ML20003C258
| ML20003C258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1981 |
| From: | Cooper J EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Shemanski P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17340A763 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-0231, CON-FIN-A-231 EGG-1183-4180, NUDOCS 8102270382 | |
| Download: ML20003C258 (14) | |
Text
g kh f i, EGG 1183-4180
[g EGrG J A N U A R Y 1981 l
ENERGYMEASUREMENTS GROUP P
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lg TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS i g OF THE OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION
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j g AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE
'g CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3 I
(DOCKET No. 50-302) lI 1
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I 8102270 N SAN RAMON OPERATIONS I
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I DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government.
Neither the United States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor any of their empl oyees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe on privately owned rights.
Reference herein to any specific commercial 3
product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or other-E wise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recormiend-ation, or favoring by the United States Government or ary agency thereof.
The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.
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INTERIM REPORT
[1:
EGs0 T.".!!W.;*O*.~
Accession No.
Report No.
EGG 1183-4180 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support I
Subject of this Document:
Technical Evaluation of the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Design Aspects of the Override of Containment Purge Valve Isolation and Other Engineered Safety Feature Signals for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Pl. nt, Unit 3 Type of Document:
Informal Report I
I Author (s):
J. H. Cooper Date of Document:
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January 1981 Responsible NRC Irdividual and NRC Of fice or Division:
Paul Shemanski, Division of Operating Reactors This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use.
It has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considemd final.
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EG&G Energy Measurements Group l
San Ramon Operations i
San Ramon, CA 94583 Prepared for the i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmssion Jashington, D.C.
I E Under 00E Contract No.B&R 201904031 NRC FIN No.
'I INTERIM REPORT I
EGG 1183-4180 g
g EBmG January 1981 Energy Measurements Group I
San Ramon Operations
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OFTHE
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OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS l
FOR THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3 I
(DOCKET No. 50-302) ll l
by J. H. Cooper I
I Approved for Publication I
' k b.Jenr-<
2 J. R. Radosevic Department Manager This document is UNCLASSIFIED I
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s f er:
[
' Nicholas E/Broderick I
Department Manager l
l Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract No DE-ACO8 76 NVO 1183.
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I ABSTRACT t
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This rvport documents the technical evaluation of the electrical, i
instrumentation, and control design aspects of containment purge valve
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isolation and other engineered safety feature signals for the Crystal River nuclear power plant, Unit 3.
The review criteria a re based on IEEE l
Std-279-1971 requirements for the safety signals to all purge and vent ila-l tion isolation valves.
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FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the Selected Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systemt Issues (SEICSI) Prog ram being con-ducted for the U.
S.
Nuclear Reg t. l atory Conunission, Office of Nuclear I
Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors, by Lawrence Livenaure Laboratory, Field Test Systems Division of the Electronics Engineerinq Depa rtment.
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The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under an authori zation entitled " El ect rical,
Instrumentation and Control System Support," B&R 20 19 04 031, FIN A-0231.
The work was performed by EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U. S. Depart-ment of Energy contract number DE-AC08-76NV01183.
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I TABLE OF CONTENTS j
l Page 1.
INTRODUCTICN 1
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_ VALUATION OF CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3 3
2.1 Review Criteria.
3 2.2 Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuits Design Descriptim.
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2.3 Containment Ventilation Isolation System Design Eval uation.
5 2.4 Other Engineered Safety Feature System Circuits.
6 3.
CONCLUSIONS I
REFERENCES 9
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN OVERRIDE ASPECTS OF I
CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3 (Docket No. 50-302)
J. H. Cooper EG8G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations I
1.
INTRODUCTION Several instances have been reported where automatic closure of the containment ventilation / purge valves would not have occurred because the safety actuation signals were either manually overridden or blocked during normal plant operations.
These events resul ted from procedural inadequacies, design deficiencies, and lack of proper management cont rol s.
These events also brought into question the mechanical operability of the I
containment isolation valves themselves.
These events were determined by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornuission (NRC) w be an Abnonr el Occurrence
(#78-5) and were, accordingly, reported to the U. S. Congresr.
As a follow-up on this obnormal occurrence, the NRC staff is rev iewing the electrical override aspects and the mechanical operability aspects of Contairinent purgi ng for all operating power reacto rs.
On I
November 28, 1978, the NRC issued a letter entitled " Containment Purging During Nonnal Plant Operation" [Ref.1] ta all boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) licensees.
In a letter dated January 10, 1979 [Ref. 2], Florida Power Corpor ation (FPC), the licensee for the I
Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, Uni?
3, replied to the NRC generic letter.
