ML20151C710

Technical Evaluation Rept of Dcrdr for Florida Power Corp Crystal River 3 Generating Station

ML20151C710
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/12/1988
From:	SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20151C712	List: ML20151C710
References
CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96 SAIC-87-3103, TAC-56115, NUDOCS 8807220128
Download: ML20151C710 (22)

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ATTACHMENT SAIC/87-3103 8

3 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT 0F THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION'S g CRYSTAL RIVER 3 GENERATING STATION l l

TAC NO. 56115 July 12, 1988 I SAIG I:

[ Prepared for:

f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555

[ Contract NRC-03-82-096 E Task Order No. 19 I

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 13ction Elgg

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.............................................. 1 2.0 EVALUATION ................................................. 3 2.1 Establishment of a Quslified Multidisciplinary R$ view Team ........-,................................. 3 2.2 System Func tion and Tas k An alysi s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.3 Comparison of Display and Control Requirements With a Control Room Inventory ......................... 5 2.4 Control Room Survey ................................... 6 2.5 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) to Determine Which Are Significant and

. Should Be Corrected ................................... 7 2.6 Selection of Design Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.7 Verification That Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Correction ................. 11 2.8 Verification That Selected Design Improve.nents Will Not Introduce New HEDs ........................... 12 2.9 Coordination of Control Room Improvements With Changes From Other Improvement Programs, Such as the Safety Parameter Display System, Operator Training, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures ............... 12

3.0 CONCLUSION

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4.0 REFERENCES

................................................. 15 ATTACHMENT 1 - ATTENDEES AT THE CRYSTAL RIVER 3 PRE-IMPLEMEhTATION AUDIT FOR THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW ATTACHMENT 2 - TENTATIVE PRE IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT AGENDA FOR CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3 11

TECHNICAL EVALVATION REPORT OF THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION'S CRYSTAL RIVER 3 GENERATING STATION 1.0 INTR 00VCT!0N The Florida Power Corporation submitted a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Program Plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on October 31,1983 (Reference 1) in order to satisfy the Program Plan require-ments of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2) for the Crystal River 3 Generating Station. The NRC staff reviewed the submittal with reference to the nino DCRDR requirements of NUREG-0737, supplement 1, and the guidance provided in NVREG 0700 (Reference 3) and NUREG-0800 (Reference 4).

NUREG-0737, Supplement I requires that a Program Plan be submitted within two months of the start of the DCRDR. Consistent with the require-ments of NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, the Program Plan should describe how the following elements of the DCRDR will be accomplished:

1. Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

2. Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency opera-tions.

3. A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory.

4. A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.

5. Assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected.

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6. Selection of design improvements.

7. Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction.

8. Verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

9. Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), opera-tor training, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgraded emer-gency operating procedures.

The staff coments on the Florida Power Corporation DCRDR Program Plan review here forwarded to Florida Power by letter dated January 27, 1984 (Reference 5). Based on the Program Plan review, the staff decided to conduct an in-progress audit on February 11-15, 1985, the results of which were documented in an NRC memorandum dated April 5,1985 (Reference 6).

NUREG-0737, Supplement I requires that a Sumary Report be submitted at the end of the DCRDR. As a minimum, it shall:

1. Outline proposed control room changes.

2. Outline proposed schedules for implementation.

3. Provide sumary justification of HEDs with safety significance to be left uncorrected or partially corrected.

Florida Power Corporation submitted a DGRDR Sumary Report for Crystal l River 3 to the NRC on June 17, 1985 (feference 7). Based on the Sumary l

Report review, as documented in an NRC memorandum dated September 3, 1985 (Reference 8), a meeting was conducted on October 24, 1985 to present and discuss concerns with the Sumary Report for the DCRDR at Crystal River 3.

In response to these concerns, Florida Power Corporation submitted a Supplement to the Summary Report on September 29, 1986 (Reference 9). Based i on the reviews of the Summary Report and Supplement to the Sumary Report, and the results of the meeting with the licensee, a pre implementation audit was conducted on October 19-21, 1987. The review team consisted of two NRC 2

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staff members, three Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) representatives, and a representative from Comex Corporation. Together, the team represented the disciplines of nuclear systems engineering, reactor operations, and human factors engineering.

