IR 05000346/1997013

Insp Rept 50-346/97-13 on 970929-1110.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20199K200
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/21/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199K162	List: IR 05000346/1997013 ML20199K159
References
50-346-97-13, NUDOCS 9712010047
Download: ML20199K200 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlli

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'I Docket No: 50-346 Ucense No: NPF-3 Report No: 50 346/97013(DRP)

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Ucensee: Toledo Edison Company Facility: Devis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5503 N. State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449 Dates: September 29 - November 10,1997

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inspectorss: S. Stasek, Senior Resident inspector S. Campbell, Senior Resident inspector K. Zellers, Resident inspector Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 9712010047 971121 PDft ADOCK 05000346 PDR

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC inspection Report No. 50-346/g/013(DRP) ,

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

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The excellent material condition of the plant resulted in minimal operator challenge !

Operators provided immediate response to plant annunciators and exhibited good adherence to procedures. On shift communications were good. Tagouts provided  ;

adequate protection of equipment and personnel during maintenance activities l (Section 01.1).

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important to safety system lineups and major flowpaths were verified to be in copformance with pla it procedures / drawings and the Updated Safety Analysis Repor L %dipment material condition was excellent in all cases (Section 02.1).

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Management Review Committee members effectively administered the initial categorization and assignment of Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reports (Section 07).

Maintenancs

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Good communications between several departments contributed in minimizing the

1. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator unavailability time during a routine maintenance outag Dieselload swings observed during post maintenance surveillance testing were corrected in a timely manner. Appropriate housekeeping, foreign material exclusion, and fire protection measures were observed. Surveillance activities were performed in conformance with written instructions, and surveillance results satisfied regulatory !

requirements (Sections M1.1, M1.2).

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The inspector noted that the implementing procedure for a technical specification surveillance test did not require that test data be recorded. This lack of documented test data prevented supervisory personnel from having the opportunity to verify that the acceptance criteria had been met. This is an inspection follow up item (Section M1.3).

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Operability recommendations were technically sound and consistent with regulatory requirements. Plant engineering personnel pursued corrective actions relating to degraded material conditions that affected the operability of plant components in a timely manner (Section E7). l

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- Radiological conditions were property communicated to plant ps.sonnel through postings,

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barriers and signs. Actual radiation conditions were vert 6ed to be consistent with a radiation area postings (Section R1).

• Security personnel were observed to be performing their duties and access control equipment was observed to be operating in socordance with regulatory requ%ments (Section 81).

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Resort Details  :

Summary of Plant Status '

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The unit was operated at about 100 percent rated thermal power thro'ughout the inspection perio . Operations 01 Conduct of c;r-C:s i 0 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors observed control room acuviGss and reviewed routine evolutions throughout the inspection period. The excellent material condluon of the plant minimized the challenges and burdens to the operators. Operators provided immediate response to plant annunciators, and referenced applicable annunciator response procedures for ,

immediate and supplemental acGons. Operators exhibited good adherence to

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procedures. The control room log adequately reflected shift activities and plant / equipment status. On shift communkeik6s conveyed important information with

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operators. Control room personnel were kept informed of degraded material conditions in .

k timely and coherent manns.. lescad clearances [tacouts) that were reviewed were assessed to have provided adequate protection of equipment and personnel during maintenance activitie Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down ilie accessible portions of the following engineered safety features (ESF) and important to safety systems during the inspection period:

. Emergency Diesel Generator Traini

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Emergency Diesel Generator Train 2

. Auxiliary Feed Water Train 1 '

. Auxiliary Feed Water Train 2

. Low Voltage Gwichgear Train 1

. Low Voltage Swichgear Train 2

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Low Pressure injection Train 1

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Low Pressure injection Train 1

. High Pressure Injection Train 1

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High Pressure Injection Train 2 No substantive concems were identified as a result of the walkdowns. System lineups and major flowpaths were verified to be in conformance with plant procedures / drawings and the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Equioment material condition was excellent in all case i

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07 Quality Aseuronse in C;:._^2:n- (71707) .

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The station initiated changes to its corrective action program to increase the level of

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managemord attention directed towards the categottembon and relative importance of.

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Individual problem reports (Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reports (PCAQRs)). A

": +;:.Two Review Committee, consisting of members of plant management, startad discussing roosnt PCAQRs about 3 times a wook to determine the priority of the PCAQR and the action organization. Previously, these functior.s had been performed by :

corrective action process personnel. The inspector observed one of the meetings and observed that "- +;+T&4 Review Committee members effectively implemented the

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initial categorization and assignmord of PCAQR '

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IL Maintenance -

M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance and surveillance Activities (61726)(62707)

The inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenar ce and surveillance testing activities during the inspection period:

• DB-SC-03070 Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Monthly Test

+- AFP 1 (Auxiliary Feed Pump Number 1)

DB-SP-03150 (Rev 02)

Monthly Jog Test

• Emergency Diesel Generator 184 Day Test DB-SC-03077 (Rev 01)