A meeting was held in Washington on September 11,1979 [Ref. 3]
with the NRC staff and EG&G, Inc. (San Ramon Operations) personnel.
In a letter dated January 10, 1979 [Ref. 2], the licensee described the system design changes made to Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3.
I This document addresses only the electrical, instrumentation, and control (El&C) design aspects of the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) and other engineered safety features (ESFs).
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EVALUATION OF CRYSTAL KlVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UH1 f 3
,I 2.1 REVIEW CRI TERI A The primary intent of tnis evaluation is to determine if the following NRC staff criteria are iaet for the safety sign <'. to all purge and ventilation isolation valves:
(1) Criterion no. 1--In keeping with tne requirements I
of GDC 55 and 56, the overriding
- of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) snauld not cause the blocking of any other type of safety
,I actuation signal (e.g., pressur e) f or those valves tnat have no function besides containment isolation.
(2) Criterion no. 2--Sufficient physical teatures (e.g.,
keylock switches) are to be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.
(3) Criterion no. 3--fne system-level annunciation of the overridden status should be provided f or every safety sy. item impacted when any override is active I
(see R.G. 1.4/).
Incidental to tnis review, the following additional NdC staff design criteria were used in the evaluation:
(1) Criterion no. 4--Diverse si gna l s should be pro-vided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system.
Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure (where containaient nigh I
pressure is not a portion of safety injection actuation) should automatically initiate CVI.
I (2) Criterion no. 5--The instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate ESF should be de-signed and qualified as safety-grace equipment.
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- Ine following definition is given for clarity of ise in this evaluation:
Override:
The signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal. I
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(3)
Criterion no. 6--The overriding or resetting of the isolation actuation signal should not cause
.ny valve or damper to change position.
Criterion 6 in tnis review applies primarily to related ESF systems because implementation of this criterion for containment isolation systems has been reviewed by the Lessons Learned Task Force, based on the I
recommendations in NUREG GS78, Section 2.1.4 [Re f. 4].
Automatic valve a
repositioning upon reset may be acceptable when containment isolation is not involved; consideration 611 be given on a case-by-case basis.
Accept-g ubility would be dependent upon system function, design intent, and suit-g able operating procedures.
2.2 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CIRC 0lTS DESIGN DESCRIPfl0N Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3,
has two ESF trains which can cause isolation of the containment ventilation system.
Tne channel contacts are combined in a two-out-of-three logic for the engine-ered safeguards signal, and are again combined to form an "0R" closure l
function for eacn set of valves:
two motor-operated valves (AHV-16 and AHV-1C) and two air-operated valves (AHV-1A and AHV-10).
Ine closure 8
signals are as follows:
(1)
Automatic C'osure (a)
High radiation in the reactor building (con-g tainment)
E (b)
High reactor building pressure (engineered safe-guards signal)
(2)
Manual Closure (a)
System-level isolation switch (b)
Individual valve closure pushbutton.
Each valve control includes the signal "0R" gate and a motor-control contactor with auxiliary contacts or an air-control valve witn auxiliary seal-in Contacts.
Neith er set of valves Can be reset or over-ridden in the control logic circuit.
In the case of motor-cperated valves, when a monitored p! ant condition or manual-close pushbutton or switch calls for isolation, tne contacts close.
Closure provides power to the motor contactor, pulling it g
in and closing the seal-in contacts that drive the motor until the closed E
limit switch is reached.
The limit switch stops the motor.
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- Tne following definition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:
Reset: The signal has come and gone, and the circuit is being cleared in order to return it to the normal condition. I
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l If a motor-operated valve is in the process of opening and an isolation (close) signal occurs, the valve will 1 aaedi atel y stop opening and reverse to closed.
If tne initiating sigrial returns to tne ur: tripped I
condition, the valve will remain closed.
Status lit;nts on motor-aperated vdlves indiCdte that tne vaive is eitner open or ciosed.
an operater can recpen the valve when all trips are cleared by pressing tne "open" pusn-
- outton, in the case of air-operated valves, wnen a monitored plant con-dition or manual-close pushbutton or switc'T calls for i so l a t i ott, it i ri te r -
rupts the power to the air control valve.
When the power to the air con-trol valve is interrupted, the control valve close', the air supply
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interrupted, and the purge isolation valve closes by spring action.
It on air-operated valve is in the process of opening and a close sign I occurs,
it wilI stop opening and close iraaed i a te I y.
If the i n i t i t.t i c y s iipio i returns to the untripped condition, the valve will recia i n closed.
Air-operated valves also have status lights to indicate tnat the valve is I
either open or closed.