This Technical Evaluation Report reflects the consolidated observa-tions, findings, and conclusions of the review team members. A list of audit meeting attendees is provided in Attachment 1 and the audit agenda is provided in Attachment 2.

2.0 EVALUATION The purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether the nine DCRDR requirements in NUREG-0737, Supplement I had been satisfied. The evaluation was performed by comparing the information provided by Florida Power Corporation with the criteria in NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, Rev. O, Appendix A of the Standard Review Plan. The reviewers' evaluation of the DCRDR for Crystal River 3 Generating Station is provided below.

2.1 Establishment of a Oualified Multidisciolinary Review Team Florida Power Corporation's DCRDR team consisted of representatives in the areas of nuclear engineering, instrument and control engineering, training, and plant operations. General Physics Corporation provided human factors support. Members of the DCRDR team received an orientation which provided a basic understanding of tha DCRDR process. The DCRDR team was provided with the resources to complete the tasks.

It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

2.2 System Function and Task Analysis During the NRC review of the 1985 Sumary Report, two major concerns regarding the task analysis performed by Florida Power Corporation were identified: 1) the scope of the task analysis was limited, and therefore, it should be expanded to cover all operator tasks specified in the Crystal 3

River 3 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs); and 2) the information providM S the Sumary Report on the task analysis process was not detailed enougl to facilitate a complete evaluation of the process. It was recomended that the licensee expand the scope of the E0Ps by including four new scenarios and several additional procedures in the task analysis. It was also recomended that the licensee provide additional details describing the methods and processes used to a) identify information not provided by the Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (AT0Gs), b) determine the characteristics of needed instrumentation, and c) identify any differences between the task analysis approaches used during the development of plant-specific emergency procedures and that used by the DCRDR team. In the meeting on October 24, 1985 between the licensee and the NRC subsequent to the Sumary Report, the licensee specifically agreed to provide additional information in its Supplement to the Sumary Report.

In the Supplemental Sumary Report, the licensee indicated that the scope of the task analysis and verification and validation (V&V) activities was expanded to cover the additional procedures recomended in the Sumary Report review and four scenarios of the Operating Sequence Overviews.

However, the licensee did not provide enough detailed documentation on the additional concerns to facilitate a complete evaluation of the task analysis process.

During the pre-implementation audit, the licensee indicated that the ATOG based E0Ps used in the task analysis were develooed by Babcock & Wilcox (8&W) from a task analysis of all known significant emergency operating scenarios for a B&W reactor. Since the ATOG based E0Ps are symptomatic in nature, subject matter experts identified the information and control j requirements from the E0Ps. These requirements were recorded on the pre-l fill portion of the task analysis worksheet. The review team confirmed that the task analysis process identified the information and control i

requirements independent of the existing control room. Additionally, the review team verified that a second task analysis was performed using the

! four new scenarios and additional procedures recomended by the NRC. This additional effort included the identification of information and control requirements which were also recorded on the pre-fill portion of the task l

analysis worksheet. Fhe additional HEOs were generated as a result of the second task analysis. Finally, the review team verified that a combination 4

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of the original and the second task analysis covered a comprehensive set of

, operator tasks during emergency operations.

It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for a function and task analysis to identify control room operator tasks and information and control require-ments during emergency operations.

2.3 Comearison of Disolav and Control Recuirements With a Control Room Inventory The information and control requirements identified during the task analysis were compared to a control room inventory provided by a full-scale photographic mock-up of the as-built control room. For instrumentation and controls not on the mock up, the requirements were evaluated in the control room. During walkthroughs of the E0ps, the availability of required instrumentation and controls was confirmed by comparing the requirements in the pre-fill portion of the task analysis worksheets to the as built control room. The human engineering suitability of the required instrumentation and controls was determined by comparing them against suitability criteria (outlined in the Supplement to the Summary Report). Missing or unsuitable instrumentation and controls were documented as human engineering observations (HEOs). Florida Power Corporation used the term human engineering observation interchangeably with human engineering discrepancy (HED).