• MWO 3 97 2522-01 Clean, Lubricate, and ECAD MDFP and Mctor

• MWO-2 95 0020-03 Replace Emergency Diesel Generator CFD Differential Reisys

• MWO 7 g6-0517 01 Inspect Emergency Diesel Generator Inboard and Outboard Generator Bearings

- Plant personnel observed performing surveillance testing rigidly adhered to surveillance procedure instructions. Surveillance procedure acceptance criteria were consistent with technical specification, USAR, and other technical requirements. Equipment was verified to perform as described in the USAR. In addition, maintenance activities performed on plant equipment were observed to have been conducted with appropriate housekeeping, foreign material exclusion, and fire protection measures take M1.2 31plion Performance Durino en Emeroency Diesel Generator Outaae was Excellent Ip_spection Scope (Q2707)

The inspectors reviewed maintenance and testing activities relating to a #2 Emergency 3 Diesel Generator (EDG) maintenance outage. This routine EDG outage included r inspection of generator bearings, modification of several relays to make them fully selsmically qualified, other minor equipment repairs, and routine preventive maintenance activitie . _ _ -_- _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. -_ _._ _ _ -- _ _ - . _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ . _

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4 ,Qbservations'and Findinos

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_ Although several emergent material and modi 6 cation issues were identified during the ' ,

outage and during post maintenance surveillanoe testing, plant personnel were,able to

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resolve them in an acceptable manner without signl6 canty affecting the EDG outage ' >

duration. This was achieved through redistribution of resources, good comnwnications -

bWween plant engineering. maintenance, operations and plant support personnel and

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effective teamwork. This resulted in only a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> addition to the emergency diesel generator unay "i"y tim One of the emergent materialitems related to varying #2 EDG load during the routine 6 month surveillance test following ti.e outage. The plant engineer, after observing several 400-500 kw load swings, recommended to operations that the diesel be shutdown

, prior to its three hour duration run weg:: i. The EDG was shut down and the vendor

consulted for trochloshooting recommendations. The vendor recommended

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troubleshooting activities be concentrated to a motor operated potentiometer. This was checked end found to be operating satisfactorily. Further investigation identified that new

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relays, installed during the system outage, were faulty. Testing of the relays determined that two of three new relays had contacts that would unexpectedly change state when l -

they were subject to vibrations. The relays to be installation on the other emergency

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diesel generator were also found to be defective. These relays were irwtallad to address

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seismic qualification concoms. The old relays were reinstalled, and the diesel was subsequently tested with no undesire!:le load swings noted.

i The licensee generated FCAQR 971420 to perform further investigation into the relay failure issue. The plant's intentions were to determine what the cause of the failures were and to determine the extent of the condition. The relays, Model # KPD13, were

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manufactured by Square D and purchased from Famwell and Hendricks Testing Labs,

! Cincir$natti, Ohio, who performed the seismic qualifica' io Conclusions Good communications between multiple organizations contributed to minimizing the unavailabi!ity of the #2 EDG during a routine maintenance outage. Dieselload swings observed during post maintenance surveillance testing were promptly identified and i -- corrected.-

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M1.3 Oversloht Verification that Surveillance Test Data Satisfied Technical Specification

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Acceptance Criteria ac frlsgection Sec De (61726)

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The inspccior conducted a review of an luoperable control rod absolute pot; tion indication

.(API) condition and the pant's subsequent actions to comply with associated technical specification limiting cor.ditions for operation requiroments. This inoperable API condition was documented by PCAQR 97-1467.

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=p Observations and Findinas On Octower 28,1997, control rod 44 API drthed below its expeded value; the l 100 percent out light for rod 44 was on, indicatmg tl'.st the rod had not actually move ~

Operations personnel declared the API for rod 44 inoperable. Additionally, the asymmetric alarm bypass switches for group four were placed in bypass in order to eliminate frequent asymmetric rod position annunciator alarms in the control room. The -

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problem with rod 44 API had occurred previously during the current operating cycl The API indication problem was thought to be cauad by reduN temperature condition l.ower oordainment and containment annulus ambient temperatures reed the containment elodrical penetrabon for rod 44 API circuitry to be the m contracte This contraction was thought to cause the API voltage divider returM.o asistance to diange, which ultimately affected the API indication. The plant's ou%it plans were to troubleshoot and repair the circuit during the next refueling outage scheduled to commence Apr:111,199 The inspector determined that operators had correctly initiated applicable technical specification action statements and surveillance requirements by implementing the

. applicable surveillance test procedures. The inspector also periodically verified that

' technical specification surveillance test aowptance criteria were satisfied by independent observations of the rod position indication syste During a review of surveillance test procedure, DB-OP-03006 (Rev RS), " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check," the inspector noted that the only documentation and review requirement for 4-hour surveillance testing of the API versus group average comparison was that a unit log entry be made stating that the surveillance had been accomplishe Additionally, for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> periodicity surveillance test, no API data was recorded to allow supervisory persannel the opportunity to independently determine whether the acceptance criteria nad been me The administrative procedure for ttu survel: lance and periodic test program, DB-DP-00013, Section 6.6.1 incticated as Niows: "The test leader's supervisor shall review the test results and package as follows: (a) Review the test, tert data and any related calculations for completeness, accuracy and acmptability. (b) Confirm that the acceptance criteria has been met."