An operator can reopen the valve by pressing tne "open" pushbutton, whicu is sealed-in by an auxiliary contact on the air control valve.
Air pressure opens the valve against the valve spring I
force.
2.3 CONTAIMENT VEHflLATION ISOLATION SYSIEM OESIGN t.VALUAflVN Cryste! River Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3,
is now purging and i
venting continuously.
The licensee states tnat they nave no overrides and I
that, in their opinion. continuous purging is in tne best interest uf the public and of tne employees of FPC.
The containment ventilation isolation nas no overrides, and l
therefore, NRC staf f criteria Nos.1. 2, and 3 are not applicable.
Tne containment ventilation isolation signal is generated oy nign I
radiation in the reactor building and by nigh reactor building pressure.
This design does not meet the NRC staff criteria for diverse actuating signals.
The licensee stated at the meeting in Betnesda [ Ret. 3] and in a I
letter dated April 12, 1979 [Re f. S], that a nign pressure core cooling injection (HPI) actuation si gna l will be added to ventilation isolation signals.
The licensee stated in tne letter of February 15, 1980 [Re t. 6]
I that the eliminary installation of the diverse isolation modification is scheduleo for February 19, 1980.
Wnen this is accomplished it will satisfy criterion No. 4.
I From the information provided by the licensee [ Ret. /] in re-sponse to an NRC letter dated August, 19/9 [Ref. 8], it appears that the radiation isolation signal is not pr ovided by safety-grade equipment; therefore, NRC staf f criterion No, b is not satisfied.
Resetting the actuation signals cannot cause the containaent isolation signal to change state.
In f act, there is no override; there-I fore, valves cannot reopen until there is a request oy a separate operator I
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I action of pushing the "open" pushbutton on each valve, or of operating the CVI system open switch.
Criterion No. 6 is, therefore, satisfied.
2,4 OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEM CIRCUITS As part of this review, the containment spray actuation system I
drawings were audited.
The licensee also stated that the circuit designs E
are the same as the CVI system with respect to resets and overrides.
Therefore, the criteria are satisfied.
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CONCLUSIONS The electrical, instrumentation, and control design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and other ESF signals for Crystal River
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Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, were evaluated using those design criteria stated in Section 2.1 of this report.
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We conclude that, with one exce pt i on, the CVi system design E
modifications will bring the CVI circuits design to an acceptable condi-tion.
The single exception is that, the radiation monitoring equipment l g does not meet the NRC staff requi rement for safety-grade equipaent.
The g
modification committed to is to add the high pressure inj ec tion (HPI) signal to the containrnent ventilation isolation actuation system.
We recommend that all of the instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate CVI be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipaent.
We al so conclude that the other ESF circuit designs discussed satisfy the NRC staff criteria.
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I REFERENCES I
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NRC/ DOR letter (A. Schwencer) to FPC, " Containment Purging Ouring Nonnal Plant Operation," dated November 28,19/8.
2.
FPC letter (W. P. Stewart) to NRC (R. Reid), "00cket S0-302, Contain-I ment Purging During Nonnal Plant Operations, Crystal River duclear Plant, Unit 3," dated January 10, 19/9.
I 3.
NRC meeting Wasnifigton, O. C., " Crystal River Nuclear Poser Statiori, Unit 3,
Containment Purge Valve Design (NRC and EG6G), dated September 11, 1979.
4.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Snort-term Reccannenda ti ori of Lessons Learned Task Force," N'JREG 0S78.
5.
FPC letter (W. P. Stewart) to NRC !&E, " Crystal River Unit do.
3, 1E Bulletin 79-OSA," response to items 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, dated April 12,1979.
6.
FPC letter (Dr.
P.
Y. Baynard) to NRC (tir.
H.
R.
Denton), " Crystal River Unit 3, Docket 50-302, Operating License No. OPR-72, NOREG-05/8, Snort-term Lessons Learned Recommendations", da.ed February 15, 1980.
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7.
Telepnone conference call with NRC, EG3G; and Florida Power Coi:1part y,
December 19, 1979.
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NRC/00R (R. Reid) to FPC, " Request for Additional In fo rma ti on, Con-i tainment Purge System Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3,"
(TAC 10211), August 1979.
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P. O. Box 808 P. 0. Box 204 Livennore, California 94550 San Ramon, California 94583 I
M. H. Dittmore, f -97 (2 copies)
Author (2 copies)
C. E. Brown (4 copies)
B. G. Mayn M. W. Nishimura LLNL/ Nevada NRC Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cortaission P. O. Box 45 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mercury, Nevada 89023 W. E. Reeves, L-577 (2 copies)
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