At the pre-implementation audit, the licensee indicated that the availability and suitability of required instrumentation and controls identified during the second phase of the task analysis were verified. This verification resulted in the identification of five additional HEOs, which were documented in the Supplement to the Sumary Report.

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It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met i the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for a comparison of display and 1 control requirements with the control room inventory. 1 2.4 Control Room Survey Florida Power Corporation's control room survey was conducted by opera-  !

tions and human factors personnel using the guidelines provided in NUREG-0700, Section 6. There was a concern from the Sumary Report that subjective guidelines may have been used extensively rather than objective guidelines such as those suggested in NUREG-0700. In the Supplement to the Sumary Report, the licensee indicated that any deviations from NUREG-0700 guidelines were abandoned. Additionally, checklists already completed were reapplied using NUREG-0700 checklists.

The review team conducted a sample survey in the control room. As a result of the sample survey, the review team identified nine HE0s and presented them to the licensee to verify licensee identification of these HEOs. The licensee had previously identified only five of these HEOs. The four unidentified HEOs and the licensee's comitment for taking action are as follows:

o Bailey meters on the Engineered Safeguards panels have extremely small multipliers (e.g., x 100) and engineering units (e.g., PSIG) which are difficult to read. An HE0 was written by the licensee for this problem on another panel. Because the review team I identified the same problem on a different panel, a concern arose as the whether this problem was evident throughout the control room. The licensee comitted to re-evaluating these meters on all panels. (NVREG 0700 Guideline 6.5.1.3a) o The Startup Feedwater valve open-close switch and test button on the Engineered Safeguards panel is not near the Emergency Feedwater System. The licensee indicated that at the time of the control room survey they were functional and in use; however, the test button is no longer used as a result of the recent Emergency Feedwater control modifications, and is being removed. The licensee did not indicate, however, what would be done with the l

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valve switch. The licensee has committed to evaluate the location of the startup feedwater valve switch and to either remove the switch or relocate it on the Emergency Feedwater panel. (NUREG-0700 Guidelines 6.4.1.1.b(.2), 6.4.2.2b, 6.8.2.lc) o BSV-3 and DHV-110 scales (SPEC 200 Foxboro controllers) on Engineered Safeguards panels are difficult to read due to small scale markings and the black pointer tip underneath a clear scale.

The licensee committed to assess this riiscrepancy. (NUREG 0700 Guideline 6.5.2.2a) o There are single filament bulb indicator lights in the control room that have no test capability. The licensee committed to re-survey the control room to identify and assess any safety-related lights that are normally off and have no other means of telling that they are burned out. (NUREG-0700 Guideline 6.5.3.la)

The licenseo is committed to address the four HEOs identified above.

It is the review team's judgment that the licensee has conducted an j effective overall survey. However, in order to meet the NUREG- l 0737, Supplement I requirement the licensee should provide NRC with a confirmatory submittal documenting the results of additional survey work.

2.5 Assessment of Human Enaineerina Discrenancies (HEDs) to Determine Which  !

Are Sianificant and Should Be Corrected At the pre implementation audit, the licensee indicated that HE0s were initially evaluated by the DCRDR team members in front of the mock-up during a two-day session. The HEOs were evaluated for safety consequences and error potential using the "expert judgment" of the DCRDR team. The human factors specialist evaluated the potential error associated with each HE0 and technical personnel evaluated the safety consequences. If an HE0 was determined to have significant safety consequences, it was categorized as 3 or above; Category 4 HEOs were those with no significant safety consequences. Error potential was then used to decide if an HE0 should be a Category 1, 2, or 3 (Category 1, documented errors; Category 2, high potential for error; Category 3, low potential for error).

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Following this initial review by the DCRDR team, General Physics, the licensee's human factors consultants, reviewed all HEOs for cumulative or interactive effects. As a result of this review, some of the Category 4 HE0s (non-safety significant) were upgraded to Category 3 (safety significant). The DCRDR team then reviewed the results of General Physics review and decided on the final assessment of all HEOs. The same process was used to assess the five additional HEOs generated by the second task analysis.

It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for an assessment of HEDs to determine which are significant and should be corrected.

