above, unless the following conditions are satisfied:
- 1. Prior to the depressurization of the containment for on-line purge, the two purge supply, two exhaust valves and one exhaust bypass valve will be cycled to test the automatic closure feature using both the Containment Gaseous Activity and Primary Vent Stack Gaseous Activity closure signals.
The operation of the inner and outer supply and exhaust 3.11-2 Amendment No. O,77,M gg A
Basis (continued)
Manual containment integrity valves may be repositioned provided that actions are taken to isolate the penetration by alternate means. As soon as practicable, but within seventy-two hours, the alternate means utilized, including associated pip-ing, will be verified to meet the same design criteria as the original isolation.
Certain valves are allowed to be repositioned under administrative controls (e.g.,
written procedures) to effect required periodic tests and to allow certain required evolutions during startup and shutdown, including main steam line warmup, steam trap blowdown, and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system operation. Examples of uses of these valves are provided below. These examples are not all inclusive.
- The calorimeter isolation valves, MS-239, 241 and 243, are opened in order to l perform planned calorimetrics.
The steam line vents, MS-48, 68 and 88, are open for several hours during heatup between reactor coolant temperatures of approximately 210 F and 300 F.
The steam trap drains, HPD-5,10 and 15, are cycled open briefly during steam line warmup to blow down the steam trap.
The isolation valves to the blowdown tank, HPD-4, 9 and 14, are open during heatup and are closed prior to entering power operation.
The steam generator non-return valve bypasses, MS 50, 70 and 90, are opened during steam line warmup.
The Residual Heat Removal System valves, RH-4, 6, 7 and 26, are utilized when the Residual Heat Removal System is in service or when low temperature overpressure protection is in service.
PAP 1 and 4 are opened monthly to perform periodic surveillance of the hydrogen purge system in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS 4.11).
The inner door 0-ring test valves, IA-218, 219 and 220, are opened to allow testing of the inner containment door 0-ring.
Hydrogen analyzer inlet valves, PAP-23 and 24, return valves, IA-212 and 213, and stop valve PAP-25 are opened briefly during flow testing and during operation of the post accident hydrogen purge and analysis system.
During the time that the steam line or steam trap isolation valves are open, the reactor is either subcritical or at low power conditions. A membrane barrier separates the main steam system from the containment atmosphere and the reactor coolant system at all times.
The RHR system containment isolation valves are opened only with the primary coolant temperature (TS 3.4) equal to or less than minimum pressurization temperature. There is a membrane barrier between the containment atmosphere and the RHR system.
Blowdown and body vent valves on instrumentation lines are allowed to be reposi-tioned under administrative controls (e.g., written procedures) to effect required calibration and maintenance. These administrative controls ensure containment boundary conditions are maintained following calibration and maintenance.
3.11-5 Amendment No. $9,89