The requirement that supervisory personnel confirm that acceptance criteria should be '

, met appeared to imply that test data had been recorded. By recording test data, a reviewer has the opportunity to independently evaluate whether acceptance criteria was satisfie Operations management personnel, in response to the inspectors' question, committed to review the meaning of the words " review" and " confirm" to determine if they implied that supervisory personnel were required to Mdependently verify test data versus acceptance criteria or that supervisory personnel we;a merely required to verify that the acceptance criteria had been satisfie _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

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o , Conclusions '

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Ponding the results of the licensee's review, this is an inspootion follow up item -

(50-344/9701341(DRP)).

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M8.1 (Closed) Inacedion Fotowun item (5044Wg7004-01(DRP)): Foreign material exclusion

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' (FME) control procedural weaknesses identified during maintenance activities. This

, matter involved inspector identification that a MWO package for maintenance on the  !

auxiliary.4edwater bearing oil system had not required FME controls. However, proper

' FME controls had been implemented by the maintenance craft. Subsequently, the <

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licensee was in proooss of revising Administrative Procedure DB-DP-00005, "

' Foreign Material Exclusion" to better define FME control requirements associated with mairdenance. In addition, cleanliness classifications of several systems were clarifie The inspectors reviewed the proposed change, with no further concems noted. This:

matter is closed, however, adequacy of FME controls will continue to be evaluated as part of the routine inspection progra '

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t E7 Quality Assurance in Engineeing Activities (37551)-

The inspector reviewed the PCAQRs listed below at various stages of the corrective action process to assess the performance of engineering personnel in making operability recommendations, initiating corrective actions, determining root causes, and initiating measures to prevent recurrence. The inspector focad that operability recommendations were technically sound and were consistent with regulatory requirements. Plant engineering personnel were cbserved to be pursuing corrective actions relating to degraded material conditions that affected the operability of p' ant components in a timely manne .

PCAQRs reviewed:

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97-1287 DC Oil Pump Fail to Shutdown 97-1325 GL 96-01, MSIV Bypass Valves 97-1410 Rod 4-6 API Dnfting

97-1411 Pipe Stress Code Allowable y

' 97-1420 EDG 2 Load Swings 97-1429 Linear Amp Voltage Swings

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N. Plant Suocort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls (71750)

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The inspectors routinely toured redk,isv;cedly restricted areas. Raduksical conditions were property communicated to plard personnel through postings, barriers and sign The inspector utilizert a portable radiation meter to veldste that actual rad 6ation

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conditions were consistent with radiation area postings on a sampling basi Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)

The inspectors, during after hours and weekend inspections, observed that aa:ess control personnel were attentive to duty arufwere adhenng to NRC access control requirements. Security patrols were observed to be fulfilling their rounds in accordance with security department procedures. Security related access control equipment was verified to be operating correctl V. Manaaement Meetinas

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X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 10,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings

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presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIS T OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

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. D. L Eshelman, Manager, Operations (Acting Plant Manager)

R. E. Donnellon, Director, Engineering and Services L W. Worley, Director, Nuclear Assurance T. J. Myers, Director, Nuclear Support Services J. L Freels, Manager, Regulatory Affairs J. L. Michaelis, Manager, Maintenance W. J. Molpus, Manager, Nuclear Training P. R. Hess, Manager, Supply C. A. Price, Manager, Business Services R. J. Scott, Manager, Radiation Protection J. W. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering G. A. Skeel, Manager, Securtty H. W. Stevens, Manager, Nuclear Safety & Inspections M. C. Beler, Mans 2er, Quality Assessment F. L. Swa.1ger, Manager, Design Basis Engineering L M. Dohrmann, Manager, Quality Services '-

D. H. Lockwood, Supervisor, Compliance R. B. Coad, Superintendent, Radiation Protection D. M. Imlay, Superintendent, Operations G. W. Gillespie, Superintendent, Chemistry G. M. Wolf, Engineer, Licensing T. J. Chambers, Ehlft Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: idaintenance Observation IP 71707: P. ant Operations IP 71750: f>lant Support Activities IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPEN2D, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50 346/97013-01(DRP) IFl Oversight Verification that Surveillance Test Data Satisfied Technical Specification Acceptance Criteria Closed 50-346/97004-01(DRP) IFl Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) control procedural weaknesses identified during maintenance activities

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIAUSMS USED API Absolute Position Indication CFR Code of Federal Regulations EDG Emergency Diesel Generator ESF Engineered Safety Feature FME Foreign Material Exclusion IR . Inspection Report MWO Maintenance Work Order NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PCAQR Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report PDR Public Document Room TS Technical Specirmation USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

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