2.6 Selection of Desian Imorovements Florida Power Corporation's process for selecting design improvements consisted of five phases - initial study of HEOs, conceptual design, detailed design, procurement, and installation. Initially, the DCRDR team categorized the HEOs by type. HEOs of a similar nature were evaluated on a generic basis; HEOs identifying specific problems were evaluated on a one-for-one basis. The DCRDR team evaluated each HE0 and determined the recom-mended method of correction. The recomendation served as the basis for development of a conceptual design by Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc. (under contract to Florida Power Corporation). This conceptual design was then reviewed by Florida Power Corporation operations and plant personnel, and the detailed design, including Construction Work Packages (CWPs), were developed. Based on 16 separate CWPs, procurement and installation of the design improvements is being conducted.

Approximately 293 HEOs were identified during the review activities.

Concerns raised regarding the proposed resolutions were documented in the -

evaluation of the Sumary Report. Review of the Supplement to the Sumary Report indicated that the concerns with the proposed corrective actions were satisfactorily resolved for all but eight of the HEOs. These HEOs and the proposed resolutions were reviewed during the pre implementation audit.

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The eight HE0s and the licensee's additional explanations are provided below:

o HE0 62: This HE0 indicated that Bailey controllers have 0-100 meters with a selector switch and that the meaning of the labels for the switches is unclear. There was a concern from the Supplement to the Summary Report that the Bailey controllers do not have engineering units. At the pre-implementation audit, the licensee resolved the NRC's concern by explaining that the meters do not have engineering units because operation of these controllers is not dependent on the reading of the dial. The operators are thoroughly trained on the use of these controllers and the meaning of the labels for the switches is clear.

o HE0 63: This HE0 indicated that the Bailey controllers described above in HE0 62 also require some conversion to use. During the audit, the licensee resolved the NRC's concern by explaining that these controls have different modes of operation and therefore the meaning of the scale of the meters depends on the mode of operation. The operators understand the meaning of the scale for each mode of operation; conversion is not required to use the controls.

o HE0 161: This HE0 indicated that the Low Pressure Injection Crossover Flow meter and Decay Heat Removal Controllers on the Engineered Saferuards Panel could be more appropriately located.

The licensee rev qwed the location of the Low Pressure Injection Crossover Flow meter and Decay Heat Removal Controllers and determined that they were correctly functionally grouped on the Engineered Safeguards Features Panel. The audit team concurred with the licensee's clarification of this HEO.

o HE0 261: This HE0 indicated that light indicators are not bright enough, making it difficult to determine if they are on. However, the justification for not correcting this HE0 addressed a glare problem, not the brightness of the lights. At the pre-implementation audit, the licenses explained that this HE0 was assessed as non safety related and thus no corrective action was 9

taken. Furthermore, the initial lighting survey was performed under non-normal conditions. When all lighting was restored, a new survey was conducted. Results of this survey indicated that the problem could not be duplicated. This clarification resolved the NRC's concerns, o HE0 245: This HE0 indicated that a plant trip had been caused because Main Steam Isolation Valve controls do not have locks to prevent them from passing through a position. The action taken to correct this HE0 was to change the shape of the knob. There was a concern that changing the shape of the knob did not correct the HE0 (i.e., prevent the control from passing through a position).

At the pre-implementatio., audit, the licensee clarified that the trip was actually caused by the operator grabbing the wrong control, not by the ability of the control to pass through a position. Accordingly, the shape of the knob was changed (temporary fix) and the knob will eventually be relocated (permanent fix). This clarification resolved the NRC's concern.

o HE0 229: This HE0 indicated that gauges are scaled in 20 pst increments but must be read within plus or minus 15 psi. The resolution of this HE0 incorporated installing a new scale with 25 psi increments. There was a concern that this new scale will not be appropriate since the operator must read the scale within plus or minus 15 psi. At the pre-implementation audit the licensee indicated that the operator does not need to read a precise value, rather, he must read a range. The licensee resolved the review team's concern by indicating that the new scale will use zone demarcation to mark normal operating limits (575 to 625 psi) for the operators, o HE0 379: This HE0 indicated that throttle valves should not be throttled based on B&W recommendation. However, the licensee's solution is to replace original valves with valves that can be throttled. At the pre-implementation audit, the licensee explained that the original throttle valves could not withstand pressure; thus, B&W recomended that these valves should not be throttled.

The licensee is correcting this problem by installing new throttle

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valves that can withstand the pressure. The review team concurred with this resolution, o HE0 110: Bailey meters on the Engineered Safeguards panels have green dymotape on the outer lens for purposes of zone banding.

While the licensee had identified similar HEOs (i.e., 110, 229),

no HEOs had been identified for this specific problem. The licensee coasmitted to ensure that Field Change Notices for meters state that permanent zone banding is to be placed on the scale face rather than the outer lens. (NUREG 0700 Guideline 6.5.2.3)

In summary, the licensee has resolved all NRC concerns related to the actual selection of DCRDR-related design improvements. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 requirement for selection of design improvements.

2.7 Verification That Selected Desian Imorovements Will Provide the Neces-sary Correction At Crystal River 3, design modification packages resulting from the selection of design improvements were reviewed by human factors personnel from General Physics to ensure that the control board modifications correct the HE0s without creating new HEOs. This review included a tabletop analysis of the computer aided design drawings of the revisions plus other design documents. Additionally, the drawings were reviewed by operations personnel. For future changes to the control boards, Florida Power Corporation has developed a human factors design conventions document (FPC SpecificationSP5145). Minor changes to the control board will utilize the human factors convention document. Projects with major changes to the control boaros will require the input of outside human factors consultants.

It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that selected improvements will produce the necessary correction.

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2.8 Verification That Selected Desian Imorovements Will Not Introduce New liEQ1 As described above, it is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for verifica-tion that the selected improvements do not introduce new HEDs.

2.9 Coordination of Control Room Imorovements With Chanaes From Other Imorovement Procrams. Such as the Safety Parameter Disolav System.

Ooerator Trainina. Rea. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Vooraded Emeraency Ooeratina Procedures Florida Power Corporation has a coordinated program in place to address the NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 initiatives. A designated Florida Power I

! Corporation individual is responsible for the coordination program.

Specific examples of coordination between the initiatives include the following: '

o Several members of the DCROR team are involved in other control room improvement programs including SPOS, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instru-mentation, and Upgraded E0Ps.

o The upgraded, plant-specific E0Ps were used as the reference for the DCRDR task analysis, o The SPDS design utilizes the same critical safety functions as the E0Ps.

o Procedures and training were assessed in the DCROR operator interviews.

o Procedural modifications, training, and SPDS capabilities were sometires used as corrective actions for HE0s.

o Through engineering studies, the results of the DCRDR are being integrated with other control room improvement programs such as Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation. Many Reg. Guide 1.97 instrument modifications were incorporated with the DCROR modifications.

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l It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for coordination of the DCRDR with l

other improvement programs such as SPDS, operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation and Upgraded E0Ps.

3.0 CONCLUSION

S Florida Power Corporation submitted the DCRDR Sumary Report for Crystal River 3, to the NRC on June 17, 1985 and a Supplement to the Sumary Report on September 29, 1986. SAIC conducted evaluations of the Sumary Report and Supplement to the Sumary Report which resulted in the identification of a number of concerns. In order to resolve the concerns and evaluate the Crystal River 3 DCRDR, a pre-implementation audit was conducted from October 19 21, 1987. During the audit, the NRC staff, accom-panied by SAIC and Comex representatives, performed a detailed evaluation of Florida Power Corporation's DCRDR. The evaluation included examination of Florida Power Corporation's DCRDR documentation, discussions with the licensee's DCRDR team, inspection of the existing control room, and inspection of proposed corrective action modifications. This report reflects the consolidated findings and conclusions of the NRC review team.

The conclusions are provided below, organized by the nine NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DCRDR requirements.

1. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

2. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737. Supplement I requirement for a function and task analysis to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations.

3. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for a comparison of display and control requirements with the control room inventory.

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4. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has conducted an effective control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles. However to meet this NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement, the licensee should provide NRC with a confirmatory submittal documenting the results of additional survey work.

5. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for an assessment of HEDs to determine which are significant and should be corrected.

6. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for selection of design improvements.

7. It is the review te m's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that selected improvements will produce the necessary correction.

8. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that the selected improvements do not introduce new HEDs.

9. It is the review team's judgment that Florida Power Corporation has met the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for coordination of the DCRDR with other Supplement 1 improvement programs, such as SPDS, operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation and Upgraded E0Ps.

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4.0 REFERENCES

1. "Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan for Crystal River 3

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Generating Station," Florida Power Corporation, October 31, 1983.

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'2 . NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require-ments," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, December 1982. j

3. NUREG 0700, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviers," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, September 1981.

4. NUREG 0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 18.1, "Control Room," and Appendix A, "Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Reviews (DCRDR)," U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, September 1984.

5. "Review of Crystal River Unit 3 Generating Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan Submittal," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, January 27, 1984.

6. "Results of In Progress Audit of the Detailed Control Room Design Review for Crystal River Unit 3,' attachment to memorandum from W.H.

Regan, USNRC, to J.F. Stolz, USNRC, dated April 5,1985.

7. "Detailed Control Room Design Review Sumary Report for Crystal River Unit 3 Generating Station," Florida Power Corporation, June 17, 1985.

8. "Results of Staff Review of the Crystal River Unit 3 Detailed Control Room Design Review Sumary Report," attachment to memorandum from W.H.

Regan, USNRC, to J.F. Stolz, USNRC, dated September 3, 1985.

9. "Detailed Control Room Design Review Supplement to the Sumary Report for Crystal River Unit 3 Generating Station," Florida Power Corporation, September 29, 1986.

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e ATTACIMENT 1 ATTENDEES AT THE CRYSTAL RIVER 3 PRE-IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT FOR THE DETAILED CONTROL ROON DESIGN REVIEW OCTOBER 19-21, 1987 i

AUDIT ATTEN0EES Hamt Affiliatlan Craig Harley General Physics Gary Bethke NRC-COMEX William H. Regan, Jr. NRC/HFA8 Barbara Glickstein NRC SAIC Bethany H. Drum NRC-SAIC

Richard J. Eckenrode NRC/HFAB J. Alberdi FPC W.L. Rossfeld FPC I David deMontfort FPC Chris Doyal FPC Ken Vogel FPC

, Bill Stephenson FPC ,

Richard H. Low FPC J.F. Stetka NRC/ SRI E.C. Simpson FPC P.R. Tanguay FPC K.R. Wilson FPC E.M. Good FPC H. Silver NRC/NRR Project Manager H.N. Berkow NRC/NRR i.

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ATTACHMENT 2 TENTATIVE PRE-IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT ASDWA FOR CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3 i

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t Attachment 2 Tentative Pre !mplementation Audit Agenda for Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 i

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e Introduction of the NRC Audit Team e Brief Presentation on the DCRDR program by the licensee e Discussion of individual activities of the DCROR program i

e System tu' ; tion and Task Analysis (SFTA) Otscussion

a. Discuss how the generic Ahnormal Transient Response Guidelines were converted to the upgraded plant specific emergency operat-ing procedures,

b. Discuss how t;ie SFTA identified a comprehensive set of operator ,

tasks emergency operations on CR3.

c. Discuss how the necessary operator information and control requirements along with instrumentation and control character-istics were identified.

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d. Discuss how the tasks identified during the task analysis woLld  ;

cover operator tasks during a loss of integrated control system event, i

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Day _1:

I e Presentation on individual elements of the DCRDR program (contin-ved)

Ar,sessment of HEDs

a. Provide detailed description of the assessment process, spect, fically on the method for estimating the safety consequence and the potential for error associated with the HEDs.

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b. Provide clarifications on tha method for prioritizing HEDs, including those that have a low safety significance but high potential for error.

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c. Provide the audit team with sample assessment documentation for review.

i Selection of Design improvements

a. Provide clarifications on the list of HED concerns attached in Appendix B of this report.

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e Sample survey of the control room conducted by the NRC audit team i e Comparison of audit team's findings with the DCRDR tean ,

o Exit briefing

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